Failure 0 civil societ is based on eager promotion-not fundamental flaws Clough, he Nation, 999 [Michael, Reflections on Civil

Society, February 22] The civil societists h 'led the good works of a vast and growing network of nongove mental org izations working on relief and development, human rights, the environm nt and othe humanitarian causes without acknowledging the narrow strategic isions and I mited resource basesof most NGOs--and hence failed to anticipate developme ts in Somalia, Rwanda/Congo and perhaps Sudan, where some NGOs ha e ended up nintentionally pursuing policies that have prolonged and exacerbat d conflict. The viI societist trumpeted the;successof the antiapartheid movement in the United St tes and oth r industrialized countries in helping to bring about changes in South Af ca without nderstanding the complex domestic circumstances that made this victory p ssible--and ence were unprepared for the obstacles human rights movements ran into i campaigni g for democracy in China and Nigeria. By overstating the magnitud of their ear y achievements, the civil societists have made it easier for their critics to iscount civi society's big victories while ignoring its much less heralded small adv ces. Thos include the establishment of thousandsof indigenous health clinics, w men's cent s, educational programs and environmental initiatives througho the world, d slow but steady shifts in global awarenessof the need for internatio al action 0 issues such as global warming, AIDS and smoking. Ultimately, it is the a umulation ver time of efforts such as these that will be the measureof the success0 civil societ , but this kind of change is slow and often almost imperceptible.

)l-.. Longing Clough,

r strong go ernment is revisionist e Nation, 1 99 [Michael, Reflections on Civil Society. February 22]

Grow ng doubts a out the civility of civil society and a rising tide of chaos, war and revol tion in plac s as physically and politically distant as the former Soviet Union, C ngo, Kosov and Iraq are causing many people to long for the good old days, when stro g national overnments maintained domestic order and provided for the general w lfare, great owers kept international anarchy in check and international monetary uthorities i sured financial stability. But the good old days were never as good as t y now see, and even the best of yesterday's institutions cannot resolve today's cr' es, much I s meet tomorrow's challenges.

)( In Afri Clough

ivil societi s are uniquely suited to solve problems and bring peace e Nation, 1999 [Michael, Reflections on Civil Society. February 22]

Pro ssive natio alists and social democrats remain committed to the idea that strong, de ocraticall controlled national governments provide the best way to limit private in rests and p otect the weak and disadvantaged. For most of the world, however, he dream 0 a strong national government is a chimera. In Africa. for example, xisting poli ical boundaries are poorly matched with societal realities, and neither A ican leader nor the "international community" possesses political will, the social bas, military c pabilities and economic where-withal that would be required either to c ange the b undaries or to fuse the societies within them. Absent such a solution, e best that an be achieved is weak democratic states that keep the peace by brokering ong opp sing groups and making as few demands as possible on society as a whol .

Just beca e Nation-s te is going to be long-running doesn't mean we shouldn't search for altern ives Clough, T e Nation, 1 99 [Michael, Reflections on Civil Society. February 22] The r al choice is not between government and its antithesis or even between greater an lesser de es of government but rather among different models of governan ; and in thi regard the biggest problem is the continuing tendency to equate effective overnance ith action by national states or some variant or combination thereof. N w theories d forms of governance do not emerge quickly. For example, it took almo t two centu ies of war, commerce and theorizing for the idea of the sovereign ational stat to develop, and it took more than a century for the United States to e olve from loose arrangementof states into an integrated modern industrial , nation. It. for this re son that loose talk about "the end of the nation-state" seemsso naive. Th issue is not whether the national state is going to be around for a while (it will be!) t whether e should give priority to reinforcing it or looking for a replaceme t. Even n the absen e of a clear alternative, there are reasons,both theoretical and practical, begin to s .ft away from the national state paradigm. There is now a fundamen al disjuncti n between the assumptions about space,time, distance, identity, security, elfare, co unication, warfare, production and exchange that underpin the seventeen -century th ory of the sovereign national state and the realities of governanc and polic aking as we approach the end of the twentieth century. In the language f the philos phy of science, what we are witnessing is a degenerating research p adigm: S vaging the core theory requires ever more effort to explain anomalies and discou disconfirming evidence. Nevertheless, the belief that there is no "realistic" ternative t the national state paradigm continues to dominate political discourse, iscouragin the process of imagining alternatives and discrediting the imaginers. A better ap roach would be to recognize that we have no choice but to encourage postmodern Bodins, Hobbeses,Lockes and Grotiuses to imagine a new form of govern ceo


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Civil soci ties are the nly hope for a better world-failures are only because proponen s were too e ger Clough, e Nation, 1999 [Michael, Reflections on Civil Society. February 22]

Less t peaceful world an internatio crises in Pakistan, history" "

an a decad ago, as the cold war was drawing to an unexpectedly suddenand ose, it was asy to be optimistic about the state of civil society around the the prospec s for global governance. Today, in the wake of a failed al intervent on in Somalia, genocidal wars in Bosnia and Rwanda, financial atin Americ , Asia and Russia, and a nuclear anus race between India and ear and des air are fast replacing hope. Speculation about "the end of emocratic eace" and "new world orders" has been replaced by analyses of

clashing vilizations, lliberal democracy and global chaos. Talk of developing new formulas d instituti ns is being drowned out by calls for stronger states,more greatpower lea ership and tronger international financial institutions. But attempting to create tw ty-first-ce ury versions of twentieth-century institutions founded on seventeenh-century a sumptions is a!ecipe for failure. For better (and worse), our best and perha s only chan e to bring into being a more peaceful, humane and equitable world is t give civil s iety a greater role in governance. A major reason for the growing I ck of confi ence in civil society is that many of the civil societists--the activists, eorists and pundits who have been at the forefront of the debate--claimed too much 00 soon. They elebrated t e victories of people power in Eastern Europe, South Africa. the Philippin and elsew ere without fully comprehending how difficult it is to translate triumphs f oppositio into lasting democratic successes--and hence were caught offguard wh leaders of the old Communist regimes succeededin refashioning themselve as populis democrats and winning elections in EasternEurope and the former So iet Union, d the Slovaks chose ethnic independence rather than being led by the pat on saint of ivil society, Vaclav Havel.


State foc s is an ince tive for war Clough, he Nation, 999 [Michael, Reflections on Civil Society. February 22] Ther are also i ediate, practiCal reasonsto question the national state paradigm. Paradoxi ly, the bel ef that only national statescan solve important contemporary public po .cy challen s and resolve serious societal conflicts has become both a cause of conflic and a dete ent to responsible action by nonstate actors. It is a source of conflict b cause it rei forces the perception that the state is crucial to the protection and advance nt of the in erests of both individuals and groups. This increasesthe perceived stakesinvol ed in struggles to win control over the state. In fact, in the same way that e decreasin value of physical control over territory has helped to reduce the incentive for states t invade one another, devaluing the importance of control over the state wou almost ce ainly reduce the incentives for groups within the state to fight civil wars Keeping Clough, herence in pproaches to problems requires mobilization of civil society e Nation, 1 99 [Michael, Reflections on Civil Society. February 22]

A fin barrier to. agining the possibility of an alternative to the national state is the failur to recogniz that the current crisis of global governanceis as much a conseque ce of overc pacity as of undercapacity. National governments have not grown we er; civil s iety has grown stronger. Now, more than ever before, other actors--re ional, state d local governments; national and international NGOs; affinity and solid .ty groups; ansnational corporations; business, labor and professional associatio s; internati nal agencies and organizations; and others--have the resources and lever e to promo e or frustrate the ability of national governments to achieve particular bjectives b th within and beyond their borders. As a consequence,once an issue has otten onto t e international public agenda,the problem often is not inaction but incoh ence. In B snia, Somalia and Rwanda, for example, there was not a shortage of individ als, organiz tions and governments willing to act; the problem was that they often acte at cross-pu oses. The challenge is not so much to increase the capacity of the state b t to find w ys to manage aIIldmobilize the capacity of civil society.




NGOs m st recogniz civil society interrelations Clough, he Nation, 999 [Michael, Reflections on Civil Society. February 22] First, much mo sector, m military more like providing overnment at alllevels--local, national and international--have to become e inclusive, ollaborative and adaptive. In their dealings with the independent st govemm nt officials now act as if they were either the director of a arching ban or the lead singer in a rock band. They need, instead, to behave he leader 0 a jazz ensemb~e, leading civil society by inspiration while space for in ependenceand improvisation.

At th same time, civil society groups must accept the fact that being an increasin ly importan part of the governance equation carries with it new burdens. Like gov ments, th y must be accountable for the consequencesof their actions. NGOs, et .c groups, rivate associations and corporations alike must recognize that society c no longer ford for them:to operate according to the narrow, selfinterested rights-one ted calculus of1classicalliberalism. Instead, they need to join in creating a new global thic of respon$ibility. Finally, t ere is muc and shoul do to end Alinsky a d most of reliable 0 tion for the that co unities can servesno urpose but and prote tion. that govemments--and NGOs, corporations and individuals--can overty, oppression and war. But, as Mohandas Gandhi, Saul story's other great social organizers have emphasized, the only oor and disempowered is self-reliance. To continue to suggest ount on the national state to promote equity, justice and security 0 delay them from developing their own means of sustenance