BLACK KNIGHTS 07/08 The K – JV Nats

RhymenoceroS 1/14

INDEX New Shell.......................................................................................................................2 Alt Solvency...................................................................................................................4 AT: Perm.......................................................................................................................11

BLACK KNIGHTS 07/08 The K – JV Nats

RhymenoceroS 2/14

New Shell
U.S. ENGAGEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST IS FUELED BY A DESIRE TO SECURE AND NEUTRALIZE POLITICAL ANTAGONISM ON THE GLOBAL LEVEL. THIS RHETORIC OF SECURITY CONSTRUCTS THE UNITED STATES AS THE LOCATION OF THE WORLD’S SELF, MAKING ALL ATTACKS ON THE U.S. ATTACKS AGAINST THE WORLD ORDER AND JUSTIFYING ALL ACTIONS BY THE U.S. IN RESPONSE AS NECESSARY FOR THE PRESERVATION OF HUMANITY. THE MIDDLE EAST HAS THE POWER TO TRANSFORM THE WORLD THROUGH ITS EXPRESSION OF ENMITY IN VIOLENCE, AND CALLS FOR CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT EXPRESS A DESIRE TO ELIMINATE THAT POWER THROUGH DISCIPLINE AND WESTERN RATIONALITY. POLICIES OF CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST FORCE OUR ENEMIES TO DECIDE BETWEEN CONFORMING TO THE VALUES AND NORMS ESTABLISHED BY THE UNITED STATES FOR HUMANITY OR BE OUTCAST AS AN EXCEPTION FROM HUMANITY ALTOGETHER. NOORANI 05 [Yaseen, Professor of Near East Studies at University of Arizona, Tucson “The Rhetoric of Security,” CR: The New Centennial Review, 5.1] DON’T BE FOOLED BY THE ATTEMPT TO REJECT THE POLITICS OF CONTAINMENT—THE MORE INSIDIOUS STRATEGY OF GLOBAL CONTROL IS THE ONE PURSUED VIA DIPLOMATIC INTEGRATION—THE PLAN IS A TROJAN HORSE DESIGNED TO LOCK IN US SUPREMACY OVER THE GLOBE AND TO CREAT A NEW MANICHEAN DIVIDE BETWEEN COMPLIANT STATES WHO WE “ENGAGE” AND A NEW GLOBAL CLASS OF OUTLAWS CAMPBELL 07 [David Campbell et all, 2007, Political Geography, VOl. 26, pg 415-416 STATES WHO FACE THE PROSPECT OF US ENGAGEMENT HAVE TWO CHOICES—ASSIMILATE TO THE GLOBAL LIBERAL ORDER OR FACE ANNIHILATION—DOESN’T MATTER THAT THE PLAN WARMS RELATIONS OR PROVIDES CONCESSIONS—BRINGING THEM INTO THE FOLD TODAY PAVES THE WAY FOR WAR AGAINST “OUR” REMAINING ENEMIES TOMORROW, THE IMPACT IS WAR AS FEEDBACK LOOP, CREATING DISORDER TO JUSTIFY INTERVENTION AGAINST THE SYMPTOMS OF DISORDER, AND ON AND ON AND ON... PEASE 02 [Aron Pease 2002, Politics and Culture, Issue 3, http://aspen.conncoll.edu/politicsandculture/pag.cfm?key=176
“Joxe works out the spatial logic of historical…the US is primarily a predatory empire”

BLACK KNIGHTS 07/08 The K – JV Nats

RhymenoceroS 3/14

AS THESE LINES OF DEMARCATION ARE ERASED THE MIDDLE EAST ASSUMES THE ROLE OF HOMO SACER – OUR STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT RECOGNIZES ONLY TWO TYPES OF CONFLICT: WAR BETWEEN GROUPS OF HOMO SACER - UNACCEPTABLE AND ILLEGITIMATE, A VIOLENCE THAT INTERRUPTS THE DESIGNS OF OUR IDEALIZED PERPETUAL PEACE AND REQUIRES INTERVENTION, AND DIRECT ATTACKS AGAINST AMERICA, WHICH ARE NECESSARILY ATTACKS AGAINST HUMANITY. THE U.S. ASSUMES THE ROLE OF THE RED CROSS, WELCOMING
OUR SUPPOSED ENEMIES INTO THE FOLD OF HUMANITY WITH ONE HAND WHILE CRUSHING BARBARIAN REBELS WITH THE OTHER.

U.S. ‘ENGAGEMENT’ IS ULTIMATELY PATRONIZING AS WE CONVINCE OUR ENEMIES TO LAY DOWN THEIR WEAPONS (THEIR LAST MEANS OF RESISTANCE AGAINST OUR EVER-EXPANDING GLOBAL ORDER) IN EXCHANGE FOR A PAT ON THE BACK. ZIZEK 02, INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL STUDIES IN LJUBLJANA, 2002 [SLAVOJ, WELCOME TO THE DESERT OF THE REAL! P. 91-97] THE ALTERNATIVE: THE AFFIRMATIVE’S CALL TO ERASE ENMITY AND CONFLICT IN LIEU OF A
UNIVERSAL HUMANITY MERELY RENDERS EXCLUSIONS INVISIBLE AND VIOLENCE AND WARFARE BECOME UNLIMITED.

IN A “UNIVERSAL LIBERAL UTOPIA” ENMITY DOESN’T DISAPPEAR BUT JUST BECOMES “SUBHUMAN” AGAINST THE “UNIVERSAL” ORDER, JUSTIFYING THE CRUELEST OF REPRISALS. THE ALTERNATIVE IS TO REJECT THIS UNIVERSAL CALL, EXPLODING THE FALSE CHOICE PRESENTED BY POLICIES OF ENGAGEMENT BY ADMITTING THAT “I HAVE AN ENEMY AND I CAN RESPECT THAT ANTAGONISM OF INTERESTS,” RECOGNIZING THE LEGITIMACY OF ITS EXPRESSION THROUGH VIOLENCE ACROSS BOLD LINES DRAWN IN THE SAND. RASCH, 2005 (William, Henry H. H. Remak Professor of Germanic Studies at India University. 'Lines in the Sand: Enmity as a Structuring Principle', South
Atlantic Quarterly, 104:2, 253-262.)

BLACK KNIGHTS 07/08 The K – JV Nats

RhymenoceroS 4/14

Alt Solvency
1. VIOLENCE IS NOT THE RESULT OF CONFLICT, IT IS THE RESULT OF THE DRIVE TO ABOLISH IT. OUR VISION FOR THE WORLD NEED NOT BE CONFINED TO IDEAS OF PEACE OR HARMONY, BUT SHOULD INSTEAD EMBRACE AGONISTIC RELATIONSHIPS IN WHICH ONE RECOGNIZES THE POWER OF THE OTHER IN ONE’S OWN POSTURE. LEGITIMIZING THE TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF DISSENT RULES OUT THE NEED FOR VIOLENCE IN THE FIRST PLACE. HATAB 2002
(LAWRENCE J. PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY 2002 PROSPECTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC AGON WHY WE CAN STILL BE NIETZSCHEANS: THE JOURNAL OF NIETZSCHE P.MUSE) How can we begin to apply the notion of agonistics to politics in general and democracy in particular? First of all, contestation and competition can be seen as fundamental to self-development and as an intrinsically social phenomenon. Agonistics helps us articulate the social and political ramifications of Nietzsche's concept of will to power. As Nietzsche put it in an 1887 note, "will to power can manifest itself only against resistances; it seeks that which resists it" (KSA 12, p.424). Power, therefore, is not simply an individual possession or a goal of action; it is more a global, interactive conception. For Nietzsche, every advance in life is an overcoming of some obstacle or

The human self is not formed in some internal sphere and then secondarily exposed to external relations and conflicts. The self is constituted in and through what it opposes and what opposes it; in other words, the self is formed through agonistic relations. Therefore, any annulment of one's Other would be an annulment of one's self in this sense. Competition can be understood as a shared activity for the sake of fostering high achievement and self-development, and therefore as an intrinsically social activity. In the light of Nietzsche's appropriation of the two forms of Eris, it is necessary to distinguish between agonistic conflict and sheer violence. A radical agonistics rules out violence, because violence is actually an impulse to eliminate conflict by annihilating or incapacitating an opponent, bringing the agon to an end. 11 In a later work Nietzsche discusses the "spiritualization of hostility (Feindschaft)," wherein one must affirm both the presence and the power of one's opponents as implicated in one's own posture (TI "Morality as Antinature," 3). And in this passage Nietzsche specifically applies such a notion to the political realm. What this implies is that the category of the social need not be confined to something like peace or harmony. Agonistic relations, therefore, do not connote a deterioration of a social disposition and can thus be extended to political relations.
counterforce, so that conflict is a mutual co-constitution of contending forces. [End Page 134] Opposition generates development. How can democracy in general terms be understood as an agonistic activity? Allow me to quote from my previous work. Political judgments are not preordained or dictated; outcomes depend upon a contest of speeches where one view wins and other views lose in a tabulation of votes; since the results are binding and backed by the coercive power of the government, democratic elections and procedures establish temporary control and subordination—which, however, can always be altered or reversed because of the succession of periodic political contests. . . . Democratic elections allow for, and depend upon, peaceful exchanges and transitions of power. . . . [L]anguage is the weapon in democratic contests. The binding results, however, produce tangible effects of gain and loss that make political exchanges more than just talk or a game. . . . The urgency of such political contests is that losers must yield to, and live under, the policies of the winner; we notice, therefore, specific configurations of power, of domination and submission in democratic politics.

BLACK KNIGHTS 07/08 The K – JV Nats

RhymenoceroS 5/14

2. THE ALTERNATIVE SIGNALS A RETURN TO CONCRETE, POLITICAL ENMITY. EXPOSING AND IDENTIFYING THE
POLITICAL OTHER MAKES ALL ENEMIES A LAWFUL AND EQUAL PARTICIPANT IN POLITICS WHEREBY PEACE CAN BE MADE AND WAR IS LIMITED, RENDERING UNNECESSARY HE ABSTRACT ENEMY IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM THAT MAKES WAR PERMANENT AND POTENTIAL ENEMIES OF EVERYONE

THORUP, 2006 (Mikkel, a lecturer in the History of Philosophy Department at Aarhus University. In Defense of Enmity – Critiques of Liberal Globalism.
Ph.D – Dissertation. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas, University of Aarhus, Denmark. p.300-301) Schmit saw political enmity as limited and feared the consequences of its degeneration, once transferred to other registers. The argument is that enmity

does not disappear, when we leave the political vocabulary. It re-emerges in new and possibly worse versions. In this
section, we’ll examine four different categories of enmity to illustrate, what is here interpreted as the return of the political – this time in distorted forms.131 The four categories are moral, abstract, biopolitical and individual enmity. What

characterizes political or conventional enmity is that the enemy is considered an equal; it’s a symmetrical relation of enmity. There is a sense of equality, which is the precondition for rules of war (Walzer 2000: 128). The goal is to defeat, not annihilate the enemy. Once the conflict is over, one can sign a peace treaty, reassume diplomatic and commercial relations etc. The interaction, even in war, is codified and hence limited. In the interstate war, no one can claim a ‘just cause’, and none is needed, because states have the right to engage in war. No one can ideally claim moral superiority. The political enmity is therefore ‘clean’, contained and limited. The enemy is ‘the other’, but recognizable and familiar even in war and enmity. The important characteristic of the political enmity is the horizontal relationship between enemies. This is seriously challenged in its other forms. One example could be the shift from Reagan’s ‘empire of evil’ to Bush Jr.’s ‘axis of evil’. The first denotes a loathed but still recognizable political form (and Reagan did negotiate with this ‘evilness’), whereas the second loses all political content and form. It’s pure evil. Evil comes in many shapes, some of them we can live with because they are, at bottom, recognized as an opponent and not as evil as such
(Dean 2005). I want to briefly mention the moral enmity before moving on to other three categories, only to later return to the moral register. The most important expression of the moral enmity is the idea of ‘just war’, which gives one the moral superiority. The enemy is degraded, deemed inferior and criminalized. In the moral vocabulary, the equal relationship between enemies is being altered to an unequal relationship between the good and the bad. Enmity goes from a non-discriminatory to a discriminatory modus operandi: “Today the enemy, just like the war itself, comes to be at once banalized (reduced to an object of routine police repression) and absolutized (as the Enemy, an absolute threat to the ethical order)” (Hardt & Negri 2000: 13). Actually there area number of similarities between the political and the moral enmity. Both operate under the assumption that the enemy is external, visible and identifiable. The relation between friend and enemy is thought as a relation between well-defined and demarcated entities. This changes, as we move to the other categories of enmity, where the obvious in/out, friend/enemy differentiation dissolve and new attempts at their reinstatement emerge. This chapter continues the exploration of the forms of enmity started in chapter 3 on Schmitt’s concepts of the enemy: Conventional, real, absolute, unconventional, internal and depoliticized. It attempts to update Schmitt’s list and zoom in on contemporary expressions of enmity emerging from liberal post-politic societies. Abstract Enmity

In the abstract enmity, as we find it for instance in ‘the war on drugs’, ‘the war on poverty’ and most prominently ‘the war on terror’ (which lies somewhere between the abstract and the moral enmity), we see a blurring of front lines and the disappearance of the enemy. It is highly symbolic that Osama Bin Laden has not been caught and that both his whereabouts and physical
condition (dead or alive?) are unknown. This illustrates nicely the invisibility of the abstract enemy. When the first George Bush was president, he said after an US-Soviet summit in 1990 that the enemy was no longer the USSR but rather ‘instability and unpredictability’ (Barash 1994: 44). This enemy is a total abstraction and it quickly gave way to various representations of ‘instability and unpredictability’, such as warlords (Somalia), old-fashioned dictators (Iraq war 1), terrorism (first attack on WTC), international crime (Russia) etc. This total abstraction cannot last and desperate attempts at re-enmification was made by what James Deer Derian (2001) calls the MIME-NET, that is, the military-industrial-media-entertainment network and by segments of academia (e.g. Samuel Huntington). Putting names and faces on ‘instability and unpredictability’ is, of course, also one way to avoid questions of a system that produces such features but mostly it serves to re-direct energies and anxieties but also

One is, of course, always tempted to put a face on this invisible enemy: The inner city crackhead in the war on drugs, single-parent, teenage-mothers in the war on poverty, Osama Bin Laden and Al- Zarkawi in the war on terror. But these are just symbols; their ‘elimination’ will not win the fight. In actuality, one of the characteristics of the abstract enmity is that the war cannot be won. War becomes unending and metaphorical. When America named its war on Al-Qaeda ‘Infinite Justice’ (they quickly abandoned the name) it is not only justice that’s
funding, policies and wars. infinite. It’s the war itself.132 We see the blurring of war/peace as the war on poverty and drugs become part of daily administration or as the terror alerts become routine.

When the ‘war’ is daily life and the emergency measures become law – as in the Patriot act – we see a blurring of classical differences. When the Department for Homeland Security tells you to be alert at all times, then there are no difference between peace and war. The same goes for the differentiation between friend and enemy; now, the enemy is potentially everyone. Drug tests in schools or the labeling of al Arab Muslims (and Western converts) as possible terrorists makes the distinction between friend and enemy impossible. As Michael Howard says, the declaration of war makes action necessary: “To declare that one is at war is immediately to create a war psychosis that may be totally counter-productive for the objective being sought. It arouses an immediate expectation, and demand, for spectacular military action against some easily identifiable adversary, preferably hostile state – action leading to decisive results” (2002: 9). But, here is no decisive battle, no

BLACK KNIGHTS 07/08 The K – JV Nats

RhymenoceroS 6/14

front line or any destructible enemy in the abstract war. This doesn’t make the abstract war any less destructive. Actually quite the opposite. Because victory keeps eluding, there is a certain eliminist tendency in the abstract enmity. In the war on poverty it can be harsh welfare cuts, disciplinary regimes and even racist ‘science’ (The Bell Curve); in the war on drugs it can be militant police measures and actual wars in Third World countries (Columbia, Panama), and in the war on terror it is shadow warriors, executions without trial, rendition of suspects to countries who routinely torture prisoners or to CIA-controlled ‘black holes’.

BLACK KNIGHTS 07/08 The K – JV Nats

RhymenoceroS 7/14

3. HUMAN BEINGS ARE NATURALLY AT WAR WITH ONE ANOTHER. RATHER THAN EMBRACE OR SUPPRESS THE WAR OF NATURE, THE ALTERNATIVE’S POLITICS OF LEGITIMIZATION ALLOWS FOR A REFINEMENT OF THAT WAR THAT CREATES THE POSSIBILITY FOR DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE, VIOLENCE AND NONVIOLENCE, FRIENDSHIP AND ENMITY. ABSENT THIS NUANCED INTERPRETATION OF CONFLICT, ONLY ONE VIOLENT EXTREME OR THE OTHER IS POSSIBLE. RASCH 04 [William, Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University Sovereignty and Its Discontents: On the primary of conflict and the structure of the political,
Birkbeck Law Press 2004, pp. 21-48]

Do we define ourselves by the enemies we make? Carl Schmitt thought so, and those who disagreed made an enemy of him. So maybe he was right. Maybe our ability to distinguish with a fine temporal and spatial sense between friend and enemy is the mark of our political existence, and thus we can say: Conflict is our vocation. There is, nonetheless, a caveat. The antagonism that determines the political is not the antagonism of the war of all against all in the state of nature. That war and that
state, Derrida would say, is discourse itself, ‘the emergence of speech and appearing’. He would also say that no ‘messianic triumph’ could abolish this originary violence that is our condition except by way of a greater and fiercer violence, a total violence. But, as Kant’s joke ought to have told us all along, the war to end all wars can lead to

So, which conflict is the conflict that is politics? Is it war, but it is not the war of nature, nor is it the violent suppression of the war of nature. On the contrary, politics is the refinement of war; it is war’s double, a force that matches, but channels and gives particular form to, the violence of nature. The form preserves difference, but not indifferently. IT takes shape as the differentiation of autonomous unities that serve as the carriers of difference. Operating as a homogeneity and heterogeneity – politics preserves the ability to initiate and the ability to put a halt to conflict, the ability to recognize and determine the difference between conflict and peace. Political antagonism, in the final analysis, is a discrete and fragile structure that limits conflict by legitimizing it. Such bounded discretion, according to Carl Schmitt, is the apogee of civilization.
perpetual peace only if it is the peace of the graveyard.

BLACK KNIGHTS 07/08 The K – JV Nats 4. THE

RhymenoceroS 8/14

DRIVE TO RATIONALLY SUPPRESS VIOLENCE THROUGH ORDER AND REASON HAS BROUGHT US TO THE

EDGE OF EXTINCTION THROUGH MILITARISTIC, ECOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL MEANS, MAKING ALL OF THE AFFIRMATIVE’S IMPACTS INEVITABLE.

DILLON & CAMPBELL 92 (Michael, Lancaster and David, Newcastle, The Political Subject of Violence, p. 163-164)
This interpretation of violence as constitutive of identity might, paradoxically, offer the only hope of some amelioration of the worst excesses of violence exhibited by the formation of (political) identity. The orthodox rendering of such violence as pre-modern abdicates its responsibility to a predetermined historical fatalism.
For if these ethnic and nationalist conflicts are understood as no more than settled history rearing its ugly head, then there is nothing that can be done in the present to resolve the tension except to repress them again. In this view, the historical drama has to be enacted according to its script, with human agency in suspension while nature

The only alternative is for nature to be overcome as the result of an idealistic transformation at the hands of reason. Either way, this fatalistic interpretation of the relationship between violence and the political is rooted in a
violently plays itself out. hypostatised conception of man/nature as determinative of the social <164> political: the latter is made possible only once the former runs its course, or if it is overturned.

the prospect of a transformation of nature by reason seemed both likely and hopeful; indeed, many of the most venerable of the debates in the political theory of international relations revolved around this very point.8 But, having reached what Foucault has called society's 'threshold of modernity', 'we' now face a prospect that radically re-figures the parameters of politics: the real prospect of extinction. As Foucault argues, we have reached this threshold because
It might have once been the case that the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies. For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity of a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics place his existence as a living being in question.9

How the prospect of extinction might materialise itself is an open question. That increasingly it can be materialised, militarily, ecologically and politically, is not. modernity's alternative of transformation through reason is not only untenable, it is deeply complicit in the form of (inter)national life that has been responsible for bringing about the real prospect of extinction in the first place. The capacity of violence to eradicate being was engendered by reason's success; not merely, or perhaps even most importantly, by furnishing the technological means, but more insidiously in setting the parameters of the political (le politique, to use the useful terms of debate in which Simon Critchley engages) while fuelling the violent practices of politics (la politique). The reliance on reason as that which could contain violence and reduce the real prospect of extinction may prove nothing less than a fatal misapprehension. In support of this proposition, consider the interpretive bases of the Holocaust.
The double bind of this prospect is that

For all that politics in the last fifty years has sought to exceptionalise the Nazis' genocide as an aberrant moment induced by evil personalities, there is no escaping the recognition that modern political life lies heavily implicated in the instigation and conduct of this horror. In so far as modernity can be characterised as the promotion of
rationality and efficiency to the exclusion of alternative criteria for action, the Holocaust is one outcome of the 'civilising process'. With its plan rationally to order Europe through the elimination of an internal other, its bureaucratised administration of death, and its employment of the technology of a modern state, the

Holocaust 'was not an irrational outflow of the not-yet-fully-eradicated residence of pre-modern barbarity. It was a legitimate resident in the house of modernity; indeed, one who would not be at home in any other house'.

BLACK KNIGHTS 07/08 The K – JV Nats

RhymenoceroS 9/14

THE FACT THAT POLICIES OF GLOBAL MANAGEMENT AND ENGAGEMENT HAVE COME TO DOMINATE THE WORLD IS EVEN MORE REASON FOR US TO CONFRONT THE NATURE OF POLITICS TODAY AS THE NEGATIVE DOES. I’M PRETTY SURE WE’VE ALL NOTICED THAT PEOPLE DON’T FIGHT WARS ON HORSEBACK ANY MORE, AND RELIANCE ON LIBERAL INSTITUTIONS LIKE THE U.N. IS NOW CONSIDERED THE NORM, AND THAT’S EXACTLY THE PROBLEM. DESPITE ITS EMERGENCE AS THE DOMINANT GLOBAL IDEOLOGY, LIBERALISM HAS FAILED TO MAKE GOOD ON ANY OF ITS PROMISES. WAR STILL RAGES AROUND THE WORLD, AND MORALITY HAS DONE NOTHING TO LIMIT THE TOTALITY AND VIOLENCE OF WARFARE. THE DANGER LIES IN BELIEVING THAT BECAUSE ONE IDEOLOGY SUPPLANTED ANOTHER IT MUST BE IN SOME WAY SUPERIOR, FURTHER HIGHLIGHTING THE NEED FOR A POLITICS THAT RESPECTS ANTAGONISM. RASCH 04 [William, Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University Sovereignty and Its Discontents: On the primary of conflict and the structure of the political,
Birkbeck Law Press 2004, pp. 21-48]

the ‘sovereignty’ of conflict, as chilling as it may seem, is quite the opposite of a Sorelian glorification of violence. Such a regularization of conflict is thought of by Schmitt as a sophisticated means of limiting the effects of conflict. It is viewed as a supreme European achievement, a stage of complex order, briefly reached, then lost again. The picture painted here is quixotic at best, wholly unimaginable with regard to contemporary international relations. Not only has the issue of national sovereignty become more or less moot – it only ever held for a minority of European states – but the nature of 20th-century warfare deviates irrevocably from the limits Schmitt desires, not least of all, as Schmitt himself recognized, because of the development of technologically overwhelming means of destruction. And finally, the types of quasi-legal, collective, international organizations Schmitt railed against have become the norm. Whether they have been the bane of human civilization as Schmitt contended is certainly open to debate. However, one thing is clear. They have not succeeded in outlawing or banishing war, nor, as recent history amply shows, have their moral exhortations managed to limit the violence exercised on civilian populations. Religious civil wars, wars of ‘ethnic cleansing’, ‘terrorism’, and the ‘surgical strikes’ that inevitably cut away healthy tissue, so to speak, with the diseased seems to have carried the day. Indeed, even those states that blithely see themselves as the carriers of the universal principle have certainly not been innocent of the types of violence they habitually condemn. Perhaps the structure that Schmitt favored is irretrievable, but this does not necessarily mean that what has replaced it is inevitably superior.
This vision of

The value of Schmitt today lies more with the structure of conflict that he outlines than with any attempt to rehabilitate his particular carriers of the structure. We saw that for Schmitt, sovereignty is the linchpin that holds the structure in place. The unity of the state, which is guaranteed by a supra-legal and personified notion of sovereignty, enables the plurality of the world, and thus enables politics. The irony is not lost on us. If politics is marked by the friend/enemy distinction, then within the state, politics is not possible. Internal
conflict can only be seen as civil war, that is, war designed to undermine sovereignty and thus designed to undermine the structure of politics t hat the ‘pillar’ of the state supports. Schmitt’s logic starts with a simple presupposition: what is to be avoided is the hegemony of a single system. As he puts it, ‘As long as a state exists, there will thus always be in the world more than just one state. A world state which embraces the entire globe and all of humanity cannot exist. World, then, must be the horizon that enables a plurality of systems, not the unity of that plurality. World is not world-system. But his state is no microcosm of the world; there is no self-similarity, no internal

From a perspective that represents itself as liberal and democratic, this homogenization and pacification of the state is the great flaw of Schmitt’s grand design.
replication of the differentiation required on the international scene. by a unity that itself was structured by differentiation.

He postulates the necessity of two levels, one domestic (or internal to the state) and the other foreign (or between states), and assumes that politics can only exist on the higher level, that a uniformity and suppression of politics must exist within the state for politics to exist anywhere at all. Schmitt could not see a structure of differentiation carried

This, then, becomes our challenge. If we accept conflict as the basic definition of politics, and if we take seriously the claim that the old European system of delimited warfare represents ‘the highest form of order of which humans are capable’ – if, in other worlds, emergent order trumps planning – then it becomes necessary to extend his ‘logic’ of conflict, to ‘re-enter’ his friend/enemy distinction within the state, without thereby collapsing the grander structure he outlines.

BLACK KNIGHTS 07/08 The K – JV Nats

RhymenoceroS 10/14

RATHER THAN EMBRACE OR SUPPRESS THE WAR OF NATURE, A POLITICS OF LEGITIMIZATION ALLOWS FOR A
REFINEMENT OF THAT WAR THAT CREATES THE POSSIBILITY FOR DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE, VIOLENCE AND NONVIOLENCE, FRIENDSHIP AND ENMITY.

ABSENT THIS NUANCED INTERPRETATION OF CONFLICT, ONLY ONE VIOLENT EXTREME OR THE OTHER IS POSSIBLE. RASCH 04 [William, Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University Sovereignty and Its Discontents: On the primary of conflict and the structure of the political,
Birkbeck Law Press 2004, pp. 21-48]

Do we define ourselves by the enemies we make? Carl Schmitt thought so, and those who disagreed made an enemy of him. So maybe he was right. Maybe our ability to distinguish with a fine temporal and spatial sense between friend and enemy is the mark of our political existence, and thus we can say: Conflict is our vocation. There is, nonetheless, a caveat. The antagonism that determines the political is not the antagonism of the war of all against all in the state of nature. That war and that
state, Derrida would say, is discourse itself, ‘the emergence of speech and appearing’. He would also say that no ‘messianic triumph’ could abolish this originary violence that is our condition except by way of a greater and fiercer violence, a total violence. But, as Kant’s joke ought to have told us all along, the war to end all wars can lead to

So, which conflict is the conflict that is politics? Is it war, but it is not the war of nature, nor is it the violent suppression of the war of nature. On the contrary, politics is the refinement of war; it is war’s double, a force that matches, but channels and gives particular form to, the violence of nature. The form preserves difference, but not indifferently. IT takes shape as the differentiation of autonomous unities that serve as the carriers of difference. Operating as a homogeneity and heterogeneity – politics preserves the ability to initiate and the ability to put a halt to conflict, the ability to recognize and determine the difference between conflict and peace. Political antagonism, in the final analysis, is a discrete and fragile structure that limits conflict by legitimizing it. Such bounded discretion, according to Carl Schmitt, is the apogee of civilization.
perpetual peace only if it is the peace of the graveyard.

BLACK KNIGHTS 07/08 The K – JV Nats

RhymenoceroS 11/14

AT: Perm
DON’T TIE YOUR BALLOT TO A REPETITION OF THE SAME PARADIGM OF SECURITY THAT PRODUCES VIOLENCE IN THE FIRST PLACE. REFUSING THE AFF IS A WAY OF ASSERTING YOU AGENCY AS A POLITICAL BEING – THAT IT ITSELF CAN CHALLENGE THE DISCURSIVE DOMINANCE OF SECURITY AND OPEN NEW POSSIBILITIES THE PRAGMATIC COMPROMISE OF THE PERMUTATION REPLICATES THE SAME PROBLEM WITH A HUMAN FACE – INSTEAD OF PERFECTING OUR IMPERFECTIONS, THE VERY THINGS WHICH LOCK US INTO CYCLES OF POLITICAL FAILURE, WE MUST ABANDON THIS THIRD WAY POLITICS THAT ONLY MASKS THE VIOLENCE WE ENJOY. ZIZEK 04, WINTER 2004, “THE ON GOING SOFT REVOLUTION” CRITICAL INQUIRY 30.2, P LION.CHADWYCK.COM
Facts like these give us a clear indication of what the Left has been doing in the last few decades: ruthlessly pursuing the path of giving way, of accommodating itself, of making the "necessary compromises" with the declared enemy (in the same way the church had to compromise on the essentials in order to redefine its role in modern secular society) by way of reconciling the opposites, that is, its own position with that of the declared opponent. It stands for socialism, but can fully endorse economic Thatcherism; it stands for science, but can fully endorse the rule of the multitude of opinions; it stands for true popular democracy, but can also play the game of politics as spectacle and electoral spin; it stands for principled fidelity, but can be totally pragmatic; it stands for the freedom of the press, but can flatter and get the support of Murdoch. In the early days of his rule, Tony Blair liked to paraphrase the famous joke from
Monty Python's Life of Brian ("All right, but apart from the sanitation, the medicine, education, wine, public order, irrigation, roads, the fresh-water system and public health, what have the Romans ever done for us?")25 in order to ironically disarm his critics: "They betrayed socialism. True, they brought more social security, they did a lot for health care and education, and so on, but, in spite of all that, they betrayed socialism." As

it is clear today, it is, rather, the inverse which applies: "We remain socialists. True, we practice Thatcherism in economics, we made a deal with Murdoch, and so on, but, nonetheless, we remain socialists."
In the old days of the twentieth century, great conservatives often did the tough job for the liberals; after the indecisive attitude of the socialist government, which ended up in the global crisis of the French Republic itself, it was de Gaulle who cut the Gordian knot by giving Algeria independence, Nixon who established diplomatic relations with China. Today, the opposite scenario is more the rule: the new Third Way Left does the job for economic conservative liberals, dismantling the welfare state, bringing privatization to an end, and so on. In his brilliant analysis of the political imbroglio of the French Revolution of 1848, Marx pointed out the paradoxical status of the ruling Party of the Order. It was the coalition of the two royalist wings (Bourbons and OrIeanists). However, because the two parties were, by definition, not able to find a common denominator at the level of royalism (one cannot be a royalist in general because one should support a certain determinate royal house), the only way for the two to unite was under the banner of the "anonymous kingdom of the Republic"; the only way to be a royalist in general is to be a republican.26 And, mutatis mutandis, is not something similar going on today? As we all know, capital nowadays is split into two factions (traditional industrial capital and "postmodern" digital-informational capital), and the only way for the two factions to find a common denominator is under the banner of the anonymous capitalism of social democracy; today, the only way to be a capitalist in general is to be a (Third Way) social democrat. This is how the opposition Left-Right works now; it is the new Third Way Left which stands for the interests of capital as such, in its totality (that is, in relative independence from its particular factions), while today's Right, as a rule, advocates the interests of some particular section of capital in contrast to other sectionswhich is why, paradoxically, in order to win the majority it has to augment its electoral base by directly appealing to select parts of the working class as well. No wonder, then, we find in the modern Right parties explicit references to the interests of the working class (protectionist measures against cheap foreign labor and cheap imports, and so on). However, condemning the postmodern Left for its accommodation is also wrong because one should ask the obvious hard question: What was, effectively, the alternative? If today's "postpolitics" is opportunistic pragmatism with no principles, then the predominant leftist reaction to it can be aptly characterized as principled opportunism: one simply sticks to old formulas (such as the welfare state) and calls them principles, dispensing with the detailed analysis of how the situation changed-and thus retaining one's position of Beautiful Soul. The inherent stupidity of the "principled" Left is clearly discernible in its standard reproach to any analysis that proposes a more complex picture of the situation, renouncing any simple prescriptions on how to act. "There is no clear political stance involved in your theory"-and this from people with no stance but their principled opportunism. Against such a stance, one should gather the courage to claim that the only way to effectively remain open to the revolutionary chance is to renounce easy calls to direct action, which necessarily involve us in an activity where things change so that the totality remains the same. Today's predicament is that, if we succumb to the urge of directly doing something (for example, engaging in the antiglobalist struggle, helping the poor), we will certainly and undoubtedly contribute to the reproduction of the existing order. The only way to lay the foundations for a true, radical change is to withdraw from the compulsion to act, to do nothing-and, thus, to open up the space for a different kind of activity. Today's antiglobalism seems to be caught in the antinomy of de- and reterritorialization. On the one hand, there are those who want to reterritorialize capitalism (conservatives, from ecologists to partisans of the nation-state and local roots or traditions); on the other hand, there are those who want an even more radical deterritorialization, liberated from the constraint of capital. But is this opposition not too simple? Is it not ultimately a false alternative? Is not the capitalist territory (everything must pass through the grid of market exchange) the very form and mobile of radical deterritorialization-its operator, as it were? (And does the same not go for the nation-state, this operator of the erasure of local traditions?) Positivity and negativity are here inextricably intertwined, which is why the true aim should be a new

BLACK KNIGHTS 07/08 The K – JV Nats

RhymenoceroS 12/14

balance, a new form of de- and reterritorialization. This brings us back to the central sociopolitical antinomy of late capitalism, the way its pluralist dynamics of permanent deterritorialization coexists with its opposite, the paranoiac logic of the One, thereby confirming that, perhaps, in the Deleuzian opposition between schizophrenia and paranoia, between the multitude and the One, we are dealing with two sides of the same coin. If the Left were to choose the "principled" attitude of fidelity to its old program, it would simply marginalize itself. The task is a much harder one: to rethink thoroughly the leftist project, beyond the alternative of accommodating new circumstances and sticking to the old attitude. Apropos of the disintegration of state socialism two decades ago, one should not forget that, at approximately the same time, the Western social democratic welfare state ideology was also dealt a crucial blow, that it also ceased to function as the imaginary able to arouse a collective passionate following. The notion that the time of the welfare state has passed is today a piece of commonly accepted wisdom. What these two defeated ideologies shared is the notion that humanity as a collective subject has the capacity to somehow limit impersonal and anonymous sociohistoric development, to steer it in a desired direction. Today, such a notion is quickly dismissed as ideological or totalitarian; the social process is again perceived as dominated by an anonymous Fate beyond social control. The rise of global capitalism is presented to us as such a Fate, against which one cannot fight; one either adapts oneself to it or one falls out of step with history and is crushed. The only thing one can do is to make global capitalism as human as possible, to fight for global capitalism with a human face (this is what, ultimately, the Third Way isor, rather, was-about).

Whenever a political project takes a radical turn, the inevitable blackmail pops up: "Of course these goals are in themselves desirable; however, if we do all of this, international capital will boycott us, the growth rate will fall, and so on." The sound barrier, the qualitative leap that occurs when one expands the quantity from local communities to wider social circles (up
to the state itself), will have to be broken, and the risk will have to be taken to organize larger and larger social circles along the lines of the self-organization of excluded marginal communities. Many fetishes will have to be broken here; who cares if growth stalls and even becomes negative? Did we not get enough of the high growth rate whose effects in the social body were mostly felt in the guise of the new forms of poverty and dispossession? What about a negative growth that would translate into a qualitatively better, not higher, standard of living for the wider popular strata? That

would have been an act in today's politics-to break the spell of automatically endorsing the frame, to break out of the debilitating alternative of either we just directly endorse free market globalization or we make impossible promises about how to have one's cake and eat it, too, of how to combine globalization with social solidarity.

BLACK KNIGHTS 07/08 The K – JV Nats

RhymenoceroS 13/14

RETAG: REMEMBER, WE DECIDE WHAT IS TERRORIST WHAT ISN’T, WHAT IS JUST WAR/GENTLE COMPULSION WHAT ISN’T – THIS DEMANDS THAT WE REJECT OURSELVES THE ALTERNATIVE IS TRY OR DIE: WHILE THE AMERICAN ZEALOTS ARE PERFECTLY SATISFIED WITH THE STATUS QUO, THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN EXCISED FROM THE CATEGORY OF HUMANITY, THE “BARBARIANS” OUTSIDE THE GATES, CANNOT SIT AND WAIT ANY LONGER FOR A “NEW POLITICS” TO ARRIVE LIKE THE SECOND COMING OF CHRIST. EVEN IF THE ALTERNATIVE HAS FLAWS THERE IS ONE ACTION THAT IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY, AND THAT IS ENSURING THAT HUMANITY BECOME A CONCRETE FACT OF LIFE AND NOT A VALUE TO BE GAINED AND LOST – COMPROMISE ON THIS POINT IS UNACCEPTABLE. RASCH, 2003 (William, Henry H. H. Remak Professor of Germanic Studies at India University. ‘Human Rights and Geopolitics’, Cultural Critique, No. 54
(Spring 2003), 143-44.)

But while affirmative theorists like Habermas and Rawls are busy constructing the ideological scaffolding that supports the structure of the status quo, what role is there for the "critical" theorist to play? Despite the sanguine hopes of Hardt and Negri (2000) that "Empire" will all but spontaneously combust as a result of the irrepressible desire of the multitude, can we seriously place our faith in some utopian grand alternative anymore, or in some revolutionary or therapeutic result based on the truth of critique that would allow us all, in the end, to sing in the sunshine and laugh everyday? Do, in fact, such utopian fantasies not lead to the moralizing hubris of a Rawls or a Habermas? In short, it is one thing to recognize the concealed, particular interests that govern the discourse and politics of human rights and quite another to think seriously about how things could be different, to imagine an international system that respected both the equality and the difference of states and/or peoples. Is it possible-and this is Todorov's question-to value Vitoria's principle of the "free circulation of men, ideas, and goods" and still also "cherish
another principle, that of self-determination and noninterference" (Todorov 1984,177)? The entire "Vitorian" tradition, from Scott to Habermas and Rawls, thinks not. Habermas, for instance, emphatically endorses the fact that "the erosion of the principle of nonintervention in recent decades has been due primarily to the politics of human rights" (1998, 147), a "normative" achievement that is not so incidentally correlated with a positive, economic fact: "In view of the subversive forces and imperatives of the world market and of the increasing density of worldwide networks of communication and commerce, the external sovereignty of states, however it may be grounded, is by

for those who sincerely believe in American institutional, cultural, and moral superiority, the times could not be rosier. After all, when push comes to shove, "we" decide-not only about which societies are decent and which ones are not, but also about which acts of violence are "terrorist" and which compose the "gentle compulsion" of a "just war." What, however, are those "barbarians" who disagree with the new world order supposed to do? With Agamben, they could wait for a "completely new politics" to come, but the contours of such a politics are unknown and will remain unknown until the time of its arrival. And that time, much like the second coming of Christ, seems infinitely deferrable. While they wait for the Benjaminian "divine violence" to sweep away the residual effects of the demonic rule of law (Benjamin 1996,248-52), the barbarians might be tempted to entertain Schmitt's rather forlorn fantasy of an egalitarian balance of power. Yet if the old, inner-European balance of power rested on an asymmetrical exclusion of the non-European world, it must be asked: what new exclusion will be necessary for a new balance, and is that new exclusion tolerable? At the moment, there is no answer to this question, only a precondition to an answer. If one wishes to entertain Todorov's challenge of thinking both equality and difference, universal commerce of people and ideas as well as self-determination and nonintervention, then the concept of humanity must once again become the invisible and unsurpassable horizon of discourse, not its positive pole. The word "human," to evoke one final distinction, must once again become descriptive of a "fact" and not a "value." Otherwise, whatever else it may be, the search for "human" rights will always also be the negative image of the relentless search for the "inhuman" other.
now in any case an anachronism" (150). And opposition to this development is not merely anachronistic; it is illegitimate, not to be tolerated. So,

BLACK KNIGHTS 07/08 The K – JV Nats

RhymenoceroS 14/14

AND THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE WITH THE WAR ON TERROR – WHILE THEY FOCUS ON THE “REAL THREATS” OUTSIDE, THEY ARE CONSOLIDATING A POLITICS OF JUSTIFIED VIOLENCE WITHIN US ALL – REJECT THE FALSE CHOICE BETWEEN PRESENTED BY THE 1AC. ZIZEK 03 “THE IRAQ WAR: WHERE IS THE TRUE DANGER?” 3/13/2003. WWW.LACAN.COM/IRAQ.HTM
We should therefore be very attentive not to fight false battles: the debates on how bad Saddam is, even on how much the war will cost, etc., are false debates. The focus should be on what effectively goes on in our societies, on what kind of society is emerging HERE as the result of the "war on terror." Instead of talking about hidden conspirative agendas, one should shift the focus onto what is going on, onto what kind of changes are taking place here and now. The ultimate result of the war will be a change in OUR political order.

The true danger can be best exemplified by the actual role of the populist Right in Europe: to introduce certain topics (the foreign threat, the necessity to limit immigration, etc.) which were then silently taken over not only by the conservative parties, but even by the de facto politics of the "Socialist" governments. Today, the need to "regulate" the status of immigrants, etc., is part of the mainstream consensus: as the story goes, le Pen did address and exploit
real problems which bother people. One is almost tempted to say that, if there were no le Pen in France, he should have been invented: he is a perfect person whom one loves to hate, the hatred for whom guarantees the wide liberal "democratic pact," the pathetic identification with democratic values of tolerance and respect for diversity however, after

shouting "Horrible! How dark and uncivilized! Wholly unacceptable! A threat to our basic democratic values!", the outraged liberals proceed to act like "le Pen with a human face," to do the same thing in a more "civilized" way, along the lines of "But the racist populists are manipulating legitimate worries of ordinary people, so we do have to take some measures!"...
We do have here a kind of perverted Hegelian "negation of negation": in a first negation, the populist Right disturbs the aseptic liberal consensus by giving voice to passionate dissent, clearly arguing against the "foreign threat"; in a second negation, the

"decent" democratic center, in the very gesture of pathetically rejecting this populist Right, integrates its message in a "civilized" way - in-between, the ENTIRE FIELD of background "unwritten rules" has already changed so much that no one even notices it and everyone is just relieved that the anti-democratic threat is over. And the true danger is that something similar will happen with the "war on terror": "extremists" like John Ashcroft will be discarded, but their legacy will remain, imperceptibly interwoven into the invisible ethical fabric of our societies. Their defeat will be their ultimate triumph: they will no longer be needed, since
their message will be incorporated into the mainstream.