ADI 2005

@ REALISM BAD

BRUSCHKE LAB
1-3

INC LINKS REALISM STATE IDENTITY SECURITy GEOPOLITICS U.S. LINK US THREAT CONSTRUCTION MILITARY LINK IR LINK (HIERARCHIES) NUCLEARISM FOREIGN POLICy IMP ACTS VIOLENCE BIOPOWER ST ATE CONTROL (NORMALIZATION) TERRORISM GENDER WAR OTHERIZA TION SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECy APOCALYPTIC VIOLENCE HOPE AL TERNATIVE TRANSVERSAL DISSENT AESTHETICS HOPE HISTORy DECONSTRUCTING POLITICS EMBRACING DIFFERENCE GUILT

4 5 6-7 8 9 10 11 12 13-14 15

16-20 21 22-25 26-28 29 30-40 41-43 44 45-50 51

52-54 55-57 58-60 61-62 63 64 65

ANSWERS TO PERMUTATION A2 REALISM INEVITABLE A2 REALISM WORKS A2 EMPIRI CALLY SOLVES A2 THREATS EXISTS

; "

66-69 70-71 72-73 74-76 77

ADI 2005 INC-REALISM BAD

BRUSCHKE LAB

A. LINK: THE AFFIRMATIVE ATTEMPTS TO REPRESENT THE WORLD AS-IS THROUGH A REALIST FRAMEWORK WHICH IS USED TO UNIVERSALLY COOPT AND SUPPRESS THE INHERENTLY SUBJECTIVE, AESTHETIC QUALITY OF POLITICS
BLEIKER, 2001 [Roland Bleiker, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No.
3, pp. 509-533]

Nothing is harder than to notice the obvious that was not noticed before. The task of critically analysing world politics is to make fuller use of various faculties and to challenge the mimetic and exclusive conventions of Realist international politics, just as Magritte's painting of a pipe was aimed at undermining 'the mimetic conventions of realistic painting'. But few tasks are more daunting than that. We all have an intuitive longing for the hope that what we represent is what we see and think, and that what we see and think must. really. be real. The belief in resemblance and recognition is part of our desire to order the world. We know, of course, that Cold War spy films are not real, yet it is much more difficult to accept, for instance, that a scientific analysis of Cold War intelligence, based on quantitative archival research, can contain equally subjective representationaldimensions.This is because we are wedded to conventionsof language; conventions that tell us, to appropriate Michel Foucault's words, that the entire purpose of a scholarlyanalysis 'is to elicit recognition,to allow the object it represents to appear without hesitation and equivocation'.26 Representation is always an act of power. This power is at its peak if a form of representation is able to disguise its subjective origins and values. Realism has been unusually successful in this endeavour: it has turned one of many credible interpretations into a form of representation that is not only widely accepted as 'realistic'. but also appears and functions as essence. Realism has been able to take historically contingent and political motivated commentaries-say by E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau about how to deal with the spread of Nazi Germany, or by Kenneth Waltz about how to interpret the 'logic' of 'anarchy' during the Cold War-and then turn them into universal and a-historic explanations that allegedly capture the 'essence' of human nature and international politics.27 Expressed in other words, Realism has managed to suppress what Kant would have called the 'aesthetic Quality' of politics. that is, the elements which are 'purely subiective in the representation of an obiect, i.e., what constitutes its reference to the subject, not to the object' .

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B. IMPLICATIONS: REALISM PERPETUATES NOTIONS OF PREDICTABLITY AND CAUSALITY WICH DIRECTLY DESTROY HUMAN ANGENCY WHILE RECREATING THE SAME REALITIES IT FEARS
BLEIKER, 2001 [Roland Bleiker, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No.
3, pp. 48-49]

The very notion of prediction does. bv its own logic. annihilate human agency. To assert that international relations is a domain of political dynamics whose future should be predictable throu2:h a convincin2: set of theoretical propositions is to assume that the course of 2:10balpolitics is to a certain extent predetermined. From such a vanta2:e-point there is no more room for interference and human a2:encv. no more possibility for politics to overtake theory. A predictive approach thus runs the risk of endin2: up in a form of inquiry that imposes a static ima2:e upon a far more complex set of transversal political practices. The point of a theoretical inquiry, however, is not to i2:nore the constantly chan2:in2: domain of international relations. Rather, the main obiective must consist of facilitatin2: an understandin2: of transversal stru2:2:1es that can 2:rapple with those moments when people walk throu2:h walls precisely when nobody expects them to do so. Prediction is a problematic assessment tool even if a theory is able to anticipate future events. Important theories, such as realist interpretations of international politics, may well predict certain events only because their theoretical premises have become so obiectivised that they have started to shape decision makers and political dynamics. Dissent, in this case,' is the process that ... reshapes these entrenched perceptions and the ensuin2: political practices.

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ADI 2005 INC-REALISM BAD

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C. ALTERNATIVE: WE SHOULD EMBRACE AN AESTHETIC APPROACH TO POLITICS IN ORDER TO REDEPLOY POLITICS IN A MANNER THAT IS CONSTRUCTIVE WHILE HAVING A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE OTHER

BLEIKER, 2001 [Roland Bleiker, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No.
3, pp. 509-533]

Although most approaches to international political theory remain wedded to mimetic principles, an increasing number of scholars are confronting the question of representation. One could, indeed, speak of an actual aesthetic turn. To be more precise, this turn has been generated through two interrelated shifts in the production afknowledge about world politics. The first occUlTed in the 1980s, when so-called postmodern scholars begun to chal1enge the positivist foundations afinternational theory. It then became possible to recognise a number of ensuing political implications, including the reproduction of cultures afviolence as well as their state-centric and masculine nature. A second and equally significant shift took place in more recent years, as various scholars have startedto think through the implications ofthe postmodern critique. They begun to explore different forms of insight into world politics, including those that emerge from images, narratives and sounds, such as literature, visual art, music, cinema and other sources that extend beyond 'high art' into popular culture. Of course, not all of the ensuing endeavours are necessarily convincing. Nor do they supersede the need for more conventional social scientific inquiries. But

aesthetic approaches have initiated an important process of broadenin2 our understandin2 of world politics beyond a relatively narrow academic discipline that has come to entrench many of the political problems it seemin2lv seeks to address and solve. The key challen2e ahead consists of fmdin2WayS to reclaim the political value of the aesthetic. To do so is no easy task. for the modern triumph of technolocical reason has by and lar2e eclipsed the aesthetic from our political purview. Overcomin2 the ensuin2 construction of common sense would amount to far more than simply addin2 an additional. sensual layer of interpretation. The aesthetic turn reorients our very understandin2 of the political: it en2enders a si2nificant shift away from a model of thou2ht that equates knowled2e with the mimetic reco2llition of external appearances towards an approach that 2enerates a more diverse but also more direct encounter with the political. The latter allows for productive interactions across different faculties. includin2 sensibility. ima2ination and reason. without any of them annihilatin2 the unique position and insi2ht of the other.

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ADI2005 BRUSCHKE REALISM BAD

P-_/_LINKS: REALISM

Realist theories have blindingly been legitimized through time, leading to the false rationalization of the irrational.
BLEIKER, 2001 [Roland Bleiker, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No.3, pp. 509533]

The power to raise subiective interpretations to a level of obiectivity is rooted in a variety of factors other than the mere persuasiveness of the respective perspective. Time is one of these factors: a simple but important one. Realist theories of (anti)representation have been around for so 10n2:that the metaphors throu2:h which they le2:itimisetheir political view of the world (ii'om the primacy of the 'national interest' to the dictates of 'Realpolitik') no 10n2:erappear as metaphors. Throu2:h decades of dominance in academic scholarship, policy formation and public discourse, the anti-representational values of Realism have shaped how we perceive the boundaries between the rational and the irrational. As a result, we have for2:otten whether we understand Realist interpretations by noticin2:resemblances to the world or whether we notice resemblances as a result of havin2: internalised such interpretations.

Status quo politics is shaped by realist mimesis --- we must understand politics truly lies within its aesthetic gaps.
BLEIKER, 2001 [Roland Bleiker, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No.3, pp. 509533]

Our insi2:hts into the international have not 2:rown substantially, nor have our abilities to prevent deadly conflicts. From Kosovo to Afghanistan violence remains the modus operandi of world politics. Even proponents of scientific research lament that 'students of international conflict are left wrestling with their data to eke out something they can label a finding'A This essay argues for the need to validate an entirely different approach to the study ofworid politics: aesthetics. More specifically, it contrasts aesthetic with mimetic forms of representation. The latter, which have dominated it scholarship, seek to represent politics as realistically and authentically as possible, aimin2: to capture world politics as-it-really-is. An aesthetic approach, by contrast, assumes that there is always a 2:ap between a form of representation and what is represented therewith. Rather than i2:norin2:or seekin2: to narrow this 2:ap. as mimetic approaches do, aesthetic insi2:ht reco2:nises that the inevitable difference between the represented and its representation is the very location of Qolitics. Some of the most si2:nificant theoretittal and practical insi2:ht into world politics emer2:es not from endeavours that i2:nore representation, but from those that explo~r hQw representative practices themselves have come to constitute and shape political practices.

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DIFFERENCE IS A RESULT OF CONSTANTLY IDENTIFYING WITH THE STATE AND GIVING IT OPPORTUNITIES TO REPRODUCE ITSELF Campbell 1992 (David, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 8,9)
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originary or sovereign presence which inhabits a prediscursive domain and gives the body, its sex, or gender a naturalizedand unproblematic quality. To be sure, many insist on understanding the body, sex, and gender as naturalized and unproblematic, But for their claim to be persuasive, we would have to overlook (among other issues) the multifarious normalizing codes that abound in our society f?r,the constitution and disciplining of sexuality. In seeking to establish, and police understandings of what constitutes the normal, the accepted, and the desirable, such codes effcct an admission of their constructed 'nature and the contingent and problematic nature of the identity of the body .. Understanding the gendered identity of the body as performative i means that we regard it as having 'no on,tologicaJ status apart from the:: various acts which constitute its reality: 'As such, the idea that gender is an, interior essence definitive of the body's identity is a discursively constructed notion which is required for the purposes of disciplining sexuality, In this ,contexr, genders are neither 'true' or 'false,' nor 'normal' or, 'abnormal,' but 'are only produced as the truth effects of a discourse or': primary and stable identity.' Moreover, gender can be understood as 'an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through a stylized repetition of acts'; an identity achieved, 'not [through] a
founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition,
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Choosing the question of gender and the body as an exemplification of the theme of identity is !lot to suggest that as an 'individual' instance of identity the performative constitution of gender and the body is prior to and determinative of instances of collective identity. In other words, I am not claiming that the state is analogous to~n,)f}?ividual with_~~~~tJ.~<:!.ii~~1.t.~ty,

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SECURITY IS PART OF A LARGER IN THE NAME OF THREATS

POLITICAL

CONSTRUCTION

TO BE ABLE TO MOBALIZE

BURKE 2002 (Anthony, APORIAS OF SECURITY, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political)
In both its realist and humanist guises, security takes the form and promise of a metaphvsical discourse: an overarchin2 political 20al and practice that 2uarantees existence itself, that makes the possibility of the world possible. US President Bill Clinton prefaced the 1997 National Security Strategy by saying that "protecting the security of our nation--our people, our territory and our way oflife--is my foremost mission and constitutional duty." Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, of Malaysia, has argued that "national security is inseparable from political stability, economic success and social harmony." In 1995, former Australian Labor leader Paul Keating argued that "a prime minister's duty, his first duty, is to the security of his country," while his successor Kim Beazley declared the party's central values as "security and opportunity" and elevated security to an overarching goal that linked, along a seamless continuum, the personal security of individuals and families with the security of the nation itself. (4) In Indonesia, security was a fundamental societal discourse during the entire tenure of the Soharto New Order, and it has taken on only greater urgency in the turmoil that accompanied his retreat from power. In Indonesia's doctrinal continuum between national and regional "resilience," security links the unity and prosperity of the nation to ideal systems of regional and international order. (5) Indeed, the European political theorist R. N. Berki argues that security is the ultimate and overridin2 human value, the basic condition for life and freedom: "Security is the paramount value for self-conscious, rational, thinking individuals ... not just an external (and therefore optional) condition of life and freedom but simply another word for life and freedom." (6) More critically, the critical scholar Michael Dillon recognizes the same drive: "Security impresslesl itself upon political thou2ht as a self-evident condition for the very existence of Iife--both individual and social. II (7) R. B. J. Walker likewise argues that modern accounts of security define "the conditions under which we have been constructed as subiects subiect to subjection. They tell us who we must be. II (8)

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SECURITY

GUARANTESS

A POWER RELATIONSHIP

BASED ON EXPLOITING

THE OTHER

BURKE 2002 (Anthony, APORIAS OF SECURITY, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political)
What does it mean to be secure? Should we even need to ask? Surely we know. We know that security is one of the most fundamental human needs: an irrefutable guarantee of safety and wellbeing, economic assurance and possibility, sociability and order; of a life lived freely without fear or hardship. That security is a universal good available to all, and a solemn pledge between citizens and their political leaders, to whom their people's security is "the first duty," the ovelTiding goal of domestic and international policy making. As such it has been able to trace a powerful path between subject and world, state and citizen, to promise simultaneously a solution to the inchoate fears and insecurities of everyday life and the enormous spatial, cultuml, economic, and geopolitical complexities of government. In short, security remains one of modernity's most stubborn and endurinl! dreams. However, I believe that, more than ever, we do need to ask what it is to be secure. Surely we no lonl!er know what security is--in that Platonic sense. Surely more than ten years after the end of the Gold War, after the Clinton Doctrine and the destruction of the Twin Towers, after humanitarian and policy disasters in Indochina, Afijca, East Timor, the Middle East, and Central America, and after a growing body of humanist and critical scholarship has questioned security's unity, discursive structure, and political implications, security no lonl!er possesses a credible wholeness. (1) This article begins from the premise that security's claims to universality and wholeness founder on a destructive series of aporias. which derive firstly from the I!rowinl! sense that security no lonl!er has a stable referent obiect, nor names a common set of needs. means. or ways of beinl!, and secondlv, from the moral relativism that lies at the center of dominant (realist) discourses of security that pretend to universality but insist that "our" security always rests on the insecurity and sufferinl! of an-other. While this article argues strongly that security has no essential ontolol!ical intel!rity, it also argues that if the power and sweep of security are to be understood and chaUenl!ed, its claims to universality must be taken seriously. They underpin and animate sweepinl! forms of power, subiectivity, force, and economic circulation and cannot be dismissed out of hand. Nor, in the hands of some humanist writers--who have sought to think human and gender security in radical counterpoint to realist images of national and international security--are such claims always pernicious. They have a valuable moral and political force that undermines, perhaps unwittingly, the logo centric presuppositions of the realist discourses they question. Yet a common assumption that security can be ontologically completed and secured does present a hurdle for the kind of "ontopolitical" critique that we really need. (2)

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ADI 2005 BRUSCHKE GEOPOLITICS AND SECURITY REALISM BAD ARE NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN DISCIPLINARY

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BURKE 2002 (Anthony, APORIAS OF SECURITY, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political)
In describing this productivity, Foucault emphasized the simultaneous individualization and totalization of governmental power-discipline and desire addressed to individuals, biopower addressed to populations, in a perpetual feedback and combination. (38) To these, however, we must add geopolitics as the form of power that combined these rationalities with the vast lusts of modern imperialism. (39) By the mid-twentieth century, geopolitics had become the practice of security par excellence--a spatializing rationality of power that sought the control of territories and populations (as both economic resources and strategic possessions) within a perpetually dangerous and contested arena, through the interdependent production of domestic and transnational political space. Notwithstanding the fascist imperialisms of the 1930s, we could thus characterize !:!eopolitics as a liberal philosophy of !:!lobal intervention, which links increasilll?:ly global issues of economic management with domestic policy formations across the whole of government. The domestic and international become fused spaces throu2h a series of interlinked processes: of domestic and foreign economic policy, transnational business and trade, and the raising of armies with images of fear and otherness that simultaneously secure and ri2idifv domestic identities. As 210bal influence becomes conceivable, the interrelation of political economy, nationalism, and the other become central to security as a vector and rationalitv of power.

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THE HEGEMONIC POWER OF U.S. MANIPULATES THE REALITY.
Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert. Super Power Syndrome, pp 113-114
The amorphousness surely engaged
9/11. There

2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9)

of the war on terrorism was such that dictator who had for in the past, could on

a country like~ Iraq, with a murderous in acts of terrorism

that basis be treated as if it had major responsibility

was no evidence at all that it did. But i£...!h.e

b~lligerent atrnosphere of the overall war on terrorism, by . means of false accusations and emphasis on the evil things S:1ddam Hussein had done (for instance, the use of poison gas on his Kurdish minority), the administration succeeded in convincing more than half of all Americans that Saddam was a key player in 9/11. The war on terrorism, then, t<?..£k amorphous impul~s toward combating terror and used them as a pretext fill" realizing a prior mission aimed at American '.n;£.nY,..TJ2e attack on Iraq reflected global hege-

the reach not only of

the "war on terrorism" bu~ of deceptions and manipulations of reality that have accompanied it. In this context, the word "war" "war on poverty" "preemptive" came to combine attack, metaphor conventional dominationJ (as in the for military or "war on drugs"), justification

(preventive)

combat, and assertion of superpower

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The Ownership of History also leads to the Ownership of Death Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert. Super Power Syndrome,
flhe

2003 ISBN' 1-156025-512-9) ..

Natiohal Security Strategy put forward a unique doc-

trine of prev~ntive strikes or wars against terrorists or other potential en~mies, as well as unilateral action wherever 'American int~rests are at stake: "While the United States will constantlystr{ve to enlist thesupportof the international cornmunity, we w~ll not hesitate to act alone, ifnecessary ... " I l1e J;;;;ument no~ only lacks any princi pie of restraint on American power qr American control-which is itself of the insists that there ~e

greatest psyc~ological importance-but

no such restr~ll1t. And all is justified, the document states,_ quoting the president, by an American determination "to a~swer these attacks [of9/11] and rid the world of evil." The.... National Securit Strategy is in fact a statement of

--

~merican susceptibility to the lure 0 t e 111ll1i e 0 a vision ofachi~ving total swa y over human endeavors. It repi;;-ents a kinql of omega J?oint of superpDwer ~d n.~~lonian~ This clairri on infinity James Carrqll inevitably turns Orwellian, becomes offense, as the warr;.s: "Defense omnipotence

protection of your child ff'n hfcomes the murder 01. ~other's, his threat becomes your preem ption. You kill to
.~ ..

stop the killing. Then you wonder, the~~ou are both." Yet a sense of- megalomania .:;..-y".

Are you the victim, or whether

and ' omnipotence,

in an individual or a sup-=:power, must sooner or later lead not to glory but collapse. The ownershi of histor i5 a fantasy in the extreme. Infinite power and control
1S

a

temptation that is as self-destructive as it is dazzling-still another version of the ownership of death.

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The United States has used military power in order to accomplish cosmic control

Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robeli. Super Power Syndrome, 2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9)

In sreaking

of superpower syndrome, I mean

to suggest a

harmful disor~:ler. I ,use this medical association to convey psychological; I and political abnormality. _I also wis~-1.0 ~_ e~ ;] ~o'tT7uence of behavior patterns: in any syndrome there is not just a single tendency but a constellation of tendencies. Though each can be identified

-.----.--as manifestations national entity . of of the

separately, 6ger

they are best understood

-;-n overarching

dynamic that controls the behavior

system, in this case the American

.The dynamic takes shape around a bizarre American collective mindset that extends our very real military power into a fantasy of cosmic control, a mindset are of a piece, each consistent with th(" brgf'r readily tempted by an apocalyptic mission. The symptoms

all too

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uniJateralism in all-important decisions, includinr- those n relating to war-makinE:; th(~ 11<:("F high t("chnolog-y So secure the ownership of death and of history; a sense of entitlement concerning the right to identify and destroy all those considered to be terrorists or friends of terrorists, while spreading "freedom" and virtl1f'<: ,("po
::IS

preemi-

..?ently ours throughout the world; the right to decide who t~lay possess weapons of mass destruction and who may not, ~nd to take military action, using nuclear weapons if necess~y, against any nation that has them or is thought manufacturing them; and underlying to be a these symptoms,

righteous vision of ridding the world of evil and purifying it sfJiritually and politically. e are talking about a serious syndrome, one that js profoundly harmful, even fatal, to the national body it

'!!

------.

InhabIts as well as to the world in which that body lives. Yet the syndrome can b~g>jmte,red-It not "clIrt:d," at least modified, altered, eventually overcome.

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ADI2K5 BRUSCHKE REALISM BAD

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THE USE OF IR THEORY AND FEAR RECREATES THE WORST HIERARCHIES

Campbell 1992
(David, Professor ofIntemational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, pg. 85,86)
/
TilE lVIORAL SPACE OF IDENTITY Danger constitutes morc than the bounda whic 1 demarcares a ~;"'Ju -have a treat requlfes cn orcmg a clusure u un the communit which is . threatened. A notIOn 01 w 1at 'we' are is intrinsic to an understanding of ~" \yhat 'we' fear. What this highlights is that there is an axiological level which p.roffers a range uf mural valuations that are implicit in any spatializat~n. I The construction of SOCIalspace that emerges trom ractJces assocIated With the paradigm u sovereignty t us s:~eeds a si~nple g~mp.l1iQlLpaujtj.QQ=ing: It results in a conception of divergent moral s~es, In othcr words, d1.So s~ial space ofmslde/outside ~th made possibLe bY..Jill..d.hclp.s cOJ1~~itLJ.tc a moral space of superior/inferior, which C~!1 b.<;: ani~!J!!~~-;:.9~ number of figurations of higher/lower~~For example, in delineating the d;rruiiiil5f the ratlOnar;oraerea pollWfroi'il"rhe dangerolls, anarchic world in which it was situated, Hobbes did more than draw a boundary: he enumerat;;-U the character of each realm by arguing that the- former was the residence of good, sane, sober, modest, and civilized pcople, while the latter was populated by cvil, mad, drunk, arrogant, and savage characters. Identity is therefore more than something which derives its meaning solely from being positioned in contradistinction -to difference; identity is a condition that has depth, is multi-layered, possesses texture, and comprises many dimensions. As sllch, identity is a condition for which there can be cataloged no single point of origin or myth of genesis; the manifold, diverse, and eclectic ingredients that comprise a settled identity cannot be reduced to any single spatial or temporal source. None of this diminishes the role of difference in the logic of identity. But it does suggest that we might consider all the characteristics or traits or distinctions which are understood as difference as being unequal in their identity-effects. Moreover, this might also suggest that some of the dispositions we combine under the category of 'difference' - especially insofar as that term is often used to refer etc. - are basic to the construction of the discursive field upon which the to entries such as race, class, gender, ethniCi~y dichotomy in a identity/difference of register of marginality, itself erected. is

...

ADI 2KS BRUSCHKE REALISM BAD

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Nu c )-eC1V

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SY}1

,.r. 11;<-,..,.'.11\

i-

i
2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9)

SUPERNATURAL POWER SEEMS TO BESTOW IS INSEPARABLE FROM A DEEPENING FEAR OF VULNERABILITY. pp 134-135
Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert. Super Power Syndrome,

_. S~ps:rpower nuclearism and "counter-proliferation," are, nO~~~lfprisingly, likely to have psychological and political Sff~~..li qIJite t1iFFFrpnr From rhmF intFnt1Fd. Smaller nations at odds with the United States, becoming painfully aware of their o\;vn vulnerability and their potential humiliation in the face of a possible attack, are then drawn to their own version of nuclearism-to ~nuclear magic-as a source of power and pride. And they .can point to evidence for doing so: Iraq, lacking a nuclear program, was invaded; North Korea, with a relatively advanced one, was not. Of course, such an approach could also hasten an American attack. ~~lrism is cont~o~, and the supernatural power it seems to bestow is inseparable from a deepening fear of v~ability. puring the Cold War, this paradox of s~lpernatural po'wer and profound vulnerability was tne... crux of the interaction between the United States and tne Soviet Union. America's ever newer generations of nuclear weapons and strategies made the Soviets feel sufficient! y vu] nerable to counteract them with no less tnreaten1l1g stockpiles and strategies, which in turn int~nsifted Americm feelings of vulnerability, which led to further stockpilifIg and more aggressive strategies until the arsenals of the two superpowers reached absurd levels, quite capable of destroying planet Earth and more.

J;. ~

ADI 2K5 BRUSCHKE

t t

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Now, with i,ust one superpower aspiring nuclear nations,

but many more actual or much

the process has become

more amorphous and considerably less manageable. Intolerant of its own vulnerability, and dismissive of diplomatic arms-control approaches, the Bush administration is now

on the lookou~ everywhere for weapons of mass destruction-especiaHy those actually or potentially in the hands of unfriendly ~lations or terrorist groups; Such weapons rnay be manufactured, purchased, or stolen; or low-tech forms of attack:may be mounted that are aimed specifically at the superp~wer's own nuclear weapons and energy installations. The superpower, trapped in its syndrome, finds itself with little recourse but the endless use of force.
1!runirig<"1tf"c11

nuclearism

combined

with

a quest

for

exclusive contnSI of the ~lUclear arena can only enhance the weapons' st~nding as a currency of power everywhere, creating a vicious circle of action and reaction from which there appears to be no exit. The seemingly invincible nation can never rest, facing as it does an ever-widening, ever-escalating iirena of threats, which span the world and could destroy it. !i0re
";....
"

than any other nation, the superbedevil.ed
f2y

power is psychol;giplly

....-----

vulnerability.

\

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ADI 2K5 BRUSCHKE REALISM BAD

P I___

LINK: FOREIGN POLICY FOREIGN POLICY REIFIES IDENTITIES TO CREATE EXCLUSION Campbell 1992 ... (David, Professor ofInternational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Wntmg Secunty: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 75-76)
\ 1 .y 0 reign 120 states with secure identities) is thus to b~J·.eLheQrjz~Q of Rre-established is;.y_{com,entional1 Y_!l nder~~QQd.aLthe_extemaLorieAtation as on~of the bo;;~:p'~;-d~~;~g p~;~t;;'~;'c~-;;t~;r-t;-~i~~-production a~d r(fufOcJ"iiCtlonoTtl1eiaentity in whose name ~tcs.l:Iowevei, we h,i've to be very careful in specifying the exact nature of the' relationship between state·based foreign policy and political identity. Foreign policy in the conventional sense is a modern cultural artifact implicated in the intensification of power in the state. It arises in a form that we would recognize as recently as the late eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries when organizations bearing the appellation 'foreign' ()r "external' first appear ilJ a systematic form. Originally somewhat puny in size, it was not until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that they took on the form of large-scale bureaucracies with global scope.64 This growth coincided with, and contributed to, a range of developments that led to the intensification of social power in the nation-state, produced the category of 'citizen,' and established nationalism as the primary form of social identity by the time of World War I. These developments included different modes of apprehending time in which literary forms such as the novel and the newspaper enabled people to think in terms of the 'nation'; rearticulations of the conventional understandings of time and space in domains as diverse as science, art, and industry; and the concerted effort to invent traditions, "Hoare national holidays, and rebuild capital cities so as to provide a particular historical understanding of the emergence of the modern state.65

I

ADI 2005 BRUSCHKE REALISM BAD

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MPX: VIOLENCE
Mimetic representations inevitably inhibit a positive engagement with the topic. Violent implications become self-fulfilling prophecies. BLEIKER, 2001 [Roland Bleiker, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No.3, pp. 509533]
An aesthetic move beyond the comfol1 of academic disciplines inevitably highlights the problematic dimensions of representation. Indeed, the closer one observes political stmggles on the ground the more one realises the manipulations of realities that are part of the very essence of politics. Look at how Michael Ignatieff has learned not from academic ruminating, but from extensive on-the ground experiences that 'all exercises in political judgement depend on the creation of "virtual realities", abstractions that simplify causes and consequences'.61 Indeed, the unproblematised understanding of reality-as-it-is. which permeates all mimetic approaches, can make sense only as long as it stays within the detached and neatly delineated boundaries of academic disciplines. As soon as one confronts the actual realities of conflict zones, it becomes evident that 'war is the easiest of realities to abstract', and that this abstraction process is intrinsically linked to whatever representational practices prevail at the time.62 Nowhere are the representational dimensions of politics, and our mimetic attempts to conceal them, more evident than in the domain of television; perhaps the most crucial source of collective consciousness today. Abstractions about war are intertwined with representational practices that are increasingly shaped by the dictates of the entertainmentoriented media industry. Consider the fact that 'the entire script content of the CBS nightly half-hour news would fit on three-quarters of the front page of the New York Times'.63 Or note how in the period from 1968 to 1988 the average sound-bite during televised coverage of US elections decreased from 43 to 9 seconds.64 Figures are probably even lower today, and whatever substance can still be packed into what remains is likely to get further blurred when presented in the context of other news and no-news, from drive-by shootings to touch-downs, famines, home-runs and laundry detergent adds.

The numbing regularity and the mimetic conventions with which these images and sound-bites are communicated to great masses soon erases their highly subiective and problematic representational form.

0

ADI 2KS BRUSCHKE REALISM BAD

TENDENCIES FOR GROWING STRONG LEADS TO MORE VIOLENCE.
Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert.SuperPo"Y:~tSY:'9f!f?:¥1:e, 2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9)

pp

11

Related Interests

7i119~·· T'

,

meric:a is "anointed"

in another

way. We have our

Q.wn ..strong tendencies toward an apocalyptic mindset, which make us susceptible to the contaRion of apocalyptic violence and quick to respond to such , viQlence in kind. Relevant here is George Bush's polarization of the world into good and evil, his concept of the "axis of evil" to describe'three nations considered antagonistic, and his stated goal of ridding the world of evil. In the mindset of the president and many around him, our actions in the world, however and unilateral, of "God's master plan" (in Bob Woodward's of those bellicose

are assumed to be part of a sacred design, paraphrase).

The most d,ire measures are iustifi~n because they have 1;0 carry out a divine project of combating evil. ~ken Jbi<: ('~n intensifies fundamentalist mindset blends with ::Inn bur military fundamentalism. Together they

lJ;

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ADI 2K5 BRUSCHKE

ft
apocalyptic combination American ~ent whose qdministered conversion by Billy

p

/_-

REALISM BAD

have given rise to a contemporary

American

version of

violence. The events of9/11 did not create this but did enlarge it exponentially: apocalypticism is fed by the rhetoric of a presto evangelical. ChristianityGraham, America's leading

evangelist-s~ved him from alcoholic self-destruction. Graham's son, Franklin, remains close to administration leaders, and has a tendency to be a bit more extreme than his father. When he recently called Islam "a very evil and but he may wicked religion," the White House quickly dissociated itself from that view and he was forced to apologize, well have been saying something tian fundamentalists, (During General Norman in Saudi Arabia, promise, Franklin widely believed by Chris-

including some in the administration. to stop encouraging Amer-

the first Gulf War, when asked by Commanding Schwarzkopf violating Graham's New Testaments

ican troops to distribute Arabic-language

Saudi law and an American answer was, ''I'm also under

orders, and that's from the king of kings and the lord of lords.") The "predominant "where attendance evangelicalism." Bush's own religious convictions have been associated creed" of the Bush White House, at Bible study was, if not compulsory, not

quite uncompulsory, either," has been "the cuI ture of modern

with dogmatic views and with tendencies toward perso12al and political fundamentalism. Certainly his administration

has been friendl~ to Christian fundamentalism, whi~~ provided much of his political base, and has.e~brac.ed ~any .. a f its passlOn ately held social and polttlcal vIewS. an ..... antiabortion star~d so extreme, for instance, that It has mterfered with inter~ational sion and homophobia discussion of AIDS. \ aid programs, and sexual ~epr.esso great as to block open sClenufic

(
"0

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ADI 2K5 BRUSCHKE

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SUPERPOWER HUMILIA nON TRANSFORMS INTO EXAGGERATED EXPRESSION OF VIOLENCE.

r

Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert. Super Power Syndrome, pp 107-109
domlDates and rules. Above all, it is never In important ways, then, the "war on ter-

2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9)

A superpower

..

to be humiliated. rorism" the humiliation

represe.Clts an impulse to undo violently precisely of that day. To be sure, the acts of 9/11 had by men convinced terms against a "crime

a warlike aspect. They were committed they could undoubtedly humanity." petrators be considered

that they were at war with us. In post-Nuremberg

The use of some kind of force against their perwas inevitable and appropriate. with American dealing The humiliation howthey as what world ambitions,

caused, together ever, precluded

with the attacks

were-terrorism by a small group of determined zealots, not war. A more focused, restrained, internationalized response to al-Qaeda Unfortunately, lMAny nation
>

could have been far more effective terrorism. from our

without being a stimulus to expanded sTlI'PT,n' .•. status and the syndrome wr attacked hum.iliated. But ~iven our national

our response was inseparable . in that way would

-

that went with it. have felt itself sense of being over-

\.;

1k4:,~pelmingly powerful and unchallen2:eable, to have our major institutions violpntly ppnetrated was an intolerable, even inconceiva hIp hrp"rh of
tc.. tLcontradiction
SlI

pprpower

inVl1lnerabilitll
can be

that specifically fed our humiliation.

We know from history that collective humiliation

a goad to various kinds of aggressive.behavior-as has been true of bin Laden and al-Qaeda. It was also true of the Nazis. Nazi doctors told me of in deli hIp ~rPDP~, whirh thf')' either witnessed after World
;:IS YOTlng

rh;lr1r~H. Sf beaten

';/en~told

:,lhnllt

hy

their fathers, of German

soldiers returning

home defeated

War 1. These

men. m::>ny of them

J ~

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~v
ADI 2K5 BRUSCHKE

p
REALISM BAD

--.--!-

";

,.

.='~,; ..•

wOllllded. eng-endered feelings of pathos, loss, .and embar---.
.

l~ssment. all ::1mi.-1~t n::1tional misery and threatened lution. where Such scenes, associated one coulc say that Hitler h~miliation, were seized upon by the Nazis

--

revoof

with strong- feelings rose to power

to the point nn the through was trans-

Rromise of a veng-ing them. With both al-Qaeda _manipulation and the Nazis, humiliation, but also powerful self-conviction,

~rmed into exag?--erated expressions of violence; Such psychological transfqrmation from weakness and shame to collective pride and a sense oflife-power, as well as power over others, can :::-eleaseenormous amounts of aggressive ~ energJ'-a dange:;ous potential that has been present from the beginning of the American "war" on terrorism:,J

LD

ADI 2005

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BRUSCHKE

MPX: BIOPOWER
Realism asserts a hegemony over representation --- it deploys the ultimate use of power in that it defines what it is to be rational. BLEIKER, 2000 [Roland; Coordinator of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Queensland, "Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics", pg 16]
Human agency is not something that exists in an a priori manner and can be measured scientifically in reference to external realities. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as human agency, for its nature and its function are, at least in part, determined by how we think about human action and its potential to shape political and social practices. The mutually constituted and constantly shilling relationship between agents and discourses thus undermines the possibility of observing social dynamics in a value-free way. To embark on such an endeavour nevertheless is to superimpose a static image upon a series of events that can only be understood in their fluidity. It is to objectivise a very particular and necessarily subjective understanding of agency and its corresponding political practices. The dangers of such an approach have been debated extensively. Authors such as Richard Ashley, Jim George and Steve Smith have shown how positivist epistemologies have transformed one specific

Realist perceptions of the international have'. gradually become accepted as common sense. to the point that any critique against them has to be evaluated in terms of an already existing and obiectivised world-view. There are powerful mechanisms of control precisely in this ability to determine meaning and rationality. 'Defining common sense', Smith thus argues, is 'the ultimate act of political power'." It separates the possible from the impossible and directs the theory and practice of international relations on a particular path.
interpretation of world political realities, the dominant realist one, into reality per se."

2\.

ADI 2K5 BRUSCHKE REALISM BAD

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I

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IMPACT FOREIGN POLICY REQUIRES THE CONSTANT JUSTIFICATION OF NORMALIZATION, RATIONALIZATION AND CONTROL OF THE STATE

Campbell 1992

..

(David, Professor ofInternational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Wntmg Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 55,56)
t/1T~~~~:.s,:2F~.~L~~~:~S~~L0~..!~9.9..::rr\~or.~.~_~!2.:!.,,~~~~!,::.:~.~~(t threats whrch abouno--lJrTt lS1lTIr~slmnle ..•,,,,,,,,"•• ethno"ranhlc _"''''''''''''''''''''~'''''''''''''''.nM''''>.,,.~,, ••..•.••. •••,,,,.,,,,,,.,, ,~,,.,.,
,,,,_,,.<ri:"""'''"'''''''''''''<.'''''' __ ·'''''''~9'''"",.,,,,,,,,,,,.,.,.,,,_,.,.,,,,,,,,,,,,, ..•• ,,,,,w,"_,,,,,,,,,,."".....".;J;.; •••..• ""'""<:"".,.,." ••",,,.··PI"'"""'b..,...-.,,.'.r'

';!.~;.r~:i.o~ ..,,~~,~lr_,S?,1l~i,~1529,i-j~.~~,l!}~<;{~,S,"~_,~ti~~"-~;r!~ ? ..o.~,d~~U?_=:~.!~£12," .. ~:......:~Ip~~~.!~blgul ty..2,f.22!~t?-qn1[~J;;,£~uIJ~~,ssL.!.,2£SQll13!}2.s.~ . ~j~~~,~~:~~,~S~fr~,~,~~,,2!L9oS!.\.tt~~(death, in its ultimate form)::nig~t E.~:e re!..~:.:':..::r..h~~!2fasrtre n~.);1'.,..god ~..!!!2.rJ.srn w~i2"f.~~~, •.fuuh not because It is peculiar to our time, but because it replicates the logic of
~stendom's evangelism of fear. Indeed, In.,~)y.~~E!~L.~~,,,,::,,::blsh,,,~a te .iJ,L~,i;L§Sg,\!r.~5L,,£b[9,yg!:uli§,~ s.~Il~§,,~~,SL9ij}Jg~E, low tactics are employed to-serve thescntg;h:ideals: ..s?Ene These tactlc~ a're'no'i:T~T;'~rent'to-tEe"1o-gTc'()rT;k'~'trty:~;llla;""o;)iY";;~I~T;:~s the definition of difference. But securing; an ordered self and an ordered world· particularly when the field-;:;"o~~;:a;;c'h"~tf;ls-~~~o~~~'~"';''''~';;t~;'"i;";~ 'eX1:ensjv€'''as''a'§J:af;;j''i;:;~~r~~Sm(,[~'fi'~T~itd~;'~m:;''t]dbr;';';d''';;~~'h'~''W;-Y"';-f

[~~~t~l~i~:'~r'~2t1i~~ii:~ii::~~:'§~'9"E::9Ji{~!:g$£I9'DJ:I9::~'~!4~I"::~,sI~i'ii~:~E~'
n:.~,~~~,~,9~!,,?L!2.1.~~~ '..irratio.?~l!,tX1"."~8,!1Qun~E!xj,,,,\Y'~§,~~I.,.§i,£!$!!,S§,§',,,B.~.f,,~f1X§lIx? incapacity, disorder;'[j1fiClI1ess,' unfreedom. They become material in need
_·",."'_"''''''''·'''.'P""".~ .. ~,''~C'''',.,r+'''f''<''",,,",,''- '~"~.""'.'.'''~; ••.,,,'''j.'''';:>'''''.C.-,)'J~'n",';>'~'''i',·(''; "'''''''!'_''';''"'>~'.',,:,w,''''''-~~:>''''''.~ "~"",:~:,,""""" ··"·'-'·""""·_'·"""'"''''''':~·'C<:'''''''''''~'_'''''!,t"'i''''', ";"':::'''''''''~·~'~''''''i'C,,-[

of ra~!.~E:3!!?:ation, .normalization, moralization, correction, punishment,
dj'sC;P \ n e,. dlSp'()S'a:r"real Iza'tion';~-e"tc:"5\~Tn""mnnvay,~"'the=:~'ta'te"project"of

i

s.~~~G!J51:"Z~I~i.[S~'~~~.~~F~"'2h~;~f;"'pr(;T~ct -;r-Salva~"hCstare-grounJ.;~
, legitimacy by offerin"g"th'C'~pro'niise 'or:~eclirity-w'lts citizens who, it says,

'.'~:()ii:l~J?~~~SL~r~:S:1~L~\!.!l;Thlli.,,~§'!i~sfi;:-T§:'~§I1iXSbJ'§fi~[I~_~CiLS:1iY
guarantecing salvation to its followers who, it sa.1s, would otherwise be
Jesti'i1ed-t~';;;";:;n'recrecme(rdeat!;::'rB'otf;""tE-;;-;t;t~

'~~~r~h~"~il;;~i~"~~"'~~1';';'

~l~i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'
ot erness, ""l'r'l""contrast to the statist discourse of international relations, this understanding proffers an entirely different orientation to the question of foreign policy. [n addition to the historical discussion above, which suggested that it was possible to argue that the state was not prior to the interstate system, ~J:hat instead of regarding foreiii£.. policy as the external view and rationalist orientation of a pre.established s'fiife;--rhe'lcfe'irti ty 0 f w 1:;I~hT;;--;;;;ille'-befOrelte-;:;re~in toreT';;'uoo;,-w'lth 'bth'ers;"we'C>rrr·c('j!l.:~~§:~£E~,~~!:~£<i!,§ii~~,,~:'!~I!i~~[r:¥toJtn:S~Ql§}.!r§:5}f da~~er'~,~~~D5:'§~Li~~,E,2",~U.~SJ&Q;Sw~!l;,:.l~~' The state, and the identity of 'n1an;"iocated in the state, can therefore be regarded as the effects of diiicour:~es-Or(r;-i11gC'r-w111chin()-re(jfteil"than-"i1ot-errno-'"St'rate-ies-of ~ ••.• _,,_ .•_.w,"w" •••.••.•_"""._,,"'_M_._"- •• ~,,_.,._•.•p._.,y_ ..,._-~,JL,.. _~ " orlieffiess'.""F'orcign "~ policy' thus needs to be ,u,Q1~.r.s"W gi:d!i,gJi~~So,,?, .. .\.L.g,~.•. Q
, '.' ,,,,.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,0;,,,,,.,,,,,,,,,, ..,,,,;,, ..••,.,,,,, ,

ho\i'n(G'''rati;''ettIlat'~'2t'"n';~'':':'~:E"'''d-~'''''-~",.,\,.."J,•. g,,,.~, ,.{!""g, ,;;:, . ,.,.,
.iJ" ..

.'.

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ADI 2K5 BRUSCHKE REALISM BAD

P

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IMPACT THEORIES OF FOREIGN POLICY REINTRENCH THE IDEA OF BOUNDARIES AND NATIONAL IDENTITY TO INEVITABLY CREATING STATIC IDENTITIES Campbell 1992 (David, Professor ofInternational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, pg. 69-70)
~.~_, •• '.,••" •• ·M ••·.,·" .•." •••••,,, ••,,•••••• •• <"'''~ ' ~

•..••·,·".,

__

~

" •.•" ...••.••.. M

•••• ,

••" •••.•"., "'•.,

-

Put simply, the principal purpose of this historical and theoretical exegesis has been to show that it is an impoverished understandinli" to b~~~s;~rwlJ:.r.-1~.YX~i]pg~te5-.1YiJb_M;fl!,!'~. !.e~~reign Po.icy ~~.:02!iQgs:I id<;..ntjtj~.Vlven the alternative standpoints from which one can appreciate the'coeval emergence of the 'state' and the 'international' system, it is not ,~.•...

possi~~~ ..sil.~_~l!.!g.<;;,E'?t\ll&.i'l!Yn,ati~_.[,!<l.?-Ji.2~~~l' ex~s~E ..the, atoJlJlze<hta-renhaCafe'fuliy-fle-dgealfitenslve entities In which IdentIty IS
,~.~.~~.,~~n :'.~.~,~.•E~~EI.,.,.~!!]-.~,,: .. .. ,!::1!].rJ.~.nIi;!,liy.![;,.. Jf. .. Q.\!£,.,,~!;Qg£,I~.~~!.~~ .. ; < .. . ~L,,~? i,?~ .. r.~~ policy. Foreign polley shIltsfrom a concern of relatIOns betwee1/ states which

~ec[;~~9..~~jiEt~~=:I~2::S9

.. ~~~~~~_~9.r.}bIi

place across ahistorical, frozen and pregiven boundaries, to a concern with the establishment of the boundaries that constitute, at one and the same time, the 'state' and 'the international system.' Conceptualized in this way, foreign policy comes t?J2s ~~eI~~_U!olitic~Lei:~Cti~JI1;t:7rr~ak~=~f9s:slg~;' certam eventsand~actQ[s"J~ Those events and actors that come to be q;;;Jg-;?~-;-~I-]"~h~ 'i~position of a certain interpretation are not considered as 'foreign' simply because they are situated in opposition to a pregiven social entity (the state). The construction of the 'foreign' is made possible by practices that also constitute the 'domestic.' In other words, forei&.:.20licti~~~~!£i~J'.ort of b..ott.!lda1J..:P'.:.!!!!ucillfip"o/itic.f!!..p.pjo17'!!!..lIce. _ ,40 This conception thus differs greatly from arguments which maintain either that domestic infli.lences are important in the construction of foreign policy, or that internatiollal influences playa role in structuring domestic politics.41 Both these perspectives rely on granting the domestic and the international realms an existence prior to history ano politics. In each case, the existence of the 'domestic' and the 'international' is regarded as an independently existing sovereign presence which exerts an influence over the other> ~Premised on the ontological assumptions of ambiguity, interpretation, rep;esentation, and discipline, ~.s._::.theoriz~tion of ~~~igrUJ.oliSY."J!.!..Lder~.~~~~~.for:!.~~.g?!~:L~~ 2Lp.'s~~<~i.£~~,,,.st~~t,,l~~.~ b~~9.!lS~.QL ... %.li.1.!}J~S•.• ... ,~.f1,,!11,~ ~.i~.~_?~:::.:.~~?';!. w~~.s!~~~ly.S~>~~}; •. E~.9L9m}}~.§i\s~£i.~g ~ .. b.~~~~~I.!~g)?f E F~~Ii~E.?J.!~1 .~.~~ co~_~~~roble~~,~2.!!'!!g£§...'2.~Je~._~:', i~ ?!:,~,J?~,~~~L3. ts:.SLR19£Y.§.L?LJE2..S!lEti()_~ ... .. !2~!lL!:,.~ce E ...~b.~~::.siPji2.l~~_.QX framing man in the spatial and temporal organization of the inside anq ;utsid~, sei7ancrother:~i~Zln-the-rst~t;-'::.:rlY >7."~~'"d7;-;;~)t operat;'in a.VQ.pre~existin~space. from which t~S.. !H~;,\,~,~,}.9 J dO!l1es}LS,:'ipcietyrn~rge: e Thei ~':;:e'ry-;p~'ratjon'fr~~;:U;5-th~;j'~';; society~'i~~ ~'h~;~ estic ~ na"J;~";,th'eycia'i'n; W-1Je' ope ratlngtilrOUgr]~·i]1eTi"-Claim,··tQ·kno·w·' 'tf;~' soljrc'e'-o(~threats~"to ; ~~ •.•.•.•...• .,..".,."" ...•.•..,"",...• ",..•... .•.,,_._.,.,,,.,_,~ . ~ ~,,.. ....• ","".,",~;"",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ,,,,. ,••..:'-"~,".>,~:,~;:.":.~".,,,.,...., "'"-'~",.>!~.''''''''''~';' •••. , ' •. ~·".''''!~···<''''''''··t:<''''''~~!'':'''~~t>'''~''''~·.1'.'~''
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ADI 2K5 BRUSCHKE REALISM BAD

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.effecteLl, is intrinsicall)' gendered,

.'V. \

Llornestic society anLi'man,' In this sense, we can unLierstand 'international i;o Ii ~i~~7;;;";~ 'l~~~a~~i-;;-~'~d;";;'i~tio n 0Ta:;-~-d ang~~~GS-:theexternail'zati~'r1 a~ti()j16Tl1angers, aname mobilizationotpopu!;;tiC;;sw'COi1trol th~sedangers - all-;n'th-e-i1;meorasocillfwtaTlty'-tfi7iT'ls''rieve,:-reaIly 'wTthin,--ancl'rl1atisneve-r p;es;;i1~'tJ;;-;-t-;I~~y;c-;;;taT;;";traCe;0 I' the ou tsiLie ;nore than an effect of the practices by which total• dangers.. are inscribeLl:43" ·'~-"'''''_'''''''·~",u.'"'t'V>:i'·~_''-'''''~=··''''''''-_''··''·''''''~''''''~_''''''~'''''N)·''''',~""."",,,~,~,,,,,,,,.'·'·-'1"· - ....••. .....: ·-.".~;·"<"'~,·+ •....• . y·'~-. ,•..• •... ~~'·_~'~R..:''''''s''' V •••• .,.
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'·'-(~ITiS~.:e,,r,i!I~~~~YFi;;Tl"-iillW .. LJ2.~undaries and. establi~iL_rr.l~!;!HiD.g
~~~P.:&~!~"'!£iE,gofaIJ.LQiglJi.r.y - practices that can be said to operate in non· purposive ways approximated by Bourdieu's understanding of the 'conducwrless orchestration of collective action and improvisations' and Foucault's 'strategies without a knowing strategist,45 - usually locate ~ dangers to 'man' in terms of threats emergin other domestic societies, l~~i;;nal politic';(~·.g.nucfear war, interstat;c(;';;'ftict, environmental degradation, or the relative autonomy of global capital) are conventionally unLierstood as being composed of threats to a pregivei1; already constituted and well·bounded identity in the form of the state. (~earry,sucTilSslieS'-are vitally important, but an understanding of ti:;;;;;J <is ~eats_C?!JTieir i~/ .~,~~~ (:(~P~!2~!3i?!!:Tfon .. §S~~~:?n ~ tion In die external, anarchic realm. GivenaTI the ~ib1(;" locations of .

~b~~~~F1~1!~:,~n~El~If'[,1iUI:SQ.£!£Rgli~:.\y9:rL~)9£&.9.Ui:I£.~:Ei~~0.,~ e)\:t~.~~.~I .. ~.~I~;.~>~~,.S?,!?~.0<~~,~,0,s;.~~g~?5A.~\~ 3 .. ~~!Df.,~8.~~~Ls,~1~[.~~~£;!g~~ ~ .. .... ix.s,~Q, \ \ ~~ E
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ADI 2KS BRUSCHKE REALISM BAD

P

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REALISM PERPETAUTES

Campbell 1992

HIERARCHIES

AND NORMALIZATION

(D~vid, Professor ~fInter~ational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security: Umted States ForeIgn Po hey and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 72)
//;f'he need to discipline and con~~i'n' ~h~' a';~'bi'~'t~ityand contingency of th ~-'d ~·~-;;·;uc·;"·r;:;·aTi1-i1.';;iVltars6"llrceoTt!i·e"·e-xteinaIlzaoonal1'a~totaf1zat;o;1'

.(iL~l~~~~02~~h~~!·~~2n_~~~~~~:~ .. !~~~;~~~gcrrill~~ch~ ~

?L.f(!,[S!.g.!)~p.?I!.?y_f.?r..5.~.S.5~~,r,S,,~,~.s.}2£~~~,~~L~~S!~.~.~.S,,~.~!::r::'S~!..~~!;,~2[ ... ;>,_~.r:Y t .. .~I~".~5~}~~.S::i;;,tj!!.g.,i.I~~.~.!.!_SL:~ia,,~J£S,r.~~ •.:'::~I.;.-~.:.:E.~S ..,f?m~~.S.\X~nS,§~."QL{o..!:.~L~n policy as one political practice among many which serves to discipline

~Pa~~~~ii~~:;;i~;~t~f~lH~i~J.i{~~t:,~~kri~I~~~~t
specific domain. This can be understood by reference to Ashley's discussion ~ftl;;;';i;;;;digm of sovereignty:") , '., ,.;rhe paradigm of sovereignty is not a paradigm in the Kuhnian sense of ..a 'conceptual resource that man applies to make sense of the world: it is a problcmatization in the Foucauldian sense that serves (() discipline the ambiguity and contingency of history by differentiating, hierarchizing, and normalizing the site in which it operates. 52 But it is also more than that. Ambiguity is not disciplined by reference to a pregiven foundation. That • 'foundation' is constituted through the same process in which its name is invoked to discipline ambiguity.
(' 'r.:!L~I211.msjigl].L9..L.~P.y.cre.igntY._.QP_(;mg,.L9..rJ ... ~.h>~,.J~~s _0.~le i,~_,.£L2. _ ~i~~'!..t::?'~~'y":.~,9;:~!~j,gr.:.tL:-:.~!~y,~.(\I;U!L~.hY, Although these terms have special significance within the discourse of international relations - a significance that depends LtpOn their effectiveness elsewhere - sovereignty and anarchy

~§~~;~~~~~~~~u~~&~H~J@2~0~~ self/other'i;Hional/irratiOllal true/false order/disorder and so on. to"ea'ch
ii'isC;ii1c'e, ..tile former is the higher, regulative ideal to which the latter is derivative and inferior, and a source of danger to the former's existence ..J!! ;?!'.-:!?.L!:;::~;l.~~~ 'so~.,~E~£~~Y~.f r its eq uivalent) o s.~(3!:i!!.~~ ..~.~;::.r;;~:E..L9..~~i~!9n, .. 9
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are replicable .concepts that are pivotal for the consuuction'i'j)"various-r:e-alms

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7--5

ADI 2K5 BRUSCHKE

p_/REALISM BAD

SELECTIVE PROFESSIONAL NUMBING COULD INCREASE THE THREAT OF TERRORISM IN AMERICA. Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert. Super Power Syndrome, 2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9) pp 152
People und,ergo instance, who deal regularlx what ~he sur~eon with death-related an open-heart matters For proceI call selective professional numbing. performing

dyre cannot afford the emotions of the patient's family m~[nbers. The professional task requires a rf'rt::J n fO,ll "r-r!

i

detachment. The same is true of political and r11ilitary 'l~aders who make rl.erisions about-vio]f'n,f' and war, But there is a grave danger of ex~~~~i-~eprofessional numbing in the service of what leaders take to be their

:orceful goals. S~ch excessive post-WI 1 numbing clearly tncluded the blocking out- of the potential "effects of a~ressive American policies on Islamic minds, and the . tent to which those olicies could i crease he terrorist :hreat to America. It also blocked out significant concern :wer non-American the later Iraq war. casualties in either the Afghanistan
\J

or

'7J.o

ADI2K5
BRlfS,(}i ,KE /

EVENTS AND MOVEMENTS ARE INEVITABLY OVERDETERMINED. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL FORCES PERPETUATE TERRORISM.
Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert. Super Power Syndrome,
2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9)

pp

93-94

mmediately after the attacks of September 11, there was a widespread feeling among Americans that asking questions about the sources of, or trying to understand the roots of, Islamist terrorism was in bad taste-or worse. All that mattered was fighting back. If that feeling was understandable, it was also wrong-headed and made more so by the way the Bush administration used such reactions to advance its own agenda. Our leaders imposed a simple good-versus-evil global dichotomy on events am: held to it, to the point of denouncing more nuanced rd1ection as "aiding the terrorists" or "unpatriotic." That kind of approach was a prescription for J narrow and militaristic nationalism and moralism. To be sure, there is neither a single cause ofIslamist ter:.:ro[ism-GI any other kind, for that [natter-nor is there a_single reLtionship between it and any particular society. History does not work that way; events and movemern;:, are inevitably overdetermined. We can, however, speak of ~ terrorist dynamic, a convergence of forces both psychological and historical that motivate and perpetuate behavior we designate as terrorism. That kind of model enables us to view al-Qaeda and related movements as many-sided, as, in fact, postmodern combinations of disparate elements: ancient Koranic doctrine recast and rendered Islamist; long-standing historical anger now directed at newly humiliating American incursions in the Middle East; contemporary worldwide fundamentalist and apocalyptic currents; anti-Western and antimodern impulses that have nontheless absorbed aspects of various Western ideologies as well as advanced technologies; and video and cinematic imagery drawing upon universal but mainly American-inspired popular culture. r£hese influ~ces have converged in a mission to depose existing ~gimes in Islamic cultural areas, attack the American s_uperpower. and ultimately Islamicize the cosmos. The model suggests that Islamist terrorism is by no means "caused" by American policies, but also that A~_e_r_i_ca_r_l_ policies can have a copsiderable effect on the natur~ s~
rb>1t

tt'rrorism:::j

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ADI 2K5 BRUSCHKE REALISM BAD

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AMERICAN WAR-MAKING FEEDS TERRORISM IN A VIOLENT CIVILIZA TIONAL STRUGGLE.

r

Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert. Super Power Syndrome, pp 104-105
Beyond the rejection America. of such temptatioo;,-however, of standing is experience up to the West,

2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9)

the revitalizing particularly

As Islamic observers friendly to the

United States have said of bin Laden: "What he says <l d n d.ges represents what many [Muslims or Arabs] ~yanr to arrogance." Bin ,arJen promises not say ~lnd can't," He thus becomes "a symbol of defiance in . t;b.eface of American
T

--

just the end of T~l::!mir humiliation. but the dramatic centuries-olrJ p<lttern: now it is the United reversal of
<"

States that i~ being humiliated.

"What

the United

States

tastes today· is a very small thing compared to what we have tasted for tens of years ... hUlll~iliation and conteml?t for ll1or~ th;;n ~ifhty years," Bin Laden's flamboyant . quisher, charisma is deeply intertwined with his attempt to create a new pan-Is1an1ic identity, warrior on a mission for God,

a "new" self that is no longer to be the victim but the vanan aggressive armed and capable of humiliating the enemy. He can thus mobilize pa~-Islamic idealism, which then becomes tragically channeled rorist'dynamic into murderous by reinforcing expressions of martyred violence. Ari1erican war-making in response feeds the terthe Islamist claim to being-

engaged in a violent civilizational struggle. The Unitied States thus becomes crucial to that new Islamist ideI~tity as an Islamist version of the anti-Christ, a Goliath that must be slain along the way to an apocalyptic realization~ This is the meaning of the American novelist Denis Johnson's comment on the terrorists: "They hate us as p~ople hate a bad God, and they'll kill them-

selves to hur.t us." Unfortunately, the "bad God" continues to behave in ways that heighten Islamic anger and feed apocalyptic fantasies.

I

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ADI 2K5 BRUSCHKE
i)
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IMPACT GENDER ST ATE CONSTRUCTION PERPETUATES GENDER CONSTRUCTION Campbell 1992 (David, Professor ofInternational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 10,11)
1~-'-,-?~;~i~7~::;'-~;gumentisdirected primarily at how the regime of Masculine/ feminine disCiplines the sexed body. But If.i~ the culturally pervasive .~~gLE!..sgendeUlorms it is co~..[!lSsl \vith, it is not ipelausible to s,~g.~~~~_~~"at a sin:.il_~~:0!iJme;,':,(): Ie~stthege~dcr n:o~ms;-hich it eifecJ;~ at. ~rates .I~ other d.omams and dIsciplines o,ther Ide~~I~les.'.-:~.,:~~~~e~~,) !ndee~, If we con~~!.ill;r hQlY_~J!!1derstandlng ~~l~~~cS IS he~vtlLlndebted and to_,~,,9Y)_~u t:~,Q~,2E!.1.yJrUy]1js.b._!.<;.g!LQn, ...L~ILQl).ality, masculini ty are rsive__ Ii~~p~~..c!-=~~~~J-pe~~~~~-,-_Ji~tio'.!.<1.~.~~y~!:'~-~!11;n]i11ti~-i~-Ti:;~t r.~u.~ __ d I~fi~~_~~_~e.p~.,::~~~~_ tha~_gen~LJl.91illLhay"~ ;!!,~.t:.! cons!itu te the ..... p.e9 norl'£l.~ L§,~,a~~£r~IX~. __ 9 Therefore, in terms of the axioloii~~j"'di';;;en~~~-;';--~f s~tiali.:!.ngyr~ctices, 'the body' can-bZ~-;:;-~~-d;;bei~;-;;I:;T;-w-;:r;;lIy welr:z;stalJTishedanalog for the constitution of state identity. This becomes e~~n--:-~(~~:§)pa-l:entwh-;;i tTiTnkofhow 'the b09Y-QQ)Ttic:"f.unctionsa.;we a regulati ng ali·u"riorrimliZjngtI:(.i~rOr-:'1kP.Q~a discussion "Wb'~-found in-Cl1apt-;;-aOlir):l'vlorco'ver, c;ntral to that regularli.ul.a~J!.!izati.2!k;!J1d
~ Ii~~?,!~_~:!i,~!::,~~,~,~ .f.ii\fJ,~ ,.,t§, .~~_~~_~~:1.95.,:3.S95?sL~ .. ,.p!.lY~~,~.9.i!J§.\ill1};_y,",2£1!'1~"~:=.y fo,r.~!~>~_y?.~,~'yoc~!~.9_,~,b~,1;~~,!~,Sig!:..9L5!~_n.~~!:- the identi~~ J Accordingly, ,~-':~,_~,~~:~~,,:-;.~~~,~_,,!~ .. g},Uil~-~,9~ilnfL£s\?!.~9.~SS$!~_f9!~~,f;.~.E~~liSy,.j~.l~~1.y. ~ ..s~,!~~

t,o.be".I)1s,YJ1b.,",4.,»:,},\b.,H!RE,.S9.~~e;,~_9L.!!j~!:!9.y,l_yd}.l;.fui.U~iQ~9,1J;!1.Q!?era: ,'::} ~.rrr~3'~~'·i7:~~~~t::~~~~·~~f~:~~:~;;~il~~:~~Td~;~~t~¥'~;~J'iI~~~~;}6~~~I't'::s 'that r;'1~;:;ihacr~ of~.~ .[i;;;E.Y:::;PZEt~'bl~ ..E ,~';;:;-;~th~'b;ry';;;rth;;" s~~~S:.~l~_p.0'lor!l1J!!.i velY"'£Q.!1E1l~ ..h;~~~11ru2~;"t!£naG~f:rt;;;ns

~£:~.:?E .. ~~;~.f.!?l!!}9,ll1i$ill"a lSQ.l1$;.!:<nJ;~i!.$":J.he.$.t!i!,!J;..:....:,~¥!!£LtXl.::;X>\!k;~~~~~~!i'gIi;:
s~~,~:::;,&!2~):'},,~SW;,?,",1£t:er all, isn'tsecur~ determined by the requirements ~at~ and war conducted in it~ name a~a rcspon...s_e ~,~.2.?jective ~~!lJ.:l0w l!ls!1£~[1 w~sRe~,2[~~~:'*~D~~.s,~~s.. acknowIea-ge-ffie non-essentialistic character of dang~r? ---rnaeea,rr;lichortne-COnvent1onai""'(~-r';t~ Q~~e ~-....,.......,••..",",..w..~~ nation __ ~~~."""~"~r~_"~~""'~~· ..... state implies th~£..,t,b.&;N,~~~Q,f.JJ:1$:l2.~~er p~~~s, t.~~l~:!l,!): of~l~tte.~~,~ tl1af'iFi'e"'j'deni:Tty a 'people' is the basis for the 1~l.!iw..a£<Y..Q,f of th~tat~"~~ its..... ;~;I;~~enrpracEices:"'.ffii~i,~:muchorth7 historical sociology' recent that the st-;;re-;;:wre-ortent~--;;otprece(fe'in:ne'-"" on this topiC Fi~ nation: that nationalis~~ constru7t'ofi:lie'stare'"in "'2ursuICoJ'its _~ _ ... ~~1>~~~~_p.,-".""~.',,,""''''''"'''-~'!O''!< legitimacy, BenedictAl'iderson,~r6r example, has argued in compelling f';shlon'~f.hat '~~,_n~ti~~':"Sho~~?~~r:~~glE.s:lJ?_~l,iti~,~1 communI ty' tha~~~~-oi11Ti IUQ....Iar..~t.!L~~.E!!fu~!~.~_~~..:. presented textuallyY Equally, Charles Tilly has argued that any coordmated, hierarchical, and territorial entitY should be only understood as a 'national state.' He stresses that few of these national states have, ever become or presently are'nation~states' - national states whose sovereign territorialization is perfectly aligned with a prior and primary form of identification, such as religio!l, language, or symbolic sense of self. Even States, Australia, Canada etc.) cannot be considered nation-states even ' modern-day Great Britain, France and Germany (and, equally, the Un~'ted though they are national states.32

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ADI 2K5 BRUSCHKE

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REALISM BAD

I

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WAR MAKING LEADS TO WAR FEVER. Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert. Super Power Syndrome,
W~r-making can quickly become associated with "war fever," the mOQilization of public excitement to the point V-. of a collective : experience. of transcendem:e. 'War then""" b_ecomesheroic', even mythic, a task that must be carried out for the defense of one's own nation, to realize its special destiny and the immortality of its people. In this case, .the growth of war fever came in several stages: it began with Bush's personal declaration of war immediately after September 11, ~ad a modest rise with the successful invasion of Afghan'istan, and then a wave of ultrapatriotic excesses-triumphalism, and the labeling of critics as disloyal or treasonous-at the time of the invasion of Iraq. War fever tends always to be subject to disillusionment. Its underside is death anxiety, in this case related less to . combat than to fears of new terrorist attacks at home or against Americans abroad-and later to growing casualties in occupied Iraq. The scope of George Bush's war was suggested within days of 9/11 whe~l the director of the CIA made a presentation called "Worldwide Attack Matrix" to the president .and his inner circle, which described active or planned pperations of va;'ious kinds in eighty countries, or what :.woodward callec: "a secret global war on terror." Early [on, the presiden: had the view that "this war will be ::Xought n many fronts" and that "we're going to rout out o

2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9)

fP 111-112

';;. "

11

:D

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," 1\
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/

terror wherever it may exist." Although under consideration long before 9/11, the invasion ofIraq could be seen as a direct continuation of this unlimited war-all the more so because of a prevailing tone among the president and his advisers, who were described as eager "to emerge from the sea of words and to pull the trigger." The war on terrorism became apocalyptic, then, exactly because it was militarized and yet ;]morphous, without

------------~--.:....:.-.--:._--

li.mits of time or place, and because it has no clear end.J! tl;.erefore enters the realm of the infinite. Implied in its approach is that every last terrorist everywhere on the earth is to be hunted down until there are no more terrorists anywhere to threaten us, and in that way the world will be rid of evil. Bush keeps his own personal "scorecard" for the war in the form of photographs, brief biographies, and personality sketches of those judged to be the world's most dangerous terrorists, each ready to be crossed out if killed or captured. The scorecard, he told Woodward, is always at hand in a desk drawer in the Oval Officej

>~\

ADI 2K5 BRUSCHKE REALISM BAD

P

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WAR RESULTS INTO FEAR OF INSECURITY AMONG AMERICANS WHICH LEADS TO WORLD WAR 4 ..
Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert. Super Power Syndrome, 2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9)

r

pp 115-116
Despite the Bush administra"?fon's constant invocation

of the theme of "security," the war on terrorism has created the very opposite-a sense of fear and insecurity amo~g Americans, which is then mobilized in support of further aggressive pI2.ns in the ext~nsion of the larger "war." What results is a vicious circle that engenders what we seek to destroy: our excessive response to lslamist attacks creating ever more terrorists and, sooner or later, more terrorist attacks, which will in turn lead to an escalation of the war . on terrorism, and so on. The projected"victory" becomes ~

f~rm of~wes~ive)longing, of sustained illusion, of an ~ending "Fourth World War" and a mythic cleansingof terrorists, of evil, of our own fear. The American military apocalyptic can then be said to partner with and act i.[l concert with the Islamist apocalyptic. l'

~1--

ADI 2K5 BRUSCHKE REALISM BAD

p

/

NON-WESTERN STATES ARE OFTEN OVERWHELMED BY THE WEST MILIT ARIL Y, TECHONOLOGICALL Y, AND CUL TURALL Y. Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert. Super Power Syndrome, pp 102-103
r1slamics
h<lv(>

2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9)

mstainl,d

their

nnmbers

in the world

(now on the order of one billion) b~t they have been othen,vise overwhelmed by the West: militarily, technologicall , and to a considerable de ree, culturall .. Islamics know themselves to be heirs to extraordinary past

achievements intellectual and scientific, arti·stic, DOli!ical and religious but the modern world has emerged mostly from an aggressively failures of blamic expansive West and the culand technology. amidst The stagture it expor~ed with its weaponry

governments-poverty

gering undistributed wealth, corrupt institutions, desp~tic rulers can easily be attributed by fanatical leaders like bin Laden simply to the humiliating hand of the West. And, of course, WF'~tF'rn policies, historical ~]nrJ contemporary, have!:Ione much to feed that perception . .,

3~

ADI2K5
BRUSCHKE
REA LISIVf BAD

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Acting as planetary policeman the United States has tried to restructure Iraq with its own vision Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert. Super Power Syndrome, 2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9)
he invasion ofIraq was a continuation of the American military apocalyptic: of destroying what is deemed necessary for the reshapinE of a designated part of the wodd. The extremity of the project ano the ewa . about the utopian d{eams of global domination that la were hidden behind administration assertions need for disarrhament,

regime change, and dernocratiza-

tion. Inevitably, the war-fighting, which was the destruccive phase, was; much more efficient than what columnist William P. Pfaff called the "planned (or as it seems, largely unplanned) pa¢ification and reconstruction" of Iraq that followed. But a~ he went on to say, "The moment of victory bas been seized to start reshapin~ the Middle East." This attempted American resl~aping of the whole region according to an world vision has already involved strong- presand Iran, aimed at its worst, minimally has wavered at

sures on Syria; Lebanon, hope. ThIS administr,ation,

between excessive secrecy and sudden, dire warnings of the "inevitability" of terrorist attacks with weapons of mass ~truction on our soil-warnings that often seem to e timed to deflect embarrassing criticism a hn1Jt rfficial measures taken to prevent or prepare for terrorism. On other occasions, the administration has spoken in more about the says and of these perceive of even tones. But there remains much uncertainty connection between what the administration what it does about terrorism, words and actions tl1emsel ves to face. and the relationship Americans to the dangers

-

Americans

therefore

have been left with a mixture

enthusiasm, confusion, anxiety, and anger in relation to the official survivor· mission thFir zovernment has Fmhraced in their name following upon 9/11 A no there is lingering unease about our targeted but still unaccounted for d;;nons, Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar, and Saddam Hussein, who in one way or another, tinue to haunt us. dead or alive, con-

BRUSCHKE - \ AUl2KS ~

I

REALISM BAD

t

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At the saime time, our leaders have eXploited the nUCIear fear ,of Americans for geopolitical and milit;;y purposes. Th'e GuU War ot lYYU-91 gained congressional support only: after George Bush Sr, declared that there was new evidence about the advanced nature of Iraq's nuclear projdct. More recently, the younger Bush's administration, in attempting to demonstrate Sad dam Hussein's actIve pursUlt ot a nuclear weapons program, did not ju-;t provide dubious or misleadin evidence as in the case of a number of ~ther claims, such as Saddam's alleged ties to
.()')

al·-Qaeda), it made use of completely forged and falsified ([ocuments, no doubt originated by others but passed on by our own intelligence agencies under pressure to support the American argument. The temptation of our .-,-. ,~~_._~= leaders is to tap into primal American nucle~0win (;cler to affirm their own aggressive fear-driven policies. -Nuclear fear comes to be juxtaposed wIth tear of terrorism, and the combination is politically mampulatecJ in the dilenioll of mililary solUliolls to be carried out by tho5rin power; theIr message IS that only mIhtary mIght can protect us. In that way nuclear fear becomes a key lever for the militarization of societt.-::.J

'~5

ADI2KS BRUSCHKE

p_J_
REALISM BAD

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE MECHANISM FOR CURRENCY OF POWER. MANY EXAMPLES.
Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert. Super Power Syndrome, pp 132-134 2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9)

r The administration ha~ --------.-""

in fact, managed to give Rucle:if

weapons increasing value globally as the currency ofpo~-.::r; irs-::1.ctions the Middle East and East Asia have provoked in Iran and North KO,rea to accelerate their own nuclear prQ::; grams and could, by a kind of domino effect, contr~ the nuclear arming of oth~ countries, including Japan. This unapologetic nuclearism has undoubtedly been a way of countering the superpower fear of vulnerability, more intolerable because nuclear of trickle-down and nowhere is that vulnerability The pattern including is ominous than in assoproliferation, nuclearism, is but

ciation with others' nuclear weapons. the phenomenon

a reality of the post-Cold Bush administration tends to focus

War "second nuclear age." The of "counter-proliferation," the to the

has been aware of this danger,

on a policy

which includes the possibility of military attacks on countries that possess or are in the process of acquiring weapons and are deemed unstable or antagonistic

~

?56

ADI 2K5 BRUSCHKE

ft
United States.jIhe
,

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REALISM BAD

administration

has also threatened
<

to

use nuclear weapons on anyone who uses weapons of mass destruction ag:ainst the United States (a threat that was made to Iraq iil the prewar months in connection with its , possible use of; chemical or biological weapons). ~merican l(~aders went further. ~\?ey jl~stified the preventive attack;on Iraq with the claim that it was illegally stockpiling weapons bf mass destruction. And while there was certainly
~l

grand imperial design b~hind the war, the

superpower fear of others' weapons of mass destruction was at issue as well. To be sure, the manipulative American presentat~ons destruction of "evidence" for Iraqi weapons of mass purchases (i~lcluding the citing of crudely forged docurevealed Iraqi urariium

-

ments that supposedly

in the African: country of Niger) were largely a pretext for an invasion the Bush administration had long been determined to carry out. SlIt the nee(Lt~Rreserv~ths:jJl)).~ion-of invulnera~0_ty also played its part, contributing to a selfproclaimed entitlement to head off imagined future dangers, including the possibility that Saddam Hussein with nuclear weapons nuclear war program a declared which (although nlight Iraq war a of an~ onl)!. posa provide al-Qaeda

has had no functional became a preventi,y.e

1990s). In that sequence, ;

.~-

since the early became

"preem}2tive"

in turn

"~oullter-_prol;iferation" war. ' In this way the approach to th,e very real problem nuclear prol~feration was thoroughly nuclear. militarized,

itself rendered ~uperpower s~uch w~ld

potentially

Ultimately,~he

finds it difficult weapons, it might

to tolerate allYOneelse surrender its own

and no less difflmlt

to imagine nuclear

in which

arsenal. As one American

official was quoted as saying,

when asked about proliferation, "My ideal for the perfect number of nuclear-weapons states is one.':.j

'~'l

ADI 2K5 BRUSCHKE

P-_/_REALISM BAD

The fear of weakness has driven the D.S to use more aggression towards other nations Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert. Super Power Syndrome, 2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9)
t~e world's only superpo~er is haunted by a fear of weakness. From psychiatric experience with individuals, we know that underneath eXpreSSiOnS ot megalomania

-

-

-

a~ms to omnipotence there tend to be profound feelings of powerlessness and emptiness. Feelings on that order may affect our leaders' projections of world co_ntrol. These could take the form of fear of the political fragmentation of our society, with accompanying death anx-

i~ty related not just to 9/11 but to the parenti;:)1 collapse of the superpower entity itself. Underneath our leaders' arrogant 'profound certainties concerning the world, there may lie intedoubts about our own SOCIaland national

gration, about America's control, of itself. Fear of beiR out of control can lead to the most aQ"Q"ressiveefforts at t-;-tal control of everyone else.

Helping

to ,overcome such fear is the claim to transcen-

dent American I, virtue, to providing beneficent and liber' ating service fO the world. That sense of a m.ission both altruistic and ?acrecl can generate a surge of power that, in turn, suppresses feelings of powerlessness and weakness. Fear of weilkness is, of course, bound up with related feeTI~gs of vulnerabilIty, WIth a superpower's sense of being a very visible target, and with its unrealizable requirement of omnipo!_ence. The world's only superpower ~target not j{lst because it is so dominant has become

but because its

recent policies and attitudes, emerging from superpower syndrome, have antagonized just about everyone. Its, unrealizable omnipotence has caused its leaders to embark on '4. ' an §!ggressive! quest for absolute security via domination, which is another form of entraDment in infinitY"---J

::P

ADI 2KS BRUSCHKE

P

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REALISM BAD

D.S manipulation of the Iraqi War images only masked the instability of the country Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert. Super Power Syndrome, 2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9)
rThe actual invasion ofIraq abruptly changed the Amer. ican psychic landscape. While there were extensive protests right up to, and after, the moment of invasion, the country at large quickly rallied around in chief, with high approval the Hag and the commander ratings for both the war and

the president. A!:lericans were mesmerized by the "shock and awe" Baghdad bombing spectacle that began the war, including its display of video-game-like high-tech accu. r~cy, sometimes accompanied by scenes of visual beauty (explosions under a waning moon). But there remained considerable uneasiness about this demonstra rinD of unlimited seemingly and unopposed American power. Americans war and to could thrill to the brilliant success of the ground fighting, but could also wonder Iraqi casualties. Most Americans ,tory enthusiasm

-

complete victory after less than three weeks of why it had all beenso easy, by evidence of extensive responded, according to

and in some cases become troubled

public opinion polls, as they were meant to, with celebrafor a noble victory, while a significant machine

--

minority decimating

saw the world's most powerful military

a small, weak country and were ashamed.

t

\
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~C\

ADI2K5
BRUSCHKE REALISM BAD

P-_/_-

/~

\
articularly confused by the responses

Americansiwere

of Iraqis. There were no flowers-In- an receptions of the kind predicted by some American leaders. There was some fierce but very brief military ·resistance. There were
I

earl'y-.:cenes ~f apparent joy on the part of the populace, fe~uring the:dramatic toppJin£"and smashing (with considerable help from IS marine tanks) of the most gigantic of all the S<iddam Hussein statues. That image of the tumbling, disintegrating statue was seized upon by American cable-television networks, replayed endlessly, and applauded by'the president as emblematic of the administration claim~that it had <:,mbarkedon a war of liberation
1:

which woulq free Iraqis from the control of a murderou~ §tator. Rnt!it btpr tllrnprl out that only a couple of hundred Iraqis actually took part in the demonstration. And ;bile many Iraqis initially seemed to feel great relief that Sad dam had gone, the mood would darken, revealing within a matter of days that American planners had prepared well for war but not for "peace." Our military units could not in the ensuing months even restore electric power in the capital to ,he> 1e>F'1~ m~intained by the-.previous regim;e, no less provide jobs for a largely unemployed peop~e and a dem~lized Iraqi..;lm:.J

uo

ADI 2KS BRUSCHKE REALISM BAD

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/ ----

ANY USE OF THREAT BY THE STATE LEADS TO THE CONSTANT EXTERMINATION OF THE OTHER

Campbell 1992
(David, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 53,54)

- ~LIn

this c~ntext ~f incipient ambiguity securing

brought

upon by an insistence

"

that can no longer be grounded,

identity in the form of thc state

.', .. \.. rgnuires~lp~a:~s

on t~~.$lshet~~~d~!;geredE.~~!~_.?E~h..~.~o.El~~

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WE MUST RECONCEPTUALIZE FOREIGN POLICY IN ORDER TO DECONSTRUCT NOTIONS OF THE OTHER

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Campbell 1992
(David, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 24)
/J{orty's ~;rthodox rendering of the cold war invites a critiquc informed bYii'n orientation in which the seemingly intransigenr strucwres of history are effects (although very powerful effects) of a variety of uncoordinated practices of differentiation that serve to constitute meaning and idemity through a series of exclusions. In this context, the imposition of an interpretation upon the ambiguity and contingency of social life always results in an other being marginalized. i\-leaning and identity are, therefore;) always the consequence of a relationship bctween the self and the other which emerges through the imposition of an interpretation, rather than being the product of uncovering an exclusive domain with its own preesrablished identity. A reconceptualization of foreign policy along these lines is not only theoretically wellgroundcd, but also provides a means of critically exploring the open-ended character of the foreign policy texts which have been important in establishing the discursive boundaries of US foreign policy;:=:>

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