Their quest for a idealistic bring the ideal into reality

utopia inevitably

becomes apocalyptic


as followers



Lifton in 2003 (Robert, Super Power Syndrome)
Think of apocalyptic violence as a form of ultimate idealism, a Quest for spiritual Utopia. The word apocalypse derives from the Greek term for "revelation" or "uncovering." In Judaism and Christianity, the apocalyptic revelation came from God and concerned a powerful event. In Christianity especially, the event came to be understood as the end ofthe world itself, or as a prophecy of that end. What gives these visions their allure is that such an end, involving untold vistas of destJ'uction, only foretold a new beginning. All-consuming violence in obliterating a hopelessly corrupt world was, in fact, required for the hopeful and lofty rebirth that was to follow. Apocalyptic imagery exists in all the major religions. Since it is most specifically a part of Jewish and Christian doctrine, students of religion have rightly warned against invoking Western assumptions when interpreting Islam. But Islam contains its own versions of the apocalyptic, as in fact do secular proj ections of world destruction and recreation found in extreme ideological movements like Communism and Fascism. Such ima2ery is part of a universal mythology of death and rebirth. As the student of world mythology Joseph Campbell put it, "l)eath-and-rebirth, rebirth through ritual ... is an extremely ancient I ideal in the history of culture." Spiritual rebirth is a goal so desirable that the annihilation of everything else on its behalf may feel justified. A recent statement by an Islamist zealot offers an indication of how far one might go on behalf of perfect spiritual renewal: "We believe in the principle of establishinghe Islamic moral and criminal code) even if this means the death of all mankind." Examples of apocalyptic violence are everywhere in the world, though not always recognized as such when they come from our part of it. For instance, we think of Timothy McVeigh as a lone fanatic who in 1995 blew up the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people, because he was enraged at his government. Such a characterization, however, neglects the apocalyptic dimensions of his act. He felt himself to be one of many believers dedicated to bringing a new world into being. His fervent hope was that in destroying a government building he would set off a chain reaction. Others, inspired by him,

Apocalyptic imagination does not have to be violent - we never expressed ours in that manner. Lifton in 2003 (Robert, Super Power Syndrome)
FROM TAME TO VIOLENT APOCALYPSE It is important to remember that historically the apocalyptic imagination has usually been nonviolent in nature. Apocalyptic imagery provided assurance that God was in control of histOlY; that there was a "divinely predetermined pattern of crisis. iudgment. and vindication"; that for those patient enough. a time of cleansing and rebirth was on its way. Indeed, such apocalypticism is "the mother of all Christian theology," and apocalyptic visions, Christian or otherwise, have flourished during times of great suffering. They have been powerful sources of hope for relief from pain. for the appearance of God's iustice. for evil and suffering to give way to spiritual beauty and perfection.





Mimesis fails true politics in that it closes off hope for a transversal approach to politics. This is necessary for understanding alternity,·and changing guaranteed epistemologica1 failure.
BLEIKER, 2001 [Roland Bleiker, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No.3, pp. 509533]

What a monstrous lie his brain would have to invent to catch up with and explain state of his senses! Before exploring the significance of aesthetic insights it is necessary to juxtapose them, if only briefly, to the prevailing wisdom of it scholarship. One perhaps could, with Jacques Derrida, speak of two nmdamentally different approaches. The first seeks to discover a truth or an originthat somehow escapes the necessity of interpretation. The second accepts or even affinns that representing the political is a fonn of interpretation that is, by its very nature, incomplete and bound up with the values of the perceiver? Much of it scholarship has, undoubtedly, been conducted in the fonner, mimetic mode of representation. The most influential contributions to the discipline, particularly in North America, continue to adhere almost exclusively to social scientific conventions. They uphold the notion of a neutral observer and a cOlTespondingseparation of object and subject. 1. David Singer proudly announced during the behavioural revolution that 'there is no longer much doubt that we can make the study of international politics into a scientific discipline worthy of the name'. Much has changed since then, of course, but representation is still widely seen as process of copin2:which. ideally. erases all traces of human interference so that the 'artistic' end-product looks iust like the ori2:inal. Realism has made 'the real' into an obiect of desire, Hayden White would say. Or, as one of the most influential contemporary methodology textbooks in political sciences states: 'the goal is to learn facts about the real world'. Mimetic approaches do not pay enou2:h attention to the relationship between the represented and its representation. Indeed, they are not really theories of representation. Thev are theories a2:ainst representation. But political reality does not exist in an a priori way. It comes into bein2:only throu2:h the process of representation. A political event, for instance, cannot determine from what perspective and in what context it is seen. Our effort to make sense of this event can. thus, never be reduced to the event itself. This is why representation 'always raises the Question of what set of true statements we mi2:ht prefer to other sets of true statements'. It is a . process throu2:h which we or2:anise our understandin2: of reality. Note as well that even if the ideal of mimesis-a perfect resemblance between si2:nifier and si2:nified-was possible. it could offer us little political insi2:ht. It would merelv replicate what is, and thus be as useless as 'as a facsimile of a text that is handed to us in answer to our Question of how to interpret that text' .







Transversal dissent is a better agency to create true global change than analyses of state behavior.
BLEIKER, 2000 [Roland; Coordinator of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Ql,Jeensland, "Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics", pg 16] Questions of a2ency in international theory should not and cannot be reduced to analyses of state behaviour. This book demonstrates how an instance of transversal dissent may influence 210bal politics at least as much as, say, a diplomatic treatise or a foreil!n policy decision. At a time when processes of 21obalisation are unfoldin2 and national boundaries are becomin2 increasin21y porous, states can no lon2er be viewed as the only consequential actors in world affairs.
Various scholars have thus begun to question the prevalent They suggest, as mentioned above, that spatial modes of representation and the artificial separation of levels of analysis that issues from them.

I!lobal life is better understood as a series of transversal strul!l!les that increasinl!ly chaIlen2e what Richard Ashley called 'the paradi2m of sovereil!n rsicl. Transversal strul!l!les, Ashley emphasises, are not limited to established spheres of sovereil!ntv. They are neither domestic nor international. They know no final boundaries between inside and outside. 18 And they have come to be increasinl!ly recol!nised as central aspects of I!lobal politics. James Rosenau is
among severa] scholars who now acknowledge that it is along the shifting frontiers of transversal struggles, 'and not through the nation state system that people sort at work in the global soene'.19

and play out the many contradictions









Bleiker 2000 (Roland, "Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics", pg. I) Manifestations of popular dissent, such as street demonstrations, social movements and civil disobedience, have for long occupied central positions in most political landscapes. The processes through which they exert human agency, however, have recently undergone important transformations. In previous epochs, popular protests had a mostly local nature, that is, their dynamic was one that directly opposed ruler and ruled. Bv the late twentieth century the nature of dissent has changed fundamentallv. The presence of mass media can transform a local act of resistance almost immediately into an event of global significance. Images of a protest march may flicker over television screens worldwide only hours after people have taken to the 'street. As a result, the protest soon takes on a much larger, trans-territorial dimension.

DISSENT IS KEY TO IMPACTING TRANSNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE Bleiker 2000 (Roland, "Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics", pg. I) Dissent has become a significant transnational phenomenon, reflecting and shaping various aspects of global politics. In fact, dissent has become what could be called a transversal phenomenon - a political practice that not onlv transgresses national boundaries, but also questions the spatial logic through which these boundaries have come to constitute and frame the conduct of international relations. The term transversal draws attention to various political transformations that are currently taking place. It has emerged in response to a growing need to rethink the manner in which the domain of international relations has traditionallv been conceptualised. David Campbell, for instance, argues convincingly that globalised life is best seen 'as a series of transversal struggles rather than as a complex of inter-national, multi-national or transnational relations'.2 The latter, he points out, !!.!:!: modes of representation that have strong investments in the very borders that are currentlv being questioned. Bv contrast, to conceptualise global politics as a site of transversal struggles is to draw attention to the multiple and multi-layered interactions that make up contemporary life. It is to recognise the complex cross-border flow of people, goods, ideas, capital - in shOlt, 'the increasing irruptions of accelerated and nonterritorial contingencies upon our horizons'.3





The greatest movements began by not engaging in direct state politics
Bleiker 200 I (Ronald, Popular Dissent, Human Agency, and Global Politics)

But there are still several missing links between an individualistic anarchist revival of la Boetie and a theo,·y of collective resistance. Romantic dissent focuses on the primacy of the perceiver and the poetisation of political practice. This pushes romantics, at least according to the influential opinion of Carl Schmitt, towards a situation in which conflicts are not addressed, but deferred, subjectified, transplanted into a higher realm of aesthetic imagination.3! Some even claim that romantic thought contains, by definition, a conservative co,·e.32 One can argue with such an interpretations, and I shall do so later. What matters at this point however, is that the anarchist romantic generally does not seek political power, but despises .and circumvents it. Thoreau engaged in the struggle around slavery by withdrawiDl! from the state that endorses this repressive practice. He returned to the woods to Walden Pond, retreating into the ultimate source of the romantic world-view, the Self. This anarchist form of individualism was subversive on many accounts, but it was perceived to lack the element of immediate and direct social engagement. From theory to practice, from individual to collective action. Some of the later romantics tried to add a more direct political dimension to the already subversive Thoreauean foundations. They shifted the practice of withdrawing consent from detachment to engagement, and from individualism to collective action. With this move arose a coherent tradition of popular dissent and an equally powerful assertion of human agency - one that came to influence political dynamics in ever-more parts of the world. The more la Boetie's legacy spread beyond national boundaries, the more it became intertwined with the emerging anarchist movement. By the end of the nineteenth century leading anarchist historians, such as Max Nettlau and Ernst Victor Zenker, portrayed la Boetie as an important intellectual precursor to the likes of Pierre Joseph Proud-hon, Mikhail Bakunin, Petr Kropotkin, Max Stirner or Emma Goldman.33 One can, indeed, hear la Boetie's voice resonating in Stirner's claim that if the labourer acts upon the insight that 'his' power is 'his' property, the state simply crumbles.34 By the eady twentieth century several anarchists started to draw directly upon la Boetie. Gustav Landauer, one of the key figures in the German anarchist movement, constructed his central arguments around a discussion of the Anti- One. Bart de Ligt, a prominent Dutch anarchopacifist relied upon la Boetie, and so did Simone Weil in her unusual fusion of Anarchism, Marxism, Stoicism and Christian mysticism.35 But to understand how radical popular dissent gained prominence in various parts of the world, we must reach further back and observe what precisely occurred when la Boetie's intellectual legacy came of age during the transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth century.






Our project employs aesthetics in order to challenge mimesis.
BLEIKER, 2001 [Roland Bleiker, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30; No.3, pp. 509533]

Although most approaches to international political theory remain wedded to mimetic principles, an increasing number of scholars are confronting the question af representation. One could, indeed, speak af an actual aesthetic turn. To be more precise, this turn has been generated through two interrelated shifts in the production af knowledge about world politics. The first occurred in the 1980s, when so-called postmodern scholars begun to challenge the positivist foundations af international theory. It then became possible to recognise a number af ensuing political implications, including the reproduction af cultures afviolence as well as their state-centric and masculine nature. A second and equally si2nificant shift took place in more recent years. as various scholars have started to think throu2h the implications of the postmodern critique. They beeun to explore different forms of insi2ht into world politics. includin2 those that emeree from ima2es. narratives and sounds. such as literature. visual art. music. cinema and other sources that extend beyond 'hi2h art' into popular culture. Of course, not all of the ensuing endeavours are necessarily convincing. Nor do they supersede the need for more conventional social scientific inquiries. But aesthetic approaches have initiated an important process of broadening our understanding of world politics beyond a relatively narrow academic discipline that has come to entrench many af the political problems it seemingly seeks to address and solve. The key challenge ahead consists of finding ways to reclaim the political value afthe aesthetic. To do so is no easy task, for the modern triumph aftechnological reason has by and large eclipsed the aesthetic from our political purview. Overcoming the ensuing construction of common sense would amount to far more than simply adding an additional, sensual layer of interpretation. The aesthetic turn reorients our very understanding of the political: it engenders a significant shift away IToma model of thought that equates knowledge with the mimetic recognition of external appearances towards an approach that generates a more diverse but also more direct encounter with the political. The latter allows for productive interactions across different faculties, including sensibility, imagination and reason, without any of them annihilating the unique position and insight of the other.






Aesthetics is net beneficial as it is both accessible and allows space for alternatives, while advancing a framework that challenges mimesis.
BLEIKER, 2001 [Roland Bleiker, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol.
30, No.3, pp. 509-533]

First, for all their theoretical engagement with the later Wittgenstein, postmodern writings have fallen short of recognising the practical significance of language games. Many postmodern texts remain buried in a highly abstract and inaccessible language that has, at times, become as predictable as the practices they seek to oppose. As a result, the critical insi2ht they may contain has failed to reach the broad audience

necessary to achieve social transformation. The issue is. of course. not easy. The innovative potential of a text emerges precisely from its refusal to take existin2 linguistic conventions for granted. from the attempt to search for new ways of speaking about issues that had been rendered un problematic throu2h a series of worn out metaphors. But a text can. of course. not depart too radicallv from existing linguistic conventions either: to do so would be to construct a private language that loses its social dimension. The key task. then. is to walk a fine line between these two extremes; a challenge that
remains by and large unmet. A second and related shortcoming of early postmodern contributions is their focus on criticising/deconstructing the shortcomings of dominant Realist and Liberal approaches to international political theory. While essential at a time when there was little space for alternative knowledge, this process of critique has nevertheless limited the potential of postmodem contributions. Discourses of

power politics and their framing of political practice cannot overcome all existing theoretical and practical. dilemmas. By articulating critique in relation to arguments advanced by orthodox approaches to IR. the impact of critical voices remains confined within the larger discursive boundaries that were established through the initial framing of these debates.





The deployment is necessary to engage gaps in the resolution. BLEIKER, 2001 [Roland Bleiker, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol.
30, No.3, pp. 509-533]

Whether in the form of images. narratives or sounds. aesthetics not only adds layers of perception or sensation, but also promotes interactions among different faculties. Kant saw judgements of the beautiful and the sublime as examples of instances where no faculty rules over others. Aesthetic judgements are Questions of taste that take place somewhere in the 'middle between understanding and reason'~ without either of these determining the rules for identifying the object that is to be judged.8oIndeed, Kant went one step fi1l1herand granted the feeling of pleasure or displeasure its own constitutive status,
which is to say that it became irreducible to any other faculty. 8 1 But even though we perceive and judge a work of art through means that are constitutive, we need to rely on other faculties, including reason, to process these perceptions and judgements. Even a visual image is never located in a separated aesthetic realm. The perceived effects of a painting,. for instance, are clearly different rrom the process of understanding and judging them, yet alone communicating the so-experienced sensation to others. The latter is a linguistic process. even though it originates in and refers to a non-linguistic realm. This is why understanding art. or politics for that matter. expresses an aesthetic relationship not only to a given object, but also to the 'history of its effect'.82 Sensibility and imagination can offer an encounter with this history. They can reorient our thoughts in a way that a mimetic process of recognition cannot. It is in this sense that a work of art can serve as an example of thought that generates productive flows between sensibility and reason, memory and imagination or between 'mind, body and soul, thought, power and desire' .83





A 1 +:

li0 'Pi:::
a better
path of life.

Hope and Imagination are interconnected is needed to find

Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert. Super Power Syndrome, 2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9)

II write

this book


a spirit of hope. tI0pe is alway~ bound We have the capacity with all apocalyptic suffering

up with the reach of our imagination. to probe painful truths in connection

viol~nce, and to make contact with the human

i~yed. With such imaginative acts, we begin to take small steps in alternative directions. That convictionj1as !:JCenpart of all of my work on twentieth-century excess. Here I think of an experience I had in the early stages of my study of Nazi doctors. After my first set of interviews in Germany, Auschwitz I went to see a friend of mine, ---------------------- an survivor who was keenly interested in the

work, As we sat over coffee, I said to him in a tone that w~~ without a bit of self-pity: "I appreciate your e~2co_I!.E?K~.::.~S~'!.t the truth is that I've begun to have terrible dreams. In my dreams I'm behind barbed wire i~ some kind of a camp, Worse than that, my wife, and at times my two children, My friend looked directly at me and answered in a matter-of-fact tone' that was neither unkind nor especially sympathetic, "Good, now you can do the st~dy." ~ telling me that unless I took in some sm" 11 part of the pct;U of the victims, the work would h;Jvt>littlt> si[':ni f)c:ulce.


are there in the camp with me."

w ~





~ Over time, that conversation

~ took on broader meaning

for me. We need to bear witness, compassionately, to the destructive ev.ents of our era if we are to embark on a ~ore humane ~ourse. In that sense the researcher's task extends ever outward. ~rvations



It is not that any study or set of bring about measurable

:can themselves

~change. Rath~r, su~ imaginative efforts enter into tIle confusions and possibilities of collective consciousness. My belief is that it takes a certain amount of critical and e~pathic energy from many directions to enable any

society to begin to chart a wiser course. This is painfully true of our re'sponses to large-scale killing and dyi nE' and o~ attempts _ to interrupt that proces0 All this implicit in th~t little conversation ~ith my friend. was





/i \+~',s~



T3clu{ ({


Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert. Super Power Syndrome, pp 129-120 2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9)


~t the hear;t of the superpower

syndrome then is the need

to eliminate a'vulnerability that, as the antithesis-.2f omni potence, contairis the basic con tr;:]~ of the syndrome. For \vulnerabilit;~bn ill! finds itself n_<=yer eelirninated, ~ a psychological either by a nation or the superRo~r The idea .of vul-

indi";d~. In seeking its elimination,


nerability is i;tolerable, the fact of it irrefutable. ~_ tion is to maintain an illusion of invulllr:rtJkility But the I s~wer \:hen mn<:..-the danger of taking increasingly 9raconian ac:tions to sustain that illusion. For to do otherwise would be to surrender superpower. , Other nations have the cherished status of that


in the world

render them and their citizens all too aware of the essential vulnerability the United aspect of life on earth. They also may be influtraditions such (far weaker reality can in be vulnerability as an enced by religious and cultural of hl;man mortality.

States) that emphasize

acceptetl hy t/,nse clinging to a sense of omnipoten~. ~. At issue is;the experience of death anxiety, which is the strongest manifestation of vulnerability.
e<l II


a deepor even at that

seated sense ot vllineraollll)l edged by the ordinary times by its leaders,

::'Ulllt:LlIllCjut: aCKllUW 1-

citizens of a superpower,

who may admit, for instance,

there is no guaranteed defense against terrorist acts. ~ those leaders nonetheless remain committed to eliminating precisely that vulnerability-committed, the illusory repeatedly American East~both goal of invulnerability. undennined-whether hegemony When by large-scale by militant that is, to that goal is terrorist to resistance

acts like 9/11, or as at present the superpower.

in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle and the worJd it acts upon

may become dangerously






The objection of our "ownership of history" will allow us to rid ourselves of fabricated fear

Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert. Super Power Syndrome, 2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9)


To renounce the claim to total power would bring reliefnot only to everyone else, but, soon enough, to citizens of the is itself. For to live out superpower syndrome


to place oneself on a treadmill that eventually has to break down. In its efforts to rule the world and to determine history, the United States is, in actuality, working against to

itself, subj eeting itself to constant fail me. It becoIn,t::s a Sisyphus with bombs, able to set off explosions but unable cope with its own burden, unable to roll its heavy stone to the top of the hill in Hades. Perhaps the crucial step in ridding ourselves of superpower syndrome is recognizing history cannot be controlled, fluidly or otherwise. Stepping enable us that also fea::: at


off the to cease

superpower beinz

treadmill nation

would by


l\.enounClng qmnipotence

might make our leaders-or

l~st future leaders-themselves less fearful of weakness] and diminish theIr 1l1ClInatlOnto 1l1still fear in their people ~~means of :enhst1l1g them for military efforts at ilh~ry world hegerriony. Without the need for invulnerability, everyone wotild have much less to be afraid of.






What we call the historical process ~gely unpredictable, never completely manageable. All the mor~ at a time of radical questioning of the phenomenon of na tionalism and its nineteenth- and twentieth-century excesses. I~ addition, t&ere has been a general decline in confidence
C _

in the nation state, and in its ability to protect its peopk1fO~ larger world J?roblems such as global warming or weapons of~1ass-~tr~ction. The quick _ dangerous substit~ but ___ T_--; .....--. .'. the superpow:er, which seeks to fill the void with a global~d, militari~ed extension of American nationalism. The traditiona ~tate whatever its shortcomings, could at least claim to be grounded in a specific geographic area and a.2articular people or cpmbination of peoples. The superpower claims'to "represent" everyone on earth, but it lacks legitimacy in the eyes of those it seeks to dominate, while its their l~aders glust struggle to 1ll:-1sk QLS.l!.j2,press own doubts about any such legitimacy. The Amei"ican superpower is an artificial construct, "...".



widely perceIved. as. illegitirrL,ne"-. whateve,r .the ac~uiescence it coerCes inothe~. Its reign is therefore inherently unst;bk. Indeed, its reach for full-scale world domination

marks the beginning of its decline. A large task for the ;~,,-~-----"<.=-"..,'" world, and for Americans in particular, is the early reco..g_~tio~:~~_ hu.:::a~:..:::anage..:nent of that decline.)










Campbell 1992
(Davi~, Prof~ssor of Interna~ional P.olitics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Secunty: Ulllte~_States Forelgn_Po~lcy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 7,8)
~or the most part, however, thes.e developments have been repre- ;'" sented in ways that do not depart dramatically from those dominant during ':' ; . the cold war. To be sure, they are not represented as being reducible to, , Soviet behavior, I3ut these challen~es are represented as dangers lo~ed inl I an external and anarc.hic environment which threaten the security of an \ ~~at functioiis have difference, danger, and otherness played in ' internal and the identit societv, the Unit,," ~ta~....a.JnajDf ;; constituting d~s{ic of;.-TliiSProvo-Kj' actor in....IDt.. I: \,national politics? To pose the question in these terms, however, is a little ini!i-re'imiTig~( It is not intended to suggest either that it is a strict functional requirement of American identity that difference and danger be articulated as otherness, or that only certain groups or phenomena can be other. As !:21L9.lllt_~.rgY.~~_,_~i~_!.~~£ES!:_ to ths"S2!lti ne.!.n.~11U1Lrb~!l~n d ",; repression of certain se~'-!.al.p..!'\!s.!iceUrLt~e ni~_~enth century~~s.:y"e.J~. ~f'L r:~tio!:!.'D!.tJ.b.£.!~§.!;ilivg.LQ.~-r.e}l.ujj,".ed,.b¥.. •..I.\l\-.!Jg~"Q,i"~=.iLQ.mWkl!iQ.!'\:,;,1l1~. l bourgeoisie wa~ i~ ~.not".iu_tb"c..m<k<LQ.J;'h~eIJ.QQ..£t0!~"ti 19. ~atlOn, ut in the Rrocedural.§.Y.ste_ITI.. th~<.?..'!g!l..~hich ~~UC~.sbl;:'ill.Q.S ~~~~!.s..52flZ!$;.5L::J.!1-2£t~_~':>.l..~~~P~,.£~0.0.~the!. than those targeted could have been the objects of surveillance and discw.lin~, In [his context, for the United States, the current perioA-in world politics can be understood being characterized by the representation of J<j )-::. ncwe;T"chalienge;fn terms ofrraditwnal analytics, and the varie<rattemptsto
/.~, II


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, .•.• ,""< __

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('!;,j"·~~ing. constItuting

the ,issue of th~ role dan~er and difference ~ the Identity of the UIIlted States lIIvolves 3. deconstructIOn relations

of and



c.:?.!2..ventionalQolitical discourse and its sdf-presentatio~n,~t effected in the practice and analysis of both international

~:;~ ~. forcign pol~n "~Ot:~Wacts of pregiven ,\~ (

reorienting analy~~ from :he conc<:rn :v~th the inJIT1tio~~ subjects to the Qroblematlc.ofsubJectlvlty,: the argument

" ~t~.' ,

-. :-:r--.: as a political practice central to me constItutIOn, proauction, and main.-.c .' teniiiceof Americ~a_llP(JJitical identi~y. In order to delineate th;7ei'a.iTonshfPbetween 'beiJ],g made here proposes foreign Unit~tes and political iden~itV" be understood that. po.licy. foreign policy this ar~ument

'-~tconven!!onarVi~upon a reconcepruahzatlon of understandmgs.policy whichstate. ,~~ IS predIcated international reJatio?s ~nd fo~eign to is deeply., the indebted: most spegfj~econceptuahzat1on of IdentItY and the


'1 '





A- \ t:Re'\ ___ U


Rfy l \'sVvJ 1'-.11

em bV'C1ce
Campbell 1992

We must reject realism and embrace a thinking based on acceptance of difference (David, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, pg. 4.5)
to are alternative ways tSL.!.hectaiC1h'i-IlLcpis.t=ic,.J;e.alislJ.1, r , commitmentthere one of them. ~ntrary to think, and this book exhibits a "d"Uut argue that as understanding, inv?l'::~,L~S.P}J£El!1,g,lb,s"}'))Jfilm!l\.~J.,hl"Eh~,~,S!:JE!,1.~~ ~; ~·,.,~.t2<2",[:~~iIF~X;,:".t,r,l(2?s:!;r~GY~5;:i~,J:'!.l..JD\?J.~.sE~.~!:?'.,.~,~_!2S«W~.l!,}~;;;n?J;;~5.~.~),?~~ ..;~~,~.~" , , ~!2at there i~.,~~.o~!.Jl.DJ!; ...£,y,s~.Lg.52,.,.'£,Lg.~~;~;~!,;~~: Contrary to a narratlVlZlO w ich selfhl':;!:()[logr:.rphv, employ a mode of historical representation conscIOusly adopts a perspectIve. Anu contrary to the 10 IC of eXDlanation:-r embrace a logic 0' II1terpretatlOn that acknowledges the improbability of catalo in " calcularing, and specifying the 'real causcs,' and concerns itself instead with considenn tIe mam cst po mca consequences of adoptiI?g ' on over another. Olle mOl eo' ' 'p' ',' As such, the argument being made here is parr of an emerging dissident literature in international relations which draws sustenance from a series of modern thinkers who have focused Oil historically specific modes of discoursc rather than the supposedly independent realms of subjects and objects. II Starting from the position that social and political life comprises" a set of practices in which things are constituted in the process of dealing with


them, this dissent docs not(and does not desire to) constitute a discrete methodolOgiC<ll sch601 claiming to magically illuminate the previously dark ri:cesses of global l)()!itics. Nor is it the dissent of a self-confident and singular figure claiming to know the error oLdl previous ways and offering salvation from all theoretical sin. Rather, this form of dissent emer~es from a dis Jaratc and sometimes divergent se;;;;~ of encounters"between the ~aditio!ls of internationa re anons an' themes increasingly prominent 111 other realms of social and olitical inc uirv. It i.' , . celebmtes difference; the proliferation of perspectives, dimensions and approaches to the very real dilemmas of global life. It is a form of dissent WhICh celebrates the artlcularity and context-bound nature of judgements . and assessments, not because it favors a so-ca e re attvlst retreat into the i!1eommensura lIt 0 alternatives, but because it recognizes the universal.. ist conceits of all attempts to force difference mto t e straIt ac et of ,identIty. t IS a form of dissent s eptlca, ut not cynical - about the "/~radltIOns 01 mternational relatiorrtand theIr e)anns of adequacy ~s a form of dissent that is concerned not to seek a better to reality. 1t fit between

:hought a?d the world, ,lane:uap'c .ann matt:r, prop,osltlon and facr. vn tl!e ontrary, It a form of dlSSe 'uestIons the very way our problems have been osed in these terms and the eonstramts WIt I .' ey 1ave beencQnsidered, and focuses inste,adonthe historically posgQle. 13_? way the world has ' been made j :=..J




AL T - experiencing world

animating guilt allows us to overcome the apocalyptic


and change the

Lifton in 2003 (Robert, Super Power Syndrome)
Like Harry Truman facing his nuclear choice in 1945, most American soldiers sent into battle in Vietnam in those war years of the late 1960s found themselyes thrown into an atrocity-producing situation for which they were utterly unprepared. But what I also learned from Vietnam veterans-in the early 1970s I participated in psychologically intense "rap groups" with many who had turned against the war and wished to examine their behavior in fighting it-was that people need not be psychologically stuck forever in such moments. Men and women could experience what I came to think of as "animating guilt" and use it as a means of reiecting the overall American mission in Vietnam and their own part in it. They could express painful forms of self-condemnation without remaining fixed in a static. mea culpa stance. Rather. they were capable of leaving both the atrocity-producing situation and the overall apocalvptic mission by transforming those guilt feelings into a sense of responsibilitv in opposing the war and revealing its grotesque details to the American people-all the while insisting that our leaders and our society acknowledge responsibility for what was being done in our name thousands of miles away. More recently. Israeli soldiers, sometimes citing the American experience in Vietnam as a model. have similarly come to oppose their war, their country's occupation of Palestinian lands and its army's brutal treatment of Palestinians, by refusing to fight in the occupied territories. Calling their group Courage to Refuse. they declare: "We shall not continue to fight beyond the 1967 borders in order to dominate, expel. starve, and humiliate an entire people." They too have demonstrated an impressive capacity to transform guilt feelings into expressions of responsibility in seeking to redirect their society toward a more humane path. Both groups had to overcome the psychic numbing associated with their allow previously suppressed compassionate feelings to surface. A further found in the animating guilt of people who were involved in the making bombs and were later able to become powerful and knowledgeable voices countries' impulses toward violent purification and interesting parallel to these two situations can be of, or strategic planning for, atomic and hydrogen warning the world about nuclear dangers.





Any inclusion of a realist approach necessarily reestablishes the destructive power order as well as destroying the local.
BLEIKER, 2001 [Roland Bleiker, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No.3, pp. 509533]

To broaden our knowlede:e of the international does. however. require more than simply addine a few additional lavers of interpretation. What is needed is a more fundamental reorientation of thoue:ht and action: a shift away from harmonious common sense imposed bv a few dominant faculties towards a model of thou2:ht that enables productive flows across a variety of discordant faculties. For Deleuze, this difference amounts to a move from recognition to a direct political encounter, from approaches that affirm appearances without disturbine: thoue:ht towards approaches that add to our understandine: and. indeed. force us to think into world politics and the tools available to pursue them. They have elevated a few select faculties. reason in particular. and e:iven them the power to order all others. The result is the erasure of a crucial location of political struee:les. the domain of representation. from our purview. This is why Waltz's otherwise commendable attempt to move away from resemblance and recognition ends up in a science-driven process of abstraction that isolates a few select features and produces generalities trom them. The problem here is not with abstraction per se for abstraction is an inevitable component of any process of representation. 'We end up with abstraction whether we want "it" or not', Christine Sylvester stresses.41 But Waltzian abstraction is obsessed with deduction, categorisation and scientific legitimacy. Rather than celebrating the diversity of life and drawing from its sensual potentials, as abstraction in art seeks to do, the neorealist version 'blocks the construction of people in international relations and hinders our view of states as more than the proverbial empty boxes'.42 The result is a narrow and problematic form of common sense. This is why even the more moderate constructivist scholars rely on analytical tools that are largely confmed to mimetic principles. Consider Wendt's highly indicative position that knowledge needs to be both systematic and scientific to be of any value. He stresses that '[p]oetry, literature and other humanistic disciplines ... are not designed to explain global war or Third World poverty, and as such if we want to solve those problems our best hope, slim as it maybe, is social science'. Hope for a better world will, indeed, remain slim if we put all our efforts into searching for a mimetic understanding of the international. Issues of global war and Third World poverty are far too serious and urgent to be left to only one form of inquiry, especially if this mode of thought suppresses important faculties and fails to tmderstand and engage the crucial problem of representation. We need to employ the full register of hwnan perception and intelligence to understand the phenomena of world politics and to address the dilemmas that emanate trom them. One of the key challenges, thus, consists of legitimising a greater variety of approaches and insights to world politics. Aesthetics is an important and necessary addition to our interpretative repertoire. It helps us understand why the emergence, meaning and significance of a political event can be appreciated only once we scrutinise the representational practices that have constituted the very nature of this event.








Campbell 1992
(David, Professor ofIntemational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 11,12)
-~ ~~.~r;:.g;?:~~_Q.Lths;!.s~~P'SSi,~5~_!~~!;~ .~~~I_'!,!12~~ understimd national states as unavoidably paradoxical entities which do non j?ossess "p'reciis~rsive, stabie1(rentm'es~s'-aCOi~nce";-~l!rsta"i:e'r-afe:' n~;'~k;';rb~~~;'T;ili;;;~~tte'nsl';;;';'"bet;~';;'~~the various domains that need to be; a igned for an 'imagined )olitical communit ' to come into being - such as territoriality and the many axes of identity - and the deman t 1at such an alignment is a response to (rather than constittJt1ve of) a prior ami stable identIty. In other WOfdS', states are nev finish as enti· ,the ensi n ~1 the demands of i( entitv and the practices that constitute it ~ never be fully resolved, because the erforma' of identit can never e u y revealed. 'Chis paradox inherent to s~ir be~~,,~~~ i.!Lpermaner;"t~1eed of rep,~~du~tio.~!;\!5!.I~J;;i£~L?_~~~~~~P,~:51~~m ~ and vanea-'pia~tIces that constituj£ the~ reali ty ,y~§. are (arid !1a'ffi..lQJ?$).J1b:v~~~s of be.9omL~ For a sF'!-ts...~end its !2.rac"sLs!<s of representation would be to expose its lack of prediscu rSIve'roUnaations;

~~~~'~i';;~";;;;;g't!le'crrlveto Ex the state's identity and contain challenges to the state' s ~Rresef17~;~;;t;;;rTy=;;-r-;E'sorureTysuccee(r'KSlde"Tro'm recog-;;Er~~t~I;';"t"·'~h~;';·i~;;~"aii"exc·eSr'Orbe;ngov'er~appearance tha t cannot be contained by disciplinary practices implicated in state formation, \\'ere it possible to reduce all being to appearance, and were it possible to bring about the absence of movement which' in that reduction of being to appearance would characterize pure security, it would be at that moment that the state withers away34 Ai that point all identities would haye congealed, all challengcs would ]~ve evaporated, and all need for dis~iplmary authorIties and their fields of force would have vanished. Should the .. s.tatc project of securIty bc successful in the terms in whiQ.l.Li1j;ulrtjcul~d, t!1Cstatc viotTIucease to eXlst.Secuflty as the absence of movement would' ~esult in death ViastasIs. IronIcally, then the in' .. of the state roject'ciT



~Ity ·'lIing toidentity.~, IS t . e guarantor of the state's continued success as an , . slIccee




/ ----

A-d.~ ~R1/M

Campbell 1992
(David, Professor ofInternational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 70-71)
Th~.s2.ral impetus behind the location of threats in the external-' realm -;;mes fro 1;-the fact that the sovereign domain, for all its identificaiio';1'as :l\verr-orJCrcd and-;:;;'tio;al' entitY:-;sa:~-mucha site of anlbi~ui!~

·ijld§.~~·;;·~0:.~Y~:.~~2.~~~ili1-;;--~€ili~,lLI0TI;~i~~h~SI.:.f~l.~~Whe~ ~ •.,
speak of 'man' we arc refernng to more than Just Individuals or national types; thc meaning of 'man' incorporates the form of the 'domestic' order, the social relations of production, the various subjectivities to which they give rise, the groups (such as women) who are are marginalized inJ:b.~ process; and the boundaries of legitimate social and political actionjIt is easier to recognize the constructed character of 'man' in societies other than our own (consider the attention given to 'socialist man')46 than to acknowledge the centrality of this practice to the 'West. ,47 But the~, in

p rin ci pie at leas t, _a..!~:!~~~i,~!~~~.,2f.":y'~~jD=~~bi9.h S\!QS;fy"...9.~nJJ.£;.J;i)"J.:!~.tLm~s~: P.J.i!r;.t.!S~4'u~:ll!~!!'JQG.4S,"9.11,J;.c.r.~<J,.HJ the poss ibi I ities are. 1 imi te~<l.\m!yJ?Y"JJ.lew d;·;1~eis:'ii;c'·~·'~;;~;,{6~!JI~~,,,.~E·i..,S9nG.c.\D~"e,~hiQiJe,g~.9y>,,~.b~,"JlniJs~«.§.t,~t~§,' I~;;'iiTg'~;;'tro;1'~I\J'Naturalizati()n Service questionnaire. But such dangers are Hot _ •. ..__ ._-- ...•. objective

c()nd~~2 _ ~_

.•E2l.JiD,mlY~~~~R'f~';;$.V$.Ql in the challenges to

m.. l.1.~ ~

.~.J.'~~na.1. reaJm. Threats

to identity are equally prevalent

hom?sexuality, and ~..!lJ.?port 1'0: social as ~~~9s:3re.Jhrej,llLtQJ2.~_G.9..D.:>1..Qs:J:f..sL on a par of tlUL,reI~.t\.Qn.L2L£.!£ownership wi the for8gl1...£]~rn'y. the don1inaiir' feminism'~ ~,~~rib~,:\1~, enframing of 'man' from within. For some, ..),)£.~gJJ!,."e:; dOo!}L~!!lL:2~l~x,J_:!.!'iy~\!}~~l..~~"ism~"''\,y.!Jl<!.~jQ.rl,~pL t !!~~2.~~,!:~,0,~,1,JLJI"Q.),lbl.s...~~sL'l~n. The interpretations of domestic ... r socIety resIstant to its inscription must be excluded from the internal reaJm:


a domam of domestIc socIety, understood as an identity and a w~ effect, 01"". oed understood as at oo",enodconflicts '" that might dlff,,,"c, ;"'0 '"'010<0 be '.In differences, discontinuities, and domain of ~narchy, dm" mn" bo once am bigl!, .il1detenniJ~;te, an~j.,,':

i fOlllly\

~1gerolls.' to 'hide' the status of the first (IS an exclusion.second, the inscription 01'1 s,-,or11ismSf exclllSlon'lSfrultclle<.f by a the purpose of\ which is For domestic society to appear as llnproblematic, it is not possible for it to be understood as having the status of one interpretation among many. All interpretations that seck to expose the inscription of 'man' as a representation that should be historicized and problcmatized have themselves t.o be excluded .. :::>






, \()\ :: 'l1.? (,(VI p. ~. Iv

AT: PERM FOREIGN POLICY EXCLUDES AL TERNA TIVES OUTSIDE OF ITS PARADIGM Campbell 1992 (David, Professor ofInternational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 78,79)


M0 rco ve , !.<:.~~~.i_~L,~_~. r, i!~h e cQll'!:.9LQLF 0 rrignJ?9Ji£x..Jb"e_1Qgj.c""Qi.i(t~liitY..J12Q[~ ::.s.1f..!J2.1?'§,N~Q_J.b\<.".p()Jitic£".()LL1Crl..tllcM.thro.l1t\ttiQ!U2f ..Q.J;h.SE.' gati ()n.• .an ness. The claim is not that Foreign P{)Jicy constitutes state identity de lIOVO; r;;t!1e'r, it is that Foreign Policy is concerned with the reproduction of all ~!)~'..t!:~_~.i~!~,r.:~.~t.Xj!.Lt;;..§..~a CO}2!.£!.!2'.D e Ill.2LS91;11~}lg~~ t<;~._~n!h~_ d to that identity. In other words, Foreign Policy does not operate in a domain

.arlcrt1i·e"·li]ie;1.~i~~--,~'~-d extensive
«"'''',:''~n,.',,,·,,,, ..•.,.I''''.'·''·'':'' ; ,

o th er' en tr;;cl1 cd con tingen ci e'S'-or-rc'slstai1CeS:'WhICFi;;~'en~;-~'~~ig;;-P~G~CY •.q,!J.\1m.'J.tjy~y,.J?g§.~,!,hiJj!;j,\;,~J~R,~j,\4,~.n,ELty; p ia~.t:;~~.~:~:;:~:J~~·pIi;~·.s.~~~l·.:iJ,\S~x:·:~:E~t~::~~~~~.:~:0,:::?~-i~:~~lii:~.:2~:~~~:;;:S~ freeof practices. w hi ch nlj.K,lLi.n·1.\.fJ.!JXi.i!J;<; ~J tu r~ of tl}e'in£ern~.I' a }~f1q,~~;{F.s[n_~I' "y,.llLJ1],Q£~.qf.t~[ttb.?'.l1,n9"t,!1e,",?J,\i!XP's'I}£J..l"Q,y,,~h~"LSgS~~.~.~.,t~' tion of danger. -::.::::" . ' ... ' ,...,

··_~.::_II.~~;'i"··~§~:~~~i:ii!l'~~:,:r.G~t'tEG:,~:p.i~ii~'i;,£.o:f¥r"~i~:~iii ..
I';> F ina


Ily, '~g,:3\.\?(?.5;',S,-lW~~lc.!]1S.P.t_~1!.:!..9,!-!J.~LuR,t"Q~,"J,'-!;l$s!JpJ,9~"~,~~g~,~£,,.~b,~J,.~..!l<;

!)(JHE~,9~rX~.l?LS.9\~s.i~)g.,J}"rf!;wpaJ!G~$,,,Qt",E.m;~igX!J?9!,i~2:.. ... ..L~,~,~!,~" 1~2.?L9,C;;,~~..,,_?~ identitythat are cl?af!x.d,;:}l;~l:.~.a_~~_d, si,ng;~lar, and neat. Indeed, Ibiven the
in l1efeE1:ly'co'iltiilg(;i1t i9.~l]..ilii.\'y'h iC~:E1!j{,F3S!rr:§Ii!ie-lf~I§lnill:m:::~§Ji.iI~:a .lU1!.L::4tGl1$j;Y,G,.i!~".th!t..ii!)),j;,s:;~.tb.s;~b,(~ill).!l,Q;[j£;'UiJ.Y~ b Iu rred, a 6filaIn'.as .JI1tens"l\;s;

trJrmuEitl()';;':-'-""'~-'-""'''-'~he 1I§'M~n

r11ultii5Je:-aild"~'t;l;;1:J 'violent. Gloria Anzaldua offers a particularly


border es ulla herida abierta [is an open wound] where the

J:I:.i,[,sj,jY...2!:!,j,.g!J!.t~,;;;,-i;\ga.iQ~,ub..<:;,mi.h!.\.',S'liuS.!~d be(2ls.,~";:s~~_E~_r:.:.::.i.S .. i

.. ~!~~SJ!Lh,:!I;;~'~Mg,g;i}l!l,_ll.]~.)J[S!?,!£2,\L h ...8L.,.\,:Y.s?,.,,;,y..2.:L~.T.~,~~l~9_,.~~,.£~;~~,~.,~~~r.? c;(~ ~.~.~~X,;::.~~,.l;~)!,9;;~,.S\~.l~~!,I\C",j~PI~.$;,E~.,~<~:S .. .~ . .. .SS,.t!£, ~ ... ;5!~sJ~,~.~ u n~~I,Si,.!.<?',!,~.HQg,m§b .• ~ .. t~",fr2~r~,J~ftt;,; J .• tU&\,n.!S;J~A§.,\l~,\!m<cj,!.I}g,J'!'Q.<:;",J!"Mr.&Q,~,"~~~



wpographical line, borders are shifting horizons

Rather than L~iLJ1arrow

IJ And rather than cIea!'!ydemarc~tingt~ ;:;:;arked by ftuxand ambigu~ d il';iIity-'or"seT{an"a""o'rheG th ey~--;~-i;rt;~;;-i;;r~~e thr;~gh·_·ati1;rlc relat;ons!i-jp'''wheri''tIle''preseiige-qrlh-q:§e''~ ho'areamoigu ous·"ancrTlffilnai ,----"'....."....-< ,~_ """'" ~.""'~.~ ,"""'.,-_._",~~,.., ,,-~

c:?,~f~~,~;~.~!D:'_~!}22£!S"g£,y.DiJi~. r~,l?l::,;~!.:E~~i~~"'<;L~~!}~iE.E 'The d efi ni tlo n of Jdent!ty, in nations and men ... depends for its accomplishment on the recognition of that which is other, like, and Simultaneously other and like, and on the abstract, objective understanding of the self that follows from this recognition.,74 It i: the obiee~i.f~!1 ofl~,S.~S.!f th~t".~~J.s.u.r,\.i3~ t::~,!~"2L2.~oJ.l,~~,.!!:~£,1:.9"ffiM;~!1.r.2l!.sLb;?1'£'~.;1£'~: ""'> ' , r-r"1·




P-_/_A~ ~Reri hsVY)



Campbell 1992
(David, Professor ofInternational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 247)
Of course, my hope is that the force of this analysis will mollify if not assuage some of these concerns. But it has to be recognized that such a desire is limited - but not precluded - by the nature of the agonism that exists between the logic of interpretation (which, outlined in the introduction, underpins this analysis) and the entailments of epistemic realism. It is not a limit that is enabled by the incommensurability of paradigms, or some such formulation, for this agonism is not something which can be resolved on methodological or epistemological grounds. It is a limit commissioned by the fact that each approach instantiates a different ethic. Epistemic realism can be considered a commitment designed to contain what Richard that either we have some sort of ultimate foundation for our knowledge or we are plunged called the void of the relative, the irrational, the which assertSlI1~ Bernstein has into the 'Cartesian anxiety,' the proposition arbitrary, the" nihilistic. As Bernstein notes, the search for a foundation and the anxiety it inculcates is more than an effort to solve the problem of the basis for knowledge and truth: 'It is the quest for some fixed point, some stable rock upon which we can secure our lives against the vicissitudes that constantly threaten us.' 10 However, this ethical impulse cannot be satisfied, particularly when we remind ourselves (as chapter two noted) that the culttrfeO modernity necessitates external guarantees but has erased the ontological preconditions for them. It was this situation, after all, which granted to fear' and danger the capacity of securing that which could no longer be reasoned into existence. As a result, epistemic realism is sustainable only through the faith of its adherents believing that they are warding off a threat. In consequence, it seems that the processes which were implicated in the rise of the state are now replicated in the traditional discourses of the relatio"liSl between srates. The evangelism of fear centered on death grounded the . church's project of salvation; the evangelism of fear articulated in the anxiety about an unfinished and dangerous world secured the state such that security occupied the position of salvation; now the evangelism of fear enunciated by those hoping to ward off 'foreign' intellectual influences ~s_to contain the instability of their representations of the world.-·



Ad. : Req \ isn'l



/ ----

AT: REALISM INEVITABLE TO BELIVE POLITICS IS ONLY RELATED TO THE STATE JUSTIFIES P A TRIARCHICAL OPPRESSION AND COLONIZATION Campbell 1992 (David, Professor ofInternational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 252-253)
Our political.irnagination.hasJ2e.cnJ!!2poverished by the practices associated withthcl;~·radigm.of.?overeignty. As discusseu~eof' the sovereignty/anarch'y' di;ti~tioll works to contain contingency through the instantiation of a sovereign presence which then acts as a regulative ideal. In terms of the political field, this has meant that the idea of ~ po~cal'_~~.~.b.~~~~.YJ2§!HIled-by-.and n~b 'the st~' In effect, the state has colonized our understanding of 'the political' by obscuring those practices through which it has been 'fashioned in the likeness of legislated fear,' and foregrounding in their place its claim to be the source of authorized articulations of danger.2u Integral to this has been the assumption that political modalities - slIch as strength, resolution, boldness, will, vigilance, etc. - associated with the regime of Masculine/ feminine (discussed in the introduction) are the natural dispositions of politics. But such a colonization and such an assumption is rendered problematic by the retheorization of identity central to this study. More specifically,. such se·cllnty--Whlch-{..·•. ergcSlfom .. understandmg----or ~._colonizatio~ is rendered ~..di:Tercnt retheorizatlon ----" of m the ~ntity. ~

REALISM IS INSUFFICIENT TO UNDERSTAND POLITICS Campbell 1992 (David, Professor ofInternational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 247-248 )
. O~ercome \:ith tl:is Cartesian anxiety, traditional scholarship in l~ternatlOna~ r~lat~ons wIl! probably continue to forget the silences, omisSIOns and limitations of the traditional approaches and maintain that epistemic realism rcsts on more than faith. But the ritual forgetting (whiCh might be characterised as post-Cartesian amnesia) of the insights of diverse scholars - such as Wittgenstein, Winch, Kuhn, Habern1as, Foucault and Derrida, all of whom have in some way contributed to the logic 9.f

! 1 Besides, only by exorc!5f~g interpretation can only increase seductive ourselves from - the unfounded but the anxi.ety. appeal that SOCialand political life has to be organised by recourse to either one option or another, and that


move towards a situation foundation outside of politicsdeal with the issues of where we are equipped to we can locate a secure and history, can~e life and death that we confront in ~~obal life .. --"


ACJ.:· Rect


Il'sm wovtj



AT: REALISM WORKS POLITICAL DISCOURSE CAN NO LONGER UNDERSTAND THE INDETERMANACY OF THE SYSTEM, IT CAN NO LONGER SOLVE NOR PROVIDE SECURITY Campbell 1992 (David, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security: United.~ates Foreign :policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 19,20) ,
. ~ ~The gl~)ba.liza~ion c~~gencL!~,~;:~:.::;;~.~:::.".~:::~:s~~.~.,t=~den~~e.~ .-, of \ ~.l!_~qe.o.~m.2,!gHltX\ ..L~,~.S!.~.[,~,I~y~,SY","~.~Q.,-u,~~~X.ti!.!I.)JX,?D.Q.(J.J..J),2,~gS1~.:.,I:~:~~~~!J~, .. ~ ! !!lese have been long Identified 111cademIc IOternatlOnalrelatIOns literature a ' ~nder the sigoe!('aiiafcfiY,' these cont~fi'Oinwl1iC1i conres tIlciT ,. understanding as globalized - can no lon~r fJecoot:une(rWTil\';nestab-IT;~d'~

, i~I.:"~Jl}!.£i.!iL~]]1d~~I~U!~~!i2!l~P~g~!.~·ili-;;·~~.~~rW~Ls~~l?X~ .
of just being written as 'out there.' Security is not taGe found 'within~' This ISmore tha;:;UStai-esullorii1terd;:p'~-;;°d~~-c~~~tfie-prollTera'tU;;;'--;;rtru;;a r ts, 0 the overflowing of domestic issues onto the world stage .tI~ convc1Ttiunal response). This is an irru~ which renders all estab,J' I!,shed contain"~rs proble;nat!.~~Il~ irr~ption do;;-;wtSimpIY invol~e the', mQX~f~EE"CQDl.f§Ji[!<D.l~JJ.QW, •• .•.. q.!2S,

~r2i~ i1tO'rIie

.0 tfie'flJUt.,'rafhe:[I:lfie

effective rendering as!ln.Q~r~"9Ihose .doinaln:~ndtr;-;;r t entailments, maRes"irttI~·~~'D.seTo"sp~;k of pol;tTc;tocci:iri:i'ng"~;;;;;;ra([tstinct'lnSide'
---:I_.t.. "":::.:


, or 'outside' (such as a 'Third Worl§_"YllicJ2J.~~P~ii'!l!y'_beX~':l~ ..~ur.bor.d~rs ;;n,j temporally backwarar-'wnell, for example, US. economic e0Icles encourage 'Third World eX~.2.£.~~.'c!.!Lfones~I:_'?~_~ngel~swhere rnanufacturers stamp their auto parts 'made in Brazil' and the clot~lI1ggooas '~ 1 al\van' to attract lower tariffs; when the defffiJgfaph~t:...c:IJang~s that have made non-wlute chIldren majorities in the Gi.rrrorrua and New York school svstems, and will make whites a ni~nority in the Uni.ted States byrhe year 2056; and when the poverty and poor health care 10 Harlem makes the area a 'zone of excess mortality' with a death rate for black males higher than their counterparts in Banglade~h,.ll ... This globaIization of~'!:£';~!..S);',h~L1IJ~..u:P:If\tlQ,P.,.cl.~t£?JJ.,~!,!1~~~:.,,~~.~~ on Iy rencrerspru[;Tei§T'is..~he :.radi.tiooals.{.la.ti.;li\z#!.\?E~£,f0wer,.\sg~r..::.~es, J a IU!E...~~_.E:illiliif,JJj\!~tis~Li~:~L~i.~.~J~2.~£.!.Y.,,;l!1~~c!!2's~~!~;.~~:c~~c:~. ~;;hich have made those. sgatlahzatlOns of power INssI!?le. fhIS IS.wnar I"S in,,,·tI1'e·'''l~';;~~;'~--;·;;f t -th-;-;;~;k~;;><;;"f"'Cert~hty"'"2~ The irr~I t~f 1 p contingency opens u~e possiglllty ofobse~l!1at~~iW2L!&.i!~; ;;ow'se; - discourses abom prior, primary" and stable IdentitIes - ~ork !,O .... -,--- . -.• d ... 10 __M••"~ thev OT)erate 'e name'c...J..en.UtJ.G5._l!L':Y.l"" •••_,, ••,,,,-,"_""" __ ••: .•• '''--Finally this erasure of certainty' brought on by the lffuptJon of , . 'JT 0 ~ut . contingency has produced the rarefaction of politic~1discourse,' It simply, while they retain some power, ~he conventional (and foun~atlonal) cat<::gQ.{il<!u),L{)J:ds;.ciJ~ilie ~te~j, Th eir !y'Q..~~n._Q.Q.!y~Q!)JJ,!l!lQ._Qy._ exhau ;;b)'uration_r~~~~E._~an_~ffi~a ti~~_~~y' can. ~u n.~~~::~~_e.2'.!.~!..SD r .. .s...~:d S · ..··" ·-r·· ,'f' .... . and excluslons-:tJut they are no longer " .."~•. .. IdenClty JY speCI ·Ylngexceptlo;~;~= ".,~~"",~=" ..",,,~"_.~~ ~ ..,,".,_~~'~~~: •..... •. ~,.~1-, ;~T~---"'~-r"r~'-I)"-Ortn1fermsof a onor and POSItIveIdeal. I:'..Vcn more .\n e to .':D0 JI}.?~S,,~.~J.J2O<"""'_'''~''''~''_''';n.m);.''''''~'''~~=''~''d''''"~""""""""""f'(j .. ' iiTi;;ort-a'o"tly" the (1~ •.ire to order has Itself become a source 0 aI}.g£L!!LQ1!.!"

time.--C ..tical.sI~lll~.~!ib..~P.s~52 [--.. Pol i ··-·-'. h - ..-d f!£.~t.J.\R~.t.!,I:~~~~;', normalizatIon, or mastery as tIle Jases 0 actIOn, t e nee or --",_ .._d'~'-""'--''''''''''''''~'''~=='''''"--~''~'-'-''f --""--'7"-''';:r-~''-''~''''''-: I' 't or ethiCS as a command; or 0 . ---'~~~-~"-"-_.'---' ... '. aClt '. 'ereu:~-n{ and " SOY-;;:r-"'gi1ty , territoriality as the contame r 0 f no.!.!E.!..c,i?~,.h?-~Jp.<~J,H:J".(;,~R~_= .• technolOgIes or or·:·"E6~p."fo5Iill~:::;:~~[ity':"> __ ~~"~"""""'_~"""''''"''~~'''''_'\ ::.'Intever'il'a'd'Tt""...-~~,..., ~,." ....••. er, or nower as a.~~.£."~""""" ,,~,.' " ..,'. ",,:;;.~~ "'_..••. •..... -"',~~~.J,,,;: •. ¥ ...•.

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AT: EMPIRICALLY EFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION FOR COLD WAR ONLY LEGITIMIZES THREAT CONSTRUCTION AND OTHERIZA TION Campbell 1992 (David, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 249-250)
We are now at an historical juncture where the demise of the Soviet Union means that policy makers in Washington are looking forward to a new era in international Lelations, the outlines of which they can barely discern. What is clear, however, is that the optimistic view in which it was held that-the so=-----, called post-cold war period would be a fundamentally different era in world .' politics placed too much credence on the essential qualities of a suppose,~ly a view was possible only because it ignored the debt that subjectivity owes to otherness and the independently-existing role the as the basis forof identity play ofthreatst'suCh'\ to other requirements an assessment in giving rise discourses of danger. What the United States-led war in the Persian Gulf demonstrates is that above all else the cold war was not based exclusively upon an orientation towards the Soviet Union:-rnoeed-;-wlJatE!~nt demonstrat;;a--=- particuriuly when considered in terms of the above analysis, with its. consideration of the themes apparent in the 'discovery' of the New World, the colonization of Ireland, the Puritan settlement in America, and the subsequent moments of identity conflict from colonial times through to the red scares of the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries - was th.e....Jyay-tn. w.h!.c~certain targets and techniques of exclusio~common to disparate h~_torical moments. In each of those instances, for all that was specific to the-' time and place, there was mor~Qften,.than-nQUUi.t;.!!se of <:.n~1angerment.. ascribed to the activities or-tile orher,_.a.J~ o'f-Internal challenge and , subversloil," a tendency to crimil}1J.liz.e..Qr ilitari~a m to tightly draw the lines of superiority/inferiority between wjlling~ss"F 'us' and 'thWl>' . ' and an that could be .

(tnere~Jt:utIng aiili1T~t.i_()IJ_..?ftfiese· 'dO;:;;-estic' and ' m:ci~iteoo~inality), ratIons and representations to dangers

located ,~"_0lC external realm sU~Qtions of SOYerelgnt~ere·" <S.!.!~s~ined. ccordi~ly, A the cold war was not ~ to one state or 01e ideology:- The cold war was a powerful and perva.sive historical configuration "of thediscucsive economy of identity/difference operating in multiple sites, --.--


~be ~o_~i:...?X_'.Vhich;-ae-mise....Q[ its most rece1!LO.hj_~lLQfi\ is





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The global dominance of the United States has lead them to claim "Ownership of History." Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert. Super Power Syndrome, 2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9)
, ~)ut this "global empire" does not follow previolls imperial models, say, of the British empire from the eighteenth to the twentieth century. There is no American plan for leaving elaborate bureaucracies in every country we dominate~ While all previous empires claimed some kind of noble mission, the new American mission contains a particularly fervent rendering of vVilsonian altruism. The National S<:;curityStrategy statement th;l t dW;ld ministration in September

released inten

2002 speaks ~randly of the American benefits offreedom

tion "to extendthe

across the gl9be" and

"to help make :the world not just safer but better.." - At the same time it makes clear that, into the foreseeable future, I;\.merica intends to hold absolute military dominance~dme might say omnipotence-on our planet: "The United {States," as the National puts it, "must and will maintain any attempt .. by an enemy-whether Security Strategy to defea~ the capability

state or non-state

actor-to im~ose its will on the United States, our alli~, -;1' our friend~. We WIll maintain the forces sufficient to support our pbligations, 'and to defend freedom. Our

~orces will be:strong enough to dissuade saries from PNrsuing a military buildup

poten tial adverin hopes of sur-

passing, or egualing, the power of the United States.'~ Bookman con:Curs with many observers in describing this _. strategy as "a plan for permanent US military and economic domination of every region of the globe."~


mIlItarization gists dream of deciding

\\kkALISM /\



Bush. administration's


of American the

power extends not only over planet Earth, but through the outcome of significant

of space, over the heavens as well. Its strateworld

events everywhere. We may call this an empire ofjtuid world control, and theIrs IS nothwg less than an inclusive claim to fFle ownership; of history. It is a claim never made because never: before has technology permitted before the imag-

imng ot such ;~nenterprise, however illusory, on the part of a head ot state and ,hIS wner The administration's
CIrcle ..•




a the

phras~ from one of the president's speeches concerning dangers we face "at the crossroads of radicalism marriage between ultimate zealotry and ultimate mentioned

and techweapons applies no

nology." What is Ineant by that phrase is the apocalyptic in our enemies, but the "crossroads"

less to American policy, specifically as laid out in this document. The administration's radicalism takes the form of aggressively remaking the world in an American world dominance, technology, becomes image. by of

Our unprecedented OLlr ul1lque mIlItary

made possible our means

doing so. The fluidity of this version of imagined world control is consistent with the Rumsfeld doctrine" of a fluid military. The latter is to sustain the former. Technology and f] uidity are counted upon to minimize ;llties and streamline lcaders for instance saturation war-making claimed American casuin general. (American

the victory in Iraq demon-

strates that, to win wars, we no longer have to engage in bombing of cities as in World War










Campbell 1992
(David, Professor ofInternational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, pg. 34)
cold ',/'The _~_.~ war, then, _ _

r:.~~ f, ~~: S (;~~~: .. ,~~~,~~,~}"',~~,9,.~,,,;~E~;K~L~,,.~~!~,~;.,.;y~~L~.h,~lWX,,!J\l.1,1,\Q.);f.,,5?f 6°. teI:tial ca[iama tes- ..e gard Ies~.52L£h£ir..?,.t;r,{jX~gU;hG.{j,g~city'"J;Q,."RS;,,'!, r .. bJ.ef!t,~ were ~1(;·tt~J·"~s";t'th;·~~t':"·"t;;'~"tl~is se~~e, the collapse, overcoming, or surrc;;dC';:"o(C)'I:;',t'(;rUj6'pfbragonists at this historical juncture does not mean 'it' is ovcr. T'hc cold war's meaning will undoubtedly change, but if wc recall that thc phrase 'cold war' was coined by a fourteenth-century Spanish writer to represent the persistent rivalry between Christians and Arabs, we comc to recognize that the sort of struggle the phrase denotes is a struggle over identity: a struggle that is not context-specific and thus not rooted in the existence of a particular kind of Soviet Union.77 Besides, the United States-Jed war against Iraq should caution us to the fact that the Western

t~: ..

was both a struggle which exceeded the ''"~-''''' ''r _ milita!y', .. -,-..,-'--'''-.•. --.. --- .. ,.-n~ .•. --'

(and part.icularly American) ~nte~tive dispositi<.:..r::~~.~b-J.2.rS!;t~~mi~n.. the pos t-World War II. ir~.s.LI}.?J!Ql1ill..,,);,!lY,.iW.!lill~,P,t.,;;;,"~.iJ;t""J,1;1~,iL?~~JQ~§}l .!] .~Il,~iY;~\;~,:QGni~lii~i[:9w;;~~L~~j,~!2.1,":~~~,~~;';~;~~2LI2,!l2,a,llKSLWJ?1l,~,~,§£K'!9SSL,t,2,,,~r tl}.S"a,s,~i::!!,!~,~.~L,~,~*'?,5~,~b,~,£I.~~!:.~,fu~LQ,Li!)J~EQ,~~sh~I,IS,~1?S,,~!1~~.~;!£,:::9...:.,s.!g~,.,~h~ . ~~S\U!SL!s):!iLE0,U\S::E\~~S,,,a,lLl~~R,Qm(;$.,,,a!),,~t~!~!1,"~UEri:~~~;~.~,?"~~~~~,~~<?,,,~LI}9;". . ?~, ~.~E;;.~~sSl,~Y!.!!lfS!js.:,,;'!.~:LS,,~5.~'sS,~.~~,~ .. ~?,~t,b,2!:;"::;.::y,~!?.,,~~r,,.~£~~~~:;,t~.,~~,~ : .. ~.~te, ~ 6r ons ideolo/'y .. A;.a~o~sequence, we ,need t?rethink the c,?!1ventionaI u nders tand ;;;g.;r.' f~r~ign"'"p'oficy':'an(f"tj~~'l{i';'t~;i~i'ty' "of"t!1e' '~01ct" ;~~ 'i'~ P";-ifti c~ la'f' ...,.."y::::.,~" .... ,.,,,.,'.,,.. "''' ".""., ., ..... . ,,::>,....




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AT: THREATS EXIST Danger and threats are non-existent, they are socially constructed in an attempt to maintain social order and justify exterminating the other Campbell 1992 (David, Professor ofIntemational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 2,3)

-,/'F urthermo re, the r~~_0:.iEs,?rprS!:~i nj'!}..lh.~_!!Lt.i~'l~~!2.!l2.L!4g,ng~!E '

nOt' restricte~"t2 .•~tLS)ro,cess by which some risks come to beconsidered "nl0f'c'iieri"6'U-s oth ~-;;~A;1;;'[;p(j';:tantslte'orii1terpretanon"'ls'tEe-w~y T;;,than. \vfilcfi"cer't;i'~~';;:;;'d';;:;-Z;{'~-;;presentation crystallize around referents marked as dangers. Qiven .~~_of.~~ous relationship b~~~!}.1lJl..~~s.",.mr.!:<Jat0J1 of dangSL.fl.JJJL.t.b.9,:SJbiective' incl<JenC'e-ofl)erlavwrsand factors thought to th~,,\.:~Il!)S:IhYJ~.!-fi?-4!Ii£uT~r-~isk-tc)~b;'~~p;~;"D"te(r;ll·'rc"iiTls"'o'f ci)'nstrt~s.~.j!,., a'lilf:lcteristics that are reviled in' the~'~~li;;;-;"iitysaid·;:o-Ge·t.f{reat;~ea.C'an .

w irrdemo!ls trarC:"0i ab i ~!.£it£i~ri~~EI'ihlj;-g~~~~~§;;I; e 12t.:!?:::.::Es dirty, ive, o r ~isb h.'!~ 9.£9I.u1i~ri!L~? ~:? ....!S~~~~S,g~oLci.~.I:J~~~J!L.thS]Sjil.~:~L~an _ .... .. .. a,r..~ ~ ~ .. ..
w • __ _ •_ ••••••• ·~_"". •••• _

expenencc. ····In ... thl;;·~ontext, ~t is also i,mporrant to note that there need not be an action or event to provide_ili!<",gI.oJ.!!JJ.!.s ..f.Q.u~Q.iDJt;;JPJ:~..~!!Ji.QLtof da!l~£:. T~S...:~ . mere existe ncs ..?L~.!l....ili~.!I!ati.Y.s . ... ..1J!.QJle_o£ ...h.\',':jDg, ..,pJ:\<§J;D'!;~""Q.(.)Y.biG..h •. ~'ti:J/r,y ..-th\',': ~~I§:£!:~[§I1§.u!!!IS!!)J,iti..~"L:),l~Q2~~~jJS"~DS1JhV,li .• deJ1i;U.waE?;¥-\'L£,Q$;. ;~~:;.,-, ~ of a particular id~ntity~~e the tru~~:..~~~~tim;:~ ... !2.'2.?ul?.~~ ;j;;k/') .. ~ l fr~duc~~~ ... ~.Ederst!.t;2!22tL~L~..!;§.at. conse.quence,. only in these'terms 61n It IS possible. to understand how some acts of mternatlOnal power pohtlCS Jr'!, raise no~a whit of concern, while something as seemingly unthreatening as the novels of a South American writer can be considered such a danger to national security that his exclusion from the country is warranted. 7 For both insurance and international relations, therefore, danger is the conseguence


an'dSequesters"'anideal of the l<!~J1Ji~..9.Lj;h>;_.peQple...said t(,) ..•b,<;:"J!t...ti~~.~...•''. calculation of a":;!.1J~~LlYb.iYJ)_gJ:!k££.iD$~Y.Y!;'!2.t~, .... .• ~£iPJine~M.iQ.!1~S' .;,l of a....·~."""'-- ..,,>.·,_.~"~•r..,·~"~·~,\,,·j:\,;;;"'·'~;I""'I~..-.,,"".' .,...v.-· . •••.



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