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HINGSTMAN 12 UTILITARIANISM GOOD; DEONTOLOGY ANSWERS INDEX
Utilitarianism is a good standard for evaluating action Moral absolutes are bad - they ignore the greater good Answers to: We cannot predict consequences of actions Answers to: Utilitarianism produces injustice Rights bad Answer to: Moral relativism makes utilitarianism impossible Answers to: Kant Answers to: Badiou 1-2 3-4 5 6-8 9-10 11-12 13-16 17

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Utilitarianism Good
Utilitarianism is good because it looks at the world as a whole

Gordon Graham, Regius Professor of moral Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen, 2004 ' [Eight Theories of Ethics, 2004, No Editors cited, p. ]
;- ~intended his work to rescue the word 'utility' from corruption, bu~'

b,/ his efforts, the words utility and utilitarian in common speech sti!,,:

mean something opposed to pleasure and only indirectly connected with happiness. But if the terminology of philosophical utilitarianism remains somewhat specialized, the doctrine itself has come to have wide appeal in the modern world. Even a cursory glance at most of the advice columns in contemporary, newspapers and magazines, for instance, will reveal that their writers assume the truth of something like the Greatest Happiness Principle. Moreover, they clearly regard such a view as not only correct, but uncontentious and incontestible. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to , moral thinking. A greathas come to besuppose that there can contemporary say that utilitarianism many people the main element in be no serious objection to the moral ideal of maximizing happiness and minimizing unhappiness, both in personal relationships and in the world at large. ,When actions are prescribed that appear to have no connection with pleasme and pain (orthodox Jewish dietary restrictions, for instance) or when social rules are upheld which run counter to the Greatest Happiness Principle (Christian restrictions on divorce, for instance) it is those actions br restrictions which are most readily called Happiness Principle itself. , into question,

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Utilitarianism Good
Consequentialism is the only true ethics because it is based on the greater good
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. ~nsequentialist theories define morality iq terms of good consequences. Whether or not I am morally obligated to do something, .. and whether - or not I am, morally permitted to do something are questions that are decided' on the basis of consequences. If the CODBequences f an action A are good or at least better than I can o expect from any other course of action, and I am an action-specific consequentialist, then I am obliged to do A. If I am a type-specific consequentialist, however, my course of action will be determined on the basis of a rule that formulates a practice that has been determined to have better consequences than any of its options. But, it should be asked, what kinds of consequences are good ones? Few thinkers dispute the claim that pleasure is good and pain is bad. Some go so far as to claim that pleasure and pain are the only things that are intrinsically good and bad, i.e., good and bad in themselves. Pain and pleasure are, for these ethicists, who are referred to as hedonists, the only things that are indispuwb/y good and bad. Jeremy Bentham argued for this view, and so did MilL but they differed regarding the issue of whether or not pleasure and pain could differ in quality. Both philosophers accepted without qualification the view that pleasures and pains could differ in quantity-they both could be more or less intense. Mill, however, thought that there were degrees of goodness associated with pleasures and pains. The pleasures one gains from reading philosophy were siud by Mill to be superior in quality to those that resulted from satisfyingthe appetites. The pleasure that one gets from food, drink, and sex were considered by Mill to be qualitatively inferior to reading Plato. It seems to me that Bentham was right and Mill wrong on thiSscore, and I will try to convince the reader of this when I discuss utilitarianismin Chapter V. But for now I wish to simply concede as obvious the fact that pleasure is good and pain is bad

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even though one can, as commonsense recognizes, have too much of a good thing. One can overindulge the appetites to such an extent that the pleasure ceases, and is replaced by pain. This should not be misconstrued to be an argument that pleasure can sometimes be unpleasant, that would be a contradiction. The truth is simply overindulgence in what is pleasurable can produce pain. Epicurus based a philosophy of life on this recognition. The Epicurean is not, as he is often misconstrued to be, someone who promotes a lifestyle associated with excessive self-indulgence. Instead, he is the one who teaches restraint in all joys of the appetite. The consequence of such a lifestyle is, a,£cording.o Epicuru.s,. onte?tmen~ t c ?".. t{ .
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Utilitarianism Good
Moral absolutes are stupid. They force us to take actions contrary to the greater good. , 'ty fMaryland 2004 , Odell, Department of Philosophy The UmverSl 0
S, Jack, On Consequentialist Ethics
jl<BPC has a It denies that moral rules, are to be and prima facie rule"trtilitarianism.distinct advantage over both literal taken literally. It also denies that t~ey,are prima faci~ rules. It maintains t?at moral ~es. ~ are simply abbrevtatl0ns or summanes ?f complex pr~ctlces--practlces ().~ that do prescribe how we ought to act m those .very Clfcumstancesthat l-.)..\t~ ti 17, .,.. the prima facie interpretation misconceives .as excep ons. { Q./ Philosophers who concern themselves with explaining what they re~ard as legitimate exceptions to moral rules do so because .they consider moral rules to be categorical imperatives. Anyone who mterprets 'Do. not lie' literally to mean 'Never under any circumst~es lie,: will have to deal with a vast number of what appear to be valid exceptiOns to the rule. They will have to deal with cases like lying to save a love? one:s life, killing a terrorist to keep him from detonating a bomb .which Will wipe out half the city, a parent's stealing of a loaf of bread m order to feed her/his starving children, clubbing an assailant in self-defense or to prevent rus banning innocent children, or even lying to avoid hurting someone's feelings. But a philosopher who defends folk ethics need not be concerned with any of these so-called "exceptions." My view, FBPC, considers those cases that are ordinarily taken to be exceptions to be already covered by the practices that our abbreviations designate. Our practice surrounding lying recognizes that it is sometimes ethically permissible to lie in order to save the lives of llmocent people. It also recognizes that it is sometimes ethically obligatory to do so. A case in point is the one I presented previously concerning the newsman on the island about to be destroyed by an impending storm. Our practice concerning when it is wrong to lie incorporates the idea that for the most part, lying is wrong, while at the same time incorporating those times when lying is permitted or obligatory. The same thing is true of our practices concerning killing, harming, and stealing. In this way, FBPC can be said, in Wittgensteinian fashion, to dissolve rather than solve the issue regarding whether or not there are valid exceptions to moral rules. The rules that FBPC defends do not have exceptions, and so we are not forced to adopt act utilitarianism to deal with them.

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Railton's objection to rule consequentialism, which is that an action can stem ITompractices or rules it would be best to have, and yet be wrong, does not apply to folk based practice consequentialism. FBPC does not deal in new and exotic sets of rules. Its rules are those rules t~t have been time-tested throughout the course of human history. FEPC claims that adherence to certain rules has produced much better resu1ts than would have occurred in acting in opposition to them. So the set that it advocates is the set that has been "most effective." FBPC does not claim that the set it recommends should never be modified or changed-either by adding new rules or modifYingexisting ones-but only that there has to be good reason for doing so, and that the adoption of the modified set will have to be justified empirically. The modified set will have to establish itself by proving to be an improvement over the original set. Otherwise, it would not qualifYas the best set, nor would it garner general acceptance. The best set, or to speak more precisely, the "expectably" best set, in my view, will be that set which has proven itself over time, both in terms of its positive results, and in terms of what would have been the consequences of acting in opposition to some or all members of it. A new and unique set of moral principles or rules might be imagined and introduced by a philosopher seeking, in Platonic fashion, an ideal set of moral principles-call it "Alpha Best." That set could even be enacted into law by our legislature, and publicized as "the best that 'money can buy," but such procedures would not establish this set as the best set. Nothing short of success over time would qualify Alpha Best as expectably best. An action cannot therefore, according to FBPC, stem ., ftom practices or rules it would be best to have, and yet be wronu

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A2: Can't Predict Consequences
. We can generalize about cause and effect even it-we can't predict exact consequences

Gordon Graham, Regius Professor of moral Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen, 2004 [Eight Theories of Ethics. 2004, No Editors cited, p.
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When it comes to holding people responsible, on the other hand, the:. position is quite different. If we enter imaginatively into the driver's situa~\ tion, we have to decide what, as consequentialists, it would be sensible to:; prescribe as his best action at the time and in the circumstances prevailing.:; Pretty plainly, having made his mistake, the recommendation would be.:that he should turn the car in order to take the Archduke back safely. He' was not to know that assassins would by chance enter the same street at that moment. Therefore, because the anticipated consequences were good, even though the actual consequences were not; he chose rightly. This distinction between deciding how to act and assessing how we have acted is obviously of the greatest importance for consequentialism, because we cannot know the consequences of our actions before we have taken them. As a result, a doctrine restricted to assessment after the event would have no practical application. But if we cannot assess actual consequences before the event, how are we to decide what to do? The answer is that we have to rely upon generalizations about cause and effect and follow general rules. We estimate the likely consequences of a proposed course of action on general of of experience, and we summarize ful the basisrulespast conduct . our experience in use-\ .-1

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A2: Utilitarianism Produces Injustice

Consequentialism

is not necessarily unjust.

Odell, Department of Philosophy The University of Maryland, 2004
S. Jack, On Consequentialist Ethics
~ we saw in the previous chApter, itWe think:of the set of rules that utilitarianism espouses as necessary for human happiness, it would appear that one way to meet objection (H) would be to fiat a justice principle, and argue for its acceptance on the grounds provided by the utility principle. One could argue that societies that persist in ignoring equity issues are not only subject to civil unrest, since they contain a fused bomb, but often are the locus of riots and revolutions. So it is clear that there is an empirical basis for such a rule and the practice it would initiate. This way of looking at the matter is quite misleading. however. It ignores the fact that such a practice already exists and functions as part of the folk morality incorporated in FBPC. The only problem that remains is that the equity rule is often applied by the advantaged, for the advantaged. Its application is frequently restricted, .•'imd,not only to the pack. but also within it. The fact that morality tJnds to be selectively or unjustly applied is not a unique problem for FBPC. Morality and its justification is one thing. The actual practice of morality is another. FBPC does have an advantage over other theories, however. Its advantage is its empirical roots. All that it or any theory of morality can be required to do is demonstrate the advantages of the universal application of the justice or equality precept, and this can, I venture, be easily accomplished by empirical means. History is the empirical laboratory that illustrates what happens when the justice principle is ignored~ I

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A2: Utilitarianism Produces Iniustice
Utilitarianism is consistent with protection of rights and civil liberties

Gordon Graham, Regius Professor of moral Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen, 2004 [Eight Theories of Ethics, 2004, No Editors cited, p. ~ -

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The moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one another (in whkn~ we must never fQrget to include wrongful interference with eaC' other's freedom) are more vital to human well-being than any maxirtt however important, which only point out the best mode of managl some department of human affairs.

It is the importance of the rules of justice for the happiness of us 'a according to Mill, that commonly gives rise to a feeling of outrage when:'~ one of them is broken. But though we have this very strong and special fe ing about justice and rights, upon reflection we can see ~\
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that justice is a name for certain moral requirements, which, regart!~' i collectively, stand higher in the scale of social utility, and are therefi!f: . . jil of more paramount obligation, than any others; though particular cases may occur in which some other social duty is so important, as to overrule anyone of the general maxims of justice. (Mill

1871, 1998: 106).j

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Consequentialism can coexist with laws. Odell, Department of Philosophy The University of Maryland, 2004
S. Jack, On Consequentialist Ethics
\ It is unrealistic to expect most individuals to do a better job of determining how to act under a variety of circumstances than has been done by society over the centuries: Why not allow ourselves to be in general guided by principles which fonnulate time-tested, much adapted, practices? But, it is important not to ignore rules. One might be tempted to argue that there is no.need for rules; all we need do is condition our youth to behave in accordance with folk ethical practices. We must resist this temptation, however. It fails to recognize that . verbalization is an essential part of the process we utilize to establish dispositions necessary. for harmonious co-existence. The rules we fonnulate to abbreviate our practices assist us in realizing our educational' goals. They also allow us to discuss our folk ethical practices and enable us to recognize where they need to be modified, and thereby accelerate their modification. Moreover, the formulation of folk ~hical practices also assists us in making and passing laws. Many of our laws are nothing more than legalized fonnulations (statutes) of I v{ 5""' folk ethical practicw

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Gordon Graham, Regius Professor of moral Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen, 2004 [Eight Theories of Ethics, 2004, No Editors cited, p. ]
Jbshould now be evident that the distinction between act and rule utili· ,,"ianism is a very important one because it has been called upon to pro, ~;de the means of replying to two serious objections. To the objection that j:ilitarianism too readily justifies the use of unjust means to utilitariar _,ds, (our example was the murder of a tramp to provide others with vita! "ansplant organs), a rule utilitarian (such as Mill) replies that the rules ane '~e deep sense of justice which this sort of counter-example appeals to, an ':fj1emselvesto be explained in terms of the greatest happiness principle. ~"Second, to the objection that it would be a bad thing if our every actior jt\Vasguided by the Greatest Happiness Principle, the rille utilitarian replie1 ~fh.at our actions should be guided by an adherence to rules which an ijifhemselves justified by appeal to the Greatest Happiness Principle.> .. ----._--~ --. - ,--------- ---~- ._- ---•.. --- .-_. "-- ..... ~ , __ .- ' .• , ~_._--.. - ---.-.- ...-.'-..

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Ri2hts Bad
The rights of the group outweigh the rights of the individual.

J. C. Lester, Professor at University of Alabama. 2000. (Escape from
Leviathan)

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\Suppose that many people find one particular person a cost to them all by his very existence. There is something about that o/w person which he cannot change but which others find objectionable in some way. Given my formula, he seems to be infringing .\~'!:> ~ the liberty of others by his very existence. What is more, given ~p"ll) enough people who find him objectionable enough it would seem to follow that the minimizing-imposed-cost policy could be that they kill him to stop his nuisance value to them. Some might feel that this is obviously illiberal, and so this interpretation of libertarian liberty is implausible. To see what is wrong with this criticism we have to make it more specific. It should clarify matters to take some examples for examination: a typhoid carrier, a

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Working for the greater good is compatible with liberty.

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I have not yet mentioned imprisoning the carrier. That would clearly be a restriction of his liberty in one common sense. However, it will still not be an (initiated) imposed cost if it is done in self-defense (or in defense of other persons than oneself, of course) because of the carrier's attempts to impose his deadly presence on others. And because such 'preventive restraint' does not impose a cost, there is no libertarian requirement for a detention centre 'luxurious enough to compensate soDieo-ne the for disadvantages of being prohibited from living among others in the wider society', as Nozick argues (1974; 144). The imprisonment of those who are no serious threat to others is, of course, utterly different: this clearly imposes a cost and there would be little need for it in a libertarian society, which would probably aim at swift and proportional retribution or restitution (see 3.5.b below Now assume, however fantastic it may seem, that the carrier

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wherever he might be. The carrier would then be bound to imis so ainfectiousothers so great could it would be disease to kill him pose cost on that people. that catch the liberal from him (f) if that is the only way to stop his being the cause of others catching, and dying from, the disease. It is illiberal to live when doing so can be done only at theunconsenting and uncompensatable expense of other people. The cost imposed on the carner is uncompensatable now, but it is only a minute fraction of that imposed on the others if he were to live. Though much more drastic and unfortunate, killing him must, on balance, be the liberal solution. So this fantasy case fits the vague account given above, but it should not intuitively seem merely intolerantly illiberal (nor does it seem likely, and perhaps there are no realis0G? tic analogs»~_

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A2: ___ Moral Relativism ~ Moral relativism justifies the Nazis ~

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University of California

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lJ:.he question is, therefore, whether we have the same reason to accept relativism with regard to cultures with very different codes of right and wrong as we have to accept it where there is such divergence in matters of taste. This it seems to me that we do not. For our starting point there was the thought that at least some very general judgements of taste could be identified through any amount of variation in the application of the key concepts through the relevant domain. I' myself have frequently argued that by contrast such variation cannot be postulated in the case of moral judgements, becaiIse the thought of moral goodness and badness cannot be held steady through any and every change in the codes of behaviour taught and in their grounds.7 From this it follows that not everything that anyone might want to call 'a moral code' should properly be so described. And this shows incidentally that hypotheses about de facto cultural relativism are not totally independent of moral theory.

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Even if an anthropologist is inclil1ed to call a certain code a moral code, and to go on to talk about a morality radically different from our own,

it does not follow that we should accept this way of describing the phenomena. An anthropologist may be as confused or prejudiced as anyone to the teachings of an alien

else in applying words such as 'morality' culture.

I shall assume that even general moral terms such as 'right' or 'ought' are restricted, to a certain degree, in their extension, at least at the level of basic principles. It is not possible that there should be two moral codes the mirror images of each other, so that what was considered fundamentally right in one community would be considered wrong at the same level in the other. It seems that some considerations simply are, and some are not, evidence for particular moral assertions. Nevertheless it does not look as if a correct account of what it is to have a moral thought, or a moral attitude, or to teach a moral code, will suffice to dismiss relativism throughout the moral sphere. Even if some moral judgements are perfectly objective, there may be others whose truth or falsity is not easily decidable by criteria internal to the subject of morality. We may suppose,

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I think, that it is clearly an objective moral fact that the Nazi treatment

the Jews are morally indefensible, given the facts and their knowledge of the facts. The Nazis' moral opinions had to be held on grounds either false or irrelevant or both, as on considerations about Germany's 'histork mission', or on the thought that genocide could be a necessary form of self-defence. It was impossible, logically speaking, for them correctly to argue that the killing of millions of innocent people did not need any moral justification, or that the extension of the German Reich was in itself a morally desirable end. Yet after such things have been said the problem of moral relativism is still with us.8 Even if the fact that it is morality that is in question gives us some guaranteed starting-points for arguments about moral right or wrong, how much is this going to settle? Are there not some moral matters on which, even within our own society, disagreement may be irreducible? And is it not possible that some alien moral systems cannot be faulted by us on any objective principles, while our moral beliefs can also not be faulted by theirs? May there not be places where societies simply confront method for settling their differences?> each other, with no rational

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A2: Kant
Kantian ethics is impossible because we can't divorce ourselves from the consequences of our actions.

Gordon Graham, Regius Professor of moral Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen 2004 ' [Eight Theories of Ethics, 2004, No Editors cited, p. ]

So far we have seen that Kant's view of the good life as the moral life is . marred in tWo respects. First, the emphasis he places upon moral goodness residing in our will or intention to do our duty and not in the good or bad consequences of our actions is mistaken since a complete divorce between intention, action and outcome is impossible. For this reason, there can be no question of judging an intention right or wrong without considering the goodness or badness of at least some of the consequences of that intention. This means that the moral q~lality of a life cannot be decided purely in terms of will and intention .. ~ Second, even if we agree that intention must form a large part of our' moral assessment, the idea of requiring the reasons upon which we act to be universally applicable, i.e. the requirement of universalizability, does not supply us with an effective test for deciding which intentions are good and whic)1 are bad. People can consistently pursue evil courses of action, and wholly contradictory recommendations can consistently be based upon the same reasoning. It follows that universalizability is not an effective test at all. Any action or mode of conduct can be made to meet it and hence no course of action can be shown to be ruled out by it.

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A2: Kant
Adherence to a moral code does not make someone a good person, only a fanatic.

Gordon Graham, Regius Professor of moral Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen, 2004 [Eight Theories of Ethics, 2004, No Editors cited, p. ]
?' In the previous chapter we saw that the existentialist's

'ethics of authen-

;'ticiry' - the idea that good actions are made good by the sincerity with ~ ~ ~which they are performed - has difficulty in accommodating the case of . ~ -r.. ·'0 J Jihe sincere Nazi' This is the person who engages sincerely in behaviour 0-- ~ idely recognized to be evil. Our intuitions suggest that this sincerity, far
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'):om making those actions good or even better than similar' actions per:,6rmed in bad faith, actually makes them worse. Indeed it is arguable that ,~rely performed .• '::oA actions objection truly the Kantian they areoffreely, deliberately found sin-~ fj'~,• similar become d to evil when ethics intention can be and in :":hat we might call 'the consistent Nazi'. Let us characterize Nazis as peo':Je who act on the maxim 'This person should be exterminated because '.~/she is a Jew'. Now according to Kant's moral philosophy we can put ,,'is maxim to the test by appealing to the categorical imperative - 'Act "ly according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that '}should become a universal law' - and we might point out to Nazis that 'jrwere a universal law of nature that Jews were regularly exterminated, )n if they themselves were Jewish, they would have to be ext.erminated. " w as a matter of fact it was not unknown for enthusiastic Nazis to be :bnd to have Jewish ancestry, and if such people were to engage in some '~cial pleading, some argument which made theirs a special case, we ,Jd indeed accuse them of failing to judge in accordance with the categor',>imperative. We could show, in other words, that the maxim 'This person .:'uld be exterminated because he/she is a Jew' was not being universalized. ,Ut if these people were consistent Nazis, who not only conceded but 'itlvely endorsed the idea that were they to be found to be Jewish they ::must' perish, we could not find fault with them on these grounds. To :'iprepared to promote political ideals that taken to their logical

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attitude of mind for m?st people. But it is certainly logically possible and displays consistency. However, if a policy of genocide is deeply mistaken from a moral (as well as every other) point of view, consistency in its application is hardly any improvement. And in so far as people are prepared to moral rectitude but theira fanaticism. ') of\\ genocide, this reveals not their ~ f \ ~~ sacrifice themselves in program~

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A2: Kant
Kantian ethics is insufficient as it fails to recognize consequences.

Odell, Department of Philosophy The University of Maryland, 2004
S. Jack, On Consequentialist Ethics
(V"lrtueethics, like Kantian ethics, puts the cart before the horse. A , IJ: .:s ~. -S '. practices, and this success~ deceptive illusion is created be incorrectly interpreted to of certain by the empirical success have been produced by virtuous persons. The actions of a person of "good character" are the purist .examples of what must be done to insure hannonious co-existence, but it is not the accumulated actions of such I:S'\ people that bring about hannonious co-existence. Instead, it is the C. accumulated actions of the majority that enables us all to enjoy e:. harmonious co-existence and all that it entails. Were it not for the realization of this consequence, we would have nothing on which to \,,;)base the idea that such and such characteristics are virtues. We would

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some fonn of conduct ethics. If we did not consider lying to be wrong, have to answer the question regarding why lying is wrong. My answer j,;? we would question is that honesty a virtue. But this means that we ~ to Rachel'snot consider honesty to beis better than dishonesty because unless the majority of us are honest it is difficultto see how it would be empirically possible to achieve hannonious co-existence. Besides, the ~ '.:;: s:.. truly virtuous person is a person who has the wherewithal to live according to his or her convictions. Those who would need to base their l~",~ , 62 ~ .....choices on the actions of truly virtuous persons or an idealized model of such persons would likely not have the sameforce of character as the truly virtuous person, and because of this deficiencywould not be able to act as the virtuous person would.1 \ '10

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Kant gives us no incentive to follow his ethics. Numerous hypotheticals can disprove Kantian ethics.

Gordon Graham, Regius Professor of moral Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen, 2004 [Eight Theories of Ethics, 2004, No Editors cited, p. ]
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rhe previous chapter concluded that Kant's conception of the best humartJ -""J ife as one lived in accordance with moral duty pursued for its own sake/ :ncounters serious difficulties. Three of these are specially important. Firsr,i t seems impossible to disregard the successfulness of our actions in decid~'1 ng how well or badly we are spending our lives. Second, Kant's categorii~ :al imperative, by means of which we are supposed to determine what oqV~ futy actually is, is purely formal, with the result that contradictory pre-i!: ;criptions can be made to square with it. Third, the divorce betweenid:~ norally virtuous life and a personally happy and fulfilling life, and thg! :mph'asis upon deserving to be happy rather than actually being happ'Y~ eaves us with a problem has no necessary connection with anyone happily~ ive morally, if doing so about motivation. Why should living aspiretq;~

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Badiou's over-generalization

makes his ethics useless and dangerous

Peter Hallward, Professor of Modem European Philosophy, 2001 (Ethics: An Essay into the understanding of Evil, Introduction, translator)

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~guably, however, Badiou's consequent characterization of all human situations, individual and collective, as immeasurably infinite multiplicities (and thus as bundles of pure and immeasurable 'differences', such that 'there are as many differences, say, between a Chinese peasant and a young Norwegian professional as between myself and anybody at all, including myself')72 dramatically simPlifies these situations, leaving no space for the acknowledgement of effectively universal structuring principles (biological, cognitive, linguistic ... ) on the one hand, or of certain 'specifYing' attributes (based on culture, religion, class, gender, .. ) on the other. Instead, we are left with 'generic human stuff' that is ontologically indistinguishable from pur~ mathematical multiplicity and effectively endowed, in its praxis, with a kind of indeterminate 'fundamental freedom'. (We might say that if the 'generic' indetermination of the situation corresponds to some degree with Sartre's pure freedom or praxis, then its state effectively occupies the vast conceptual space Sartre embraced under the concept of the 'practice-inert'). The potential risk, as I have suggested elsewhere, is the effective 'despecification' (or 'singularization') of situations in general, to say nothing of the truth-processes that 'puncture' them.73 Some readers might prefer to settle for a slightly more 'impure' range of possibility were it informed by a more determinate, more
specific

understan.ding of .the situation as su~ -~------

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