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CASSANOVAS VS. HORD [8 Phil 125; No.

3473; 22 Mar 1907]


Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Decided February 20, 1928


276 U.S. 174

Facts: The Spanish Govt. by virtue of a royal decree granted the plaintiff certain
mines. The plaintiff is now the owner of those mines. The Collector of Internal
Revenue imposed tax on the properties, contending that they were valid
perfected mine concessions and it falls within the provisions of sec.134 of Act
No. 1189 known as Internal Revenue Act. The plaintiff paid under protest. He
brought an action against the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue to
recover the sum of Php. 9, 600 paid by him as taxes. Judgment was rendered
in favor of the defendant, so the plaintiff appealed.

Syllabus
1. After services have been rendered by a public officer under a law specifying
his compensation, there arises an implied contract under which he is entitled to
have the amount so fixed. P. 276 U. S. 179.
2. The protection of the Contract Clause of the federal Constitution extends to
such contracts. Id.

Issue: Whether or Not Sec. 164 is void or valid.


Held: The deed constituted a contract between the Spanish Government and
the plaintiff. The obligation of which contract was impaired by the enactment of
sec. 134 of the Internal Revenue Law infringing sec. 5 of the Act of Congress
which provides that no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
enacted. Sec. 134 of the Internal Revenue Law of 1904 is void because it
impairs the obligation of contracts contained in the concessions of mine made
by the Spanish Government. Judgment reversed.
U.S. Supreme Court
Mississippi ex Rel. Robertson v. Miller, 276 U.S. 174 (1928)
Mississippi ex Rel. Robertson v. Miller
No. 206
Argued January 20, 1928

3. Relator, while a revenue agent in Mississippi, brought suits for recovery of


past due taxes, and, by the law then in force, was thereupon entitled to a
specified percentage of the taxes, payable upon their collection, and was
authorized, upon his retirement, to prosecute the suits in the name of his
successor. An Act passed after his retirement which authorized any suits
brought by an outgoing agent to be conducted in the name of his successor
upon petition of the latter showing to the court that he had investigated its
merits and believed that it was just and should be maintained, and which
provided that the commissions derived from such suits, when the successor
had thus joined therein, should be shared equally between him and his
predecessor, was construed retroactively by the state court as requiring that
commissions due the relator from the suits brought by him should be so
shared, albeit the successor had performed no services in the matters beyond
receiving payment of the taxes from the taxpayers. Held violative of the
relator's rights under the Contract Clause of the Constitution. P. 276 U. S. 178.
144 Miss. 614 reversed.

Error to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Mississippi which affirmed a


judgment giving the relator but one-half of the amount of certain commissions
claimed as compensation for services rendered by him as a revenue agent in
investigating and suing for past due taxes. This suit was against his successor
in office, to whom the taxes had been paid.

application.As structured, Section 45 of RA 8189 makes a recital of election


offenses under the same Act. Section 45(j) clearly specifies that a violation of
any of the provisions of RA 8189 is an election offense. The language of
Section45(j) is precise. The challenged provision renders itself to no other
interpretation and involves no guesswork

01 Romualdez vs. COMELEC


G.R. No. 167011 April 30, 2008

Bill of Rights: Section 4 - Freedom of Expression


G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR
TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE
LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU
and RODULFO MUNSOD, Petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, Respondents.

FACTS: COMELEC Law Department filed two separate informations before the
RTCBarauen, Leyte against spouses Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda
R.Romualdez for knowingly making false or untruthful statement in their
application for voters registration relative to their place of residence and non
registration in other areas, which are violations of Sections 10(g) and (j),
inrelation to Section 45(j) of RA 8189 or the Voters Registration Act, to
wit:SEC. 10
Registration of Voters
.
xxx
The application shall contain thefollowing data: x x x (g) Periods of residence in
the Philippines and in theplace of registration; x x x (j) A statement that the
application is not aregistered voter of any precinct;SEC. 45.
Election Offense
. The following shall be considered electionoffenses under this Act: x x x (j)
Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.Pending the above case, the
spouses filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari against COMELEC, on the
ground, among others, of the unconstitutionality of Section 45(j) for being
contrary to the fair notice requirement Section 14(1)and Section 14(2), Article III
of the 1987 Constitution, as such penal provisionis vague on its
face.ISSUEWON Section 45(j) of RA 8189 is unconstitutional for having
uncertainelection prohibition.RULINGNo, the Supreme Court held. Using the
void for vagueness doctrine, it the lawis said to be facially invalid only if men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its

FACTS:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization
(hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the
employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and
petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de
Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo
Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union. PBMEO decided to
stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacaang to express their grievances
against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass
demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged
abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift
(from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts
(from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they
informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.

The Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders
of the PBMEO after learning about the planned mass demonstration. During
the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was
stressed out by the union that the demonstration was not a strike against the
company but was in factual exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional
right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for
redress of grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would
interrupt the normal course of their business which may result in the loss of
revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers
would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally.
A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their
appeal that while the workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st
and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they
would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took
place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation
of the No Strike and No Lockout clause of their Collective Bargaining
Agreement.
The lower court decided in favour of Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,
and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. The
PBMEOs motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of
Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the Collective
Bargaining Agreement?
RULING:
No.

While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of
human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are
"delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the
"threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting
government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property
rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression, free
assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential
to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete
fulfilment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the
periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public
officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the
appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as
well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.
Yrasuegui v. PAL
G.R. no. 168081. Oct. 17, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner Yrasuegui, an international flight steward of Philippine
Airlines Inc. (PAL) was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the
weight standards of the airline company.
In consequence thereof, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against PAL before the Labor Arbiter (LA). Te Labor Arbiter ruled
that the petitioner was illegally dismissed. It also issued a writ of execution
directing the reinstatement of the petitioner without loss of seniority and other
benefits, and also the payment of back wages. Respondent PAL appealed to
the NLRC which affirmed the LAs decision. Respondent PAL appealed to the
Court of Appeals. CA reversed the NLRC case.

Issue:
Was the dismissal of the petitioner valid?
Held:
Yes. The Court upheld the legality of the petitioners dismissal. Separation
pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social
justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not serious
misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character.
The obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as
flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282 (e) of the
Labor ode. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary.
Voluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the
employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions.
This element runs through all just causes under Art. 282, whether they be in
nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a
recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of
intent found in Art. 282 (a), (c), and (d).
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a
particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that
sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the
job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ).[55] In the United States, there are a few federal and many state job
discrimination laws that contain an exception allowing an employer to engage
in an otherwise unlawful form of prohibited discrimination when the action is
based on a BFOQ necessary to the normal operation of a business or
enterprise.
Argument that BFQQ is a statutory defense must fail.
Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It does not
exist if there is no statute providing for it. ]Further, there is no existing BFOQ
statute that could justify his dismissal.

First, the Constitution, the Labor Code, and RA No. 7277 or the
Magna Carta for Disabled Persons contain provisions similar to BFOQ.
Second, in British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission
(BSPSERC) v. The British Columbia Government and Service Employees
Union (BCGSEU), the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the so-called
Meiorin Test in determining whether an employment policy is
justified. Under this test, (1) the employer must show that it adopted the
standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job; (2)
the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary to the
accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and (3) the employer must
establish that the standard is reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the
legitimate work-related purpose. Similarly, in Star Paper Corporation
v. Simbol, this Court held that in order to justify a BFOQ, the employer must
prove that (1) the employment qualification is reasonably related to the
essential operation of the job involved; and (2) that there is factual basis for
believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would
be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.
In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used
because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid provided it reflects an
inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.
The weight standards of PAL are reasonable. A common carrier, from the
nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to observe
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers it transports.
Petitioner is entitled to separation pay, even if terminated for just cause.
Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed employee as an
act of social justice, or based on equity. Provided the dismissal:
(1)
Was not for serious misconduct;
(2)
Does not conduct on the moral character of the employee
Thus, he was granted separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) months pay
for every year of service.

HON. RENATO C. CORONA, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for Legal


Affairs, HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary,
Department of Transportation and Communications, and ROGELIO A.
DAYAN, in his capacity as General Manager of Philippine Ports Authority,
petitioners, vs. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES and MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

discipline and thereby afford better protection to the port users through the
improvement of pilotage services. This was implemented by providing
therein that all existing regular appointments which have been previously
issued either by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31
December 1992 only and that all appointments to harbor pilot positions in
all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from
date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority
after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance.

In issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92), limiting the
term of appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or
cancellation, did the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate respondents
right to exercise their profession and their right to due process of law?

On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the
Manila Pilots Association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPAAO No. 04-92 before the Department of Transportation and Communication,
but they were informed by then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that the
matter of reviewing, recalling or annulling PPAs administrative issuances lies
exclusively with its Board of Directors as its governing body.

The PPA was created on July 11, 1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree No.
505. On December 23, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 857 was issued revising
the PPAs charter. Pursuant to its power of control, regulation, and
supervision of pilots and the pilotage profession, [1] the PPA promulgated
PPA-AO-03-85 [2] on March 21, 1985, which embodied the Rules and
Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage
Fees in Philippine Ports. These rules mandate, inter alia, that aspiring pilots
must be holders of pilot licenses [3] and must train as probationary pilots in
outports for three months and in the Port of Manila for four months. It is only
after they have achieved satisfactory performance [4] that they are given
permanent and regular appointments by the PPA itself [5] to exercise harbor
pilotage until they reach the age of 70, unless sooner removed by reason of
mental or physical unfitness by the PPA General Manager. [6] Harbor pilots in
every harbor district are further required to organize themselves into pilot
associations which would make available such equipment as may be required
by the PPA for effective pilotage services. In view of this mandate, pilot
associations invested in floating, communications, and office equipment. In
fact, every new pilot appointed by the PPA automatically becomes a member
of a pilot association and is required to pay a proportionate equivalent equity
or capital before being allowed to assume his duties, as reimbursement to the
association concerned of the amount it paid to his predecessor.
Subsequently, then PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO
No. 04-92 [7] on July 15, 1992, whose avowed policy was to instill effective

Meanwhile, on August 31, 1992, the PPA issued Memorandum Order No. 0892 [8] which laid down the criteria or factors to be considered in the
reappointment of harbor pilots, viz.: (1) Qualifying Factors: [9] safety record
and physical/mental medical exam report and (2) Criteria for Evaluation: [10]
promptness in servicing vessels, compliance with PPA Pilotage Guidelines,
number of years as a harbor pilot, average GRT of vessels serviced as pilot,
awards/commendations as harbor pilot, and age.
Respondents reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation
of PPA-AO No. 04-92, but Secretary Garcia insisted on his position that the
matter was within the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors of the PPA.
Compas appealed this ruling to the Office of the President (OP), reiterating his
arguments before the DOTC.
On December 23, 1992, the OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in
abeyance the implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In its answer, the PPA
countered that said administrative order was issued in the exercise of its
administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots under Section 6-a
(viii), Article IV of P. D. No. 857, as amended, and it, along with its
implementing guidelines, was intended to restore order in the ports and to
improve the quality of port services.

On March 17, 1993, the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the
restraining order issued earlier. [11] He concluded that PPA-AO No. 04-92
applied to all harbor pilots and, for all intents and purposes, was not the act of
Dayan, but of the PPA, which was merely implementing Section 6 of P.D. No.
857, mandating it to control, regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct of
pilots in any port district.
On the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its
implementing memoranda and circulars, Secretary Corona opined that:
The exercise of ones profession falls within the constitutional guarantee
against wrongful deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without
due process. In the limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not
constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of,
the property rights of those affected thereby. As may be noted, the issuance
aims no more than to improve pilotage services by limiting the appointment to
harbor pilot positions to one year, subject to renewal or cancellation after a
rigid evaluation of the appointees performance.

Consequently, respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and


injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
damages, before Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 93-65673. On September 6, 1993, the trial court
rendered the following judgment: [12]
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, this Court hereby rules that:
1. Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted in excess of jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion and in a capricious, whimsical and arbitrary
manner in promulgating PPA Administrative Order 04-92 including all its
implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders;
2. PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and
Orders are declared null and void;
3. The respondents are permanently enjoined from implementing PPA
Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and
Orders.
No costs.

PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor
pilots of their profession in PPAs jurisdictional area. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, as regards the alleged absence of ample prior consultation before
the issuance of the administrative order, Secretary Corona cited Section 26 of
P.D. No. 857, which merely requires the PPA to consult with relevant
Government agencies. Since the PPA Board of Directors is composed of the
Secretaries of the DOTC, the Department of Public Works and Highways, the
Department of Finance, and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, as well as the Director-General of the National Economic
Development Agency, the Administrator of the Maritime Industry Authority
(MARINA), and the private sector representative who, due to his knowledge
and expertise, was appointed by the President to the Board, he concluded that
the law has been sufficiently complied with by the PPA in issuing the assailed
administrative order.

SO ORDERED.
The court a quo pointed out that the Bureau of Customs, the precursor of the
PPA, recognized pilotage as a profession and, therefore, a property right under
Callanta v. Carnation Philippines, Inc. [13] Thus, abbreviating the term within
which that privilege may be exercised would be an interference with the
property rights of the harbor pilots. Consequently, any withdrawal or
alteration of such property right must be strictly made in accordance with the
constitutional mandate of due process of law. This was apparently not
followed by the PPA when it did not conduct public hearings prior to the
issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92; respondents allegedly learned about it only
after its publication in the newspapers. From this decision, petitioners
elevated their case to this Court on certiorari.
After carefully examining the records and deliberating on the arguments of the
parties, the Court is convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark

disregard of respondents right against deprivation of property without due


process of law. Consequently, the instant petition must be denied.
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the due process
clause of the Constitution, viz.:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, x x x.
In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur,
namely, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without
proper observance of due process. When one speaks of due process of law,
however, a distinction must be made between matters of procedure and
matters of substance. In essence, procedural due process refers to the
method or manner by which the law is enforced, while substantive due
process requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the
law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just. [14] PPA-AO No. 04-92
must be examined in light of this distinction.
Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPAAO No. 04-92 allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby relevant
government agencies and the pilots themselves could ventilate their views.
They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect of the enactment.
Fortunately, the Court has maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance
it has stressed in the recent case of Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea, [15] where it
declared that (a)s long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his
interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of
law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process.
Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is
granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.
In the case at bar, respondents questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than
four times [16] before the matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their
arguments on this score, however, fail to persuade. While respondents
emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard, which issues the licenses of
pilots after administering the pilots examinations, was not consulted, [17]

the facts show that the MARINA, which took over the licensing function of
the Philippine Coast Guard, was duly represented in the Board of Directors of
the PPA. Thus, petitioners correctly argued that, there being no matters of
naval defense involved in the issuance of the administrative order, the
Philippine Coast Guard need not be consulted.[18]
Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way
taint the validity of the administrative order. As a general rule, notice and
hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are
essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial
function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as
issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with
the requirements of notice and hearing.[19]
Upon the other hand, it is also contended that the sole and exclusive right to
the exercise of harbor pilotage by pilots is a settled issue. Respondents aver
that said right has become vested and can only be withdrawn or shortened
by observing the constitutional mandate of due process of law. Their
argument has thus shifted from the procedural to one of substance. It is here
where PPA-AO No. 04-92 fails to meet the condition set by the organic law.
There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a
property right. Even petitioner Corona recognized this when he stated in his
March 17, 1993, decision that (t)he exercise of ones profession falls within
the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or interference
with, property rights without due process. [20] He merely expressed the
opinion that (i)n the limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not
constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of,
the property rights of those affected thereby, and that PPA-AO 04-92 does
not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their
profession. As will be presently demonstrated, such supposition is gravely
erroneous and tends to perpetuate an administrative order which is not only
unreasonable but also superfluous.
Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed
individuals. Licensure is the granting of license especially to practice a
profession. It is also the system of granting licenses (as for professional

practice) in accordance with established standards. [21] A license is a right


or permission granted by some competent authority to carry on a business or
do an act which, without such license, would be illegal. [22]
Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, they
literally have to pass through the proverbial eye of a needle by taking, not one
but five examinations, each followed by actual training and practice. Thus,
the court a quo observed:
Petitioners (herein respondents) contend, and the respondents (herein
petitioners) do not deny, that here (sic) in this jurisdiction, before a person can
be a harbor pilot, he must pass five (5) government professional examinations,
namely, (1) For Third Mate and after which he must work, train and practice
on board a vessel for at least a year; (2) For Second Mate and after which he
must work, train and practice for at least a year; (3) For Chief Mate and after
which he must work, train and practice for at least a year; (4) For a Master
Mariner and after which he must work as Captain of vessels for at least two
(2) years to qualify for an examination to be a pilot; and finally, of course, that
given for pilots.
Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to
engage in pilotage until they retire at the age 70 years. This is a vested right.
Under the terms of PPA-AO No. 04-92, (a)ll existing regular appointments
which have been previously issued by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall
remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only, and (a)ll appointments to
harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a
term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to renewal or cancellation
by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance.
It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of
harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. In
the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after passing five
examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a
license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by
the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have
to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be
temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance
evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with

one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period. Renewal of
their license is now dependent on a rigid evaluation of performance which
is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use
of the term renewal. It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily
makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real
sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law.
The Court notes that PPA-AO No. 04-92 and PPA-MO No. 08-92 are already
covered by PPA-AO No. 03-85, which is still operational. Respondents are
correct in pointing out that PPA-AO No. 04-92 is a surplusage [23] and,
therefore, an unnecessary enactment. PPA-AO 03-85 is a comprehensive
order setting forth the Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services,
the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports. It provides,
inter alia, for the qualification, appointment, performance evaluation,
disciplining and removal of harbor pilots - matters which are duplicated in
PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its implementing memorandum order. Since it adds
nothing new or substantial, PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be struck down.
Finally, respondents insinuation that then PPA General Manager Dayan was
responsible for the issuance of the questioned administrative order may have
some factual basis; after all, power and authority were vested in his office to
propose rules and regulations. The trial courts finding of animosity between
him and private respondents might likewise have a grain of truth. Yet the
number of cases filed in court between private respondents and Dayan,
including cases which have reached this Court, cannot certainly be considered
the primordial reason for the issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In the absence
of proof to the contrary, Dayan should be presumed to have acted in
accordance with law and the best of professional motives. In any event, his
actions are certainly always subject to scrutiny by higher administrative
authorities.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed
decision of the court a quo dated September 6, 1993, in Civil Case No. 9365673 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
BELL VS BURSON

Citation. 402 U.S. 535, 91 S. Ct. 1586, 29 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1971)


Brief Fact Summary. A clergyman in Georgia was involved in an accident
when a child rode her bike into the side of his car. He challenged the
constitutionality of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act
(Act), which prevented him from submitting evidence regarding his lack of
fault prior to the suspension of his drivers license.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Once licenses are issued, they cannot be revoked
without procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Facts. The Act provided that the registration and license of an uninsured
motorist involved in an accident should be suspended unless he posted a
security to cover the damages claimed in the accident reports. The
administrative hearing to be conducted prior to the suspension excluded any
evidence of fault or liability for the accident. Petitioner was a clergyman who
was involved in an accident when a five-year-old child rode her bike into the
side of his car. In the administrative hearing, Petitioner was not permitted to
present any evidence that he was not at fault for the accident, or that his
ministry would be severely handicapped if he lost his license. Petitioner
appealed to Superior Court, which found him free from fault for the accident
and ordered that his license not be suspended. The Georgia Court of Appeals
reversed, rejecting Petitioners contention that the States statutory scheme
denied him due process of law.
Issue. Did the revocation of Petitioners license without affording him an
opportunity to contest liability violate due process?
Held. Yes. Reversed. Once issued, licenses may become essential in the
pursuit of a livelihood, as in the Petitioners case. Suspension of issued
licenses involves state action that adjudicates important interests of licensees,
and due process is required. The procedure set forth by the Act violated due
process. Dissent. None. Concurrence. None.
Discussion. It is fundamental that, except for in emergency situations, States
afford notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of a case

before terminating an interest. This case did not involve an emergency


situation, and due process was violated.
STARPAPER VS. SIMBOL
G.R. No. 164774, April 12, 2006
Petitioners: Star Paper Corporation, Josephine Ongsitco, and Sebastian Chua
Respondents: Ronaldo V. Simbol, Wilfreda N. Comia, and Lorna E. Estrella
Ponente: J. Puno
Facts:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated August 03, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73477 reversing the
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which
affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. The following facts were presented:
(a) The respondents were all regular employees of the company;
(b) On October 27, 1993, Simbol was hired by the company. He met Alma
Dayrit, also an employee of the company. He married her on June 27, 1998.
Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to
get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy
promulgated in 1995. Simbol resigned on June 20, 1998.
(c) On February 5, 1997, Comia was hired by the company. She met Howard
Comia, a co-employee whom she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise
reminded them pursuant to the aforementioned company policy. Comia
resigned on June 30, 2000.
(d) Simbol and Comia alleged that they did not resign voluntarily; they were
compelled to resign in view of an illegal company policy.
(e) On July 29, 1994, Estrella was hired by the company. She met Luisito
Zuniga, also a co-worker, whom petitioners claimed to be a married man who
got Estrella impregnated. The company allegedly could have terminated her
services due to immorality but she opted to resign on December 21, 1999.
(f) Estrella alleged that she had a relationship with co-worker Zuniga who
misrepresented himself as a married but a separated man. After he got her
pregnant, she discovered that he was not separated. Thus, she severed her
relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to company policy.
(g) On November 30, 1999, Estrella met an accident and had to recuperate for
twenty-one (21) days as advised by the doctor of the Orthopaedic Hospital.
On December 21, 1999 but she found out that her name was on hold at the
gate. She was directed to the personnel office and handed a memorandum

that stated that she was being dismissed for immoral conduct. Estrella was
asked to submit an explanation but she was dismissed nonetheless. She
resigned because she was in dire need of money and resignation could give
her the thirteenth month pay.
On May 31, 2001, Labor Arbiter Del Rosario dismissed the complaint for lack
of merit.
On January, 11, 2002, NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
On August 8, 2002, NLRC denied the respondents Motion for
Reconsideration through a Resolution.
On August 3, 2004, the CA reversed the NLRC decision and declared that:
(a) The petitioners dismissal from employment was illegal:
(b) The private respondents are ordered to reinstate the petitioners to their
former positions without loss of seniority rights with full backwages from the
time of their dismissal until actual reinstatement; and
(c) The private respondents are to pay petitioners attorneys fees amounting
to 10% of the award and the cost of the suit.
Hence, this petition.
Issues:
The issues raised by this petition are:
(1) Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the subject 1995 policy/
regulation is violative of the constituional rights towards marriage and the
family of employees and of Article 136 of the Labor Code: and
(2) Whether or not the respondents resignations were far from voluntary.
Held:
(1) No. The CA did not err in holding that the subject 1995 policy/ regulation
is violative of the constitutional rights towards marriage and the family of
employees and or Article 136 of the Labor Code:
(ARTICLE 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an
employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of
employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be
deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate
or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.)

G.R. No. 162994

Duncan Association Of Detailman-PTGWO and Pedro A. Tecson, petitioner


vs. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc., respondent
September 19, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Pedro Tecson was hired on Oct. 25, 1995 by respondent
Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. as a medical representative. He was
assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte
sales area. Upon his employment, Tecson signed an employment contract,
wherein he agreed, among others, to study and abide by existing company
rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug
companies; and if management found that such relationship posed a possible
conflict of interest, to resign from the company.
On September, 1998 Tecson married Bettsy, an employee of a rival
pharmaceutical firm Astra Pharmaceuticals as the branch coordinator. The
relationship, including the subsequent marriage, dismayed Glaxo. On January
1999, Tecson's superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy had given
rise to a conflict of interest. Negotiations ensued, with Tecson adverting to his
wife's possible resignation from Astra, and Glaxo making it known that they
preferred to retain his services owing to his good performance. Yet no
resolution came to pass. In September 1999, Tecson applied for a transfer to
Glaxo's milk division, but his application was denied in view of Glaxo's "leastmovement-possible" policy. Then in November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson
to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked
Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request was denied. Tecson sought
Glaxos reconsideration regarding his transfer and brought the matter to
Glaxos Grievance Committee. Glaxo, however, remained firm in its decision
and gave Tescon until February 7, 2000 to comply with the transfer order.
Tecson defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical
representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.

On Nov. 15, 2000, the Natl. Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled
that Glaxos policy was valid. Glaxo's policy on relationships between its
employees and persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming
Glaxo's right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory. This decision was
assailed by petitioners before the Court of Appeals and the Court, but for
nothing.
ISSUE:
1)Whether or Not Glaxos policy against its employees marrying employees
from competitor companies is valid, and in not holding that said policy violates
the equal protection clause of the Constitution;
(2) Whether Tecson was constructively dismissed.
RULING:
The record shows that Tecson was cognizant about the policy
imposed by Glaxo company, upon signing the contract, he voluntarily set his
hands to follow the said policies. Albeit employees are free to cultivate
relationships w/ and marry persons of their own choosing. What the company
merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the
company that may arise out of such relationships. After Tecson married Bettsy,
Glaxo gave him time to resolve the conflict . Glaxo even expressed its desire to
retain Tecson in its employ because of his satisfactory performance and
suggested that his wife would be the one to resign instead. Glaxo likewise
acceded to his repeated requests for more time to resolve the conflict of
interest. When the problem could not be resolved after several years of waiting,
Glaxo was constrained to reassign Tecson to a sales area different from that
handled by his wife for Astra. Notably, the Court did not terminate Tecson from
employment but only reassigned him to another area where his home province,
Agusan del Sur, was included. In effecting Tecsons transfer, Glaxo even
considered the welfare of Tecsons family. Clearly, the foregoing dispels any
suspicion of unfairness and bad faith on the part of Glaxo.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against


petitioners.