The Nature of Guerilla Warfare

Author(s): R. Ernest Dupuy

Source: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Jun., 1939), pp. 138-148
Published by: Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2750798 .
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THE NATURE OF GUERILLA

WARFARE
R. ERNEST Dupuy
FOREDOOMED as a resultof generationsof militaryand industrialunpreparedness,
China's nationalarmieswere drivenback
by Japanesemilitarysuperiority
aftera yearand a halfof resistance
thatamazed the world.That this coordinatedChinesemilitaryeffortshouldhave lastedas long as it did is a tributeto the fighting
men of China. Shanghai,Nanking, Hankow, the defenseof the
amongstwhich Taierchwang
Lunghai line and correlatedconflicts,
standspreeminent,
proved to a somewhatincredulousworld that
Chinesesoldiers,given leadershipof sortsand partialtraining,can
fight.This lesson was given once before,by the Ever Victorious
Armyof FrederickTownsend Ward, the Americansoldierof fortune,and his Britishsuccessor"Chinese"Gordon,in thedaysof the
Taiping Rebellion.
Japannow facesthe secondarystageof conquest,the pacification
of occupied territory,
while Chinese resistancetakes the formof
guerilla warfare,a more or less disorganizedeffortquite distinct
from the grand tactics of regularlyconstitutednational armed
forces.How farChina's guerillaresistancemay be prolonged,what
hegemonyin theFar East,
effectit will have on Japan'sself-assured
remainto be seen. China fightson today; what of tomorrow?
Proponentsof China repeat the words of Oom Paul Kruger,
Presidentof the Transvaal Republic,followingCronje's surrender
at Paardeburgand thereliefof Ladysmith:"The realwar will begin
between
now!" Comparisonsare drawn,even,by wishfulthinkers,
China's presentsituationand thatof the ThirteenColonies during
the AmericanRevolution.The realistis limitedin his conjectureto
a comparativeanalysisof guerillawarfarein thepast.Beforetaking
up otherhistoricalexamples,it may be well to pointout certainessentialfactorsin thefinalsuccessof theAmericanRevolutionwhich
are entirelylackingin China today.These factorsare three:thein<<138>>

The Nature of GuerillaWarfare

fluenceof allied sea power (French); the assistanceof allied regular
troops (French); and the unpopularityof the war amongstthe
enemypeople (England).
We speak gliblyof guerillawar in China. The termis broad.
Perhapsthe beststudyupon the subjectand one whichdid mostto
crystallizethoughtupon it, so far as the rulesof land warfareare
concerned,is containedin a pamphletpreparedin i862 by Dr.
Francis Lieber,' at the request of Major General Halleck, then
general-in-chief
of the Armyof the United States: GuerillaParties
ConsideredwithReferenceto theLaws and Usages of War. Lieber,
tracingthe word "guerilla"fromits originalSpanish definitionof
"littlewar" to its later and also at firstSpanish definitionof "A
partyof lighttroopsfor reconnaisanceand openingthe firstskiron thetermas appliedto the selfmishes,"and leaningparticularly
constitutedbands which took fearfultoll of the French in the

Peninsular
War of i808-I4 says:

It is universally
in thiscountry
understood
at thepresenttimethata
band of armedmen,carrying
on an
guerillapartymeansan irregular
irregular
war,notbeingable,accordingto theircharacter
as a guerilla
to carryon whatthelaw termsa regularwar.
party,
He enumeratesall termslooselyassociatedwith the expression,
suchas thepartisan,thefree-corps,
thespy,therebel,theconspirator,
therobber,themarauder,thebrigandand finallythelevee en masse
or so-called"armingof thepeasants."The presentChineseresistance
to Japan,being a sporadicnationaleffort,
falls squarelyinto this
last category,
but since in practicallyall guerillawarfarethe other
elementsare also present,one may well firstmentiona few broad
and examplesto clarifythesituation.
classifications
The partisan,in militarynomenclaturefor centuriespast, has
been recognizedas a soldier-regularor volunteer-engagingin
minor operationsto assist the main effortof the governmentto
which he belongs. In the American RevolutionaryWar "Light
Horse Harry"Lee, Ethan Allen, Marion,Sumterand Morgan on
theAmericanside,and Tarletonand Fergusonon the British,were
1
FrancisLieber-German-American
lawyer,publicist,historianand politicaleconomist; born in BerlinMarch i8, i8oo, emigratedto the United States 1827; died
October2, 1872.

<<I39 >>

PacificAflairs
partisanleaders.The Cossacksand peasantbandswho brokeNaalso.In theCivil
poleon'sGrandeArmeein Russiawerepartisans
horse;
peerlessleaderof irregular
War NathanBedfordForrest,
JohnTurnerAshby,JohnMorganand Mosbymaybe thusclassiwithhisArabbands,standsout.
fied.In theWorldWarLawrence,
seems
on hissidelacks,thepartisan
maineffort
Whereorganized
not recognized
of thefree-corps-usually
to fallintothecategory
Heremaybe placedtheFrench
bytheenemyas a legalbelligerent.
justas
bytheGermans
as brigands
of i870-71, treated
franc-tireurs
of
of Prussiaby Napoleon.Operations
weretheearlierfreischutz
to theleve'een masse.The famous
thistypemaybe preliminaries
of GermanyDeath's Head Hussars-theBlack Brunswickers
unitorganizedin i8o8 to harrythe
an irregular
wereoriginally
and raisetheGermanpopulaceto revolt;
Imperialcommunications
Nafollowing
theflameof Prussianregeneration
theyrepresented
fallDe Wet,Delareyand
In thesamecategory
poleon'sconquest.
Empire
horsewhosettheBritish
theotherBoerleadersofirregular
resistance
bytheearsfora yearand a halfafterthenationalarmed
of the TransvaalRepublicand Orange Free State crumpled.
all the way to the
Rangingfromthepartisanand thefree-corps
and
the
Russian
of
Revolution
leveeen massecometheoperations
oftheRedArmyitssequels,whichin thiscaseled tothecreation
ofguerillafighting.
army-astheoutgrowth
a national
The
takepartin all classesof warfare.
The spyand conspirator
jurisdicrebelis calleda rebelwhentheopponentclaimsmilitary
or othercause.GiveneasternChinese
tionbyvirtueof occupation
and those
boththosein processof formation
puppetgovernments,
becoming
now set up, we findtheChiangKai-shekGovernment
and this is pertinent.
in Japaneseeyes a rebel administration,
ofthe
Examplesin thepastaretheChouanandVendeeoperations
to
the
approach
us
again
make
which
recognize
Revolution,
French
theleveeen masse.
bandit,brigandand robberclass,alwaysassoThe marauder,
includesuchclassicexamplesas the
ciatedwithguerillawarfare,
and
Quantrell
Revolution,
of
the
American
Skinners
and
Cowboys
on the
his kindredon the one side and the Kansas Jayhawkers
otherin theAmericanCivil War,theHunghutzeof China and
t I40:

The Nature of GuerillaWarfare

Manchuriain recenttimes.In theborderlandbetweenpartisanand
outlaw come such murderousrapscallionsas the Siberian White
CossackleadersSemenov,Kalmykovand Annenkov.
Finally we come to the leve'een masse or "armingof the peasants." Among examplesare the annihilationof Varus' legionsby
Arminius,the operationsof Spanish guerillasor partidasin the
PeninsularWar, again those of the latterpart of the FrancoPrussianWar and the Boer War, the Cuban revoltsagainstSpain,
all North Africanoperationsagainst
the PhilippineInsurrection,
the French and Spanish, the wide-spreadfightingof the period
in Siberia,and last but not least the
i9i8-22
in Russia,particularly
recentSpanishcivilwar,in whichtherewas a definitedevelopment,
on theRepublicanside,of nationalforcesfromguerillas.
Of all these,the Siberiancampaignsat firstglance most nearly
resemblethe presentSino-Japanese
situation,because of extentof
and the self-reliance
imposedupon
terrain,lack of communications
the defendingside by lack of outsidemilitaryassistance.This last
is mostimportantwhen we considerthatJapantodayholds nearly
In
all Chineseseaports,industrialcentersand rail communications.
the Siberianoperationsthe Allies held all seaportsand the Czech
and Kolchak forcesheld the trans-Siberian
Railwayfromthe Urals
to Vladivostok.In both cases flowof munitionsfromthe outside
was limited-onlythe Germanborderbeing open to the Sovietsat
thattime,while the ChineseNational Governmentnow has available only the two French Indochina routes (and even these are
officially
closed), theBurmaroad and theeven longerroad through
ChineseTurkestanfromRussia.
at once appears to the soldier: in both cases
Anothersimilarity
the partyreducedto guerillaoperationsexceededthe otherside in
potentialman power.This meritsthought,sincethusfarin military
historythe transitionof SiberiafromWhite to Red appears to be
the sole instanceof finalsuccessof guerillaoperationsunassistedby
regulartacticalmovementof trainedtroops.Here the tempting
comparisonends,forthe White Russian armiesin Siberiaand the
very small detachmentsof regularAllied troopswith them-excepting the Czechs and Japanese-were themselvessecond-rate
forces,while White leadershipwas both stupid and incompetent.
<<I4I >>

PacificAfairs
The AmericanExpeditionary
Force in Siberiais excludedfromthis
analysis,since Major General William S. Graves, commanding,
War Departadheredto both the letterand spiritof the stringent
ment directiveof non-intervention
in internalstruggles,despite
mostextraordinary
temptation
and all sortsof pressure.

UNDERSTAND
theproblemfacingbothsides in China todayone
mustgraspthe major objectiveof guerillawarfareby the party
adoptingit. Lawrence,in Seven Pillars of Wisdom,analyzingthe
problemconfronting
him,hit the nail on the head as he pondered
on how theTurks would defendthe ioo,ooosquare milesof Arabia:

No doubtbya trenchlineacrossthebottomif we camelike an army

withbanners;butsupposewe were(as we mightbe) an influence,
an
idea,a thingintangible,
invulnerable,
withoutfrontand back,drifting
aboutlikea gas? Armieswerelikeplants,immobile,
nourfirm-rooted,
ishedthroughlong stemsto thehead . . . It seemeda regularsoldier
mightbe helplesswithouta target,owningonlywhathe sat on, and
subjugating
onlywhat,byorder,he couldpokehisrifleat.
out
I figured howmanymentheywouldneedto siton all thisground,
to save it fromour attack-in-depth,
seditionputtingup her head in
everyunoccupied
one of thoseioo,ooosquaremiles. . . it seemedthey
wouldhaveneedof a fortified
posteveryfoursquaremiles,and a post
couldnotbe lessthantwenty
men.If so, theywouldneed6oo,ooomen
to meettheill willsof all theArab peoples,combinedwiththe active
We
hostility
of a fewzealots. . . Oursshouldbe a war of detachment.
wereto containtheenemybythesilentthreatof a vastunknowndesert,
notdisclosing
ourselves
untilwe attacked.
The attackmightbe nominal,
directed
notagainsthim,but againsthis stuff. . . We might. . . developa habitof neverengagingtheenemy.This wouldchimewiththe
numerical
a target.
pleaforneveraffording
In thesewordslies all the theoryof guerillawarfare.Lawrence's
to the Allied successon
operationswere an importantcontribution
the Easternfront.But again we mustavoid the temptation
to jump
at conclusions.Lawrence's operationswere those of a partisan,
"On his own" locally,he was nevertheless
assistingthe main effort.
a componentin a plan of regularwarfare.This does not affectthe
of his conceptionof thetask.When the AssociatedPress
correctness
<< I42 >>

The Nature of GuerillaWarfare

tellsus of a Chinese translationof Seven Pillars of Wisdom being
used as text-bookby the guerillasoperatingin the plains southof
latentin thevastnesswhich
Peiping,one ponderson thepossibilities
is China.
For instance,in the PeninsularWar the operationsof Spanish
guerillasso hamperedthe movementsof the armiesof Napoleon as
to restrict
theFrenchto possessiononlyof such terrainas theyheld
by physicaloccupation.Forays,ambush of convoysand small dewith consequentshortages
cripplingof communications
tachments,
much to the finaldefeatof the
of food and munitions,contributed
Frenchby theBritishin the open field.Never did the guerillaswin
in organizedwarfare.Nowhereis therean indicationthat,without
British
the presenceand tacticaloperationsof regularlyconstituted
armiesin Spain at thattime,the Imperialarmiescould have been
forcedout. Yet in all thisbickeringFrance lost an estimatedioo,ooo men in battlecasualtiesto the Spanish alone, and was forced
to build a series of blockhousesalong all principalchannels of
of whichwas
southof thePyrenees,thegarrisoning
communication
in Spain.
a terrific
drain on its effectives
In the Franco-PrussianWar the total defeat of the French
armiesand the investmentof Paris broughtabout the collapse of
of a provisionalgovernment.Gamthe Empire and establishment
betta called for guerrea l'outrance, and some 40,000 franc-tireurs
commencedguerillaoperationsagainst the German lines of communications.The Germantroopsin France at the openingof i87I
included450,000 infantry,
5o,ooo cavalryand i,oooguns, of which
6,ooocavalryand 8o guns,organizedin a systemof
i50,000 infantry,
"stationcommands"along a railroad only 250 miles long, were
necessaryto maintaintheline and thesixteentrainsper day needed
to supplythe besiegersof Paris. Germanyrefusedto recognizethe
as belligerentsand executedall prisonersafterdrumfranc-tireurs
The guerillawarfarewas futile.
head courtmartial.
of Kruger quoted above,
In the Boer War, despitethe statement
and despitethe skillfulmaneuveringof the wily and brilliantDe
Wet, the guerillaswere forcedto surrenderaftereighteenmonths
of fighting.Britainput into the fieldin South Africa a forceof
450,000 men; the Boer forcesare sometimesput at a totalof 95,000
<< I43 >>

PacificAffairs
but thisis farfromexact,as therewerenevermorethana few
in thefieldat anyone time.
thousand
in thescattered
commandos
to establishlinesof
To crushBoer resistance
it was necessary
fromioo to iooo paces apart,
mutuallysupporting
blockhouses,
witha network
ofbarbedwireandtrenches,
alongthemainrailway
in thefieldflying
columns
capableofguerilla
lines,andtomaintain
bytheimpedimenta
of organized
fighting
themselves,
unhampered
warfare.
Even thenthe Boer commandos
playedhob withcomtheraillinealmostat
munications,
ambushing
troopsand cutting
will.Withall normalsourcesof supplyclosed,theBoerssubsisted
on British
withtheuniforms,
rodethe
supplies,
clothedthemselves
horsesand armedthemselves
and ammunition
withtherifles
capa "gentleturedfromthefoe.Thisguerillawarwas to someextent
afterstripmen'swar."The Boersalwaysreleasedtheirprisoners
prisoners,
of coursepingthem-they
had no meansforsecuring
so thattheiroperations,
exceptforactualbattlecasualties,
causedno
diminution
on theotherhand,
in the Britishforces.The British,
of concentookprisoners;
but it was not untiltheestablishment
weregathered,
and
trationcampsintowhichall non-combatants
of farms,livestock
and crops,that
afteran organizeddestruction
down.
thepatriotic
"willto win"was whittled
HE levceen masseis marked
by certaindefinite
characteristics,
oftheguerillatoassumeat
ofwhichis theability
mostimportant
bothmobilization
for
Thisfacilitates
willtheroleofnon-combatant.
oftheraiders.
disappearance
suddenlocalraidsand thesubsequent
Conversely,
beinga violationof the rulesof land warfarewhich
or distinctive
mark,and theopen
prescribe
wearingof a uniform
forlegitimate
belligerency,
bearingofarmsas amongtheconditions
and privation
to therealnon-combatant,
thisbringshostileseverity
and oftenmisery
and deathto man,womanand childin thearea
involved.
Guerillasin thelevee en massecanhaveno dreamsof shattering
sincetheothersideis alreadytoo
in openconflict,
enemystrength
All
resistance. thatcanbe hopedforis harassfororganized
strong
whichmayweardown
bedevilment
continual
ment,embarrassment,
is thekeynotethanitsstrength.
thehostilemoralerather
Fluidity

<<144 >~>

The Nature of GuerillaWarfare

heretoday,theretomorrow;peacefulworkersin the fieldsby day,
jayhawkersand snipersby night,theguerillasstriveto derailtrains,
and convoys,burnbridges,
blockroads,ambushsmall detachments
raid stores.Their operationsparalyzeall commerceand production
If
in the occupied area, foilingenemyplans to profittherefrom.
theyare determined
enough,theguerillascan onlybe conqueredby
resourceto theirown methods.Mobile flyingcolumns,capable of
travellinglight and fightingunder any and all conditions,harry
thesoil,burnproperty
and crops,removethepopulation,make the
land uninhabitedand lifenot worththeliving.
Having no organizedbase,guerillascan take no prisoners.They
can releasecaptivesor kill them.Release meansforegoingan opportunityto diminishthe hostilemanpower;killingprisonersmeans
status
theloss at once of whateverremnantof legitimatebelligerent
the guerillasmay still hold in enemyeyes-usually not much to
startwith.
Naturally,thetimeelementinvolvedin suppressionis a function
ofthemethodsofrepression
used bythepartyin military
occupation.
resistancewas cowed in a
In theFranco-Prussian
War, franc-tireur
few monthsby the rope and the firing-squad.
Britishpressurein
the Boer War, omittingthislegalized murderand relyingon economic strangulation,
took fourtimesas long. On the otherhand
Frenchresistanceceased when the capitalfell,whereasin the Boer
War guerillaresistanceflaredwiththe fall of the capital.
In Cuba, the insurrection
againstSpain held out against ioo,ooo
trainedtroops,most of them spread in the famous"Trocha," an
earthworksystemwhich cut the island in half but over which the
in crossing.Garrotte
insurrectosapparentlyfound littledifficulty
and firingsquad took full toll. However,it was not until Weyler
introducedconcentrationcamps, sweeping the insurgentdistricts
of inhabitantsand shelterforthe rebels,thathe began to make a
The Americandeclaration
good start,forSpain,towardpacification.
of war interrupted
this.
That the question of prisonerswill rise in the Sino-Japanese
struggleis to be doubted,if newspaperaccountsare to be believed.
occurnotonlyin munitionsand supplies,
will accordingly
Attrition
but also in manpower,bringingup the pointbeforementionedof
<<I45 >>

PacificAffairs
the potentialJapaneseinferiority
in this respect.To Japan,then,
outsideof economicreasons,thetimeelementis all themoreimportant.Thereforethe grim questionseems to be whetherJapancan
make conditionsso terribleto the Chinese as to bringabout peace
at any price.
It is this questionof self-preservation
which has in the past so
frequentlymarked the end of unsupportedguerillawarfare.The
enemyfromwithin,composedof thosewho will fightno further
for liberty,the "hands-uppers,"
add to the organized strengthof
theforeignenemy.The National Scoutsof the Boer War, Boers in
Britishservice,played quite a part in huntingdown the guerillas.
Irregularnative horse in British pay contributedmuch to the
crushingof the Sepoy Rebellion.France,fromthe beginning,has
organized natives for militaryservice in North Africa. In the
the PhilippineScouts aided the American
PhilippineInsurrection,
campaign.So far,it would seem,theManchukuoand Chineselevies
in Japanesepay have notcontributed
of Japan.
muchto thestrength
Nevertheless
theymustbe considered;theirvalue to Japanwill wax
and wane in accordancewith Japan'ssuccess,not despiteit.
Railroadswill be amongtheprincipaltargets,
if not the principal
target,of guerillaoperations.The objectof the guerillasis interrupthemorecompletethebetter.In theAmerican
tionof rail transport;
Civil War boththeNorthand Southfoundthatsimpleuprootingof
railsand tiesmeantonlytemporary
delay,and thatsystematic
burning of pilesof tiesupon whichrailswere placed to warp themwas
still only a temporaryexpedient.Ingenious methodsof straightening out partlybent rails were soon invented.Only by actually
puttinga double twistin a rail can it be permanently
put out of
action,as it must then be re-rolled.So equally ingeniousportable
claws were theninvented,to put such a corkscrewtwistinto a rail
thatit would be useless.Now it would appearthattheChinesehave
added anotherrefinement,
by use of theirmanpower.Rails are carriedbodilyoffforseveralmiles and buried.
For a long time the Chinese, while still in possessionof the
Canton-Hankowline,used theirmanpowerto make almostimmediate repairsof destruction
caused by aerialbombardment.
The Japalocal populations,can effectalmost
nese today,by commandeering
<<146 >>

The Nature of GuerillaWarfare

as speedyrepairs,but thecomplication
of rail disappearanceis somethingnot locallycurable.Destructionof rollingstock,while quite
serious,is not quite so importantas permanentdamage to the
road-bed.
In 1870-7i the Germansin France solvedthe problemof railwaytamperingby repressivemeasuresin communitieswhere outrages
occurred,and also by placinghostageson the pilotsof enginestraversingsuspectareas.Armoredtrainsas a means of protection
first
came into use duringthe AmericanCivil War, in the operations
aroundRichmondin i864; but it remainedforthe Britishto make
full use of them during the Boer War. The weakness of the
armoredtrainis thenecessity
forconstantsupportlestguerillaraids
destroytheline behindit,immobilizingand isolatingit.
Finally,what conclusionsmay we draw as to the effect,
on the
Japanesearmy,of thelevee en masse?
To be brutallyfrank,the answer would seem to be: none, for
a long time.But, like everything
else, theremay be an exception.
The reconstitution
of an active frontis the significanttoken for
whichthe trainedobserveris seeking.This, if it develops,may be
expectedto take the form of delayingactions on a wide front,
necessitating
furtherJapaneseadvanceson the grand scale. Then,
and onlythen,can it be said thatChinesenationalmilitary
regenerationhas begun.And then,and onlythen,can theguerillas,operating
as partisanson theflanksand rearof theenemy,make theirpresence
a real menace.This was the way in which a Soviet army slowly
developedin Siberia,out of "amateur"Red Guard bands. By constantpressurethis new army crushedthe Kolchak forces,while
behindand on bothsides of the trans-Siberian
line armedpeasants,
maddened by the outragesof pettyWhite despots,rose to wear
themout and drag themdown.
Fantastic and fearsomeare the problemsand possibilitiesof
guerillawarfaresuchas ragesin China today,withno quartergiven
by theJapanese,thoughit has been reportedon good authority
that
theEighthRoute Armytakesprisoners,
treatsthemwell,and sends
them back to the Japaneselines in the hope of demoralizingthe
Japaneseconscripts.The resultin the long run depends not on
mechanization,motorization,airplaneor tank, but on the power
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PacificAflairs
and weakness,the fortitudeand fears,of the human mind, the
human body and the human heart.Too much should not be expectedof the zealot,the patriotand "the valor of ignorance."The
lessonof military
historyis thatthedisciplined,trainedprofessional
soldierhas always had an advantageover the amateur.The one
thingan over-extended
Japanmustfearis thatthe Chineseguerillas
will hold out long enoughto allow a new trainedprofessional
army
to be formedbehindthem.Should thatday come, the Rising Sun
will set.

WestPoint,January
1939

( 148 >>