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Framework Answers File

AT: Deontology........................................................................................................................................................ 2
AT: Util/Consequentalism....................................................................................................................................... 3
AT: Cummiskey....................................................................................................................................................... 4
AT: Pain-Pleasure Calculus..................................................................................................................................... 5
AT: Neuro Ethics..................................................................................................................................................... 6
AT: Determinism..................................................................................................................................................... 7
AT: Skepticism......................................................................................................................................................... 8
AT: Relativism......................................................................................................................................................... 9
AT: Moral Realism.................................................................................................................................................. 11
AT: Expressivism/Quasi-Realism.......................................................................................................................... 12
AT: Kantian Political Theory..................................................................................................................................13
AT: Aristotelian Naturalism................................................................................................................................... 14
AT: Cognitivism...................................................................................................................................................... 15
AT: Non-Cognitivism............................................................................................................................................. 16
AT: Error Theory/Moral Skep................................................................................................................................ 17
AT: Emotivism....................................................................................................................................................... 18
AT: Prescriptivism................................................................................................................................................. 19
AT: Virtue Ethics................................................................................................................................................... 20
AT: Intuitionism..................................................................................................................................................... 21
AT: Communitarianism......................................................................................................................................... 22
AT: States ARE Moral Agents................................................................................................................................ 23
AT: States AREN’T Moral Agents.......................................................................................................................... 24
AT: Social Contract................................................................................................................................................ 25
AT: Contractualism................................................................................................................................................ 26
AT: Veil of Ignorance............................................................................................................................................. 27
AT: Levinasian Ethics............................................................................................................................................ 28
AT: Intent/Kavka Analysis.................................................................................................................................... 29

AT: Deontology

AT: Util/Consequentalism .

AT: Cummiskey .

. he’d probably be apprehensive because his knowledge of what is pleasurable is limited. a little child playing with sticks in the mud knows that this is the most enjoyable experience he had.AT: Pain-Pleasure Calculus 1) This commits a serious is-ought fallacy: just because man is governed by his response to pain and pleasure doesn’t mean that he ought to act to end pain. For example. our wanting to avoid death or pain could be just as unfounded because we have no knowledge of what’s on the other side. 2) We have no comparative standard for different types of pain and pleasure. If asked if he wants to go to the beach. There’s no way we can objectively judge what constitutes pain and what constitutes pleasure. 3) What we know as good or pleasing is limited by our experiences—we don’t know if something else is potentially better. For example. the pleasure of a good meal for someone could be as good as the pleasure of sex for someone else. Similarly.

AT: Neuro Ethics .

AT: Determinism .

AT: Skepticism .

but rather criminals. Chinese. But the most remarkable thing is this. instead they believed that the Jews were not innocent. Greeks and Romans. For example. stemming from the belief that people were better off in the afterlife if they entered it while still physically active and vigorous.S. 4) If morality is subjective via cultural beliefs it would mean that any attempt at moral reform is impossible. Velasquez et al 3: Other philosophers criticize ethical relativism because of its implications for individual moral beliefs. Selfishness has never been admired. but they had different conceptions of fact than us. say. People who led witch hunts in the 17th century did not think killing women was okay. killing one's parents after they reached a certain age was common practice. But if treaties do not matter. Men have differed as regards what people you ought to be unselfish to-whether it was only your own family. Societies. If anyone will take the trouble to compare the moral teaching of.AT: Relativism 1) C.the duty to care for parents. Plus subjective morality assumes that all members of society have the same views on morality. then it follows that one must obey the norms of one's society and to diverge from those norms is to act immorally. the fundamental moral principles underlying these practices do not. Their morality was the same as ours. 2005 I know that some people say the idea of a Law of Nature or decent behaviour known to all men is unsound. For example. These philosophers assert that if the rightness or wrongness of an action depends on a society's norms. but then. Professor of Literature at Cambridge. No culture believed that killing innocent people was the right thing to do. or your fellow countrymen. Babylonians. but if you try breaking one to him he will be complaining "It's not fair" before you can say Jack Robinson. we would agree with these societies on the underlying moral principle -. Whenever you find a man who says he does not believe in a real Right and Wrong. 3) The theory of moral relativism is inherently contradictory—it states that 1) there are no universal moral principles but it also states that 2) one ought to adhere to the moral principles of one’s own group—but that itself is a universal moral principle. Some claim that while the moral practices of societies may differ. they spoil their case by saying that the particular treaty they want to break was an unfair one. if there is no Law of Nature-what is the difference between a fair treaty and an unfair one? Have they not let the cat out of the bag and shown that. they really know the Law of Nature just like anyone else? 2) Different people’s conceptions of morality has stayed the same. the Nazi’s did not believe that killing innocent people was moral. Velasquez et al 1: Most ethicists reject the theory of ethical relativism. But this is not true. a grave threat to their society. While such a practice would be condemned in our society. then. in some societies. But they have always agreed that you ought not to put yourself first. but their knowledge of fact has changed. you will find the same man going back on this a moment later. Some of the evidence for this I have put together in the appendix of another book called The Abolition of Man. There have been differences between their moralities. whatever they say. You might just as well try to imagine a country where two and two made five. Men have differed as to whether you should have one wife or four. the ancient Egyptians. He may break his promise to you.in other words. This means that if I am a member of a society that believes that racial . And. So this proves that around the world. Think of a country where people were admired for running away in battle. people inherently have the same conception of what is morally right or wrong. or where a man felt proud of double-crossing all the people who had been kindest to him. because different civilisations and different ages have had quite different moralities. Non-conformity is deemed immoral. “Mere Christianity”. instead they believed them to be inhuman. but for our present purpose I need only ask the reader to think what a totally different morality would mean. Lewis. A nation may say treaties do not matter. may differ in their application of fundamental moral principles but agree on the principles. what will really strike him will be how very like they are to each other and to our own. although the practices of societies differ it does not mean that the underlying principles of morality are not the same. but these have never amounted to anything like a total difference. next minute. But they have always agreed that you must not simply have any woman you liked. or everyone. parts of the Devil. Hindus. and if there is no such thing as Right and Wrong.

But such a view promotes social conformity and leaves no room for moral reform or improvement in a society. These philosophers assert that if the rightness or wrongness of an action depends on a society's norms. such as customs regarding dress and decency.S. then it follows that one must obey the norms of one's society and to diverge from those norms is to act immorally. universal moral standards can exist among cultural differences. may depend on local custom whereas other practices. ethics is an inquiry into right and wrong through a critical examination of the reasons underlying practices and beliefs. Velasquez et al 4: Perhaps the strongest argument against ethical relativism comes from those who assert that universal moral standards can exist even if some moral practices and beliefs vary among cultures. for example. for example. The practice of slavery in pre-Civil war U. Simply because some practices are relative does not mean that all practices are relative. Velasquez et al 2: Also. What constitutes right action when social consensus is lacking? . then I must accept those practices as morally right. a variety of moral opinions exists on matters ranging from animal experimentation to abortion. In the United States. such as slavery. it is argued. This means that if I am a member of a society that believes that racial or sexist practices are morally permissible. What constitutes right action when social consensus is lacking? 5) Just because some principals are relative to cultures does not prove that all principals of morality are subjective. then I must accept those practices as morally right. The treatment of the Jews in Nazi society is morally reprehensible regardless of the moral beliefs of Nazi society . In the United States. As a theory for justifying moral practices and beliefs. In other words. But such a view promotes social conformity and leaves no room for moral reform or improvement in a society. ethical relativism fails to recognize that some societies have better reasons for holding their views than others. Certain practices. Velasquez et al 3: Other philosophers criticize ethical relativism because of its implications for individual moral beliefs. members of the same society may hold different views on practices. Furthermore. 6) We cannot assume that because some morality is subjective that no morality is subjective. torture. or political repression. a variety of moral opinions exists on matters ranging from animal experimentation to abortion. may be governed by universal moral standards and judged wrong despite the many other differences that exist among cultures. it may be the case that some moral beliefs are culturally relative whereas others are not. Non-conformity is deemed immoral. Furthermore. society or the practice of apartheid in South Africa is wrong despite the beliefs of those societies. For these philosophers. Plus subjective morality assumes that all members of society have the same views on morality.or sexist practices are morally permissible. we can acknowledge cultural differences in moral practices and beliefs and still hold that some of these practices and beliefs are morally wrong. members of the same society may hold different views on practices. 5) If morality is subjective via cultural beliefs it would mean that any attempt at moral reform is impossible.

AT: Moral Realism .

AT: Expressivism/Quasi-Realism .

AT: Kantian Political Theory .

AT: Aristotelian Naturalism .

AT: Cognitivism .

AT: Non-Cognitivism .

3) Extend all the cards. I gave you a bit of mine"-"Come on. It looks. about which they really agreed. They say things like this: "How'd you like it if anyone did the same to you?"-"That's my seat. of course.AT: Error Theory/Moral Skep 1) This is the premise of Error Theory/Moral Skep-->All moral statements are false. Lewis." People say things like that every day. they might. Sometimes it sounds funny and sometimes it sounds merely unpleasant. educated people as well as uneducated. people are being blown up and killed right now. fight like animals. I’m winning default by RISK—even the slightest chance that the neg is wrong and reality does exist justifies an aff ballot. you promised." Nearly always he tries to make out that what he has been doing does not really go against the standard. . very much as if both parties had in mind some kind of Law or Rule of fair play or decent behaviour or morality or whatever you like to call it.S. Well that statement was just a moral statement. And the other man very seldom replies: "To hell with your standard. Now what interests me about all these remarks is that the man who makes them is not merely saying that the other man's behaviour does not happen to please him. or that if it does there is some special excuse. 2005 Every one has heard people quarrelling. He is appealing to some kind of standard of behaviour which he expects the other man to know about. but however it sounds. in fact. or that something has turned up which lets him off keeping his promise. 4) If there is no way to prove that anything is true. and children as well as grown-ups. I was there first"-"Leave him alone. So you’ll just have to vote aff because I like pudding. or that things were quite different when he was given the bit of orange. He pretends there is some special reason in this particular case why the person who took the seat first should not keep it. how do we know that that statement was false as well? 2) C. And they have. he isn't doing you any harm""Why should you shove in first?"-"Give me a bit of your orange. but they could not quarrel in the human sense of the word. there is no basis to vote aff or neg because there’s no such thing as fairness or no obligation towards education. just as there would be no sense in saying that a footballer had committed a foul unless there was some agreement about the rules of football. Quarrelling means trying to show that the other man is in the wrong. I believe we can learn something very important from listening to the kind of things they say. “Mere Christianity”. If they had not. And there would be no sense in trying to do that unless you and he had some sort of agreement as to what Right and Wrong are. Professor of Literature at Cambridge. Any risk that a single person is dying outweighs his vague mumbo jumbo.

AT: Emotivism .

AT: Prescriptivism .

AT: Virtue Ethics .

AT: Intuitionism .

AT: Communitarianism .

AT: States ARE Moral Agents .

just a holistic self awareness b) People who form the state have a conception of their stateliness---for example the president acts differently as a statesman than as an individual. selfish. There is no state that conceives of itself that is a state. AT: you have to exist within a moral realm and the international arena isn’t a moral realm—there is no legislation a) beg the question of if states are moral actors in the first place (states aren’t moral actors because there’s no international moral arena. For example. . a) Just because states don’t have constant self-awareness.AT: States AREN’T Moral Agents AT: States lack a single will. Whenever we consider taking an action. but rather a compromise of our different wills. doesn’t mean they don’t have holistic self-awareness. we don’t form one single will. and we ultimately take a single course of action. people change as a person. Just like different policy-makers within the state have different intents and views towards an action. b) strange conception of agency—untenable that humans and states operate under same agency standards AT: States lack self-awareness. etc. and there’s no international moral arena because state’s aren’t moral actors) (Thomas Donaldson—International Deontology Defended) AT: There’s no higher arena to enforce morality for states. their? people change as a person—doesn’t mean that it needs constant self-awareness. individuals have different motivations going in their heads towards an action—altruistic. ability to form a single intent a) Even individuals lack the ability to form one single intent just like the state. a) Well there’s no higher arena to enforce morality for individuals.

AT: Social Contract .

AT: Contractualism .

AT: Veil of Ignorance .

AT: Levinasian Ethics .

Anscombe claimed that "grounds of intention are only reasons for acting" (1963. by its very nature.AT: Intent/Kavka Analysis 1) The Kavka analysis states that intentions determine whether an action is moral or not. desire to gain a million dollars and a belief that one's intending to drink the toxin would suffice for that. p.a reason constituted by a According to a popular view. not about what to intend to do. instead. writes there’s no such thing as intention. That a philosopher who focuses on relatively normal cases of intentional action and associated practical reasoning should arrive at this position is unsurprising. 90). E. is about what to do. were to receive not only the standard toxin offer. not for drinking. someone possessed of such a reason seemingly may deliberate about what to intend. Alfred Mele. on a popular view. there is no reward for intentions themselves. a billionaire offers people a million dollars for intending by midnight to drink a certain nonfatal toxin tomorrow. This argument is going to be game over for the affirmative because it is giving you a reason why intentions aren’t going to be as important 2) Fallacy of Origin Just because moral intentions form the basis for moral actions doesn’t mean that moral permissibility is based on just moral intentions. My primary concern is a related thesis: (T3) Reasons for intending to A that are not also reasons for A-ing cannot play a deliberative role in the information of an intention to A. L. M. but also a counter-offer: another billionaire.e. people desirous of riches seemingly have a reason for intending to drink the toxin that is not also a reason for drinking it . Since the payoff is for intending. Philosophical Studies. pp. and Michael Bratman (Pink 1991. with an apparent challenge to the following pair of theses: (T1) Reasons for intending to A do not extend beyond reasons for A-ing.5 million for not intending to drink one toxin and for intending instead to drink two. Alfred R. we deliberate about what to do and ot~r intentions fall in line. Suppose an agent. if the popular view is right. We are faced. Volume 79. this is COMPLETELY condradictory in so far as a state cannot form an intention. Donald Davidson. but not a sufficient condition to form a moral action. pg. only reasons to do something. independently of the behavior that they prompt or sustain in the intending agent.. Should it be granted that atypical cases are conceivable . 344-45). 85-93 practical reasoning or deliberation . Mele. M. offers her 1. Let us say that a reason for intending to A that is not also a reason for A-ing is a special reason for intending. T. T1) as a "conventional view" and attributes it to Aristotle. However. It looks as though Ann may deliberate about whether to intend to drink one toxin or. we cannot accurately determine the intent for a state (or anyone else for that matter). to intend to drink two. in a direct answer to Kavka.cases featuring "special" reasons for intending . G. Pink represents the view that there are no special reasons for intending (i.the conceptual landscape would look different: there would seem to be a deliberative route to intentions that the conventional view does not countenance. whom Ann knows to be somewhat less trustworthy. Ann. Anscombe. This view is threatened by the alleged existence of reasons for intending to A that are not also reasons for A-ing. Number 1. In normal cases of deliberation. Moreover. . then. by its very nature. in Gregory Kavka's toxin puzzle (1983). Just because water and food form the basis of human life doesn’t mean that we are morally obligated to protect food and water. is never (even in part) about what to intend . For example. “Effective Deliberation about what to intend: Or striking it rich in a toxin-free environment”. Further. Moral Intentions are a necessary condition. a route involving deliberative consideration of special reasons for intending. (T2) Deliberation. 3) Assumes that 4) When coupled with the state as an actor. either as deliberative conclusions or as consequences (in part) of concluding deliberative judgments) But in normal cases.