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VERA V. AVELINO, 77 Phil.

863
FACTS: Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the Congress
of the Philippines a report regarding the national elections held the previous month. It stated that
by reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in the province of Pampanga,
Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the true and free
expression of the popular will.

During the session, when the senate convened on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was
approved referring to the report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero
who had been included among the 16 candidates for senator receiving the highest number of
votes, proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections shall not be sworn, nor seated, as
members of the chamber, pending the termination of the of the protest lodged against their
election.
Petitioners thus immediately instituted an action against their colleagues responsible for the
resolution, praying for an order to annul it and compelling respondents to permit them to occupy
their seats and to exercise their senatorial prerogative. They also allege that only the Electoral
Tribunal had jurisdiction over contests relating to their election, returns and qualifications.
Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum resolution.
.
ISSUE:
1.Whether the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether or not votes
cast in the said provinces are valid.
2.Whether administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose
Romero should be deferred pending hearing and decision on the protests lodged against their
elections.
RULING:
The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers, holding
that the case was not a contest, and affirmed the inherent right of the legislature to determine
who shall be admitted to its membership.
Granting that the postponement of the administration of the oath amounts to suspension of the
petitioners from their office, and conceding arguendo that such suspension is beyond the power
of the respondents, who in effect are and acted as the Philippine Senate (Alejandrino vs.
Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, 88),this petition should be denied. As was explained in the Alejandrino
case, we could not order one branch of the Legislature to reinstate a member thereof. To do so
would be to establish judicial predominance, and to upset the classic pattern of checks and
balances wisely woven into our institutional setup.

The Constitution provides (Article VI, section 15) that "for any speech or debate" in congress,
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Senators and congressmen "shall not be questioned in any other place."


The Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted this privilege to include the giving of a
vote or the presentation of a resolution.
. . . It would be a narrow view of the constitutional provision to limit it towards spoken in debate.
The reason of the rule is as forcible in its application to written reports presented in that body by
its committees, to resolutions offered, which, though in writing, must be reproduced in speech,
and to the act of voting, . . . (Kilbourn vs. thompson, 103 U.S., 204; 26 Law. ed., 377, p. 391.)
In the above case, Kilbourn, for refusing to answer questions put to him by the House of
Representatives of the United States Congress, concerning the business of a real estate
partnership, was imprisoned for contempt by resolution of the house. He sued to recover
damages from the sergeant at arms and the congressional members of the committee, who had
caused him to be brought before the house, where he was adjudged to be in contempt. The
Supreme Court of the United States found that the resolution of the House was void for want of
jurisdiction in that body, but the action was dismissed as to the members of the committee upon
the strength of the herein above-mentioned congressional immunity. The court cited with
approval the following excerpts from an earlier decision of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts:
These privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of protecting the members against
prosecutions for their own benefit, but to support the rights of the people, by enabling their
representatives to execute the functions of their office without fear of prosecutions, civil or
criminal. I, therefore, think that the article ought not to be construed strictly, but liberally, that the
full design of it may be answered. . . (103 U.S., 203.) (Emphasis ours.)
Commenting on this Congressional privilege, Willoughby relates apparently as controlling, the
following incident:
In 1910, several Members of Congress having been served with a writ of mandamus in a civil
action brought against them as members of the Joint Committee on Printing and growing out a
refusal of a bid of the Valley Paper Company, for the furnishing of paper, the Senate resolved
that the Justice issuing the writ had "unlawfully invaded the constitutional privileges and
prerogatives of the Senate of the United States and of three Senators; and was without
jurisdiction to grant the rule, and Senators are directed to make no appearance in response
thereto." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. I, Second Edition, p. 616.)
Respondents are, by this proceeding, called to account for their votes in approving the
Pendatum Resolution. Having sworn to uphold the Constitution, we must enforce the
constitutional directive. We must not question, nor permit respondents to be questioned here in
connection with their votes. (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, supra.)
Case dismissed.
Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83 (1924)
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Facts:
The petitioner in this original petition for mandamus and injunction is Jose Alejandrino, a
Senator appointed by the Governor General. to represent the 12th Senatorial District. The casus
belli is a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate composed of the respondent Senators, On
February 5,1924,depriving Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his
office for the period of 1 yr from 1/24 having been declared guilty of disorderly conduct and
flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted Sen. de Vera
on the occasion of certain phrases being uttered by the latter in the course of the debate
regarding the credentials of Mr. Alejandrino. The burden of petitioner's complaint is that the
resolution is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect.
Issue:
WON the Supreme Court by mandamus and injunction may annul the suspension of Senator
Alejandrino and compel the Philippine Senate to reinstate him in his official position?
Held:
The general rule is that the writ will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate
branch, for the very obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. Mandamus will not lie
against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties
purely legislative in their character w/c therefore pertains to their legislative functions and over
w/c they have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without a gross
usurpation of power. Precedents have held that where a member has been expelled by the
legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or
wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement

Santiago vs sandiganbayan. April 19, 2001


In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then Commissioner of the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID), approved the application for legalization of
the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it
ran counter against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The
legalization of such is also a violation of Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the
legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her
to be disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this
information, Francis Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant
of arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty since she was just
recovering from a car accident which was approved. In 1995, a motion was filed with the
Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then. The
Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90
days.

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ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate
without violating the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. it is true that the Constitution provides that each house may determine the rules
of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of
two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when
imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:
Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property
whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by
final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is
acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed
to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been
filed against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress
to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above
constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate
or the Lower House, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary,
preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner
for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension
order.
But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still be
suspended as a senator?
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be
suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has
been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word office would indicate that it
applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office
under which he stands accused.
Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended?
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The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension
proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to
determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the
offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or
pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence before the court could
have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it
secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the
proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary
investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his
mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the
information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the
Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.

De Venecia v Sandiganbayan GR 130240, 5 February 2002

Facts: On 12 March 1993, an Information (docketed as Criminal Case 18857) was filed with the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) against then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan
del Sur for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, as amended). After the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution filed a Motion To
Suspend The Accused Pendente Lite. In its Resolution dated 6 June 1997, the Sandiganbayan
granted the motion and ordered the Speaker to suspend the accused. But the Speaker did not
comply. Thus, on 12 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution requiring him to
appear before it, on 18 August 1997 at 8:00 a.m., to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of court. Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through counsel, a motion for
reconsideration, invoking the rule on separation of powers and claiming that he can only act
as may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to House Resolution 116 adopted on 13
August 1997. On 29 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution declaring Speaker
Jose C. de Venecia, Jr. in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00
within 10 days from notice. Jose de Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the House of
Representatives; Roberto P. Nazareno, in his capacity as Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives; Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuao, Cashier, House of Representatives; Antonio M.
Chan, Chief, Property Division, House of Representatives, filed the petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether the suspension provided in the Anti-Graft law is a penalty or a precautionary
measure; and
Whether the doctrine of separation of powers exclude the members of Congress from the
mandate of R.A. 3019.
Held: As held in Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (GR 118354, 8 August 1995), the
suspension provided for in the Anti-Graft law is mandatory and is of different nature and
purpose. It is imposed by the court, not as a penalty, but as a precautionary measure resorted
to upon the filing of valid Information.
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As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., the doctrine of separation of


powers does not exclude the members of Congress from the mandate of RA 3019. The order of
suspension prescribed by Republic Act 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline
its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional
provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon a determination by the Senate or the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.
Ratio: Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating his prosecution by
influencing witnesses or tampering with documentary evidence and from committing further acts
of malfeasance while in office. It is thus an incident to the criminal proceedings before the court.
On the other hand, the suspension or expulsion contemplated in the Constitution is a Houseimposed sanction against its members. It is, therefore, a penalty for disorderly behavior to
enforce discipline, maintain order in its proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded
members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply
recognizes that each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the
government the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary has exclusive prerogatives and
cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly
intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.
League of Cities v. Comelec
Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the
Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas assailing the constitutionality of
the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and
respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into
cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which
took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by
increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20
million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger
share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal
independence.

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After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted
Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in
RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress.
However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as
Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again
failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16
municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood
bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million
income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate
also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed
on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March
to July 2007 without the Presidents signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in
each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation
of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the
share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the
same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local
Government Code.
Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.
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First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a
prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the
cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of
a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a
fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by
RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no
resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the
coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local
Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not
extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause.
===================================================
Section 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its
regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for
such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular
session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special
session at any time.
Section 16.
1. The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a
majority vote of all its respective Members. Each House shall choose such other officers
as it may deem necessary.

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2. A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number
may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in
such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.
3. Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend
or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
4. Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the
yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present,
be entered in the Journal. Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
5. Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the
other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two
Houses shall be sitting.
====================================================
Casco Chemical vs Gimenez 7 scra 347 (1963)
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues
used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and
formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange
Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95,
fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the
circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications
for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in same law. In compliance, Casco paid
the fees but later moved for reimbursement as Casco maintained that urea and formaldehyde
are exempted from such fees. The CBP issued the vouchers for refund (pursuant to Resolution
1529 of the CBP) but the banks auditor refused to honor the vouchers since he maintained that
this is in contrast to the provision of Sec 2, par 18 of RA 2609 which provides: The margin
established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be
imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:
xxx

xxx

xxx

XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by
and for the exclusive use of end-users.
The Auditor General, Gimenez, affirmed the ruling of CBPs auditor. Casco maintains that the
term urea formaldehyde appearing in this provision should be construed as urea and
formaldehyde He further contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative
conjunction and between the terms urea and, formaldehyde, and that the members of
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Congress intended to exempt urea and formaldehyde separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called urea formaldehyde, not the latter a finished
product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the
consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and
formaldehyde.
HELD: Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a
condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain
conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in
water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use
in the manufacture of plywood. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which is
patently distinct and different from urea and formaldehyde, as separate articles used in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin known as urea formaldehyde The opinions of any member
of Congress does not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the
enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. It is well settled that the enrolled bill which
uses the term urea formaldehyde instead of urea and formaldehyde is conclusive upon
the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the
officers of Congress and approved by the Executive on which the SC cannot speculate,
without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation,
not by judicial decree.

PHIL JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS PRADO ENBANC


Posted by kaye lee on 6:34 PM
227 SCRA 703 G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the franking privilege
from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of
Deeds, along with certain other government offices.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title
embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the
required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were
not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and
encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.
RULING:
No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional.
1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title
fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is
not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane
to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a
more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a
repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the
franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was
not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this
paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI,
Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall
have differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive
upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and
nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme
Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an
amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354
and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House.
Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e.,
in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official
assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very
least, a becoming courtesy.
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3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing
that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled
corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public
service. While it may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself
from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise
extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14
Among the services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of
the government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.
US v Pons 34 Phil 729
Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y
Lopez arrived in Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine
were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons house. On the other
hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not
delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted
an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium.
Since the act of trading and dealing opium is against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were
charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material to the
Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was approved while the
Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the
said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission
was adjourned at 12MN on February 28, 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null
and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act
2381 was indeed made a law on February 28, 1914.
HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused
to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the
Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they
are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of
the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a
coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate
powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons witnesses cannot be given due weight against
the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the
Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the
court did not err in declining to go beyond these journals. The SC passed upon the
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case
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Astorga vs Villegas

In 1964, Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of
offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business
establishments in Manila todisregard the provisions of RA 4065. He likewise issued an order to
the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to
Vice-Mayor Astorga presumably under authority of RA 4065. Astorga reacted against the steps
carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for
Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction
to compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions
of RA 4065. Respondent denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights
and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections
Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known
as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) because the said law was considered to have
never been enacted. When the this said law passed the 3rd reading in the lower house as HB
9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal
Governments and Cities headed by Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made
before the bill was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations,
Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate.
The bill was then sent back to the HOR and was thereafter approved by the HOR. The bill was
sent to the President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out however that
the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the HOR for approval and sent to the
President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments
thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate.
Due to this fact, the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and
invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law. Astorga maintains that the RA is
still vald and binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not invalidate the
statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is
conclusive proof of a bills due enactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look into the Journal to determine if the said law was validly
enacted.
HELD: The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the
risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. This SC is
merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the
same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of
this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose.
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The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and
approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and
signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the
alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become
law. As done by both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew
their signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be
was never made into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding
that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about
mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.

Morales vs Subido
Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but
does not possess a bachelors degree, is qualified for appointment as chief of police. Morales
was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of
lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present
position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief , Morales was designated acting chief of
police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by
the mayor of Manila. Subido approved the designation of the petitioner but rejected his
appointment for failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service
eligibility requirements for the said position. Instead, the respondent certified other persons as
qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. No person may be
appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree from a recognized
institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has
served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at
least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed
Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person who has served the police
department of a city can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the
said act was being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree
and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of
Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent
therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police

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department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with
the rank of captain and/or higher.
Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress
but when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the
provision was the insertion of the phraseor has served as chief of police with exemplary
record. Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy
of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill
division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the
journals, to look searchingly into the matter.
HELD: The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the
Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip
form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really
happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that the SC act
upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of
their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted
role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with
consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The SC is not of course to be
understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure
there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the
journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure
to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon but is
not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now decide. All the SC
holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the
enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

U.S. v. Pompeya
G.R. No. L-10255, August 6, 1915

police power of the state

"general welfare" clause

FACTS:
This case is regarding the complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo,
charging Silvestre Pompeya with violation of the municipal ordinance of Iloilo for willfully,
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illegally, and criminally and without justifiable motive failing to render service on patrol duty,
required
under
said
municipal ordinance.
Upon arraignment, Pompeya presented a demurrer, stating that the acts charged in the
complaint do not constitute a crime and that the municipal ordinance is unconstitutional for
being repugnant to the Organic Act of the Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the
citizens.
The trial judge sustained said demurrer and ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
Hence,

this

appeal.

ISSUE:
W/N the facts stated in the complaint are sufficient to show a cause of action under the said law
W/N said law is in violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill in depriving citizens of their
rights
therein
guaranteed
HELD:
Is

the

assailed

municipal ordinance a violation of

the

Philippine

Bill?

The municipal ordinance was enacted pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1309, the specific
purpose of which is to require each able-bodied male resident of the municipality, between the
ages of 18 and 55, as well as each householder when so required by the president, to assist in
the maintenance of peace and good order in the community, by apprehending ladrones, etc., as
well as by giving information of the existence of such persons in the locality. The
amendment contains a punishment for those who may be called upon for such service, and who
refuse
to
render
the
same.
The question asked by the Supreme Court is whether there is anything in the law, organic or
otherwise, in force in the Philippine Islands, which prohibits the central Government, or any
governmental entity connected therewith, from adopting or enacting rules and regulations for the
maintenance
of
peace
and
good
government?
In answering this, the Supreme Court cited the tribal relations of the primitive man, the feudal
system, the days of the "hundreds" -- all of which support the idea of an ancient obligation of
the individual to assist in the protection of the peace and good order of his community.
The Supreme Court held that the power exercised under the provisions of Act No. 1309 falls
within the police power of the state and that the state was fully authorized and justified in
conferring the same upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the
provisions of the said Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in derogation of the rights of
the
persons
affected
thereby.
Is

there

cause

of

action?

The complain is unable to show (a) that the defendant was a male citizen of the municipality; (b)
that he was an able-bodied citizen; (c) that he was not under 18 years of age nor over 55; nor
(d) that conditions existed which justified the president of the municipality in calling upon him for
the
services
mentioned
in
the
law.
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"For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs.
So ordered."
ichong vs hernandez
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business
opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his
fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June
1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of
which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned
for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded
by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda).
He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps
in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted
principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there
is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal
protection of the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a
statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power
which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a
treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay
city market.

Agustin v Edu (1979) 88 SCRA 195


Facts:
Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the constitutionality of Letter of Instruction
229 and its implementing order No. 1 issued by LTO Commissioner Romeo Edu. His car
already had warning lights and did not want to use this.

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The letter was promulgation for the requirement of an early warning device installed on a vehicle
to reduce accidents between moving vehicles and parked cars.
The LTO was the issuer of the device at the rate of not more than 15% of the acquisition cost.
The triangular reflector plates were set when the car parked on any street or highway for 30
minutes. It was mandatory.
Petitioner: 1. LOI violated the provisions and delegation of police power, equal protection, and
due process/
2. It was oppressive because the make manufacturers and car dealers millionaires at the
expense f car owners at 56-72 pesos per set.
Hence the petition.
The OSG denied the allegations in par X and XI of the petition with regard to the
unconstitutionality and undue delegation of police power to such acts.
The Philippines was also a member of the 1968 Vienna convention of UN on road signs as a
regulation. To the petitioner, this was still an unlawful delegation of police power.

Issue:
Is the LOI constitutional? If it is, is it a valid delegation of police power?

Held: Yes on both. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
Police power, according to the case of Edu v Ericta, which cited J. Taney, is nothing more or less
than the power of government inherent in every sovereignty.
The case also says that police power is state authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property to promote the general welfare.
Primicias v Fulgoso- It is the power to describe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order, and general welfare of the people.

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J. Carazo- government limitations to protect constitutional rights did not also intend to enable a
citizen to obstruct unreasonable the enactment of measures calculated to insure communal
peace.
There was no factual foundation on petitioner to refute validity.
Ermita Malate Hotel-The presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of factual
record in over throwing the statute.
Brandeis- constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation in
overthrowing the statute.
Even if the car had blinking lights, he must still buy reflectors. His claims that the statute was
oppressive was fantastic because the reflectors were not expensive.
SC- blinking lights may lead to confusion whether the nature and purpose of the driver is
concerned.
Unlike the triangular reflectors, whose nature is evident because its installed when parked for
30 minutes and placed from 400 meters from the car allowing drivers to see clearly.
There was no constitutional basis for petitioner because the law doesnt violate any
constitutional provision.
LOI 229 doesnt force motor vehicle owners to purchase the reflector from the LTO. It only
prescribes rge requirement from any source.
The objective is public safety.
The Vienna convention on road rights and PD 207 both recommended enforcement for
installation of ewds. Bother possess relevance in applying rules with the decvlaration of
principles in the Constitution.
On the unlawful delegation of legislative power, the petitioners have no settled legal doctrines

Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849

On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ord 4760 and the same was approved
by then acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760 sought to regulate hotels and motels. It classified them
into 1st class (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2nd class (taxed at 4.5k/yr). It also compelled hotels/motels to
get the demographics of anyone who checks in to their rooms. It compelled hotels/motels to
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have wide open spaces so as not to conceal the identity of their patrons. Ermita-Malate
impugned the validity of the law averring that such is oppressive, arbitrary and against due
process. The lower court as well as the appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-Malate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by
Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity,
the presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot
prevail over the presumption. Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is
no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only
discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also increases the revenue
of the lgu concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well. The due process
contention is likewise untenable, due process has no exact definition but has reason as a
standard. In this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to curb down
prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by mere singling out of
the provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be vague.
Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del
Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in
the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board
to regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted
that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable
and violative of due process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum
for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; there was also the requirement
that the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging
houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be violative of
due process for being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain
minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or,
restaurant andlaundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being
arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24
hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
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The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of
the hotels that violated the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?
Held: No. Judgment reversed.
Ratio:
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law. However, the Judiciary should not lightly set
aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under
the guise of police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police power. As
underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of
recordfor overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case,
the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the
presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the
increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from
operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city
government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good
order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process,
equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the power must not be
unreasonable or violative of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a
procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place
and

circumstances,"

decisions

based

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on

such

clause

requiring

"close

and

perceptive inquiryinto fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are not
to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinances nullity for an alleged failure to meet
the due process requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power
and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing
amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in
this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle
that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as
a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the states police power.
In one case- much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount,"
here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as
a policepower measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It
was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is
'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and
for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind
through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant
equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike in the sole
case of People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the
assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected
with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the
person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting,
but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of
establishments, and the full rate of payment- Holmes- We agree to all the generalities about
not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using common
sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."
Arnault vs Nazareno (G.R. No. L-3820)
Posted: July 25, 2011 in Case Digests
0

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Arnault v. Nazareno
Petition for habeas corpus to relieve petitioner Jean Arnault from confinement in the New Bilibid
prison. Denied.

FACTS: In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural
Progress Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums
of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. P1,000,000 was paid for the first sum and P 500,000
to the second sum both to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his two attorney-in-fact
in the Philippines, as represented by Jean L. Arnault, for both estates respectively. However,
Ernest H. Burt was not the original owner of the estate. He bought the first from San Juan de
Dios hospital and the second from the Philippine trust company. In both instances, Burt was not
able to pay the necessary amount of money to complete his payments. As such, his contract
with said owners were cancelled.

On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the
Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress Administration by an abolute deed of sale in
consideration of the sum of P750,000. The Philippine Government then, through the Secretary
of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank, from which the money was
borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the latter part of October, 1949, as
stated at the outset.

On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which created a special
committee to investigate the transactions surrounding the estates. The special committee
created by the resolution called and examined various witnesses, among the most important of
whom was Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was
the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the Governments paying to Burt the total sum
of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to
have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were
responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government.
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Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him
on the afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the
name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two checks
aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same occasion he drew on said account two checks;
one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the
Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.

It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000
that gave rise to the present case. As Arnault resisted to name the recipient of the money, the
senate then approved a resolution that cited him for contempt. It is this resolution which brought
him to jail and is being contested in this petition.

ISSUES:
1. WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal the
name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000.
2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of
legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950.
3. WON the privilege against self incrimination protects the petitioner from being questioned.

HELD:
1. YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative
body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any
question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against selfincrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be
material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to
legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to
coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or
investigation. The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the
subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The
reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character
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of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result
of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.

2. NO. Senate is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical
dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to
the Senates power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be
exerted as in the present case. Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper
bounds, i.e. abuse their power and keep the witness in prison for life. If proper limitations are
disregarded, Court isalways open to those whose rights might thus be transgressed.

3. NO. Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, which is
the name of that person to whom witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His insistent
claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate
himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave
P440,000 to a person to him unknown. Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is
equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify
would be so punishable. Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and
that he gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latters verbal
instruction, Court found no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that
person might incriminate him.

This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of
the Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. Among the witnesses called to be
examined by the special committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a
lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a representative of the vendor. During
the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said representative, at the
same time invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a
resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned until he
shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the name of the person to whom
he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith.
Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus
ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its questions in a
congressional hearing in aid of legislation.
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HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty to
conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein established that a witness who refuses
to answer a query by the Committee may be detained during the term of the members imposing
said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to violate the witness right to due
process of law.

Tan vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 73155 case brief summary


Tan vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 73155 case brief summary
July 11, 1986

Facts: The complainants are residents of Province of Negros Occidental. This case is petition
contesting the constitutionality of RA No. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of
Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. Pursuant to
and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986 on
the proposed new province. The plebiscite resulted in the affirmative votes thus the
proclamation of the new province known as Negros del Norte.

Issue:
(1)This case question whether as residents of the parent province, the citizens should be
included in the plebiscite as the constitution provides that it should be conducted in the affected
area
(2)They also question the constitutionality of the law as the territory did not reach the required
minimum of 2500 sq.km

Rulings:
(Issue 1): The Supreme Court held the citizens of the parent province should also be included in
the plebiscite as they are also affected by the division of the province. This division will cause an
alteration to the parent provinces territorial boundaries, political units as well as may have
adverse economic effects.
(Issue 2): Based on records, it was proved that the territorial boundaries of the new province will
not reach the required minimum of 3500 sq.km.
As such, the Supreme Court ruled that RA No. 885 is unconstitutional.
Tan v. COMELEC
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G.R. No. 73155, July 11, 1986


NOTA BENE: This case is relevant to the current buzz regarding the "Sugbuak." The issue in
this
case,
however,
is
a
bit
on
the
technical
side.
- when the boundaries of a LGU is substantially altered, there are necessarily more than one
unit affected -- the parent LGU and the new LGU that was created as a result of the alteration
FACTS:
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New
Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective
Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso,
Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto.
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January
3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is
unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because:
(1) The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the
territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite
(2) The area which would comprise the new provinc of Negros del Norte would only be about
2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute
The Supreme Court was in recess at the time so the petition was not timely considered.
Consequently, petitioners filed a supplemental pleading on January 4, 1986, after the plebiscite
sought
to
be
restrained
was
held
the
previous
day,
January
3.
ISSUE:
W/N the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites under Article XI,
Sec.
3
of
the
Consititution,
which
states
that
-"Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or
its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the
unit
or
units
affected."
HELD:
In interpreting the above provision, the Supreme Court held that whenever a province is
created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, "the approval of
a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" must first be obtained.
The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the
division
and
alteration
of
the
existing
boundaries
of
Negros Occidental.
"Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would
be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially
altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the
mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte."
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The Supreme Court further held that the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus the
Honorable Executive Secretary to the President, et al., G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128
SCRA 6), which the respondents used to support their case, should not be taken as a doctrinal
or compelling precedent. Rather, it held that the dissenting view of Justice Vicente Abad Santos
in the aforementioned case is the forerunner of the applicable ruling, quoting that:
"...when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all of the people of
the municipality if themunicipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of
two or more municipalities if there be a merger. I see no ambiguity in the Constitutional
provision."
It appeared that when Parliamentary Bill NO. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new
province of Negros del Norte was passed for approval, it recited therein that "the plebiscite shall
be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the
approval of this Act." However, when the bill was enacted into B.P. 885, tehre was an
unexplained change from "areas affecte" to "the proposed new province, which are the areas
affected." The Supreme Court held that it was a self-serving phrase to state that the new
province
constitutes
the
area
affected.
"Such additional statement serves no useful purpose for the same is misleading, erroneous, and
far from truth. The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The
substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the
adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners."
Consequently, the Supreme Court pronounced that the plebscite held on January 3, 1986 has
no
legal
effect
for
being
a
patent
nullity.
"WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional.
The proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the
officials thereof are also declared null and void.
Torralba vs. Municipality of Sibagat, G.R. No. 59180. Jan. 29, 1987 147 SCRA 390
FACTS:
Batas Pambansa 56, enacted February 1980, created theMunicipality of Sibagat, Province of
Agusan del Sur. Petitioners assail its validity for being violative of Section 3, Article XI, 1973
Constitution:
Sec. 3. No province, city,municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or
its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the unit or units affected.

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Petitioners argued that the LGC must first be enacted to determine the criteria for the creation of
any province, city, municipality, or barrio and since no LGC had yet been enacted as of the date
BP 56 was passed, the latter could not have possibly complied with any criteria when
the Municipality was created.
The Local Government Code came into being only on 10 February 1983 so that when BP 56
was enacted, the code was not yet in existence.
HELD:
The absence of the Local Government Code at the time of its enactment did not curtail nor was
it intended to cripple legislative competence to create municipal corporations. Section 3, Article
XI of the 1973 Constitution does not proscribe nor prohibit the modification of territorial and
political subdivisions before the enactment of the Local Government Code. It contains no
requirement that the Local Government Code is a condition sine qua non for the creation of
amunicipality, in much the same way that the creation of a new municipality does not preclude
the enactment of a Local Government Code. What the Constitutionalprovision means is that
once said Code is enacted, the creation, modification or dissolution of local government units
should conform with the criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum before the enactment of such
Code, the legislative power remains plenary except that the creation of the new local
government unit should be approved by the people concerned in a plebiscite called for the
purpose.
The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said requisite. A plebiscite was
conducted and the people of the unit/units affected endorsed and approved the creation of the
new local government unit. In fact, the conduct of said plebiscite is not questioned herein. The
officials of the new Municipalityhave effectively taken their oaths of office and are performing
their functions. A dejure entity has thus been created.
The power to create a municipal corporation is legislative in nature. In the absence of any
constitutional limitation, a legislative body may create any corporation it deems essential for the
more efficient administration of government. The creation of the new Municipality was a valid
exercise of legislative power vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Interim Batasang
Pambansa.
========================================================================
=============
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-Procedural Limitations
ARTICLE VI
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 26.
1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
2. No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings
on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the
last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall
be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
Section 27.
1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return
the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the
objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill,
it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise
be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall
become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas
or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its
Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it
originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a
law as if he had signed it.
2. The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which
he does not object.
-Express Substantive limitations
ARTICLE III
BILL OF RIGHTS

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
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Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
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Section 3.
1. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed
by law.
2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress
of grievances.
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors,
to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance
shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
Section 12.
1. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
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preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
2. No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.
3. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
4. The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this Section as well as
compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their
families.
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
Section 14.
1. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
2. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused: Provided, that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Section 18.
1. No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
2. No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
Section 19.
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1. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
2. The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any
prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under
subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an
act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
ARTICLE VI
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 25.
1. The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for
the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and
manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
2. No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it
relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or
enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
3. The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the
procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.
4. A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall
be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be
raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein.
5. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions
may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
6. Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public
purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as
may be prescribed by law.

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7. If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general
appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the
preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect
until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
Section 28.
1. The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation.
2. The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government.
3. Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually,
directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxation.
4. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority
of all the Members of the Congress.
Section 29.
1. No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.
2. No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly
or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious
teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.
3. All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special
fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was
created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the
general funds of the Government.
Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
Section 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted.
-delegation to the president
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Section 23.
1. The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting
separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.
2. In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless
sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) vs. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
Posted on June 20, 2013 by winnieclaire

G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005


Facts: Mounting budget deficit, revenue generation, inadequate fiscal allocation for education,
increased emoluments for health workers, and wider coverage for full value-added tax benefits
these are the reasons why Republic Act No. 9337 (R.A. No. 9337) was enacted.
R.A. No. 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills namely, House Bill Nos. 3555 and
3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950.
Because of the conflicting provisions of the proposed bills the Senate agreed to the request of
the House of Representatives for a committee conference. The Conference Committee on the
Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill recommended the approval of its report, which the Senate
and the House of the Representatives did.
The President signed into law the consolidated House and Senate versions as Republic Act
9337. Before the law was to take effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining government from implementing the law in response to a slew of
petitions for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law.
Among others, Petitioners contend that Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A. No. 9337 constitute an
undue delegation of legislative power, in violation of Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution;
Issue: W/N there is an undue delegation of legislative power
Held: In the present case, the challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in
Sections 4, 5 and 6 which reads as follows: That the President, upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to
twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
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(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and
one-half percent (1 %)
In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is
valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate;41 and (b) fixes a standard the limits
of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy,
marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates
the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. Both tests are
intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not
allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done,
and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be made.
The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of
ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under
the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January
1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or nonoperation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No
discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact
that the word shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the word shall connote a
mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with
the idea of discretion. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean
exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution
of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly
delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope
of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative
process can go forward.
United States vs Ang Tang Ho
In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No.
2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said
act, under extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the
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necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this
Act, in August 1919, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August 20,
1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho,
a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said
amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6 th of August
1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as
charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the
sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.
HELD: First of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior
to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further,
one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when
both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.
Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly
what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy
required to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner
in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be
delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be
complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government
and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the
legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may
be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or
event.

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V POEA


Posted by kaye lee on 5:21 PM
G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988 [Non delegation of legislative power; subordinate legislation]
FACTS:
A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint for
charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular No.
2, issued by the POEA which stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of overseas
workers. ESL questioned the validity of the memorandum circular as violative of the principle of
non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to
promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an
exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
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Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.


ISSUE:
Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of
powers.
RULING:
No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order
No. 797. ... "The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory
functions of the Administration (POEA)."
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated.
What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what
the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to
entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions
of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute
by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations,
such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code.
These regulations have the force and effect of law.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves
the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce
it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
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Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate,
who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially
legislative.

SOLICITOR GENERAL V METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY (1991)


Facts: In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, the
Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was
not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD
1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the case of stalled
vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that even the confiscation of
driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed
by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. However, petitioners alleged that Traffic
Enforces continued with the confiscation of drivers licenses and removal of license plates. Dir
General Cesar P. Nazareno of the PNP assured the Court that his office had never authorized
the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles.
Later, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, authorizing itself "to detach
the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally
parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila." The Court issued a resolution requiring
the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the SolGen to submit separate comments in light of the
contradiction between the Ordinance and the SC ruling. The MMA defended the ordinance on
the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the power conferred upon it by EO 32 (formulation of
policies, promulgation of resolutions). The Sol Gen expressed the view that the ordinance was
null and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The
flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not
permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's
licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of the
alleged impropriety of examining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its
validity.
Issue: WON Ordinance 11 is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in
the LGC
Held: No. Ratio: The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to
promulgate such measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present.
These requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the
presence of a sufficient standard.
The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the
national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of
their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the
particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing
municipal corporations. According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be
partial ordiscriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be
unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy.

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A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not
pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD
1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's
licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following
provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission to impose
such sanctions. In fact, the provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan
Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators
only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree
itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by thedecree or at least allowed
by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in
case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are
applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions
comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong. `The requirement
that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political
subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the
national legislature. They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate
legislation. As delegates of the Congress, thelocal government unit cannot contravene but must
obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question,
which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force
and effect of a statute. To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other
ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus,
ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage
licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution
of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of parts, to deter imposture; the exercise of
freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the
end be valid, would be ultra vires. The measures in question do not merely add to
the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact
actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal
the law. We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the
Metropolitan Manila area. It is anexception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on
the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the
country with the sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned. The Court agrees
that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern
of the rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila
through the imposition and enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon traffic violators. At the
same time, it must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that may attend the
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enforcement of such sanction in eluding the illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong
decision. At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority for and indeed there is
astatutory prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be impose by the challenged enactments by
virtue only of the delegated legislative powers. It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of
its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either directly through a statute or
by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila.
Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues prohibit the confiscation of
license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver
licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.
Sema vs COMELEC
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of
Maguindanao but it is not part or ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a
plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district
comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it with power to
create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional
Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of
the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1 st district is now
only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status
quo should be retained however just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be
called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration
from Congress as to Cotabatos status as a legislative district (or part of any).
Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato
(1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative
district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival
Dilangalen was from there and D was winning in fact he won). She contended that under the
Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains
legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in effect
Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S.
Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.
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ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly
LGUs.
HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established
in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or
barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must
follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict
with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units
affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for
Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local
legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards
and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has
delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays
within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a
province, once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in
order to have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district.
Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so Semas contention is untenable. On
the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating
a legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative
districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities
and provinces.

Emmanuel Pelaez vs Auditor General


In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this
was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in
part:
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The President may by executive order define the boundary of any municipality and may
change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public
welfare may require
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit
the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez
claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been
impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be created or
their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: If
the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality
which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from
being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality
can be created without creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC,
Congress has delegated such power to create municipalities to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by
virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch
of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration
of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said
law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory
declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the
essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the
scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public welfare may require
which would mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may
require is present, still, such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of
power. In the first place, what the phrase as the public welfare may require qualifies is the text
which immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is the President may change the
seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may
require. Only the seat of government may be changed by the President when public welfare so
requires and NOT the creation of municipality.

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The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently
legislative in character not administrative (not executive).

Garcia vs Executive Secretary


In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed,
in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into
the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed
across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into
the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475
was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products
continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475
and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which
provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress,
the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478
which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue
and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than
the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475
and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to be
exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the
Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject
to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President subject
to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose to fix within specific limits tariff
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rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . . In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which
authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.

BIRAOGO VS PTC Leave a comment


G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
x -x
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated
July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration,
and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body
as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between
contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption
and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine
from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of
law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing
its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create
a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
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(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize
the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the
power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth
Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth
Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the
Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative
Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their
peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who
may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents executive
power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled
jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and
the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not
duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly
created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of
Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

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RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must
have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which
they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of
each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers
of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested
by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity
of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any
personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits,
standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Real-party-in interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the
general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out
a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen
or taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court,
however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental
importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in
the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The
powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of
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the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty
is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts
and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to
know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to
the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of
the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be
allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no
impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all,
the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The
function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the
courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to
obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its
apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions
to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection
clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the states duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the
test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
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Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The
clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to
single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is
not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the
authority to investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws
must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
G.R. No. 177807 & G.R. No. 177933

October 11, 2011

Subject Matter: Constitutional Law


Gancayco vs. City Government of Quezon City
G.R. No. 177807
Petitioners: Justice Emilio A. Gancayco (Retired)
Respondents: City Government of Quezon City and Metro Manila Development Authority
G.R. No. 177933
Petitioners: Metro Manila Development Authority
Respondents: Justice Emilio A. Gancayco (Retired)

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Facts: Retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of land located EDSA,3 Quezon City.
A few years later, the Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled "An Ordinance
Requiring the Construction of Arcades, for Commercial Buildings to be Constructed in Zones
Designated as Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of Quezon City, and Providing Penalties in
Violation Thereof. It required the relevant property owner to construct an arcade along EDSA.
An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first floor projecting over the
sidewalk beyond the first storey wall used as protection for pedestrians against rain or sun. It
bears emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city council, there was
yet no building code passed by the national legislature. Thus, the regulation of the construction
of buildings was left to the discretion of local government units. Under this particular ordinance,
the city council required that the arcade is to be created by constructing the wall of the ground
floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line. Thus, the building owner is
not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the property line, thereby creating a space or
shelter under the first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as
an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes.
The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, Justice Gancayco
sought the exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the
application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his
property. The City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancaycos request "subject to the
condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable time,
demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his own expense when public interest so demands."
The MMDA then sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his
building violated the National Building Code of the Philippines in relation to Ordinance No. 2904.
He did not comply with the notice. The MMDA then proceeded to demolish the party wall of the
ground floor structure. The City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a
valid exercise of police power, regulating the use of property in a business zone.
Justice Gancayco filed a Petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. The RTC ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The Court of
Appeals reversed the RTCs decision and ruled that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the
right of the local government unit to promote the general welfare of its constituents pursuant to
its police powers.

Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 2094 is a valid exercise of police power.

Held: Yes, it is a valid delegation of Police Power


Ratio: Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power
vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
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repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast
and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals,
and the general welfare. In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the government.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property
rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by
due process, must yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on
the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned
provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged
confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the
presumption of validity which every law has in its favor.
It is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of Quezon City when it issued the
questioned ordinance ordering the construction of arcades were the health and safety of the city
and its inhabitants; the promotion of their prosperity; and the improvement of their morals,
peace, good order, comfort, and the convenience. At the time that the ordinance was passed,
there was no national building code enforced to guide the city council; thus, there was no law of
national application that prohibited the city council from regulating the construction of buildings,
arcades and sidewalks in their jurisdiction.

Social Justice Society vs. Hon. Lito Atienza, Jr. Mayor of Manila G.R. No. 156052 Digest
Social Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao, and Bonifacio S.
Tumbokon vs. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, jr., in his capacity as Mayor of Manila
G.R. No. 156052
March 7, 2007
Facts: On November 20, 2001, The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Maynila enacted Ordinance
No. 8027. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, jr. approved the said ordinance on November 28, 2001. and it
became effective on December 28, 2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area of
Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of
businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses
within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in
the area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies Caltex, Petron and Shell.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy entered into a
memorandum of understanding with the oil companies in which they agreed that :scaling down
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of Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and practicable option. Under the memorandum of
understanding, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy permits the Oil Companies to
continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting
from the joint operations and the scale down program.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the memorandum of understanding in Resolution No. 97.
In that resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the memorandum of understanding was
effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30, 2003,
the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April
30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies.
Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance.
Issue: Whether or not respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals. And Whether or not the June 26, 2002
memorandum of understanding and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance
No. 8027.
Held: The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as City Mayor of Manila,
to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. One of these is
Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to put into effect
Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or negated by the
courts.
On the other hand assuming that the terms of the memorandum of understanding were
contradictory with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on
the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. There is nothing
that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027. Wherefore the Court
Ordered Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the city of Manila to immediately enforce
Ordinance No. 8027.
EDU VS ERICTA
Posted by kaye lee on 2:56 PM
G.R. No. L-32096 October 24, 1970 En Banc [Non-delegation of power; police power]
FACTS:
Judge Ericta and Teddy C. Galo filed suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction assailing the validity of enactment of the Reflector as well as Admin Order No. 2
implementing it, as an invalid exercise of the police power for being violative of the due process
clause. Galo followed with a manifestation that in the event that Judge would uphold said statute
constitutional, A.O. No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner, implementing such
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legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power.


ISSUE:
Whether Reflector Law and Administrative Order is constitutional and valid.
RULING:
Yes. Reflector Law is enacted under the police power in order to promote public safety and
order.
Justice Laurel identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property
could thus "be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
comfort, health and prosperity of the state." The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably
vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state
and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the
enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order,
and welfare.
The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity of
Administrative Order No. 2 issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly approved by the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, for being contrary to the principle of nondelegation of legislative power. Such administrative order, which took effect on April 17, 1970,
has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act.
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress
may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to
the exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What
cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal
them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the
hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative
power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The
legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do
it, and what is the scope of his authority.
It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation Code.
Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and
emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is
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likewise a categorical affirmation Of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation


Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such
fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order
No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable, launched against it by respondent Galo.
Edu v Ericta Digest
Facts:

1. Assailed is the validity of the Reflector Law and Admin Order No. 2 which implements it.
Under the law, a vehicle has to comply with the requirements of having reflective device prior to
being
registered
at
the
LTO.
2. The respondent Galo on his behalf and that of other motorists, filed a suit for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the challenged Act as an invalid
exercise of the police power for being violative of the due process clause. This he followed on
May 28, 1970 with a manifestation wherein he sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event
that respondent Judge would hold said statute constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of the
Land Transportation Commissioner, now petitioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as
an undue exercise of legislative power.

Issue: W/N Reflector Law is unconstitutional, and w/n AO2 is valid

YES, both the law and AO 2 are valid.

It is thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the police power to
promote public safety. What is delegated is authority which is non-legislative in character, the
completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed.

1. Police Power
It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. "the most
essential, insistent, and at least illimitable of powers," (Justice Holmes) aptly pointed out "to all
the great public needs."
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice
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Cardozo: "Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present
with the well-being of the nation.

2. Delegation of Legislative Power


It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress
may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to
the exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What
cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal
them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the
hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative
power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The
legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do
it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only
way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made
between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to
what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion
as to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection
call be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the
necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very
least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It
is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or
administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental rules and regulations.

The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied
from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the
legislative objective is public safety.

OSMEA
220
GR No. 99886, March 31, 1993

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vs.
SCRA

ORBOS
703

" To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of the power to tax, there must be a standard which
implies that the legislature determines matter of principle and lays down fundamental policy."
FACTS: Senator John Osmea assails the constitutionality of paragraph 1c of PD 1956, as
amended by EO 137, empowering the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve the increase
of fuel prices or impose additional amounts on petroleum products which proceeds shall accrue
to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) established for the reimbursement to ailing oil
companies in the event of sudden price increases. The petitioner avers that the collection on oil
products establishments is an undue and invalid delegation of legislative power to tax. Further,
the petitioner points out that since a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the
taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to
the special purpose/objective for which it was created. It thus appears that the challenge posed
by the petitioner is premised primarily on the view that the powers granted to the ERB under
P.D. 1956, as amended, partake of the nature of the taxation power of the State.
ISSUE: Is there an undue delegation of the legislative power of taxation?
HELD: None. It seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are
exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF as a special
fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general
fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund
nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that
these measures comply with the constitutional description of a "special fund."

With regard to

the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the provision conferring
the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides a
sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general policy of
the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates, P.D.
1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment the resources of
the Fund.

OSMENA VS ORBOS
FACTS
October 10, 1984, President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in
the General Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF
wasdesigned to reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and importedpetroleum
products resulting from exchange rate adjustments and from increases in the
world market prices of crude oil. Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified into a trust liability
account, in virtue of E.O. 1024,. Now, the petition alleges that the
status of the
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OPSF as of March 31, 1991 showed a Terminal Fund Balance deficit of some P12.877billion; 8
that to abate the worsening deficit, the Energy Regulatory Board . . issued anapproving the
increase in pump prices of petroleum products, and a
t the rate of recoupment, the OPSF deficit should have been fully covered in a span of six (6)
months,but this notwithstanding, the respondents are poised to accept, process and pay claims
not authorized under P.D. 1956." 9
ISSUE
Whether or not the powers granted to the ERB under PD 1956 partake of the nature of
thetaxation power of the state such that the creation of the trust fund violates Section
29(3),Article VI of the Constitution
RULING
It seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted inthe
exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund isplain from
the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund;and while it is
placed in what the l
aw refers to as a trust liability account, the fund
nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied
that these measures comply with the constitutional description of a special fund. Indeed,
the practice is not without precedent

ARTICLE X
LOCAL GOVERNMENT

GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among
the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for
the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and
duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the
local units.

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