ADI 2007 Bruschke Lab

1 Realism > Crazy

Realist Performance Neg

Realist Performance Neg......................................................................................................................................................1 State-Lovin’ 1NC..................................................................................................................................................................2 .............................................................................................................................................................................................6 Realism True: Human Nature...............................................................................................................................................7 Policy Analysis Key to Realism............................................................................................................................................8 A2: Perm...............................................................................................................................................................................9 Turn Shield – Realism is Dynamic.....................................................................................................................................11 Turn Shield – Defensive Realism.......................................................................................................................................12 A2: Realism Causes War.....................................................................................................................................................13 A2: State is Obsolete...........................................................................................................................................................14 A2: Leaders aren’t Objective..............................................................................................................................................15 A2: Realism Excludes!.......................................................................................................................................................16 A2: Realism is Unethical....................................................................................................................................................17

ADI 2007 Bruschke Lab

2 Realism > Crazy

State-Lovin’ 1NC
[1/5] Contention One: Realism is Capital “T” True States will inevitably compete for power to survive – three reasons John Mearsheimer – Prof of PoliSci at U. Chicago – 2001 The Tragedy of Great Power Politics p. 2-3
This unrelenting pursuit of power means that great powers are inclined to look for opportunities to alter the distribution of world power in their favor. They will seize these opportunities if they have the necessary capability. Simply put, great powers are primed for offense. But not only does a great power seek to gain power at the expense of other states, it also tries to thwart rivals bent on gaining power at its expense. Thus, a great power will defend the balance of power when looming change favors another state, and it will try to undermine the balance when the direction of change is in its own favor. Why do great powers behave this way? My answer is that the structure of international system forces states which seek only to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other. Three features of the international system combine to cause states to fear one another: 1) the absence of a central authority that sites above states and can protect them from each other, 2) the fact that states always have some offensive military capability, and 3) the fact that states can never be certain about other states’ intentions. Given this fear – which can never be wholly eliminated – states recognize that the more powerful they are relative to their rivals, the better their chances of survival. Indeed, the best guarantee of survival is to be a hegemon, because no other state can seriously threaten such a mighty power.

Self-interest is rooted in human nature, which results in realism Morgenthau ’78 (Hans J. Morgenthau. “Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace”. Fifth Edition. New York. 1978 pp. 4-15. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm)
1.Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve society it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. The operation of these laws being impervious to our preferences, men will challenge them only at the risk of failure. Realism, believing as it does in the objectivity of the laws of politics, must also believe in the possibility of developing a rational theory that reflects, however imperfectly and one-sidedly, these objective laws. It believes also, then, in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion-between what is true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only a subjective judgment, divorced from the facts as they are and informed by prejudice and wishful thinking. Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover these laws. Hence, novelty is not necessarily a virtue in political theory, nor is old age a defect. The fact that a theory of politics, if there be such a theory, has never been heard of before tends to create a presumption against, rather than in favor of, its soundness. Conversely, the fact that a theory of politics was developed hundreds or even thousands of years ag~as was the theory of the balance of power-does not create a presumption that it must be outmoded and obsolete. A theory of politics must be subjected to the dual test of reason and experience. To dismiss such a theory because it had its flowering in centuries past is to present not a rational argument but a modernistic prejudice that takes for granted the superiority of the present over the past. To dispose of the revival of such a theory as a "fashion" or "fad" is tantamount to assuming that in matters political we can have opinions but no truths.

ADI 2007 Bruschke Lab

3 Realism > Crazy

State-Lovin’ 1NC
[2/5] Contention Two: You’re not Realist. There is no room for their project in the study of international relations – emphasizing the role of personal discourse and narrative undermines the theoretical consistency needed to realistically respond to political problems. Darryl S.L. Jarvis – Professor at University of Sydney – 2K International Relations and the Challenge of PostModernism: Defending the Discipline p. 200-1
What then, would we be left with and what could this newly constituted enterprise offer? As Ashley freely admits, it could offer little. It could not “claim to offer an alternative position or perspective” since there would be no secure ontological ground upon which these could be established. Nor could it offer alternative interpretations save it would attempt to impose “interpretation upon interpretation” and capture history by imposing fixed meanings and understandings. Least of all could it offer theory, the very tyranny of modernist narratives that tend to “privilege” and “marginalize”. Absent any theoretical legacy or factual knowledge, we could forced into an endless intertextual discourse predicated on consumption of words and the individual thoughts they evoke: a kind of purified anarchism albeit in a perpetual state of self-dispersal. We would live in a world of relativistic knowledge claims, each “true” to those that think it, but its truthfulness unobtainable to those who would read it or wish to communicate it. Above all, we would be left without theory- knowledge as a basis for decision, judgment, prescription, and action, surrendering us to “a view from afar, from up high”. But as Nicholas Onuf asks “what does this leave for dealing with those close at hand?” In the end, however, the intellectual rift that separates these counter-poised disciplines is not so much a theoretical chasm as a political one. The attacks by Ashley and subversive postmodernists stem as much from a deep political suspicion not only toward the discipline, but the implicit project they think it harbors and the political-sectional elite interests they accuse it of representing. Robert Keohane’s desire for theoretical synthesis of these contending approaches thus proves naïve, not least for the fact that subversive postmodernism is likely best appreciated as a neotheoretical tool for inflicting damage upon a discipline that subversive postmodernists would see done away with – a spanner in the works, as it were, which much like sabotage threatens to clog the wheels of theoretical endeavor and reconstitute the machine in partisan terms defined by their respective political agendas. Here the need for vigilance, or more precisely, standards in the evaluation of theory and of the various theoretical importations that are frequently attempted in International Relations. If only because of a liberal tolerance for intellectual dissonance, International Relations has been welcoming of all schools of thought and all perspectives. I, for one, support this, believing it to be the embodiment of intellectual discourse and progress. Yet this has to be reconciled amid a notion of discipline, one that demands some degree of conformity in terms of subject matter, aims, approach, and theory, save the very essence of our discipline dissipates into an intellectual free-for-all where anything goes, anything counts as theory, and where everything is assumed to fall within the purview of International Relations. This is not the case and is most definitely inappropriate. To be sure, intellectual innovations are nearly always controversial, the seeding of new ideas frequently derided as obtuse or unrelated, often requiring time to germinate and thereby grow and mature. But never are attempts at dismantling the basis of intellectuality by suggesting theoretical closure through deconstruction, or by initiating witch hunts that threaten to hunt down those implicated in the so-called modernist project. Such approaches fail the test of theory, falling short of the aims, ambitions and purpose of a discipline that strives to understand, not to reproach.

ADI 2007 Bruschke Lab

4 Realism > Crazy

State-Lovin’ 1NC
[3/5] We must remove irrational and subjective knowledge from policy-making or it results in foolish wars Morgenthau ’78 (Hans J. Morgenthau. “Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace”. Fifth Edition. New York. 1978 pp. 4-15. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm)
It stands to reason that not all foreign policies have always followed so rational, objective, and unemotional a course. The contingent elements of personality, prejudice, and subjective preference, and of all the weaknesses of intellect and will which flesh is heir to, are bound to deflect foreign policies from their rational course. Especially where foreign policy is conducted under the conditions of democratic control, the need to marshal popular emotions to the support of foreign policy cannot fail to impair the rationality of foreign policy itself. Yet a theory of foreign policy which aims at rationality must for the time being, as it were, abstract from these irrational elements and seek to paint a picture of foreign policy which presents the rational essence to be found in experience, without the contingent deviations from rationality which are also found in experience. Deviations from rationality which are not the result of the personal whim or the personal psychopathology of the policy maker may appear contingent only from the vantage point of rationality, but may themselves be elements in a coherent system of irrationality. The conduct of the Indochina War by the United States suggests that possibility. It is a question worth looking into whether modern psychology and psychiatry have provided us with the conceptual tools which would enable us to construct, as it were, a counter-theory of irrational politics, a kind of pathology of international politics. The experience of the Indochina War suggests five factors such a theory might encompass: the imposition upon the empirical world of a simplistic and a priori picture of the world derived from folklore and ideological assumption, that is, the replacement of experience with superstition; the refusal to correct this picture of the world in the light of experience; the persistence in a foreign policy derived from the misperception of reality and the use of intelligence for the purpose not of adapting policy to reality but of reinterpreting reality to fit policy; the egotism of the policy makers widening the gap between perception and policy, on the one hand, and reality, on the other; finally, the urge to close the gap at least subjectively by action, any kind of action, that creates the illusion of mastery over a recalcitrant reality. According to the Wall Street Journal of April 3, 1970, "the desire to 'do something' pervades top levels of Government and may overpower other 'common sense' advice that insists the U.S. ability to shape events is negligible. The yen for action could lead to bold policy as therapy."

ADI 2007 Bruschke Lab

5 Realism > Crazy

State-Lovin’ 1NC
[4/5] Their criticism is based on overly optimistic assumptions about human nature. Inclusion is not always progress, it’s important to first address concrete realities – gradual governmental reform is a pre-condition to a peaceful international community where their project might be possible Murray 97 (Alistair J. H., lecturer in the department of politics at the University of Swansea, Reconstructing Realism
Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, pg 194-95)

At the same time, however, realism no more fits into a reflectivist mould than it does a rationalist one. Whilst it joins the critique of contemporary resolutions of the problem of political authority, it also recognises that they provide an essential measure of order in a disorderly world. Whilst it remains open to the possibility of development towards more inclusive forms of community, it refuses to take the additional step of assuming that this development can necessarily be described as progress. Realism ultimately agrees that the 'necessitous' elements of the international system are largely social constructions generated by human practices, but it retains an ambivalence about human motivations which dictates a sceptical position towards the possibility of overcoming estrangement. For every example of progress created by man's ability to transcend 'learned responses', for every case of his 'inherent self-developing capacity', we have examples of regression as he employs this for purposes other than promoting self-determination. For realism, man remains, in the final analysis, limited by himself. As such, it emphasises caution, and focuses not merely upon the achievement of long-term objectives, but also upon the resolution of more immediate difficulties. Given that, in the absence of a resolution of such difficulties, longer-term objectives are liable to be unachievable, realism would seem to offer a more effective strategy of transition than reflectivism itself. Whereas, in constructivism, such strategies are divorced from an awareness of the immediate problems which obstruct such efforts, and, in critical theoretical perspectives, they are divorced from the current realities of international politics altogether, realism's emphasis on first addressing the immediate obstacles to development ensures that it at least generates strategies which offer us a tangible path to follow. If these strategies perhaps lack the visionary appeal of reflectivist proposals, emphasising simply the necessity of a restrained, moderate diplomacy in order to ameliorate conflicts between states, to foster a degree of mutual understanding in international relations, and, ultimately, to develop a sense of community which might underlie a more comprehensive international society, they at least seek to take advantage of the possibilities of reform in the current international system without jeopardising the possibilities of order. Realism's gradualist reformism, the careful tending of what it regards as an essentially organic process, ultimately suggests the basis for a more sustainable strategy for reform than reflectivist perspectives, however dramatic, can offer.

ADI 2007 Bruschke Lab

6 Realism > Crazy

State-Lovin’ 1NC
[5/5] Contention Three: Reject their performance. Realism is the beginning and end of international relations – debates must engage in policy argumentation to engage the discipline meaningfully. Francis A. Beer (Professor of Political Science at U. of Colorado, Boulder) and Robert Hariman (teaches rhetorical theory and the critical study of public culture at Northwestern) 1996 Post-Realism:
The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations. Michigan State University Press. p. 1-2 [nfb]
The conduct of international relations has always involved skillful use of persuasive discourse. Relations between states might depend on factors such as military capability and natural resources, but the decisions made about the conduct of peace and war are also a result of the successes, failures, habits, and nuances of persuasive appeal among elites and publics alike. For the most part, however, academic research in international relations has not focused on the forms and effects of conversations, speeches, debates, narratives, or discourses in political practice. This systematic inattention to the role of words in foreign affairs is the result of a specific intellectual history that emphasized the material bases of international politics as it "really" was. Political realism, historically known as reason of state or Realpolitik, was contrasted with both the utopian tendencies of philosophical idealism and the liberal overvaluing of verbal agreements that was epitomized at Munich. As it was linked to the modern valorization of scientific method, the doctrine of political realism became the dominant theory within the contemporary discipline of international relations. By 1960, political realism had "swept the field in the United States"; one more recent study suggested that 90 percent of the hypotheses in behavioral studies in the discipline were realist in conception. 1 There has been a corresponding lack of attention to foreign affairs in rhetorical studies, which have been directed largely to domestic politics and national literatures. Recently, however, we have seen a convergence of interests, a bridging of the realist's unexamined divisions between foreign and domestic politics and between the languages of politics and of inquiry. On the one hand, scholars in rhetoric have produced a number of critical studies of foreign policy discourse. 2 These studies reveal that foreign policy decision making is influenced powerfully by modes of persuasive appeal that realist explanation overlooks or presumes irrational or even replicates dangerously. On the other hand, "dissident" scholars in the discipline of international relations have taken a linguistic turn. 3 By drawing on a number of linguistic methodologies ranging from Chaim Perelman's anatomy of rhetoric to various post-structuralisms, these initiatives not only explicate phenomena that were excluded from realist explanatory schemes but also suggest how realist discourse operates as a rhetoric influencing the world it purports to describe. Periodic criticisms of the realist paradigm have not substantially altered either the conventional wisdom of international studies or its considerable influence over foreign affairs. For most political scientists and the many practitioners they school, the analysis, explanation, and evaluation of international relations begins and usually ends with the realist paradigm. Consequently, any reconsideration of international studies has to come to terms with realism: considering how it produces and limits knowledge of foreign affairs, how it describes and structures political practice, how it contains untapped resources and misleading directions, and how it needs to be adapted to changes in world politics and in the conduct of inquiry. Rhetorical scholars have additional interests as well. The realist paradigm is a superb example of persuasive success in twentieth-century modernist culture, and, so long as realist assumptions structure international study, such inquiry will not be hospitable to the rhetorical tradition. By identifying how realism works as a persuasive discourse, one can challenge its hegemony within international studies and demonstrate how a rhetorical sensibility can contribute to more sophisticated and strategic understanding of foreign affairs.

ADI 2007 Bruschke Lab

7 Realism > Crazy

Realism True: Human Nature
Humans are universally driven by self-interest, which proves realism Morgenthau ’78 (Hans J. Morgenthau. “Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace”. Fifth Edition. New York. 1978 pp. 4-15. www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm)
A small knowledge of human nature will convince us, that, with far the greatest part of mankind, interest is the governing principle; and that almost every man is more or less, under its influence. Motives of public virtue may for a time, or in particular instances, actuate men to the observance of a conduct purely disinterested; but they are not of themselves sufficient to produce persevering conformity to the refined dictates and obligations of social duty. Few men are capable of making a continual sacrifice of all views of private interest, or advantage, to the common good. It is vain to exclaim against the depravity of human nature on this account; the fact is so, the experience of every age and nation has proved it and we must in a great measure, change the constitution of man, before we can make it otherwise. No institution, not built on the presumptive truth of these maxims can succeed.

ADI 2007 Bruschke Lab

8 Realism > Crazy

Policy Analysis Key to Realism
Specific policy analysis is key to adapt realist principles to specific countries – [that’s an impact to topic-specific education] Heller ’03 (Eric Nathaniel Heller. “Power Projections of the People’s Republic of China: An Investigative Analysis of Defensive and Offensive Realism in Chinese Foreign Policy”. November 2003. http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/Research/OPs/Heller/contents/partone.html)
Realism in its purest form is based upon the following assumptions: 1) that states are primary and rational actors, 2) states adjust their policies in order to further their own self-interests, and 3) for states, military and national security interests are the principal policies.[1] Further along in this analysis some of these assumptions will be slightly relaxed, at times incorporating principles related to structural realism. The author believes that in order to truly understand how a state is operating, one must study social, economic, security, and political elements of a country and how each of these parts interacts with one another. Such adjustments will include the role of multinational corporations and international organizations in the policy calculus, and economic determinants will be combined with military factors in determining the power of a state. Thus, the principal measures of power potential are population, gross national product (GNP), military size, and defense expenditures and trends. Only by incorporating all of these dynamics can a researcher grasp how a country’s leadership is thinking and as such, what that leadership’s next moves will be.

Realism demands a photographic picture of the political world only possible through rational analysis Morgenthau ’78 (Hans J. Morgenthau. “Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace”. Fifth Edition. New York. 1978 pp. 4-15. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm) At the same time political realism considers a rational foreign policy to be good foreign policy; for only a rational foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits and, hence, complies
both with the moral precept of prudence and the political requirement of success. Political realism wants the photographic picture of the political world to resemble as much as possible its painted portrait. Aware of the inevitable gap between good—that is, rational—foreign policy and foreign policy as it actually is, political realism maintains not only that theory must focus upon the rational elements of political reality, but also that foreign policy ought to be rational in view of its own moral and practical purposes. Hence, it is no argument against the theory here presented that actual foreign policy does not or cannot live up to it. That argument misunderstands the intention of this book, which is to present not an indiscriminate description of political reality, but a rational theory of international politics. Far from being invalidated by the fact that, for instance, a perfect balance of power policy will scarcely be found in reality, it assumes that reality, being deficient in this respect, must be understood and evaluated as an approximation to an ideal system of balance of power.

ADI 2007 Bruschke Lab

9 Realism > Crazy

A2: Perm
[1/2] Cross-apply the Jarvis evidence- realism demands standards for scholarship which they have not met. Their inability to present a coherent theory of international politics means they must be excluded for the discipline to survive – the permutation is a wrench in the works of realist analysis Inclusion of their project poisons realism and is unnecessary, realism can already adapt to important world events Murray 97 (Alistair J. H., lecturer in the department of politics at the University of Swansea, Reconstructing Realism
Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, pg 178)

Cox's articulation of the division between the two approaches is perhaps definitive, but his conclusion is much more problematic. Whilst he is undoubtedly correct to argue that each has a contribution to make, this does not suggest, as he presumes, a strategy of alternation according to the stability of the historical process. It is precisely this question of stability which is ultimately at stake in the debates between rationalist and reflectivist perspectives, and the danger is always that the one will predominate to the exclusion of the other in periods ill-suited to it, undermining whatever possibilities of order or reform actually exist. Consequently, a strategy of alternation is inevitably going to prove inadequate to the challenges posed by world politics; what is required is some form of synthesis. 6 Realism, I will argue, is capable of providing a foundation on which such a perspective might be built. It is, of course, conventionally treated as a part of the rationalist orthodoxy — and hence criticised for reproducing an iniquitous status quo by seeking to mitigate its problems. Yet, as should already be apparent from the understanding of realism put forward in earlier chapters, this account is clearly problematic. If realism emphasises the need to grasp what semblance of order can be obtained under the current structure of the system, it nevertheless acknowledges the need to investigate the possibilities of reforming this structure. If it makes use of aspects of the positivist methodology employed by rationalism, it is nevertheless convinced of the importance of the more interpretative approach adopted by reflectivism.7 Realism ultimately avoids the monism of perspective which leads to the self-destructive conflict between the two, maintaining a position which provides an opening for a path between the conservatism that privileges the extant to the exclusion of the possible and the progressivism which privileges the possible to the exclusion of the extant.

Their approach cannot create strategies for change –realism’s concrete goals are mutually exclusive with their aimless rambling Murray 97 (Alistair J. H., lecturer in the department of politics at the University of Swansea, Reconstructing Realism
Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, pg 189)

In the final analysis, then, Ashley's post-structuralist approach boils down to little more than a critique — and, at that, a critique which fails. It is predicated on the assumption that the constraints upon us are simply restrictive knowledge practices, such that it presumes that the entirety of the solution to our problems is little more than the removal of such false ways of thinking. It offers nothing by way of alternative — no strategies, no proximate goals, indeed, little by way of goals at all. If, in constructivism, the progressive purpose leads to strategies divorced from an awareness of the problems confronting transformatory efforts, and, in critical theoretical perspectives, it produces strategies divorced from international politics in their entirety, in post-structuralism it generates a complete absence of strategies altogether. Critique serves to fill the void, yet this critique ultimately proves unsustainable. With its defeat, post-structuralism is left with nothing. Once one peels away the layers of misconstruction, it simply fades away. If realism is, as Ashley puts it, 'a tradition forever immersed in the expectation of political tragedy', it at least offers us a concrete vision of objectives and ways in which to achieve them which his own position, forever immersed in the expectation of deliverance, is manifestly unable to provide.

ADI 2007 Bruschke Lab

10 Realism > Crazy

A2: Perm
[2/2] Realism depends on a coherent theory that allows us to map outcomes – they have failed to justify their perspective within realism and most be excluded Morgenthau ’78 (Hans J. Morgenthau. “Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace”. Fifth Edition. New York. 1978 pp. 4-15. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm)
For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason. It assumes that the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained only through the examination of the political acts performed and of the foreseeable consequences of these acts. Thus we can find out what statesmen have actually done, and from the foreseeable consequences of their acts we can surmise what their objectives might have been. Yet examination of the facts is not enough. To give meaning to the factual raw material of foreign policy, we must approach political reality with a kind of rational outline, a map that suggests to us the possible meanings of foreign policy. In other words, we put ourselves in the position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances, and we ask ourselves what the rational alternatives are from which a statesman may choose who must meet this problem under these circumstances (presuming always that he acts in a rational manner), and which of these rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under these circumstances, is likely to choose. It is the testing of this rational hypothesis against the actual facts and their consequences that gives theoretical meaning to the facts of international politics.

ADI 2007 Bruschke Lab

11 Realism > Crazy

Turn Shield – Realism is Dynamic
Realism adapts to changing circumstances and provides effective strategies for reform – their project has no way to achieve the transition Murray 97 (Alistair J. H., lecturer in the department of politics at the University of Swansea, Reconstructing Realism Between
Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, pg 179)

Yet, an examination of the arguments put forward from each of these perspectives suggests not only that the effort to locate realism within a conservative, rationalist camp is untenable, but, beyond this, that realism is able to provide reformist strategies which are superior to those that they can generate themselves. The progressive purpose which motivates the critique of realism in these perspectives ultimately generates a bias which undermines their own ability to generate effective strategies of transition. In constructivism, this bias appears in its most limited version, producing strategies so divorced from the obstacles presented by the current structure of international politics that they threaten to become counter-productive. In critical theory it moves a stage further, producing strategies so abstract that one is at a loss to determine what they actually imply in terms of the current structure of international politics. And, in post-modernism, it reaches its highest form, producing an absence of such strategies altogether, until we reach the point at which we are left with nothing but critique. Against this failure, realism contains the potential to act as the basis of a more constructive approach to international relations, incorporating many of the strengths of reflectivism and yet avoiding its weaknesses. It appears, in the final analysis, as an opening within which some synthesis of rationalism and reflectivism, of conservatism and progressivism, might be built.

ADI 2007 Bruschke Lab

12 Realism > Crazy

Turn Shield – Defensive Realism
There’s different kinds of realism – offensive and defensive Heller ’03 (Eric Nathaniel Heller. “Power Projections of the People’s Republic of China: An Investigative Analysis of Defensive and Offensive Realism in Chinese Foreign Policy”. November 2003. http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/Research/OPs/Heller/contents/partone.html)
In the simplest bifurcation of realism, Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller argue that realism is composed of both an aggressive and offensive version and of a more defensive orientation. In offensive realism, states view security as a fixed pie; unless a state works to increase its own security and resources by coercive means, others will take their portions and use them against the state that surrendered such capabilities in order to obtain more security. In such a circumstance, war and other aggressive military postures are more likely, and international competition will be rampant. At the same time, those states that believe that there is an infinite amount of security in the international system will adopt defensive strategies and view security as non-zero sum, therefore allowing themselves simply to work to retain their own security.[9] In this configuration, the old cliché that the best offense is a good defense holds true. Chairman Mao Zedong once called for an “active defense,” by which he meant that the Chinese must assert an “offensive defense, or defense through decisive engagement.”[10] Mao’s statement provides a springboard for this paper’s argument that China is best described as a defensive realist state.

We advocate defensive realism, their evidence assumes offensive realism – none of their offense applies. Heller’03 (Eric Nathaniel Heller. “Power Projections of the People’s Republic of China: An Investigative Analysis of Defensive and Offensive Realism in Chinese Foreign Policy”. November 2003. http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/Research/OPs/Heller/contents/partone.html)
Defensive realists believe that much of international politics is a Prisoners’ Dilemma or a more complex security dilemma. The desire to gain mixes with the need for protection; much of statecraft consists of structuring situations so that states can maximize their common interests. The ever-present fear that others will take advantage of the state—and the knowledge that others have reciprocal worries—leads diplomats to seek arrangements that will reduce if not neutralize these concern.[12] In this respect, the defensive realist will utilize a minimax strategy; maximizing minimum gain and minimizing maximum loss. This paper argues that states that adhere to a defensive strategy will not only adopt defensive policies, but those states will also form a sphere or arc of influence in their immediate global theater that they will claim as a defensive perimeter. Within such a region, a state is willing to project its power to retain control over that which it feels belongs to it. Defensive realism argues that states will respond to the anarchy of the international system with the use of force out of fear, rather than out of hegemonic desires. It is also important to note that both defensive and offensive realists share the idea of relative gains as all realist states do. A defensive realist would be concerned with the relative gains necessary to secure control over its defensive perimeter, for example, as well as all of the other prescriptions for a defensive realist state presented in Table 1. Similarly, while an offensive realist state is concerned with absolute gains to a great extent, it also strives to obtain relative gains until it has the capability to overcome the defenses and conquer a territory or state, for example, as well as the other ideas indicated in Table 1. At the same time, though, defensive realists assert that analysts should not overstate the role of anarchy in international relations, for global interactions provide incentives for restrained behavior. Reckless, expansionist behavior characteristic of offensive realism is a result of domestic political factors, and not attributable to anarchy.[13] In a globalized world where trade and economic policies carry great influence and the ability to adopt internationally accepted, imperialist policies is non-existent, a defensive strategy is likely to be the most widely accepted and tolerated.

ADI 2007 Bruschke Lab

13 Realism > Crazy

A2: Realism Causes War
Realism doesn’t cause war, it gives the theoretical tools to prevent it. Because international competition is inevitable, the only way to stop it from escalating is to understand it fully. And realist wars will never escalate to extinction because its in states’ best interests to survive – the success of deterrence during the Cold War shows that realist states will follow mutually assured destruction. It’s only when idealist follies like the affirmative enter the picture that miscalculation becomes possible. And states only fight when its in their interests – they rationally calculate when to do so Heller ’03 (Eric Nathaniel Heller. “Power Projections of the People’s Republic of China: An Investigative Analysis of Defensive and Offensive Realism in Chinese Foreign Policy”. November 2003. http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/Research/OPs/Heller/contents/partone.html)
Realism concludes that states are motivated by power and national interest and as such will pursue gains relative to their peers and adversaries. The argument continues that in a system characterized by anarchy and threats viewed as omnipresent, a state will strive to increase its tangible power assets in comparison to its nearest threat or competitor.[4] Subsequently, nations will seek to maintain their territorial integrity and will focus on military security in its interactions with other actors in the system. Additionally, material capabilities, leadership, and unity are viewed as the center of power. States may also form alliances to balance power and thus increase their relative security.[5] Because states are rational actors, they will assess the costs and benefits of engaging in provocative actions and determine whether or not the expected utility that can come from such aggressive policies will be worth the consequences.[6]

ADI 2007 Bruschke Lab

14 Realism > Crazy

A2: State is Obsolete
The state is vital and alive. Global and local challenges do not contest the relevance of sovereignty Soguk 1997 (Nevzat; Ph.D. from Arizona State University, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Hawaii; Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities; page 286-287)
In reflecting upon the conditions of local and global interactions, there seems to be a loose convergence around an image that makes it increasingly more problematic to speak of the conditions of local and global life in terms of a Cartesian spatial segmentation built around the image/name of the modern state. This familiar state-oriented practice of territorialization or “the spatial incarceration of peoples,” their images, ideas, and identities within/around the state is beset by challenges from within and without. Increasingly, “pride of place” is attributed to the notion of spatial mobility perceived largely as the movements of peoples, identities, images, ideas, and technologies in a non-Cartesian space through nonisomorphic fashions. Put succinctly, the pervasive activity of the day is the politico-cultural and politico-economic deterritorialization of “life” across the borders and boundaries drawn at the juncture of modernity. It is at this juncture where the notions of nation, the state, sovereignty, identity, and security collapse into one another to create “the myth of the modern” that the dislocations, accelerations, and contingencies of the world gradually inculcate the images and manifest the realities of “many worlds.” Thus, the perceptions of the worlds we live in are more divers than ever before. These emergent images of the conditions of the global and the local do not point, however, to the demise of the statist activities as territorializing practices. In fact, an economy of statist practices, best conceptualized and understood in the articulation of peculiar sovereignty claims on life expressions and meanings, is a practice prevalent in the terrain of activities, though no more eliciting an axiomatic reverence and approval. In a practical sense, sovereignty claims, connected inescapably to some understanding of space/territory/identity, are territorializing practices in the quest for constructing: representable” essences, meanings, identities, and cultures. In that sense, sovereignty claims over a space/territory/body are engaged not only in the construction of “referable” national physical borders and boundaries but also in the construction of “representable” cultural, political, and economic identities and “essences” (of bodies/spaces) ostensibly overlapping with the physical borders.

ADI 2007 Bruschke Lab

15 Realism > Crazy

A2: Leaders aren’t Objective
Viewing IR as power creates a rational framework that doesn’t depend on individual people – the search for motives is self-defeating Morgenthau ’78 (Hans J. Morgenthau. “Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace”. Fifth Edition. New York. 1978 pp. 4-15. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm)
The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible. On the side of the actor, it provides for rational discipline in action and creates that astounding continuity in foreign policy which makes American, British, or Russian foreign policy appear as an intelligible, rational continuum, by and large consistent within itself, regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of successive statesmen. A realist theory of international politics, then, will guard against two popular fallacies: the concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences. To search for the clue to foreign policy exclusively in the motives of statesmen is both futile and deceptive. It is futile because motives are the most illusive of psychological data, distorted as they are, frequently beyond recognition, by the interests and emotions of actor and observer alike. Do we really know what our own motives are? And what do we know of the motives of others? Yet even if we had access to the real motives of statesmen, that knowledge would help us little in understanding foreign policies, and might well lead us astray. It is true that the knowledge of the statesman's motives may give us one among many clues as to what the direction of his foreign policy might be. It cannot give us, however, the one clue by which to predict his foreign policies. History shows no exact and necessary correlation between the quality of motives and the quality of foreign policy. This is true in both moral and political terms.

ADI 2007 Bruschke Lab

16 Realism > Crazy

A2: Realism Excludes!
Yes realism ignores some groups, disregarding some perspectives is necessary for collective security that allows anyone to speak at all. Heller ’03 (Eric Nathaniel Heller. “Power Projections of the People’s Republic of China: An Investigative Analysis of Defensive and Offensive Realism in Chinese Foreign Policy”. November 2003. http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/Research/OPs/Heller/contents/partone.html)
Domestic social policy describes how a state’s government treats ethnic, religious, and linguistic minority groups within the state’s border and whether they seek to blindly subjugate them or have respect for human rights. Both the defensive and offensive realist state works to put down internal movements seeking to disrupt state policy, yet the aggressiveness with which each variation does so differs. The offensive realist state will not respond to international objections and pressures to curtail abuses of minorities and political dissidents. A defensive realist state, however, stops short of blind persecution, instead working to control these movements only to the point that the international community sees the country as unified. Political rhetoric is a subjective idea that pertains to how a state interacts diplomatically with other states and how said state promises to pursue its policy objectives. The concept of territory is crucial, especially to this paper, in that it highlights a given state’s respect for the notion of the Westphalian nation-state and a nation’s policy concerning additional territory acquisition. Where an offensive realist state will overtly declare its broad intention to challenge the hegemon and regional competitors, the defensive realist state will be very clear in what policies it is pursuing, the objectives behind those policies, and how it will react to any member of the international community attempting to disrupt its agenda.

ADI 2007 Bruschke Lab

17 Realism > Crazy

A2: Realism is Unethical
Incorporating ethics into international relations doesn’t assure good outcomes – its more likely to cause the wrong results Morgenthau ’78 (Hans J. Morgenthau. “Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace”. Fifth Edition. New York. 1978 pp. 4-15. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm)
We cannot conclude from the good intentions of a statesman that his foreign policies will be either morally praiseworthy or politically successful. Judging his motives, we can say that he will not intentionally pursue policies that are morally wrong, but we can say nothing about the probability of their success. If we want to know the moral and political qualities of his actions, we must know them, not his motives. How often have statesmen been motivated by the desire to improve the world, and ended by making it worse? And how often have they sought one goal, and ended by achieving something they neither expected nor desired?

Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler proves our arg – good motives excuse terrible policy Morgenthau ’78 (Hans J. Morgenthau. “Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace”. Fifth Edition. New York. 1978 pp. 4-15. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm)
Neville Chamberlain's politics of appeasement were, as far as we can judge, inspired by good motives; he was probably less motivated by considerations of personal power than were many other British prime ministers, and he sought to preserve peace and to assure the happiness of all concerned. Yet his policies helped to make the Second World War inevitable, and to bring untold miseries to millions of men. Sir Winston Churchill's motives, on the other hand, were much less universal in scope and much more narrowly directed toward personal and national power, yet the foreign policies that sprang from these inferior motives were certainly superior in moral and political quality to those pursued by his predecessor. Judged by his motives,
Robespierre was one of the most virtuous men who ever lived. Yet it was the utopian radicalism of that very virtue that made him kill those less virtuous than himself, brought him to the scaffold, and destroyed the revolution of which he was a leader. Good motives give assurance against deliberately bad policies; they do not guarantee the moral goodness and political success of the policies they inspire. What is important to know, if one wants to understand foreign policy, is not primarily the motives of a statesman, but his intellectual ability to comprehend the essentials of foreign policy, as well as his political ability to translate what he has comprehended into successful political action. It follows that while ethics in the abstract judges the moral qualities of motives, political theory must judge the political qualities of intellect, will, and action.A realist theory of international politics will also avoid

the other popular fallacy of equating the foreign policies of a statesman with his philosophic or political sympathies, and of deducing the former from the latter. Statesmen, especially under contemporary conditions, may well make a habit of presenting their foreign policies in terms of their philosophic and political sympathies in order to gain popular support for them. Yet they will distinguish with Lincoln between their "official duty,"
which is to think and act in terms of the national interest, and their "personal wish," which is to see their own moral values and political principles realized throughout the world. Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible-between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place.

Only acting rationally can create ethical foreign policy
Morgenthau ’78 (Hans J. Morgenthau. “Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace”. Fifth Edition. New York. 1978 pp. 4-15. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm) Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes between truth and opinion, so it distinguishes between truth and idolatry. All
nations are tempted-and few have been able to resist the temptation for long-to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purposes of the universe. To know that nations are subject to the moral law is one thing, while to pretend to know with certainty what is good and evil in the relations among nations is quite another. There is a world of difference between the belief that all nations stand under the judgment of God, inscrutable to the human mind, and the blasphemous conviction that God is always on one's side and that what one wills oneself cannot fail to be willed by God also. The lighthearted equation between a particular nationalism and the counsels of Providence is morally indefensible, for it is that very sin of pride against which the Greek tragedians and the Biblical prophets have warned rulers and ruled. That equation is also politically pernicious, for it is liable to engender the distortion in judgment which, in the blindness of crusading frenzy, destroys nations and civilizations-in the name of moral principle, ideal, or God himself. On the other hand, it is exactly the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from both that moral excess and that political folly. For if we look at all nations, our own included, as political entities pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power, we are able to do justice to all of them. And we are able to do justice to all of them in a dual sense: We are able to judge other nations as we judge our own and, having judged them in this fashion, we are then

ADI 2007

18

Bruschke Lab Realism > Crazy capable of pursuing policies that respect the interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting those of our own. Moderation in policy cannot fail to reflect the moderation of moral judgment.

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful