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62
ANN BANFIELD
But the category of "objective" linguistic material, so crucial to the dual voice
position, has never been precisely defined, although it is continuously invoked
on the intuitive level. Narrative statements describing a character's actions,
especially when in a vocabulary the character would not use in dialogue,
presumably adopt a point of view outside the character's own; likewise, a
descriptive noun phrase or a proper noun referring to the character could not
represent the character's own consciousness of himself but must originate in an
outside source. The relevant descriptive statements and phrases are, it is
apparently assumed, intuitively recognizable.
There are no objections to postulating the existence of a style - i.e., of a kind
of sentence - which eliminates the linguistic features of subjectivity and also
exhibits identifying linguistic traits unique to it. This is essentially Benveniste's
(1966) claim for the stylistic category histoire, whose linguistic features have been
further treated in Banfield (1979). It is when a complete sentence (E) combines
features of both a subjective and an objective style that a problem is raised for a
theory maintaining the empirical validity of 1 E/1 SELF. According to the
proponents of the dual voice position, the sentences of (1) are counter-examples
to 1 E/1 SELF because they seem to combine a narrative statement, which is
taken to imply a narrator's voice, but contain phrases or words (the embeddable
italicized constructions in (1)) only attributable to a character (a-c are taken from
defenders of dual voice).
(1) a. This time she managed to re-fasten her veil (Conrad, cited in Dillon and
Kirchhoff, 1976: 434-5)
b. elle aimait la brebis malade, le sacr6 coeur perc6 de fl&ches aigues, ou le
pauvre Jesus qui tombe en marchant sur sa croix (Flaubert, Madame Bovary,
cited in Perruchot, 1975: 260)
c. She had conceived her first passion, and the object of it was her governess. It
hadn't been put to her, and she couldn't, or at any rate, didn't, put it to herself,
that she liked Miss Overmore better than she liked papa; but it would have
sustained her under such an imputation to feel herself able to reply that papa
too liked Miss Overmore exactly as much. He had particularly told her so.
Besides she could easily see it. (Henry James, What Maisie Knew, cited in
Cohn, 1978: 47)
d. Ce pauvre diable d'ouvrier, perdu sur les routes, l'interressait. (Zola,
Germinal, 30)
e. On devait, disait-il, trouver la de l'or a la pelle. L'id6e 6tait juste. Seulement,
le million y avait passe et cette damnee crise allaient lui donner raison. (ibid.:
80)
f. Catherine ne put que gifler son frere, la petite galopait deja avec une
bouteille. Ces satanes enfants finiraient au bagne. (ibid.: 150)
Les
camarades le regardaient, remues, ayant quelque part en eux l'echo de ce
g.
qu'il leur disait... (ibid.: 316)
h. En tout cas, monsieur 6tait prevenu, elle preferait flanquer son diner au feu,
si elle le ratait, a cause de la revolution. (ibid.: 343)
"The point of view" in (Ic), for instance, "is clearly Maisie's, but the language
is elaborately Jamesian; with the single exception of the word 'papa' not a single
REFLECTIVEAND NON-REFLECTIVE
CONSCIOUSNESS
63
phrase corresponds to a child's idiom" (Cohn, 1978: 47). Likewise for the other
examples in (1); in every case a subjective word or phrase ascribable to a
character - deictics like this, ce, cette and ces in (la, d, e, and f) respectively,
kinship terms like papa in (Ic) and camarades in (lg) and the similar monsieurin
(lh), subjective or evaluative adjectives like pauvre in (lb and d), satanees in (If),
damnee in (le) and what Milner (1978) calls "noms de qualit6" like ce diable
d'ouvrierin (Id) - is contained in a sentence whose vocabulary and syntax does
not transcribe the character's train of thoughts in any direct way.
In Banfield (1978), I have demonstrated that the sentences of (1) cannot be
said to contain a SELF distinct from the character and, hence, are narratorless,
since any narrator is to be equated with the linguistic notion SELF. The choice of
language is attributable to the author and not a narrator. This is the language in
which thought is represented by the novelist. Therefore, the examples of (1) do
not constitute counter-evidence to 1 E/1 SELF.
However, the relation between sentences like those in (1) and the classic
examples of represented speech and thought, where consciousness is
represented in its full expressivity, has yet to be defined. According to Pascal
(1977: 107), there is no "definable line" between such sentences and the "more
declared forms" of represented thought. If the two are related, their relation can
only be seen as a continuum from the purely objective to the purely subjective,
and the existence of sentences like those of (1) renders suspect a formal account
of represented speech and thought itself. This style, it is concluded, is not
"a linguistically identifiable phenomenon" (Culler, 1978:612); it "cannot
be defined purely in formal terms" (Bronzwaer, paraphrased in Dillon and
Kirchhoff, 1976: 433). "Nous ne parviendrons a l'approcher que si nous
renongons a le faire entrer sous le boisseau de I'unite, logique ou synthetique,
celle de l'etre ou celle du sujet, celle de la forme ou celle du sens" (Perruchot,
1975: 254).
It is not the classic examples of represented speech and thought which,
according to the dual voice position, escape formal definition. Rather, its
defenders insist that the sentences of (1) must be included in the formal account
of the style but that any attempt to do so meets with failure. But might not the
inability to define the sentences of (1) in formal terms only describe the impasse
reached by the proponents of the dual voice position? The inability of research to
discover a formal solution to an empirical problem should not too soon be taken
as an inherent property of the object of inquiry. For a systematic account of
represented speech and thought and sentences like those in (1) we require a
conceptualization which allows for relating both on the basis of precisely
identifiable shared features but one which explains their obvious differences.
1. THE EPISTEMOLOGICALDISTINCTIONBETWEEN REFLECTIVEAND
NON-REFLECTIVECONSCIOUSNESS
The necessary generalization which permits an explanatory account of sentences
representing consciousness, including those of (1), is the distinction between two
levels of consciousness. Following Kuroda (1976), I will call the former
64
ANN BANFIELD
REFLECTIVEAND NON-REFLECTIVE
CONSCIOUSNESS
65
66
ANN BANFIELD
Sentimentale,281)
b. Emma mit un chale sur ses epaules, ouvrit la fenetre et s'accouda. La nuit fut
noire. Quelques gouttes de pluie tomberent (*maintenant).
Mme Arnoux's s'approcha de la fenetre pour respirer. De l'autre c6te de la
rue, sur le trottoir, un emballeur en manches de chemise cloua une caisse.
(*Maintenant) des fiacres passerent.
The use of the imparfait may suggest that the events or scene described are
phenomena perceived by the subject; but the aorist may not. Sentences with the
imparfaitmay represent what is seen through the subject's eyes or heard through
his ears. The same contrast exists in English between the past progressive and the
simple past, as shown in (4).
67
With the simple past, the events are simply narrated, with no suggestion of a
point of view; with the imparfait or past progressive, what is narrated becomes,
not just a description of events, but a representation of the character's perceiving
consciousness. English, however, also allows the simple past to be cotemporal
with NOW, i.e., with the act of consciousness; this is particularly the case with
stative verbs which cannot appear in the progressive. So we find representations
of perceptions in the simple past. The example in (5) is clearly not to be
interpreted as represented thought; the consciousness it represents remains
non-reflective, where the SELF is a preverbal infant.
(5) The little boy [...] grubbed. The flower blazed between the angles of the roots.
Membrane after membrane was torn. It blazed a soft yellow, a lambent light
under a film of velvet; it filled the canvas behind the eyes with light. All that inner
darkness became a hall, leaf smelling, earth smelling of yellow light. And the tree
was beyond the flower; the grass, the flower, and the tree were entire. Down on
his knees grubbing he held the flower complete. Then there was a roar and a hot
breath and a stream of coarse grey hair rushed between him and the flower. Up
he leapt, toppling in his fright, and saw coming towards him a terrible peaked
eyeless monster moving on legs, brandishing arms. (Virginia Woolf, Between the
Acts, 12-13)
With a first person narrative, sentences in the imparfait imply the speaker's
past experience of the events he recounts. The aorist does not, in contrast, imply
that the speaker perceived what he describes, although he might have.
A related linguistic feature which represented perceptions share with
represented thought is the use of the "shifted" modals could, should, would and
might where discourse would have can, shall, will and may. The passage in (6)
signals the representation of perceptions through shifted modals, as well as the
past progressive and the past.
(6) She sat up in bed and looked out through the slit of the blind. Through the gap she
could see a slice of the sky; then roofs; then the tree in the garden; then the backs
of houses opposite standing in a long row. One of the houses was brilliantly lit and
from the long open windows came dance music. They were waltzing. She saw
shadows twirling across the blind. (Virginia Woolf, The Years, 107)
he could see it now in the pedlar's box. (Eliot, Silas Marner, 114)
2.1.2. Embeddable Evaluative or Subjective Elements
The embeddable lexical items which are interpreted with reference to the SELF
and which in represented speech and thought may be attributable to a non-first
person may also be so attributed in representations of perceptions. These items
include deictics, evaluative adjectives like poor and fucking and kinship terms
like papa and comrade discussed in Banfield (1973) as well as the nouns Milner
68
ANN BANFIELD
(1978) calls "les noms de qualite." The sentences of represented perception in (7)
contain such items, which are italicized.
(7) Sara got up and went to the window. A crowd had gathered outside the public
house. A man was being thrown out. There he came, staggering. (Woolf, The
Years, 203)
This time she managed to re-fasten her veil.
The doctor came - a fat country practitioner, pleasant and kind. (D.H.
Lawrence, "England, My England," 318)
Poor Joyce, stretched out on a bed in the big closed motor-car - the mother
sitting by her head, the grandfather in his short grey beard and a bowler hat,
sitting by her feet, thick, and implacable in his responsibility - they rolled away
from Crockham, and from Egbert, who stood there bareheaded and a little
ignominious, left behind. (ibid.: 321)
Ce pauvre diable d'ouvrier,perdu sur les routes, l'interressait.
She stood in the Square of the Annunziata and saw in the living terra-cotta those
divine babies whom no cheap reproduction can ever stale. (E.M. Forster, A
Room with a View, 23)
It might, indeed. For at that moment Father turned towards her and said,
half-apologetically, stuffing the purse back, "I gave him a shilling." (Katherine
Mansfield, "Six Years After," 345)
Les camarades le regardaient, remues, ayant quelque part en eux l'6cho de ce
qu'il leur disait, cette ob6issance du soldat, la fraternit6 et la resignation dans le
danger.
As in the case of the cotemporality of PAST and NOW, the presence of such
lexical items or constructions mark the sentence as a representation of
consciousness.
2.2. The Syntactic Differences Between the Two Levels of Consciousness
There are, however, constructions which cannot occur in a representation of
consciousness without forcing it to be interpreted as reflective consciousness. A
sentence representing consciousness which lacks these constructions may be
but the
consciousness,
ambiguous between reflective and non-reflective
is only
it
and
the
constructions
sentence,
of
these
disambiguates
presence
consciousness.
it
as
reflective
to
understand
possible
2.2.1. Exclamations and other Non-Embeddable Expressive Constructions
The first such constructions are those generated leftmost under E in Banfield
(1973); only represented thought allows exclamations, for instance. (8a) can only
be read as reflective consciousness, while (8b) can be either reflective or
non-reflective.
(8) a. Quelques gouttes de pluie tombaient maintenant.
A few drops of rain were now falling.
b. Oui, quelques gouttes de pluie tombaient maintenant!
Yes, a few drops of rain were now falling!
2.2.2. Direct Questions
Similarly, a direct question where the PAST is cotemporal with NOW is only
69
(9) a. She was sitting there on that quiet steamer beside Father and at the same time
she was hushing and holding a little slender boy.
The air was now heavy with the fragrance of pittosporum.
Ils empechaient ces enrages-la de s'embrocher.
Cet 6cervele de Paul etait en train de la cacher.
b. How was it possible that she was sitting there on that quiet steamer beside
Father and at the same time she was hushing and holding a little slender boy so pale - who had just waked out of a dreadful dream? (K. Mansfield, "Six
Years After," 347)
Was the air heavy with the fragrance of pittosporum, or was it jasmine? She
could not decide which.
Et comment empecher ces enrages-la de s'embrocher eux-memes?
(Germinal, 407)
Ou diable cet 6cervele de Paul avait-il bien pu la fourrer? (ibid.: 327)
To ask oneself a question is to bring the content of the question to the level of
reflection; this observation, recorded in both Russell and Sartre, is reflected in
our interpretation of interrogative sentences.
2.2.3. Parentheticals
Thirdly, when a parenthetical is added to a sentence interpretable as the
representation of a perception, it has the same affect as the addition of an
exclamation: the sentence must be read as represented thought, i.e., as reflective
consciousness. The sentences in (10) without the parentheticals are ambiguous
between reflective and non-reflective consciousness; with the parentheticals,
they can only be read as represented thought.
(10) A few drops of rain were falling, she realized.
Des fiacres passaient, elle se souvint.
The whole of life did not consist in going to bed with a woman, he thought,
returning to Scott and Balzac, to the Enlightenment and the French novel.
(Woolf, To the Lighthouse, 139)
The crucial role the parenthetical plays in establishing a sentence representing
consciousness
as represented thought, i.e., as reflective consciousness,
is
recognized by Pascal in the passage already cited, for he notes that sentences of
what we are calling "non-reflective consciousness" "could not be
prefaced by
'she said,' 'she thought,' etc." (1977: 107)
The difference the presence of the parenthetical plays is most apparent when
the parenthetical verb is a perception verb. (Only see and feel can
appear.)
Perception verbs can only metaphorically imply reflective consciousness; when
they occur in parentheticals, they must have this metaphoric meaning.
(11) A few drops of rain were falling, she saw.
The wind was cold, she felt.
"It was raining, she saw," means not that she saw it raining, but that she
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ANN BANFIELD
discovered or realized that it was raining. Thus, in (12) saw represents her
reflections.
(12) Paul could choose the lesser in place of the higher he saw (Lawrence, Sons and
Lovers, 244).
2.2.4. Parenthetical Verbs of Reflective Consciousness
Fourthly, the class of those verbs of consciousness which may appear in
parentheticals seems to coincide with few exceptions with the class of verbs
which imply reflective consciousness. We saw in the last section that verbs of
perception may appear in parentheticals only if they have a figurative,
"reflective" meaning. Verbs representing other non-reflective mental states like
feelings or emotions and sensations are also barred from parentheticals:
(13) ?It hurt on her left side, she felt.=
She felt that it hurt on her left side. #
She felt the pain on her left side.
*The perfume of the iris was heavy, she smelt.
*They would arrive at six, he heard. (Only acceptable with the parenthetical
interpreted as part of the speech represented, i.e., as an equivalent of the
discourse parenthetical "I hear.")
*Oh what a beautiful morning, she liked.
*The flowers were perfect, he loved.
The eggs would break, he was *anxious/sure
The play would be a hit, the director was certain/convinced.
*eager/glad/sad/happy/aware.
*irritated/uncertain/confused.
An interesting case can be seen in the following contrast:
(14) The cake was still in the oven, he remembered.
l *forgot.
L?hadforgotten.
It is difficult to say whether forgetting is a conscious state or the absence of one;
but if it is a conscious state, it is certainly non-reflective.
2.2.5. Noun Phrases Referring to the SELF
Finally, noun phrases referring to the SELF behave differently in representaand in represented
tions of perceptions
thought. In the sentence of
NP
to
the
SELF must be a pronoun; in
referring
represented thought, any
of
conscious states in
of
non-reflective
perceptions (and
representations
as long as the
NP
to
the
refer
SELF,
may
general), any appropriate
to the
information
unknown
not
or
does
present
description
appellation
SELF. This restriction on represented thought is pointed out in Reinhart
(1975): for what she calls "parenthetical subject oriented sentences contain(i.e., represented
speech and thought), backwards
ing parentheticals"
anaphora is obligatory (p. 138). She gives the examples in (15) and (16),
which contrast with the discourse parenthetical in (17).
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ANN BANFIELD
may not appear in the clause which is interpreted reflectively: "when she
wanted to [...] laugh at nothing - at nothing, simply" (the repetition at the
end is non-embeddable). Such is not the case for the proper noun used for
the addressee/hearer, as in (18a and b): "unless Lucy would at all like to go out?"
(18a and b) are, of course, representations of speech. It might be
considered surprising that speech can be represented as non-reflective
consciousness, since we have already seen that speech implies reflection.
Sentences like (18a and b) have the consistent structure of non-reflective
consciousness in never allowing the expressive elements generated in the
leftmost position directly under E or parentheticals to appear with the
proper noun for the SELF or ADDRESSEE/HEARER. If such elements
are inserted, it becomes difficult to read "Miss Bartlett" as the SELF (i.e.,
the represented speaker):
(19) Yes, Miss Bartlett was, after all, a wee bit tired.
*Miss Bartlett, was a wee bit tired, she said (cf. with 16).
(The direct question, however, may appear with a nominal
ADDRESSEE/HEARER, as in 18b.)
What the appearance of sentences like (18a and b) shows is that the
notion of non-reflective consciousness is, finally, a syntactic one and suggests
that future research should explore its syntactic relation to sentences of pure
narration, instead of seeing its significance exhausted by the semantic
distinction between reflection and non-reflection.
The data presented here thus suggest a distinction between a reflective
and a non-reflective SELF. A pronoun is coreferential with the reflective
SELF, while a proper noun (or pronoun) may refer to the non-reflective
SELF. 1E/1 SELF applies to both, and thus assigns sentences of nonreflective consciousness a point of view. Furthermore, in a passage
representing consciousness, a reflective and a non-reflective SELF may be
coreferential. Only the reflective SELF is restricted to a pronoun realization,
and the SPEAKER is always a reflective SELF.
It is significant that the NP referring to the non-reflective SELF is limited,
however, to a proper noun. Descriptive noun phrases like "the grizzled old
veteran," "the old tarpaulin," "that much injured but on the whole
even-tempered person" or "the quaker librarian" cannot refer to the SELF
in a sentence of non-reflective consciousness. It is even questionable whether
such descriptive noun phrases may occur as the subject of parentheticals
accompanying represented speech or thought. The examples given above all
occur in parentheticals accompanying direct speech: "the grizzled old
veteran interrogated" (Ulysses, 625), "the old tarpaulin corroborated" (625),
"that much injured but on the whole even-tempered person declared" (627),
and "the quaker librarian asked" (207). The proper name is the name the
SELF knows himself by, as opposed to such descriptive phrases. The
principle governing this seems to be that the relation between the SELF and
an NP in non-reflective consciousness is not one of anaphora, but rather that
REFLECTIVEAND NON-REFLECTIVE
CONSCIOUSNESS
73
ANN BANFIELD
74
consciousness
represented
Le style indirect libre a pour effet d'etendre son action en dehors de l'enonce
des paroles ou des pensees, sur le verbe introducteur lui-meme; par une sorte de
construction ad sensum, ce verbe est attir6 par les verbes de l'6nonce et se met
au meme temps qu'eux. Le cas le plus clair de cette attraction est celui oi le
verbe est en incidente. Une phrase telle que: L'claireur acheva son rapport:
L'ennemi, dit-il, en terminant, sera l& dans deux heures ne donne lieu a aucune
remarque avec son style direct pur; notre expose du style indirect libre explique
egalement cette variante: ... L'ennemi, dit-il, serait la dans deux heures. Mais
comment juger celle-ci: ... L'ennemi, disait-il, serait la dans deux heures!
L'imparfait du verbe declaratif disait-il, ne s'explique, selon moi, que par
I'attraction decrite plus haut; englobe dans le texte du rapport, il en adopte la
syntaxe (1912: 599).
thought,
REFLECTIVEAND NON-REFLECTIVE
CONSCIOUSNESS
75
76
ANN BANFIELD
REFERENCES
BALLY, CHARLES, 1912. "Le style indirect libre en franqais moderne I et II," Germanisch-