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Case3:15-cv-01169 Document1 Filed03/12/15 Page1 of 15

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MICHAEL S. DANKO (SBN 111359)
mdanko@dankolaw.com
CLAIRE Y. CHOO (SBN 252723)
cchoo@dankolaw.com
DANKO MEREDITH
333 Twin Dolphin Drive, Suite 145
Redwood Shores, CA 94065
Telephone: (650) 453-3600
Facsimile: (650) 394-8672
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
LINDA ANDREINI, EDWARD J. ANDREINI,
and MARIO ANDREINI

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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LINDA ANDREINI, EDWARD J.
ANDREINI, and MARIO ANDREINI,
individually and as successors-in-interest to
EDWARD A. ANDREINI, Deceased,

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Plaintiffs,
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Case No. 15-cv-01169
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
(Fed. Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. § 2671 et
seq.) and Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983))

vs.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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Defendant.
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Plaintiffs Linda Andreini, Edward J. Andreini, and Mario Andreini, individually and as

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successors-in-interest to Edward A. Andreini, deceased, by and through their counsel, and for

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their Complaint against defendant United States of America, allege as follows:
INTRODUCTION

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1.

This action arises from the acts and omissions of the defendant’s agency, the

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United States Air Force, 60th Air Mobility Wing at Travis Air Force Base. The Air Force’s

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acts and omissions resulted in the death of plaintiffs’ decedent, Edward A. Andreini. Plaintiffs

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bring this action against defendant United States of America under the Federal Tort Claims

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Act, (28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq.), and the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. § 1983).
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COMPLAINT

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2.

The Air Force promoted and produced an open house and air show at Travis Air

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Force Base, called “Thunder Over Solano,” on May 3, 2014 through May 4, 2014. To attract

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civilian stunt pilots to perform at its air show, the Air Force represented to prospective

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performers that it would ensure their safety by, among other things, providing effective,

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appropriate, and reasonable aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF) services in the event a pilot

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experienced a mishap in the course of his routine.

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3.

Regulations, directives, and orders designed to ensure effective ARFF response

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to air show accidents required the Air Force to pre-position its ARFF equipment and personnel

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in front of the show’s crowd line and near show center—the spot where an accident is most

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likely to occur during an air show. Further, regulations and orders required the Air Force to pre-

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position additional ARFF teams around the airfield such that a team could reach a crash on any

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operational runway, regardless of its location, within three minutes of the accident.

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4.

The Air Force failed to comply with the requirements set forth above and thus

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failed to provide a timely or effective ARFF response at the Thunder Over Solano air show.

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For example, instead of pre-positioning teams to allow them immediate access to show center,

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the Air Force positioned the ARFF teams either behind the crowd line or, alternatively, more

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than one mile away from show center. Further, the Air Force failed to position ARFF teams so

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as to ensure a team could reach performers anywhere on the runway within three minutes of a

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crash. Indeed, ARFF teams were not even able to reach crashes at show center within that time

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frame.

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5.

On May 4, 2014, while performing at the Thunder Over Solano air show,

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Edward Andreini impacted the runway during an “inverted ribbon-cut” maneuver. The aircraft

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slid upside down on the runway and came to a stop. Mr. Andreini broadcast over his aircraft

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radio that he was uninjured but was trapped in the wreckage and needed immediate rescue. The

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aircraft caught on fire. The Air Force ARFF dispatcher ordered ARFF trucks to respond

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immediately, and the show announcer ordered all non-ARFF personnel to refrain from

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rendering aid and to instead “let the [ARFF teams] do their job.” But the ARFF teams did not

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do their job. As the crowd, other performers, crew members, and various Air Force personnel
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COMPLAINT

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watched and waited for an ARFF team to arrive, Mr. Andreini struggled, alone, to extricate

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himself from the wreckage.

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6.

Due to the Air Force’s failure to comply with the applicable regulations,

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directives, standards, and orders, no ARFF team arrived in time to effectively respond to Mr.

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Andreini’s mishap. Indeed, by the time the first ARFF truck arrived, nearly 5 minutes had

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elapsed. By then, it was too late. Mr. Andreini needlessly died of extensive thermal injuries.

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Had the Air Force provided effective and reasonably prompt firefighting and rescue service as

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required by applicable regulations, standards, directives, and orders, appropriate ARFF

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equipment would have reached Mr. Andreini within three minutes and Mr. Andreini would not

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have perished.

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THE PARTIES
7.

Plaintiff Linda Andreini is decedent Edward A. Andreini’s surviving spouse,

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heir, and the successor-in-interest to his estate. Linda Andreini is a resident of Half Moon Bay

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in San Mateo County, California.

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8.

Plaintiffs Edward J. Andreini and Mario Andreini are decedent Edward A.

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Andreini’s surviving issue, heirs, and successors-in-interest to decedent Edward A. Andreini’s

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estate. Edward J. Andreini and Mario Andreini are residents of Half Moon Bay in San Mateo

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County, California.

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9.

Defendant United States of America, through its agency, the United States Air

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Force, 60th Mobility Wing at Travis Air Force Base is located in Fairfield, California.

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Defendant United States of America, including its directors, officers, operators, administrators,

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employees, agents, and staff at the United States Air Force Base, 60th Air Mobility Wing are

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throughout this complaint collectively referred to as “the Air Force.”

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10.

At all times relevant to this Complaint, the directors, officers, operators,

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administrators, employees, agents and staff were employed by and/or acting on behalf of

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defendant.

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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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This action is brought pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671
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COMPLAINT

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et seq. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) which

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states that this Court “shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the

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United States . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the

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negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within

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the scope of his office or employment.”

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12.

This action also raises federal questions under the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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This Court is the proper venue because plaintiffs reside in this district. An action

against the United States may be brought in the judicial district in which the plaintiffs reside.
28 U.S.C. § 1402(b).
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This action should be assigned to the San Francisco/Oakland division of this

Court because plaintiffs reside in San Mateo County.
15.

On or about July 16, 2014, Plaintiffs submitted an administrative claim for the

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claim set forth below to the United States Air Force, 60th Air Mobility Wing at Travis Air

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Force Base. As of the date of the filing of this complaint, plaintiffs have not received a final

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disposition of the claim. It has been more than six months after the claim was submitted to the

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Air Force. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), the failure of the Air Force to make a final disposition is

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deemed a final denial of the claim. Thus, plaintiffs have exhausted their administrative

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remedies.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS AND CLAIMS

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ARFF Rules and Requirements

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16.

The Air Force began planning for the Travis AFB Open House “Thunder Over

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Solano,” in November 2013. As part of its preparation, the Air Force sent Lt. Col. Eric Weber

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and another representative to the International Council of Air Shows (ICAS) annual tradeshow

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in Las Vegas.

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Lt. Col. Weber returned from the ICAS tradeshow with a manual entitled Air

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Shows 101: Air/Ground Operations Training. The manual addressed the importance of pre-

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positioning ARFF equipment, stating that “[t]he primary purpose of your ARFF personnel and
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COMPLAINT

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equipment is to rapidly and effectively respond to an aircraft emergency at your air show, to

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keep your performers and public safe. . . . This requires your ARFF team to be properly

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prepared, and positioned accordingly to respond immediately upon notification.” (Emphasis

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added.)

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The Air Shows 101 manual further advised that “[t] hose [ARFF responders]

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assigned to support flight operations and respond to incidents in front of the crowd line should

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have unrestricted access to the aerobatic box.” (The aerobatic box is the area within which

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performing aircraft fly their routines.)

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19.

Consistent with the guidance set forth in the Air Shows 101 manual, the Air

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Force’s own directives require that it pre-position its emergency vehicles so “as not to be

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trapped behind the crowd control lines.” (Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-1004, Conducting Air

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Force Open Houses.)

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Similarly, the Air Force’s Thunderbirds manual requires the Air Force to

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position ARFF personnel within the “aerobatic box” and outside the crowd line so that rescuers

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have immediate access to the show line. The 60th Air Mobility Wing specifically agreed to

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comply with that directive with regard to Mr. Andreini’s performance when it scheduled the

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Thunderbirds (the Air Force aerial demonstration team) to perform later in the day. (DD Form

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2535, “Request for Military Aerial Support.”)

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21.

Air Force directives make plain that proper pre-positioning of ARFF equipment

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and personnel is critical for a timely response to any aircraft rescue and firefighting emergency.

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For example, the Department of Defense incorporates within its own regulations, instructions,

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and directives the codes and standards advanced by the National Fire Protection Association

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(NFPA), a trade association that promulgates standards and codes for firefighting and rescue

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response. See Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 6055.06, Fire and Emergency

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Services (F&ES) Program (December 21, 2006.) Those standards provide that “[t]he response

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time of the first responding ARFF vehicle to reach any point on the operational runway and

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begin agent application shall be within 3 minutes of the time of the alarm.” (National Fire

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Protection Association. (2014) NFPA 403: Standards for Aircraft Rescue and Fire-fighting
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Services at Airports, § 9.1.3.1, emphasis added.)
22.

ARFF must reach any aircraft in three minutes or less after impact because:

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The survivable atmosphere inside an aircraft fuselage involved in

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an exterior fuel fire is limited to approximately 3 minutes if the

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integrity of the airframe is maintained during the impact. . . . When

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the aluminum skin is directly exposed to flame, burnthrough will

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occur within 60 seconds or less, while the windows and insulation

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may withstand penetration for up to 3 minutes. Because of this

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serious life hazard to occupants, rapid fire control is critical.

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Therefore, whenever flight operations are in progress, ARFF

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vehicles and personnel should be located so that optimum response

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and fire control can be achieved within this time frame. [¶] Any

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delay in response time is critical.

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NPFA 402: Guide for Aircraft Rescue and Fire-fighting Operations, §§ 6.1.1-6.1.2.
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The Coalition for Airport and Airplane Passenger Safety states that “[w]hatever

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the role of ARFF personnel at an aviation accident, there is ample evidence to verify that they

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must arrive at the accident scene in less than three minutes if they are to save lives.” (Surviving

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the Crash: The Need to Improve Lifesaving Measures at Our Nation’s Airports, Coalition for

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Airport and Airplane Passenger Safety (1999), 15, emphasis added.) There is nearly universal

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agreement on the critical 3-minute response requirement.

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In fact, even if the 3-minute response is sufficient for standard operations, it may

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be insufficient for an air show that involves aerobatic flying. The International Council of Air

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Shows states:

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[Air] shows provide an environment that can be best described as

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non-standard. While a firehouse may be built in a location to

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provide an appropriate response during standard operations, Air

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Show Layout Plans may (and usually do) require ARFF Equipment

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to be pre-positioned to provide unrestricted access to the aerobatic
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box.

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Air Shows 101, supra, at 3. Thus, to meet the minimum 3-minute requirement, the Air Force

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must pre-position it resources for an air show. “Fire stations should be located to allow rapid

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direct access to operational runway(s) so that maximum acceleration rate and top speed of the

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vehicles can be utilized to enable them to reach any point on the runway(s).” NFPA 402,

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supra, at § 6.1.3-6.1.4, emphasis added.

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Thunder Over Solano
25.

The Air Force requested Edward A. Andreini, a Hall of Fame aerobatic pilot

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with over 60 years of flying experience, to perform a routine, including an inverted ribbon cut

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maneuver, at the “Thunder Over Solano” Open House and Airshow at Travis AFB on May 3

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and May 4, 2014. The Air Force agreed to provide for the benefit of Andreini and other

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performers appropriate and effective emergency services in the event of a mishap.

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26.

During the Air Force’s pre-show safety briefing, one performer raised concerns

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about the ARFF truck’s proximity to show center. The Air Force assured the performers that

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the emergency response team had everything managed, and that if a response was needed it

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would be swift as the Air Force would position fast response vehicles nearby. The Air Force

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told performers that in the event of an emergency, they should not seek to render aid to a fellow

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performer: “Don’t do it yourself; let the [Travis] fire department do their job.”

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27.

During the briefing, performers also raised their concerns about an incident at an

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air show at Barksdale Air Force Base. In that case, the ARFF response to an aircraft fire was

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delayed because ARFF personnel were not wearing their protective gear during the airshow and

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thus were not ready to respond immediately upon receiving an alarm. As a result, while the

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ARFF personnel got dressed, a performer felt he had no alternative but to—and did—

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extinguish the fire himself. On behalf of the performers, the civilian Air Boss specifically

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asked the representative of the Travis AFB fire and rescue team whether such would be an

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issue at this air show. The Travis AFB representative assured the Air Boss and the performers

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that the Air Force had nearly 60 trained people who were prepared for any situation that may

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come up at the air show and that the mistakes made at Barksdale would not be repeated.
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COMPLAINT

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28.

On Sunday, May 4, 2014, Edward Andreini was piloting his Boeing E75

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Stearman at the air show. Per the Air Force’s request, Andreini was to perform a “ribbon-cut”

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maneuver, which required the pilot to invert the plane, fly low over the runway and use the

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aircraft’s tail to cut a ribbon stretched between two poles located on the runway at show center.

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As it approached the ribbon at low altitude, for reasons unknown, Mr. Andreini’s aircraft

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descended several feet and impacted the runway. The aircraft slid inverted on the runway and

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came to a stop near show center. Approximately 10 seconds passed from time of impact to

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when the aircraft came to rest.

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The engine on the plane was still running and Mr. Andreini broadcast over the

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aircraft radio, “I am okay but I can’t get out.” Mr. Andreini shut down the engine and the white

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smoke system on the plane was stopped.

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30.

Shortly after coming to rest, Mr. Andreini called over the radio, “I’m on fire –

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get me out!” One of Mr. Andreini’s crew members called for fire and rescue on his handheld

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radio. Mr. Andreini yelled from his aircraft, “I can’t get out….I can’t get out!” Mr. Andreini’s

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crewmember again called for fire and rescue, “Get out here now!” The emergency dispatcher

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ordered ARFF trucks to roll immediately. Black smoke started to rise from the aircraft as a

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small fire started under the engine cowling. At this point, approximately 30 seconds had

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elapsed since impact.

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31.

Crucial seconds and minutes passed. The air show announcer warned all to stay

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back, not render aid, and “let the [emergency responders] do their job.” Approximately two

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minutes after impact, an airport maintenance crew member driving his pick-up truck

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disregarded the warning and slowly approached Mr. Andreini’s aircraft. As he approached, the

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maintenance crew member could see that Mr. Andreini was still trapped in his cockpit and

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struggling to get out.

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32.

The crew member took a small fire extinguisher out of the bed of the truck. One

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of Mr. Andreini’s own crew members grabbed the small fire extinguisher from the maintenance

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crew member and, with no ARFF trucks in sight, attempted to put the fire out himself. His

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efforts had little effect. Approximately 2 minutes and 30 seconds had passed since the moment
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of impact. Still, no ARFF vehicle had arrived.

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33.

Finally, approximately 4 minutes and 30 seconds after the aircraft impacted the

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runway, the first fire fighting vehicle, the “P-245”, arrived at the aircraft. This vehicle,

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however, did not meet the applicable extinguishing agent standards and was thus considered to

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be one of the “extra” trucks, not a qualifying ARFF vehicle. Because the truck did not have the

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appropriate extinguishing agent on board, it too had little or no effect on the fire.

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34.

The next vehicle, “CRASH-10” (also referred to as the “P-23”), arrived more

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than 35 seconds later—about 5 minutes and 5 seconds after the impact. CRASH-10 had the

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appropriate extinguishing agent on board. But by then, it was too late. Mr. Andreini was dead.

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The coroner’s autopsy report showed that the crash had caused Mr. Andreini no blunt force

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trauma. Otherwise uninjured, the cause of Mr. Andreini’s death was extensive thermal injuries.

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35.

Despite the Air Force’s knowledge that it was to pre-position its ARFF trucks so

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that they would arrive at the scene of a crash anywhere on the field within three minutes or less,

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no ARFF equipment or personnel arrived at show center until well after that window had

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closed.

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extinguishing agent requirements and, in any event, did not arrive until more than 4 minutes

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and 30 seconds after impact. The second arriving ARFF vehicle arrived 35 seconds later, in

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violation of DoDI 6055.06 which requires that, regardless of how long it takes the first ARFF

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vehicle to reach the crash site, additional units must arrive in intervals not exceeding 30

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seconds.

The first vehicle, the P-245, was not suitable as it did not meet the Air Force’s own

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Why ARFF Failed to Arrive
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The Air Force was required to pre-position its ARFF vehicles so that they have

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immediate access to the runways. It failed to comply with that requirement. Instead, it

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positioned the closest ARFF station from which trucks could respond to show center 1.3 miles

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away. There was a closer fire station—the “primary” crash response unit—but the Air Force

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had improperly positioned that station behind the crowd line and thus, the ARFF team’s route

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to the runway was blocked by spectators, rendering the station of no use to the performers.

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37.

Furthermore, the Air Force improperly imposed on the ARFF vehicles various
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and conflicting speed limits which essentially assured that, given their distances from show

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center, a timely and effective response to show center would be virtually impossible. For

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example, though some of the ARFF vehicles are capable of speeds in excess 65 mph, Travis

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imposed on all responding vehicles using the taxiways a speed limit of 25 mph. This is in

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conflict with the NFPA’s standard, adopted by the Air Force, that ARFF vehicles be placed so

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that maximum acceleration rate and top speed of the vehicles can be utilized. NPFA 402,

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supra, at § 6.1.4.

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38.

Further reasons ARFF personnel failed to respond to the accident at show center

in a timely fashion were that (1) the Air Force’s ARFF personnel were not “ready to go” and
(2) communications were muddled, confused, and delayed.
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The ICAS training documents state:

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Even when your ARFF team is positioned perfectly, if they are not

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ready to roll immediately they may as well be back in the air

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conditioned fire house. The team chosen to operate in front of the

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crowd line must realize that they are continuously ready to roll

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from the moment they report in position until they return to the

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firehouse at the end of the show. This means that they are suited

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up, equipment at the ready, vehicles running and ready to “roll”

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immediately. No lawn chairs, no cookouts and absolutely no

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family members in or on the trucks. Those few seconds could be

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the difference between life and death.”

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Air Shows 101, supra, at p. 3, emphasis added.
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Unfortunately, ARFF crew members were not in a state of readiness, and were

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not in their protective gear. Instead, they “were across the field taking pictures of aircraft.”

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Further, only one crew member at the fire station had the necessary equipment to communicate

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by radio, and there was no PA system at the fire station to simultaneously and effectively alert

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all the ARFF crew members of the need to respond. Thus, after the alarm was sounded, the sole

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crew member with a radio had to find and gather together the other picture-taking crew
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members before they could respond to Mr. Andreini’s emergency. Even then, according to one

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Air Force witness, “[d]ue to . . . the standby posture of the [ARFF] personnel there were several

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minutes of apparent inactivity as crews dressed in their bunkers and rolled their vehicles to the

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scene.”

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CLAIM I - Wrongful Death Based on Negligence and/or Gross Negligence
41.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference as though fully stated herein all of the

foregoing paragraphs.
42.

The Air Force, acting by and through its various departments, agencies and/or

divisions, was responsible for providing aircraft rescue and firefighting services for the Travis
Air Force Base at the Open House on May 4, 2014.
43.

At all relevant times mentioned above, all of the individuals responsible for the

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planning of the open house, including but not limited to the positioning, staffing, and

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supervision of aircraft rescue and firefighting vehicles and crew members, and all of the

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individuals were responsible for responding to the aircraft fire which caused Mr. Andreini’s

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death, were employees of the Air Force.

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44.

The Air Force had a duty to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and to avoid

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injury to Mr. Andreini, to provide rescue services in a safe and reasonable manner, and to

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otherwise coordinate response efforts in a proper, safe, careful and reasonable manner.

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45.

The Air Force breached its duty of care to Mr. Andreini and acted with

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deliberate indifference to known and obvious dangers, with a lack of due or proper care and/or

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with an extreme departure from what a reasonably careful person would do in the same

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situation to prevent harm to oneself or to others, through, inter alia, the following acts and

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omissions, which are set forth in greater detail above:

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a. Failing to pre-position the ARFF vehicles and crewmembers within the
aerobatic box to reduce response time;
b. Failing to use appropriate extinguishing agents as required by standards, codes,
guidelines, and regulations;
c. Failing to have ARFF crew members dressed and ready to respond to any
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emergencies;

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d. Failing to coordinate response efforts in a proper, safe, careful and reasonable

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manner; and

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e. Failing to respond to the aircraft fire within 3 minutes as required by the NFPA,

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federal aviation regulations, and other standards, codes, guidelines, and

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regulations; and

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f. Failing to implement appropriate and federally mandated procedures to prevent

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injury and death during aircraft emergencies.
46.

As a direct and proximate result of the negligence, carelessness, gross

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negligence, recklessness, deliberate indifference to known and obvious dangers, and/or other

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wrongful acts and/or omissions of the Air Force, Edward A. Andreini suffered massive

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incineration and death.

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47.

As a result of Edward A. Andreini’s death, plaintiffs sustained pecuniary and

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non-pecuniary losses, including without limitation, grief, loss of society, loss of support,

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services, care, comfort, affection, moral support, solace, and other losses for which recovery is

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authorized under applicable law.

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CLAIM II - Violation of Constitutional and Federally Protected Rights and Wrongful

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Death as Authorized Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

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48.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference as though fully stated herein all of the

foregoing paragraphs.
49.

As a result of the acts set forth herein, plaintiffs and Edward A. Andreini were

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subjected to deprivation of rights by the Air Force, which rights include, but are not limited to,

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privileges and immunities secured to plaintiffs and Edward A. Andreini by the Constitution and

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laws of the United States. By reason of such acts, the Air Force has violated the constitutional

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rights and liberty interests of plaintiffs and Edward A. Andreini, which are protected under,

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among other things, the 14th Amendment’s prohibition against depriving a person of life and

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family relationships without due process of law.

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50.

At all relevant times, the Air Force and the individuals responsible for aircraft
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rescue and firefighting were acting under the color of law and of statutes, or ordinances,

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regulations, customs, and usages of the law of the United States.

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51.

At all relevant times, the Air Force was responsible for, inter alia, emergency

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rescue services for Travis AFB and required to provide such services in the event of an aircraft

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incident.

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52.

At all relevant times mentioned above, the Air Force owed Edward A. Andreini

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and plaintiffs a duty to, inter alia, exercise reasonable and ordinary care and to avoid injury to

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Edward A. Andreini, to provide rescue services in a safe and reasonable manner, and to

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otherwise coordinate response efforts in a proper, safe, careful and reasonable manner.

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53.

The Air Force breached its duty of care to Edward A. Andreini and plaintiffs

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and acted recklessly and/or with callous or deliberate indifference to known and obvious

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dangers, with a lack of due or proper care and/or with an extreme departure from what a

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reasonably careful person would do in the same situation to prevent harm to oneself or to

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others, through, inter alia, the following acts and omissions, which are set forth in greater detail

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above:

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g. Failing to pre-position the ARFF vehicles and crewmembers within the
aerobatic box to reduce response time;
h. Failing to use appropriate extinguishing agents as required by standards, codes,
guidelines, and regulations;
i. Failing to have ARFF crew members dressed and ready to respond to any
emergencies;
j. Failing to coordinate response efforts in a proper, safe, careful and reasonable
manner;
k. Failing to respond to the aircraft fire within 3 minutes as required by the NFPA,

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federal aviation regulations, and other standards, codes, guidelines, and

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regulations; and

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l. Failing to implement appropriate and federally mandated procedures to prevent
injury and death during aircraft emergencies.
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COMPLAINT

Case3:15-cv-01169 Document1 Filed03/12/15 Page14 of 15

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54.

At all times herein mentioned, the Air Force knew, or should have known of the

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obvious dangers, was deliberately indifferent to them, ignored them, and failed to provide

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rescue services for Edward A. Andreini.

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55.

The conduct of the Air Force was so egregious and outrageous and contrary to

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the right to life implicit in ordered liberty and common decency so as to shock the conscious of

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the community.

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56.

As a direct result of the Air Force’s deliberate indifference and conduct,

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Edward A. Andreini was deprived of the necessary rescue, medical intervention, care and

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treatment, was essentially abandoned in the aircraft fire, and suffered serious injuries and death,

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and as a result of the injury, pain, and suffering Edward A. Andreini suffered prior to his death,

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plaintiffs claim damages for loss of life and pain and suffering prior to Edward A. Andreini’s

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death as a survival action.

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57.

As a result of the foregoing violations which caused and/or contributed to the

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death of Edward A. Andreini, plaintiffs sustained pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses,

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including, without limitation, grief, loss of support, services, care, comfort, affection, moral

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support, solace and other losses for which recovery is authorized under applicable law.

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58.

As a further direct result of Edward A. Andreini’s death, plaintiffs incurred

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expenses for funeral, burial, attorney’s fees and seek recovery for all damages authorized by

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law in an amount to be determined at trial.

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

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WHEREFORE, plaintiffs hereby pray relief against defendant as follows:

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A. For judgment in favor of plaintiffs against defendant on all claims as alleged in

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the Complaint;

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B. For compensatory and pecuniary damages in an amount to be ascertained at

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trial;

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C. For costs of suit incurred herein;

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D. For attorney’s fees to the extent authorized by law; and

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///
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COMPLAINT

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E. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

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Dated: March 12, 2015

Respectfully submitted,
DANKO MEREDITH

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By:

/s/ Michael S. Danko
________________________
MICHAEL S. DANKO
CLAIRE Y. CHOO
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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COMPLAINT