Professional Documents
Culture Documents
By
Sam Katz
For decades, Philadelphias public school system has confronted a massive resource
Services, programs, staffing and educational supports afforded students in wealthier
school districts have often not been available to students who attend Philadelphia public
schools. SRC Commissioner Bill Green recently observed, "the fundamental problem with
the district is that we cant get anyone to invest in us, because we cant get anyone to
believe that if they give us the money, we will be successful. That seems to be the number
one impediment to resources. From my perspective, this assessment is absolutely correct.
gap.1
Surely, money isnt the only thing that matters in preparing kids to become critical
thinkers, capable of competing for jobs and living self-sufficient lives and building a
foundation for good citizenship. But if money didnt matter, would the parents in Lower
Merion, Council Rock and Radnor be spending so much more of it to educate their children?
This proposal argues for modifying tax policy and using publicly owned
assets to narrow the resource gap in public education. It recognizes the critical
role in resource acquisition of corporate and foundation philanthropy. And it
argues for changing our long held practice of depending on the State to solve
this issue. Moreover, this approach says Philadelphia owns its schools, that
Philadelphias leadershippolitical, civic, clergy, labor, (notably the PFT who
are essential to the coalition that can make this plan happen) and business
has to evidence the will to exercise that ownership, and must finally accept that
closing the educational resource gap starts at home.
Since the 1960s, political leaders have argued that Harrisburg needs to do more. But
our experience has more often been disappointing even when the City has enjoyed
significant influence in State government, which it certainly does not today. Yes, Harrisburg
needs to do more. The fight for a funding formula that recognizes the poverty-wealth
1
Among
other
resources
that
address
the
data
on
this
point,
see:
(1)
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/Assets/2015/01/PhiladelphiaSchoolFundingReportJanuary2015.pdf?la=en;
(2)
http://www.openpagov.org/school-spending/sdefault.asp
;
(3)
http://thenotebook.org/summer-
2007/07106/school-spending-student-southeastern-pennsylvania;
and
(4)
http://www.gse.upenn.edu/pdf/school_funding_summary_findings_steinberg_quinn.pdf
disparity and for legislation that addresses the deficits created from student transfers to
charter schools are both critical intergovernmental issues. But I would argue our chances of
doing better improve dramatically only by demonstrating that closing the educational
resource gap is this citys top priority. We do more first! We show Harrisburg the money!
We evidence our commitment. We act like parents and take care of what our kids need.
I believe the place to start is with local tax policy and not tax rate
increases. The local tax base is the principal source of funding all government services of
which by far the single largest is public education.2 In response to the fact that our tax
system has a significant deterrent to job creation and economic growth, weve implemented
numerous breaks and transactional fixes to stimulate the citys economy. To address that,
policies to stimulate investment have been layered into the Citys tax regime. These multiple
tax policies and practices inadvertently contribute to the educational resource gap. Every tax
subsidy that drives one economic activity takes a bite out of revenue that would otherwise
flow to schools. We have always formed the policy question around jobs and development.
Now it is time we asked the question, can public education meet the needs of its students
with fewer resources so that other economic interests can accomplish more?
The second element of the strategy to address the school funding gap
should focus on the municipal pension crisis. A recent PICA staff report3 frames the
issue effectively. Philadelphias hugely underfunded municipal pension system (a $5 billion
unfunded liability in a pension system only 47% funded) is an enormous risk for employees,
retirees and taxpayers. It is also a major problem for closing the educational resource gap.
The financial and budgetary dots between the pension crisis and public education all
connect. Heres how.
The City treats that massive unfunded pension liability like mortgage
debt. The annual costs to pay off the debt approximate $464 million. There is
only one-way, long term, to address this crisis and that is to infuse the pension
system with capital. In doing so, lowering the appropriations to amortize unfunded
liabilities will enable the City to address both the pension crisis and school-funding gap,
simultaneously.
2
The
combined
City
and
School
District
budgets
for
FY15
total
in
excess
of
$7.1
billion.
The
School
District
will
spend
$2.6
billion
or
36.6%
of
that
total.
3
http://www.picapa.org/docs/OW/Philadelphia_Pension_System_012015.pdf
March 12, 2015
Page 2
And the third element is philanthropy and private investment. Not so long
ago a sizable level of community philanthropy was invested in public education. Rather, we
need to engage philanthropy and private capital in supporting public educational initiatives
beyond what is afforded by the Districts operating budget. 4 There was a time when public
schools had powerful and supportive allies in the private sector, both corporate and
philanthropic. The civic and business community was organized to help schools. Today,
although there are uncoordinated important initiatives5, one would be hard pressed to
identify a similar sense of broad community spirit that supports strengthening schools.
Public finance including additional taxes, on property, sales and cigarettes, has generated
important allies, but private financial support for public schools remains in a deficit
position.
Each of these strategies, modifying tax policy, addressing the pension crisis head on
and developing a private philanthropic investment plan, collectively could help Philadelphia
narrow the school resource gap. Once underway, our messaging to Harrisburg will entirely
change and should strengthen the prospects for more financial support from the
Commonwealth, as partner. The Wolf Administration has outlined a very ambitious
program to increase educational spending. Exactly how much incremental state funding will
materialize will be known once the FY16 Commonwealth budget is approved (presumably by
June 30th). The challenge has been and will continue to be persuading the General
Assembly.
If citizens and our elected leaders considered the following, Philadelphia could make
a significant dent in closing the educational funding gap.
Tax Policy. Can Philadelphias schools afford to forego tax revenues to enable
higher education and hospitals among other non-profit enterprises to remain tax-exempt for
real estate tax purposes? Is the trade-off in tax revenue to continue 100% 10-year tax
abatement sustainable for schools? Should we be examining other tax incentives that incent
4
In
the
late
1990s,
the
Annenberg
Foundation
initiated
Children
Achieving
that
provided
$50
million
to
the
School
District
of
Philadelphia.
This
project
met
with
less
than
robust
results.
I
am
not
making
an
argument
for
re-instituting
that
program;
only
that
there
was
such
a
significantly
resourced
private
initiative.
For
more
information
on
that
program
see:
http://www.annenbergfoundation.org/about/directors-
activities/annenberg-challenge/challenges-sites
5
For
examples
visit:
(1)
http://www.williampennfoundation.org/ClosingtheAchievementGap.aspx;
(2)
http://www.philaschoolpartnership.org/
;
(3)
The
Neubauer
Family
Foundation
is
funding
a
huge
project
to
provide
for
school
leader
development
for
all
three
sectors
of
schools
(will
be
called
Philadelphia
Leadership
Academy).
March 12, 2015
Page 3
private companies to locate to special zones or utilize other tax incented financing? Can tax
collection and enforcement practices be accelerated to drive more funding to education?
Can we continue to engage in a policy of transactional economic subsidy when one of the
clear impacts creates so much inequity for the school kids of our city?
What needs to change?
First, we need to change the policy of tax exemption for most non-profits.
Religious institutions, K-12 schools, social service agencies and others that address at risk
constituencies should continue to be exempt from real estate taxes. Obviously, this is
complicated but there are enough wise people to make it work. Whether we assess the value
of land and improvements so that eds and meds pay a rate that becomes a PILOT
(payment in lieu of tax) or follow the proposal made by Council President Clarke for a
partnership approach is a matter for study and debate. Boston, a city of 645,000, roughly
41% the size of Philadelphia, collected $25.9 million in PILOT payments (plus non-cash
community benefits) in FY2014.6 Philadelphia should have a target between $45-50
million annually in new tax revenue to flow from this source. It may be wise to step up to
these funding levels in a scaled manner.
Clearly, some important research has been
conducted in support of opposition to PILOTs 7. There is no argument that area hospitals
and universities add greatly to the citys vitality. But it is equally true that the population
that lives here creates the market and corresponding revenue streams for services supplied
by the area health care institutions. Similarly, the cultural life, infrastructure and
transportation services, diverse neighborhoods and communities make Philadelphia a
magnet for faculty, administrators, researchers, physicians and students of area universities
and medical centers. There are real costs to make a community great and real sacrifices that
also have to be made. It is time for current property tax exemption to be fixed.
Next, we need to re-examine the tax abatement, tax incentive districts
and opportunity zones, tax increment financing, and other site and project
specific mechanisms designed and implemented when Philadelphias economy
6
Boston
received
$25.9
million
in
PILOT
contributions
in
fiscal
year
2014,
a
71.0%
increase
over
what
was
previously
paid
under
the
prior
PILOT
program
in
fiscal
year
2011.
This
amount
represents
74.8%
of
the
$34.6
million
requested
PILOT
amount.
In
all,
49
private
institutions
from
the
educational,
medical,
and
cultural
sectors
were
identified
as
owning
tax-exempt
property
valued
in
excess
of
the
$15
million
threshold
established
in
the
PILOT
guidelines.
Note
that
neither
Harvard
nor
MIT
are
located
in
the
city
of
Boston.
http://www.cityofboston.gov/assessing/PILOTProgram.asp.
7
See
Econsult
Solutions
report,
The
City
of
Philadelphia
and
its
Higher
Eds:
Shared
Goals,
Shared
Missions,
Shared
Results
at
http://www.econsultsolutions.com/report/35740/
March 12, 2015
Page 4
was in the tank and there was a pressing need to address job loss and economic
decline. Most studies that have been done to explore the impacts of these tax incentives
have found them to be extremely important and effective. None of these studies have ever
evaluated the impact of these tax subsidies on public education resources. It is obvious that
if the question was asked from the perspective of public education funding, researchers
might have different answers regarding whether or not these incentive arrangements should
be implemented, what their structure might look like and how long they should remain in
place. For example the ten-year property tax abatement might be valuable to create
affordable and low-income housing outside of the gentrification zone. But within the
widening Philadelphia zone of gentrification, real estate is red hot. The studies that have
concluded the value of tax abatement seem to assign extremely high correlation between
abated taxes and development/investment decisions.8 Financially, the loss of these revenue
streams in the future matter to school finance. Over the past decade, property tax
abatements would have generated $44.2 million for the School District.9 Im not arguing for
the elimination of tax abatement or the other programs intended to incent re-location and
economic development but I am convinced that too much value is assigned to real estate
expansion and tax incentives. There may be good reasons to continue to use them
selectively. But these should be predicated on todays market conditions and should focus
on locations and construction sectors experiencing disinvestment. Far too often, tax policy
stays in force well beyond its useful life. So it is time that all of these practices come under
close scrutiny and that the mechanisms, terms and longevity be re-calibrated to current
market conditions and real needs.
This change in approach reflects a policy of investing in human capital as well as in
physical capital. Most experts argue that labor costs necessitate the abatement for new
construction. If we could finally address the relative competitiveness of our convention
center costs with labor, perhaps the time is right to negotiate construction labor agreements
that will enable additional tax receipts to flow to education.10 A recent column in the
Philadelphia Daily News11 reporting how much better the experience is for exhibitors at the
8
See
Kevin
C.
Gillens
April
2013
report,
Philadelphias
Ten-Year
Property
Tax
Abatement
at
http://www.biaofphiladelphia.com/ufiles/abatement_report.pdf
.
9
The
total
value
of
taxes
abated
during
this
period
(FY
2005
to
FY
2014)
according
the
City
Revenue
Department
was
$98.5
million
of
which
$44.2
million
would
have
been
collected
by
the
City
assuming
the
real
estate
development
of
abated
properties
had
occurred.
10
Gillens
report
observes
Philadelphia
has
the
4th
highest
cost
of
construction
of
any
city
in
the
country,
which
is
also
25%
above
the
average
national
cost.
(page
1)
11
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/20150301_It_s_a_new_day_at_the_Flower_Show.html
March 12, 2015
Page 5
Pennsylvania Convention Center creates a sense of optimism about a new collaboration with
labor to tackle this issue in the interests of strengthening funding for schools.
Finally, the City needs to address the absurd and embarrassing
performance of its tax collection system. Several years ago, this was made a top
priority. There has been much progress to report on collecting current tax obligations.12 Yet
more than $1.2 billion of uncollected taxes and obligations due the City and School District
remain outstanding. In excess of $820 million (68%) of this amount is owed in real estate,
water and gas bills.13 The underlying value of the real estate on which these delinquencies
remain outstanding is in the billions of dollars. In view of this incredible disconnect, experts
in the real estate market and professionals in the tax collection business believe that
Philadelphia could realize between $250-$400 million in collected taxes on this unpaid
delinquent inventory. There are simply no excuses for not aggressively taking the steps
necessary to collect. Yes, this is complicated but it is also the lowest hanging fruit. We need
to make collecting collectible taxes a top revenue priority. This situation also needs to be
cleaned up. Those delinquencies that are irrevocably uncollectible should be written off. A
major initiative on this through tax lien sales, for example, could seed fund the educational
endowment and kick-start private sector philanthropy. It would also send a powerful
message to tax deadbeats that Philadelphia is no longer willing to look the other way when it
comes to collecting delinquent payments. It is unlikely that the skills and enforcement
culture is sufficiently present within City government to do this (or else it would have
already been done). This may be an area where third party engagement, for example
through wholesale tax lien sales and outsourced collection entities, could prove very fruitful.
Given that the City realizes no current revenue from tax exempt, tax abated, tax free
zoned and tax delinquent properties, it would be smart to define a ten year period during
which all of the new revenue generated from reforms in these areas be dedicated solely to
the School District. A goal of $75 million annually recurring locally generated fundingnot
requiring tax increases--is achievable.
12
As
reported
by
the
Pew
Charitable
Trusts
at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-
sheets/2014/12/philadelphia-improves-on-collecting-delinquent-property-taxes
and
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2013/06/27/delinquent-property-tax-in-
philadelphia-stark-challenges-and-realistic-goals
and
at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/fact-sheets/2014/12/philadelphia-improves-on-collecting-delinquent-property-taxes
13
Data
acquired
from
Philadelphias
Office
of
Property
Assessment.
March 12, 2015
Page 6
Pensions. Reforming pensions is an important goal and the PICA report has offered
some excellent recommendations.14 The General Fund includes $687 million15 in FY15 to
fund our municipal retirement system, making it abundantly clear why we cant adequately
finance infrastructure, lower wage taxes or adequately support public education. Only one
strategy will make a dent on this crisis and that is to infuse the pension fund with cash.
Selling bonds is an inflexible funding tool and the capital markets are skittish about this
option that, if widely exercised, could flood the markets. Relying on annual appropriations
has undermined our capacity to address other needs. Awaiting a federal or Commonwealth
bailout is a pipe dream given that most state and municipal pension systems are deeply
underwater. If you question that assertion one only needs to look at the situation in
Pennsylvania where, combined, the State employees and teachers pension funds have a total
unfunded liability of $50 billion,16 and where State annual appropriations to retire that
liability are woefully inadequate. 17
What we can do to generate cash for the pension fund is look to resources the city
owns. We can sell or otherwise monetize profitable operating assets, the businesses that
Philadelphia simply does not need to be in. I have long supported the sale of PGW for
precisely this purpose and reason.
Perhaps City Council partnering with a new
administration can structure an approach that will generate an infusion of cash from a
public-private partnership.18 We should all be agnostic about the legal structuring that
enables monetizing these assets but we need to be purposeful in pursuing this. And we dont
14
I
might
not
be
totally
objective.
This
research
for
that
report
was
initiated
while
I
Chairired
the
PICA
Board,
on
which
I
served
from
February
2011
to
February
2014.
A
copy
of
that
report
is
referenced
above
in
footnote
3.
15
This
amount
includes
$92.2
million
in
normal
costs
(employer
contributions),
$464
million
to
amortize
the
unfunded
liability
and
$131
million
for
debt
service
on
the
ill
advised
1999
$1.2
billion
of
Pension
Obligation
Bonds.
The
amortization
costs
represent
10.9%
of
all
General
Fund
spending.
In
FY03,
these
costs
represented
2.9%
of
General
Fund
spending.
16
Actuarial
reports
on
the
State
Employee
Retirement
Systems
unfunded
liability
at
June
30,
2013
calculated
that
liability
to
be
$17.9
billion.
For
the
same
date,
the
unfunded
liability
of
the
Pennsylvania
School
Employees
Retirement
System
was
$32.6
billion.
There
are
more
than
a
few
actuaries
who
believe
that
both
of
these
calculations
understate
the
dimension
of
this
liability
and
that
the
actual
combined
number
exceeds
$60
billion.
17
Consider
that
with
unfunded
liability
of
$5
billion,
Philadelphia
appropriates
$465
million
to
amortize
its
pension
problems.
Pennsylvanias
problem
is
10
times
larger
while
its
amortization
appropriates
is
only
three
times
the
amount
that
Philadelphia
funds.
18
For
a
discussion
on
what
public
private
partnerships
are
and
how
they
can
work
see:
http://www.ncppp.org/ppp-basics/7-keys/
March 12, 2015
Page 7
need to own our gas business19 anymore than we need to own our airport, our water
business or the parking business. All of these can and will command excellent valuations in
the municipal infrastructure marketplace and their sale or lease can generate the significant
cash needed to address the pension problem. If these operating business are not
municipally owned or operated, will we still turn our faucets on and get water, get gas to
cook and heat, be able to fly in and out of PHL and find places to park our cars? Everyone
knows the answer is that we most certainly will.
Consider this simple math. For every dollar transferred to reduce unfunded pension
liability, the City can reduce its annual appropriation by 8-9 cents. For every billion dollars
used to reduce the liability, annual appropriations would be reduced by $80- $90 million. If
PGW can generate $600 million net of funding its employee pensions20, pay off PGW debt
and fund certain reserves, Water, Airport and Parking should be expected yield at least an
additional $2.2-$2.6 billion in net proceeds.21
19
Among
the
25
largest
cities
in
the
U.S.,
Philadelphia,
San
Antonio
and
Memphis
are
the
only
ones
that
own
their
gas
business.
See:
http://www.apga.org/files/public/11-23-09Top100.pdf
and
http://www.factmonster.com/ipka/A0763098.html
.
20
I
think
the
best
case
for
selling
PGW
is
(unintentionally)
presented
in
the
report
prepared
for
the
Philadelphia
City
Council
by
Concentric
Energy
Advisors,
Inc.
in
October
2014
and
can
be
read
here:
http://phlcouncil.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/FA-Report-Final-October-2014.pdf
21
Applying
valuations
to
the
Water,
Aviation
and
Parking
operating
businesses
of
Philadelphia
absent
careful
analysis
is
difficult
guesswork.
PGW
and
the
Philadelphia
Water
Department
are
comparable
in
gross
sales/revenues,
approximating
$650-$700
million
annually.
There
is
significant
upside
in
the
water
business
versus
gas.
Historically
net
revenues
after
operations
total
approximately
$240
million
for
Water
and
$120
million
for
PGW.
Outstanding
Water
Revenue
Bonds
approximate
$1.7
billion
(see:
http://www.phila.gov/investor/pdfs/OSPhiladelphiaWater2014A.pdf,
page
149)
while
Gas
Works
Revenue
Bonds
are
slightly
in
excess
of
$1
billion
(see:
http://www.pgworks.com/files/pdfs/FY2013AuditedFinancialReport.pdf,
page
18).
The
Water
business
should
generate
$3.5-$4.0
billion
and
could
net
the
City
in
excess
of
$1
billion.
Aviation
is
harder
to
gauge
since
there
have
been
no
sales
of
major
American
airports.
A
Federal
demonstration
program
(http://www.faa.gov/airports/airport_compliance/privatization/)
granted
Chicago
the
right
to
sell
Midway
Airport
but
that
sale
has
not
been
executed
although
the
original
plan
called
for
a
99-year
$2.5
billion
lease.
Perhaps
PHL
could
seek
to
replace
Midway
in
the
Federal
demonstration
program.
Major
airports
around
the
world
have
been
fully
or
partially
transferred
to
a
variety
of
ownership
groups
each
with
varying
levels
of
success.
The
sale
of
PHL
and
its
Philadelphia
Parking
Authority
garages,
one
PPAs
major
money
generators,
would
likely
need
to
be
executed
in
tandem
for
the
City
to
realize
the
full
value
of
an
airport
sale.
The
sale
of
the
Lisbon,
Portugal
airport
was
completed
in
2013
for
$4
billion
(see:
http://reason.org/files/apr-2014-air-
transportation.pdf).
Finally,
in
conversations
with
a
major
investment
banking
firm
several
years
ago,
I
was
advised
that
a
sale
of
the
Philadelphia
Parking
Authoritys
operating
business
and
assets
could
generate
between
$300-$400
million
in
net
proceeds.
March 12, 2015
Page 8
If the Citys pension fund experienced an infusion of $3.0 billion22, 60%, or nearly
$280 million would be cut from the $465 million cost of amortization unfunded liability.
Take a sizable portion of those savings and dedicate it to schools and an additional $180
million to invest in the future of the children of this city would be available. The balance
might be used to increase pension fund amortization, invest in much needed infrastructure
or help enable wage tax reductions. Some have suggested that this strategy represents a
one-time benefit. That is wrong. These amortization costs are recurring annually. These
savings would materialize annually as well.
I recognize that opponents to these proposal will use politically charged messages like
privatization, threats to workers, higher utility rates, loss of development incentives,
the great things that the largest non-profits do for the city and more. There are valid
arguments and concerns to be considered, debated and addressed. The lease, sale or
partnership of these services is a very difficult strategy, no doubt. There are many issues to
be addressed with employees, their unions, regulation, rates and charges, legislation, the
FAA, the PUC, etc. But when a community makes a huge commitment to invest in the
education of its children and in its economic future, there is nothing but hard and complex
choices to make. The alternative? Wait for Harrisburg to finally come through. And that is a
bet we should not be willing to make.
Philanthropy. We ask much of the charitable institutions and philanthropic
individuals of Greater Philadelphia. But it would be myopic to fail to observe that the
charitable landscape has undergone an extraordinary transformation. The Annenberg
Foundation has moved to California. The Pew Charitable Trust has re-defined its mission as
a public charity. The Lenfest Foundation has donated much of its considerable resources.
Harsh economic conditions have imposed great demands on a shrinking asset base of local
charitable institutions. Certainly there are wonderful examples of generous giving, both
institutional and individual, to support a variety of educational initiatives throughout the
city. A read of the recent study commissioned by the William Penn Foundation23 shed
interesting light on the imbalance of charitable needs (in this instance in the arts) and the
supply of philanthropic resources. It is likely that this imbalance is even more acute in basic
education and other human service needs.
22
Or
alternatively,
an
endowment
could
be
created,
with
the
funds
invested
and
the
investment
income
used
to
cover
the
annual
amortization
expenses
now
paid
to
the
Pension
Fund
by
the
General
Fund.
23
Reported
by
the
Inquirer
at
http://articles.philly.com/2015-02-09/news/58933303_1_arts-groups-arts-
community-william-penn-foundation
March 12, 2015
Page 9
school
system
was
largely
considered
a
failure.
Why
that
was
and
what
lessons
might
be
learned
for
schools
districts
like
Philadelphia
that
seek
significant
philanthropic
infusions
was
reported
in
an
excellent
article
in
the
New
Yorker
and
can
be
read
here:
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/05/19/schooled
March 12, 2015
Page 10
bargain to leaders in the State capital, one in which we demonstrate a re-set of our priorities,
that we want to be the nations leaders in educating our students. We need Harrisburg as a
partner on many fronts. This time Philadelphia is taking the lead. Were putting our money
where our mouths are. Were asking to match us to the maximum extent possible. I cant
predict what that might look like dollar wise. But consider that if that added $100 million in
new state money to the $25o million in new municipal money and $50 million in private
philanthropy, the School District of Philadelphia would have additional resources of $400
million, $4 billion over 10 years.
There is also the need for a public debate about delivering educational
services, about public, charter, magnet, parochial, home, cyber and other
schools and platforms through which our citys children learn. That is a
conversation for another moment and one I look forward to joining. But the
compelling argument I am hopeful of making here is that by prioritizing in financial terms a
major turnaround for todays 230,000 (and growing) public school population with $400
million new dollars annually we would make a major close the gap move. The imagination
ignites with what strong leadership, well supported political, by parents and private
In addition to moving the needle on the educational resource gap, this set of
proposals would:
Fully fund the pensions of employees and retirees of the Gas Works, the
Water Department, the Aviation Fund and the Parking Authority;
Eliminate the pension crisis confronting Philadelphias municipal
employees, retirees and taxpayers;
Kick start a renewed level of civic, business, and philanthropic commitment
to strengthening public education in the city;
Stimulate a debate about re-structuring tax incentivized economic
development policies;
Start a conversation and (hopefully, a negotiation) about how to bring
down the cost of labor in construction so as to free up abated and other
incentivized tax allowances to become available for public schools;
Free up additional funds in the General Fund budget of the City to be used
for infrastructure investment and wage tax relief;
Enable Philadelphia to demonstrate its renewed commitment to funding
education;
Change the dynamic in our State government relationship; and
March 12, 2015
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Enhance our self-image and global image as a 21st century city ready to
address its educational and financial challenges.
Conclusion. This is an election year. A focus on polls, the horse race, media buys,
independent expenditures, and negative campaigning often overwhelm issues. But
campaigns can be highly valuable when they generate debate around our most important
needs and concerns. The 2015 Mayoral campaign is our best opportunity to clarify the kind
of city we want Philadelphia to be.
Philadelphia can no longer afford and should not be content with incrementalism.
There are thousands of young people facing a fork in the road, students in failing schools
and families with school age children and lots of choices.
Were their parents, not just to our own kids and grandkids, but to all of the kids in
this city. We, all of us, need to take care of their futures. We have important decisions to
make, hard ones requiring serious sacrifices.
Time is not our childrens ally. Lets focus on moving the needle and solving this
deficiency.
I hope youll post your comments and reactions at www.citizensam.net and that youll
talk to your network about these and other ideas.
Thanks for engaging.
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