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Hazard Evaluation, HE, Techniques


The following are types of HE, techniques:

What if

Check Lists

HAZOP

FMEA

FTA

CPQRA

Quantitative
Quantitative
FMEA, Failure Mode Effects Analysis
is a preliminary qualitative technique
that may require preliminary
quantitative analysis (Mini-QRA)
This presentation only considers the HAZOP technique.

Press Page Down for 9 pages of further information on HAZOPS.


(Best viewed with 24 lines per screen - adjust your Zoom% to suit)
continue to page 2

Hazards and Operability Analysis

HAZOP

HAZOP was developed by Lawley (1974) of ICI. Based on early account by Elliott & Owen (1968)
Hazop studies are carried out by an experienced, multidisciplanary team, who review all physical
aspects of a process (lines, equipment, instrumentation) to discover potential hazards and
operability problems using a check list approach.
The basis for a HAZOP is a critical examination of information found in a word model, a process
flowsheet, a plant layout, equipment specification or a P&ID, (Piping and Instrument Drawing).
The principals of examination include:
1
2
3
4

Intention
Deviation
Causes
Consequences
(a) hazards
(b) operating difficulties
5 Safeguards
6 Recommendations / Actions
continue to page 3

See tabs D1 to D3 for examples of computer forms.

Early HAZOP studies used the following set of Guide Words to systematically review the process:

NO or NOT

Negation of intention

No Flow of A

MORE

Quantitative increase

Flow of A greater than design flow

LESS

Quantitative decrease

Flow of A less than design flow

AS WELL AS

Quantitative increase

Transfer of some component additional to A

PART OF

Quantitative decrease

Failure to transfer all components of A

REVERSE

Logical opposite of intention

Flow of A in direction opposite to design direction

OTHER THAN Complete substitution

Transfer of some material other than A

More recent computerization techniques use a Standard Set Of Generic Deviations


For Specific Section Types. See Dev'ns tab for examples.
continue to page 4

Some Common HAZOP Analysis Process Parameters

Flow

Time

Frequency

Mixing

Pressure

Composition

Viscosity

Addition

Temperature

pH

Voltage

Separation

Level

Speed

Toxicity

Reaction

continue to page 5

Prepare for the review

Attitude
Preparation

Meeting Leadership
HAZOP
Review By
Team

Knowledge
Experience

Teams HAZOP
Experience

Documentation

Follow-up

Info for study


P&Ids, Layout

Table

Deviation

continue to page 6

Causes

Consequences

Safeguards

Action

HAZOP analysis method flow diagram


Select a process
section or
operating step

contiue page down

Explain design
intention

Repeat for all


process sections

Select a process
variable or task

Repeat for all


process variables

Apply guide word


to process variable

Repeat for all


guide words

Examine
Consequences
associated with
deviation

Develop action
items

List possible
causes of
deviation

Assess acceptability
of risk based on
consequences

6 con't

Identify existing
safeguards to
prevent deviation

continue to page 7

Potential HAZOP Pitfalls


1

Poor understanding by management of the HAZOP procedure


An Ethylene plant has 100 P&IDs, 625 equip't items.
Consider 5 variables, Pressure, Temperature, Flow
Composition and Function.
Consider 6 Guidewords, None, More of, Less of
Part of, More than and Other than.
Questions to be answered =
Consider 5 minutes per question =
Time for ethylene plant HAZOP study =
4 hour, 240 minutes sessions per day =
No. working of days =
Days per week =
No. of weeks to complete HAZOP for plant =

Inexperienced HAZOP team

Inadequately trained or in-experienced leader

continue to page 8

625
5
6
18750
5
93750
250
375
5
75

items

variables

guide words
questions
min./question
minutes
minutes/day
days
days/week
weeks

c
d = axbxc
e
f = dxe
g
h=f/g
I
j=h/I

Common Mistakes
1 Failing to establish a "safe" environment for team members
2 Consequences of events not carried to conclusion.
3 Taking unwarranted credit for safeguards

See example on page 9 - one page down

4 Too little credit given for safeguards


5 Maing recommendations as specific as possible
6 Poor recording of HAZOPS
7 Failure to HAZOP start-up and shut-down procedures
8 Poorly up-dated P&IDs
9 A HAZOP is performed in lieu of properly executed design reviews
10 Wrong technique for system being reviewed (See spreadsheet titled Fig 5.3)
continue to page 9

HAZOP Example

See page 8 - item No. 3

To Compressor Inlet
LAH

Teams tend to quickly identify alarms, shut-downs


and controls, and claim them for safeguards.

FV
1

An alarm not tested may not work when called upon


to do so.

Inlet Line
LIC
1

Nuisance alarms are frequently bypassed and are


not effective as safeguards.
Often operators are not monitoring control panel.
Valve in manual

end

Automatic control routines are often set in manual


mode.

See tab D1 for computer documentation example

Dev'ns

Table 1
Source

ID No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Example Standard Set Of Generic Deviations For Process Section Types


Lessons Learned From HAZOPS Reviews of FCCUs by P.E. McCluer et al, Hydrocarbon Processing, Aug 1992, p-140-C

Deviation
High Flow
High Level
High Interface
High Pressure
High Temperature
High Concentration
Low / No Flow
Low Level
Low Interface
Low Pressure
Low Temperature
Low Concentration
Reverse / Misdirected Flow
Tube Leak
Tube Rupture
Leak
Rupture

Column
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

Some other typical HAZOP deviations

Tank or
Vessel
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

Line
X

Heat
Exchanger

Pump

Compressor

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X

Press Page Down

More Flow
Less Flow
More Pressure
Less Pressure
More Level
Less Level
Part of, wrong concentration
As well as, contaminants
other than, wrong material
More Reaction
Less Reaction
No Reaction
More Mixing
Less Mixing
More Corrosion
More Erosion
Sampling

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X
X

X
X

D1

Company Nova
Location Corunna
Leader
RAH
Scribe
GFR
Prod'n
PM
Node No.

Revision
Dwg No.
Proc Des
Instr'ts
Mech
Describe

JB
GH
FD

0
Cor -123-4567
Research
Electrical
HH
Safety
MN

Date
Page
Op Tech
Other
Other

2-Jun-97
1

Transfer Ethane from Deethanizer to C2 KO Pot

Intention The intent is to transfer 150,000 lb/hr of C2/C2= mix at 300 psig and at -30 F for the startup period.

Guide Wrd

High

Param

Flow

Dev'n High Flow

Possible Causes
1
FV-1 Wide open
2
3
Consequences
1
High level in KO pot with liquid carry-over to compressor with serious damage to rotor. Potential hydrocarbons release.
2
3
Safeguards
1
High level alarm LAH-1
2
3
Recommendation / Actions
Respib
By
Date
1
Consider limiting flow orifice, auto SD trip on High-High level, smart check valve.
1
JB
1-Jan-99
2
2
3
3

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D2

Company
Location
Leader
Scribe
Prod'n

Nova
Corunna
RAH
GFR
PM

Node No.

Proc Des JB
Instr'ts
GH
Mech
FD

Revision
0
Dwg No. Cor -123-4567
Research
Electrical HH
Safety
MN

Date
Page
Op Tech
Other
Other

2-Jun-97
2
0
0
0

1 Describe Transfer Ethane from Deethanizer to C2 KO Pot

Intention The intent is to transfer 150,000 lb/hr of C2/C2= mix at 300 psig and at -30 F for the startup period.
0
0
Guide Wrd

Low

Param Flow

Dev'n Low Flow

Possible Causes
1
2
3
Consequences
1
2
3
Safeguards
1
2
3
Rec / Actions
1
2
3

Respib
1
2
3

Page 12

By

Date

D3

Company
Location
Leader
Scribe
Prod'n
Node No.

Revision
Dwg No.
Proc Des
Instr'ts
Mech

Date
Page
Op Tech
Other
Other

Research
Electrical
Safety

Describe

Intention

Guide Wrd

Param

Dev'n

Possible Causes
1
2
3
Consequences
1
2
3
Safeguards
1
2
3
Rec / Actions
1
2
3

Respib
1
2
3

Page 13

By

Date

Chk List

Hazard & Operability Studies Check List Example


1 Changes In Quantity

High Flow

1 Pump racing, delivery vessel pressure lost,


suction pressurized, scale dislodged, leak in
heat exchanger

Loss of automatic
control

Low Flow

2 Pump failure, scaling of delivery, presence


of foreign body, poor suction condition,
cavitation, leak in heat exchanger, drain
leak, valve jammed

Operator error

No Flow

3 Pump failure, delivery vessel


overpressurized, gas blockage, presence of
foreign body, scale, sediment, suction vessel
empty.

Failure of joint, pipe,


valve, trap, bursting
disc, relief valve.

Reverse Flow

4 Pump failure, pump reversed, delivery


vessel over pressurized, poor isolation, gas
locking, surging, back siphoning.

High or Low
pressure

1 Boiling, cavitation, freezing, chemical


breakdown, flashing, condensation,
sedimentation, scaling, foaming, gas
release, priming, exploding, imploding.
Changes in viscosity, density. External Fire,
Weather conditions, Hammer.

High or Low
Temperature
Static buildup

2 same as 1

3 Changes in chemical a
condition
b

High or Low
Conentration
Contaminants

1 Changes in proportion of mixture, in water or


solvent content.
2 Ingress of air, water, steam, fuel, lubricant,
corrosion products, other process materials
from high pressure system, leakage through
heat exchangers. gas entrainment, spray,
mist.

4 Startup and
Shutdown
Condiotion.

Testing

1 Vacuum, pressure testing with with harmless


material.

Commissioning

2 Concentration of reactants, intermediates

Maintenance

3 Purging, venting, sweetening, drying,


warming. Access, spares.

Pipeline
registration

1 Should this pipe be considered for


registration?

2 Changes in physical
condition

5 Hazardous Pipelines a

3 Source of Ignition, Personnel shock.

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