38

THE HUMANIST CONTROVERSY

its central categories: it is bound up with the truth-guarantee'

the centred, double mirror structure.
1rt
Drawing the consequences of this 'pertinence', I do not t~
it is possible to talk about a 'subject' of the unconscious, althollgh
Lacan does, or of a 'subject of science', or of a 'subject of aestheij
discourse' - even if certain categories of the discourses in
tion do bear a relation to the category of the subject, inasmUch as
all are articulated with ideological discourse, each in a spe~t:
. ~l.UC

que:

way.
All this already provides a basis for refinements and rectifica..
tions, but I don't have the time to work them out right now.
others can say what they are and develop them at length, under
I

more favourable conditions.

(b) all of the last part of Note 1 has to be revised and very
seriously modified, both because of the status it implicitly aSCribes
to the subject of the general theory and also because of the
General Theory which it suggests is determinant.

Note 1
[On Psychoanalysis]

1. The current situation of psychoanalytic theory

We can describe psychoanalytic theory in its current state by
saying that, apart from a few attempts discussed below, it takes
the form, in the best of cases, of a regional theory which lacks.8
general theoryl although it is, in principle, the realization of thiS
general theory.
To approach psychoanalytic theory as a regional theory is to
approach it as a theory, a system of theoretical concepts
makes it possible to account for the structure and functioning 0
its object, currently known as the psychoanalytic unconscioUS
The unconscious is the theoretical object (or object of knowledge)
of psychoanalytic theory (a regional theory).
. t
This theory of the unconscious, as found in Freud (the fits
topography, the second topography) or Lacan has, as a theorY'
to be carefully distinguished from its application (precepts, praCtical rules for the conduct of the cure) as well as from obset"

tha:

THREE NOTES ON THE THEORY OF DISCOURSES

39

of psychoanalytic practice (the cure), which are

\,ahon~ lesS registered in the concepts of that theory. The conl'Iever~ e means of which the experimental data of the cure are
cepts hi (and manipulated) are practised concepts, not (theoretithol.1g thought concepts.
cal~ concepts that are systematically thought in the regional
h~analytic theory do not take as their object the real object
psyc hich the practice of the cure and its observations bear, but
onJ~retical object that allows us to think, among other things, what
a t Ie5 on in the cure. Freu d' s topographies think the unCOnsCIOUS
.
~oegel1erall that is, provide the concepts that account not only for
",
11y m
pa thoogtca
1 I' caseswhat
goes on . tJze cure, espeCla
psychoses and neuroses - but also for what goes on outside the
cure, and elsewhere than in so-called ipathological' cases. It is no
accident that Freud first wrote an Interpretation of Dreams, then
went on to produce a Psychopatllology of Everyday Life and a
theory of the Witz, or that he discussed art, religion, and so on.
The theory of the unconscious is, in principle, the theory of all
tile possible effects of the unconscious - in the cure, outside the
cure, in 'pathological' as well as 'normal' cases. What characterizes it as a theory is what makes any theory a theory: it takes as
its object not this or that real object, but an object of knowledge
(and thus a theoretical object); it produces the knowledge of the
(determinate) possibility of the effects, and thus of the possible
effects of this object in its real forms of existenC'e~ Every theory,
~he~, goes beyond the real object that constitutes the empirical
pOUlt of departure' for the historical constitution of the theory
(In Freud, this point of departure is the 'talking cure') and
pro~uces its own theoretical object as well as knowledge of it,
which is knowledge of the possibilities [Ies possibles] of this object,
~? the forms of existence in which these determinate possiI ~ties ~re realized, that is, exist as real objects.
d n ~his perspective, we may say that a psychoanalytic theory
p~~ lOdeed exist, that this theory has its theoretical object and
bil~r uce.s knowledge [connaissances], the knowledge of the possi~:s (m particular, the possible effects) of this object.
regi the same time, however, we must say that this theory is a
in po~al. theory which exhibits the peculiar feature of depending
rmCl I
In th P ~ on a general theory that is absent.
e hlstory of the sciences, this situation is not unique to
.

"1

40

THE HUMANIST CONTROVERSY

psychoanalysis. EveryS new 'science' irrupts, when it .

'founded', in the form of a regional theory that depends .IS
principle on an absent general theory. This de jure dependence :
a general theory which is absent in fact means that:
tl
we can observe, within the regional theory itself, the
absence of the general theory (the effects of this absence) at
the theoretical level: for as long as the general theory is
lacking, the regional theory strives to 'achieve closure', but
fails to; Of, to put it in other terms, it tries to define its oWn
object differe'1tially (in contradistinction to other theoretiCal
objects: in the present case, those of biology, psychology,
sociology, etc.), but fails to. This attempt and failure are the
presence of this de facto absence of a general theory, the
existence of which is nevertheless called for, de jure, in
order to found these attempts;
we can also observe the absence of the general theory at the
practical level. The theoretical problem of the limits, and
thus of the differential definition of the object of psychoanalysis - a problem which, in the absence of a general
theory, remains unsolved - produces specific effects in the
field of technique and the field of practice. For example: if
the psychoses can be made accessible to psychoanalytic
technique, how should the cure of psychotics be conducted,
and so on? For example: what is the relationship, practically
and technically speaking, between the psychoanalytic cure
and the psychotherapies, between psychoanalysis and psychosomatic medicine, and so on? For example - this is the
most serious consequence: because of the lack of a general
theory, we are witnessing the decline of the regional theory,
ignorance of it as a theory, and its retreat into the elllpiri
cism of psychoanalytic practice or its unwarranted confla..
tion with other regional theories (biology, psychology, etc.)
even at the technical level (consider the technical deviations
of certain schools, whether Adler and Jung or the Eng)jsh
and American schools).
.
It must, however, be pOinted out that the effects of ~
absence can be relatively limited, confined within limits ttl"
\-Ie
safeguard both Freud's psychoanalytic rules (the technlq
d
of the cure) and the regional theory on which they depet1 .

ra REE

NOTES ON THE THEORY OF DISCOURSES

The practice

41

~f many practitioners may well be t~chnically

rrect even If they do not master, at the theoretical level,

~e regional theory (it is enough for the~ to ma~ter it ~ i~s
technical forms, the guarantee of effective practice) - (It IS
nough for them to 'practise' it). By the same token, the
;egional theory, despite the dangers just evoked, can survive more or less intact in the absence of a general theory,
the need for which nevertheless makes itself felt in principle
in that theory's very absence.
These are the features which define the situation of psychoanalytic practice and psychoanalytic theory today. We find either
practitioners who 'practise' ~e regional theory . (and whose
practice is correct, whatever Ideas about the regIonal the 0 ry,
correct or not, they may have in their heads); or practitioners
who do not practise it (but, rather, practise a false theory); Of,
again, psychoanalysts who master the regional theory theoretically (and who, at the same time, can simultaneously - this is not
inconceivable - 'practise' it badly). In the immense majority of
cases, psychoanalysis does not go beyond the regional theory.

Tile fact that psychoanalysis does not have a general theory at its
disposal, only a practice or a regional theory, confers a very
peculiar status upon it: it is not in a position to provide objective
proof of its scientificity - that is to say, it is not in a position
differentially to define (or locate) its theoretical object in the field
of theoretical objectivity (a field constituted by the differential
relations of the different theoretical objects in existence). Indeed,
the. only possible way to provide proof of the scientificity of a
reg.lonal theory is point to the differential articulation which
aS~l~S that regional theory its place in the articulated field of

:Sting t~eoretical. obj.ects. The ~eneral theory. alone can fu~

't s ~ction, by thinking the object of the [regIOnal]6 theory m

a~culated relationship with the other objects whose system

constitutes the existing field of scientific objectivity~
1s

2. The question of the general theory

Cert .
res ~In a~thors have attempted to answer this question, to
thea Ve thiS problem, with varying degrees of success; some of
se attempts have proven aberrant, others interesting.

42

THE HUMANIST CONTROVERSY

The aberrant attempts: these are, in their way, manifestatj

of the. existence of the problem, in the very form of th~
aberration.
eir

Let us mention the biologistic attempt, the psychologisij

attempt, the ethologistic attempt, the sodologistic attempt, ~
philosophical attempt. These attempts are distinguished by th .
reductive character: in setting out (or not) to think the differene.r
between the theoretical object of psychoanalysis (the
sdous) and some other theoretical object (that of biOlogy, PSy.

uncO:

chology, philosophy, etc.), they in fact reduce the object of

psychoanalysis to the object of these other disciplines.
The interesting attempts: Freud's own, and, today, Lacan's.
We find in Freud (in the meta psychological essays, Three
Essays on Sexuality, and also in Totem and Taboo or 'The Future of
an Illusion') an attempt to situate the object of psychoanalysis
with respect to other objects belonging to existing diSCiplines.
The interest of Freud's attempts lies in the fact that they are not
reductive but, rather, differential (consider the theory of the drives
in its differential relation with the theory of the instincts). One
may say that the existence of these attempts and their differentisl
character are proof that Freud was aware, very keenly aware, of
the need to think the theoretical object of psychoanalysis within
the limits of the field of scientific objectivity. His constant references to science, scientific objectivity, and the various sciences
already in existence, including the myths in which he anticipated
the future theoretical'solution' of the problems of psychoanalytic
theory that would result from the development of some other
discipline - all this offers direct and indirect evidence (right
down to certain myths) of Freud's recognition of the need for a
general theory. Once again, what is remarkable here, in th~
absence of the theoretical conditions that would have made It
possible to constitute this general theory (we are quite possiblY
still at the same stage)J is the fact that, even when he had to
borrow certain of his concepts from some other discipline (irOO1
the sciences, or even from a certain philosophy) in order ~
outline this general theory, Freud always conceived it as it'

principle distinct from the regional theories from which }te

borrowed. He never lapsed into a biological general theory, a
psychological general theory, or a philosophical general theo~
Whence the paradox of his attempt: he had to sketch the broS

1"tlREE NOTES ON THE THEORY OF DISCOURSES

43

. f a general theory that intended to be a general theory

oJ.ltbne 0 as its function was concerned, and did not intend to be

in ~
far as its content was concerned. Freud reproduced, in
ooe lfl cal theory (the metapsychology), what might be called
IUS genepUISOry solitude of the regional theory, which it is the
the CO~ a general theory, precisely, to eliminate. To say that
efteC~t~ general theory reproduced his regional theory means
freu the concepts of the general theory are just as 'isolated' as his
tha~ nal theory: instead of furnishing the differential link
re:een his regional theory and other regional theories, instead
~ serving as general co~ce~ts th~t would m~ke possible several
d'fferent regional theones, IncludIng the regIonal theory of psyc~oanalysis, they express a (hollow) claim to generality rather
than the reality of this generality in its true, concrete role. These
concepts reproduce the concepts of the regional theory; they are
nothing but replicas of it cast in the form of generality - when
they are not simply concepts of the regional theory decked out
with a nante that assigns them a function in the general theory, a
function of which this name is not the concept. A single example
will suffice to illustrate this point: the concept of the death instinct
(opposed to the Libido) actually belongs to the regional theory;
by dint of its nan-Ie, however, it is charged with functions in the
general theory.7 Yet its name does not transform the regional
concept into a general concept: its name is a programme that
does nothing more than delimit a function in its very absence.
Lacan's attempt very lucidly takes up what is best in Freud's~
The labour of conceptual denomination that Lacan has carried
~ut. on the concepts of Freud's regional theory goes beyond the
houts of the regional theory. This rectified terminology, rendered
systematic and coherent, is one from which Lacan has drawn
ehxtremely
far-reaching theoretical effects (within the regional
t
ofeory); 1t'IS an elaboration that could not have been conceived
a and realized without (i) an awareness of the need to elaborate
ge~eneral theory; (ii) a correct" conception of the nature of a
genera~ theory; and (iii) the beginnings of an elaboration of this
ali"era theory. The most spectacular sign of this threefold impernot ~~f ~hich Lacan is cognizant, is his use of linguistics. Lacan
to Wh'Yhuercely defends the principle, found in Freud, according
frOIll.:~ the o?ject of psychoanalysis must be differentiated
at of bIology, psychology and philosophy (especially

fa:a

44

THE HUMANIST CONTROVERSY

phenomenology); over and above this defensive, negative e6

he makes a positive effort to show, with respect to linguis~'
both what distinguishes the (theoretical) object of psychoanaty~'
from that of linguistics and what makes them similar. In sh SIs
he thinks a difference not only in its negative, but also in~,
positive aspect; that is, he thinks a differential relation. And itl~
this differential relation with the object of linguistics that 5el'\r IS
him as a fundamental principle for thinking the other differenU:
relations: with ~he objects of biology, psychology, sociology,
ethology and phIlosophy.
It is certainly no theoretical accident if one specific differential
relation (here, the one that brings the object of linguistics into a
relation of pertinent difference with the object of psychoanalysis)
- this relation and no other - turns out to be the right principle
for bringing out the other differential relations. If this differential
relation plays this privileged role, it is because it commands the
others, at least in the present state of thought on the subject. It
should be added that we can discern, thanks to one of its effects
(which is usually completely ignored), the function 'genenl
theory' which is fulfilled by the recourse to linguistics in the
conceptual elaboration of the concepts of the regional theory of
psychoanalysis: for Lacan is led to clarify not only the theoretical
concepts of the regional theory of psychoanalysis, but also
certain theoretical concepts of the regional theory of linguistics
itself. What we see here is a specific effect of any general theory:
whenever it clarifies a given regional theory about itself, helping
it to formulate and rectify its concepts, it necessarily has theSQmt
effect of rectification-reclassification on the concepts of the other
regional theory brought into play in this operation of differential
definition. The linguists have perhaps not yet realized what they
owe, in their own discipline, to an undertaking that apparen~
has no bearing on it. Yet what we see here is a standard effect 0
any general theory: in setting out to develop one regional theory
by confronting it with another, it rectifies-reclassifies the c~n
cepts that it brings to bear (the concepts of the regional theort: J
not only in the theory that is to be rectified, but also in ~
theory that does the rectifying; not only in the theory wor}(
on, but also in the theory that is put to work.
. .ts
However, this effect brings a rather severe disadvantag~ jJ1 ~f
wake if one fails to see that it is a question of the elaboratiotl

1'IIREE NOTES ON THE THEORY OF DISCOURSES

45

al theory, if one believes that what is involved is simply

a ~nerl theories and their simple confrontation (as if everything

reglon:aking place between two regional theories, without the

~ere ention of a third element, which, precisely, is not located
U'\te; same level, in other words, is not regional, but is a theory
a~ t ~ompletely different kind, since what is involved is a third
o a ent precisely the general theory). If this is not clear, and
e:e~IY ~onceived, one can be misled into thinking that what
c eaurs in this confrontation is wholly due to one of the two
al theories. One might suppose that it is psychoanalysis
rehich holds the keys to linguistics, or the other way round; one
~ght suppose that one regional theory (that of psychoanalysis
or linguistics) is the general theory of the other. This misperception
will then give rise to an ideology that is either linguistic or
psychoanalytic (as occurs frequently, because this is hard to
avoid); it will lead one to say (and, worse, to think) that, for
instance, linguistics is the mother-discipline of the human sciences, .or that psychoanalysis is.

oe;on

Despite all the precautions Lacan has taken, one cannot say
that he - or, in any case, some of his disCiples - is not tempted
by this ideological misperception. Witness, for instance, the issue
of La Psycha11alyse on 'Psychoanalysis and the Human Sciences,'9
and the positions Lacan has taken [vis-a-vis] the work of LeviStrauss, as well as certain themes that he develops in discussing
the history of the Sciences [and] Descartes, or the (highly
ambiguous) use to which he puts the thought of certain philosophers (Plato, Hegel, Heidegger). It is quite striking that the use
to which Lacan puts linguistics in elaborating the concepts of the
psyc~oanalytic regional theory is totally exempt from the effects

of nusperception which haunt these examples. This tends to

pr~ve that the general theory towards which Lacan is workin~
:' for the elaboration of which he provides certain basic
Siernents, is not perfectly situated in its status of general theory,
o:c~ for example, what Lacan withholds from linguistics with
Str: and~ Whenever he deals with it explicitly, he grants Leviit isu~ ~Ith the other, and, as it were, surreptitiously - although
field ? VIOUS that Levi-Strauss imports linguistics into his own
an extremely summary, non-critical way that has nothing
laca:ever. to do with the kind of 'importation' that we find in
(which is, precisely, critical, differential importation).

what'

46

THE HUMANIST CONTROVERSY

Although Lacan treats the relations between linguistics

psychoanalysis in a way that is epistemologically correct ~
assigns the (incorrect) use of linguistics by Levi-Strauss the ; :
and responsibility of 'mediating' the relationship between l
choanalysis and the other Human Sciences.
Psy.
This entails the following ambiguity: either linguistics is tit
general theory of the Human Sciences, or psychoanalysis (~
to linguistics, which it is supposed to have brought back to'ts
origins) is the general theory of the Human Sciences. The e~.
ence and perpetuation of this ambiguity, whose effects are visibl
(the relations of psychoanalysis or linguistics to the Huma:;
Sciences), are the manifestation of the objective limits that Lacan
has reached in his effort to elaborate a general theory, the
necessity for which he lucidly perceives. It would be facile to
explain these limits (and the effects of misperception to which
they give rise) as the limits of an individual effort which,
however brilliant it may be, is too 'caught Upl in the labour of
regional elaboration to attend as closely as it should to the
labour of general elaboration whose absolute necessity Lacan
nevertheless very clearly perceives. Such an explanation has to
do with the personal history of Lacan/s investigation. We need
to examine this matter in the light of very different principles,
and to say that the existence of these limits is in fact the sign of
a limitation in Lacan's conception of the nature of a general theory.
Going beyond these limits plainly calls for something other than
an experience that is internal to the psychoanalytic regional
theory and the linguistic regional theory: what is required is
general epistemological views, that is, a well-defined, correct
philosophical conception that effectively embraces the specific
object known as a general theory.1 Only if one has such a
conception is one likely to take up and pursue the following lead:
the idea that the general theory of psychoanalysis, the one which
it requires and for which its regional theory calls, cannot. ~
developed solely by means of the differential 'confrontatiOn
(and its general-theory 'effects') between the regional theory ~f
linguistics and the regional theory of psychoanalysiS; that It
must be developed in a very different perspective, by means of very
different confrontations, through the intervention of very differ"
ent regional theories and their differential relations, with the
help of a very different reclassification which, precisely, caUS

'fJlJ{E

E NOTES ON THE THEORY OF DISCOURSES

47

Oon the objects affected by the limitation described

ioto questhe famous H uman Sclences.

above - st that we look for the general theory of psychoanalysis

I SUgg~ich makes it possible to constitute the regional theory
in that :iScourse of the unconscious as both a discourse and a
o~ the se of tlte unconscious - that is, in not one but two general
dlSCo~rs whose articulation we need to think.
theOne
I

3. The character of the unconscious

T determine the nature of the theoretical elements that must be

~embled in order to constitute the general theory of psycho a~alysis, we have to set out from the c~aracteristics o.f the object
of the regional theory of psychoanalysIs: the unconscIous.
It is well known that this regional theory has been developed
on the basis of observations and experiences provided by the
practice of the cure as well as observations provided by other
phenomena external to the cure (the effects of the unconscious
in "everyday' life, art, religion, and so on).
We can characterize the unconscio'us as follows:
(a) The unconscious is manifested, that is, exists in its effects,
both normal and pathological: 11 these effects are discernible in dreams, all the various forms of symptoms, and all
the different kinds of 'play' (including 'wordplay').
(b) This manifestation is not that of an essence whose effects
are its phenomena. That which exists is the mechanisms of
a system that functions by producing these effects. These
mechanisms are themselves determinate. It may be said
that, in the narrow sense of the word that which exists is
the formations of the unconscious - in other words, the
determinate systems that function by producing certain
determinate effects. 'The unconscious' designates nothing
other than the theoretical object which allows us to think
the formations of the unconscious, that is, systems funcI

tioning in accordance with mechanisms producing effects.

c) The unconscious is a structure (or system) combining
determinate elements subject to determinate laws of combination and functioning in accordance with determinate
mechanisms.