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Jen and Li in the "Analects

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Author(s): Kwong-loi Shun
Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Jul., 1993), pp. 457-479
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
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JEN AND LI IN THE ANALECTS

Kwong-loi Shun

Jen (humaneness, goodness) and li (rites) are two concepts central to
Confucius' ethical thinking as reported in the Analects (Lun Yii). The
former refers to the ethical ideal, and the latter to certain traditional
norms governing human conduct. It is generally agreed that Confucius
regards the observance of li as closely related to the ideal of jen, but
there has been radical disagreement concerning the nature of the relation. In what follows, I will defend a certain interpretation of his conception of that relation.
There are at least two different views concerning the earlier meaning
of the character 'jen." According to one view, the character originally
referred to the quality that makes someone a distinctive member of an
aristocratic clan.' According to another view, it originally had the meaning of love, especially the kindness of rulers to their subjects.2 For the
purpose of my discussion, it is not necessary to adjudicate between
these competing views. It suffices to note that, in the Analects, "jen" is
used both more narrowly to refer to one desirable quality among others,
and more broadly to refer to an all-encompassing ethical ideal which
includes all the desirable qualities. That "jen"is used in both ways is seen
from the fact that jen is both listed as one desirable quality among
others, such as wisdom and courage (9.29, 14.28), and described as something that includes other desirable qualities such as courage (14.4).3In the
narrower sense, it probably emphasizes affection for others; on one occasion (12.22),jen is explained in terms of love for fellow human beings. But
the character is used more often in the Analects in the broader sense of
an all-encompassing ethical ideal, and I will from now on use "jen" in
this sense.
The character "/i" originally referred to rites of sacrifice but, even
before the time of Confucius, its scope of application had expanded to
include other things, such as norms governing polite behavior. For example, in the Shih Ching, which scholars generally agree to be datable to a
time before Confucius, while the character is still used in connection with
sacrifices (poems 279, 290), it is also related to yi (good form) (52) and used
in contexts going beyond sacrifices (193/5).4 In the Tso Chuan, datable to
a period extending before and after the time of Confucius, "/i" is used in
a much broader sense. Li is distinguished from yi (good form); norms
governing polite behavior such as ways of presenting a gift are described
as a matter of yi (good form) but not li (pp. 704/8-9; 601/8-12).5 Li is
related to norms of conduct governing those in a higher and those in a
lower position (704/16), to proper ways of governing a state (601/8-12;
521/10-12), and to the proper relation between rulers and ministers,
fathers and sons, older and younger brothers, husbands and wives, and

Associate Professor,
Departmentof
Philosophy,University
of California
at Berkeley
nfHpil

PhilosophyEast& West
Volume 43, Number3
July 1993
457-479
? 1993

by Universityof
HawaiiPress

457

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Instead.26).3) or that li is the ideal basis for government (2. and toward other human beings when observing the norms of polite behavior and when observing the responsibilities that one has toward others by virtue of one's social position. but it remains unclear how broad the scope of li is when the text makes such general observations as that one has to learn lito take a stand (8. I will not attempt to determine the exact scope of application of "/i" as the character is used in the Analects.8. where "li-yi" is often used to refer generally to social distinctions and norms governing conduct appropriate to people by virtue of their social positions (for example.3.I will distinguish between two opposed interpretations of Confucius' conception of the relation between jen and i and indicate. 9. 19/1-15).200. in section III. the question arises as to how the ideal of jen and the observance of li are related.3. I will continue to speak of the relation between jen and li. while some regard i as still restricted to ceremonious behavior.in which "li" is at times used as if interchangeable with "li-yi" (chap. while it is clear that li is regarded as ideally accompanied by ching (for example.13. and discuss how the two are related.218 on Mon. I will focus attention on that aspect of jen (whether it is the sole aspect or one of several aspects) which has to do with the observance of li (whether construed more broadly or more narrowly). The broader use of "li" is found in the Hsun Tzu. For convenience. it is not entirely clear what the scope of li is. as emphasized in various classical texts. Since the two interpretations are opposed. 4/72-77. 4. 16.I will argue that the conflict is merely apparent. 20. However.15. Many commentators on the Analects take li to include all the rules governing proper behavior in various kinds of social and political contexts. one is supposed to have ching toward spirits when performing rites of sacrifice. Whether we construe the scope more broadly or more narrowly. 3.4. 9/64-75). In section II.tUt a PhilosophyEast&West mothers and daughters-in-law (715/12-17). Proper observance of li is supposed to be the basis for an orderly society (715/12-17) and the ideal basis for government (31/13). this seems to reveal a conflict between different parts of the text. 3. 17. 3. for each interpretation.17.10. 9/17-18.8 I will not address this issue of disagreement in my discussion. In the Analects. 27 Oct 2014 10:15:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . and that all the relevant passages can be accommodated by a third 458 This content downloaded from 50.11).13). but subsequent uses of "jen" are to be understood as a shorthand for referring to that aspect of jen having to do with the observance of ii. passages in the Analects which seem to fit in better with one interpretation than with the other.6 What gives unity to the various things that have come to be included in the scope of li is presumably ching (reverence).7 The actual examples of li found in the Analects have to do largely with ceremonious behavior (3. One issue of disagreement concerning the relation between them is whether there are aspects of the jen ideal which bear no significant relation to /j.

which are psychological in this sense. in using such locutions. 27 Oct 2014 10:15:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . it is misguided to attempt to come up with such an account.10 To address this concern. I will be using certain psychological locutions. we may note that the fact that the Analects was compiled after Confucius' death by disciples with different views does not by itself show that some passages are not authentic. whether Cartesian dualism or some form of behaviorism. and my use of such psychological locutions as "emotion" and "attitude" is for the purpose of referring in a more general way to the phenomena referred to by the psychological locutions used in the Analects.200. In using such locutions. and the objections can take at least two forms. by disciples with different views and a different understanding of Confucius' teachings. Some may also have methodological objections concerning the attempt to come up with an interpretation of Confucius' conception of the relation between jen and li which can make sense of all the relevant passages. Before proceeding to the main discussion. I regard psychological locutions basically as locutions which people apply and regard as appropriate to apply to persons and perhaps certain other animals. let me add some clarificatory observations concerning the use of certain terminology in the discussion and concerning methodology. but not (except in a derivative sense) to inanimate objects. I conclude with some general observations about the proposed interpretation. Until there is philological evidence for the inauthenticity of certain passages. nor have I ascribed to him more reflective thoughts about the phenomena referred to by his use of psychological locutions. Philological studies may show this to be the case. such as "ching" (reverence). and to attempt to find an interpretation of Kwong-loiShun 459 This content downloaded from 50. Some may be concerned that. all I presuppose is that Confucius does use locutions which are psychological in the sense described.9 In the subsequent discussion. I have not thereby ascribed to him any reflective theory of the mind." in discussing Confucius. In section IV. First. and that the text as a whole does not present a single coherent account of the relation between jen and li. such as the terms "emotion" and "attitude. So.218 on Mon. I might have thereby ascribed to Confucius a certain picture of the self which he does not have.10. There is therefore reason to expect that parts of the Analects are not authentic reports of Confucius' teachings. I think the Analects does contain locutions. That it can accommodate all the relevant passages in a way that the other two interpretations cannot counts in favor of this third interpretation. but so far there is no general agreement on this issue.interpretation.there is evidence that the Analects was compiled long after Confucius' death. In response to this objection. it does not seem misguided to take the text as a whole. I will make explicit the presuppositions behind my use of such locutions.

In the Analects. I will set up the two interpretations in a way that is probably more elaborate and extreme than any of the interpretations actually proposed in the literature. it can still further our understanding of the text as long as it has the explanatory power described in the second condition. An account which meets the first condition will employ conceptual apparatus familiar to us and foreign to that thinker. we may observe that an attempt to interpret a thinker's position on a subject matter is an attempt to understand his position. emphasizes the importance of observing li. More specifically. reflective accounts of the relation between jen and li. If the attempt fails. Given the heuristic nature of the distinction. II PhilosophyEast& West I now describe two opposed interpretations of Confucius' conception of the relation between jen and li. So. But there is no reason to regard the attempt as misguided and doomed to failure at the outset. To present the accounts as interpretations is to ascribe to Confucius a kind of reflectivity not supported by the text. cannot legitimately be regarded as interpretations of the text. On the instrumentalist interpretation. 27 Oct 2014 10:15:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . 460 This content downloaded from 50. put forward a reflective account of how jen and li are related. and will go beyond the text in various other ways.Confucius' conception of the relation between jen and li which can make sense of all the relevant passages. and sometimes relates jen to the observance of li. The distinction between them is intended as a heuristic device for highlighting certain apparently conflicting elements in the Analects. Confucius describes what the jen person is like.200.10.218 on Mon. Such understanding can be achieved by coming up with an account which meets two conditions: that it is intelligible to us. which I will label the instrumentalist and the definitionalist interpretations. an account may further our understanding of a thinker's position even if it exhibits a degree of reflectivity not present in the thinker himself. thereby preparing the ground for introducing my own interpretation. and does not commit us to ascribing to the thinker the same degree of reflectivity as exhibited in that account. As a sketch of one possible response. Although it will go beyond the text. will have a systematic character not present in the relevant text. The second kind of methodological objection goes as follows. however. this will give reason to suspect either an inconsistency in Confucius' thinking or the inauthenticity of certain passages. Confucius regards the observance of li as standing in a mere instrumental relation to the ideal of jen. To present it as an interpretation is to ascribe to it the explanatory power described in the second condition. He does not. The objection raises difficult methodological issues that I cannot go into here. and that it can best explain the things the thinker has said in connection with the subject matter. such as the ones to be discussed.

it provides a means of cultivating the appropriate emotional dispositions and attitudes. as a matter of fact. as a matter of fact. they are related by the following means-end relation. and makes the person more susceptible to having emotional dispositions and attitudes of the ideal kind. It is in principle possible for jen to exist independently of the existence of li. On this interpretation. either generally or on particular occasions. For example. I leave it open that two items may be related in a way which warrants our speaking of one as a means to the other. In so characterizing a mere instrumental relation.Kwong-loiShun 461 This content downloaded from 50. on the instrumentalist interpretation.218 on Mon. Jen has evaluative priority over li in the following sense. and of an individual's observing such practices. Accordingly. and the value of the existence of li practices in society. which is distinct from and intelligible independently of the general observance of i. and may in principle obtain without the other obtaining. the existence of elaborate ii practices in society is justified by the instrumental role they play with regard to jen. is derived from the instrumental role li plays with regard to jen. if doing so does not affect the efficacy of the rule of li in performing its function with regard to the jen ideal. Confucius regards the jen ideal as defined in terms of the general observance of those li rules actually existing in the Chinese society of his time. For someone who has approximated the jen ideal. though. but which relates the two in a more intimate manner than a mere instrumental relation. as a matter of fact.200. Thus. the two are related by causal relations which make one a means to the other. For someone who has not yet approximated the ideal. comprising emotional dispositions and attitudes of certain kinds.10. However. whatever these may be. The claim is not just that to be a jen person is to be someone who generally observes the existing li rules. actually existed in the Chinese society of Confucius' time. It is jen alone which has ultimate value.By saying that two items stand in a mere instrumental relation. People may be justified in revising or occasionally departing from a rule of li if observing the rule does not serve well its function with regard to the jen ideal. jen is supposed to be a state of the mind. observance of li provides a means of expressing the emotional dispositions and attitudes constituting the ideal. 27 Oct 2014 10:15:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . the claim is that to be a jen person is to be someone who generally observes those rules of li which. the three-year period of mourning provides a means of expressing one's continuing love for and remembrance of a deceased parent. jen also provides a standard against which one can assess the justifiability of revising or departing from a rule of i. And they may be justified in revising a rule of li on other grounds such as economic grounds. On the definitionalist interpretation. I mean that each of the two is distinct from and intelligible independently of the other. Rather. More. Participation in li practices has a feedback effect on a person.

According to Hsu Fu-kuan. 2 This way of interpreting Confucius contrasts sharply with that proposed by Chao Chi-pin and Ts'ai Shang-szu. Confucius has given 462 This content downloaded from 50. one may even regard li as having an evaluative priority over jen. In section IV. this identity is supposed to follow from the concept of jen. this conception of the relation between jen and li is conservative in spirit in that it is opposed to any revision of or departure from the existing li rules.PhilosophyEast& West over. and the observance of the li practices of his time as providing the sole criterion for distinguishing between the possession and lack of jen. According to Chao Chi-pin. The distinction between the two interpretations is not intended as an exhaustive classification of interpretations found in the literature. the observance of li has to be accompanied by the right spirit." And. unlike the instrumentalist interpretation. 27 Oct 2014 10:15:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . jen is no longer regarded as a state of mind distinct from and intelligible independently of the general observance of li. Still. thereby giving jen evaluative priority over /i. I will mention examples from the literature of ways of interpreting Confucius which lie close to one or the other of the two interpretations. I will consider other interpretations found in the literature which do not lie close to either of these two interpretations. jen no longer has an evaluative priority over li. it is the observance of li which has ultimate value. according to Lin Yu-sheng.10. Confucius regards the content of jen as determined by li. and the observance of li can no longer be regarded as a means to cultivating or expressing jen. to show that these two interpretations are not totally unrelated to the literature. jen has evaluative priority over /i. First. Furthermore. in the way just described for the instrumentalist interpretation. jen is an ideal inner life which has ultimate value. distinguishing the definitionalist from the instrumentalist interpretation. Accordingly. That is. Indeed. Confucius gives the traditional li rules a justification in terms of the jen ideal. since the ideal is just generally to observe those rules of /i which actually exist. Something close to the instrumentalist interpretation is put forward by Hsu Fu-kuan and LinYu-sheng. In doing so.218 on Mon. one of the most important innovations of Confucius is the discovery of the ideal inner life which he characterizes in terms of the jen ideal. however having the right spirit is to be interpreted. jen no longer provides a standard against which one can assess the justifiability of revising or departing from a rule of li. since li can be characterized independently of jen but not vice versa. Admittedly. which lies close to the definitionalist interpretation. from which the value of being the kind of person who generally observes li is derived. Second.200. For now. while li derives its value from jen through the instrumental role it plays in the cultivation and development of jen. and provides a perspective from which one can justify the revision of a li rule. Two consequences follow from the identity of jen with the general observance of the actually existing li rules.

my sole purpose is to report how each passage can be read in a way that appears to provide support for something close to one of the two interpretations.13. li is described as having the function of keeping order among people and thereby governing the state. I am not myself endorsing the proposed readings of the passages.10. 27 Oct 2014 10:15:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .li a priority over jen. I will state these observations and describe how certain passages can be read as supporting the observations.200. In what follows. furthermore.18: The gentlemantakes rightness(yi) as what is essential. For example. a man's not being jen is also regarded by Confucius as a situation in which li does not perform its function. In light of this.3.3. The first observation favoring the instrumentalist over the definitionalist interpretation is that there are passages in which Confucius seems to regard li as playing an instrumental role with regard to jen. For each of the two interpretations. Although I do regard them as possible and in some cases plausible readings. In 4.3. Observance of li is the criterion for the possession of jen.14 These two very different ways of interpreting Confucius are made possible by the fact that each seems to have some textual support. the query "what has he to do with li (ju li ho)?"comes after the description of a situation in which /i fails to perform this function.218 on Mon. what has he to do with li (ju li ho)? In 2. he asks: A man who is not jen. the observations appear to have textual support. the instrumentalist would argue that. where he asks: If one is able to govern a state with iiand deference. and Confucius' conception of the jen person is just the conception of someone who follows the existing li rules in all areas of life. Furthermore.T_ Kwong-loiShun 463 This content downloaded from 50.13 Ts'ai Shang-szu proposes a similar interpretation. what difficultywill he have?Ifone is unable to govern a state with ii and deference. in 3. So.and put rightnessinto practice by observingli (liyi hsing chih). what has he to do with li (ju li ho)? IHDfUJ This can be compared to 4. In doing so. it seems that Confucius regards the observance of li as a means to cultivating and expressing jen. According to him. As further support for regarding li instrumentally. in 3. A Ul. the instrumentalist may cite 15.13. there are two observations about Confucius' conception of jen and li which can apparently be more easily accommodated by one interpretation than by the other and. and it is li which distinguishes human beings from other animals. this conception of the relation between jen and li is opposed to any revision of or departure from the existing li practices. li is the most important concept in Confucius' moral thinking. since the ideal is just to observe the existing li practices.

blacksilkis used instead.Today. Confucius is here not just advocating the retention of or departure from a rule of li.it is better to be economical than to be extravagant.3. In 2. the observance of li is here regarded as a means to putting rightness into practice. As mentioned earlier. This explains why Confucius rejects departure from the traditional li rule of bowing to the prince before ascending the steps to the upper hall.10. However.4: Lin Fang asked about the basis of li.Today. With regardto mourning. the instrumentalist would argue that Confucius regards li rules as a means to expressing emotional dispositions and attitudes of certain kinds. the instrumentalist would argue that a justification is implied in 9. people bow after ascending them. Presumably. and to depart from the rule without good reason shows disrespect for the prince.Thisis more economical. thereby defeating the purpose of the rule.9. where Confucius says: Usinga linen cap is li. and in 3. the instrumentalist may cite 3. a conception of jen as defined in terms of the observance of the existing li practices is opposed to such revision or departure.15 A second observation favoring the instrumentalist interpretation is that there are passages in which Confucius speaks as if there is a justification for the revision of or departure from an existing rule of /i. since otherwise it would have justified the elimination of the ceremonial cap altogether.200. and I follow the majority. but is also giving reasons for doing so. He cites economic consideration in favor of replacing the linen ceremonial cap used in rituals with one made of black silk." PhilosophyEast& West The instrumentalist would take the reference to a basis (pen) of li to show that there is something with reference to which the existence of li 464 This content downloaded from 50. Economic consideration cannot be the only relevant consideration.Bowingbefore ascendingthe steps is li.14 he advocates the /i practices of Chou over those of Hsia and Shang. and would accept revision of or departure from a li rule on the basis of such considerations as economic consideration only if the efficacy of the rule in serving its purpose is unaffected.With regardto li.Again. Following this line of thought. This is presumptuousand. the instrumentalist would say. it can justify departure from a li rule only when the efficacy of the li rule in serving its purpose remains unaffected. The Master said.23 and 3. According to the instrumentalist.I follow the practiceof bowing before ascending. Confucius describes changes in li from the Hsia to the Shang and then to the Chou dynasty. although it is contraryto the majority.16 As further evidence. These passages do not yet imply a justification for the changes or for Confucius' preference for Chou /i. "A great question indeed. 27 Oct 2014 10:15:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . This li rule serves as a means of paying homage to the prince.it is better to have grief than to observe every formality.218 on Mon.

The Master said. "Do not look if it is contraryto li. The definitionalist may also cite 1. A second observation apparently favoring the definitionalist interpretation is Confucius' generally conservative attitude toward li as evidenced throughout the Analects.2. along with 2.can be justified. although Confucius sometimes speaks as if observing li is a means to cultivating jen. where Confucius explains filial piety in terms of the observance of li. the definitionalist will take Confucius to be saying that the observance of li is. and not from others. If a person can for one day k'o chi fu i. He emphasizes adherence to tradi.10. And Confucius' observation that grief is what is important to mourning suggests that he regards grief as the basis to the li rules governing mourning-so long as such grief is present and appropriately expressed. there are two observations about Confucius' attitude toward li which seem to fit in better with the definitionalist interpretation. it is not necessary to observe every formality.Kwong-loiShun 465 This content downloaded from 50. The first is that. for example. do not speak if it is contraryto ii.14) and as someone who loves and transmits ancient culture (7."However we read the expression. where Confucius describes filial piety as a basis (pen) of jen. constitutive of jen.1: Yen Yuan asked about jen. he presents himself as an advocate of traditional Chou li (3. This reading the definitionalist will regard as supported by the rest of the passage." Yen Yuan said. he also speaks of it as constitutive of jen." or as "succeeding in aligning oneself with ii. the two passages are supposed to show that Confucius regards the observance of li as standing to jen in a much closer relation than that of a mere instrumental relation. the passage 12. While the two observations described above seem to fit in better with the instrumentalist interpretation.1. The attainment of jen comes from oneself. 7. in which Confucius explains jen in terms of //i-like behavior and attitudes.5. in the sense that it is an essential component of and a starting point for cultivating jen. 27 Oct 2014 10:15:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Taken together. all under Heaven will regardhim as havingjen." and whether we take the object of "k'o" to be "chi" (oneself) or "chi fu li" (aligning oneself with li). and we may depart from or revise li rules in light of economic consideration. do not listen if it is contraryto li.2. "MayI ask about the items of this?" The Master said. at least in part. For example. in which Confucius explains what he has in mind in terms of the general observance of li in all areas of life. "K'o chi fu li constitutes jen.218 on Mon. the definitionalist may also cite 12. the expression "k'o chi fu li" can be translated as "subduing oneself and returning to the observance of /i. Take." Depending on whether we take "k'o" to mean "subdue" or "succeed in. do not act if it is contrary to ii.20).200.'7 As further evidence that Confucius regards the observance of li as constitutive of jen.

19 On the other hand. Confucius' conservative attitude toward li appears to support the definitionalist interpretation. Forexample. 3. I am not myself endorsing these readings. he will have difficulty accommodating all the passages. As mentioned earlier. Forexample. a conflict which may be explained in terms of either an & West East Philosophy inconsistency in Confucius' thinking or the inauthenticity of certain parts 466 This content downloaded from 50. Now. for each of the two interpretations. it is difficult to see how it can accommodate Confucius' endorsement in 9. he will have difficulty making sense of 12.218 on Mon.200.3 of a departure from an existing rule of i. 27 Oct 2014 10:15:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . there are passages which fit in better with that interpretation than with the other. even if we take the possible alternative readings of the relevant passages into consideration. can also be read as saying that observing liis the manner in which (rather than the means by which) one puts rightness into practice.20 Suppose we grant that. this would explain why there is no room for such revision. A passage cited in support of one interpretation may be given an alternative reading on which it no longer supHlUM2_ ports that interpretation.tional i practices (for example.1 and the other passages cited in support of the observation that Confucius sometimes speaks as if observing li is (at least in part) constitutive of jen. for example. if jen is defined in terms of the general observance of existing li practices. So. such as 15. This may seem to show that there is a conflict between different parts of the Analects. how the instrumentalist may try to accommodate the passages usually cited in support of the definitionalist interpretation. I believe it is not possible to come up with a way of reading allthe relevant passages that is not artificial but that makes all the passages compatible with one of the two interpretations. On the other hand.18. without introducing an artificial reading of the passage. showing that the departure from li he occasionally advocates (for example.17).3) is only a departure against the background of a general adherence to li. in 15. if participation in li is a mere means for cultivating and expressing jen. The instrumentalist can account for Confucius' conservative attitude toward li by appealing to Confucius' optimism that the existing li practices do perform well the function of cultivating and expressing jen." which the instrumentalist takes to mean that observing li is a means to putting rightness into practice. the expression "liyi hsing chih. Consider. although I think the ways of reading the relevant passages described above are possible readings. 9. in which case the passage no longer provides support for the instrumentalist interpretation.10. which has just been considered.18. and by citing the fact that some kind of stability is needed for them to perform this function. 3.18 Still. while the definitionalist may dispute the reading of some of the passages cited in support of the instrumentalist interpretation. Still.1. we would expect more room for the revision of existing li practices.

Let us first consider a couple of examples of such a relation. For example. doubt. Suppose we characterize the mastery of a concept as the capacity to have thoughts of a certain kind. Rather.200. getting married and performing the particular motions employed in this community for wedding ceremonies do not stand in the relation in terms of which the definitionalist interpretation is characterized. we need to introduce a kind of relation different from those in terms of which the instrumentalist and definitionalist interpretations have been characterized. the fact that it resolves the apparent conflict will count in its favor. on a ceremonious occasion of a certain kind. So.2' However. it being left open that different communities may have different ceremonial procedures for the undertaking of such commitments. I do not think we are yet justified in drawing this conclusion. since there remains the possibility that there is a third interpretation that can accommodate the apparently conflicting textual evidence. conjecture. So. On the other hand. for otherwise we would not have been able to make sense of people's getting married by some other ceremonial procedure in a different community. 27 Oct 2014 10:15:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . If we can find such an interpretation. given the practice of the community. 111 For this purpose.218 on Mon. just as we can speak of Chinese and English as different languages. that Confucius had many disciples. the former just constitutes the latter. within this community. In what follows.of the text. to master the concept of the past is to have the capacity to have the thoughts (to believe. such as exchanging rings. we can also speak of different ways of talking about the past as different languages about Kwong-loiShun 467 This content downloaded from 50. Imagine a community in which the only way of getting married is for the partners to perform certain motions. For example. allowing a language to be of varying scope. and so forth. suppose we understand language in the sense of a symbolism in which thoughts can be verbally expressed. performing these motions and getting married are not separate occurrences which happen to be causally related.10. rather. it is not the case that getting married is defined in terms of the performance of these particular motions on ceremonious occasions of this particular kind. and so forth) that Socrates was a Greek. our conception of marriage is the conception of an institution in which partners undertake certain commitments to each other by following some appropriate ceremonial procedure. Also. two people's performing the appropriate motions on the appropriate occasion is both necessary and sufficient for their getting married. Now. I will develop such an interpretation. Moreover. The second example concerns the relation between the mastery of a concept and the mastery of a corresponding linguistic practice. the two do not stand in the mere instrumental relation in terms of which the instrumentalist interpretation is characterized.

for otherwise we would not have been able to make sense of the concept's being shared by members of a different community with a different linguistic practice. and suppose that it is given verbal expression by a certain linguistic practice in a certain community. instantiation of B is both necessary and sufficient for the instantiation of A.10. Within that community. and this is not because A and B are related by some ordinary causal relation.218 on Mon. On the other hand. given the linguistic practice of the community. it is much less controversial that such dependence relation obtains for some concepts. So. within this community. while it is a subject of controversy whether mastery of concepts is generally dependent on mastery of corresponding linguistic practices. given the conventional practice of that community. a person's mastery of the concept and mastery of the corresponding linguistic practice are not distinct capacities which happen to be causally related. the two do not stand in the relation in terms of which the definitionalist interpretation is characterized. mastery of the corresponding linguistic practice is not only necessary. and an item B (performing certain motions on a ceremonious occasion of a certain kind. which concerns the observance of a certain conventional practice of a community. A and B do not stand in a mere instrumental relation. but also sufficient. such as the concept of the past. the two capacities do not stand in the mere instrumental relation in terms of which the instrumentalist interpretation is characterized. which can be instantiated in different communities.200. Moreover. On the other hand.22 468 This content downloaded from 50. Rather. So. we cannot conceive of one of the two being instantiated without the other. mastery of the concept is not defined in terms of mastery of the particular linguistic practice in use in this community. a person's ability to use correctly and respond appropriately to the use of the corresponding language will be sufficient for our attributing to the person the capacity to have thoughts of the relevant kind. this allowing for the possibility that different communities may have different practices playing the appropriate PhilosophyEast& West role. neither is A defined in terms of B. mastery of a concept). our conception of A is the conception of something whose instantiation requires the observance of some appropriate conventional practice. Within this community. Let us take a concept of this kind. To master a linguistic practice is to have the capacity to use a language correctly in appropriate circumstances and to respond in appropriate ways to its use. mastery of a certain linguistic practice). Now. Rather. for we can conceive of A's being instantiated in a different community with a practice different from but playing a role similar to B. Our two examples illustrate a relation of the following kind between an item A (getting married.the past. 27 Oct 2014 10:15:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . So. for the mastery of the concept. we cannot make sense of a member of the community having one but not the other of the two capacities.

it is not defined in terms of it as the concept can be shared by other linguistic communities.200. (2) that revision of or departure from an actually existing li rule can be justified by economic or some other consideration.10. although mastery of the concept is constituted by mastery of the linguistic practice. First. constitutive of jen. at least in part. there is a sense in which the mastery of the linguistic practice is constitutive of mastery of the concept. this appears to show that the two pairs of observations are in conflict. 27 Oct 2014 10:15:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Third. The apparent conflict can be resolved if we regard jen and li as related by the kind of relation just described. So. the latter is both necessary and sufficient for the former. as long as this does not affect its efficacy in performing the function described in (1). and it is inconceivable that a member of the community should have one but not the other of the two capacities. We saw earlier that there appears to be a conflict between two pairs of observations describing Confucius' attitude toward the relation. and (3) that the general observance of li is. Since mastery of the concept 'transcends' mastery of the linguistic practice in this way. The following are four plausible observations concerning how mastery of the concept and mastery of the linguistic practice are related.Let us return to the relation between jen and li. there is a sense in which observing the linguistic practice can be described as a means to acquiring and later expressing that concept. it provides a perspective for assessing revision of the linguistic practice. The first pair of observations can be more easily accommodated on the instrumentalist than on the definitionalist interpretation. Having mastered the concept through having been brought up in the linguistic practice. while the reverse is true of the second pair of observations. (4) a generally conservative attitude toward the existing ii practices. members of the community can propose revisions to simplify the existing Kwong-loiShun 469 This content downloaded from 50.within the community. Second. Since the two interpretations are opposed.218 on Mon. and suppose that the concept is expressed by a certain linguistic practice in a certain community. Take a concept of the kind mastery of which is dependent on mastery of a corresponding linguistic practice. since mastery of the concept 'transcends' mastery of the linguistic practice. The point can be illustrated by a comparison with the relation between mastery of a concept and mastery of a corresponding linguistic practice. all of which appear to have some textual basis: (1) that observance of li is a means to cultivating and expressing jen.

there is a constraint on the extent of the revision at any particular time. the attitude can be described as a sense of dependence on or indebtedness to one's ancestors for one's present existence and the present conditions of one's existence. A similar attitude toward a recently deceased parent also admits of nonconventional expression. second. Consider a member of a community in which there is no conven- 470 This content downloaded from 50. In this case. 27 Oct 2014 10:15:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . if we regard the possession of jen and the general observance of li as related in a similar manner. this sense of dependence or indebtedness leading to a reverential attitude. Roughly. This accounts for a generally conservative attitude toward the linguistic practice actually in existence.23 Now. To develop this suggestion. as one may have no idea of what their wishes may be. the attitude may be expressed in one's providing support for parents and in one's general obedience to their wishes. Since the concept itself is made available to members of the community by the existing linguistic practice. Fourth. the attitude may admit of nonconventional expression. no such nonconventional expression may be available. that is. In this case. These four observations parallel respectively the third. the kind of practices to which the character "li" originally refers. first. However. although revisions may be justified by such considerations as simplicity. to simplify discussion. For him. a similar attitude of indebtedness and reverence can be directed toward one's living parents. but. This shows that. one may continue to act in conformity with their wishes and avoid doing what would have been displeasing in their eyes if they were alive. For example. let us first try it out in the case of sacrificial rites. the importance of such sacrifices derives from their association with a certain attitude toward ancestors. One may conduct such sacrifices with the belief that ancestral spirits literally exist as intelligent beings who are able to respond to sacrifices by bestowing good fortune.PhilosophyEast& West practice as long as this does not affect its efficacy in expressing the concept. Such sacrifices can be directed toward other objects. let us confine our attention to sacrifices to ancestors. While this may describe the way these sacrifices have been conducted in times earlier than that of Confucius. thereby ruling out the possibility of a more comprehensive revision. I take it that this is not the kind of rationale Confucius sees in such sacrifices. For example. in the case of long-deceased ancestors with whom one had no previous personal contact. the only channel for expressing one's indebtedness and reverence may be through conventional practices such as rites of sacrifice. and fourth of the four observations about the relation between jen and i.10. expression in behavior the suitability of which for expressing the attitude is not dependent on the existence of appropriate conventional practices.218 on Mon.200. we will be able to resolve the apparent conflict between the four observations. any revision has to proceed against the background of a general acceptance of the existing practice.

and we cannot correctly ascribe the attitude to an individual unless that person belongs to a community in which some such practice exists and unless he or she is generally disposed to observe such a practice. If we look at the relation between the attitude and the corresponding practice in the manner just described. given that possession of the attitude 'transcends' participation in the rites. having come to acquire the attitude through having been brought up to participate in such rites. given that there is no nonconventional manifestation of the attitude under consideration. for it can be instantiated in other communities with different conventional practices associated with the attitudes. Fourth. although revision can be justified in the manner described.200. In ancient Chinese society. Second.10.tional practice associated with such an attitude or. as long as this does not affect the efficacy of the revised practices in cultivating and expressing the attitude. and so there is a sense in which general participation in sacrificial rites is constitutive of one's possessing the attitude under consideration. however. First. leaves it open that the attitude may be manifested in the observance of different conventional practices in different communities. So. As there is no nonconventional manifestation of the attitude. This. within the community. members of the community can propose revisions in the rites on the basis of economic consideration. There is reason Kwong-loiShun 471 This content downloaded from 50. it provides a perspective from which revision of the existing ritual practices can be assessed. and thereby provides a sense in which participation in such rites is a means to cultivating and expressing the attitude. and as this individual does not engage in some appropriate conventional practice manifesting the attitude. That is. it has to proceed against the background of a general acceptance of the existing practices. the following four observations follow. if the community has such a practice. we cannot conceive of one of the two obtaining without the other. general participation in sacrificial rites (with the proper spirit)is both necessary and sufficient for one's having an attitude of indebtedness and reverence toward ancestors. there was an established practice of sacrifices to ancestors (to be conducted with the proper spirit)associated with such an attitude. a practice to which the character "li" originally referred. Third. For example. there will be no basis for our ascribing to this person the attitude of indebtedness and reverence toward ancestors. possession of the attitude 'transcends' participation in the actually existing sacrificial rites. a member who does not engage in the practice. 27 Oct 2014 10:15:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Moreover. our conception of the attitude is the conception of something manifested in the observance of some appropriate conventional practice. since it is the existing practices which make available to members of the community the attitude under consideration.218 on Mon. the attitude is not defined in terms of general participation in the sacrificial rites actually existing in this community. within the community.

jen is an ideal which is intelligible and can be shown to have a validity independent of li. and li. it is not totally determined by li since advocacy of the ideal allows room for departing from or revising an existing rule of ii. We therefore see how jen and li may be related in the way in which the relevant attitudes toward ancestors and sacrificial rites were related.10. While the character "/i" originally referred to sacrificial rites.to oppose any change initiated without good reason. This explains why.218 on Mon. What results is a cluster of emotional dispositions and attitudes which stand to the traditional norms in the same kind of relation in which the attitude of indebtedness and reverence originally stood to sacrificial rites. IV PhilosophyEast& West On the instrumentalist interpretation. and any arbitrary departure would demonstrate a lack of seriousness. Although Confucius does not advocate an unconditional observance 472 This content downloaded from 50. Jen comprises this cluster of emotional dispositions and attitudes. the relevant practices have to be relatively stable to perform their function. imagine that.24 As the next step in working out our proposal. comprises the various norms governing human conduct. there will be a generally conservative attitude toward the existing ritual practices. On the definitionalist interpretation. its use has gradually expanded to include traditional norms governing human conduct in other areas of life.200. Its ability to resolve the apparent conflict provides support for this alternative interpretation. the four observations concerning the latter relation also hold true of the relation between jen and li. and this shows how the apparent conflict between the two pairs of observations about the relation between jen and li can be resolved on this interpretation of the relation. along with the expansion of the scope of li. as long as the relevant attitude is regarded as desirable within the community. the kind of emotional dispositions and attitudes associated with li have also broadened to include not just the attitude of indebtedness and reverence toward ancestors. li is a means to realizing this ideal and is to be evaluated in terms of its efficacy in performing this function. However. My proposed interpretation lies between the two extremes. as against the instrumentalist and definitionalist interpretations. Moreover. a jen person is just someone who generally observes the actually existing li practices. in the expanded sense. and advocacy of the jen ideal is linked to an extreme conservatism toward li. the ideal of jen is shaped by the actually existing li practices in that it is not intelligible and cannot be shown to have a validity independent of li. On this interpretation. 27 Oct 2014 10:15:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . but also various emotional dispositions and attitudes (such as respect for elders) directed toward other people with whom one's relations are governed by traditional norms.

or one's reputation going beyond the way one actually is (Mencius 4B:18).27). the notion yi is related to that of disgrace (ju). although there are examples of yi behavior which are a matter of following li. 27 Oct 2014 10:15:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . not-yi is linked to disgrace in both the Mo Tzu (3/6) and a Yangist chapter of the Lii-shih ch'un-ch'iu (2/7b. it is explained by the observation that any departure from or revision of a rule of li has to proceed against the background of a general acceptance of the existing li practices and has to be based on good reasons. and probably also by Confucius' optimism that the existing li practices do function well and that there is little basis for departure or revision. and one typical example of behavior which is not-yi found in the Mencius (Meng Tzu) is that of subjecting oneself to insulting treatment. In the Mencius. in its earlier use.of li. which differ from ordinary standards concerning what is disgraceful.5-9). it is also an object of shame (ch'ih). and. such as the distinction in the Hsun Tzu between disgrace linked to yi(yi-ju) and ordinary or social disgrace (shih-ju) (Hsuin Tzu 18/104-111). it remains the case that he has a generally conservative attitude toward li. of course. although the text describes circumstances in which li may be overridden by other considerations so that it is appropriate not to follow a rule of li in some situations (4A:17.5 Disgrace is something to which one has an aversion (wu). still refer to as disgrace the falling short of the standards that define yi. ~. oneself in a way that other objects of aversion do not. This makes possible the linking of yi to standards differing from ordinary standards of disgrace. It is likely that. or the kinds of situations one allows oneself to be in. That Confucius does not advocate an unconditional observance of li is related to the use of the notion yi in the Analects. need not be disgrace in the ordinary sense. On the proposed interpretation. But since one may subscribe to standards concerning the things one does. such as not imposing heavy taxation (3B:8) or not taking from the common people in certain ways (5B:4). there are also examples of yi behavior which are not a matter of following li. One can.10. Rather. what is regarded as reflecting negatively on oneself.200. by the observation that Confucius regards jen as merely a matter of generally observing ii. For example. but doing so will call for a distinction between two kinds of disgrace. it is unlikely that yi is similarly Kwong-loiShun 473 This content downloaded from 50. and hence the object of shame. shame (ch'ih) can be directed to such things as being an official in a state in which the Way does not prevail (Analects 14. Also. to the extent that it reflects negatively on . such as accepting food given in an insulting manner (6A:10) or seeing a prince when the prince summons one in a manner inappropriate to one's status (5B:7). this conservatism is not explained. Mencius 5B:5).218 on Mon. as it is on the definitionalist interpretation.1. such as pouring wine first for certain individuals in ancestral temples (6A:5). 6B:1). one's words exceeding one's deeds (Analects 14.

after setting up the distinction between the instrumentalist and the definitionalist interpretations. the distinction is not intended as an exhaustive classification of interpretations actually found in the literature. and governs one's behavior in circumstances in which li does not provide guidance. The second component. Ch'en Ta-ch'i has observed that Confucius allows room for departing from or revising existing rules of li if there are grounds for doing so. while D. but serves only as a heuristic device to prepare the ground for introducing my proposed interpretation. is highlighted not only by those interpretations in the literature which lie close to the instrumentalist interpretation. On the proposed interpretation of Confucius' conception of the relation between jen and li. but also by other interpretations. It seems that yi has to do with the appropriateness or rightness of one's behavior. My proposed interpretation has two components. unlike the definitionalist interpretation. there can be grounds for revising or departing from a rule of ii.10. one should observe the rule only because it is appropriate or right to do. 27 Oct 2014 10:15:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .18). it acknowledges the role of li in shaping the ethical ideal of jen. and one is supposed always to abide by yi (4B:11). and this explains Confucius' observation that one's behavior should always be in accord with yi (4. To give a more complete picture of the kinds of interpretations that have been proposed and of the relation of my proposed interpretation to them. I discussed interpretations in the literature which lie close to one or the other of the two extremes.That there can be grounds for such revision or departure shows that. which is not just a matter of following i. The notion of yi is less prominent in the Analects than in the Mencius. Unlike the instrumentalist interpretation.10) and that yi is the substance which li puts into practice (15. For example. As I mentioned. Antonio S. yi underlies both the observance of and departure from li. Lau has likewise inter- 474 This content downloaded from 50. which is related to the conception of the relation between yi and li just described. I conclude by briefly considering some other interpretations found in the literature.26 Also.PhilosophyEast& West viewed. but it is likely that the conception of yi and of the relation between yi and li just described is already emerging in the Analects. rather. Cua has pointed out that Confucius regards yi as a sense of appropriateness which is important in applying rules of li to particular cases. and. C. This notion of appropriateness or rightness is probably captured by the notion yi in the Analects. and Tu Wei-ming has observed that Confucius advocates a critical attitude toward existing /i. Earlier. it is stated without qualification that yi is always more important than life (6A:10).200. rather. and this calls for a notion of appropriateness or rightness which allows one to say that these grounds make it appropriate or right thus to revise or depart from the rule of Ii. it allows for the possibility of departing from or revising an existing rule of li if there is good reason for doing so. even when a rule of li should be observed.218 on Mon.

these authors have not presented their interpretations in a way that warrants ascribing to them anything close to the instrumentalist interpretation. The first component of my proposed interpretation."28Though these remarks may suggest something close to the definitionalist interpretation. closer to its present form and written in 1987."and one should "retain a certain critical independence" from /i. that concerning the role of li in shaping the jen ideal. for Confucius. 1987.218 on Mon. has also been highlighted by interpretations in the literature which do not obviously lie close to the definitionalist interpretation.preted Confucius' conception of the relation between yiand li in the way just described. Hall and Roger T. For example. li is "reformable" and "corrigible. Ames have proposed an interpretation according to which Confucius stresses the contribution of li in shaping the human ideal. they also observe that Confucius is not a rigid conservative. Furthermore. an idea they expressed in terms of the "irreducibly social context of person making. held in Berkeley on November 14. and some of these may even be close to my proposed interpretation. Although the kind of interpretation I propose is not entirely novel. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for Philosophy East and West for substantive suggestions. 27 Oct 2014 10:15:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . it shows how this kind of interpretation has an advantage over the other two in that it can make better sense of the relevant passages in the Analects.200. many of which Kwong-loiShun 475 This content downloaded from 50."30At the same time. In addition.29 Similarly. The latter version was presented at the 1987 annual meeting of the Western Branch of the American Oriental Society."and jen is "the shaping of oneself in /l. Fingarette may have an interpretation closer to my proposed interpretation. the jen person is someone "perfected in li.27 Despite emphasizing the possibility of a critical assessment of li. what the discussion above has done is to spell out its nature in detail and in different terms. and from extensive written comments by Chad Hansen on a longer version. and I have benefitted from comments by the participants. Herbert Fingarette has emphasized the role of li in shaping jen.10. David L. but emphasizes yi as a capacity to adapt inherited culture critically and creatively to one's own circumstances. for him. since he also observes in other contexts that. there are interpretations in the literature which do not lie close to either the instrumentalist or the definitionalist interpretation. Nivison on a much shorter version of this essay written in 1984. NOTES I have benefitted from comments by David S.31 So. and to locate it in the literature by showing how it lies between two other kinds of interpretations.

1985). 3 . 5. 71.pp. 240."in Neo-Confucianism. pp.10. 92 n."Li"as used in the Analects is regardedas referringto all rules of human conduct by LaoSze-kwang. 7 L--fi Philosophy East & West 7. (HongKong:ChungChi Collegeof the ChineseUniversityof Hong Kong. ) 1 . The Chinese Classics."Monumenta Serica (Journalof OrientalStudies) 31 (1974-1975):172-183. 1969). LinYu-sheng"TheEvolution of the Pre-ConfucianMeaningof Jen and the ConfucianConcept of MoralAutonomy.Referencesto the Shih Chingare by poem and (ifapplicable)stanza numbers.A E.Referencesto the Tso Chuanare by page and line numbers.1980). Schwartz. 23. a( (AL: 4^^ R L N i bE:. 2d ed.p.Disputers of the Tao(Open Court. Tu Wei-ming.1960). 19.Proponentsof this view includeT'angChun-i.1989). ArthurWaley.1974).1982). and to discuss other interpretationsin the literaturegoing beyond those consideredin section II.Chung-kuoszu-hsiangshih lun-chihsu-p'ien(Taipei:Shih-paoWen-hua Ch'u-pan-shih-yeh Yu-hsien-kung-szu.Etc. 67-68. 4 . 358-365. 1.1976). and Wing-tsit Chan.Chung-kuoche-hsueh shih. trans. *.f . 1.200. Lun-yu i-chu..it. TheAnalects of Confucius (GeorgeAllen & Unwin.vol.in responseto the referee'ssuggestion that there is a need to discuss in detail the notion of yi and its relationto li. (Taipei:TaiwanHsueh-sheng Shu-chu.pp.pp.218 on Mon.I have incorporated. Ts'aiShang-szu. ConfucianThought:Selfhoodas CreativeTransformation (Albany:State Universityof New YorkPress. The Ch'unTs'ewwith The Tso Chuen(HongKong:Hong KongUniversity Press. C.Chung-kuoche-hsueh yuan-lun:yuan-tao-p'ien."TheEvolutionof the ConfucianConcept Jen. C.using InstituteSinologicalIndexSeries:A the text in the Harvard-Yenching Concordanceto Hsun Tzu. 40.The whole of section IVis an expansionof a couple of footnotes in the submittedversion.The Worldof Thoughtin Ancient China(Harvard UniversityPress.1982). 2.vol. 27. p. ( P4i: so4 at &WSt T ) -*t. A. ed. and A.using the text in James Legge.S.p. 2 . 238. 6 .K'ung-tzuszu-hsiangt'i-hsi (Shanghai:ShanghaiJen-minCh'u-pan-she.:Essaysby Wing-tsitChan(HongKong:OrientalSociety.1938). rev.p.Proponentsof this view includeHsuFu-kuan. Chan observes that "jen" has the connotation of the kindnessof rulersto their subjects.Referencesto the Analects are by passage numbers. 2d ed. 27 Oct 2014 10:15:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . 1985).p. and BenjaminI. citing FangYing-hsienon p. (Peking:Chung-huaShu-chu. vol. 84-85. Graham. 5 .Referencesto the Hsun Tzuare by chapter and line numbers. trans.followingthe numbering of passages in Yang Po-chun. Graham(Disputersof 476 This content downloaded from 50.

pp. and regards Confucius' espousal of the jen ideal.I am indebted to Chad Hansen for pointing out the need to address these issues. Hsu Fu-kuan (Chung-kuo jen-hsing-lun shih) p. pp. Charles Wei-hsun Fu gives a similar interpretation of Confucius in his "Fingarette and Munro on Early Confucianism: A Methodological Examination. 311-312.218 on Mon. Lun-Yuhsin-t'an. 11) seems to regard li as restricted to the ceremonious in the Analects. cites both 3. Lin Yu-sheng. the remainder of this section has been added in response to his comments. (Taipei:Taiwan Shang-wu Yin-shu-kuan. 2d ed. 90. and in Graham's review of Schwartz' book in Times Literary Supplement (July 18. 106-107. 90. as an attempt by Confucius to oppose the disintegration of the feudal system. C. vol. pp. 69.1 (Lun-Yu hsin-t'an.Chao Chi-pin.EW.1 as the key passage for understanding Confucius' conception of the relation between jen and li (K'ung-tzu szuhsiang t'i-hsi.Chao Chi-pin builds his interpretation of Confucius on an elaborate discussion of 12. pp. 193-196. 14."p. 11 . Graham (Disputers of the Tao. 15 . 106-107).Reservations about the use of psychological locutions have been expressed by Herbert Fingarette in his Confucius: The Secular as Sacred (Harper & Row. Schwartz (World of Thought. -dA Pia &if) 1976).For example. 17 . 9 . 1975)." in Philosophy East and West 28 (1978): 181-198.Hsu Fu-kuan. 3.18 in support of his interpretation of Confucius."pp.3 and 15. Chao takes the further step (ALS>A P EM of identifying li with the feudal system of western Chou. 2 (Peking:Jen-min Ch'u-pan-she. 288-290. tN PmA tit e~fP il-M. Kwong-loiShun 477 This content downloaded from 50. 10. "Evolution. 288-325). pp.3 in support of his interpretation of Confucius. and defended by A. 8- For example. understood in terms of the general observance of li. LinYu-sheng ("Evolution. 238-240. pp. 18- Cf. 80-81) argues against Herbert Fingarette that there are aspects of jen which have no obvious relation to li.LinYu-sheng.For example. 12. section II.Ts'ai Shang-szu. pp. mm^mt 13 . 16 . especially chap. they have been challenged by Benjamin I. Schwartz (World of Thought. 307-309. "Evolution. 195) cites 9.10. 282-285. K'ung-tzu szu-hsiang t'i-hsi. 1972).the Tao. 196.l~ t a ( Ak : ^aSAP mXff. 1986).200."p. Fingarette's claims are still a subject of controversy. pp. and Ts'ai Shangszu likewise regards 12. 27 Oct 2014 10:15:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . 25-27). Chung-kuo jen-hsing-lun shih: hsien Ch'in p'ien. Benjamin I. p. jLht. 72-85).

which apparently gives priority to jen over li.200. Lin Yu-sheng translates the phrase as "to master oneself and return to /i.10. but am just spelling out the nature of a phenomenon considered in various subfields of philosophy. pp.3.1 as "self-restraint and submission to /i. 188). such as J. 30-31. Austin's work on performative utterances and John Searle's work on speech acts. 27 Oct 2014 10:15:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .I mentioned that it is not clear how broad the scope of application of "li" is. Raymond Dawson.Arthur Waley (The Analects. p. Taking 12."and then claims that Confucius' emphasis is on self-restraint. the overcoming of selfish desire. it is unclear why we should regard the passage as emphasizing selfrestraint more than the observance of li and how the idea of a naturally endowed moral quality comes into the picture.Charles Wei-hsun Fu translates "k'o chi fu li" in 12.Earlier. in the sense that li can still exist even if people are not jen.1. 22 .Chao Chi-pin (Lun-Yuhsin-t'an. The discussion in this paragraph does not require our determining the actual scope of li. I have not discussed the work of any particular philosopher in connection with the relation. p.. 1981). 311) interprets 3. which apparently gives priority to li and defines jen in terms of the observance of ii.218 on Mon.References to the Mo Tzuare by chapter and line numbers. Since I am not relying on the work of any particular philosopher in characterizing the relation. whether we construe the scope of li more broadly to include all norms of conduct or more narrowly to include only norms of ceremonious behavior.19 . such as the philosophy of action. 61) describes the attitude of reverence and love as the prevailing attitude toward the dead among the upper classes of Confucius' time. 194). 20 . in his Confucius (New York: Hilland Wang. as the character is used in the Analects. The observation is plausible. 24 .1 by itself." p. L. 23 .For example. 21 .An anonymous referee has observed that the kind of relation I am discussing has been considered in contemporary writings in the philosophy of language. rather than on li ("Fingarette and Munro. and I think this kind of relation has also been considered in other subfields in philosophy.3 as emphasizing the priority of li over jen."and takes Confucius to be saying that "to master the cultivation of a naturally endowed moral quality within the structure of the proper social and ritual norms is the way to achieve moral excellence" (ibid. p. PhilosophyEast& West 25 . refers to a "conflict" between 3. since the proposal is that we should look at Confucius' conception of the relation between jen and li in the manner described. using the text in the Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series: A 478 This content downloaded from 50. This I find an artificial reading of the passage. and 12.

27 Oct 2014 10:15:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . 100.Concordance to Mo Tzu.. Lau. References to the Lu-shih ch'un-ch'iu are by volume. 1964).200. 30. Thematic Issue S. and line numbers. 28 . 47.Antonio S. p. Ref. m=tmtV. pp. 150-152. 48. K'ung-tzu hsueh-shuo (Taipei:Cheng-chung Shu-chu. Ames. page. 84. Thinking Through Confucius (Albany: State University of New York Press. 29 . 31 . Kwong-loiShun 479 This content downloaded from 50. and Tu Wei-ming. 30- David L. Cua. 1987)." Journal of the American Academy of Religion. 1979). pp.Ch'en Ta-ch'i.10. Humanity and Self-Cultivation: Essays in Confucian Thought (Berkeley:Asian Humanities Press. C. RLWa (AiL::E A) 27 . pp. 26 . 47-50. 21.trans.( JLk':VP )E erences to the Mencius (Meng-tzu) are by chapter and passage numbers. Hall and Roger T. ?At." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 11 (1984):230. 108-111. pp..218 on Mon.Herbert Fingarette. Vtw Lu-shih ch'un-ch'iu chi-shih (Peking: Chung-kuo Shu-tien. "Following the 'One Thread' of the Analects. Confucius: The Analects (Penguin Books. using the text in Hsu Wei-yu. 1985). "Confucian Vision and Human Community. 1979). 22. 84. using the text in the Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series: A Concordance to Meng Tzu. pp. no. 37-39.Ibid. and D.Herbert Fingarette Confucius: The Secular as Sacred. 3 (1980): 390-391.