COMPENDIUM OF

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
CASE DIGESTS

By 2nd Year - Special Section – A
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CASES /GR NO. / SCRA / PHIL
PAGE NO.
Arbia vs. Republic GR 173808 ----------------------------------------------------------------------2
2008Alcantara vs. DENR GR 161881 2008 --------------------------------------------------------4
Buenaventura vs. Republic GR 186865 2007 ----------------------------------------------------6
Republic vs Candymaker GR 163766 2006 --------------------------------------------------------7
Republic vs Heirs of Lachica-Sin GR 157485 2014 -----------------------------------------------8
Carino vs Insular Government 41 Phil 935
Cruz vs DENR GR 135385 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------10

1

Sec of DENR vs Yap GR 167707 ----------------------------------------------------------------------12
Central Mindanao University vs Executive Secretary GR 184869 ---------------------------13
Malabanan vs Republic GR 179987 -----------------------------------------------------------------15
Ching vs Malaya 153 SCRA 412 ----------------------------------------------------------------------17
Legarda vs Saleeby GR 8936 --------------------------------------------------------------------------19
Vagilidad vs Vagilidad GR 16136 ---------------------------------------------------------------------20
Castillo vs Escutin GR 171056 -------------------------------------------------------------------------23
Phil National Bank vs CA 153 SCRA 435 -------------------------------------------------------------26
Bornales vs Court of Appeals 166 SCRA 519 -------------------------------------------------------28
Viajar vs CA 168 SCRA 435 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------30
Coronel vs IAC 155 SCRA 270 --------------------------------------------------------------------------31
Galloy vs CA 173 SCRA 26 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------33
Hacienda Bigaa, Inc. Vs Chavez GR 174160
---------------------------------------------------------34
Director of Forestry vs Munoz 23 SCrA 1183 -------------------------------------------------------35
Acosta vs Salazar GR 160134 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------37
SM Prime Holding vs Madayag GR 164687 ---------------------------------------------------------39
Manotok vs Barque GR 1622335 ----------------------------------------------------------------------41
Santiago vs SBMA GR 156888 --------------------------------------------------------------------------43
Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro vs CA GR 103727
---------------------------------- 45
Baranda vs Gustilo 165 SCRA 757 ---------------------------------------------------------------------46
Ledesma vs Villsensor 13 SCRA 494
-------------------------------------------------------------------47
Almirol vs Register of Deeds 22 SCRA 1152
---------------------------------------------------------50
Balbin vs Register of Deeds 28 SCRA 12
-------------------------------------------------------------51
Gallardo vs IAC 155 SCRA 248 -------------------------------------------------------------------------52
Canete vs Genuino Ice Co GR 154080 ---------------------------------------------------------------53

2

Republic vs CA 131 SCRA 532 --------------------------------------------------------------------------55
Republic vs Alagad 169 SCRA 466 ---------------------------------------------------------------------56
Municipality of Antipolo vs Zapanta 133 SCRA 820
-----------------------------------------------58
Martinez vs CA 66 SCRA 674 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------59
Navera vs Qunicho 5 SCRA 454
-------------------------------------------------------------------------62
Ampoloqio vs CA 232 SCRA 47
Laurel vs Garcia 187 SCRA 797
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 63
Republic vs CA 83 SCRA 453
----------------------------------------------------------------------------65
Navera vs Quicho 5 SCRA 454 -----------------------------------------------------------------------67
Republic vs Ayala y Sia 14 SCRA 259
------------------------------------------------------------------69
Hilario vs City of Manila 19 SCRA 931
-----------------------------------------------------------------71
Republic vs Soison 9 SCRA 533
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 72
Martines vs CA 56 SCRA 647
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 74
Republic vs CA 132 SCRA 514
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 76
Land Bank vs Rep GR 150824
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 77
Diaz vs Republic GR 181502
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 78
Director of Forestry vs Villareal 170 SCRA 598
--------------------------------------------------------- 81
Tongson vs Director of Forestry 79 SCRA 130
---------------------------------------------------------- 82
Rep vs Algad 169 SCRA 455
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 84
Cagampang vs Moreno 22 SCRA 1040
------------------------------------------------------------------- 85
Dizon vs Rodriguez 13 SCRA 704
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 86
Rep vs Vda de Castillo 163 SCRA 286
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 88
Cantoja vs Lim GR 168386
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 89
Lahora vs Dayanghirang 37 SCRA 346
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 91
Lepanto Consolidated Mining vs Dumyung 89 SCRA 532
-------------------------------------------- 92

3

Atok Big Wedge Mining vs CA 193 SCRA 71
------------------------------------------------------------- 95
Mateo vs Moreno 28 SCRA 796
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 98
Rep vs CA 132 SCRA 514
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 99
Maneclang vs IAC 161 SCRA 469
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 100
Rep vs Reyes 155 SCRA 313
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 101
Director of Lands vs Aquino GR NO 31688
-------------------------------------------------------------- 103
Director of Forestry vs Munoz
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 104
Rep vs CA 73 SCRA 146
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 105
Rep vs Animas
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 107
Heirs of Ammunategui vs Director of Lands
------------------------------------------------------------ 109
Rep vs Sps Maximo 135 SCRA 156
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 113
Rep vs Marcos 152 Phil 204
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 114
Rep vs IAC 155 SCRA 412
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 116
Director of Lands vs Meralco GR No. L 57461
--------------------------------------------------------- 117
Director of Lands vs CA 179 SCRA 522
------------------------------------------------------------------- 119
Chavez vs National Housing Authority GR 1333250 Rep vs Fangonil 133 SCRA 517
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 122
Rep vs Sangalang 159 SCRA 515
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 125
Heirs of Dicman v Carino GR 146459
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 126
Rep vs Remman Enterprise GR 199310
----------------------------------------------------------------- 128
National College of Fisheries vs Heirs of Maxima Lachica-Sin GR 157485
----------------------- 130
Carlos vs Rep
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 132
Roman Catholic Archbishop vs Cresenia Sta. Teresa Ramos GR 179181
------------------------- 133
Del Rosario-Igtiben vs Rep GR 158449
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 136
Rep vs IAC and ACME GR 73002
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 138

4

Director of Lands vs Meralco 153 SCRA 186
------------------------------------------------------------- 139
Susi vs Razon GR 24066
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 141
Rep vs INC GR 180067
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 143
Palawan Agricultural and Industrial Company vs Director of Lands 44 SCRA 15
---------------- 144
Director of Land Management vs CA 205 SCRA 485
--------------------------------------------------- 146
Reyes vs Sierra 93 SCRA 472
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 147
Ramirez vs CA 144 SCRA 292
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 149
Kidpalos vs Baguio Mining 14 SCRA 913
------------------------------------------------------------------- 150
Balais-Mabanag vs Register of Deeds Quezon City GR 153142
-------------------------------------- 153
Malabanan vs Rep GR 179987
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 155
City Mayor of Paranaque vs Ebio GR 178411
---------------------------------------------------------- 156
Republic vs Diloy, GR No. 174633, 26 August 2008, 563 SCRA 413 (2008)
--------------------- 158
Republic vs de Porkan 151 Scra 88
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 160
Ong vs Republic, Gr No 175746 , 12 March 2008 , 548 Scra 160 (2008)
------------------------ 161
Miller vs Director of Lads, 12 Scra 292
------------------------------------------------------------------ 163
Roxas vs Court of Appeals 63 SCRA 302
----------------------------------------------------------------- 165
DELOS ANGELES VS SANTOS , 12 SCRA 622
------------------------------------------------------------ 166
Benin vs Tuason 57 SCRA 531
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 167
REPUBLIC VS MARASIGAN, 198 SCRA 219
--------------------------------------------------------------- 169
PO VS REPUBLIC 40 SCRA 37
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 170
FEWKES vs Vasquez, 39 SCRA 514
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 171
Republic vs CA, 236 SCRA 442
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 173
Leyva vs Jandoc, 4 Scra 595
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 175
De Castro vs Marcos, 26 SCRA 644
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 176
Regalado vs Republic, GR. No. 168155, February 17,2007
------------------------------------------ 178

5

Fernandez vs Aboratigue, 36 SCRA 476
------------------------------------------------------------------ 180
Republic of the Philippines vs Antonio Bacas, et. Al. GR No. 182913 November 20 ,
2013 --- 181
Miller vs Director of Lands, 12 SCRA 292
---------------------------------------------------------------- 183
Cachero vs Marzan, 196 SCRA 601
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 184
Esconde vs Barlongay, 152 SCRA 603
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 186
Director of Lands vs Santiago , 160 SCRA 186
----------------------------------------------------------- 189
Omico Mining vs Catolico, 63 SCRA 300
------------------------------------------------------------------ 193
Valisno vs Plano, 143 SCRA 502
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 195
Secretary of DENR vs YAP, GR NO. 167707 , October 8, 2008, 568 SCRA 164
------------------- 197
Republic vs Lee 197 SCRA
13--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 198
Laragan vs CA 153 SCRA 172
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 199
Republic vs Sayo 191 SCRA
71-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 201
SEC. OF DENR VS YAP GR NO. 167707 , October 8, 2008,
-------------------------------------------- 203
Director of Lands vs CA 129 SCRA 689 , citing Rep vs CA 99 SCRA 742
---------------------------- 206
Republic vs De Porkan, 151 SCRA 88
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 207
IHVCP vs UP 200 SCRA 554
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 210
Director of Lands vs CA 178 SCRA 708
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 211
Heirs Amuunategui vs Director of Lands 126 SCRA 69
------------------------------------------------- 213
Republic vs TAN Properties GR no. 154953, 26 June 2008, 555 SCRA 477 (2008)
--------------Repblic vs Tan
Properties--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 214
Sunbeam Conveience Foods vs CA 181 SCRA 443
--------------------------------------------------------215
Director of Lands vs CA 133 SCRA 701REPUBLIC vs CA 154 SCRA 476
------------------------------ 216
Republic vsCA 154 SCRA 476
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 217
Director of Lands vs CA 129 SCRA 689
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 216
Republic vs Bacus 176 SCRA 376
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 218

6

Republic of the Philippines vs Remman Enterprises Inc. represented by Ronnie P.
Inocencio GR. No. 199310. February19,2014
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 219
Republic Cement Corp. Vs CA. 198 SCRA 734
------------------------------------------------------------- 221
Director of Lands vs Reyes 68 SCRA 177
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 222
Republic vs Sps. Maximo 135 SCRA 156
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 224
MALABANAN VS REPUBLIC GR NO. 179987, April 29 2009
---------------------------------------------- 225
Municipality of Antipolo vs ZAPANTA. 133 SCRA 820
----------------------------------------------------- 226
Reyes vs Sierra 93 Scra 472
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 227
Regalado vs Republic GR NO. 1681155 February 15 2007
----------------------------------------------- 229
Daclag vs Macahilig GR No. 159578, July 28 2008
--------------------------------------------------------- 230
Santiago vs SBMA Gr No. 156888, November 20, 2006
-------------------------------------------------- 231
Republic vs CA 73 SCRA 146
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 233
Republic vs Sayo, 191 SCRA 71
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 234
Director of Lands vs IAC 195 SCRA 38
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 237
Director of Lands vs CA
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 239
Gomez vs CA 168 SCRA 503
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 238
Mendoza vs CA 84 SCRA 76
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 240
Caragay Layno vs CA 133 SCRA 718
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 241
Director of Lands vs CA 181 SCRA 450
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 242
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. SOFRONIO G. SAYO G.R. No. L-60413
-------------------- 245
Director of Lands vs Reyes 68 scra 177
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 246
Gomez vs ca 168 scra 503
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 249
Cayanan vs De Los Santos 21 SCRA 1348
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 250
Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs De Banavar 25 SCRA 316
---------------------------------------------------- 251
Vda. De barroza vs Albano 157 SCRA 131
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 253

7

Dela Merced vs CA 5 SCRA 240
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 254
Director of Lands vs Busuego 12 SCRA 678
------------------------------------------------------------------ 255
Eland Philippines Inc. vs Garcia GR NO 173289 February 17, 2010
------------------------------------ 257
Bolanos vs JM Tuason and Co. 37 PHIL 223
------------------------------------------------------------------ 260
Heirs of Marcos vs De Banuvar
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 261
Realty Sales vs IAC 161 SCRA 56
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 263
Manotok vs Barque GR NO. 162335, December 12, 2005
----------------------------------------------- 266
Manotok vs CLT Realty, GR No. 123346, December 14 2007
------------------------------------------- 271
Manotok vs Barque GR NO. 162335 AND 162605 , August 24 2010
---------------------------------- 273
Vencilao vs Vano 182 SCRA 491
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 274
Bernas vs Nuevo 127 SCRA 399
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 276
Lucero vs Loot 25 SCRA 687
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 278
Vda. De Barroga vs Albano 157 SCRA 131
------------------------------------------------------------------- 279
Gawaran vs IAC, 162 SCRA 154
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 282
Republic vs Diloy GR No. 174633
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 283
CHING VS. MALAYA 153 SCRA 412
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 285
Vda, de Arceo vs. CA, 184 SCRA 602
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 286
Widows and Orphans vs. CA, 201 Scra 175
----------------------------------------------------------------- 288
Pamintuan vs, San Agustin, 43 Phil,558
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 289
Gabriel vs. CA, 159 SCRA
461----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 290
City of Baguio vs. Marcos, 27 SCRA 342
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 291
Duran vs. Olivia, 3 SCRA 154
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 292
Republic vs. CA, 9 SCRA 651
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 294
Heirs of Cornelio Labrada vs. Monsanto, 131 SCRA 651
----------------------------------------------- 295
Silvestre vs. CA, 115 SCRA 63
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 297

8

Director of Lands vs CA, 106 SCRA 426
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 298
De la Merced vs. CA, 5 SCRA 145
---------------------------------------------------------------------------300
Cayanan vs. Delos Santos, 21 SCRA 1348
------------------------------------------------------------------ 302
Abellera vs Guzman, 85 Phil 738
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 305
Medina vs. Valdellon, 63 SCRA 278
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 306
Balbin vs RD, 28 SCRA 12
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 307
Republic vs CA 83 SCRA 453
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 309
Lorenzana vs CA 231 SCRA 713
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 311
Cambridge Realty and Resources Corp. vs. Eridanus Development Inc., GR no.
152445, 4 July 2008
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------312
Pagaduan vs. Ocuma, GR No.176308,8 May 2009
------------------------------------------------------ 315
Roxas v Dinglasan 28 SCRA 430
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 316
Egao v CA, 174 SCRA 484
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 317
People v Reyes 175 SCRA 597
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 318
Ching v CA 181 SCRA 9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 320
Dela Cruz v CA 298 SCRA 172
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 321
Cabrera v CA 267 SCRA 339
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 322
Avila v Tapucar 201 SCRA 148
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 323
Tan v Bantegui GR No. 154027, 24 October 2005
------------------------------------------------------- 325
Demasiado v Velasco 71 SCRA 105
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 326
Odsigue v CA, 233 SCRA 626
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 327
Budlong v Pondoc 79 SCRA 24
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 328
Cana v Evangelical Free Church GR NO. 157573, 11 February 2008, 544 SCRA 225
(2008) ---- 330
Natalia Realty Corp. vs Valdez 173 SCRA 534
------------------------------------------------------------- 331
Lucas v Gamponia 100 Phil 277
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 333

9

JM Tuason v CA, 93 SCRA 146
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 335
Dablo v CA, 226 SCRA 618
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 336
Melgar v Pagayon 21 SCRA 841
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 338
Eagle Realty Corporation v Republic GR NO 151424, 24 July 2008
----------------------------------- 339
De Guzman v Agbagala GR NO 163566, 19 February 2008, 546 SCRA 278 (2008)
---------------- 340
Bornales v IAC 166 SCRA 512
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 341
Heirs of Tiro v PES, GR NO 170528, 26 August 2008, 563 SCRA 309 (2008)
------------------------- 342
Agne v Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 46
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 343
Martinez v CA GR NO 170409, 28 January 2008, 542 SCRA 604 (2008)
------------------------------ 345
Caragay-Layno v CA 132 SCRA 718
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 346
Iglesia v CFI of NE 208 Phil 441
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 348
Heirs of Sps. Lim vs RTC Judge GR NO 173891, 8 September 2008 (564 SCRA 352)
--------------- 349
Tapuroc v Loquellano GR NO 152007, 22 January 2007
-------------------------------------------------- 351
Natalia Realty v Valdez 173 SCRA 534
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 353
Estanislao v Honrada 114 SCRA 748
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 354
Ferrer v Bautista 231 SCRA 748
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 356
National Grains Authority v IAC 157 SCRA 380
--------------------------------------------------------------- 358
Roxas et. al vs Tagaytay City 60 OG 6, p. 820
----------------------------------------------------------------- 361
Digran v Auditor General 64 OG 19, p. 4512
------------------------------------------------------------------ 363
Fajardo v Freedom to Build GR NO 134692, 1 August 2000
----------------------------------------------- 366
REMEDIES OF PARTIES AGGRIEVED BY REGISTRATION
---------------------------------------------------- 367
Republic v Sayo 191 SCRA 71
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 368
Republic v CA 135 SCRA 156
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 369
Gomez v CA 168 SCRA 503
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 370
Republic v Estenzo 158 SCRA 282
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 371

10

Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v De Banuvar 25 SCRA 316
----------------------------------------------------- 373
Nieto v Quines 6 SCRA 74
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 375
Director of Lands v Reyes 68 SCRA 177
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 376
Talavera v Mangoba 8 SCRA 837 (1963)
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 378
Antonio v Ramos 2 SCRA 731 (1961)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 380
People v Dela Cruz 207 SCRA 632 (1992)
-------------------------------------------------------------------381
Garcia vs Mendoza 203 SCRA 732 (1991)
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 384
Rublico v Orellano 30 SCRA 511 (1969)
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 385
Crisolo v CA 68 SCRA 435 (1975)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 386
Cruz v Navarro 54 SCRA 109 (1973)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 387
Boniel v Reyes 35 SCRA 218 (1970)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 389
Baldoz v Papa 14 SCRA 691 (1965)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 390
Walstrom v Mapa Jr. 181 SCRA 431 (1990)
------------------------------------------------------------------- 391
Sterling Investment Corp. v Ruiz 30 SCRA 318 (1969)
------------------------------------------------------ 392
Ramirez v CA 144 SCRA 292 (1986)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 393
Heirs of Dolleton vs Fil-Estate Management GR NO 100750, 7 April 2009
---------------------------- 394
Regents v Tanjuatco GR NO 168800, 16 April 2009
--------------------------------------------------------- 395
Municipality of Victorias v Ca 149 SCRA 32 (1987)
---------------------------------------------------------- 396
Rodriguez v Torena 79 SCRA 356 (1977)
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 397
Esconde v Borlongay 152 SCRA 603 (1987)
------------------------------------------------------------------- 398
Daclag v Macahilig GR NO 159578, 28 JULY 2008, 560 SCRA 137 (2008)
----------------------------- 400
Heirs of Dominga Lustre GR NO 151016, 6 August 2008, 561 SCRA 120 (2008)
--------------------- 401
Cabrera v CA 163 SCRA 214 (1988)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 402
Esconde v Borlongay 152 SCRA 603 (1987)
------------------------------------------------------------------- 403
Huang v CA GR NO 198525, 13 September 1994
----------------------------------------------------------- 404

11

Villagonzalo v IAC 167 SCRA 535 (1988)
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 406
Alzona v Capunitan 4 SCRA 450 (1962)
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 408
Almarza v Arquelles 156 SCRA 718
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 409
Tamayo v Callejo 46 SCRA 27 (1972) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 411
Castillo v Heirs of Madrigal 198 SCRA 556 (1991)
---------------------------------------------------------- 413
Ching v CA 181 SCRA 9
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 414
Yujuico v Republic GR NO 168861 26 October 2007
------------------------------------------------------- 416
Galicia vs Manliquez GR NO 155785, 13 April 2007
-------------------------------------------------------- 418
Levin VS. Bass, 91 Phil 420 (1952)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 420
Garcia vs. CA, 95 SCRA 389 (1980)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 422
National Housing Authority vs. Basa, Jr., GR No. 149121, 20 April 2010
----------------------------- 424
Republic VS. Ravelo GR No. 165114 6 August 2008
------------------------------------------------------ 426
AFP-MBA Inc. m Santiago GR No. 147559, 27 June 20 2008 556 SCRA 46 2008
------------------- 428
Campillo vs. CA, 129 SCRA 513
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 430
Centeno vs. CA, 139 SCRA 545 (1985)
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 431
Ibarra vs. Ibarra Sr., 156 SCRA 616 (1987)
------------------------------------------------------------------ 434
Duran vs. IAC, 138 SCRA 489 (1985)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 436
David vs. Bandin, 149 SCRA 140, (1987)
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 437
Sps. Villamil vs. Villaros GR No. 1777187 7 April 2009
-------------------------------------------------- 439
Reality Corporation vs. Republic, GR No. 151424, 24 July 2008
-------------------------------------- 441
Egao vs. CA, 174 SCRA 484 (1989)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 442
Francisco vs. CA, 153 SCRA 330 (1987)
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 443
Quiniano vs. CA, 39 SCRA 221 (1991)
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 444
PNB vs. CA, 98 SCRA 207 (1980)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 445
Bernales vs. IAC, 166 SCRA 519 (1988)
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 448

12

DBP vs. Mangawang, 11 SCRA 405 ; Realty Sales Enterprises vs. IAC, 154 SCRA 328
------------ 449
Gatioan vs. Gaffud, 27 SCRA 706
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 451
De Villa vs. Trinidad, 22 SCRA 1167
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 454
Bergado vs. CA, 173 SCRA 497
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 457
Heirs of Tiro vs., GR No. 17052 26 August 2008 563 SCRA 309
------------------------------------------ 458
Raneses vs. IAC, 187 SCRA 397 (1990)
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 460
Solivel vs. Francisco, 170 SCRA 218 (1989)
------------------------------------------------------------------- 462
Tenio-Obsequio vs. CA, 230 SCRA 550 (1994)
--------------------------------------------------------------- 464
Duran vs. IAC, 138 SCRA 489 (1985)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 465
Torres vs. CA, 186 SCRA 672 (1990)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 466
PNB vs. CA, 187 SCRA 735 (1990)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 468
Lonzame vs. Amore, 134 SCRA 386 (1985)
------------------------------------------------------------------- 470
Gonzales vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 587
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 472
Prudential Bank vs. Panis, 153 SCRA 390 (1987)
------------------------------------------------------------ 473
Central Bank vs. CA, 139 SCRA 46 (1985)
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 474
Rural Bank of Sariaya vs. Yacon, 175 SCRA 62 (1989)
------------------------------------------------------ 476
Uchuan vs. CA, 161 SCRA 710
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 478
B & I Realty vs. Caspe, GR No. 146972, 29 January 2008, 543 SCRA 1
---------------------------------- 480
Rural Bank vs. CA, 101 SCRA 5 (1980)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 481
DBP vs. Doyon, GR No. 167238, 25 March 2009
-------------------------------------------------------------- 483
Gorospe vs. UCPB, 193 SCRA 546 (1991)
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 484
Limpin vs. IAC, 166 SCRA 87 (1980)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 486
Tolentino vs. CA, 106 SCRA 513 (1981)
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 488
Ramirez vs. CA, 219 SCRA 598
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 490
Medida vs CA GR 98334
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 491

13

PNB vs. IAC, 199 SCRA 508 (1991)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 492
China Banking Corporation vs. Lozada GR No. 164919, 4 July 2008
------------------------------------ 494
PNB vs. Gotesco, GR No. 183211 June 5, 2009
--------------------------------------------------------------- 499
BPI vs. Tarampi G.R. No. 174988, December 10, 2008
----------------------------------------------------- 501
Veloso vs. IAC, 205 SCRA 227
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 502
Lam vs. Metrobank GR No. 178881. 18 February 2008
---------------------------------------------------- 504
David Enterprises vs. Insular Bank of Asia and America,191 SCRA 516 (1990)
----------------------- 506
Sueno vs. LBP, GR No 174711 17 Sept 2008
------------------------------------------------------------------ 508
Joven vs. CA, 212 SCRA 700 (1992)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 510
Sps. Vaca vs CA, GR No. 109672, 14 July 1994
--------------------------------------------------------------- 512
Glapuno vs. Gapultos, 132 SCRA 429
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 514
Sulit vs. CA, 268 SCRA 441
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 515
Leong vs. Tanguangco, GR No. 154632, 14 march 2008, 548 scra 387 (2008)
----------------------- 518
De Ramos vs. CA, 213 SCRA 207 (1992)
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 520
San Fernando Rural Bank vs. Pampanga Omnibus Development Corp., GR 168088, 4
April 2007
-------------------------------------- 523
Vda de Delfin vs. Dellota, GR No. 143697, 28 January 2008 (542 SCRA 397)
------------------------ 525
Cachola Sr. vs. CA, 208 SCRA 496, (1992)
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 527
Mindanao Development Authority vs. CA 113 scra 429 (1982)
----------------------------------------- 529
Santos v Aquino 205 scra 127
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 531
Arrazola v Bernas 86 scra 279 (1978)
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 533
Arrazola v Bernas 175 Phil 452 1978
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 535
Sanchez v Ca 69 scra 327
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 537
Lozano v ballesteros 195 scra 681 (1991)
------------------------------------------------------------------- 539
Ching v enrile gr 156076, sept 17 2008
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 541

14

542 LP Leviste vs. Noblejas. GR No. vs.544 Tanedo vs. GR No. 168 -------------------------------------------------------------------. 170621. G. 2008 ------------------------------------------------------. 165300.569 Magdalena Homeowner’s Assn.547 Junio vs. 184 SCRA 325 (1990) -----------------------------------------. 204 SCRA 569 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------.2010 -------------------------------------------------.573 Doronilla vs. CA.586 15 . February 02.579 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. 109 Phil. January 20. 188 SCRA 321 (1990) --------------------------------------------------------------------. GR No.567 Heirs of Maria Marasigan vs. Monsod. Delos Santos. August 4.561 Villaflor vs.556 Sajonas vs. vs Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City. Court of Appeals.2008 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 132 SCRA 513 (1979) ---------------------------------------------------------------. 2010 -----------------. Viray. 2009 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. ADOLFO & ARSENIA ENRILE. 165114.548 Director of Lands vs.Arrazala v bernas 86 scra 279 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------. GR No. April 23. 106 Phil 911 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 5 July 1996. CA. 174290. Inc.571 Biglang-awavsConstantino. 102377. 156076. 184 SCRA 315 (1990) --------------------------------------------------------------------.554 SPS. DyPAo. No. Sps. 103 Phil. 858 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------. RD 106. 183719. 258 SCRA 79 -----------------------------------------------.551 Castro vs. GR No. Mary of the Woods School. Ferrer vs. Sevilla.572 Tirador vs. IAC.R.546 Atty. No. G. 168 SCRA 198 ---------------------------------------------------------. 162218 Feb. Esquivel. SPS.R. 322 Phil 84 (1996) ----------------------------------------------------------.582 AguravsSerfino Sr.564 St.575 Lopez vs.559 Ty Sin Tie vs. Ababa. GR No. 25. 157 SCRA 26 (1988) ------------------------------------------------------------------------.. PETITOINERS VS. 152 SCRA 325 (1987) -------------------------------------------------. 168734 & NORDEC vs Esquivel. Juezan. September 17. 2011 ------------------------------------------------. CA.549 Estella vs. Diaz GR No. Both Dated April 24. 89 scra 529 (1979) -----------------------------------------------------------------.584 Heirs of Tengcovs Heirs of Aliwas. 88 SCRA 513 (1979) ---------------------------------------------------------.565 Republic vsRavelo. JESUS CHING AND LEE POE TIN. 2009 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------.

CA. CA.609 Lee vs LBP. GR No.624 Camitan vs.599 Director of lands vs CFI.615 Nepomucenovs City of Siargao.606 Land Bank of the Philippines vsOrilla. 124795 dec. 543 SCRA 627 (2008) -----------------.Gomez vs CA. -------------------------------. 2008. 22 SCRA 1152 (1968) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------. Heirs of Domingo. Mar. 127198 (2005) ----------------------------------------------------------------------. feb.623 Montano vs Lim GR .627 16 . 71 SCRA 57 ---------------------------------------------------------------------.603 Kayaban vs. 160725 sep. GR No.625 Republic vs. Mina 114 SCRA 945 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------. SAntua. GR no. GR no. 29. 175175. 8 2008 -----------------------------------------------------------------. July 28.601 Republic vs. heirs of abrille. 565 SCRA 17 ------------------------------------------.618 FORFOM Dev.620 Aleman vs DE Catera 1 SCRA 776 (1961). 94 SCRA 853 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------. Delos Reyes. 168533.593 PNB vs. 2006 --------------------------------------------------------------------. 122 SCRA 843 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------. 567 SCRA 31 -------------------------------------. GR No. 8 2008 ----------------------------------------------------------------. 2008 ---------------------------------------------.591 Decolongon vs. 135 SCRA 17 -------------------------------------------------------------------------. vs. 128099.588 PNB vs. GR No. 175725. oct. june 27. CA. 10. 20. 168 SCRA 503 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------.602 Republic vs.611 LBP vs heirs of cruz. 170422. No. CA. Dec. 42008. 173 SCRA 42 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------. Montano vs Lim Ang . 2008. april 7.594 Santanasvs Marinas. PNR. Corp. 179 SCRA 628 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------. GR No. 7 SCRA 250 ------------------------------. 146091. Banatao.605 Almirolvs RD. GR No. L-13057 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 548 SCRA 52 --------------------------------------------------.613 LBP vsnatividad. Sep. GR No. 155703.616 NPC vs Suarez GR. 7.596 Vallanga vs. 157206. Republic 122 SCRA 652 --------------------------------------------------------------------------.589 Gonzaga vs. 12 2008. GR no.617 NPC vsPurefoods. 149221. Sep. 51 SCRA 381 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------. GR No. 2009 ------------------------------------------------------------. 560 SCRA 41 ----------------------. 2008.608 LBP vs. 2008.

173210 april 24. GR No. 3 2008 -------------------------------------------------------------------.663 17 . 150741 june 12. Republic.628 Villanueva vsViloria. GR No. 155804.653 Republic vs Imperial ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------.632 Republic vsSantua.647 Director of Lands vs Rivas 141 SCRA 329 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------. lagramada GR.656 Cayanan vs Estenzo 21 SCRA 1348 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 150470 Aug. 168742 sep. 8 2008 -------------------------------------------------------------------.662 Talusan vs Tayag GR 133698 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------..654 Sec of DENR vs Yap GR 172775 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------.633 Republic vs. 162097. Corp. 162335.638 Valiao vs Republic GR 170757 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. GR No. 13. 2008. 545 SCRA 186 ------------------------------------------. 2009 --------------------------------------------------------. Barque GR No.630 LAyosvsFil-Estate Golf and Dev’t. 548 SCRA 401 ------------------------------------------. GR no. No.636 Manotok vs. GR No.651 Tan Vs Director of Forestry --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 18 2008 ---------------------------------------------------------------. 6 2008 ---------------------------------------.Oyales. 14 2008. dec.631 Republic vsTaustumban.649 Homenavs Casa 157 SCRA 232 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 2008 ----------------------------------------------------------. Feb.645 Republic vs Estenzo 158 SCRA 282 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 155703 sep. Mar.635 Republic vs .GR no.Pascua vs.

respondent.FERNANDA ARBIAS vs THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES GR No. Subsequently. 287 of the Estancia Cadastre (subject property). was only 600 square meters. the subject property was residential and consisted of 600 square meters. Three years thereafter. as well as her acts of ownership and possession over the same. on 17 June 1996. the RTC ordered that its initial hearing on 17 February 1999. the respondent Republic of the Philippines. petitioner took the witness stand where she identified documentary exhibits and testified as to her purchase of the subject property. and Pablo Garin. who declared that he had no objection thereto. Lourdes T. Issue: Whether or not the public respondent court of appeals erred in not holding that the lot in question ceases (sic) to be public land in view of petitioner’s 18 . married to Jimmy Arbias (Jimmy). a parcel of unregistered land situated at Poblacion.00. more or less. through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). The owners of the lots adjoining the subject property who attended the hearing were Hector Tiples. 173808 Facts: On 12 March 1993. manifested that it had no evidence to contradict petitioner’s application for registration. At the hearing on 23 July 1999 before the RTC. represented by the City Prosecutor. It merely reiterated its objection that the area of the subject property. as stated in the Deed of Sale in favor of petitioner and the Tax Declarations covering the property. On 3 September 1996. while the area stated in the Cadastral Survey was 717 square meters. the RTC transmitted the application with all the attached documents and evidences to the Land Registration Authority (LRA) that petitioner had already complied with all the requirements precedent to the publication. filed its Notice of Appearance and deputized the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City to appear on its behalf before the RTC. for the sum of P33. Jardeleza (Jardeleza) executed a Deed of Absolute Sale selling to petitioner.000. When its turn to present evidence came. and identified as Cadastral Lot No. Iloilo. Estancia. who opposed the supposed area of the subject property. On 6 January 1999. petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Application for Registration of Title over the subject property. According to the Deed.

The fact that no third person appeared before the RTC to oppose the petitioner’s application for registration is also irrelevant. This same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. paragraph 1 of Presidential Decree No. the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration. so far as possible.. to require the petitioner to show. Furthermore. 1529 states the requirements necessary for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title to be issued. i. a person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on the basis of possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily. Hence. a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. even in the absence of any opposition. we must consider the same as still inalienable public domain. Indeed. In the present case. petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The applicant must show that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. persons who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open. by a preponderance of evidence and by positive and absolute proof. whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives. By relying solely on the said surveyor’s assertion. and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. The burden of proof imposed by law on petitioner does not shift. the court has the bounden duty. all lands of the public domain belong to the State.and that of her predecessor’s-in-interest possession en concepto de dueno for more than thirty (30) years. petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. that he is the owner in fee simple of the lands which he is attempting to register The Survey Plan and Technical Description of the subject property submitted by 19 . continuous.e. In accordance with said provision. he must prove his title and should not rely on the absence or weakness of the evidence of the oppositors. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is already classified as alienable and disposable. Section 14. Held: Under the Regalian doctrine. may file in the proper trial court an application for registration of title to land.

In which the land is claimed as ancestral land of indigenous B’laan and Maguindanaoans since time immemorial and that only after World War II that Christian settlers started occupying the area. or the Indigenous People's Rights Act (IPRA). they are completely ineffectual in proving that petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest actually possessed the subject property in the concept of an owner for the necessary period. or until December 31. On April 10. Although they help in establishing the identity of the property sought to be registered. Congress passed Republic Act No. 542) which he claimed to be subsisting since 1983 issued by DENR with an area of nine hundred twenty-three (923) hectares of public forest land located at Sitio Lanton.petitioner merely plot the location. 2018. which was intended to recognize and promote all the rights of the country's Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) within the framework of the Constitution. 1997. ruling that the issues and arguments it raised had all been addressed squarely in the Supreme Court's decision in G. 8371. 161881 Facts: Nicasio Alcantara is a lessee under Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement No. Barrio Apopong. 145838 which upheld the COSLAP's decision and which had long become final and executory. private respondents. On October 29. 542 and the reversion of the land to the indigenous communities. area and boundaries thereof. 542 and declare the area as ancestral lands of the B’laans.R. Despite opposition. 1990. representing the B'laan and Maguindanao tribes. ALCANTARA vs. 542 (FLGLA No. General Santos City. Alcantara questions the authority of the COSLAP and alleged that it was the secretary of the DENR who should have jurisdiction to administer and dispose of public lands. 542 in 1993 for another 25 years. but the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the COSLAP. filed a complaint against petitioner before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) seeking the cancellation of FLGLA No. Later. Alcantara was able to renew FLGLA No. DENR G. No.R. COSLAP rendered its decision in favor of the complainant indigenous people and recommended to DENR to cancel Alcantara’s renewed FLGLA No. No. Alcantara filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) questioning the decision of the COSLAP. NICASIO I. Issue(s): 20 .

based on his alleged residual rights. 145838 in which the Court made final finding that FLGLA No. 186865 March 2. and that it was made in violation of prevailing laws. to be distributed exclusively among the members of the indigenous cultural group concerned. 145838. as well as to the police power of the State. It was likewise declared that FLGLA No. 2018. rescinded. Whether respondents DENR officials committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing the COSLAP's decision. 410 which states that all unappropriated agricultural lands forming part of the public domain are declared part of the ancestral lands of the indigenous cultural groups occupying the same. the license or privilege must yield to the supremacy of the latter. nor does it create a vested right. may continue his enjoyment of the land up to the expiration of FLGA No. BUENAVENTURA VS. Ruling: The question whether FLGLA No. a privilege or license is not in the nature of a contract that enjoys protection under the due process and nonimpairment clauses of the Constitution. REPUBLIC GR NO.Whether petitioner. no irrevocable rights are created in its issuance. 2007 Facts: The subject property in dispute was acquired by Amado 21 . The Court finds that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by respondent DENR officials in their implementation of the COSLAP decision. Petitioner has had no residue of any right and no entitlement to the land. Petitioner’s alleged "residual right" has no legal basis and contradicts his admission that FLGLA No. Such a privilege or license is not even a property or property right. can be revoked. No. and these lands are further declared alienable and disposable. from the very beginning. 542 granted to petitioner violated Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. whenever public welfare or public interest so requires. amended or modified. 542 has been declared invalid by the Court in its decision in G. as such. a forest land grazing lease agreement is a mere permit which.R.R. by executive action. 542 was issued illegally. 542 is valid has been settled conclusively in G. In cases in which the license or privilege is in conflict with the people's welfare. Thus. 542 on December 31. 542 is a mere license or privilege granted by the State to petitioner for the use or exploitation of natural resources and public lands over which the State has sovereign ownership under the Regalian Doctrine. cancelled. Like timber or mining licenses. FLGLA No. No.

Petitioners then filed an Application for Registration of Title on 5 June 2000 before the RTC of Parañaque City of the subject property. thus. by way of Deed of Sale. the Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals. the spouses Buenaventura transferred. and possession as owners of the same since time immemorial and/or within the period provided for by law." They also presented and identified various documents supporting their claim. Issue: Whether or not the subject property in dispute is a public land. under the Regalian Doctrine. In 1978. However. On 29 October 2001. where they alleged that "they and their predecessors-in-interest acquired title to the said parcel of land thru inheritance. the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of the Republic. all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. transfer. among whom are herein petitioners. such presumption is not conclusive. It can be rebutted by the applicant’s presentation of incontrovertible evidence showing that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable and disposable. Angelita and Preciosa. Feeling aggrieved. On 23 August 2004. Article XII of the Constitution. alleging that petitioners’ own evidence tends to show that the subject property is not alienable and disposable because it was a salt bed and a fishpond and under Section 2. Held: NO. the subject property to their children. except for agricultural lands.Buenaventura and Irene Flores (spouses Buenaventura) even before World War II. all other natural resources shall not be alienated. overturning the Order of the court a quo. the court a quo issued an Order granting the application for registration of title of the subject property. Likewise. The certification issued by the Department of Environment and 22 . It is true that under the Regalian Doctrine all lands of the public domain belong to the State and all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.

inalienable and indisposable. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute sufficient basis for a claim of ownership. and if so. Candy Maker. and Felisa.50m. as applicant. The statute of limitations with regard to public agricultural lands does not operate against the statute unless the occupant proves possession and occupation of the same after a claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CANDY MAKER. INC. June 22. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CANDY MAKER. its jurisdiction. Inc. INC. filed an application with the MTC of Taytay. On July 2001. In light of the foregoing. 23 . Ruling: The property subject of this application was alienable and disposable public agricultural land. whether respondent adduced the requisite quantum of evidence to prove it’s ownership over the property. However. 163766. the petition of the Republic of the Philippines is granted. GR.Natural Resources verified that the subject parcel of land is “alienable and disposable land of the public domain”. On the other hand. 1999. the LLDA filed its opposition which alleged that the lot subject of the application for registration may not be alienated and disposed since it is considered part of the Laguna Lake Bed. the Land Registration Authority recommended the exclusion of lot no. for a parcel of land located below the reglementary lake elevation of 12. The CENRO of Antipolo City declared the land to fall within the alienable and disposable zone. hence. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Candy Maker. such possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to presumptive grant from the state. respondent failed to prove that it possesses registrable title over the property. 3138-B on the ground that it is a legal easement and intended for public use. Inc. a public land within. the Republic of the Philippines. Eladia. The said certification is sufficient to establish the true nature or character of the subject property. Antonia. 2006 Facts: On April.NO. Issue: Whether or not the property subject of the amended application is alienable and disposable property of the State. all surnamed Cruz. about 900 meters away the Laguna de Bay. Rizal for registration of it’s alleged title over the lot. 29.

respondent heirs instituted in the RTC of Kalibo. June 22.50m. Rizal for registration of it’s alleged title over the lot. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute sufficient basis for a claim of ownership. The statute of limitations with regard to public agricultural lands does not operate against the statute unless the occupant proves possession and occupation of the same after a claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. and if so. quieting of title. 3138-B on the ground that it is a legal easement and intended for public use. 29. such possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to presumptive grant from the state. In light of the foregoing. whether respondent adduced the requisite quantum of evidence to prove it’s ownership over the property.NO. 1991. about 900 meters away the Laguna de Bay. Ruling: The property subject of this application was alienable and disposable public agricultural land. the Land Registration Authority recommended the exclusion of lot no. However. Candy Maker. and declaration of ownership with damages. inalienable and indisposable. 2006 Facts: On April. The CENRO of Antipolo City declared the land to fall within the alienable and disposable zone. the LLDA filed its opposition which alleged that the lot subject of the application for registration may not be alienated and disposed since it is considered part of the Laguna Lake Bed. Eladia. On the other hand. Aklan a complaint against Lucio Arquisola (Superintendent of ANCF) for recovery of possession. Issue: Whether or not the property subject of the amended application is alienable and disposable property of the State. all surnamed Cruz. filed an application with the MTC of Taytay. Antonia.231-square meter-portion of the property they inherited had been usurped by ANCF. creating a cloud of doubt with respect to 24 . Inc. hence. the petition of the Republic of the Philippines is granted. a public land within. as applicant. NO. its jurisdiction. Inc. the Republic of the Philippines. On July 2001. Respondent heirs claim that a 41. respondent failed to prove that it possesses registrable title over the property. for a parcel of land located below the reglementary lake elevation of 12. 157485 Facts: On August 26. 1999. 163766.GR. REPUBLIC VS HEIRS OF LACHICA-SIN GR. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Candy Maker. and Felisa.

the MCTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondents. for 30 years before it was declared as a timberland on December 22. 2000. Aklan. continuous. The Court held that there are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. Ruling: The private right referred to is an alleged imperfect title. The RTC remanded the case to the MCTC of New Washington and Batan. continuous. 141. which respondents supposedly acquired by possession of the subject property. exclusive. The ANCF Superintendent averred that the subject parcel of land is timberland and therefore not susceptible of private ownership. the courts a quo held that the disputed property was alienable and disposable before 1960.their ownership over the parcel of land they wish to remove from the ANCF reservation. Petitioner. Issue: Whether or not the CA gravely erred on a question of law in upholding respondents’ claim to supposed “private rights” over subject land despite the DENR certification that it is classified as timberland. which included said portion of private respondents’ alleged property. appealed to the RTC of Kalibo. through their predecessors-in-interest. citing petitioner’s failure to show competent evidence that the subject land was declared a timberland before its formal classification as such 25 . 7659 which expanded the jurisdiction of first-level courts. On June 19. With respect to the second requisite. namely: (1) open. 2074 of then President Ferdinand E. 1945. and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12. The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being claimed by respondents was the subject of Proclamation No. 1960. which should be respected and protected. and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Petitioner Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a Petition for Review and the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. as civil reservation for educational purposes of ANCF. exclusive and notorious possession amounts to an imperfect title. Aklan and the RTC rendered its Decision affirming the MCTC Judgment. through the Solicitor General. in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. Marcos allocating 24.0551 hectares of land within the area. The MCTC ruled that the claim of respondent heirs over the disputed land by virtue of their and their predecessors’ open. It must be noted that respondents have not filed an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act or the Property Registration Decree.

however. Carino. on the other hand. CARINO VS. In the case at bar. the alleged possession by them and by their predecessors-in-interest is inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership. Carino obtained possessory title to the land under the Spanish Mortgage Law. it is therefore the respondents which have the burden to identify a positive act of the government. 26 . Furthermore. which required registration of land claims within a limited period of time. ignored his possessory title and built a public road on the land prompting him to seek a Torrens title to his property in the land registration court. The SC grant the prayer of petitioner Republic to dismiss the civil case for lack of merit. And that he inherited it in accordance with Igorot custom. On one hand. In Heirs of Malabanan vs Republic. asserted that he was the absolute owner of the land jure gentium. In 1904. however. His grandfather had lived upon it. The Philippine Supreme Court affirmed the CFI’s decision by applying the Valenton ruling. 1945 may be subject to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. In 1901. 1880. Supreme Court. however. the Philippine government invoked the Regalian Doctrine and contended that Carino failed to comply with the provisions of the Royal Decree of June 25. Since respondents failed to do so. Both the Government of the Philippine Islands and the U.S.on said year. INSULAR GOVERNMENT 41 Phil 935 Facts: Don Mateo Carino. Accordingly. the land registration court granted Carino’s application for absolute ownership to the land. He claimed that the said land had been possessed and occupied by his ancestors since time immemorial. Carino took the case to the U. sought to register with the land registration court a parcel of land in the Province of Benguet. The American colonial government. had been issued from the Spanish Crown. declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.S. his father had cultivated some parts of the land. and had maintained fences around the property for holding of cattle. such as an official proclamation. and that the land never formed part of the public domain. No document of title. Government appealed to the CFI of Benguet which reversed the land registration court and dismissed Carino’s application. the members of this Court were in disagreement as to whether lands declared alienable or disposable after June 12. There was. an Igorot. no disagreement that there must be a declaration to that effect. 2074 as to prevent the application of said proclamation to the subject property. respondents cannot be considered to have private rights within the purview of Proclamation No.

through Justice Holmes declared: “It might perhaps. as far as testimony or memory goes. After the deepseated deliberation. They failed to come up with the necessary majority instead the votes were equally divided. by recognizing the right of ownership of Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands based on their native title.” There is an existence of native title to land. in virtue of Section 7. the members of the court voted as follows: Seven Justices have voted to dismiss the petition while the other 7 Justices ruled in favor of the petition. and never to have been public land. CRUZ V. Rule 56 of the 27 . The United States Supreme Court. Ruling: No.R. or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown. as an exception to the theory of jura regalia. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES G.Issue: Whether or not the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine. the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership. it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest. 8371 which is also known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) on the ground that it amounts to the unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain and all other natural resources therein. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his land. As a result. be proper and sufficient to say that when. No. 135385 Facts: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa in their capacity as citizens and taxpayers assailed the constitutionality of R.A. No. Both parties initiated a redeliberation but nothing happened since the voting remained the same.

NO. The Congress in its wisdom did not intend to have clashing of laws. On the other hand. caves and peninsulas as tourist zones and marine reserves under administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority. In this case. 167707 Facts: The DENR identified several lots in Boracay as being claimed by named persons. By having this IPRA. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. among other islands. YAP G. 1801 was not a legal 28 .R. SECRETARY OF DENR VS. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone. Issue: Whether or not the Regalian Doctrine negates native title Ruling: The Regalian Doctrine does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial. it also resolved the question on whether the existence of native title to land is considered as an exception to the theory of Regalian.Rules of Court. registration may spawn if ownership of land is not acquired or proven by the seven modes of acquiring ownership. The Regalian Doctrine and the Doctrine of the Native Title can exist side by side. Moreover. The Office of the Solicitor General countered that Boracay Island was unclassified land of the public domain which formed part of the “public forest” . It is a recognition of something that is already present. President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. Respondentsclaimants alleged that it raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. 1801 declaring Boracay Island. the NCIP does not give title but it merely facilitates the recognition of ancestral lands. Issue: Whether or not the Proclamation No. it serves as a way that removed the barriers when it comes to the idea of reconciling the Regalian Doctrine and Doctrine of Native Title such as for this instance wherein it is impossible to own land in Baguio or in the whole Cordillera Administrative Region under PD 1529 since lands which are beyond 18 % slope cannot be titled but this problem was cured. it was susceptible of private ownership. Ruling: The RTC and CA ruled that the Proclamation No. Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. It has been clearly elucidated by the Supreme Court that the Doctrine of native title is not an exception to the Regalian Doctrine. the petitioned was dismissed. The possession per se since time immemorial has ripened to ownership. 1801 has posed any legal impediment to the titling of lands in Boracay Islands.

In 1958 President Garcia issued Presidential Proclamation 476. Petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU) is a chartered educational institution owned and run by the State. Thus the islands remain as public domain which is governed by the Regalian doctrine. The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve. 184869 Facts: This case involves the constitutionality of a presidential proclamation appropriating state university property to be allocated to indigenous peoples and cultural communities. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest. he would have identified the specific limits of each. Bukidnon. The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA – to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the development of the areas’ tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment. reserving 3. 1801. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. being a valid State act. CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY VS. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo after forty-five years (January 7. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the declaration of Boracay Island. or both. caves and peninsulas in the Philippines. together with other islands. CMU subsequently filed a petition to declare the presidential proclamation as unconstitutional. as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. as school site for CMU.401 hectares of lands of the public domain in Musuan.080 hectares of those lands. CMU obtained title in its name over 3. This was not done in Proclamation No. Maramag. the RTC posited that the ultimate owner of the lands is the State and that CMU merely held the same in its behalf. 29 . EXECUTIVE SECRETARY GR NO. Said proclamation takes 670 hectares from CMU’s registered lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities in Barangay Musuan. Eventually. Bukidnon. RTC ruled that Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional. Proclamation No. It does not address the areas’ alienability.impediment in the titling of lands in Boracay Islands. 1064. More so. 2003) issued Presidential Proclamation 310. Simply put.

It is in Bukidnon that it was built. the petition of the CMU asking for the unconstitutionality of Proclamation No. 2009 Facts: On February 20 1998. Presidential Proclamation No. HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. the proclamation of President Arroyo is immaterial. 179987April 29. This ruling concerns state colleges and universities whose resources and research facilities may be gradually eroded by misconstruing the exemptions from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARP). 476 exempting from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College (forerunner of the CMU) a land reservation of 3. When President Garcia issued Proclamation No.Issue: Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. Still. State colleges and universities like the CMU are the country’s conduit towards scientific and technological advancement in the field of agriculture. as such the need for a vast tract of agricultural land for future programs of expansion is justified. Indeed . neither have to be compromised. there must still be vast tracts of agricultural land in Mindanao outside the CMU land reservation which can be allocated to qualified beneficiaries. which is apparently an important field in our society.the education of the youth and agrarian reform are among the highest priorities in the government socio-economic programs. CMU is a school established to promote agriculture and industry. 310 is unconstitutional for being contrary to law and public policy. Certainly. In this case. 310 is granted. The taking of the CMU land which had been segregated for educational purposes for distribution to yet uncertain beneficiaries is a gross misinterpretation of law. These are needed fro an agricultural educational institution to grow. Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration 30 . for the lands in dispute ceased to be alienable public lands from the time President Garcia dedicated them for CMU’s use in scientific and technological research in the field of agriculture. 310 is constitutional. Through the years the CMU lands were used to support the expanding activities of the school in the fields of agricultural technology and scientific research.Thus. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES GR No. and for the furtherance of development and training of future farmers of Mindanao. The decision in this case is of optimum significance. Ruling: No.080 hectares is for the promotion of the school’s agriculture and industry. so that there are enough resources and wide open spaces.

In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No.” On December 3. 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open. and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than 30 years. consisting of 71. Lino Velazco. the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the application of Malabanan. Eduardo Velazco. Upon Lino’s death. their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties. The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather. 1529. But by 1966. Lino. arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Gregorio. which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite. which originally belonged to his uncle. Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco. issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office. exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June12. Lino had four sons– Benedicto. continuous. meters. Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR). 1982. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15. 2002. and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. notorious. his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena.3013 established under project no. On February 23. Esteban’s wife. had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. the RTC approved the application for registration. Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001. should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12. Magdalena. Issues: 1. 1945 or earlier? 31 . including Lot 9864-A. 2007.before the RTC of Cavite. otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.324 sq.

may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code? 3. consider that under the Civil Code. In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. and registrable title to. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription? 4. under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open. (b) The right to register granted under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. (a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession. and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. In complying with Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree. exclusive. However. continuous. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth. prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act. since June 12.2. 1945” have acquired ownership of. under Article 422 of the Civil Code. the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable. such lands based on the length and quality of their possession. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of 32 . For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section14 (1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both? Ruling: The Petition is denied.

Issue: Whether or not Ching is the rightful owner of the residential land. this decision was set aside by the respondent judge. CHING VS. as the basic question was one of ownership and not of mere possession. Patrimonial property is private property of the government. affirming its jurisdiction. The respondents argued. The mere circumstance that proof of title. or evidence of ownership. The property in question consists of a residential house and lot covered by TCT No. MALAYA 153 SCRA 412 Facts: The petitioners Jose Ching and Caridad Ching had alleged in their complaint for ejectment that the private respondents Cesar and Araceli Alvarado had forced their way into the disputed premises without any right whatsoever and had refused to vacate the same despite repeated demands. But the Supreme Court held that this particular case is not an ownership case. The parties just showed evidence of ownership so as to prove possession and this will not divest the Municipal Court of 33 . having acquired it by virtue of a valid sale. On appeal. arguing that the property belonged to them by right of inheritance. T-85126 and registered in the name of petitioner Jose Ching in the Registry of Deeds of Laguna. in their answer. who held that the municipal court had no competence to resolve the case as it involved a question of ownership.the public dominion begin to run. The private respondents. the municipal court had no jurisdiction and should dismiss the complaint. These demands were based on the petitioners’ case that they were the owners of the said property. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree. Ruling: Municipal courts do not have jurisdiction over ownership cases. proceeded to trial and thereafter rendered judgment ordering the private respondents to vacate the disputed property. The municipal court. had been introduced during the trial before the Municipal Court would not deprive said court of jurisdiction to rule on the question of who had the prior physical possession. had challenged the claimed sale.

1915 Facts: The plaintiffs. No protest was ever filed against the Deed of Sale since 1978. On the other hand. Saleeby.1912. 1906. L-8936 October 2. On the 25th day of March. on the 25th day of October. and the defendant.its jurisdiction. However. the land is registered under Ching’s name in the Registry of Deeds in Laguna. 1912. Between the said lots was a stone wall which is located on the lot of the plaintiffs. denied said petition upon the theory that. Alvarado only filed an annulment case (which is a separate case) when the ejectment case was filed. With a strong evidence to back Ching’s claim. N. Consuelo and Mauro.M.They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties. the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the Torrens system. Subsequently.R. The land was actually sold to him by Alvarado’s father in 1978. decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for under the Torrens system. the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant . the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. Said registration and certificate included the wall. the Municipal Court’s decision was reinstated by the Supreme Court. CONSUELO LEGARDA vs. On the 2nd day of March. After a consideration of said petition the court. 1906.SALEEBY G. the lower without notice to the defendant. during the pendency of the petition 34 . the plaintiffs presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. On December 13. are owners of adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall.No.

November 16. without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court. in the certificate. VAGILIDAD V. VAGILIDAD G. it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure. The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it." to avoid the possibility of losing his land. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated. including the wall. or which may arise subsequent thereto. or sitting in the "mirador de su casa. to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title. they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot. That is the rule between original parties. he may lose it all. That being the purpose of the law.R. in the name of the defendant. Issue: Who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons? What is the purpose of registration? Ruling: The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land. 2006 35 . If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate.for the registration of the defendant's land. that the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. In case of double registration under the Land Registration Act. 161136. except claims which were noted at the time of registration. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the method adopted in the present case. then nothing has been gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. No.

1987. was issued in the name of LORETO alone. 202500. T-16693 was issued in favor of LORETO. to Loreto. 36 . 1987. 1253-B to Wilfredo was registered. 1987. 1253-B as collateral of the loan and the transaction was inscribed at the back of TCT No. The parties however seemed to have already reached an amicable settlement without the knowledge of their counsels. Subsequently. TCT No. 1986. Efren Labiao and Priscilla Espanueva. but on even date. on May 12. adjudicating the entire Lot No.00 and mortgaged Lot No. covering Lot No. Gabino Jr. was issued in favor of Wilfredo pursuant to the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 7. San Jose. the trial court issued an Order dated March 21. 87-731-A. consequently. as petitioner. 1253) situated in Atabay.000. 1989. 1994 sending the case to the archives. T-18023. TCT No. Subsequently. Gabino Jr. T-16694. covering 4. On the same date. covering the said property. cancelling TCT No. Antique was owned by Zoilo Labiao as per Original Certificate of Title No. On January 29. 196268. 18023. 1038 where the property was specified as Lot No. 191053 as per inscription dated November 17. 18023 as Entry No.280 square meters. sold to Gabino Vagilidad Jr. 186876. the sale of Lot No. 16694.000. 18023 as Entry No. Zoilo died. 1992 in TCT No. EFREN and PRISCILLA. docketed as Cadastral Case No. Sometime in 1931. son of Zoilo. in view of their father’s death. Wilfredo obtained another loan from Development Bank of the Philippines in the amount of P200. RO-2301 issued on March 3. Subsequently.. measuring 1. Spouses Wilfredo and Lolita obtained a loan from the Philippine National Bank in the amount of P150. Zoilo’s children Loreto. Loreto Labiao. 1253. 1990.Facts: A parcel of land (Lot No. The said loan was paid and.604 square meters as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Loreto. On July 31. a portion of Lot No.00 and mortgaged Lot No. filed a Petition for the Surrender of TCT No. 1989. paid real estate taxes on the land he bought from Loreto as per Tax Declaration No. 1253 against LORETO. 1253-B as collateral of the said loan and the transaction was inscribed at the back of TCT No. 1253. the mortgage was cancelled as Entry No. Gabino Jr. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. Consequently. T-16694. Deed of Absolute Sale of a Portion of Land involving the opt-described property was also executed by Loreto in favor of Wilfredo. 1931. On February 14. the real estate mortgage was cancelled under Entry No. executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated January 20. T-16693 was cancelled and TCT No. thereafter sold the same lot to Wilfredo Vagilidad as per Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 7. 1253-B.

Then Gabino claimed that Wilfredo resort to fraud to obtain ownership of the said property. In the case at bar. 1987. the appellate court can not presume that the aliquot part of Loreto was the parcel designated as Lot 1253-B? Ruling: No. Issue: Are the petitioners correct in their contention that since the subdivision plan of Lot No. Vda.426 square meters but sold some 1. and Dorothy filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. 1253-B in defendant Wilfredo’s name for loaning purposes with the agreement that the land will be returned when the plaintiffs need the same. per se. the contract of sale between Loreto and Gabino.. 1987. Jr. 1253 was only approved on January 19.604 square meters to Gabino. Dorothy. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners. Be that as it may. on May 12. executed the Deed of Sale dated December 7. We held in Lopez v.Spouses Gabino and Ma. The mere fact that Loreto sold a definite portion of the coowned lot by metes and bounds before partition does not. They added that. to transfer the ownership of Lot No. 1253 in favor of Loreto in an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated January 20.280-square meter property or some 1. Dorothy Vagilidad. the co-heirs of Loreto waived all their rights and interests over Lot No. De Cuaycong that the fact that an agreement purported to sell a concrete portion of a co-owned property does not render the sale void. without the knowledge and consent of his spouse. At the time of sale. render the sale a nullity. Jr. We have ruled that if a co-owner sells more than his aliquot share in the property. But Wilfredo claimed that they are the owner the land because they already bought it to from the former owner who sold the same to Gabino. Gabino. Loreto had an aliquot share of one-third of the 4. Jr. 1986 could be legally recognized. The appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. as plaintiffs. plaintiff Gabino Jr. They raised that defendant Wilfredo requested Gabino Jr. for it is well-established that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. 1989 in favor of defendant Wilfredo receiving nothing as payment therefor. the sale will affect only his share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. They declared that they have previously received their respective shares from the 37 . Reconveyance and Damages. filed a Complaint for Annulment of Document. pursuant to the mentioned agreement.

other estate of their parents Zoilo and Purificacion. These rights were not effectively transferred by Loreto to Wilfredo in the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land. while Urbana and Perla owned the other 10. However. covered by Tax Declaration No. Nor were these rights alienated from Gabino. 00942-A was cancelled. petitioner learned that Lot 13713 was inside the Summit Point Golf and Country Club Subdivision owned by Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation. 15. Inc. No. commercial. 2009 Facts: Petitioner is a judgment creditor of Raquel K. whether judicial or patent. When the petitioner verified the property. 00449. She immediately went to the Makati City office of Summit Realty to meet with its Vice President.R. co-owned Lot 13713.648 square 38 . ESCUTIN G. without giving her notice. or subject to the issuance of a Certificate of Land Ownership Award or patent under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. When petitioner attempted to pay real estate taxes. Petitioner bought Raquel’s 1/3 pro-indiviso share in Lot and was then issued Tax Declaration No. as owner over Lot No. Lot 13713 was said to be encompassed in and overlapping with the 105. Racquel. 171056 March 13. CASTILLO vs ANTONIO M. DINAH C. her mother. Orense. 1253-B are thus preserved. upon the issuance of the title to the subject property in the name of Wilfredo. Moratilla. Urbana Kalaw and sister. 00942-A. JR. and recreational uses was approved and the property was not covered by a certificate of title. her Tax Declaration No.000 squaremeter. Jr. indicating that she owned 5. she found out that the application of Summit Point Golf & Country Club. Before the scheduled public auction sale. The rights of Gabino. Perla Moratilla.000 square meters of Lot 13713.000 square meters. she was shocked to that. Petitioner then proceeded to levy on execution Lot 13713. for conversion of several agricultural landholdings. Its alleged incontrovertibility cannot be successfully invoked by Wilfredo because certificates of title cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner or be used as a shield for the commission of fraud. Registration of property is not a means of acquiring ownership. to residential. she claimed that Orense did not show her any document to prove ownership of Lot 13713 by Summit Realty. including Lot 13713.

under the same terms and condition as in its original form. 181 In Lieu of Lost One. it did not express the desire of Summit Realty to purchase Lot 1-B or indicate its consent and conformity to the terms of the Deed. it was Orense’s request which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac.648 square meters. TCT No. 181 with the Registry of Deeds. Lot 1 was informally subdivided into several parts among his heirs and/or successors-in-interest. 000376. 181 covering the same was never cancelled. and the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. who. filed by Summit Realty before the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City. 181 covering Lot 1 and the issuance of a new certificate of title for Lot 1B. with a consolidated area of 105.meter parcel of land known as Lot 1-B. after Catigbac’s death. Petitioner asserted that Summit Realty was well-aware of Catigbac’s death. covered by TCT No. in an Order dated 3 January 2001. Likewise. reflecting the supposed sale of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty. Petitioner cast doubt on the acts undertaken by Summit Realty in connection with Catigbac’s property.975 square meters. Subsequently. There were also missing information in the said Deed. and identified as Lot 1-B after survey. through a letter dated 27 June 2001. Summit Realty separately bought subdivided parts of Lot 181 from their respective owners. measuring 132. yet it was Summit Realty which instituted LRC Case No. it was not Yagin. The Special Power of Attorney dated 6 February 1976 granted Yagin the right to sue on behalf of Catigbac. 129642 bore three entries. T134609 in the name of Summit Realty. having acknowledged the same in LRC Case No. Lot 1 of Plan Psu-12014. requested the cancellation of TCT No. purportedly without legal personality and capacity. 181 in the name of Catigbac. 181 in the name of Catigbac. despite the subdivision and transfer of ownership of Lot 1. Hence. The reverse side of TCT No. 181 was lost and the fact of such loss was annotated at the back of the original copy of TCT No. some of whom again transferred their shares to other persons. 00-0376. the RTC granted the Petition in LRC Case No. Orense testified on behalf of Summit Realty that Catigbac’s property used to form part of a bigger parcel of land. In the supposed Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Summit Realty by Leonardo Yagin. both in the name of Francisco Catigbac. 39 . and Yagin had no participation at all in said case. 00-0376 and directed the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. later cancelled and replaced by TCT No. but Orense. as Catigbac’s attorney-in-fact. During the ex parte presentation of evidence in the latter part of 2000. the Petition for Issuance of New Owner’s Duplicate of TCT No.

Title. Summit Realty bought Lot 1-B measuring 105. Raquel K. it is important to note. As a result of such purchase. Catigbac’s right as registered owner of Lot 1-B under TCT No. therefore. Moratilla and her supposed co-owners acquired portions of Lot 1 described as Lot 13713 stated in TD No.000 square meter property from Raquel who.Petitioner questioned why. in the absence of any other certificate of title to the same property. Catigbac’s certificate of title is binding upon the whole world. Petitioner acquired her title to the 5. Ruling: As between Catigbac’s title. covered by a certificate of title.648 square meters. specifically covered by TCT No. 00949-A was thus still issued in the name of Catigbac. both in the name of Catigbac. 129642 in the name of Catigbac and the issuance in its place of TCT No. on the other hand. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty. Summit Realty had every reason to believe in good faith that said property was indeed owned by Catigbac on the basis of the latter’s certificate of title over the same. and petitioner’s title. Tax Declaration No. the Court of Appeals aptly observed that. was superior to petitioner’s. Issue: Whether petitioner was indeed unlawfully deprived of her 5.000 square meter property. 129642. evidenced only by a tax declaration. the former is evidently far superior and is. conclusive and indefeasible as to Catigbac’s ownership of Lot 1-B. despite the cancellation of TCT No. as to how and when petitioner’s alleged predecessor-in-interest. Certificate of title. instead of Summit Realty. petitioner had so far remained utterly silent. 00942-A. may be defined briefly as that which constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession. which was based on a mere tax declaration. it was the former cancelled title which was used as basis for canceling petitioner’s Tax Declaration No. is a 40 . 129642. ownership of Lot 1-B was transferred from Catigbac to Summit Realty. The Court ruled that tax declarations and corresponding tax receipts cannot be used to prove title to or ownership of a real property inasmuch as they are not conclusive evidence of the same. 00449. Title is generally defined as the lawful cause or ground of possessing that which is ours. likewise only had a tax declaration to evidence her title. 181/No. including respondent public officers and even petitioner herself. It is that which is the foundation of ownership of property. real or personal. or which is the foundation of ownership of property. "curiously." A title is different from a certificate of title. In addition.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. A-229. No. 1991 FACTS: As found by respondent court and sustained by the record. or a Transfer Certificate of Title. Record No. a petition for the cancellation of a memorandum of encumbrance annotated upon its sixteen (16) transfer certificates of title. As a backdrop. 1985. 1986. Pangasinan and docketed therein as LRC No. Under the Torrens system. issued subsequent to the original registration. 41 . petitioner alleged that spouses Archimedes J. the sixteen (16) parcels of land covered by the real estate mortgages executed by the said spouses in favor of petitioner.) Whether the action of the Register of Deeds in carrying the annotations of levy over to the new title certificates issued in purchaser's favor is vid and illegal.mere evidence of ownership. denying the petition for lack of jurisdiction. the latter extrajudicially foreclosed under Act 3135. filed an opposition to the petition contending that. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK and COURT OF APPEALS G. b. On August 28. as successor in interest of the defunct Continental Bank. on May 7. the new and consolidated titles over the foreclosed properties issued in favor of herein petitioner are null and void. as amended. private respondent International Corporate Bank.R. Balingit and Ely Suntay executed in its favor the following real estate mortgages. 1972 with the Register of Deeds. 1986. N-33399. it is not the title to the land itself. ISSUES: a.) Whether Section 108 of "Property Registration Decree" expresly allows the summary amendment of certificates of title whenever interest annotated has "terminated and ceased".For failure of the Balingit spouses to settle their loan obligation with petitioner. On May 28. a certificate of title may be an Original Certificate of Title. 86679 July 23. The sheriff s certificate of sale was registered on April 3. which constitutes a true copy of the decree of registration. with a memorandum thereof duly annotated at the back of the aforesaid certificates of title of the foreclosed properties. petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos. since it was not informed of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. the lower court rendered a decision.

A-229. Ordinarily. appearing at the back of petitioner's certificates of titles.. and the purchaser at public auction held pursuant thereto acquires title free from the subordinate liens. et al. on May 7. gives the purchaser a perfect right to secure the cancellation of the annotation of said creditor's attachment lien on the certificates of title of said land." Finally. we had earlier held that the failure of the subsequent attaching creditor to redeem. The rule is that upon a proper foreclosure of a prior mortgage. This alone is sufficient justification for the dropping of the adverse claim from the new certificates of title to be issued to her.. Otherwise. Pangasinan and docketed therein as LRC No. within the time allowed by Section 6 of Act 3136. the land which was sold extrajudicially to satisfy the first mortgage.. the levy in favor of private respondent's predecessor in interest arising from the judgment in Civil Case No. et al. a petition for the cancellation of a memorandum of encumbrance annotated upon its sixteen (16) transfer certificates of title. 17 that "(a)ny subsequent lien or encumbrance annotated at the back of the certificates of title cannot in any way prejudice the mortgage previously registered. the value of the mortgage could be easily destroyed by a subsequent record of an adverse claim. is already without force and effect consider that the same has been annotated in the certificates of title for more than ten (10) years without being duly implemented. as directed by respondent Commissioner in his opinion subject of this appeal. N-33399. 1985. petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos. 15 In a case with similar features. thereafter the Register of Deeds is authorized to issue the new titles without carrying over the annotation of subordinate liens. BORNALES VS COURT OF APPEALS 166 SCRA 519 FACTS: As found by respondent court and sustained by the record. petitioner alleged that spouses 42 . Record No. 69035 of the Court of First Instance of Manila.RULING: We find the foregoing contentions meritorious. Noblejas. Properties levied upon by execution must be sold at public auction within the period of ten (10) years during which the judgment can be enforced by action. vs. . It has likewise been declared in Bank of the Philippine Islands. for no one would purchase at a foreclosure sale if bound by the posterior claim. . etc. As a backdrop. all liens subordinate to the mortgage are likewise foreclosed. and the lots subject thereto pass to the purchaser at the public auction sale free from any lien or encumbrance. etc. .

For failure of the Balingit spouses to settle their loan obligation with petitioner. b. filed an opposition to the petition contending that.Archimedes J. we had earlier held that the failure of the subsequent attaching creditor to redeem. gives the purchaser a perfect right to secure the cancellation of the annotation of said creditor's attachment lien on the certificates of title of said land. denying the petition for lack of jurisdiction. On May 28. the land which was sold extrajudicially to satisfy the first mortgage. RULING: We find the foregoing contentions meritorious.. 1986.) Whether Section 108 of "Property Registration Decree" expresly allows the summary amendment of certificates of title whenever interest annotated has "terminated and ceased". all liens subordinate to the mortgage are likewise foreclosed. within the time allowed by Section 6 of Act 3136. with a memorandum thereof duly annotated at the back of the aforesaid certificates of title of the foreclosed properties. 15 In a case with similar features. the latter extrajudicially foreclosed under Act 3135.. The sheriff s certificate of sale was registered on April 3. etc. et al. 1972 with the Register of Deeds. as amended. the lower court rendered a decision. ISSUES: a.. Balingit and Ely Suntay executed in its favor the following real estate mortgages. thereafter the Register of Deeds is authorized to issue the new titles without carrying over the annotation of subordinate liens. It has likewise been declared in Bank of the Philippine Islands. vs. as successor in interest of the defunct Continental Bank. 1986. private respondent International Corporate Bank. since it was not informed of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. and the purchaser at public auction held pursuant thereto acquires title free from the subordinate liens. The rule is that upon a proper foreclosure of a prior mortgage. Ordinarily. etc. On August 28. Noblejas. et al.) Whether the action of the Register of Deeds in carrying the annotations of levy over to the new title certificates issued in purchaser's favor is vid and illegal. the new and consolidated titles over the foreclosed properties issued in favor of herein petitioner are null and void. the sixteen (16) parcels of land covered by the real estate mortgages executed by the said spouses in favor of petitioner. 17 that "(a)ny subsequent lien or encumbrance annotated at 43 .

COURT OF APPEALS 168 SCRA 405 Facts: The spouses Ricardo Y. that at the time of the cadastral survey in 1926. During the pendency of the case.819 square meters of what was Lot No. Otherwise. Iloilo. the value of the mortgage could be easily destroyed by a subsequent record of an adverse claim.Later Viajar found out that the propert was in possession of Ladrido and demanded for its return but latter refused. Ladrido were the owners of Lot No. that the area 44 . 7511 and Lot No. Angelica F.the back of the certificates of title cannot in any way prejudice the mortgage previously registered. Viajar. Rosendo H. 7340 has been in the possession of the defendants. 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan was located in barangay Guibuanogan Pototan." Finally.sold this lot to Angelica F. . Viajar instituted a civil action for recovery of possession and damages against Ricardo Y. The facts admitted by the parties during the pre-trial show that the piece of real property which used to be Lot No. Lot No. Viajar for P5. Viajar and Celso F. the levy in favor of private respondent's predecessor in interest arising from the judgment in Civil Case No. Angelica F. . plaintiff Celso F.267 square meters and was registered in the names of the spouses under Transfer Certificate of Title. 7511 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan comprosing of an area 154. Viajar sold his rights over Lot No. 69035 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Defendant Ladrido died and substituted by his wife and children. as directed by respondent Commissioner in his opinion subject of this appeal. Viajar and Celso F. A Torrens title was later issued in the names of Angelica F.089 square meters. Viajar and Celso F. . is already without force and effect consider that the same has been annotated in the certificates of title for more than ten (10) years without being duly implemented.. 7340 to his mother and co-plaintiff. Te.000 with the confirmation of Ana Te. Properties levied upon by execution must be sold at public auction within the period of ten (10) years during which the judgment can be enforced by action. Ladrido and Leonor P. appearing at the back of petitioner's certificates of titles. Ladrido. VIAJAR vs. This alone is sufficient justification for the dropping of the adverse claim from the new certificates of title to be issued to her. that the area of 11. 7340 were separated by the Suague River. that it consisted of 20. Viajar. for no one would purchase at a foreclosure sale if bound by the posterior claim. and the lots subject thereto pass to the purchaser at the public auction sale free from any lien or encumbrance.

by accretion. and that the plaintiffs have never been in actual physical possession of Lot No. InPayatas Estate Improvement Co. 55. Thus. Accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of the owners of the banks (Art. Jose Merlan. The rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his registered land through gradual changes in the course of an adjoining stream is well settled. 53 Phil. and should not extend to registered land. The court of appeals affirmed the decision if court a quo Contention of the Petitioners: Article 457 of the New Civil Code must be construed to limit the accretion mentioned therein as accretion of unregistered land to the riparian owner. Issue: Whether the land registered protected from ownership by accretion in accordance with article 457 Ruling: No. Art. for that will defeat the indefeasibility of a Torrens Title.The lower court rendered its judgment in favour of the defendants. Brigido Merlan. Teodorico Nostrates. which was formerly the river bed of the Suague River per cadastral survey of 1926. 457 of the New). 366 of the Old Civil Code.036 square meters. Severo Jeciel Santiago Fernan and Fortunato 45 . Tuason. 7340. the lot in question having remained the registered land of the petitioners. CORONEL v IAC 155 SCRA 270 Facts: Petitioner Rodolfo Coronel filed a complaint for recovery of possession of a parcel of land registered under his name against the private respondents Elias Merlan. then the private respondents cannot acquire title there in derogation to that of the petitioners.Registration does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream.of 14. vs. has also been in the possession of the defendants.

which includes by mistake or oversight land which cannot be registered under the Torrens systems. If a person obtains a title. It was actually their other co-heirs who sold their undivided portions. They contended that the lots occupied by them form part of a 1/3 undivided share of brothers Brigido Merlan and Jose Merlan which they inherited from their deceased father Gabriel Merlan. The Merlan brothers never sold their undivided 1/3 share of the lot to anybody. the holder (Cornel) of the certificate of title is not necessarily the owner of all property. The lower courts ruled in favor of the defendants. by virtue of said certificate alone. The simple possession of a certificate of title. the defendants were already occupying a portion thereof as "tenants at will". hence plaintiff’s ownership is fraudulent. The defendants denied Coronel allegations. void. The Merlans have always been in open and peaceful possession of their undivided share of the lot throughout the years.Ocampo before the then Court of First Instance of Cavite. declaring them as the absolute owners of the remaining 1 1/3 of the 2/8 portion pertaining to the late Bernabela Lontoc Issue: Whether the holder (Cornel) of the certificate of title is the true owner of all the property Ruling: No. the defendants refused to. one of the three heirs of Bernabela Lontoc. under the Torrens System. become the owner of 46 . he does not. under the Torrens system. Despite demands to vacate the premises. does not necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property described therein. Coronel alleged that at the time he purchased the parcel of land. and without effect.

1989 Facts: Petitioner possessed and a registered owner of a 41. Hence. and 3) Daniel Anuat and Paz Anuat. private respondents Brigido Merlan and Jose Merlan were in open.m parcel of land for more than 20 years. 1) Bernardino Merlan. peaceful and adverse possession of their 1/3 share over the lot even after 1950 when the first sale of the lot took place. the surveyor submitted a report wherein there are overlapping on the boundaries of the 47 . 2) Jose Merlan and Brigido Merlan. the parties agreed that they will appoint a public surveyor to relocate the disputed area to determine the true and correct boundaries of their parcels. 47491. what their coowners sold to Ignacio Manalo was their 2/3 share of the same lot. Ignacio sold his interest to Mariano Manalo. However. The deed of sale was registered in the name of petitioner Rodolfo Coronel. The 1/3 undivided portion of the private respondents was mistakenly included in the transfer certificate of title of Mariano Manalo. On the other hand. Moreover.the lands illegally included. May 4. the Southwest portion of the petitioner’s land is bounded by the respondents’ land. The petitioner is bound to recognize the lien in favor of the private respondents which was mistakenly excluded and therefore not inscribed in the torrens title of the land of his predecessors-in-interest. petitioner filed an action to quit title. Lontoc’s property was survived by three sets of heirs.The respondents subdivided their land among themselves and placed 2 monuments inside the Southwest portion of the petitioner’s land. and that Ignacio Manalo sold only the 2/3 share to third-party defendant Mariano Manalo. Bernardino Merlan sold their 2/3 undivided portion of the lot to spouses Ignacio Manalo and Marcela Nobelo. CA 173 SCRA 26 GR No. The private respondents never sold their 1/3 share. 545-sq. Subsequently. the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Rodolfo Coronel. In the per-trail. GOLLOY vs. which Coronel also bought later on.

considering that petitioner and his predecessor or predecessors have been in continuous possession in the concept of an owner. 722. however. the Republic. Besides. for almost 50 years when the property was registered. the petitioner is entitled to the land in dispute. through the Bureau of Fisheries.Among the buyers or transferees of the expanded and subdivided areas was Hacienda Bigaa.In those previous cases. CHAVEZ G. Wherefore. Dominga Balanga.the Supreme Court declared that the excess areas of TCT No. EPIFANIO V. known as Hacienda Calatagan. he submitted a report that respondents' land. was later subdivided and was sold to third parties. the latter if they have any right at all to the overlapped portion. foreshore and bay areas.652. vs. no such objection was made. owned by Ayala y Cia and/or Alfonso. Ayala and/or the Zobels expanded TCT No. 722 to cover an additional 2. The hacienda. leased out portions of the same lands to qualified applicants in whose favor fishpond permits were issued. with an area of 9. Ruling: Yes. and navigable waters (excess areas). never believed that she has a right and legal claim to the overlapped portion.000 hectares of land consisting of beach. Jacobo and Enrique Zobel.583 hectares. 2010 Facts: The lots under consideration in this litigation were originally covered by TCT No. These facts could only be construed to mean that private respondents' predecessor. 174160 April 20. It is hardly persuasive that private respondents' predecessor. are guilty of laches. since the former was surveyed and titled ahead. Issue: Whether the petitioner is entitled to the land in dispute.R. No. 722. prevails over petitioner's land. 722 are 48 .2 lands and that the overlapping are due to the defect in the survey on petitioner's land since it did not duly conform with the previously approved survey. including such excess areas. making it appear that these excess areas are part of Hacienda Calatagan's TCT No. On the other hand. and the Republic or fishpond permittees. up to when the respondents placed 2 monuments inside his land. INC. Dominga Balanga. 722. which caused the issuance of titles under its name covering the purchased subdivided areas. HACIENDA BIGAA. Suits were filed in various courts in Batangas for the recovery of the areas in excess of the area originally covered by TCT No. believing that she has a rightful claim to the overlapped portions. This event gave rise to ownership and/or possessory disputes between the owners of Hacienda Calatagan and their privies and/or successors-in-interest.

44695 and 56120.1996.there can be no valid cause for the ejectment of Epifanio Chavez by Hacienda Bigaa.000 hectares of land located in municipalities of Angat. It actually cut 49 .Inc. Norzagaray. does not in fact support their claim of ownership over the lands in dispute.R. alleged that on April 29.Chavez. For that reason. Since the transfer of lands by the Ayalas and Zobels to Hacienda Bigaa.that the Ayalas and the Zobels were found to be mere usurpers of public domain areas. by force entered the premises of Hacienda Bigaa's properties covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. Inc. 4136 as incontrovertible evidence of its ownership. PIADECO relied on the Titulo Propriedad No. province of Bulacan. L-24796 June 28.who has the better right of possession of the disputed lots? Ruling: The antecedent cases which were both ruled in favor of the Republic and its lessees or permittees laid to rest the issues of ownership and of possession oover the subject lands.000 hectares of this land. is void. No. and in Antipolo and Montalban. and occupied the lots without the prior consent and against the will of Hacienda Bigaa.. In 1964. Issue: Between the petitioner and the respondent.Hacienda Bigaa. The registration of lands of the public domain under the Torrens system cannot convert public lands into private lands. The certificate of title which Hacienda Bigaa have. and San Jose Del Monte. the wrongfully registered public domain areas reverted to the Republic.The Republic. the NAWASA director ordered the cancellation of Piadeco’s certificate because it encroached beyond what was allowed in the certificate.The case of forcible entry filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the MTC. this petition. In this petition. province of Rizal.and all subdivision titles issued to them or their privies and covering these areas were invalidated.Inc. the case for forcible entry should be dismissed.unregisterable lands of the public domain such that any title covering these excess areas are necessarily void. built a house on the property. the latter has no better right over the subject land than the defendant.and affirmed by the RTC and Court of Appeals. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY vs MUNOZ G. Piadeco applied for registration as private woodland some 10. 1968 Facts: Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation (PIADECO) was claiming to be the owner of some 72. as the rightful owner of the expanded areas – portions of the public domain – has the right to place its lessees and permittees (among them Zoila de Chavez) in possession of the fishpond lots. Hence. Thus.

“[a]ll that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law. The latter ruled that the Spanish title is no longer recognized and should have never been used to apply for a Certificate. with the approval of the department head. There should be no question now that Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 has the force and effect of law. Director of Forestry. It is no less a valid law.trees in the Angat and Marikina watershed area which was prohibited. stating “Private ownership of land must be proved not only through the genuineness of title but also with clear identity of the land claimed xxx no definite area seems to have been mentioned in the title. Ruling: No. and regulating the use and occupancy of the forests and forest reserves. The Spanish title it acquired cannot be used to register for another Certificate. to issue regulations “deemed expedient or necessary to secure the protection and conservation of the public forests in such manner as to insure a continued supply of valuable timber and other forest products for the future. A rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress authorized the promulgation of administrative rules and regulations to implement a given legislation. to the same end. Revised Administrative Code. Piadeco also had a settlement with Nawasa. empowers the Bureau of Forestry. The lower court ruled in favor of Piadeco. Piadeco sought to renew its certificate but it was denied by the Asst. that the 50 .” Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 was recommended by the Director of Forestry. and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Issue: Whether or not Piadeco can claim ownership over the property. Justice Sanchez noted the dubious validity of the title in his opinion. Section 1817. It is an administrative regulation germane to the objects and purposes of the law. It was promulgated pursuant to law.

19756 and 20102 and to cancel all the tax declarations issued based thereon. No. Later. 20102. On this basis. Threatened with contempt. Subsequently. 2009 Facts: On November 19.R. 1986. On October 20. On October 21. who died without issue. the RD elevated the matter en consulta to the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration. explained that to comply with the said court order would remove the basis for many other transfer certificates of title and would result in the deprivation of the right to due process of the registered owners thereof. 40287 registered in the names of spouses Juan Soriano and Vicenta Macaraeg. 1985. in turn. 1986. 161034. but conform to the standards that the law prescribes. The Salazars claim that two of the entries annotated in the title are void since no consolidation of rights appear in the Registry of Deeds (RD) of Tarlac to support the entries. the RTC denied the motion and advised the Salazars to elevate the matter en consulta to the Land Registration Commission. 1987. the Salazars filed a new motion praying that the RD of Tarlac be ordered to comply with the court’s order issued on November 7. No respondent was impleaded in the said petition. The RD. the Salazars filed an urgent motion praying for the issuance of an order to direct the RD of Tarlac to recall all titles issued under Entry Nos. 51 . 40287. 9297.regulation be not in contradiction with it. After the Salazars moved for reconsideration. the Salazars filed a second urgent motion praying that the owners of the affected property be ordered to appear before the court to show cause why their titles should not be cancelled.” Zenaida ACOSTA vs. The motion was granted. which. the RTC directed the RD of Tarlac to comply with the orders. is non-existent according to a certification issued by the RD. RTC Branch 63 of Tarlac resolved to grant the petition and ordered the cancellation of Entry No. Trinidad SALAZAR AND ANICETA SALAZAR G. however. which supposedly cancelled OCT No. June 30. and that TCT No. respondents Trinidad and Aniceta Salazar filed a petition for the cancellation of the entries annotated at the back of OCT No. issued a resolution directing the RD to comply with the RTC’s orders.

the proceedings of the case. Ruling The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. Defendants Raymundo Macaraeg. Hence. had no jurisdiction over issues of ownership. among others. that they had acquired their titles in good faith and for value. in the certificate. Furthermore. Martha Estacio (both deceased). at the time of registration. 1989. any judgment or order issued by the court thereon is still null and void for want of authority on the part of the court to act with respect to the parties never impleaded in the action. unless there is compelling reason to do so and only upon a direct action filed in court proceeded in accordance with law. to impugn the validity of a Torrens certificate of title by the simple expediency of filing an ex parte petition for cancellation of entries would inevitably erode the very reason why the Torrens system was adopted in this country. Issue: Whether or not the action taken by the Salazars regarding the cancellation of the subsequent titles and tax declarations is valid. except claims that were noted. which is to quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any question on the legality of the title. Rarely will the court allow another person to attack the validity and indefeasibility of a Torrens certificate. Lucio Macaraeg. such as the Salazars in this case. In their comment. 219121 issued in the name of the Salazars is void and that the case for quieting of title is not a direct. 1986 order of the RTC is null and void because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. but a collateral. Defendants filed three separate answers. although the action proceeded. Yet. this petition. Thus. acting as a land registration court. Adelaida Macaraeg. 40287 should have been a ground for the RTC to dismiss. Gregorio Baluyut and Eligia Obcena (hereinafter. the orders issued by the lower court never acquired finality. represented by Eufracia Macaraeg Baluyot as attorney-in-fact. They also argued that TCT No. More crucial is the fact that both parties in this case are dealing with property registered under the Torrens system. attack against a property covered by a Torrens certificate. Macaraegs) maintained that the November 7. the court also noted that for 30 years the Salazars never contested the ownership of the said property in any 52 . and that the lower court. or which may arise subsequent thereto. the oppositors contended. To allow any individual.Then herein petitioners together with other subsequent purchasers for value of the disputed property – twenty-seven (27) titleholders in all – filed their formal written comment dated April 17. the failure of the Salazars to implead indispensable party defendants in the petition for cancellation of entries in OCT No. The Court of appeals ruled in favor of the Salazars. or at least suspend.

1976. Regional Survey Division. Urdaneta City. Petitioner then manifested its opposition to the respondent’s application for registration. On August 20. approved by the Land Management Services (LMS) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). 2001. v ANGELA V. D. and the case was reinstated to the RTC. nor the transfer of the portions of the property to the petitioners. Hence. 2002.. and previously covered by Survey Plan No. except as to the petitioner. 2009 Facts: On July 12. Thereafter. 2001. Madayag filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta. through the Office of the Solicitor General. it was not notified of the survey conducted on June 8. Region 1. 1970. No. and the heirs of Romulo Visperas. some of which are already in the name of the petitioner while the others are still in the name of the previous owners. C.court. Petitioner alleged that it had recently bought seven parcels of land in Barangay Anonas. On February 6. Inc. Pangasinan. Pangasinan an application for registration of a parcel of land with an area of 1. 2001. Psu-236090 approved by the Bureau of Lands on December 29. Urdaneta. petitioner filed its formal opposition. E. through counsel. the RTC declared a general default. and the heirs of Romulo Visperas also filed their respective oppositions.492 square meters located in Barangay Anonas. approved by the Land Registration Commission on August 26. the Supreme court granted the petition and the appellate courts decision was set aside. The CA ratiocinated that the survey plan which was 53 . 164687 February 12. despite being the new owner of the adjoining lots. wrote the Chief.R. H and I in ConsolidationSubdivision Plan No. San Fernando City. delineated as Lots B. respondent commenced the presentation of evidence. On February 20. Attached to the application was a tracing cloth of Survey Plan Psu01-008438. G. INC. DENR. Region I. The Republic of the Philippines. MADAYAG G. respondent Angela V. the Republic. SM PRIME HOLDINGS. (LRC) Pcs-21329. 2002. petitioner SM Prime Holdings. demanding the cancellation of the respondent’s survey plan because the lot encroached on the properties it recently purchased from several lot owners and that. These parcels of land are covered by separate certificates of title.

Land registration courts. Ruling: It is well to note at this point that. hear and determine all questions that arise from a petition for registration. as well as those involving substantial issues. After all. in its bid to avoid multiplicity of suits and to promote the expeditious resolution of cases. In view of the nature of a Torrens title. a survey plan precisely serves to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration. the latter is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective. can now hear and decide even controversial and contentious cases. and that the RTC has the power to hear and determine all questions arising from an application for registration.duly approved by the DENR should be accorded the presumption of regularity. the court may require the filing of additional papers to aid in its determination of 54 . a land registration court has the duty to determine whether the issuance of a new certificate of title will alter a valid and existing certificate of title. But the RTC need not wait for the decision of the DENR in the petition to cancel the survey plan in order to determine whether the subject property is already titled or forms part of already titled property. therefore. and to forestall the possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land. Issue: Whether the Court of Appelas committed manifest errorr in holding that the Lower Court has acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending the proceedings and archiving the case.Should the court find it difficult to do so. When the law confers jurisdiction upon a court. Presidential Decree (P. as such.) No. It may. which is not allowed by law.D. An application for registration of an already titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title. The court may now verify this allegation based on the respondent’s survey plan vis-à-vis the certificates of title of the petitioner and its predecessors-ininterest. 1529 eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the latter’s limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land registration court.

denied the petition for reconstitution of the Barque title. 1529 Manotok v. as reconstituting officer of the LRA. based on Section 21 of P. They alleged that the Barque title was among the records destroyed by the 1988 fire.the propriety of the application. In support of their petition. 2008 Facts: On 11 June 1988. Severino M. On 30 June 1997. The Barques’ petition for review was docketed as CA55 . Barque G. hence.R. No. The LRA reversed Atty.The Barques’ motion for reconsideration was denied by Atty. Bustos in an Order dated 10 February 1998. the Barques submitted copies of the alleged owner’s duplicate of the Barque title. Atty. Bustos on appeal. That fire has attained notoriety due to the numerous certificates of title on file with that office.D. Benjamin M. tax declarations and a Plan FLS 3168-D covering the property. Respondents Heirs of Homer Barque (the Barques) filed a petition with the Land Registration Authority (LRA) for administrative reconstitution of the original of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. et. real estate tax receipts. No. al. which were destroyed as a consequence. immolating. records stored in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. et al. They further alleged that the Barque title was spurious. the Barques appealed to the LRA. 162335 &162605 December 18. Manotok IV. The Manotoks claimed that the lot covered by the Barque title formed part of the land covered by their reconstituted title TCT No. (the Manotoks) filed their opposition thereto. a fire gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall. 210177 (the Barque title) issued in the name of Homer Barque. RT-22481 [372302] (the Manotok title) in the name of Severino Manotok. Bustos. The LRA further found anomalies in the Manotoks’ title. Both the Manotoks and the Barques appealed the LRA decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). It ruled that the reconstituting officer should not have required the submission of documents other than the owner’s duplicate certificate of title as basis for denying the petition and should have confined himself to the owner’s duplicate certificate of title. among others.

the cancellation of the Manotok title cannot arise incidentally from the administrative proceeding for reconstitution of the Barque title even if the evidence from that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as fake. 1529.P. Still.) No. Blg. Nowhere in the aforecited provision is it stated that the LRA has the power to cancel titles.G. 66700. albeit in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the ruling of the LRA. SP No. even under Republic Act (R. which 56 . Ruling: It could not pursuant to Section 48 of Presidential Decree No.P. Nor could it have emerged incidentally in the appellate review of the LRA’s administrative proceeding. 26 as amended by Rep. Its exclusive original jurisdiction is determined by law. for the appellate court to be able to direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the course of reviewing a decision of the LRA. Indeed. 1529 enumerates the general functions of the Land Registration Commissioner. as amended. the LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel a Torrens title in the first place. the Barques are unable to point to any basis in law that confirms the power of the LRA to effect such cancellation. SP No. 129). also pursuant to Section 9 of B. On 13 September 2002.R. 66642.A. 129.D. Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals was empowered to direct the annulment of the Manotok title through the petitions raised before it by the Barques and the Manotoks. while the Manotoks’ petition for review was docketed as CA-G. Clearly. Section 9 of that law restricts the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to special civil actions and to actions for annulment of judgments of the regional trial court. 6732. particularly by Batas Pambansa (B. the Second Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision denying the Barques’ petition and affirming the LRA Resolution. No.There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to annul Torrens titles or to otherwise adjudicate questions over ownership of property. Act No. Thus. Section 6 of P.R. also known as the Property Registration Decree. the Court of Appeals did acquire jurisdiction over the Barques’ and the Manotoks’ petitions.

It is thus clear that neither the Court of Appeals nor the LRA had jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title. since the contract between Liwanag and SBMA concluded and has not been renewed. SANTIAGO vs. And in fact defendant is using the two parcels of land for commercial and other purposes. as we shall see shortly such laws take great care to ensure that a petition for administrative reconstitution of title will not disturb existing Torrens titles. Issue: Whether or not Spanish Titles are still admissible as evidence of ownership of lands? 57 . SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY G. To comply with her contractual commitments. No. and that as a consequence thereof. Santiago is informed by the agents of SBMA that he should vacate the property because said defendant would need the same for its own use. In fact. defendant is still claiming possessory rights over said property. SBMA further alleged in its counter statement of facts that. Liwanag Santiago ceased to be an employee of respondent SBMA. Said parcels of land were leased by Rodriguez to Santiago and Mateo for a period of 50 years. By virtue of the contract Santiago is occupying the land. R. Lately. 156888 November 20. The petitioners further alleged that defendant having no authority to possess the land. as mandated by the SBMA Housing Policy. However. Hermogenes Rodriguez was the owner of parcels of land registered in his name under a certificate of title denominated as Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree. she and her family were asked to vacate and return possession of the subject housing unit. Liwanag Santiago (wife of Pedro Santiago) only availed of the housing units as a privilege for her being an employee of SBMA. Rodriguez now desires to recover possession of the property from the defendant.authorizes the administrative reconstitution of titles in limited cases. 2006 Facts: Plaintiffs claim that co-petitioner Victoria Rodriguez is the sole heir and administrator of the estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez. PEDRO R.

Title to real property refers to that upon which ownership is based. 892. If not. thus affecting in general lands extending from Malolos. Victoria M. 1996 Facts: The heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban laid claim and have been laying claim to the ownership of. It is the evidence of the right of the owner or the extent of his interest. 892 which took effect on 16 February 1976. Armando G. assert right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property. 496) within six months from the date of effectivity of the said Decree or until 16 August 1976. and their Spanish title remain inadmissible as evidence of their ownership of the Subject Property. Considering the vastness of the land claim.D. many suits have been filed all for the purpose of owning the lands. Rodriguez. according to the San Pedro heirs. the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands covered thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act (Act No. And.Ruling: It has long been settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. without legal or equitable title to the subject property. No. Bulacan to the City Hall of Quezon City and the land area between Dingalan Bayin the north and Tayabas Bay in the south. by which means he can maintain control and. The fact that petitioners were in actual possession of the Subject Property when they filed the Complaint with the trial court on 29 April 1996 does not exclude them from the application of P. against third persons and the Government itself. 103727 December 1. In the case at bar. 1894. INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO Y ESTEBAN vs.R. 58 . entitled "Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136" dated April 25. The claim. whether in a land registration proceeding or in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title. non-compliance therewith will result in a reclassification of the real property. No. Santiago lacked the personality to claim entitlement to possession of the same. The petitioners contend on the basis of a Spanish title. appears to cover lands. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R. COURT OF APPEALS G. we have no alternative but to uphold the ruling that Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership. as a rule.

The court resolved that TCT No. Iloilo covered by OCT No. the respondents refused to honor it on the ground that they also have a TCT numbered T-25772 over the same lot. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia. OCT No. T-106098 to which. 4517 of Sta. 1988 Facts: This case involves two cases (G. However. 106098 was issued in the names of the petitioner. 64432 and G. 6406 was cancelled and TCT No. While the petitioners contend that the lands are subject of The Spanish Mortgage Law or the “Titulo Propriedad Numero 4136”. It is settled that by virtue of Pd no 892 which took effect on February 16. 6204) over the same parcel of land known as Lot No.Issue: WON the heirs of Don Mariano have the legal claim over the properties involved. the court also ordered the writ of possession to the petitioners be carried out. a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a separate case (Civil Case No. 6406. No. and respondents Gregorio Perez. No. This prompted the petitioners to file for a new petition directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the new certificates of titles issued. This is the subject of the dispute between petitioner Eduardo S. BARANDA V. In this case the heirs have no legal claim over the said lands because PD 892 invaldates any claim of title and must be first registered under the Torrens system of titling.R. Ruling: No.R. Issues: 59 . 81163 September 26. Maria Gotera and Susan Silao. It held the validity of Title No. GUSTILO GR No. Barbara. the Supreme Court ruled otherwise. However. 1976 the syte of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands coverd thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act within 6 months from date of effectivity of the said decree. 15871) still pending in the Court of Appeals" was carried out and annotated in the new certificates of titles issued to the petitioners. T-25772 was acquired fraudulently. and declared it null and void.

62042 as well as G. Whether the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case No. .. and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree. the proper court has the discretionary power to cancel it under peculiar circumstances. 64432.R. No. No.R. SC have once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency which has been filed in a proper case. 15871 were trying to delay the full implementation of the final decisions in G. Presidential Decree No. Section 10. . 64432. and where the continuances of the trial. 15871 with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from cancelling the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners which were earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court in G.R. as for instance..R. where the evidence so far presented by the plaintiff does not bear out the main allegations of his complaint. Whether the Register of Deeds has the duty to annotate or annul the notice of lis pendens in a Torrens Certificate of Title. for which the plaintiff is responsible. are unnecessarily delaying the determination of the case to the prejudice of the defendant. The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. cannot be cancelled while the action is pending and undetermined. No. it is crystal clear that private respondents herein. he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing. No. in filing Civil Case No. 60 . No. If the instrument is not registrable. 62042 and G. No. 2. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. 2. Under these circumstances. Ruling: 1. stating the ground or reasons therefore.1. Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party causing the registration thereof.

Ledesma two lots registered in his name. Negros Occidental. VILLASENOR 13 SCRA 494 Facts: Felix Villaseñor. in his capacity as special administrator of the estate of his deceased father. LEDESMA v. Eusebio Villaseñor. to wit. the court ordered the cancellation of the certificates thus issued and the issuance of still new ones. The ground alleged in the petition was that Civil Case No. and solely on the basis of the allegations in the petition. 2532-C and 2533-B of the Cadastral Survey of Bago. Appellant claims that the lower court erred in issuing the orders appealed from because: (1) appellee failed to give notice to appellant or to furnish him copy of the petition. filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (Civil Case No. asking that the Register of Deeds be ordered to register the aforementioned deed of sale. The vendee. Ledesma.The function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances. (3) the court had no power to order the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale in question when the same was being contested as 61 . On October 8. The court issued a writ of preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo. without notice either to the Register of Deeds or to appellant. who had not been impleaded as a party-defendant. 1960. Ledesma filed his own petition in the cadastral record of said lots. On the same day the court. The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land. 5662) to enjoin the Register of Deeds of the same province from registering a deed of sale by which the deceased conveyed to Jose Ma. issued the corresponding order for registration. again upon Ledema's petition. Lots Nos. On October 3. (2) appellee should have filed the same in Civil Case No. on October 5. also in his name. Two days later. 5662 had been dismissed and the preliminary injunction issued therein had been dissolved. 5662 and not in the cadastral proceeding. The reason given for seeking injunctive relief was that the deed of sale was fictitious and that the signature of the vendor was forged. instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. In compliance therewith the Register of Deeds cancelled the two certificates of title in the name of the deceased Eusebio Villaseñor and issued new ones in Ledesma's name. 1960 the court lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the petition. Villaseñor moved for reconsideration of the two orders and then perfected this appeal upon their denial. intervened in the case.

The effect of the dissolution was immediate and would not be stayed even if an appeal had been perfected from the order of dismissal (Watson v. unnecessarily took the matter out of his hands and at the same time preempted the question of registration still pending in the civil action filed by appellant. however. But that is only as far as the Register of Deeds was concerned. was no authority for the court in the cadastral proceeding to issue the orders complained of without notice to the Register of Deeds or to appellant. Ventura. The court a quo. 480. Enriquez. the least that the court a quo should have done was to afford appellant proper notice and hearing. 1 Phil. 5662 was dissolved in the same order which dismissed appellant's petition the obstacle to the registration of the deed of sale was removed. Irrespective of the propriety or impropriety of the remedy pursued. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN 22 SCRA 1152 Facts: On June 28. to register an instrument which in his opinion is registrable. ALMIROL V. the Register of Deeds had improperly refused to register the deed of sale. and (4) if. 497). It is one thing for the Register of Deeds. in anticipating the action of the Register of Deeds. that is. in the exercise of his ministerial duties under the law. 1 Phil. Issue: Whether or not the court erred in issuing the orders of lifting the injunction and the dismissal of the petition without notice to the Register of Deeds or to appellant. or even the dismissal of the petition. Sitia Taco v. considering that the dismissal of Civil Case No. the proper remedy should have been a suit for mandamus. 3662 was not yet final. To be sure. and quite another thing for the court itself to order the registration. so that he could reiterate his objections to the registration and present evidence to substantiate them and/or call the court's attention to the fact that the question had not yet been definitely settled in the civil action since the order dismissing it was not yet final. whether or not mandamus should have been resorted to.fictitious nor to order the issuance of titles in the name of the supposed buyer. his duty under the circumstances — if the document was on its face registrable — being administrative and ministerial. as appellee points out. 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land 62 . The court knew of the pendency of that case and of the fact that the relief sought therein by appellant was precisely to prevent registration. The lifting of the injunction. when the writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. The former does not contemplate notice to and hearings of interested parties such as are required in a judicial proceeding nor carry with it the solemnity and legal consequences of a court judgment. Ruling: We are of the opinion that the lower court did commit the error attributed to it.

" Sometime in May. and covered by original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo. Issue: Whether or not a case can be directly filed to the court without appealing first to the Commissioner of Land Registration? Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the dismissal by the lower court is correct and provides that "where any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds . married to Nicolasa M. Cornelio Balbin(registered owner) appeared to have donated the 2/3 of the subject land. province of Agusan." which shall be "conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds. AURELIO BALBIN v REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR G. the respondent contends that the petitioner did not extract all remedies before going to court since he can appeal the decision to the Commissioner of Lad Registration. ." This administrative remedy must be resorted to by the petitioner before he can have recourse to the courts. 1962 Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a transfer certificate of title.situated in the municipality of Esperanza. . The lower court held that mandamus cannot lie because that exist that adequate remedy. 63 ." who thereafter shall "enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration. requesting that the latter be annotated on the title. On the other hand. L-20611 May 8. So the petitioner filed to the CFI of Agusan a petition for mandamus to compel the register of deeds. The Register of Deeds refused to register the land contending that it is a conjugal property and needs the consent of the other spouse. the RoD denied the petition for annotation “legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in law”. No. Abalo.R. 1969 Facts: Aurelio and Francis Balbin presented to the Register of Deeds Ilocos Sur a duplicate copy of the registered owner’s certificate of title and a deed if donation intervivos. In its answer.

. The said persons received their co-owners duplicate CT’s. property of donor Cornelio and his deceased wife Nemesia Mina.” Assuming the conjugal nature of the property. in favor of Florention. there integrity might be affected if it was annotated in once copy and not on the others. namely. the whole system of Torrens system would cease to be reliable. Pursuant to sec. which is why the RoD denied said annotation. Issue: W/N the LRC is correct in denying request for annotation? Ruling Yes. if there are duplicates than that of originally issues. Thus. who on the other hand upheld the decision of the RoD. there should only be one duplicate of the title in question( the registered owner himself). The petitioners failed to present the 3 co-owner’s copies of CT’s. Thus. In the case at bar. the donation bears on its face an infirmity which justified the denial of registration. 55 of Act 496. there were several copies of the same title in existence. “there should first be a liquidation of the partnership before the surviving spouse may make such a conveyance. that is. the 64 . Since the property subject of donation is also presumed conjugal. However. it must contain identical entries of transaction affecting the land covered by the said title.It shows that there was an annotation in the memorandum of encumbrance on the Original Certificate of Title of 3 separate sales executed by the registered owner. Juana Gabayan and Roberto Bravo. the petitioners referred the matter to the LRC. Cornelio. if different copies were permitted to carry different annotations.

Dr. 1924 owned and registered in the name of the late Pedro Villanueva. and Restituto R. So. When petitioners learned of this Affidavit of Adverse Claim. the OCT was cancelled and a new certificate of title was issued in the name of the petitioners covered by TCT NO. Villanueva executed and filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the Office of the Registered of Deeds of Laguna. 1937. attempt was made to settle said controversy amicably. RT6293 (No.300x square meters. petitioners file a notice of appeal to the IAC.fact that 2/3 portion of the property which Cornelio donated was more than ½ his share. The Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered its decision declaring the deedd of sale of August 10. the latter being the daughter of Pedro Villanueva. The subject matter of this controversy involves a parcel of land situated in Cavinti. On August 10.. as well as the reconstituted transfer certificate of title of petitioners. 1944. 2262. Thus. Sr. not to say more than what remained of such share after he had sold portions of the same land to 3 other parties. 1937. void ab initio. 1976. 23350) on January 4. 1977. an unnotarized deed of sale written in Tagalog that was allegedly signed by the late Pedro Villanueva conveying and transferring the property in question in favour of the petitioners. Jr. 65 . petitioner claimed that the aforesaid land was sold to them in a private document. defendant Marta Villanueva together with Pedro Villanueva. On November 17. issued on April 2. Marcelo S. by filling a complaint for Quieting of the Title and Damages with the Court of First Instance of Laguna on February 3. petitioners instituted court suit against the private respondent and her husband. Agana. Subsequently. Laguna consisting of 81. but they failed. GALLARDO vs INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT 155 SCRA 248 Facts: Petitioners were nephew and niece of the late Pedro Villanueva and first cousin of the private respondent Marta Villanueva de Agana. more or less. However. initially covered by an Original Certificate of Title No.

2008 66 . the contention that ownership over registered property may be acquired by prescription or adverse possession is absolutely without merit. RT-6293 (No. affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Section 127 of the land Registration Act. CANETE V. 1984. 23350) issued in the names of petitioners. 154080 January 22. INC. No title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. who shall certify such acknowledgement substantially in from next hereinafter stated” was violated.. Issue: Whether or not there was a valid reconstitution of Transfer Certificate ofTitle No. that the conveyance be executed “before the judge of a court of record or clerk of a court of record or a notary public or a justice of the peace. Ruling: No. on May 22. Also. GENUINO ICE CO. and shall be as effective to convey. encumber or bind the lands as though made in accordance with more prolix forms heretofore in use. GR No.” It is therefore evident that Exhibit “E” in the case at bar is definitely not registerable under the Land Registration Act. Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors. The action of the Register of Deeds of Laguna in allowing the registration of the private deed of sale was unauthorized and did not lend a bit of validity to the defective private document of sale. Section 127 of Act 496 which requires. among other things. With reference to the special law. Act 496 “Deed of Conveyance. affecting lands. whether registered under this act or unregistered shall be sufficient in law when made substantially in accordance with the following forms.the IAC.

The plaintiffs gave only an incomplete narration of facts unsupported by documentary or other exhibits. fictitious and issued under mysterious circumstances considering that the holders thereof and their predecessors-ininterest were never in actual. Respondent. 614 from which the foregoing TCTs originated of were derived. The respondents filed a petition for certiorari to the CA which granted the petition and dismissed the amended complain of the petitioners. And that the real property in question is a portion of the friar land known as the “Piedad Estate”. and the 67 . adverse. The amended complaint alleged that the plaintiffs and their predecessors-ininterest are among those in actual. peaceful. that no relief may be granted as a matter of law. sought the dismissal of the case on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action because petitioners are not real parties-in-interest. The motion to dismiss was denied. which is intended for distribution among the bona fide occupants thereof pursuant to the Friar Lands Act. and continuous possession in the concept of owner of unregistered parcels of land in Sitio Mabilog. and physical possession of the property rendering them ineligible to acquire title under the Friar Lands Act. adverse.Facts: Petitioners filed a complaint and an amended complaint for cancellation of title to property covered by several TCTs for being spurious. Issue: Whether the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the certiorari and dismissing the complaint Ruling: No. They also seek to annul OCT No. The complaint and amended complaint failed to state the “ultimate fact” which are essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. and that petitioners failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. Quezon City.

It has been found that OCT 614 did legally exist and was previously issued in the name of the Philippine Government in 1910.allegations are mere conclusions of law also. the allegations of fraud are not specific and were not substantiated. as well as his successors-in-interest. may not claim successional rights to purchase by reason of occupation from time immemorial unless it is shown that their predecessors-in-interest were actual settlers and occupants at the time said land were acquired by the government. The initial claim that OCT 164 of which all the other subject titles are derivatives is null and void has been proven wrong as held in previous cases (Pinlac). found that as early as prior to the Second World War. REPUBLIC V. An Ad Hoc Committee of the then Ministry of Natural Resources specifically tasked to investigate the historical background of the Piedad Estate. 68 . Also. as held in the Balicudiong case one who acquired title under the Friar Land Act. all lots in the Piedad Estate had already been disposed of. T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan. The Piedad Estate has been placed under the Torrens system which means that all lots therein are titled. Being so. Azucena Tancinco Reyes. CA 131 SCRA 532 Facts: Respondents Benjamin Tancinco. Marina (should be "Maria") Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. Their interest is mere expectancy based on the probability that the government would give them preference as buyers or lessees of the subject lands. they are not real parties in interest for the purpose of maintaining a suit for cancellation of the subject titles. conceding to the State’s ownership of the property. Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. Also. the plaintiffs did not pray to be declared owners of the subject property-despite their alleged adverse possession-but only to be adjudged as the bona fide occupants thereof. On real-parties in interest may file for the cancellation of title of property and not one whose interest is based on mere expectancy.

the registration of the lots is not valid. On June 26. 19. Ruling: No. These lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as 69 . the respondent Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the lower court. The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the names of the private respondents. 1976. On August. 89709 however. The private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the application for registration with respect to Lot 3 in line with the recommendation of the Commissioner appointed by the Court. 1982. the petitioner Republic appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals.Meycauayan. hence it was ordered withdrawn from the application. They filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent to their fishpond property but the Bureau of Lands filed a written opposition to the application for registration. the lower court rendered a decision granting the application on the finding that the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents' fishponds covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. and trial proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu131892. Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. There are facts and circumstances in the record which render untenable the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents' fishponds. Issue: Whether the registration of the lots valid.

continuously. publicly and adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26. as plaintiffs therein. Issue: Whether the property in question a foreshore or a part and parcel of the public domain Ruling: 70 . ordering the defendants therein to return possession of the premises to herein defendants. and lot 2 was declared public land. The only valid conclusion therefore is that the said areas could not have been there in 1939. the defendants filed an application for registration of their title over a parcel of land in Laguna. defendants were declared owners of lots 1. promulgated in 1956. opposed the application on the ground that the applicants and their predecessors have not been in possession of the land openly. they prayed for the eviction of the barrio folk occupying portions of Lot 1. The Republic. paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. They existed only after the private respondents transferred their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951. however. It appears that barrio folks also opposed the application. 1894 and the land has not ceased to be part of the public domain. REPUBLIC V.property of the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502. In a civil case they filed in 1966. What private respondents claim as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river by reclamation. Judgment was rendered in 1968. The adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names of the private respondents is null and void. In a case. ALAGAD 169 SCRA 466 Facts: In 1951. They are not open to registration under the Land Registration Act.

the Integrated National Police Building. MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO V. He had applied for 71 . are res publicae and incapable of private appropriation.Properties of public dominion. is a strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. Laguna de Bay is a lake. like the Puericulture and Family Planning Center. the portions inundated thereby are not considered part of the bed or basin of the body of water in question. And under Article 74 of the Law of Waters. and in which case. since 1920 “up to today. rainfall for instance. on other hand. A foreshore land. and the public abattoir. 1977. additional public structures were built thereon. Those public structures occupy almost the entire area of the land. and land capable of registration as private property. where the rise in water level is due to the extraordinary action of nature. for more than 50 years now. held by the State by regalian right. It cannot therefore be said to be foreshore land but land outside of the public dominion. the natural bed or basin of lakes is the ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth. On August 8. described below. Branch XV. the Office of the Municipal Treasurer. has considered the disputed property. One of the two applicants was Conrado Eniceo. a single application for the registration of two distinct parcels of land was filed by two distinct applicants before the then CFI Rizal. ZAPANTA 133 SCRA 820 Facts: The Municipality of Antipolo. This case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Makati (the Registration Court). There is indication to the effect that it had been the site of the public market as far back as 1908. to be public land subject to Antipolo’s use and permission to use within the prerogatives and purposes of a municipal corporation.” Gradually. or at the latest. it forms part of the national dominion. Otherwise.

Antipolo filed a motion for reconsideration. 1983 despite the fact that before the dismissal. The applications were approved by the Registration Court on 26 February 1980. Antipolo had submitted its Appellant’s Brief. the appeal was dismissed on August 23. Ruling: The claim of the Avendaño heirs that they merely tolerated occupancy by Antipolo which had borrowed the disputed property from them. Issue: Whether the subject parcel of land was a property of public domain. since as far back as 1916. They forget that all lands are presumed to be public lands until the contrary is established. The other applicant was “Heirs of Joaquin Avendaño”.826 sq. Antipolo perfected an appeal to the then Court of Appeals. m. (the disputed property) surveyed in the name of the Municipality of Antipolo. and their assignees praying for nullification of the judgment rendered by the Registration Court. Pasig against named “Heirs of Joaquin Avendaño”. Both parcels were situated in the Municipality of Antipolo. 1981. in their Answer. Antipolo had also declared the disputed 72 . and the land they were applying for registration was a parcel containing 9. its appeal was disallowed. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. The defendants. m. Antipolo filed a complaint (Civil Case 41353) at the CFI Rizal. the case was dismissed. On May 22. erroneously presupposes ownership thereof since that time. Upon motion of the Avendaño heirs to dismiss on the ground the Antipolo had not filed its Brief within the reglementary period. Antipolo took steps to interpose an appeal but because it failed to amend the Record on Appeal. pleaded a special defense of res judicata. since they had been in possession. which Antipolo claimed it had not received. The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in their names or of their predecessors-in-interest as early as 1918 does not necessarily prove ownership. A notice to file Brief was issued by the Appellate Court.registration under the Torrens system of a parcel of land containing 258 sq. After a preliminary hearing on the mentioned special defense. Branch XIII.

1974 Facts: The spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez. Since the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for registration of public property of Antipolo. and can be attacked at any time. COURT OF APPEALS G. are the registered owners of two (2) parcels of land located in Lubao. Pursuant to the Court's 73 . It follows that the titles issued in favor of the Avendaño heirs must also be held to be null and void. granted the registration over and against the opposition of the AttorneyGeneral and the Director of Forestry. who in turn.R. Maria Montemayor and Donata Montemayor. Potenciano Garcia applied for the registration of both parcels of land in his name. as well as the first parcel. It was not a bar to the action brought by Antipolo for its annulment by reason of res judicata. 1925. L-31271 April 29. its Decision adjudicating the disputed property as of private ownership is null and void. After the death of Paulino Montemayor the said property passed to his successors-in-interest. Pampanga.property as its own in Tax Declarations Nos. MARTINEZ vs. Both parcels of land are fishponds. 993 and 454. On April 17. No. and the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. now petitionersappellees. who secured a "titulo real" over it way back in 1883. sold it. covered by transfer certificate of title No. The property involved in the instant case is the second parcel mentioned in the above-named transfer certificate of title. 15856 of the Register of Deeds of the said province. to a certain Potenciano Garcia. It never attained finality. The disputed property was originally owned by one Paulino Montemayor. sitting as land registration court. 909.

making nugatory. Dikes. by then composed of the Honorable Pedro Tuason. Or Any Other Walls In Public Navigable Waters. 1925. To Regulate Works in Such Waters or Waterways And In Communal Fishing Grounds. And To Provide Penalties For Its Violation. Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources and Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Thereafter. Remove and/or Demolish the Construction of Dams. 1421 was first issued on November 9. and setting aside the two lawful decisions of the Court Exhibits K and I. directing the appellees herein to remove the dikes they had constructed. entitled "An Act To Prohibit. To avoid any untoward incident. Contention of Private Defendant: In holding that the investigation ordered by the respondent Secretary in this case is illegal on the ground that the said respondent Secretary has arrogated unto himself the power. 14318. the ownership of these properties changed hands until eventually they were acquired by the herein appellee spouses who hold them by virtue of transfer certificate of title No. original certificate of title No. And For Other Purposes. which he does not possess. as chairman. the one rendered by the highest 74 . While Civil Case No. 1958. then Secretary of Public Works and Communications. ordered another investigation of the said parcel of land. covering said parcels 1 and 2 was issued to the spouses Potenciano Garcia and Lorenza Sioson. 751 was still pending the Honorable Florencio Moreno. of reversing. Or Waterways and In Communal Fishing Grounds. and the Honorable Salvador Araneta and Vicente Orosa. on the strength of the authority vested in him by Republic Act No.decision. respectively. 2056. These parcels of land were subsequently bought by Emilio Cruz de Dios in whose name transfer certificate of title No. 15856. approved on June 13. and even annulling thereby. the disputants agreed to refer the matter to the Committee on Rivers and Streams. as members. at that time Secretary of Justice.

is a river of the public domain. confirms the fact that Lot No. the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto in favor of the appellants for the land covered thereby is no longer open to attack under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) and the jurisprudence on the matter established by this Tribunal. 1 and 2 appearing in Original Certificate of Title No. Potenciano Garcia.. 2 (Plan Psu 992) of Transfer Certificate of Title No. which ordinarily makes the title absolute and indefeasible." Ruling: The evidence submitted before the trial court which was passed upon by the respondent Court of Appeals shows that Lot No. claims or rights arising or existing under the laws or Constitution of the United States or of the Philippine Islands which the statute of the Philippine Islands cannot require to appear of record in the registry. 2 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. The technical description of both Lots Nos. from which the present Transfer Certificate of Title No. is assailed by the petitioners-appellants as being a collateral attack on the indefeasibility of the torrens title originally issued in 1925 in favor of the petitioners-appellants' predecessor-in-interest. 15856 of the petitioners-appellants is a public stream and that said title should be cancelled and the river covered reverted to public domain. Section 38 of the Land Registration Act cited by appellants expressly makes a decree of registration. which is violative of the rule of res judicata. In not sustaining respondent's claim that petitioners have no cause of action because the property in dispute is a public river and in holding that the said claim has no basis in fact and in law. subject to the exemption stated in Section 39 of the said Act among which are: "liens. 15856. CA The ruling of the Court of Appeals that Lot No.Tribunal of the land. 15856 was derived. It is argued that as the decree of registration issued by the Land Registration Court was not re-opened through a petition for review filed within one (1) year from the entry of the decree of title. 14318 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. 2 embraced in said title is bounded practically on all sides 75 .

m. Thus. As held by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in Civil Case No. the municipality prays for the correction in the certificate of title. 2 of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1961 the municipality of Ligao filed for the correction of Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Godofredo Navera. 1247 for injunction filed by the petitioners' predecessors-in-interest against the Municipal Mayor of Lubao and decided in 1916 (Exh. was erroneously included in said title during the cadastral survey of Ligao. covering Lot No. there is no longer any doubt that Lot No. is erroneously included in Lot No. 2 is a branch of the main river that has been covered with water since time immemorial and. 15856 of petitioners is a river which is not capable of private appropriation or acquisition by prescription. The municipality of Ligao alleged that the land amounting to 123 sq. "L"). This finding having been affirmed by the Supreme Court. 2793-A. Lot No. for said portion of land is part of a street in the municipality. 2793-A. NAVERA V. therefore. Consequently. on the ground that a portion of 123 sq. QUICHO 5 SCRA 45 Facts: On January 24.by rivers. Navera filed a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the relief which petitioner seeks to obtain cannot be granted under Section 112 of Act 496 because the same would involve the opening of the original decree of registration. with 76 . part of the public domain. m.

LAUREL V. GARCIA 187 SCRA 797 Facts: 77 . even if not noted on a title. Ruling: Even if the portion to be segregated was really erroneously included in the title issued to petitioner because it is part of the Natera street which belongs to the municipality of Ligao that portion may be excluded under Section 112 of Act 496 because under the law any public highway. if a person obtains a title under the Torrens System which includes by mistake or oversight a land which cannot be registered. This is upon the principle that a person who obtains a title which includes by mistake a land which cannot legally be registered does not by virtue of such inclusion become the owner of the land erroneously included therein. In the present case unanimity among the parties is lacking. erroneously included therein. the portion of 123 sq. of land is erroneously included in Lot No. m. Hence. m. petition is affirmed. Thus. But this theory only holds true if there is no dispute that the portion to be excluded is really part of a public highway. is in our opinion correct. This principle only applies if there is unanimity as to the issue of fact involved. The trial court affirmed the petition of the municipality. Issue: Whether the 123 sq. he does not by virtue of such certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally included therein. is deemed excluded therefrom as a legal lien or encumbrance. The ruling of the trial court is founded on the principle that.a view to excluding therefrom. 2793-A. which title is granted to Navera. the order of the respondent court is set aside. this petition by Navera.

to lease the subject property to Kajima Corporation. Valdez. its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot. with great vigor. the Kobe Commercial Property (Commercial lot used as warehouse and parking lot of consulate staff). and the renovation of the Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai. Issue: 1. 1 building in Nampeidai. The Roponggi property consists of the land and building "for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. 78 . The President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of reparations' capital goods and services in the event of sale. it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai on 22 July 1976 when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Whether or not the Roppongi property and others of its kind can be alienated by the Philippine government. Amidst opposition by various sectors. the Executive branch of the government has been pushing. During the incumbency of President Aquino. the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that time. lease or disposition. The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government through Reparations Contract. Carlos J. in exchange of the construction of 2 buildings in Roppongi.The subject Roppongi property is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on 9 May 1956. and the Kobe Residential Property (a vacant residential lot)." As intended. a Japanese firm. Due to the failure of our government to provide necessary funds. a proposal was made by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan. The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for national development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World War II. the other lots being the Nampeidai Property (site of Philippine Embassy Chancery).

A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) there is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable. And the property continues to be part of the public domain. Marina (should be "Maria") Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. none of the above elements exists. Whether there was a conflict of law between the Japanese law on property (as the real property is situated there) and Philippine law. REPUBLIC V. CA 83 SCRA 453 Facts: Respondents Benjamin Tancinco. There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion and is outside the commerce of man. Azucena Tancinco Reyes. T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan. are to be determined. A conflict of law rule cannot apply when no conflict of law situation exists. No. the need to determine which law should apply. It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will. No. the essential validity and effect of the transfer. The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out. or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance. not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the Japanese government. 79 . Any such conveyances must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. Hence. such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables. Ruling: 1. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. In the present case. Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2. and (2) a foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. the formalities of conveyance.2.

These lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as property of the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502. Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. the petitioner Republic appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals. There are facts and circumstances in the record which render untenable the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents' fishponds. Issue: Whether the registration of the lots valid. Ruling: No. On August. 19. 80 . 89709 however. On June 26. hence it was ordered withdrawn from the application and trial proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu131892. the registration of the lots is not valid. The private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the application for registration with respect to Lot 3 in line with the recommendation of the Commissioner appointed by the Court.Meycauayan. the lower court rendered a decision granting the application on the finding that the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents' fishponds covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. They filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent to their fishpond property but the Bureau of Lands filed a written opposition to the application for registration. the respondent Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the lower court. paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. 1976. The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the names of the private respondents. 1982.

1961. was erroneously included in said title during the cadastral survey of Ligao. for the correction of Transfer Certificate of Title No. or one which is consented to by all parties concerned. covering Lot No. the municipality of Ligao filed with the Court of First Instance of Albay a petition under Section 112 of Act No. He contends that. Here the petition will have such effect. under said section. the court can only authorize an alteration which may not impair the rights recorded in the decree. The adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names of the private respondents is null and void. They existed only after the private respondents transferred their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951. 2793-A. for it will involve the correction of the technical description of the land covered by the certificate of title in question. m. 496. which eventually will cause the amendment of the original decree of registration. QUICHO 5 SCRA 454 Facts: On January 24. Navera filed a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the relief which petitioner seeks to obtain cannot be granted under Section 112 of Act 496 because the same would involve the opening of the original decree of registration. on the ground that a portion of 123 sq. or one which will not prejudice such rights. as amended. What private respondents claim as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river by reclamation. segregating therefrom the portion alleged to have been erroneously included.They are not open to registration under the Land Registration Act. This cannot be done at this stage after the lapse of 23 years from the issuance of the certificate of title. The only valid conclusion therefore is that the said areas could not have been there in 1939. 81 . NAVERA V. or can authorize the correction of any error or mistake which would not involve the reopening of the original decree of registration. T-9304 issued in the name of Godofredo Navera.

or any Government irrigation canal or lateral thereof. T-9304 issued in the name of Godofredo Navera. 82 . 2793-A now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. have been determined. Petitioner Navera does not agree with this ruling Navera contends that the purpose of the instant petition is not merely to correct a clerical error but to reopen the original decree of registration which was issued in 1937. way. The court a quo issued an order denying the motion to dismiss and requiring Navera to answer the petition within the reglementary period. and this is so because the petition seeks to direct the register of deeds to make the necessary correction in the technical description in order that the portion erroneously included may be returned to the municipality of Ligao. private way established by law. which was erroneously included in Lot No. pursuant to said Section 39. way." The principle involved here is that. therefore. 2793-A of the cadastral survey of Ligao has encroached upon said street by depriving the street of an area amounting to 123 sq. or irrigation canal or lateral thereof.It is alleged by the municipality of Ligao that in the course of the construction or repair of Natera street of said municipality it was ascertained by a duly licensed surveyor that Lot No. as well as in the certificate of title. with a view to excluding therefrom. where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such highway. the municipality prays for the correction of such error in the technical description of the lot. if a person obtains a title under the Torrens System which includes by mistake or oversight a land which cannot be registered. erroneously included therein. m. he does not by virtue of such certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally included therein. the petition does not seek merely the correction of a mistake or error but the return or reconveyance of a portion of a registered property to respondent. The courts based its decision on the rationale that “It is a rule of law that lands brought under the operation of the Torrens System are deemed relieved from all claims and encumbrances not appearing on the title. m. the portion of 123 sq. is "any public highway. In effect. Hence. Among the burdens on the land registered which continue to exist.

the court can only authorize an alteration which may not impair the rights recorded in the decree. He contends that. as amended.2 But this theory only holds true if there is no dispute that the portion to be excluded is really part of a public highway. under said section. even if not noted on a title. is in our opinion correct. on the ground that a portion of 123 sq. This is upon the principle that a person who obtains a title which includes by mistake a land which cannot legally be registered does not by virtue of such inclusion become the owner of the land erroneously included therein. 496. This principle only applies if there is unanimity as to the issue of fact involved. or one which is consented to by all parties concerned. Navera filed a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the relief which petitioner seeks to obtain cannot be granted under Section 112 of Act 496 because the same would involve the opening of the original decree of registration. On January 24. is deemed excluded therefrom as a legal lien or encumbrance. T-9304 issued in the name of Godofredo Navera. or one which will not prejudice such rights. covering Lot No. the municipality of Ligao filed with the Court of First Instance of Albay a petition under Section 112 of Act No. 1961. 2793-A. for the correction of Transfer Certificate of Title No.Issue: Whether the inclusion of public highways in the title is correct. m. Ruling: The theory entertained by the court a quo that if the portion to be segregated was really erroneously included in the title issued to petitioner because it is part of the Natera street which belongs to the municipality of Ligao that portion may be excluded under Section 112 of Act 496 because under the law1 any public highway. was erroneously included in said title during the cadastral survey of Ligao. or can authorize the correction of any 83 .

way. the portion of 123 sq. where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such highway. if a person obtains a title under the Torrens System which includes by mistake or oversight a land which cannot be 84 . or any Government irrigation canal or lateral thereof. The court a quo issued an order denying the motion to dismiss and requiring Navera to answer the petition within the reglementary period. Hence. private way established by law. m." The principle involved here is that. The courts based its decision on the rationale that “It is a rule of law that lands brought under the operation of the Torrens System are deemed relieved from all claims and encumbrances not appearing on the title. way. or irrigation canal or lateral thereof. Among the burdens on the land registered which continue to exist. T-9304 issued in the name of Godofredo Navera. This cannot be done at this stage after the lapse of 23 years from the issuance of the certificate of title. with a view to excluding therefrom. the municipality prays for the correction of such error in the technical description of the lot.error or mistake which would not involve the reopening of the original decree of registration. pursuant to said Section 39. segregating therefrom the portion alleged to have been erroneously included. which was erroneously included in Lot No. is "any public highway. 2793-A of the cadastral survey of Ligao has encroached upon said street by depriving the street of an area amounting to 123 sq. Republic vs Ayala 14 SCRA 259 It is alleged by the municipality of Ligao that in the course of the construction or repair of Natera street of said municipality it was ascertained by a duly licensed surveyor that Lot No. have been determined. 2793-A now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. which eventually will cause the amendment of the original decree of registration. m. Here the petition will have such effect. for it will involve the correction of the technical description of the land covered by the certificate of title in question. erroneously included therein. as well as in the certificate of title.

Issue: Whether the inclusion of public highways in the title is correct. Petitioner Navera does not agree with this ruling Navera contends that the purpose of the instant petition is not merely to correct a clerical error but to reopen the original decree of registration which was issued in 1937. HILARIO V. is deemed excluded therefrom as a legal lien or encumbrance. is in our opinion correct. In effect. CITY OF MANILA 19 SCRA 931 Facts: 85 . therefore.2 But this theory only holds true if there is no dispute that the portion to be excluded is really part of a public highway.registered. and this is so because the petition seeks to direct the register of deeds to make the necessary correction in the technical description in order that the portion erroneously included may be returned to the municipality of Ligao. This principle only applies if there is unanimity as to the issue of fact involved. Ruling: The theory entertained by the court a quo that if the portion to be segregated was really erroneously included in the title issued to petitioner because it is part of the Natera street which belongs to the municipality of Ligao that portion may be excluded under Section 112 of Act 496 because under the law1 any public highway. he does not by virtue of such certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally included therein. This is upon the principle that a person who obtains a title which includes by mistake a land which cannot legally be registered does not by virtue of such inclusion become the owner of the land erroneously included therein. even if not noted on a title. the petition does not seek merely the correction of a mistake or error but the return or reconveyance of a portion of a registered property to respondent.

The subject of the petition is a lot situated on the Western side of San Mateo River. a bed and banks. To prevent the river from entering the lot. the whole river. The Director of Lands filed an opposition to one of the parcels of land the registration which was applied for stating (a) that neither 86 . it should have only one nature. Paombong. of which the claimed to be the owners in fee simple. REPUBLIC V. these several parts constituting the river. SIOSON 9 SCRA 533 Facts: The spouses Segundo Sioson and Pascuala Bautista filed an application for registration four (4) parcels of land situated in barrio San Roque. Bulacan. In 1947. segregating from the rest thereof a lenticular place of land. it is implicit that all the three component elements be of the same nature also. the sand and gravel plant was turned over to the respondents. a dike was built on the northern side of the river. A "river" consists of water. In 1945. flood occurred and the river destroyed the dike. the US Army conducted excavations in the lenticular strip which stands between the old river bed and the new course. And since rivers are of public ownership. Issue: Is a newly formed riverbank in a private estate considered property of public dominion? Ruling: Yes. In 1937. The US Army has paid for such activities. bulldozing and extraction activities be restrained. The respondents continued the activities carried out by the US army. Since a river is but one compound concept. The petitioner then filed the case praying that the excavation. left its original bed and meandered into the Hilario estate.

(b) that neither the applicants nor their predecessors in interest have possesses the land openly. 4 was and still is in truth and in 87 . continuously. 4 be decreed in the name of the appellants. The applicants appealed from the judgment in so far it did not decree the registration of Lot No. 4 in the name of the appellants. The Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. The CFI Bulacan ordered the registration of Lots Nos. The parcel of land referred to in the petition is Lot No. The petition alleges actual and extrinsic fraud practiced by the herein respondents. (e) that the said parcel of land sought to be registered is a part of the public domain and as such belong to the Republic of the Philippines. 4 in their names. that the said Lot No. instead of filing a brief to answer that of the appellants.the applicants nor their predecessors in interest had sufficient title to the said parcel of land. 1894. then applicants. 2 and 3 in favor of the spouses. However. 4. The respondents filed an opposition to the petition. by intentional and deliberate concealment of facts and connivance by and between the respondents and the land inspector. The Court of Appeals rendered judgment modifying that of the lower court and decreeing the registration of Lot No. adversely and under bona fide claim of ownership since July 26. the same not having been a acquired either by composicion title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title under the Royal Decree of February 13. no adjudication was made with respect to Lot 4. that they had not practiced any actual fraud. publicly. The Solicitor General in behalf of the Director of Lands. 1. Respondents alleged. filed in the same Court a petition for review of the decree of registration and cancellation of title to a parcel of land in the name of the spouses Segundo Sioson and Pascuala Bautista. among other things. filed in the Court of Appeals a pleading recommending that the registration of Lot No. 1894.

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the petition without hearing the evidence in support of the allegation and claim that actual and extrinsic fraud had been committed by the respondents. MARTINEZ VS CA 56 SCRA 647 Facts: 88 . Without hearing and presentation of evidence the lower court entered an order denying the petition.fact an accretion to a titled parcel of land. The Republic of the Philippines has appealed. and that the Solicitor General is deemed to be in estoppel to make allegations in the present petition contrary to or inconsistent with those stated in the a pleading entitled "Comments" recommending that the registration of the fourth parcel of land which was an accretion to the titled lands of the then applicants-appellants be decreed in their names. Ruling: There being an allegation of actual and extrinsic fraud the Court should have afforded the petitioner an opportunity to prove it. Moreover. if it is true that the lot is or forms part of the bed of a navigable stream. that the present petition for review under the principle of res judicata is undeniably improper. unwarranted and illegal. Navigable rivers cannot be appropriated and registered under the Land Registration Act. creek or river the decree and title to it in the name of the respondents would not give them any right or title to it.

2 and 3 in favor of the spouses. no adjudication was made with respect to Lot 4. 1894. The parcel of land referred to in the petition is Lot No. 4. The Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. 4 be decreed in the name of the appellants. (e) that the said parcel of land sought to be registered is a part of the public domain and as such belong to the Republic of the Philippines. The CFI Bulacan ordered the registration of Lots Nos. 1894. The Director of Lands filed an opposition to one of the parcels of land the registration which was applied for stating (a) that neither the applicants nor their predecessors in interest had sufficient title to the said parcel of land. The Court of Appeals rendered judgment modifying that of the lower court and decreeing the registration of Lot No.The spouses Segundo Sioson and Pascuala Bautista filed an application for registration four (4) parcels of land situated in barrio San Roque. Bulacan. of which the claimed to be the owners in fee simple. adversely and under bona fide claim of ownership since July 26. filed in the Court of Appeals a pleading recommending that the registration of Lot No. filed in the same Court a petition for review of the decree of registration and cancellation of title to a parcel of land in the name of the spouses Segundo Sioson and Pascuala Bautista. The applicants appealed from the judgment in so far it did not decree the registration of Lot No. the same not having been a acquired either by composicion title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title under the Royal Decree of February 13. publicly.(b) that neither the applicants nor their predecessors in interest have possesses the land openly. Paombong. The petition 89 . 4 in the name of the appellants. 1. However. 4 in their names. The Solicitor General in behalf of the Director of Lands. instead of filing a brief to answer that of the appellants. continuously.

and that the Solicitor General is deemed to be in estoppel to make allegations in the present petition contrary to or inconsistent with those stated in the a pleading entitled "Comments" recommending that the registration of the fourth parcel of land which was an accretion to the titled lands of the then applicants-appellants be decreed in their names. Moreover. among other things.alleges actual and extrinsic fraud practiced by the herein respondents. that they had not practiced any actual fraud. that the said Lot No. 4 was and still is in truth and in fact an accretion to a titled parcel of land. The respondents filed an opposition to the petition. then applicants. Respondents alleged. unwarranted and illegal. Navigable rivers cannot be appropriated and registered under the Land Registration Act. The Republic of the Philippines has appealed. Without hearing and presentation of evidence the lower court entered an order denying the petition. creek or river the decree and title to it in the name of the respondents would not give them any right or title to it. that the present petition for review under the principle of res judicata is undeniably improper. by intentional and deliberate concealment of facts and connivance by and between the respondents and the land inspector. if it is true that the lot is or forms part of the bed of a navigable stream. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the petition without hearing the evidence in support of the allegation and claim that actual and extrinsic fraud had been committed by the respondents. Ruling: There being an allegation of actual and extrinsic fraud the Court should have afforded the petitioner an opportunity to prove it. 90 .

REPUBLIC V. CA
132 SCRA 514
Facts:
The lot subject matter of this land registration case is situated
near the shore of Laguna de Bay, about twenty (20) meters there
from in Barrio Pinagbayanan, Pila, Laguna. It was purchased by
Benedicto del Rio from Angel Pili on April 19, 1909. When
Benedicto del Rio died in 1957, his heirs extrajudicially partitioned
his estate and the subject parcel passed on to his son, Santos del
Rio, as the latter's share in the inheritance. Santos del Rio, herein
applicant-private respondent, filed his application for registration
of said parcel on May 9, 1966. The application was opposed by
the Director of Lands and by private oppositors. Sometime before
1966, private oppositors obtained permission from Santos del Rio
to construct duck houses on the land in question. Although there
was no definite commitment as to rentals, some of them had
made voluntary payments to private respondent. In violation of
the original agreement, private oppositors constructed residential
houses on the land which prompted private respondent to file an
ejectment suit against the former in 1966. 4Meanwhile, during the
latter part of 1965 and in 1966, private oppositors had
simultaneously filed their respective sales applications with the
Bureau of Lands, and in 1966, they opposed Santos del Rios
application for registration. The Court of First Instance of Laguna
dismissed the application for registration. Applicant appealed and
obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of Appeals. The
Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed their respective
Petitions for Review of said decision.
Issue:
Whether the applicant private respondent has registrable title to
the land.
Ruling:
91

Property, which includes parcels of land found in Philippine
territory, is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
Public lands, or those of public dominion, have been described as
those which, under existing legislation are not the subject of
private ownership, and are reserved for public purposes.
The inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and
reflux of tides." It cannot be considered a foreshore land, hence it
is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as
private property provided that the applicant proves that he has a
registerable title. The purpose of land registration under the
Torrens System is not the acquisition of lands but only the
registration of title which applicant already possesses over the
land.
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence
of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired
by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession
of the property. Applicant by himself and through his father
before him, has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful,
exclusive and adverse possession of the disputed land for more
than thirty (30) years and has presented tax declarations and tax
receipts. Applicant has more than satisfied the legal
requirements. Thus, he is clearly entitled to the registration in his
favor of said land.

LAND BANK V. REPUBLIC
543 SCRA 453
Facts:
A parcel of land in Davao City with an area of 41,276 square
meters was issued to Angelito C. Bugayong with OCT no. P-2823
92

(the mother title came from the Sales Patent No.4576) in 1969.
The land was subdivided into four lots with a new TCT in the name
of Bugayong and sold all his lots to different persons. He sold one
particular lot to the spouses Du. They then then subdivided the lot
into two, in which they sold one lot to the spouses Dayola and
registered the other lot in the name of Lourdes Farms Inc. (which
is the subject of the case). Lourdes Farms, Inc. mortgaged the
land to Landbank on April 14, 1980.
The Bureau of Lands conducted an investigation upon a formal
petition and found out that the Land of Bugayong with Sales
Patent no.4576 was classified within the forest zone on August 6,
1923 and was released as alienable and disposable only on March
25, 1981 through an Administrative order. The Bureau resolved
that the sales patent was illegally issued and the OCT was
improperly issued by the Director of Lands at that time. Now, the
Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands,
through the office of the Sol. Gen. filed a complaint before the RTC
of Davao to cancel the titles that were issued to Bugayong and
the other owners and mortgagors of the land and the reversion of
the land into the mass of public domain. LBP claimed that it is a
mortgagee in good faith and for value. It prayed that should the
TCT issued to Lourdes Farms, Inc. be annulled by the court,
Lourdes Farms, Inc. should be ordered to pay its outstanding
obligations to LBP or to provide a new collateral security.
Issue:
1. Whether a forest land is capable of private appropriation.
2. Whether or not LBP have the Mortgage Right and Interest over
the land for being a purchaser in good faith.
Ruling:
1. No. Forest lands are outside the commerce of man and
unsusceptible of private appropriation in any form.
2. No. It is well settled that a certificate of title is void when it
covers property of public domain classified as forest, timber or
93

mineral lands. Any title issued covering non-disposable lots even
in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value shall be
cancelled. The rule must stand no matter how harsh it may
seem. Dura lex sed lex.Ang batas ay maaaring mahigpit subalit
ito ang mananaig.
DIAZ V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 181502; February 2, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner’s late mother, Flora Garcia, filed an application for
registration of a vast tract of land located in Laur, Nueva Ecija and
Palayan City in the then Court of First Instance on August 12,
1976. She alleged that she possessed the land as owner and
worked, developed and harvested the agricultural products and
benefits of the same continuously, publicly and adversely for
more or less 26 years.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, opposed the application because the land in
question was within the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation,
established by virtue of Proclamation No. 237 in 1955. Thus, it
was inalienable as it formed part of the public domain.
The CFI ruled in Garcia’s favor in a decision dated July 1, 1981.
The Republic eventually appealed the decision of the CFI to the
Court of Appeals. In its decision dated February 26, 1992, penned
by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,the appellate court reversed and
set aside the decision of the CFI.
The CA observed that Garcia also traced her ownership of the
land in question to Possessory Information Title No. 216. As
Garcia’s right to the property was largely dependent on the
existence and validity of the possessory information title the
probative value,and inasmuch as the land was situated inside a
military reservation, the CA concluded that she did not validly
acquire title thereto.
94

During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia passed away
and was substituted by her heirs, one of whom was petitioner
Florencia G. Diaz.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Mendoza
decision. While the motion was pending in the CA. Subsequently,
however, the CA encouraged the parties to reach an amicable
settlement on the matter and even gave the parties sufficient
time to draft and finalize the same.
The parties ultimately entered into a compromise agreement with
the Republic withdrawing its claim on the more or less 4,689
hectares supposedly outside the FMMR. For her part, petitioner
withdrew her application for the portion of the property inside the
military reservation. They filed a motion for approval of the
amicable settlement in the CA.
On June 30, 1999, the appellate court approved the compromise
agreement. On January 12, 2000, it directed the Land Registration
Administration to issue the corresponding decree of registration in
petitioner’s favor.
However, the OSG filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA
resolution ordering the issuance of the decree of registration. The
OSG informed the appellate court that the tract of land subject of
the amicable settlement was still within the military reservation.
Issue:
Whether or the land within the military reservation is registrable.
Ruling:
SC ruled that in registration cases filed under the provisions of the
Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an incomplete and
imperfect title, an order dismissing an application for registration
and declaring the land as part of the public domain constitutes
res judicata, not only against the adverse claimant, but also
against all persons.

95

However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when they
have been reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and
categorical manner coupled with possession by the claimant as
well as that of her predecessors-in-interest. Unfortunately for
petitioner, she was not able to produce such evidence.
Accordingly, her occupation thereof, and that of her predecessorsin-interest, could not have ripened into ownership of the subject
land. This is because prior to the conversion of forest land as
alienable land, any occupation or possession thereof cannot be
counted in reckoning compliance with the thirty-year possession
requirement under Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141) or the Public
Land Act. The rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not
apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released
through an official proclamation to that effect. Then and only then
will it form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain.
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY V. VILLAREAL
G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989
Facts:
Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on 25 January 1949, a land consisting
of 178,113 sq. m. of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian,
Capiz, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of
the land for more than 40 years. He was opposed by several persons, including the
Director of Forestry on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the
application was approved by the CFI Capiz. The decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry then came to the Supreme Court in a
petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private
appropriation.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals
96

and dismissed the application for registration of title of Villareal
and held that It is elementary in the law governing natural
resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It
is not registerable. The adverse possession which can be the
basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases
cannot commence until after the forest land has been declared
alienable and disposable. Possession of forest land, no matter bow
long cannot convert it into private property. It is reiterated for
emphasis that, conformably to the legislative definition embodied
in Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917,
which remains unamended up to now, mangrove swamps
or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines.

TONGSON V. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, ET AL
G.R. No. L-34463 September 27, 1977

Facts:

As early as 1905 the parcel of land (LOT 855) was under the
exclusive possession of Francisco Borja who cut trees therefrom
and converted them into firewood. Moreover, he established a salt
factory, selling salts and the firewood. After his death, his son
Arturo took possession of the land, continued to cut trees up until
1910. May of 1917, Antero Borja sold the land to Deogracias
Gayacao evidenced by a private instrument.
Deogracias on the other hand sold 5 parcels of land to Santiago
Bermejo one of the parcels known as parcel No. 4 is cadastral Lot
No. 855. The sale is evidenced by the public instrument. During
his lifetime, Santiago M. Bermejo possessed said parcel of land,
cut trees for the firewood purposes and also had a salt factory.
Upon his death in 1951, his children took possession of this parcel
97

of land and when Macario Bermejo was appointed judicial
administrator by the Court of First Instance of Capiz, LOT 855
appeared in the Revised Inventory of the estate of the late
Santiago M. Bermejo. When Macario Bermejo took possession of
the land in 1953 he converted it into a fishpond and started to
construct fishpond dikes. However, due to lack of funds, the
construction of the fishpond was not completed. On May 30,
1956, Macario Bermejo, in his capacity as administrator of the
estate of the late Santiago M. Bermejo, leased the land to
Leopoldo L. Somes with the approval of the Court of First Instance
of Capiz.

The possession of the heirs of Santiago M. Bermejo together with
that of their predecessors-in-interest was likewise peaceful,
continuous, open, adverse and in concept of owners for a period
of not less than fifty years.
Issue:

Whether or not a parcel of land, in the possession of the
predecessors- in-interest and the oppositor Bermejo as far back as
1905, asserted to have originally been mangrove swamps,
thereafter converted into a fishpond, may still be considered as
part of the timber domain which is not disposable.

Ruling:

The decision of the lower court is affirmed. "In the case of Mapa v.
Insular Government ..., this court said that the phrase 'agricultural
lands' as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired
from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. Whatever may
have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish
law, the Act of Congress of July Ist 1902, classifies the public lands
98

in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands,
and all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are
necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as
nipa swamps, manglare, fisheries or ordinary farm lands. The
definition of forestry as including manglares found in the
Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested
prior to its enactment," 9 What is even more persuasive as to the
correctness of the decision reached by the lower court is that in
the Garchitorena decision, this Court, through Justice Ostrand who
was famed for his authoritative opinions on public land
controversies, promulgated in 1933, more than fifteen years after
the effectivity of the Revised Administrative Code, was equally
explicit:

The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that in the
land covered by the application there are mangrove lands as
shown in this opponent's Exhibit 1, but we think this
opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch
as it has been definitely decided that mangrove lands are
not forests lands in the sense in which this phrase is used in
the Act of Congress ... It could be said, therefore, that even
on the assumptions that the parcel of land in question could
be characterized as mangrove swamps, the conclusion
reached by the lower court is not without support in the
applicable authorities.

In fact, it cannot be said with certainty that there was a finding in
the appealed decision that to the disputed lot was originally
mangrove swamps. As stated therein: "Mangrove swamps where
only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees are small
and sparse fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing
are not of commercial value as lumber, do not convert the land
into public land. Such lands are not forest in character. They do
not form part of the public domain." Based on such a finding
which must be accorded due weight and is control the sole
question raised on appeal is one of law, the decision arrived at by
99

the lower court is not open to any valid objection.

REPUBLIC vs. AMANDA LAT VDA. DE CASTILLO
G.R. No. L-69002 June 30, 1988
Facts:
In 1951,Modesto Castillo applied for the registration of two
parcels of land, Lots 1 and 2, located in Batangas. In a decision
dated August 31, 1951, the said Modesto Castillo was declared
the true and absolute owner of the land with the improvements
thereon, for which OCT No. 0-665 was issued to him by the
Register of Deeds. By virtue of an instrument dated March 18,
1960, the said Lots 1 and 2 covered by OCT No. 0-665, together
with Lot No. 12374 covered by TCT No. 3254-A and Lot No. 12377
covered by TCT No. 3251-A, were consolidated and sub-divided
into Lots 1 to 9 under Pcs-1046. After the death of Modesto
Castillo, in 1960, Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo, et al., executed a
deed of partition and assumption of mortgage in favor of
Florencio L. Castillo, et al., as a result of which OCT No. D-665 was
cancelled, and in lieu thereof, new transfer certificates of title
were issued to Florencio Castillo, et al. The Republic of the
Philippines then filed a Civil Case with the lower court for the
annulment of the certificates of title issued to defendants, and for
the reversion of the lands covered thereby to the State.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the Land Registration Court
involving shore lands constitutes res adjudicata.
Ruling:
Shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use
and, therefore, not registrable. Accretions on the bank of a lake,
like Laguna de Bay, belong to the owners of the estate to which
they have been added while accretion on a sea bank still belongs
to the public domain, and is not available for private ownership
until formally declared by the government to be no longer needed
100

for public use. The defense of long possession is likewise not
available in this case because, as already ruled by this Court,
mere possession of land does not by itself automatically divest
the land of its public character.

REPUBLIC V. ALAGAD
G.R. No. L-66807 January 26, 1989

Facts:

On or about October 11, 1951, defendants filed an application for
registration of their title over a parcel of land situated at Linga,
Pila, Laguna, with an area of 8.1263 hectares, reflected in survey
plan Psu-116971, which was amended after the land was divided
into two parcels, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 5.2476 hectares
and Lot 2 with an area of 2.8421 hectares, reflected in survey
plan Psu-226971, amd. 2. The Republic opposed the application
on the stereo-typed ground that applicants and their predecessors
have not been in possession of the land openly, continuously,
publicly and adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since
July 26, 1894 and the land has not ceased to be a part of the
public domain. Republic claims that the decree and title rendered
and issued in LRC Case is concerned, are void ab initio. The trial
court ruled that the parcel of land is a portion of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, and hence,
available for disposition and registration.

Issue:

Whether or not the properties in question are foreshore lands or
part and parcel of the public domain.
101

Ruling:

The Supreme court reversed the decision of the lower court. The
parcel of land is a foreshore land so it is not registerable. It
defines a foreshore land as that part of (the land) which is
between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of
the tides. If the submergence, however, of the land is due to
precipitation, it does not become foreshore, despite its proximity
to the waters. The Court cannot make a ruling because the case
is not a trier of facts, and it is in possession of no evidence to
assist it in arriving at a conclusive disposition, hence the Supreme
Court remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-43105 AUGUST 31, 1984
Facts:
The subject land in this case is situated 20 meters away from the shores of Laguna
de Bay. Said land was owned by Benedicto del Rio. After the death of Benedicto,
the land was acquired by his son Santos Del Rio. The private oppositors in this
case sought and obtained permission from Santos Del Rio to construct duck houses
on said land. The private oppositors, however, violated their agreement and instead
constructed residential houses thereon. Santos then filed an ejectment suit against
the private oppositors and later on sought to register the land. Meanwhile, private
oppositors simultaneously filed their respective sales applications with the Bureau
of Lands, and they opposed Santos del Rio’s application for registration. The CFI
of Laguna dismissed the application for registration. Applicant appealed and
obtained a favourable judgment from the Court of Appeals. The Director of Lands
and the private oppositors filed their respective petitions for review on said
decision to the Supreme Court. The Director of Lands contends that since a portion
of the land is covered with water four to five months a year, the same is part of the
lake bed of Laguna de Bay and therefore it cannot be the subject of registration.
Issue:
102

Whether or not the parcel of land in question is public land.
Ruling:
The inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides." It
cannot be considered a foreshore land, hence it is not a public land and therefore
capable of registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that
he has a registerable title. The purpose of land registration under the Torrens
System is not the acquisition of lands but only the registration of title which
applicant already possesses over the land.
CAGAMPANG V. MORANO
G.R. No. L-25738. March 14, 1968
Facts:
The case began with a forcible entry and detainer suit instituted
by Silverio Cagampang to recover from the defendant, Flaviano
Morano, a parcel of land abutting on the sea in the municipality of
Bacuag, Surigao del Norte. Plaintiff, who claimed to have been in
possession of the land for over 80 years, charged that in 1960
defendant, through strategy and stealth, occupied a portion of the
land and refused to vacate it, to the prejudice of plaintiff;
wherefore, the latter sought to have possession restored to him,
to collect a rental of P3.00 a month, plus P5,000.00 damages and
costs. The defendant's answer pleaded occupancy by virtue of a
foreshore "grant from proper authorities".
At the ocular inspection in 1965, the Court found that the lot in
question is not reached, much less, covered by the highest
ordinary tide. It can only be reached or covered by the highest
tide during the months of May, June and July or during the months
when the highest tide of the year will occur.
Issue:

103

Whether or not lands covered by the sea at high tide not due to
abnormal conditions are part of the shore and therefore public
land.
Ruling:
At the ocular inspection, the Court found that the land was
covered by the sea water at high tide in the months of May, June
and, July. This finding makes it clear that the land was part of the
shore, and was, therefore, public land belonging to the State,
conformably to Article 1, paragraph 3 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866:
Art. 1. — The following are part of the national domain open to
public use: (3) The Shores. By shore is understood that space
covered and uncovered by the movement of the tide. Its interior
or terrestrial limit is the line reached by the highest equinoctial
tides. Where the tides are not appreciable, the shore begins on
the land side at the line reached by the sea during ordinary
storms and tempests. By Article 420 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, shores are declared property of the public domain.
As the lot was covered by the highest tides from May to July, and
there is no showing that these tides are due to abnormal
conditions, the land is obviously part of the shore and public
property. Hence, legal possession thereof appertains to the
national government or its grantees.
DIZON V. RODRIGUEZ
G.R. Nos. L-20300-01 April 30, 1965
Facts:
These are separate appeals instituted by Antonino Dizon, et al. (G.R. Nos. L20300-01) and the Republic of the Philippines, et al. (G.R. Nos. L-20355-56), from
a single decision of the Court of Appeals.
Hacienda Calatagan is owned by Alfonso and Jacobo Zobel. In 1938, the Hacienda
constructed a pier, called "Santiago Landing," to be used by the Hacienda sugar
104

In 1949. the Zobels ordered the subdivision of the Hacienda which was approved by the Director of Lands. Sy-Jucos. 1952.00 per hectare. On October 1. In its decision the appellate court adopted the findings of the lower court but the CA awarded to applicants Tolentinos damages in the amount of P200. the decision of the lower court was sustained. On May 24. that they do not contest the existence of the pier that was used by the hacienda owners in the loading of their manufactured sugar to 105 . The Dizons. 1954. Protestants then filed an appeal with the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.mill but when it ceased its operation the owners converted the pier into a fishpond dike and built additional dikes which were converted into a fishpond. The Republic of the Philippines intervenes in view of the finding that the lots were part of the foreshore area before their conversion. the protestants filed an action in the CFI of Manila to restrain the Director of Fisheries from issuing the fishpond permits but the court dismissed this petition for non-exhaustion of administrative remedy. and the Register of Deeds issued a title in the name of Jacobo Zobel and the latter sold to Antonio Dizon Lot 49 with 37 hectares. Miguel Tolentino and his daughter filed with the Bureau of Fisheries an application for ordinary fishpond permit or lease for Lot 49 and Lot 1. and Gocos filed a protest with the Bureau of Fisheries. Appellants were thus declared entitled to retention of the properties. The CFI of Batangas promulgated a joint decision making the finding that the subdivision plan was prepared in disregard of the technical description. to quiet their titles over Lots 49 and 1. Issue: Whether or not the Lots in question are part of the seashore or foreshore area. Ruling: It is noteworthy in connection with the appeal of plaintiffs. On appeal to this Court. claiming the properties to be private land but were dismissed by the Director of Fisheries. Hence the Dizons filed Civil Case in the CFI of Batangas.

No. And. 3254-A and Lot No. support the conclusion reached by both the lower court and the Court of Appeals that Lots 49 and 1 are actually part of the territorial waters and belong to the State. the ruling of the Court of Appeals must be upheld. plaintiffs were not able to disprove the testimonial evidence that the fishponds in question were constructed by enclosing the areas with dikes. the said Lots 1 and 2 covered by OCT No. And. et al. 12374 covered by TCT No. were consolidated and sub-divided into Lots 1 to 9 under Pcs-1046. 3251-A. 1988 Facts: In 1951. Amanda Lat Vda. executed a 106 . L-69002 June 30. Lots 1 and 2. 1960. the said Modesto Castillo was declared the true and absolute owner of the land with the improvements thereon. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. The fact that said pier jutted out 600 meters to the sea indicates that the area over which such cemented structure spanned was part of the sea or at least foreshore land. 12377 covered by TCT No. As such title-holders. 0-665 was issued to him by the Register of Deeds. together with Lot No. There is no showing that plaintiffs are not purchasers in good faith and for value. 1951. and the fact that the subdivision plan was found to have been prepared not in accordance with the technical descriptions in but in disregard of it. 0-665. for which OCT No. using the pier as one of the ends of the fishponds. After the death of Modesto Castillo. In a decision dated August 31.vessels. This. On the matter of possession of plaintiffs-appellants. in 1960.Modesto Castillo applied for the registration of two parcels of land. CASTILLO G.. it is an elementary principle that the incontestable and indefeasible character of a Torrens certificate of title does not operate when the land thus covered is not capable of registration. It is clear that the areas thus enclosed and converted into fishponds were really part of the foreshore. By virtue of an instrument dated March 18.R. they have reason to rely on the indefeasible character of their certificates. de Castillo. located in Batangas.

therefore. and for the reversion of the lands covered thereby to the State. D-665 was cancelled. Ruling: One of the requisites of res judicata is that the court rendering the final judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter. like Laguna de Bay. 107 . it was established that the occupants of the lots who were engaged in duck raising filled up the area with shells and sand to make it habitable. as a result of which OCT No. et al. and in lieu thereof. Castillo. The defense of long possession is likewise not available in this case because. and is not available for private ownership until formally declared by the government to be no longer needed for public use. belong to the owners of the estate to which they have been added while accretion on a sea bank still belongs to the public domain. et al. that shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use (Article 420. Thus. Issue: Whether or not the decision of the Land Registration Court involving shore lands constitutes res adjudicata. as already ruled by this Court.. The Republic of the Philippines then filed a Civil Case with the lower court for the annulment of the certificates of title issued to defendants. new transfer certificates of title were issued to Florencio Castillo. not registrable. mere possession of land does not by itself automatically divest the land of its public character. On the contrary. Civil Code) and. Their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title upon the registrant Accretions on the bank of a lake. But such distinction will not help private respondents because there is no accretion shown to exist in the case at bar.deed of partition and assumption of mortgage in favor of Florencio L. it has long been settled that portions of the foreshore or of the territorial waters and beaches cannot be registered.

Thus. Five years after. respondent already owned the land adjacent to the foreshore land. Lim presented a TCT over a lot which adjoins the foreshore area subject of the lease. 1990. 2010 Facts: Respondent Roberto Cantoja Sr. filed an application for a Foreshore Lease Contract over the foreshore area located in Makar. Cantoja has committed fraud and misrepresentation in declaring in his application that the subject foreshore area adjoined his (Cantoja’s) property. petitioner Harry Lim filed a protest questioning the grant of FLA to Cantoja since according to him. No. The Court of Appeals held that Cantoja committed misrepresentation amounting to fraud in his application for lease when he declared in his application that his lot adjoins that of the foreshore area sought to be leased. Like the DENR Secretary. the Office of the President also relied on the findings of Special Investigator that the petitioner’s titled land is an inalienable foreshore area which could not be subject of a valid patent or title. 2015. The Lease contract was executed on November 23. prior to Cantoja’s foreshore lease application in1989 and the grant of the foreshore lease contract on November 23.CANTOJA V. 168386 March 29. General Santos City in 1989. Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in cancelling the Foreshore Lease Contract granted to Cantoja covering the foreshore area? Ruling: No. during which petitioner failed to appear despite notice. It is undisputed that respondent is the registered owner of the land adjacent to the foreshore area leased to Cantoja. LIM G. respondent Harry Lim appealed to the Court of Appeals. 1990 and would expire on October 21.To prove this allegation. The sketch 108 . Aggrieved. Upon ocular inspection.R. a Special Investigator found that Cantoja was in actual possession of the foreshore area which was utilized as “dock-board of the Cantoja’s Fishing Business. It was ascertained that no portion has been occupied or possessed by any other person or persons. nor was there any adverse claimant thereof.

L-28565 January 30. So. dated 30 April 1936. In this case. No.plan submitted by the Geodetic Engineer clearly shows that respondent’s property is in between the foreshore land and Cantoja’s property.” In other words. Under stipulation no. or for the established of special industries. any fraud or misrepresentation committed by the applicant is a ground for cancellation or rescission of the Foreshore Lease Agreement. article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral owner (riparian according to paragraph 32) to the foreshore land formed by accretions or alluvial deposits due to the action of the sea.” shall be declared by the Government “to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof. LAHORA V. 7-1. which is that accretion compensates the riparian owner for the diminutions which his land suffers by reason of the destructive force of the waters. “when they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility. he who loses by the encroachments of the sea should gain by its recession. while lands added to the shore by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea form part of the public domain. DAYANGHIRANG. One-half 109 . in the case of littoral lands. G. 15 of the Foreshore Lease Agreement. Cantoja committed fraud when he misrepresented himself as the riparian or littoral owner in his application for the foreshore lease.R. such lands. Being the owner of the land adjoining the foreshore area. respondent is the riparian or littoral owner who has preferential right to lease the foreshore area as provided under paragraph 32 of the Lands Administrative Order No. The reason for that preferential right is the same as the justification for giving accretions to the riparian owner. JR. or for the coast guard service. 1971 Facts: Spouses Lahora and Toribia Moralizon filed a petition for the registration of the nine parcels of land located in Davao. Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 provides that.

were not notified of the application for patent therefor and of its adjudication. exclusive and adverse possession in the concept of an owner. since they were the actual occupants of the property. as well as the original certificate of title subsequently obtained by her. who alleged that the subject lands belong to him and his wife. The Director of Lands also opposed the petition of Lahora spouses because applicants or their predecessors-in-interest never had sufficient title over the parcels of land sought to be registered. Said petition was opposed by Emilio Dayanghirang Jr. the government could not have awarded it to oppositor's wife.The said lot has been previously registered and titled. and the patent issued to the latter. 2228 was registered and titled in the name of oppositors' wife as of 21 June 1956. were null and void.of the said land was acquired by Toribia through inheritance and the other half was by purchase and open. the alleged actual occupants of the land. because appellants. nor have they been in open. Issue: Whether or not the subject land can be re-registered under Torrens title even if it was already recorded in the issuance of public land patent. according to appellants. Lot No. continuous. Ruling: In the present case. 110 . and notorious possession thereof for at least 30 years. nine (9) years earlier. said parcel of land can no longer be the subject of adjudication in another proceeding.The lower court contends that patent issued to oppositor's wife was procured by fraud. Thus.. continuous.

L-31666. but in an appropriate action such as one for reconveyance or reversion. the proper party to bring the action would only be the person prejudiced by the alleged fraudulent act — the owner and grantor. would be torn away. In a cadastral case the court has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier case. and that a second decree for the same land would be null and void. DUMYUNG G. can no longer prosper. on the ground that the first certificate of title (OCT No. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY V. the relief provided by the law in such instance may be secured by the aggrieved party. the indefeasibility of the first title. by the issuance of the public land patent and the recording thereof. further registration of the same would lead to the obviously undesirable result of two certificates of title being issued for the same piece of land. Nos. If there indeed exists a proper case for cancellation of the patent for intrinsic fraud. Furthermore. the action for review of the decree should have been filed before the one year period had elapsed. even if both certificates should be in the name of the same person. 1979 111 . And if they were to be issued to different persons. for land already registered in the name of a person cannot be the subject of another registration. Thereafter. which is the most valued characteristic of Torrens titles. Of course. for all legal purposes.Clearly. L-31667 and L-31668 April 30.R. the situation would be different. Having become registered land under Act 496. and not another applicant or claimant. appellants' petition for registration of the same parcel of land on 26 November 1965. if the patent had been issued during the pendency of the registration proceedings. P-6053) covering the said property is a nullity. or for damages in case the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. not in another registration.

140-’62 and that another portion of said lands is embraced in its mineral claims. 3872.4169 hectares.Facts: The Republic of the Philippines thru the Director of Lands filed three Civil Cases for the annulment of Free Patents and of Original Certificates of Title. 1955. petitioner herein. The lands embraced in the patents and titles comprise a total area of 58. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company alleged that the portion of the titled land is within its ordinary timber license No. which were granted. filed motions for intervention in the three civil cases. shall be entitled to the right to said land. whether disposable or not since July 4. The defendants alleged that they are entitled to the benefits of Republic Act No. The defendants in the three civil cases filed an amended joint answer with counterclaim to the complaint in intervention. and situated in the Municipal District of Mankayan. a tract or tracts of land. The Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company. It was stipulated therein that a member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and cultivated. Mountain Province. either by himself or through his predecessors-ininterest. The proceedings on the three civil cases were suspended pending the outcome of the criminal cases. on the ground of misrepresentation and false data and information furnished by the defendants. After the presentation of evidence by the prosecution in the three 112 .

113 . The plaintiff. the defense filed a motion to dismiss the same on the ground that the accused had complied with all the legal requirements in the acquisition of their patents which were duly issued by the Director of Lands and that they are not guilty of the alleged falsification of public documents.criminal cases. Subsequently. filed separate motions for reconsideration of the order dismissing the three Civil Cases. the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the three civil cases on the ground that the extinction of the penal action carries with it the extinction of the civil action when the extinction proceeds from a declaration that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. Issues: (1) Whether or not the lands in question are timber or mineral lands. and the intervenor. The court of appeals sustained the ruling of the trial court. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company. The trial court ruled in favor of the defense and dismissed the three criminal cases for insufficiency of evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused. Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands. As such intervenor filed this petition.

Thus. There is no evidence that the private respondents are members of the National Cultural Minorities. It is well settled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. 1955. because the lands are not alienable and disposable.(2) Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to the benefits of Republic Act No. These qualifications must be established by evidence. shall be cancelled. the order of the trial court is set aside. petitioner herein. Ruling: (1) Yes. the lands in question are considered mineral lands. claims that it was in possession of the lands in question when the private respondents applied for free patents thereon. 114 . 3872. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value. Precisely. The acquittal of the private respondents in the criminal cases for falsification is not a bar to the civil cases to cancel their titles. and that they are not the owner of any land secured or disposable under the Public Land Act at the time they filed the free patent applications. that they have continuously occupied and cultivated either by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest the lands in question since July 4. (2) No. the intervenor.

1947 which was presented by the Oppositor Atok Big Wedge Mining Company as its Exhibit 14. it was planted with camote. and the land tax under Exh. which indicates that all pre-war records of tax declarations and real property receipts of the municipality of Itogon where the property is located were burned and destroyed during the last world war. 10. 439 dated Feb.Sally. that he has been paying the taxes during the Japanese occupation and even before it. APPELLATE COURT and TUKTUKAN SAINGAN 193 scra 71 INTERMEDIATE Facts: The evidence for the applicant who was 70 years old at the time he testified shows that he acquired the land from his father-in-law. And so it ruled in favor of petitioner as oppositor in the land registration proceedings. that he was never disturbed in his possession. Dongail. `C’. apparently impressed the court a quo. that at the time of his acquisition. The said tax declarations show that they cancel tax declaration No. The receipt showing payment of the taxes on such tax declarations is dated Feb. 2. coffee and avocados. Supporting his oral testimony. applicant submitted tax declarations both dated March 20. 1921. that he lived on the land since his marriage up to the present.” Petitioner’s presentation of evidence proving registration of the mining claims of petitioner in the Mining Recorder of Benguet dating back to 1931. 7 and 8. So the evidence of the applicant cannot prevail over the documentary exhibits of the oppositor Atok 115 . VS. Evelyn and Ethel Atok Big Wedge Mining Company submitted Exhibits 6. the court a quo ratiocinating in this wise: “The mining claims were recorded ahead of the time when the applicant declared the land for taxation purposes based on his documentary exhibits. the former for a rural land and the latter for urban land and improvement therein. when he married his daughter. langka. 1948. gabi. The Atok Big Wedge Mining Company came in also as oppositor claiming that the land in question is within its mineral claims . notably about sixteen (16) years before private respondent declared the land in question for taxation purposes and thirty four (34) years before private respondent filed the land registration proceedings in 1965. all showing that the annual assessment work of these mineral claims were maintained from 1932 to 1967 for Sally and Evelyn and from 1946 to 1967 for Ethel. Applicant has also submitted Exh. at the latest. that he was then 18 years old. It was likewise shown that these mineral claims were recorded in the mining recorder’s office. 8. 14 was paid by applicant in 1947. casava.ATOK BIG-WEDGE MINING COMPANY. 1931 and Ethel on March 18. Sally and Evelyn on Jan. 1949.

The foregoing facts show that the mining company had established its rights long before applicant asserted ownership over the land. We agree with respondent Court of Appeals that “a reading of tsn. Ruling: The records bear out that private respondent has been in possession of subject parcel of land in concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years.all fruit bearing. years before. would rather persuade that applicant had shown quite well that subject property had been in continuous and adverse possession. segregated them from the public domain and the beneficial ownership thereof became vested in the locator. Thus. notwithstanding the recording of the 116 . that the process of recording mining claims could not have been intended to be the operative act of classifying lands into mineral lands. flowering plants and fruit trees such as mangoes. coffee plants. this strengthens our holding that the rights of a mining claimant are confined to possessing the land for purposes of extracting therefrom minerals in exclusion of any or all other persons whose claims are subsequent to the original mining locator. The power to classify lands into mineral lands could not have been intended under the Philippine Bill of 1902 to be vested in just anyone who records a mining claim. ruling that the applicant possessed the land in the concept of an owner. Dongail and. Issue: Whether or not the ownership of subject land had long been vested on petitioner after it had allegedly located and recorded its mining claim in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. In fact. The perfection of mining claims over the mineral lands involved. of his predecessor-in-interest.” We also learn from our reading of our past and present mining laws in their proper historical perspectives. himself. The court a quo made the following factual findings based on the testimony of private respondent: The land applied for is almost 90% improved with numerous irrigated rice terraces newly planted to palay at the time of the ocular inspection and others planted to vegetables such as potatoes. long before the outbreak of the last war. banana plants. after the death of the latter. if no minerals are extracted therefrom.” The CA reversed the trial court’s decision and ruled in favor of the applicant. first. avocados and citrus .Big Wedge Mining Company. that is. jackfruits. The recording of a mining claim only operates to reserve to the registrant exclusive rights to undertake mining activities upon the land subject of the claim.

Moreover. 463 in its activities respecting its mining lease. Subsequently. No. 1959. be ordered reopened and restored to its original condition. Ruling: 117 . MATEO V. the land is not mineral land and registration thereof is not precluded by such recorded claim. The letter was referred to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.D.claim. a public navigable stream. which had been blocked by means of dikes and dams and converted into fishponds. Bulacan. For that reason. if private respondent’s claim of adverse and open possession of the subject land for more than 30 years were not established. 1214. who caused an investigation to be conducted pursuant to RA No. 2056.D. the Secretary ordered Mateo. No. finding that the Sapang Cabay was a public navigable stream. Equally borne out by the records is the fact that petitioner has indeed applied for a mining lease under P. it has. by P. to remove the dikes and dams constructed therein within 30 days from notice. Issue: Whether or the body of water is private property or constitutes a navigable stream or river of the public domain and subject to acquisitive prescription. sent a lettercomplaint to the Highway District Engineer of that province asking that the Sapang Cabay. otherwise they would be removed at his expense. waived its right to secure a patent and it shall have been governed. MORENO 28 SCRA 796 Facts: In 1959 a number of residents of Guiguinto. in effect. the Secretary rendered his decision on August 10. who had acquired the property inside which the creek is situated.

The absence of any mention of a navigable stream within a property covered by a certificate of title does not preclude a subsequent investigation and determination of its existence nor make it private property of the title holder.). It is true that Jacobo who was then the owner from whom Mateo subsequently bought the property. Maria Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. and that the ownership of a navigable stream or of the bed thereof is not subject to acquisitive prescription. Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land covered by TCT T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan. Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. was able to get her free patent application approved in 1953 and to secure the corresponding certificate of title. 1985 sq.On 6 March 1975. error of law. m.m. Moreover.. On 7 March 1975. Azucena Tancinco Reyes. CA 132 SCRA 514 Facts: Benjamin Tancinco. Meycauayan.m.453 sq. 33837 sq. but said title did not change the public character of the Sapang Cabay. the findings of fact made by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications should be respected in the absence of illegality. On 24 June 1973. REPUBLIC V. Lot 2. as long as such findings are supported by substantial evidence. fraud or imposition. Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from the application and trial proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 118 . Lot 3. the Tancincos filed an application for the registration of 3 lots adjacent to their fishpond property (Psu131892: Lot 1. the Tancincos filed a partial withdrawal of the application for registration with respect to Lot 3 of Plan Psu131892.. 5.

The petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil Code because what actually happened is that the private respondents simply transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the Meycauayan River. and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers. The alleged alluvial 119 . 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Evidence shows the addition to the said property was artificial and man-made. The private respondents contended that the accretion was without human intervention because the transfer of the dike occurred after the accretion was complete. (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water. The lower court rendered a decision granting the application on the finding that the lands in question are accretions to the Tancincos' fishponds covered by TCT 89709.The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable.Thus. Ruling: The Supreme Court granted the petition.Hence. entitling them to the ownership thereof. The following are the three requisites that need to occur before an accretion is said to have taken place: (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible. it is man-made and artificial and not the result of the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river. This excludes from Art. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. if there is any accretion to speak of. Issue: Whether the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents’ fishponds. the petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the CA. The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals.covered by Plan Psu-131892. The appellate court rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the lower cost.

filed for quieting of title over a certain fishpond located within the four parcels of land belonging to them situated in Barrio Salomague. IAC 161 SCRA 469 Facts: Petitioners.deposits came into being not because of the sole effect of the current of the rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching upon it. Hence. Petitioners appealed said decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court. The adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names of the private respondents is null and void. 1940 and in the Cadastral Survey of the entire Municipality of Meycauayan conducted between the years 1958 to 1960. The trial court dismissed the complaint upon a finding that the body of water traversing the titled properties of petitioners is a creek constituting a tributary of the Agno River. Bugallon.Moreover. therefore public in nature and not subject to private appropriation. The accretion claimed is really an encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river by reclamation. MANECLANG V. Issue: Whether the compromise agreement adjudicating the ownership of the property in favor of the petitioner is null and void. Said areas existed only after the private respondents transferred their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951. Pangasinan. 120 .They are not open to registration under the Land Registration Act. The alleged accretion was declared for taxation purposes only in 1972 or 33 years after it had permanently formed allegedly on 1939.The lots sought to be registered were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as property of the public domain .the lots in question were not included in the survey of their adjacent property conducted on May 10. this petition for review on certiorari.

1956 the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the Registration Book for the Province of Rizal. Lara and Godofredo R. These patents were transcribed and registered on June 21.Ruling: Creek is a recess/arm extending from a river and participating in the flow of the sea. or by its conversion into a fishpond. Eusebio filed with the Bureau of Lands their Free Patent Applications for the parcels of land designated as Free Patent Applications Nos. REYES 155 SCRA 313 Facts: Urbano C. The Anti-Graft and Corruption Board of the Bureau of Lands conducted and investigation and it was discovered that the parcels of land patented and titled in the names of respondents Godofredo R. It is not susceptible to appropriation & acquisitive prescription because such is as public water. Rizal. Its nature as property of the public domain cannot be modified by the construction of irrigation dikes by the National Irrigation Authority. Taguig. 1956. The compromise agreement has no legal effect since it is contrary to law and public policy. The said free patent applications were approved on June 14. Eusebio and Lara 121 . Free Patent Titles were then issued to respondents Godofredo R. Hence. Eusebio and Urbano C.2 situated in Napindan. a compromise agreement adjudicating the ownership of such property in favor of an individual is null and void. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara.1and Lot No. 7-207 and 7-208 for Lot No. REPUBLIC V. it cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual. It is a property belonging to the public domain. Lara were actually under water and form part of the Laguna de Bay.

The lower court then rendered separate decisions declaring null and void Certificates of Title Nos. and the doctrine of indefeasibility of torrens title does not apply to free patent secured through fraud. Ruling: That it is well settled that any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value. Likewise. This rule applies even after the issuance of the certificate of title. the Court ruled in Cuevas vs. Any false statement in an application for public land shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the title granted. 1990 122 .R. that mere possession of land does not itself divest the land of its public character.expressly agreed to have their patents and certificates of title cancelled. Pineda. Complaints were also filed against them before the CFI of Pasig. shall be cancelled. These are neither agricultural nor disposable. Subject patents and titles were erroneously issued due to misrepresentations and false reports and must therefore be cancelled. In the case at bar. the free patents and certificates of title issued to Eusebio and Lara cover areas which form parts of Laguna de Bay. A certificate of title cannot be used as a shield to perpetuate fraud. Issue: Whether lakes can be registered under the Torrens System. DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. Void free patents and certificates of title do not divest the state of its ownership of the land nor operate to change the public character of the land to private. No. 31688 December 17. Rizal. 140 and 139 and ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel said patents and titles and for failure of defendants to move for reconsideration or appeal. AQUINO G. said decisions became final and executory. 143 SCRA 674 [1986].

Therefore. They alleged there was fraud in the application of AIC. but the Director of Lands thru the Provincial Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration contending that although the land may be reclassified by the Bureau of Mines as a mineral land. AIC was not able to prove that the lands they claimed were alienable and disposable or that the lands were no longer part of the forest reserve.FACTS: A 70-hectare lime rich land in Bucay. The lower court approved the registration of the said parcels of land. notwithstanding the fact that they are within the forest zone. with mention of Director of Forestry v. After a year from the issuance. since they only showed 24 hectares but actually included 46 hectares of the said forest reserve. 5440. Muñoz where it was held that forest lands and forests reserves are not alienable. They have also complied with all the requirements for registering the said land. Then the petitioners filed an appeal to the Court of appeals but were denied since it was filed out of time. the petitioners filed to the Supreme Court a petition for review for certiorari under R. registration of AIC’s applied lands were issued. citing a long line of cases. Without waiting for the decision. Meanwhile. but the lower court denied it saying that the Bureau of Mines and Bureau of Forestry should also be parties to the case. but further contended that motion of intervention by said bureaus are not proper in land registration cases. In the case. the decision of the lower court was reversed and set aside.Hence. But the lower court ruled that the judicial error was not synonymous with actual fraud.A. the lands applied for are still part of the forest zone which was inalienable under the 1935 Constitution. No.A. Private respondents opposed the motion for reconsideration prayed for. It is the President who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain upon recommendation of the proper department head. On the other hand. Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in granting the application of registration of the said lands. as it is premised in the Regalian doctrine which is enshrined in our constitution. the petitioners opposed the application of AIC since the highly mineralized parcels of land are within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and are not yet reclassified as alienable and disposable lands pursuant to the Public Land Law. 3092. Ruling: The Supreme court ruled in favor of the petitioners. 123 . Abra is claimed by the private respondents Abra Industiral Corporation (AIC) as their own since they and their predecessors-in-interest have been occupying the said land for forty-nine years. it has not yet been excluded from the Cordillera Forest Reserve pursuant to Sec. No. the Solicitor General thru the lower court filed for a petition for review of the said decrees. however long a person was in possession thereof. 1826 of R.

Piadeco sought to renew its certificate but it was denied by the Asst.DIRECTOR OF FORESTY V. to issue regulations “deemed expedient or necessary to secure the protection and conservation of the public forests in such manner as to insure a continued supply of valuable timber and other forest products for the future. Ruling: No. There should be no question now that Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 has the force and effect of law. Section 1817. Inc. and approved by 124 . MUNOZ 23 SCRA 184 Facts: Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation. The Spanish title it acquired cannot be used to register for another Certificate. empowers the Bureau of Forestry. Issue: Whether Piadeco can claim ownership over the property. Revised Administrative Code.” Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 was recommended by the Director of Forestry. to the same end. and regulating the use and occupancy of the forests and forest reserves. It actually cut trees in the Angat and Marikina watershed area which was prohibited. with the approval of the department head.000 hectare of land. In 1964. It was given a Certificate of Private Woodland Registration so that it can operate in a 72. the NAWASA director ordered the cancellation of Piadeco’s certificate because it encroached beyond what was allowed in the certificate. It also has a Titulo de Propriedad which it acquired in 1894 under the Spanish regime. It was promulgated pursuant to law. Director of Forestry. (Piadeco) is a company engaged in logging. Piadeco also had a settlement with Nawasa. The latter ruled that the Spanish title is no longer recognized and should have never been used to apply for a Certificate. The lower court ruled in favor of Piadeco.

As to the claim of 125 . Ruling: No. The Director of lands. through the Solicitor General and the Director of Forestry. exclusively. The Court ruled that the petitioner clearly proved thru the reports and testimonies of the district foresters that the land applied for registration is a part of a forestland. CA 154 SCRA 476 Facts: In 1968. It is no less a valid law. Issue: Whether the land in dispute is alienable and disposable. that the regulation be not in contradiction with it. continuously.the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. but conform to the standards that the law prescribes. opposed the application on the ground that the said portion land is within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve as shown in the reports and testimonies of the district foresters. The CFI granted the application. It is an administrative regulation germane to the objects and purposes of the law.” REPUBLIC V. which the latter claimed to be in their possession and occupation openly. “[a]ll that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law. which was also affirmed by the CA. The government’s failure to show that the disputed land is more valuable for forest purposes is one of the reasons for the CA’s ruling. A rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress authorized the promulgation of administrative rules and regulations to implement a given legislation. notoriously since 1915. It also noted the failure to prove that trees are thriving in the land. Martina Carantes for and in behalf of the heirs of Salming Piraso filed in the CFI of Baguio an application for the registration of the land.

The Court again reiterated that there must first be a formal Government declaration that the forestland has been re-classified into alienable and disposable agricultural land. after transmittal of the patent to the Register of Deeds of General Santos City. the Republic of the Philippines.C. V-466102 was issued by the President of the Philippines for the land in question. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. and on July 20. as a transferee from Precila Soria. before private persons in accordance with the various modes of acquiring public agricultural lands can acquire it. Munoz (23 SCRA 1184). Branch I. 1969. who on February 23. at the instance of the Bureau of Forestry. free Patent No. no matter how long. On August 5. 1971. transferred her rights to the land and its improvements to defendant Isagani Du Timbol who filed his application therefor on February 3. where it ruled.) No. REPUBLIC V. ―A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. 126 . 1970. 75). P-2508 was issued in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol. filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato.T. 1966.the applicants that they have been in possession of the land since 1915. Original Certificate of Title (O. the Court also addressed the CA’s ruling by citing its decision in Heirs of Amunatequi v. Forestlands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. On December 12. cannot ripen into private ownership. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69. the court cited its decision in Director of Forestry v. In its decision. ANIMAS 56 SCRA 499 Facts: The land covered by the free patent and title in question was originally applied for by Precila Soria.where it stated that possession of forest lands. 1969.

In the case of disposable public lands. 1969. Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the state in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act 127 . The lapse of the one year period within which a decree of title may be reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof. 700 to be inside the area which was reverted to the category of public forest. 1958. A title will be considered void if it is procured through fraud. said title has not become indefeasible for prescription cannot be invoked against the state. P-2508 in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol null and void ab initio and to order the reversion of the land in question to the mass of public domain. failure on the part of the grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by law is a ground for holding such title void. A title founded on fraud may be cancelled. this Court grants the petition on the ground that the area covered by the patent and title is not disposable public land. the said land was plotted on Bureau of Forestry map L. whereas the application for free patent by Isagani Du Timbol was filed on June 3. Issue: Whether the area is a part of the forest zone Ruling: Yes.General Santos City (Civil Case No. The action is based on the ground that the land covered thereby is a forest or timber land which is not disposable under the Public Land Act.C. hence the patent and title thereto are null and void. 1253). even if such title had been secured through fraud or in violation of the law. would be the height of absurdity. through a petition filed in court by the Solicitor General. Considering that it is the state is seeking the cancellation of the title of respondent Isagani Du Timbol. for to hold that a title may become indefeasible by registration. as when a person applies for registration of the land under his name although the property belongs to another. V-466102 and Original Certificate of Title No. that in a reclassification of the public lands in the vicinity where the land in question is situated made by the Bureau of Forestry on March 7. Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing title. After careful deliberation. it being a part of the forest zone and. it is. or more than eleven years thereafter. that the said patent and title were obtained fraudulently as private respondent Isagani Du Timbol never occupied and cultivated the land applied for. to declare free patent No. notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the issuance thereof. A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled.

No. May 23.R. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the state is not barred prescription. L-30035. In due time. . No. the heirs of Jose Amunategui. Prescription does not lie against the state in such cases for the Statute of Limitations does not run against the state (Article 1108.747 square meters was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre. L-14707. Jugado et al. L-27873 filed an opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. for the remedy of reconveyance is adequately covered by the prayer of the complaint for the grant of such other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises. At the same time. 885 to Angel Alpasan. the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117. applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever rights and interests he may have on Lot No. paragraph 4 of the New Civil Code). filed the application for registration. .703 square meters. During the progress of the trial. HEIRS OF AMMUNATEGUI V. claiming that he is entitled to have said lot registered in his name. the land covered thereby may be reconveyed to the state in an action for reconveyance under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act). DIRECTOR OF LANDS 126 SCRA 69 Facts: There are two petitions in this case. and has an area of 645. The Court of Appeals declared the disputed property as forest land. they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. After trial. 1961).(Director of Lands vs. The latter also filed an opposition. Capiz. petitioner in G.956 square meters to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land containing 527. petitioners in G. Even granting that the title of private respondent Isagani Du Timbol can no longer be reopened under the Land Registration Act.R.R.. Roque Borre. and Melquiades Borre. as to the northeastern portion of 128 . 885 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527.747 square meters be confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui. G. The parcel of land sought to be registered is known as Lot No. the Court of Appeals held ". the conclusion so far must have to be that as to the private litigants that have been shown to have a better right over Lot 885 are. No. In its decision. Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry filed their respective appeals with the Court of Appeals. These two petitions have their genesis in an application for confirmation of imperfect title and its registration filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz.

in order for applicant to be able to demonstrate a registerable title he must have shown "‘open. the title that these two (2) private litigants have shown did not amount to a registerable one in view of the opposition and evidence of the Director of Forestry ".747 square meters. it was Emeterio Bereber and as to the rest of 527. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years.’ the foregoing details cannot but justify the conclusion that not one of the applicants or oppositors had shown that during the required period of thirty (30) years prescribed by Republic Act 1942 in order for him to have shown a registerable title for the entire period of thirty (30) years before filing of the application. and the only time when the property was converted into a fishpond was sometime after 1950. the land was a classified forest land so much so that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensee before 1926 and after that. he had been in "‘open. but the last question that must have to be considered is whether after all. continuous. it was the heirs of Jose Amunategui. the result must be to deny all these applications. preceding the filing of the application. the fact must have to be accepted that during that period. . continuous. and this can only mean that the Bureau of Forestry had stood and maintained its ground that it was a forest land as indeed the testimonial evidence referred to above persuasively indicates. it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry had insisted on its claim all throughout that period of thirty (30) years and even before and applicants and their predecessors had made implicit recognition of that. just the same to resolve the conflicting positions of the private litigants among themselves as to who of them had demonstrated a better right to possess because this Court 129 . so that having these in mind and remembering that even under Republic Act 1942 which came into effect in 1957. that even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain’. . or a bare five (5) years before the filing of the application. turning back the clock thirty (30) years from 1955 when the application was filed which would place it at 1925. two (2) years after this case had already been filed in the lower Court. but only after there had been a previous warning by the District Forester that that could not be done because it was classified as a public forest. this Court stating that it had felt impelled notwithstanding.a little less than 117.956 square meters.

said land was already "private land" better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest classification. contending that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui.foresees that this litigation will go all the way to the Supreme Court and it is always better that the findings be as complete as possible to enable the Highest Court to pass final judgment. The petitioners also question the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in passing upon the relative rights of the parties over the disputed lot when its final decision after all is to declare said lot a part of the public domain classified as forest land." Although conceding that a "mangrove swamp" is included in the classification of forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code."cralaw virtua1aw library. The complaint was dismissed on the basis of the Court of Appeals’ decision that the disputed lot is part of the public domain. even if it is a mangrove swamp. The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 496 known as the Land Registration Act. 1942. is still subject to land registration proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of private persons for many years. On the other hand. no more pronouncement as to costs. Furthermore. The Borre complaint was for the annulment of the deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in favor of the Heirs of Amunategui. another petition for review on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin. second and third groups are found on the land in question. "IN VIEW WHEREOF. and therefore. A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui contending that the disputed lot had been in the possession of private persons for over thirty years and therefore in accordance with Republic Act No. said lot could still be the subject of registration and confirmation of title in the name of a private person in accordance with Act No. the application as well as all the oppositions with the exception of that of the Director of Forestry which is hereby sustained are dismissed. 885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a "mangrove swamp. the decision must have to be as it is hereby reversed. they contend that Lot 885. the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of said Code as first. Issue: Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals should be sustained Ruling: 130 .

" In confirmation of imperfect title cases. and that as late as 1926. Mulanay.Yes. the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. REPUBLIC V. 141. MAXIMO 135 SCRA 156 Facts: The Court of First Instance at Gumaca. 885 does not divest such land of its being classified as forest land. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees. much less as land of the public domain. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. 1961 rendered a decision. 131 . it should be sustained. Commonwealth Act No. The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court’s finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. ordering the registration of said land. It was only sometime in 1950 that the property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District Forester that the same could not be done because it was classified as "public forest. the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48. SPS. Quezon on March 21. and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. nipa palms. The appellate court found that in 1912. The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative Code are found in Lot No. as amended by Republic Act No. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Lot 1. the land must have been a virgin forest as stated by Emeterio Bereber’s witness Deogracias Gavacao. 1942. allegedly located at Barrio Cambuga (Anonang). it must have been a thickly forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. in the names of the spouses Prudencio Maxino and Tarciana Morales.

The petition was verified by the Acting Director of Forestry. a gratuitous composition title or adjustment title issued on July 30. Issue: Whether the land in question can be registered under the Torrens System Ruling: No. 1884 for 29 hectares of pasture land. The title states that the 29-hectare land was located in Barrio Yamay. The boundaries and areas stated in Tesalona's tax declarations reveal that a different land was covered thereby. the Carantes heirs. the Republic filed with court an amended petition to annul the decision. After hearing the judge denied the petition and ruled in favor of the spouses. More than eight years later. Tesalona’s tax declarations stated that the land was located in Barrio Cambuga. The basis of the claim of the Maxinos is a Spanish title. filed under Civil Reservation Case No. The decision became final and executory. Moreover. the possessory information title relied upon by the Maxino spouses covered only 29 hectares of land and not 885 hectares. however long. cannot ripen into private ownership. the said land cannot be registered. A decree and an original certificate of title were issued. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. now Anonang. No.R.less 200 hectares which should be registered in the names of the Heirs of Lorenzo Consolacion. It is axiomatic that public forestal land is not registerable. decree and title on the ground that they are void because the land in question was still a part of the unclassified public forest. The spouses have not shown that a title for 29 hectares could be a valid title for 970 hectares. The court said that possession of public forestal lands. L-32941 July 31. 1973 Facts: On November 12. 1966. MARCOS G. 132 . 1888 to Prudencio Tesalona pursuant to the Royal Decree of December 26.

in a 1910 decision. Commander of the Philippine Squadron. and for the registration in their favor of four lots with a total area of 74. Then on December 14. This notwithstanding. respondent Judge issued an order requiring the publication and posting of notices thereof. specifically governs the subject matter of reservations. Court of First Instance 133 . The subject lots are inside the Camp John Hay Leave and Recreation Center. As provided therein: "All lands or buildings. Apparently. 1969. or any interests therein. 1968. as a report of an investigator of his office was that the area sought to be registered is inside Camp John Hay in Baguio City. buildings. The efforts exerted by the Director of Lands and the City of Baguio to appeal said decision did not prosper because respondent Judge because he believes that "the proper party to appeal should be Camp John Hay. to wit: "subject to prior and existing private rights. 931 is our ruling in Government v." Finally. It must be noted that the location of the lot inside Camp John Hay is not a subject of dispute. 1969 that the Solicitor-General entered his appearance in the case and filed a motion to annul the decision based on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the proceedings as the land in question is part of a duly established military reservation." The validity of this statute was sustained as against the allegation that there was a violation of the due process clause. enacted as far back as 1903. Such motion was denied by respondent Judge on December 8. under the circumstances hereinafter stated. the respondent Judge rendered his decision in favour of the Carantes. The Director of Lands duly opposed. and such of said lands. within the Philippine Islands lying within the boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be military reservations shall be forthwith brought under the operations of the Land Registration Act. on November 9. Jose v. an earlier case of decisive significance was referred to: "What is even more conclusive as to the absence of any right on the part of the private respondents to seek a re-opening under Republic Act No. 1966. the respondent Judge in refusing to set aside his decision was impressed by the claim that the private respondents had been in possession "since the Spanish regime. and interests therein as shall not be determined to be public lands shall become registered land in accordance with the provisions of said Land Registration Act.017 square meters.1 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City a petition for the re-opening of said proceeding to have them declared owners. It was not until August 22. Its historical background was next passed upon: "An earlier act." Issue: Is the land in dispute is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain? Ruling: Yes." and thus came within the protection of the words annotated on all survey plans of Camp John Hay.

the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title 134 . Inc Issues: 1. a corp. or any interest therein. Isabela. but a grant of the Government." REPUBLIC VS IAC 155 SCRA 412 Facts: Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain. a 1926 decision. We there explicitly held: "The defendant's contention that the respondent court. 931. YES. Whether or not the land is already a private land.. in a cadastral case. The establishment of military reservations is governed by Act No. respondent Judge in that case was devoid "of jurisdiction to pass upon the claim of private respondents invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. by operation of law not only a right to a grant. . Donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela IAC affirmed CFI in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. 2... It had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property. Ruling: 1.. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario. . has jurisdiction to order the registration portions of a legally established military reservation cannot be sustained. Already acquired.of Pampanga. Inc.. an application therefore is sufficient. Whether or not the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations applies. has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements.Possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan. Inc." ' " This Court could conclude therefore that as contended by petitioner Republic.Ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon.Land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands. acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel. The application for confirmation is mere formality. at least by presumption. 627 of the Philippine Commission and Section 1 of that Act provides that "All lands or buildings. for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts. members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land.Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.. within the Philippine Islands lying within the boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be military reservations shall be forthwith brought under the operations of the Land Registration Act.

No. 1986). wherever made.024 hectares. The effect of the proof. it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition.R. 1979. NO. Metro Manila on December 4. 1981 respondent Judge rendered a decision ordering the registration of the property in the name of the private respondent. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire.. the Court gave the petition due course. Issue: Whether or not the doctrine that open. 1970. 1976.. L73002 (December 29. exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land. applicant acquired the land applied for registration by purchase from Ricardo Natividad who in turn acquired the same from his father Gregorio Natividad as evidenced by a Deed of Original Absolute Sale executed on December 28. Applicant's predecessors-in-interest have possessed the property under the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. The Director of Lands interposed this petition raising the issue of whether or not a corporation may apply for registration of title to land. if not by earlier law 2.. DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS MERALCO G. was not to confer title. No. as already conferred by the decree. 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners. If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infields had a legally sufficient and transferable title On October 29. etc. Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1. The legal issue raised by the petitioner Director of Lands has been squarely dealt with in two recent cases (The Director of Lands v. On August 17. but simply to establish it. On May 29. The property was declared for taxation purposes under the name of the applicant and the taxes due thereon have been paid.as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. After comments were filed by the respondents. Inc. ceases to be public land and becomes private 135 . upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction. 146 SCRA 509. L-57461 Facts: Manila Electric Company filed an amended application for registration of a parcel of land located in Taguig.

Military Reservation under Executive Order of the President of the United States of America. Thereafter. and that Arturo could not have inherited the land from his grandfather. peaceful. Bataan. Ruling: In the case at bar. "productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in no wise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings. Thirty-nine (39) persons filed their Opposition to the petition for registration filed by Arturo and Guillermo contending that they have been in actual. only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny private respondent the right to register its property which was validly acquired. As ruled in the Acme case. 1736 for more than thirty (30) years and have introduced improvements thereon. Arturo sold two-thirds (2/3) undivided portion of the land to Guillermo Reyes and Francisco S. The land in question was deemed reverted to the public domain as it was excluded from the US-Philippine Military Bases Agreement. alleged to have been occupied since 1913 by the late Vicente Rodriguez. Alcantara. XIV. then the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against corporations holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease (1973 Const. Orion. the Public Land Act. Upon Vicente’s death." Considering that it is not disputed that the Natividads could have had their title confirmed. embodied in Proc. 1206 but was rejected upon knowledge that the land was classified as within the U. See. 10 of the Governor-General of the Philippines. Art. his sons. during his lifetime filed Lease Application No.S. COURT OF APPEALS 179 SCRA 522 Facts: Lot No. 141. 1736 is a 233.property. adverse and continuous possession of portions of Lot No.. who. contends that a corporation is not among those that may apply for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. Victorino (the father of Arturo) and Pablo possessed the property that was subsequently turned over to Arturo. if the land was already private at the time Meralco bought it from Natividad.6883-hectare agricultural land in Barrio Kapok. however. 136 . because the children of Vicente are still living. the fact that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by a corporation is simply another accidental circumstance. No. that the applicants have never been in possession of the property. Petitioner. 11) does not apply.

The lower court ruled in favor of the applicants ordering its registration in their names. continuous. This circumstance considered. No. CHAVEZ V. the land having been segregate as part of a military reservation. While the cadastral proceedings in 1927 cannot be considered a bar to the registration proceedings instituted by private respondents. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY G. Issue: Whether the applicants had registrable title over Lot 1736. The intervening period commencing from the promulgation of Proc. the Court of Appeals reversed its decision and ruled that the prior decision of the cadastral court declaring the lot in question as public land way back in 1930 does not bar the present application for registration of title or confirmation of imperfect title under Act 496 of the same parcel of land. 10 in 1925 declaring the land in question as part of the U. exclusive and notorious possession over the land in question should be counted only from 1953. possession over the land in question because during this interregnum. said land was not alienable nor disposable and this was shown by the denial of the lease application filed then by private respondents' predecessor-in-interest. no amount of time in whatever nature of possession could have ripen such possession into private ownership. In a resolution. Military Reservation until 1953 when the land was deemed reverted back to the public domain disturbed private respondents.S. Considering that the application for registration was filed in 1965.R. When Cadastral Case No. 15 was instituted in 1927 and terminated in 1930. the land in question was still classified as within the U. the 30-year requirement had not been met at the time the action for registration was filed that would add up to only fourteen (14) years. S. The decision in the aforesaid cadastral case does not constitute res judicata upon a subsequent action for land registration considering the futility of filing any claim then over the land in question since the same would nevertheless have been denied because during the pendency of the cadastral case. the chronology of events clearly negates compliance by private respondents with the 30-year possession requirement. Ruling: None. No. Military Reservation and was deemed reverted to the public domain only in 1953. private respondents' claim of open. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the lower court. 164527 15 August 2007 137 .The Director of Lands likewise filed his opposition alleging that the applicants do not possess sufficient title to the land.

In a ruling involving PEA “alienable lands of public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties. (RBI). Marcos issued Presidential 138 . 133250 July 9. does not convert alienable lands of public domain into private or patrimonial lands. 1977. then President Ferdinand E.Facts: President Cory Aquino. It may be argued that the grant of authority to sell public lands. on 1988. The Build-Operate-and-Transfer Law (BOT) being enacted. NHA was ordered to “conduct feasibility studies and develop low-cost housing projects at the dumpsite and absorb scavengers in NHA resettlement/low-cost housing projects. pursuant to PEA. they are automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the State which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private corporations. Among the agencies tasked for the implementation of such plan is respondent. The moment titles over reclaimed lands based on the special patents are transferred to the NHA by the Register of Deeds. He alleges that RBI cannot acquire the reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas as these are inalienable public lands beyond the commerce of man Issue: Whether RBI can validly acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas? Ruling: Yes. Part of the profit of the developer RBI as provided for in the JVA is to own 40 hectares of the reclaimed area. The NHA is an “end-user agency” authorized by law to administer and dispose of reclaimed lands.R. the role of the private sector was recognized in national development. Petitioner Chavez filed a petition against respondents raising constitutional issues. issued Memorandum Order No. 60% of which are owned by Filipinos. or to government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands. NHA then entered into a joint venture agreement with R-II Builders Inc. before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands. 2002 Facts: On February 4. No. (MO) 161 directing the implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. PEA G. NHA is a government agency not tasked to dispose of public lands under its charter. CHAVEZ V.” Respondent then formulated the “Smokey Mountain Development Plan and Reclamation of the Area Across R-10” and submitted it to the President for approval.

On April 28." On the same date. then President Fidel V. 1988. and 7312. 1995. 7311. (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void. filed the instant 139 . to develop the Freedom Islands. Ramos. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 1995. and (3) the JVA itself is illegal. including foreshore and submerged areas. Ramos. 1245. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA. the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. the Board of Directors of PEA. then President Corazon C. 1998. a private corporation. x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land. petitioner Frank I. PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI. in the name of PEA. 7309. Parañaque City. confirmed the JVA. through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres. in its Resolution No. then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. PD No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. On April 25. On June 8. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. On January 19. 1997. On December 5. The Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that there were ongoing renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an order issued by then President Fidel V. 3517. on April 9. granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the MCCRRP containing a total area of 1. The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No.Decree No. 560. 1997." Subsequently. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP). The Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises. 1988. 560 dated September 16. Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands." and "to develop. conducted a joint investigation. On April 27. approved the JVA. and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations. Chavez as a taxpayer. improve. 1084 creating Public Estates Authority (PEA). acquire. then President Fidel V. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP.894 square meters.915. 1995. contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees. covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding.

15 hectares which are still submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. and in their present state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. reclaimed and still to be reclaimed. the government may declare these lands no longer needed for public service. These submerged areas are not covered by any patent or certificate of title. these submerged areas are. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3.Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Thus. Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural lands. under the Constitution. The DENR decides whether areas under water. There can be no dispute that these submerged areas form part of the public domain. the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President." Issue Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to AMARI of certain lands. PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement. 1999. 1999. 1999. Thereafter. which the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22. like foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay. Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered alienable or disposable lands of the public domain and within the commerce of man. Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged areas be classified as public agricultural lands. On March 30. violate the 1987 constitution. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations. On May 28. the government may then officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition. but also an additional 592. which under the Constitution are the only natural resources that the State may alienate. Meanwhile. 140 . "waters x x x owned by the State. Ruling: The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands. Until reclaimed from the sea. the Office of the President under the administration of then President Joseph E. 1999. petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated May 26. There is no legislative or Presidential act classifying these submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition. Estrada approved the Amended JVA. should be reclaimed or not. petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void." forming part of the public domain and consequently inalienable.

15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. unless converted pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. applied with the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent (Sales Application No. 1976 Facts: On January 22. Foreshore and submerged areas form part of the public domain and are inalienable.R. the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3. the 592. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Clearly. contracts whose "object or purpose is contrary to law. through 141 . In their present state. the 592. the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Still. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain. and further declare them no longer needed for public service. the Bureau of Lands. 5436) of a 33-hectare situated in barrio Libaron. 1921." or whose "object is outside the commerce of men. On January 23. and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio. which are the only natural resources the government can alienate." are "inexistent and void from the beginning. Municipality of Davao (now Davao City). such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code. the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3. REPUBLIC V. L-40912 September 30. the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable. CA G.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable. Eugenio de Jesus. lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain. 1934. Absent two official acts – a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed for public service. No. Thus. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. The property applied for was a portion of what was then known as Lot 522 of the Davao Cadastre.much less patrimonial lands of PEA." The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution.

1948. accepted sealed bids for the purchase of the subject land. 1936. another bidding was held on October 4. Josc Ebro submitted a bid of P100. consisting of 12. On November 29.6400 hectares. Thereafter. On September 7. the very land in question. the Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales Application of Eugenio de Jesus stating that "a portion of the land covered by Sales Application No. 1176-B-2 from sale and settlement and reserving the same for military purposes.its Davao District Land Officer. situated in the barrio of Poblacion. He equalled the bid previously submitted by Dr. City of Davao. Bsd-10153. under the administration of the Chief of Staff." The area excluded was Identified as Lot 1176-B-2. Sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus was the lone bidder. it will continue to be given due course. 1934. while a certain Dr. 1176-B-2) as the same had already been excluded from the Sales Application at the time the payment was made. Davao City. 1936. This payment did not include the military camp site (Lot No.8081 hectares. In the following October 9. and as thus amended. 64 ares.00 representing 10% of the price of the land at P100. City of Davao. Eugenio de Jesus paid P660. 1176-A. 1939. Jose Ebro and made a deposit of P221. the Bureau of Lands conducted a survey under Plan Bsd-1514. Island of Mindanao. On August 28. annulled the auction sale for the reason that the sales applicant. Because the area conveyed had not been actually surveyed at the time Eugenio de Jesus filed his Sales Application. Philippines. On August 11. or on May 15. pursuant to his Sales Application for "a tract of land having an area of 20.00 per hectare. 1176-B-1-A and 1176-B-1-B with an aggregate area of 20. and 00 centares. On July 29. President Manuel L. 1936. 328 and reserved the same Lot No. On the same date. Quezon issued Proclaimation No. then Director of Lands Jose P. Dans ordered the issuance of patent to Eugenio de Jesus. Philippine Army. 1176-B-2 for 142 . President Ramon Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No.6400 hectares. the said application is amended so as to exclude therefrom portion "A" as shown in the sketch on the back thereof. then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Mariano Garchitorena granted a Sales Patent to Eugenio de Jesus for "a tract of agricultural public land situated in the City of Davao. failed to participate in the bidding for non-service of notice on him of the scheduled bidding.45 covering the 8th and 10th installment for 20. however. 1956. containing an area of 20 hectares. In lieu of that sale. President Magsaysay revoked this Proclamation No. the plan was approved and the land awarded to Eugenio de Jesus was designated as Lot Nos. 85 withdrawing Lot No. Eugenio de Jesus.50 per hectare.6400 hectares. the remaining area after his Sales Application was amended. 5436 (E-3231) of Eugenio de Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army for military camp site purposes. 85 and declared the disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition under the provisions of the Public land Act for resettlement of the squatters in the Piapi Beach. One Irineo Jose bidded for P20.50 per hectare The Director of Lands.

its nervous disease pavilion and their reasonable appurtenances. had aquired a vested right on the subject lot by virtue of the Order of Award issued to him by the Director of Lands. Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over the whole contested area of 12. Such land grant is constitutive of a "fee simple" tile or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. After due hearing. 1956. On July 5. Section 122 of the Act. shown on Plan Ap-6512. petitioner Mindanao Medical Center moved for reconsideration. directing "the registration of the title to Lot No. 350. the Court of First Instance of Davao rendered judgment on September 2.medical center site purposes under the administration of the Director of Hospital. Bureau of Medical Services. Proclamation No. Department of Health. dated October 9. which governs the registration of grants or patents involving public lands.081 square meters in the name of the Mindanao Medical Center. 1969. validity sufficient for initial registration under the Land Registration Act. of President Magsaysay legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center. Forthwith. Alejandro de Jesus and Arsenio Suazo.8081 hectares. excepted from this judgment of the trial court and appealed the case to the respondent Court of Appeals. Eugenio de Jesus. maintaining ownership over the entire area of 12. Bureau of Medical Services. petitioner Mindanao Medical Center elevated the matter to Us thru the present appeal. City of Davao. provides that "Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the Philippines are alienated.8081 hectares. A certain Arsenio Suazo likewise filed his opposition to the registration on the claim that the 2-hectare portion on the northeastern part of Lot 1176-B-2 belongs to him. 1176-B-2. situated in the Barrio of Central. but the Appellate Court in a Special Division of Five denied the motion on June 17. and not only on a portion thereof occupied by the Medical Center. 1176-B-2 of Subdivision Plan Bsd5134. Issue: Whether the appeal of the petitioner meritorious Ruling: We find petitioner's appeal to be meritorious. designated Lot No. 1966. opposed the registration oil the ground that his father. Act 496] and shall become registered lands. granted. or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations. Thus. of the whole lot. The two oppositors. 350 reserving the area for medical center site purposes. Department of Health. Whereupon." It would be completely absurd 143 . the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act [Land Registration Act. the son and successor-in-interest of sale applicant Eugenio de Jesus. on December 6. petitioner Mindanao Medical Center applied for the Torrens registration of the 12. and containing an area of 128. The Medical Center claimed "fee simple" title to the land on the strength of proclamation No. 1974.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 with the Court of First Instance of Davao. 1975. Respondent Alejandro de Jesus.

and to establish. the property must be held to be part of the public domain. its nervous disease pavilion and the reasonable appurtenances. his father. when the proclamation explicitly reserved the entire Lot 1176-B-2 of 12. filling. maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may 144 ." but Eugenio de Jesus or his son Alejandro de Jesus failed to prove any private rights over the property reserved. or other means. such as grants or patents. the Medical Center has registerable title on the portion occupied by it. or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public interest requires it. proclamation no. or any other means for the acquisition of public lands. of any foreshore lands bordering them. or of the inhabitants thereof. It is true that Proclamation No. section 64 (e) of the Revised Administrative Code empowers the president "(t)o reserve from sale oe other disposition and for specific public uses for service. Section 83 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) authorizes the President to "designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use ofthe commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its branches.. the use of which is not otherwise directed by law.. if any there be. 350.A. 350 states that the same is subject to "privilege rights." Similarly. . provide. against which no acquisitive prescription may lie 27 except as provided in Section 48(b) of C. 350 is free of any legal infirmity. any land belonging to the private domain of the Government of the Philippines.8081-hectare lot was included in the original sales application for 33 hectares). Wee-settled is the rule that unless the applicant has shown by clear and convincing evidence that a certain portion of the public domain was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title. on the basis of Proclamation No. including reservations for . construct..8081 hectares to the Center. Nor could respondent Alejandro de Jesus legetimately claim to have obtained title by prescription over the disputed 12. other improvements for the public benefit. 141. 1957.. RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging. as amended. necessarily admits that the portions applied for are part of the public domain. and not on the full extent of the reservation. REPUBLIC VS CA 73 SCRA 146 Facts: On June 22. the land reserved "shall be used for the specific purposes directed by such executive order until otherwise provided by law.to rule that.8081 hectares. Certainly. It proceeds from the recognized competence of the president to reserve by executive proclamation alienable lands of the public domain for a specific public use or service. inasmuch as by applying for the sale thereof (assuming hypothetically that the 12. Eugenio de Jesus.

the term "foreshore lands" refers to: The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project. It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. among others. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term foreshore lands. Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce of man because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term “foreshore land” than that in the definition provided by the dictionary. and therefore ultra vires and null and void REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. L-26100 February 28. Pursuant to the said law. and the Agreement under attack. RA 1899. that the agreement between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the contract is outside the commerce of man. as amended by Ordinance No. 121. it being a foreshore land. and the decision was affirmed by the CA with modifications. 158. The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act. If the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas. much less widen the coverage thereof. it should have provided expressly.R. To repeat. 1969 145 . Ruling: The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the respondent court that the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged areas.determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream). we cannot broaden its meaning. Ordinance No. It contended. Republic questioned the agreement. In so doing. Issue: Whether or not the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged area and whether or not “foreshore land” and the reclaimed area is within the commerce of man. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Pasay City and RREC. the part of a seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm. have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899. No. MARCOS G.

After independence. 1956. issued an executive order reserving for naval purposes the lots now disputed. Considering that as far back as October 10. Baguio Cadastre). 931 speaks in a manner far from ambiguous. William H.Philippine Military Bases Agreement on Dec. 5139. and was subsequently released or turned over to the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of the U. It cannot admit of doubt. issued by the then President William Howard Taft of the United States. On September 11. then this statute finds no application." Issue: Whether the Baguio Courts can reopen judicial proceedings involving Civil Case No. 1254 of October 10. sought the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1967.S. On October 7. 1910.Facts: Prior to Civil Reservation Case No. 1956 but the same has not been reserved for military purposes by the Republic of the Philippines. The Solicitor General filed a motion to annul the decision dated October 7. praying for the issuance in their favor of title to a parcel of land designated as LRC-SWO-6132 (Lots 140 and 141. 1. Taft. 1? Ruling: No. respondent Daisy Pacnos filed an opposition. Fleet Naval Rehabilitation Center consisting of Lots 140 and 141 of the Baguio Cadastre was set aside pursuant to Executive Order No. Republic Act No. Only persons "claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object of cadastral proceedings" are granted the right to petition for a reopening thereof if the other conditions named therein are successfully met. 1965 the Pirasos. respondents herein. 1. The Pirasos claimed: "The land in question is not a military reservation under the Republic of the Philippines although it was formerly reserved and placed under the control of the Navy Department for the use as Naval Hospital and for other purposes of the Navy during the American regime (U. It is quite explicit and categorical. the Baguio Courts cannot reopen. their relinquishment being formalized by an agreement of December 6. 6. the then President of the United States. On May 21. therefore. based on lack of jurisdiction. alleging she has the right to register it.S. that if the parcels of land were not the object of cadastral proceedings. 1967.S. they could 146 . Judge Marcos decided the case in favor of respondent Daisy Pacnos. 1910. the United States relinquished to the Republic of the Philippines all claims to title over the military bases including the aforesaid lots. 1965. Government) pursuant to Executive Order No. a military reservation known as the U.

R. No. 1966. This notwithstanding. The subject lots are inside the Camp John Hay Leave and Recreation Center.017 square meters. 1973 Facts: On November 12. decided only on November 13. residence Section D. 141.. The Director of Lands duly opposed. . 1922. declaring to be a naval reservation of the Government of the United States "that tract of land known as lot no. 1969 that the Solicitor-General entered his appearance in the case and filed a motion to annul the decision based on the ground of lack of 147 . the respondent Judge rendered his decision in favour of the Carantes.." Included in the petition is an executive order of the then President Herbert Hoover of June 19. Then on December 14. Baguio naval reservation. L-32941 July 31. granted. This lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Judge is made more patent by another specific restriction of the right of a person to seek reopening under this statute. 1966. reserved. that ought to be removed by this reaffirmation of a presidential determination. The respondent Judge is devoid of jurisdiction to pass upon the claim of private respondents invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. . MARCOS G. 1 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City a petition for the re-opening of said proceeding to have them declared owners. that the lot in question should be a naval reservation. leased. filed under Civil Reservation Case No. 1929. 931. heretofore reserved for naval purposes .not have been the object of the cadastral proceeding involving the Baguio townsite reservation. then binding and conclusive as we were under American sovereignty." If there were still any lingering doubt. the Carantes heirs. and for the registration in their favor of four lots with a total area of 74.. The efforts exerted by the Director of Lands and the City of Baguio to appeal said decision did not prosper because respondent Judge because he believes that "the proper party to appeal should be Camp John Hay.. respondent Judge issued an order requiring the publication and posting of notices thereof. on November 9. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. as a report of an investigator of his office was that the area sought to be registered is inside Camp John Hay in Baguio City. It was not until August 22. 1968. For the power of the Court to order such reopening is limited "to such of said parcels of land as have not been alienated. or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government .

respondent Judge in that case was devoid "of jurisdiction to pass upon the claim of 148 . Commander of the Philippine Squadron. enacted as far back as 1903. under the circumstances hereinafter stated. 627 of the Philippine Commission and Section 1 of that Act provides that "All lands or buildings. Jose v. 1969. an earlier case of decisive significance was referred to: "What is even more conclusive as to the absence of any right on the part of the private respondents to seek a re-opening under Republic Act No." The validity of this statute was sustained as against the allegation that there was a violation of the due process clause. to wit: "subject to prior and existing private rights. or any interest therein. It must be noted that the location of the lot inside Camp John Hay is not a subject of dispute. a 1926 decision." ' " This Court could conclude therefore that as contended by petitioner Republic. in a cadastral case. and interests therein as shall not be determined to be public lands shall become registered land in accordance with the provisions of said Land Registration Act. Court of First Instance of Pampanga. or any interests therein. Such motion was denied by respondent Judge on December 8.. the respondent Judge in refusing to set aside his decision was impressed by the claim that the private respondents had been in possession "since the Spanish regime. The establishment of military reservations is governed by Act No. has jurisdiction to order the registration portions of a legally established military reservation cannot be sustained. As provided therein: "All lands or buildings. Apparently. within the Philippine Islands lying within the boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be military reservations shall be forthwith brought under the operations of the Land Registration Act.jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the proceedings as the land in question is part of a duly established military reservation." Finally. within the Philippine Islands lying within the boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be military reservations shall be forthwith brought under the operations of the Land Registration Act. buildings. We there explicitly held: "The defendant's contention that the respondent court." and thus came within the protection of the words annotated on all survey plans of Camp John Hay. 931 is our ruling in Government v. specifically governs the subject matter of reservations. Its historical background was next passed upon: "An earlier act." Issue: Is the land in dispute is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain? Ruling: Yes.. . and such of said lands. in a 1910 decision. .

M.The purpose of the case was to determine what portions of the Baguio Townsite Reservation were private and registerable under Act No.private respondents invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. or during the years 1972 to 1976. 496. a petition was filed regarding the Baguio Townsite Reservation (Case No.211). In 1922. petitioners filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio applications for the registration of lots inside the Baguio Townsite Reservation. the court required all persons claiming lots inside the reservation to file within six months from the date of the notice petitions for the registration of their titles under Act No. As held by Judge Belmonte in a 1973 case. FAÑGONIL G. L-57112 November 29. In 1915. 211. the judge refused to dismiss the applications because presentation of satisfactory evidence in a regular hearing as to the presence or absence of complete service of notice is needed. He concedes that lands within the Baguio Townsite Reservation may not be acquired by long possession for over thirty years subsequent to Case No. The 1922 decision established the rule that lots of the Baguio Townsite Reservation. 496. 496. then section 48 (b) and (c) of the Public Land Law should be applied because they and their predecessors have been in possession of the lots for more than thirty years. 496 and the Public Land Law. No. The Director of Lands opposed the applications. Villareal held that all lands within the Reservation are public lands with the exception of (1) lands reserved for specified public uses and (2) lands claimed and adjudicated as private property. in order to determine whether res judicata applies. being public domain. are not registerable under Act No. 931. 1984 Facts: In 1912. Judge C. no further registration proceeding would be allowed. the Baguio Court of First Instance "has no Jurisdiction to entertain any land registration proceedings" under Act No. prescription and res judicata. covering any lot within the Baguio Townsite Reservation. 496. Once so determined. They alleged that in case the lots are not registerable under Act No. However. The trial judge held that section 48 cannot be invoked by the applicants because it applies only to disposable agricultural lands situated outside the reservation. After more than half a century from the 1922 decision declaring the townsite public domain.R. Issue: 149 . He ruled that claims for private lands by all persons not presented for registration within the period fixed were barred forever." REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction.

contemplate notification to two classes of persons. Section 3 of Act No. 627 provides that the certificate of the clerk of court is "conclusive proof of service". known as old man Kiang (one name) who in turn inherited the same from his parents Quebec and Cawane. 211 was completely destroyed during the last war. 627. The Solicitor General is correct that after Case No. Contrary to the opinion of Judge Fangonil. who were in continuous possession of the land 150 . 496 on any purchase or grant from the State or on possession since time immemorial. No. Their right relative to the period within which they must respond are determined by the date of the personal service. 1915.Whether applications for the registration of lands could prosper in the absence of complete service of notice of the reservation received by the respondents. Moreover. the fact is that the notice in Case No. 211. and the six-month period does not begin to run until the notice is served upon them personally. Ruling: Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. SANGALANG G.R. The applicants have the burden of proving that their predecessors were living upon or in visible possession of the lands in 1915 and were not served any notice. (1) those who are living upon or in visible possession of any part of the military reservation and (2) persons who are not living upon or in visible possession but are absentees. L-58822 April 8. 627. It would give way to baseless litigations intended to be foreclosed by that 1912 case. 496 cannot apply to them. As to those who are living upon or in visible possession of the lands. That is why Act No. 211. namely. applications for the registration of lands could not be made because such would reopen Case No. The period of more than fifty years completely bars the applicants from securing relief due to the alleged lack of personal notice to their predecessors. The clerk of court certified that 134 persons living upon or in visible possession of any part of the reservation were personally served with notice of the reservation. it has always been necessary to issue Presidential proclamations for the disposition of portions of the Baguio Townsite Reservation. service is not complete. 1988 Facts: The subject property was inherited by the private respondents Kiangs from their father. 211 was issued on July 22. they are not "Igorot claimants". The eight applicants do not base their applications under Act No. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. the law governing military reservations. Such evidence cannot be produced at this time because the court record of Case No. The trial court erred in requiring the presentation of evidence as to the notice required under Act No. In the case at bar.

Marcos. Among those declared public lands were the lands applied for by old man Kiang which was dismissed by the court in said decision. Mountain Province. The Court of First Instance of Benquet. filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Banquet. that the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Banquet. the respondent Kiangs filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Banquet an application for registration under Act No. as amended. all lands within the limits of the Baguio Townsite Reservation were declared 'public lands' no longer registrable under the Land Registration Act.R. Within this site. of the parcels of land in question. 1 declared all lands comprised within the Baguio Townsite Reservation as public lands. Ruling: The decision of land registration court in Civil Reservation Case No. 146459 June 8. Marcos. Issue: Whether or not the court which awarded title do not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. CARIÑO G. with the exception of lands "reserved for specific public purposes and those claimed and adjudicated private property. Heald in connection 151 . with the exception of lands reserved for specific public purposes and those claimed and adjudicated private property. Kiang had it surveyed by the Bureau of Lands and filed an application for registration. Marcos rendered a decision adjudicating the aforesaid parcels of land in favor of the respondents.since the Spanish times. rendered a decision declaring as public lands all lands within the limits of the Baguio Townsite Reservation. therefore. It is clear. No. HEIRS OF DICMAN V. 3168. represented by the Solicitor General. presided over by Judge Pio R. 496. The decision of Judge Marcos was null and void ab initio for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter. docketed as Civil Case No. After 31 years." Outside of those lands specifically excepted from the effects of the decision. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines. 2006 Facts: The subject land had been part of the land claim of Mateo Cariño.C. The respondent court presided over by Judge Pio R. a sawmill and other buildings had been constructed by H. had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Land Registration Case and to render a decision awarding title to the land in question to the applicants Mariano Kiang et al. for the annulment of the decision of Judge Pio R.

Proclamation No.” and prohibiting any encumbrance or alienation of these claims for a period of 15 years from acquisition of patent. the land in controversy. On March 6. 1928. The application was given due course. The petition originated from an action for recovery of possession of the eastern half of a parcel of land situated in Residence Section "J". On May 23. The petition sought to establish ownership over Lot 76-A and Lot 76-B. 1955. The Estate of Sioco Cariño likewise filed an opposition. But as to Lot 76-B. H. the trial court rendered a partial judgment and confirmed that the title over Lot 76-A belonged to the heirs of Ting-el Dicman. 1963. but it cannot be construed as to prejudice vested rights. Heald sold the buildings to Sioco Cariño. on January 8. Camp Seven. Guzman Cariño. 1916. Sioco Cariño then took possession of the buildings and the land on which the buildings were situated. 628 reserved the subject land from Igorot claims? Ruling: Segregating and reserving certain Igorot claims and prohibiting encumbrance or alienation therein for 15 years from the grant of the patent is not applicable where vested interest are affected. On March 14. including one purportedly belonging to the “Heirs of Dicman. On January 10. Guzman Cariño filed a Free Patent Application over the land in question. Guzman Cariño opposed the petition insofar as he insisted ownership over Lot 76-B. Garcia issued Proclamation No. Meanwhile. the trial court found it necessary to hold further hearing in order to decide on the adverse claims of the parties. but Guzman later withdrew it when he decided to file his opposition to the petition later filed by the heirs of Ting-el Dicman. Garcia on January 8. Sioco Cariño sold the subject land to his son. 1960 had the effect of “segregating” and “reserving” certain Igorot claims identified therein. The executive 152 .C. 1960. all rights over the property in question had already been vested in private respondent. 628 issued by then President Carlos P. On October 22.with his lumber business.” Issue: Whether or not Proclamation No. The executive issuance can only go as far as to classify public land. 628 “excluding from the operation of the Baguio Townsite Reservation certain parcels of public land known as ‘Igorot Claims’ situated in the City of Baguio and declaring the same open to disposition under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Public Land Act. Ting-el Dicman executed a public instrument entitled "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" with Sioco Cariño. But by the time the Proclamation had been issued. while the foregoing petition was pending in the trial court. son of Mateo Cariño and grandfather of private respondent Jose Cariño. 1938. there having been no adverse claim. President Carlos P. Baguio City.

continuous. it also included certifications by the DENR that the said lands are alienable and disposable. 2001.2002. only Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor to the said application.applicatns for registration of title must sufficiently establish first. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents on May 2007. exclusive.Judicial Registration a. Said application is comprised of two parcels of land also located in Taguig. RTC found that the application for registration was sufficient in form and substance and scheduled an initial hearing which was published in the Official Gazette. On Dec. continuous. and third. Inc. On the other hand.R.50 m. REMMAN ENTERPRISES G.issuance can only go so far as to classify public land.50 meters are public lands which form part of the bed of the said lake.D. but it cannot be construed as to prejudice vested rights. that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain. LLDA pointed out that under RA 4850 it states that lands surrounding the Laguna de Bay. and notorious possession of the lands since June 12. applied for a judicial confirmation of title with the RTC of Taguig. that it is under bona fide claim of ownership since June 12. 31. The engineer for LLDA testified that upon aerial survey of the subject parcel of lands. a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The Court of Appeals 153 . May 30.second. exclusive. Under Section 14(1) of P.Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title i. NO. and the notice was posted in conspicuous places in the City Hall of Taguig. Likewise. which the engineer for the respondents rebutted. and notorious possession and occupation of the same. 1529. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. the Republic of the Philippines also opposed said registration since they claim that the respondents failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. LLDA avers that the subject lands are not alienable and disposable. that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open. Each party presented their respective witnesses. No. it was found out that the elevations of the lots were less thatn 12. located at and below the reglamentary elevation of 12. Respondents also presented documents supporting their claim over the subject parcel of lands. 1945 or earlier. Proceedings for registration of land A. or earlier. 199310 Facts: Respondent Remman Ent.1945.

the Supreme Court held that the respondents failed to present incontrovertible evidence to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable Furthermore. continuous. No. applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish: first. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect to public land acquired under Sect. Ruling: Under the Regalian doctrine. In the case at bar. sect.R. the second requisite was not also satisfied. No. No. exclusive. 157485 154 . and should be attested by the legal custodian of the official records. 1945. No. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision which granted the application for registration filed by the respondent. as the respondents only started paying taxes for the said properties in 2002 which is contrary to their claim that their predecessors-in-interest were already in possession of said lots in 1943. 14(1) of P. 14(1) of P. The original approved document signed by the DENR Secretary must also be presented. NATIONAL COLLEGES OF FISHERIES (ANCF) VS HEIRS OF MAXIMA LACHICA SIN G. 1529. They have presented certification from a proper government agency but failed to obtain an approval from the DENR Secretary that the land of public domain is released as alienable and disposable. second. 1945. or earlier. 141. Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open.D. that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open. as amended by P. The respondents failed to satify the above mentioned requisites. the respondent's application for registration was denied. 1073. all lands of the public domain belong to the State.D. exclusive. which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. or earlier. continuous. that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12.affirmed the decision of the lower court. that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain. or the Public Land Act.A. and notorious possession and occupation of the same since June 12. and third. NO. 48(b) of C.D. and notorious possession and occupation of the same. In addition. Under Sect.

which should be respected and protected. which respondents supposedly acquired by possession of the subject property. namely: (1) open. Maxima Sin acquired said bigger parcel of land by virtue of a Deed of Sale. for 30 years before it was declared as a timberland on December 22. Respondent heirs of Maxima Sin asserted that they were previously in possession of the disputed land in the concept of an owner. and (2) the classification of the land as 155 . for educational purposes of ANCF and that the subject parcel of land is timberland and therefore not susceptible of private ownership. To prove possession. the MCTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondents. banana plants. the earliest of which was in the year 1945. continuous. the respondent heirs presented evidence that they inherited a bigger parcel of land from their mother.0551 hectares of land within the area. and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12. Respondent heirs claim that a 41. creating a cloud of doubt with respect to their ownership over the parcel of land they wish to remove from the ANCF reservation. The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being claimed by respondents was the subject of Proclamation No. The MCTC thus ruled that the claim of respondent heirs over the disputed land by virtue of their and their predecessors’ open. respondents presented several tax declarations. 141. 2074 of then President Ferdinand E. The RTC affirmed the MCTC’s decision. aklan). and then developed the same by planting coconut trees. continuous. 1945 . exclusive. through their predecessors-in-interest. On June 19. mango trees and nipa palms and usufructing the produce of said land until her death in 1945. and declaration of ownership with damages.Facts: Respondent heirs instituted a complaint against the National College of fisheries (ANCF) in Kalibo. Marcos allocating 24. Ruling: The private right referred to is an alleged imperfect title. exclusive and notorious possession amounts to an imperfect title. Capiz (now Aklan). Issue: Whether or not the heirs of Maxima Lachica Sin acquired private rights by virtue of their possession to the disputed property so as to entitle them for the judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Maxima Sin. This Court has thus held that there are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. who died in the year 1945 in New Washington. for recovery of possession. 2000. 1960.231square meter-portion of the property they inherited had been usurped by ANCF. quieting of title.

Rosario. On the contrary. In the case at bar. HELD: The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners. 1988. 1987. ISSUE(S): Whether or not the remedy of petition for review of judgment exists or is warranted by Act No. and subsequently. Since respondents failed to do so. 2259 (Cadastral Act). 1938. Carlos vs RP FACTS: Petitioner Mercedes A. Garcia claims that she and her husband. it is therefore the respondents which have the burden to identify a positive act of the government. They subsequently sold it under a Pacto de Retro sale to co-petitioners Sps. Cirilo Mendoza. respondents cannot be considered to have private rights within the purview of Proclamation No. 38. Accordingly. their son. Accordingly.alienable and disposable land of the public domain. 496. The petitioners filed with the court a petition for review of judgment but denied. Dulcesimo Rosario and Violeta Reyes and Erlinda O. 2074 as to prevent the application of said proclamation to the subject property. in the case at bar. declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. 32080 in favor of Dominador G. the presumption is that unclassified lands are inalienable public lands. does not apply to a cadastral proceeding. 32080 located in San Carlos City. who then took possession of said lot. On February 23. Mendoza. Mendoza. donated the same to his son. inherited the property from Hermenegildo Mendoza. the alleged possession by them and by their predecessors-in-interest is inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership. Garcia claims that there was actual fraud because Mendoza falsely claimed that his father. Mendoza countered that a petition for relief from judgment under Sec. 1181 ( 4390) for lack of merit. Act 2259 clearly states that except as otherwise provided by the Cadastral Act. had purchased Lot No. the cadastral court issued a decision adjudicating Lot No. We are thus constrained to reverse the rulings of the courts a quo and grant the prayer of petitioner Republic to dismiss Civil Case No. Pangasinan on April 24. all the provision of the 156 . who had been in possession of the lot since October 15. Act No. that Mendoza made it appear that Lot 32080 was an exclusive property of Cirilo Mendoza. such as an official proclamation. Cirilo Mendoza. Sec. so they appealed. 11. the failure of petitioner Republic to show competent evidence that the subject land was declared a timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960 does not lead to the presumption that said land was alienable and disposable prior to said date.

1992. through her husband Ponciano Francisco. up to the present. the RCAM filed before the R TC. 1529 for confirmation and registration of imperfect title. No. Teresa Ramos. Issue: Who -between the RCAM and Cresencia -is entitled to the benefits of C.Land Registration Act are applicable to cadastral proceedings as well as to the decree and certificates of title granted and issued under the Cadastral Act. 1529 for confirmation and registration of imperfect title. filed her opposition to the RCAM's application.832 square meters). On August 18. 1966.) No. Taguig. public.A. No. 141 and Presidential Decree (P. that it acquired the property during the Spanish time. No.) No. the Court 157 .A. Rizal. 179181 Facts: At the core of the controversy in the present petition are two parcels of land – Lot 1 with an area of 34 square meters and Lot 2 with an area of 760 square meterscovered by amended Plan PSU-223919 property). the RCAM amended its application by reducing Lot 2 to 760 square meters (from 1. Ruling: Neither RCAM nor Cresencia is entitled to the benefitsof C. both located in what used to be Barrio Bagumbayan. it has been in open. continuous and peaceful possession of it in the concept of an owner. to support her requested confirmation of imperfect title.A. 141 (the Public Land Act). among others. an application for registration of title (application) of property. the RCAM claimed that it owned the property. In its amended application. 141 and Presidential Decree (P. On September 15..R. respondent Cresencia Sta. no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind affects the property. not fictional or constructive. Cresencia submitted documents.A. In Carlos v Republic of the Philippines. pursuant to Commonwealth Act C. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA VS CRESENCIA STA. during the Spanish time. on the property.) No. TERESA RAMOS G. and that no person has any claim. (then Court of First Instance of Rizal. She alleged that the property formed part of the entire property that her family owns and has continuously possessed and occupied from the time of her grandparents. a. Branch 11. acting as a land registration court. On October 4. legal or equitable.D. and that since then.D. It added that to the best of its knowledge and belief. 1974. 141 is actual. No. The RC M failed to prove possession of the property in the manner and for the period required by law The possession contemplated by Section 48(b) of C.

open. as follows: The law speaks of possession and occupation. the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify. Taken together with the words open. to prove its compliance with Section 48(b)' s possession requirement. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. To our mind." the RCAM used to describe its alleged possession. and in concept of owner. public. hardly constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible evidence required in cases of this nature. continuous. the CA erred when it affirmed the contrary findings of the RTC and confirmed Cresencia’s title over the property. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. therefore. the RCAM failed to show or point to any specific act characterizing its claimed possession in the manner described above. unbroken and not intermittent or occasional. confirmation and registration of title over the property in Cresencia' s name was still improper in the absence of competent and persuasive 158 . which we do not. When. Proof of actual possession of the property at the time of the filing of the application is required because the phrase adverse. and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. At any rate. No. visible. The various documents that it submitted.explained the character of the required possession. the law adds the word occupation. continuous. thus. we also find insufficient the evidence that Cresencia presented to prove her claimed possession of the property in the manner and for the period required by C. exclusive when [the possession is characterized by acts manifesting] exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to [the applicant's] own use and benefit. 141. Under the same legal parameters we used to affirm the RTC's denial of the RCAM' s application. exclusive and notorious possession of the property. Like the RCAM. apparent [and] notorious x x x continuous when uninterrupted. Accordingly." Very noticeably. it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. as well as the bare assertions it made and those of its witnesses. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and. that it had been in open.not an allegation of fact. Possession is open when it is patent. We elaborate below on these points. even if we were to consider these pieces of evidence to be sufficient. she also failed to discharge this burden of proof. exclusive and notorious. the RCAM had to show that it performed specific overt acts in the character an owner would naturally exercise over his own property. his possession must not be a mere fiction.A. is a conclusion of law. Cresencia was bound to adduce evidence that irrefutably proves her compliance with the requirements for confirmation of title. continuous.

Prior to the CA’s decision. The petitioner had a valid title. 86018 as well as the proceedings in LRC GLRO Cad. except if the owner still holds a valid and existing certificate of title covering the same property. it never handed or delivered to anyone its owner's duplicate of the transfer certificate of title. 75643 against the spouses Cue for the annulment of the mortgage with preliminary injunction. He forged a simulated deed of sale of the realties in his favor. The trial court declared that Mota’s title is void but CA reversed it. and paying the real estate taxes. Fernandez failed to pay his various loans which prompted the Cues to institute an extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. 105953. ISSUE: Whether a forged sale may be the root of a valid title. Fernandez filed Civil Case No. He was and still in possession of the realties. 53628 was lost. The subject realties were then levied upon and sold at public auction where Rosario Mota was the highest bidder. 53628 issued in his name) is owned by Torres. Del Rosario-Igtiben vs RP GR 158499 FACTS: The land erected with a building (TCT No.evidence on record proving that the property is alienable and disposable. Francisco Fernandez. No. 133. HELD: Yes. Torres filed a complaint to restrain Mota from collecting rentals and for the declaration as void TCT No. obtained another copy of the certificate. and also to Angela Fermin. Mota was issued the title. and collecting rentals from tenants occupying the building. He mortgaged the same to Rosario Mota. wife of Ernesto Cue. Fernandez failed to comply with his obligation under the amicable settlement and the Cues were granted a writ of execution. Torres filed civil case against Fernandez to annul TCT No. Rec. holding safely to his owner's duplicate certificate of title. It never parted with it. The claim of indefeasibility under the Torrens land title system would be correct if previous valid title to the same parcel of land did not exist. The trial court ruled that Torres is the true and legal evidence of ownership of the subject immovable which was affirmed by the CA. Torres' brother-in-law. misrepresenting to be the attorney-infact of Torres and falsely alleging that the duplicate copy of TCT No. The redemption period for the property having lapsed without Fernandez nor Torres redeeming the properties. it could not be charged with negligence 159 . who later assigned her credit to the spouses Cue.

Inc. As he had no title to the parcel of land. Whether or not the land is already a private land.R. Donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela IAC affirmed CFI in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. If the respondent's contention as to indefeasibility of his title should be upheld. an application therefore is sufficient. Whether or not the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations applies. that Mota was an innocent mortgagee would be futile because no certificate of title covering the realties in derogation of Torres' certificate of title may validly be issued. Isabela.Possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan.Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. by operation of law not only a right to a grant. for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts. Already acquired. but a grant of the Government. in the same way that a thief does not own or have title to the stolen goods. Rodolfo Nazario. To hold. REPUBLIC VS IAC AND ACME G. YES.in the keeping of its duplicate certificate of title or with any act which could have brought about the issuance of another certificate upon which a purchaser in good faith and for value could rely. NO. Inc. has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements. Such disastrous results which would shake and destroy the stability of land titles had not been foreseen by those who had endowed with indefeasibility land titles issued under the Torrens system. 2. acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel. It had already ceased to be of the public domain and had 160 . Ruling: 1.. then registered owners without the least fault on their part could be divested of their title and deprived of their property. represented by Mr.. for the purpose of enforcing the mortgage. members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land. he could not transmit title which he did not have nor possess. Inc Issues: 1.. Fernandez perpetrated the fraud by making false representations in his petition and the title issued to him being the product of fraud could not vest him valid and legal title to the parcel of land in litigation.Ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon. 73002 Facts: Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. a corp..Land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands. whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine that open. hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1. Metro Manila on December 4. 1979. DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS MERALCO G. Inc. it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition. No. The effect of the proof.become private property. ceases to be public land and becomes private property. etc. wherever made. Applicant's predecessors-in-interest have possessed the property under the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. 146 SCRA 509. 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners.R. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire. The application for confirmation is mere formality. After comments were filed by the respondents. but simply to establish it. exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land. The legal issue raised by the petitioner Director of Lands has been squarely dealt with in two recent cases (The Director of Lands v. The property was declared for taxation purposes under the name of the applicant and the taxes due thereon have been paid.. NO. 1986). On May 29. if not by earlier law 2. at least by presumption. 1981 respondent Judge rendered a decision ordering the registration of the property in the name of the private respondent. Ruling: 161 ..024 hectares. No. was not to confer title.. If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infields had a legally sufficient and transferable title On October 29. upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction. 1976. applicant acquired the land applied for registration by purchase from Ricardo Natividad who in turn acquired the same from his father Gregorio Natividad as evidenced by a Deed of Original Absolute Sale executed on December 28. the Court gave the petition due course. as already conferred by the decree. The Director of Lands interposed this petition raising the issue of whether or not a corporation may apply for registration of title to land. Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. 1970. L-57461 Facts: Manila Electric Company filed an amended application for registration of a parcel of land located in Taguig. L73002 (December 29. On August 17.

Art. assigning thereto that :the holding that plaintiff is entitled to recover the possession of said parcel of land. with the costs against Angela Razon. and (d) sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as damages. contends that a corporation is not among those that may apply for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. (c) ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to said Angela Razon. (b) annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon. See. and the ordering that the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds of the Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be cancelled.R. praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land described in the second paragraph of the complaint. if the land was already private at the time Meralco bought it from Natividad. 11) does not apply..For his answer to the complaint. on the ground that the land is a private property. annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon. the fact that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by a corporation is simply another accidental circumstance. the CFI of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring Susi entitled to the possession of the land. As ruled in the Acme case. which was made in accordance with law. the annulment of the sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela Razon. 141. alleged that the land in question was a property of the Government of the United States under the administration and control of the Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela Razon. however. XIV. From this judgment the Director of Lands took this appeal.NO. the Director of Lands denied each allegation contained therein and. Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in 162 . and The evidence shows that on December 18. and ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her." Considering that it is not disputed that the Natividads could have had their title confirmed.In the case at bar. as special defense. with the costs. 1880.After trial. "productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in no wise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings. the Public Land Act. SUSI VS RAZON G. Petitioner. only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny private respondent the right to register its property which was validly acquired. then the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against corporations holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease (1973 Const. 24066 Facts: This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga by a complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the Director of Lands.

reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit A). 1914. 1921. tho Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12. first. adversely. When on August 15. she brought and action for forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court of Guagua. continuous. except when Angela Razon. Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and through his predecessors for thirty-four years. September 5. and then by Valentin Susi has been open. after considering the evidence introduced at the trial. Pampanga. The possession and occupation of the land in question. or disturbance. on September 13. Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in question through the court. with the proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the price of the property.question. Having learned of said application. Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question. Before the execution of the deed of sale. asserting his possession of the land for twenty-five years. After making the proper administrative investigation. and as he refused to do so. the plaintiffappellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession. Ruling: It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in question openly. adverse and public. 1914. dismissing the complaint. Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15. except during the revolution. 1915. by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza. for about forty-five years. and publicly. without any interruption. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond when he sold it on December 18. continuously. On August 31. Armed with said document. since the year 1880. personally and through his predecessors. 1913. availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon. the court rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon. 1899. Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land. Issue: Whether or not the land in question being of the public domain. it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and 163 . 1880. the register of deeds issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon. yet it is controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in possession thereof. sold it to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12. reserving the right to repurchase the same. commenced an action in the CFI of Pampanga to recover the possession of said land. the Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon. that is. which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. then a fish pond. the case being one of title to real property. While the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands. Valentin Susi then brought this action. Valentin Susi filed and opposition thereto on December 6. Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said land.

The Republic. 3946 of the Currimao Cadastre was surveyed and consisted of 4. beyond the control of the Director of Lands. NO. Saturnino Sacayanan. 180067 Facts: On November 19. Manalo. the essential requisites for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title over the subject lot have been complied with. Badanguio in 1954 then declared the entire bigger lot he purchased from Sabuco for tax purposes and was issued TD 006114. Sabuco sold the bigger lot to Bernardo Badanguio less the small portion where the INC chapel was built. REPUBLIC VS IGLESIA NI CRISTO G. the Geodetic Engineer’s Certificate. and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC). and the September 7. The MCTC found and appreciated the continuous possession by INC of the subject lot for over 40 years after its acquisition of the lot. Subject Lot No. as corporate sole. were never disturbed in their possession of the portions they sold to INC constituting the subject lot. The cadastral court held that based on documentary and testimonial evidence. Badanguio also sold a small portion of the bigger lot to INC for which a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on January 8. represented by Eraño G. Tax Declaration. In February 23. at least by presumption. the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control. It noted that Badanguio and Sabuco. the period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory. 1959. of Valentin Susi.R. testified to the sale by Sabuco and the erection of the small chapel by INC in1952. Subsequently. Consequently. 1952. Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State. in selling the land in question to Angela Razon.201 square meters. who was born in 1941 and became a member of INC in 1948. 1970 Deed of Sale executed by Bernardo Bandaguio in favor of INC. and the sale thus made was void and of no effect. Sabuco sold a small portion of the bigger lot to INC which built a chapel on the lot. it had already ceased to be the public domain and had become private property. through the OSG appeared and filed an Opposition to INC’s application. the predecessors-in-interest of INC. filed its Application for Registration of Title before the MCTC in Paoay-Currimao. Appended to the application were the sepia or tracing cloth and technical description of subject lot. 1998. CA affirmed the lower court decision PALAWAN AGRICULTURAL AND INDUCTRIAL COMPANY VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS 164 .occupy it.In 1959.

As such sales applicant. therefore. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands under a bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership. Momentarily. L-25914 Facts: On April of 1920. Subsequently. is not the possession and occupation contemplated by the present law on this matter (Subsection [b]. justified in concluding that applicant possession was not that of an owner. it was again set to be sold at a public bidding but was again postponed because the company asked for reappraisal of the value given by the Director of lands. Of Agriculture and Commerce an appraisal of P18. however.R. as the trial court had aptly observed:In the mind of the Court. If confirmation or registration of title can be done. the Director of Lands issued a notice of auction setting the date of bidding for Feb. Ruling: No. Again. 1942). the Palawan Agricultural and Industrial Company. The trial court was. 141 as amended by Republic Act No. Since the time. as it is being done now by the applicant company.00/ha. Thus. the applicant took possession of the land and improved portion thereof. he asked this court that the land be declared in favour of him as he was in an open. planting coconuts and other crops. to which the application was submitted. On December of 1930. the Palawan Company requested the director of Land to reduce the area applied for because the portion it originally applied for were squatted and claimed by others. Inc. After 4 years. the possession and occupation by the applicant company of the land sought to be registered. If this were the case. there will be many instances where the government will be defrauded.The appellant’s possession of the land in question was merely that of a sales applicant thereof. appellant manifestly acknowledged that he does not own the land and that the same is a public land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands. it issued a letter advising Palawan Company to recommend to the Sec. Palawan which was given due course by the Bureau of Lands. Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 1935 at Puerto Princesa. 27. continous. it did not take place as the applicant requested for postponement. a possessor and 165 . in view of the Director of lands that it be cancelled for lack of interest of the said company. as required by law.G. No. to whom it had not been awarded because of its refusal to pay the price fixed therefore by the Bureau of Lands. Subsequently. the applicant prayed that its Sales Application be not cancelled. (Palawan Company) Filed a sales application over a parcel of public land located in Aborlan. Issue: Whether or not a sales applicant can file a registration of the same land covered by his sales application.

1529 requires publication of the notice of initial hearing. our legislators would have been a party to an act of defrauding our government . Being in rem.The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. including the state. who have rights to or interests in the property.occupant of a public agricultural land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands who has applied for the purchase of the same will just sit on his right. Such situation is not the one contemplated by our legislators when they passed Republic Act No. for had it been their intention. 1529. Exception: Successor who acquired by prescription a land previously subject to free patent application of his predecessor-in-interest may file registration. will abandon his sales application and convert it to an application for judicial confirmation or registration of title. and then after a lapse of 30 years. 1942.. the process must strictly be complied with. Issue: Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory.) No. The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to the Supreme Court. set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. pay the corresponding taxes religiously and consistently. declare the same for taxation purposes.D. Ruling: YES. It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. 166 . making the application pending for more than 30 years while he possesses and occupies the land. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. DIRECTOR OF LAND MANAGEMENT VS CA 205 SCRA 486 Facts: Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (P. in compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. The land registration court in its decision dated June 13. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. Petition was granted. such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons. The case was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals which. The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. 1989 dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction”. This being so.. .

No. Thus. antichresis. the mortgagor. Oppositors appealed contending that the land applied for was originally owned by Basilia Beltran's parents. Apolonio. relied on his belief that the property belongs to his father who bought the same from Basilia Beltran. vacillation or equivocation. although the mortgage document evidencing the loan was non-registrable being a purely private instrument. Francisco Sierra and Emilio Sierra together with Alejandra. Issue: Whether the land was mortgaged or a subject to conditional sale Ruling: The Suprem Court held that the applicant's predecessor-in-interest is a mere mortgagee. or pactum commission and not as an absolute sale or pacto de retro sale. borrowed from applicant's father. Felimon. manifest that the document should be treated as a mortgage. in seeking the registration of the land.The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. a widow.. There is no alternative." "Kahit isangla o ipagbili. Vicente Reyes. Applicant. provided that the title to be issued shall be subject to a public easement of right of-way over a 2." etc. there is no room for interpretation. Oppositors contended that the words "isinangla. however. The act of applicant in 167 .00 meter-wide strip of the land along Lucay Street for the latter's widening and improvement. the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future. which would grant the latter the right to appropriate the thing mortgaged or dispose of it. this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language. Sr. Constancio.00 and secured the loan with the piece of land in question. all surnamed Sierra and Antonia Santos. The trial court declares Vicente Reyes the true and rightful owner of the land and orders the registration of his title. and upon their death in 1894. the amount of P100. and ownership of the thing mortgaged is retained by Basilia Beltran. Basilia Beltran. Failure of mortgagor to redeem the property does not automatically vest ownership of the property to the mortgagee. An opposition was filed by the Director of Lands. Aurelio. On April 19. 1961 an application for registration of his title to a parcel of land situated in Antipolo. Basilia inherited the property." "na ipananagutan sa inutang na halagang isang daang piso.R. REYES VS SIERRA G. Time and again. 1926. Rizal covered by Plan Psu-189753 of the Bureau of Lands which he acquired by inheritance from his father. there is room only for application. Cirilo. L-28658 Facts: Vicente Reyes filed on January 3. after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with. The mortgagee. may recover the loan.

They alleged. Finding the claims of the herein respondents sustained by the evidence. 2273 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the names of herein petitioners and the issuance in lieu thereof of another original certificate of title in the names of herein respondents. Las Pinas Rizal. In their answer.A. RAMIREZ VS C. mortgaged it to the spouses Ramirez to secure the payment of a loan in the amount of P400. the private respondents filed a petition to review the decree of registration on the ground of fraud. 144 SCRA 292 Facts: On September 15. and that the respondents took possession of the land as owners after the death of Agapita Bonifacio and in 1938. Issue: Whether or not an antichretic creditor can acquire by prescription the land surrendered to him by the debtor. the court found that the deeds of sale were spurious. 1960. 8777 was cancelled and substituted by Tax Declaration Nos. Tax Declaration No. 1937 which they allegedly found accidentally in March 1960. On March 30. and pay the land taxes thereon. 9522 and 2385 issued in the names of the petitioners. petitioners-spouses Hilario Ramirez and Valentina Bonifacio filed an application for registration of a parcel of Riceland in Pamplona.00 plus interest at the rate of six per cent (6%) per annum from April 19.1959. enjoy its fruits. Meanwhile. After trial. the court ordered the issuance of OCT No. 1926 until paid. Thereafter. among others. The petitioners presented parol evidence that they acquired the land in question by purchase from Gregorio Pascual during the early part of the American regime but the corresponding contract of sale was lost and no copy or record of the same was available. the debt in the amount of P100.registering the property in his own name upon mortgagor's failure to redeem the property would amount to a pactum commissorium which is against good morals and public policy. oppositors-appellants are directed to pay the applicant.00 from the petitioners which they secured with a mortgage on the land in question by way of antichresis and that for this reason. they based their claim to the land on two deeds of sale allegedly executed on April 15. it ordered the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. that in 1938 respondents obtained a loan of P400.appellee within ninety (90) days from the finality of decision. It was agreed that the respondents could not redeem the property within a period of five years and that the petitioners would take possession of the land.00. 168 . 2273 in the petitioners’ names. the spouses Ramirez denied the material allegations of the petition. 1937 and April 23.

00. to annul the declarations of location of certain mineral claims of the Baguio Gold Mining Company.The petition alleged that 'the applicants Hilario Ramirez and Valentina Bonifacio willfully and fraudulently suppressed the facts that the petitioners are the legal and rightful owners of the rice field in question and that they possess the said rice field merely as antichretic creditors as security for the loan of P400.' These we believe are sufficient allegations of extrinsic fraud. In the applicant's application for registration. in the case at bar. asked for dismissal of the action and damages. the Court of First Instance found that the plaintiffs Cayapa. legal or equitable. claiming title by virtue of valid locations of the claims since 1925 to 1930. de Lampacan sued the Baguio Gold Mining Company and the Director of Mines in the Court of First Instance of Baguio City (Civil Cases Nos. 458. Waldo Kidpalos. as We have found. 457.' This allegation is false and made in bad faith. which followed the form required by the Land Registration Act. for. the latter 169 . KIDPALOS VS BAGUIO MINING 14 SCRA 913 Facts: The fact is uncontroverted that on August 31. that no other person had any claim or interest in the said land. that the applicants are guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment when they declared in their application. seeking judgment declaring said plaintiffs to be the owners of certain parcels of land situated in sitio Binanga Barrio of Tuding.. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA-G. there is no mortgage or incumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting said land. No. 19628-R to 19632-R). remainder. Benguet. Mountain Province. nor any other person having any estate or interest therein. The Court of Appeals stated:.R. Fernandez Kidpalos. the applicants alleged that 'to the best of our knowledge and belief. overlapping the parcels claimed by plaintiffs. After due trial. The Court ruled that the issue was submitted to the appellate court and was correctly resolved therein. reversion or expectancy.. in possession. and Ipang Lebos Vda. 460. et al. and to have the mine buildings erected on the land in question demolished at the latter's expense.. Municipality of Itogon. had failed to substantiate their claims of ownership and dismissed the suits. and to recover damages from the Company.Ruling: NO. Nabos Valenciano. 463 and 549). 1954. The defendant Baguio Gold Mining Company. the applicants are not the owners of the land sought to be registered and they are in possession thereof only as antichretic creditors. Maglia Cayapa. The complaint also sought to enjoin the Director of Mines from proceeding with the lode patent applications of The Mining Company.

The 1960 Supreme Court resolution in L-16649-53 having become final. The latter dismissed the applications. 1958. Neither is it disputable that the causes of action in both cases are identical. Hawley. it cannot be again litigated between the same parties without virtually impeaching the correctness of the former decision. Ruling: The appealed order of dismissal of these proceedings on the ground of res judicata is affirmed. Baguio Gold opposed the registration. from motives 170 . Rep. plaintiffs had filed in Court the present registration cases. or that the parties are the same. Metzger. It thus appears that appellants do not dispute that the subject matter in the present registration proceedings is the same land involved in the previous litigation. 326. Or. it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties.. 30 Kan. and moved to dismiss the applications. they are as conclusive as the judgment itself. 97.rendered judgment. While the former cases were reivindicatory in character and the ones presently before us are land registration proceedings. When a fact has been once determined in the course of a judicial proceeding. 26 Am. While the cases were still pending appeal before the Court of Appeals. without which multiplicity of actions will be unavoidable. which. on July 31.. 99-100: . Issue: Whether or not once previously threshed out and finally adjudicated should no longer be relitigated between the same parties on the same subject matter and cause of action. if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter. and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises. . since in both the appellants asserted that they are the sole and exclusive owners of the land in dispute. and a final judgment has been rendered in accordance therewith. as stated in Redden vs. The substance of res judicata. and the applicants then directly appealed to this Supreme Court. and that it formed part of the Public domain. finding that the land lay within the Cordillera Forest Reservation proclaimed by Governor General Stimson. allegedly invaded by appellee Baguio Gold Mining Company. St. the oppositor Baguio Gold Mining Company reiterated its motions to dismiss the registration cases in the Court of First Instance. such difference in forms of action are irrelevant for the purposes of res judicata. Hence the doctrine is that — Under this rule. The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is compulsive on the parties as to all points directly involved in it and necessarily determined. The rule of res adjudicata applies as well to facts settled and adjudicated as to causes of action: Whitaker v.

580. the sum of P50. Romulo A. or the groundwork upon which it must have been founded. It is allowable to reason back from a judgment to the basis on which it stands. 119627 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. 1985.of public policy.240.00 in the bank in trust for Ramona Patricia Alcaraz. BALAIS-MABANAG VS REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY G. 1985.00. So the Coronels rescinded their contract with Ramona by depositing her down payment of P50. NO. which denied her petition for review for being filed out of time and denied the MR.000. 1989. Acting on the respondents’ motion for execution. the Coronels sold the property covered by TCT No. and ordered the RTC of Quezon City to execute the deed of absolute sale in favor of Ramona in lieu of the defendants. upon the obvious principle that where a conclusion is indisputable. stipulating that they received from respondent Ramona through her mother. 153142 Facts: On January 19.. respondent Concepcion D.000. Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration. Thereafter. the law does not permit to be done The estoppel is not confined to the judgment. the RTC approved the respondents’motion for appointment of suitable person to execute deed. as well as the counterclaims of defendants and intervenors are dismissed. 1985. which the RTC denied.00 as down payment on the total purchase price of P1.” On February 18. but extend to all facts involved in it as necessary steps. So the petitioner and Coronels filed in the CA a petition for certiorari assailing the RTC’s orders but the CA dismissed the petition but they presented their MR in the CA. the premises are equally indisputable with the conclusion. On March 1.000. On February 22. Concepcion filed a complaint for specific performance and damages in her own name in the RTC in Quezon City against the Coronels. the RTC rendered its decision ordering defendant to execute in favor of plaintiffs a deed of absolute sale and the plaintiffs’ claim for damages and attorney’s fees. After the RTC granted the respondents’ pending 171 . The petitioner thus appealed to the Court.00 for their “inherited house and lot. 327043 to the petitioner for the higher price ofP1. Upon failure to comply with the writ of execution. the RTC issued a writ of execution but the petitioner and the Coronels filed their motion to stay execution and supplemental motion for reconsideration.R. the CA denied the MR. the Coronels and the petitioner appealed to the CA but was denied hence they appealed the CA judgment to SC but affirmed the CA decision. and could have been drawn only from certain premises. covered by TCT No. Ultimately. the respondents moved in the RTC for the resolution of their pending motion. Alcaraz. Coronel and other Coronels executed a document entitled receipt of down payment. etc.000.

R. 1999. The issue of citizenship of the registered owner of land cannot anymore be raised to forestall the execution of a final and executory judgment where the objecting party had the opportunity to raise the issue prior to the finality of the judgment. the petitioner filed a MR against such order. NO. but the RTC denied her motion on September 23. Apart from presenting documentary evidence. The application was raffled to the RTC Cavite-Tagaytay City. Ruling: The petition lacks merit. notorious. as plaintiff. when the final decision of the RTC is already being implemented. 1999. The OSG duly designated the Jose Velazco. 179987 Facts: On 20 February 1998. Malabanan himself and his witness. despite the petitioner’s opportunity to do so. who testified that the 172 . Jr. 1985.motion on July 29. not during the execution of a final decision. The petitioner’s move was outrightly unwarranted. to appear on behalf of the State. the petitioner would thwart the execution by assailing the directive of the RTC for the Branch Clerk of Court to execute the deed of absolute sale and by blocking the registration of the deed of absolute sale in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the registration by the Registrar of Deeds of the deed of absolute sale despite the lack of indication of the citizenship of the buyer of the subject property. Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land in Silang Cavite. respondent Concepcion. In the complaint dated February 22. categorically averred that she was a Filipino citizen. The petitioner did not deny or disprove the averment of Filipino citizenship during the trial and on appeal. The time for assailing the capacity of the winning party to acquire the land was during the trial. now. and that he and his predecessors-ininterest had been in open. Aristedes Velazco. MALABANAN VS REPUBLIC G. Yet. and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty years. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco. on the ground that Ramona was disqualified from owning land in the Philippines. The petitioner did not also advert to the issue of citizenship after the complaint was amended in order to implead Ramona as a co-plaintiff.

Ebio. Mario Ebio secured building permits from the Parañaque municipal office for the construction of their house within the land. Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. On April 21.property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather. it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. Jose Vitalez. Thus. Lino Velazco. respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro’s daughter. From then on. 1987. CITY MAYOR OF PARANAQUE VS EBIO G. in 1961. 08. Respondents immediately opposed and the project was suspended. Meanwhile. 178411 Facts: Respondents claim to be absolute owners of A 406 square meters parcel of land located in Parañaque City covered by Tax Declarations in the name of respondent Mario D. In April 1964 and in October 1971. The proposed road will run from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez Compound traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. Pedro was able to obtain a tax declaration over the said property in his name. in 1930. In 1966. On March 30. according to their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in particular —is to the year 1948.R. conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence. which was given to his son. 173 . after executing an affidavit declaring possession and occupancy. NO. the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No. Pedro Valdez. Issue: Whether or not petitioners can register the subject land under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both Ruling: No. Thus. Pedro transferred his rights over the land in favor of Ebio. Zenaida. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Pedro continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. Respondents assert that the original occupant and possessor land was their great grandfather. series of 1990 seeking assistance from the City Government of Parañaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay. 1999. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek.

563 SCRA 413 (2008) Facts: As early as 1948. while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion. streams. in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code. there can be no prescription against the State regarding property of public domain. No matter how long the possession of the properties has been. otherwise. respondents went to the RTC of Parañaque City on April 21. the land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear provision of law. Even a city or municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as against the State. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. or be physically evicted from the said property. the City Administrator sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days. 2005. respondents were surprised when several officials from the barangay and the city planning office proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees planted on the said lot. This being the case. Threatened of being evicted. rivers. The request remained unheeded. the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons. the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Crispin Leaban had already declared the subject property for taxation purposes under his name.In January 2003. DILOY GR NO. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system. ART. however. properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof. 174633. 84. Issue: Whether or not the State may build on the land in question Ruling: It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. 2005 and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners. He was then succeeded by his son. belong to the owners of such lands. Eusebio 174 . Hence. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks. In contrast. and lakes. Art. which remains in effect. Respondents sent a reply.On March 28. REPUBLIC vs. 26 August 2008. asserting their claim over the subject property and expressing intent for a further dialogue.

respondent presented her father. The said Motion for Reconsideration was denied. declared the same for taxation purposes under her name. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).Leaban. in 1974. In 1997. continuous. Diloy. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal of the Republic. any occupation or possession thereof could not be considered in the counting of the 30-year possession requirement. Aggrieved. open. The MCTC rendered a Decision dated 5 May 1999 in favor of the respondent. because during those periods. and Armando Ramos as witnesses to strengthen her claim that her predecessors-in-interest had been in actual. by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale. Prior to its declaration as alienable land in 1982. in turn. I is beyond question that the subject property was already an alienable and disposable land at the time the Application for Registration of Title over the same was filed by the respondent. On 15 June 1979. The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the respondent failed to prove her possession as required under Presidential Decree No. Neither can her possession of the subject property be tacked to that of her predecessors-in-interest. the subject property was then conveyed by Pacencia Leaban to her daughter. Issue: Whether the respondent has acquired a registrable title. The period of possession by the respondent of the subject property cannot be considered to have started in 1979. notorious and adverse possession of the subject property. who. when the same was conveyed to her by her mother. Pacencia Leaban. Thereafter. respondent Gregoria L. the subject property became alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982. however. During the hearing of the Application for Registration of Title. Any period of possession prior to the date when the subject lot was classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the 175 . who also filed for taxation purposes in his name from the period covering the years 1951-1969. on behalf of the Republic. 1529. the subject property was transferred to Eusebio Leaban’s daughter. Hence. the subject property had not yet been classified as alienable and disposable land capable of private appropriation. However. this Petition. filed an Opposition to the Application for Registration of Title. even if they had occupied and were in possession of the same since 1948. Rustico Diloy. granting her application for registration over the subject property. Diloy filed an Application for Registration of Title over the subject property. Subsequently. the Republic filed a motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision which was likewise denied. Held: No. herein respondent Gregoria L. the Republic appealed the Decision of the MCTC to the Court of Appeals.

the CFI dismissed the complaints and upheld the validity of the titles/patents of de Porkan & Macatindog over the lands in dispute. 1099 alleging among others that the patentees secured their patents and titles through fraud. Held: Yes. An issue over said lots arose when a certain Viola Azurin obtained from the then Philippine Fisheries Commission an Ordinary Fishpond Permit covering portions of Lots Nos. the respondent was in possession of the same for only 15 years. From 1982 up to 1997. REPUBLIC vs. Azurin filed with the Bureau of Lands a complaint for correction. when the case was brought to the Court of First Instance. misrepresentation and illegal machinations. the SG stated that the disputed portions of land were actually claimed by Azurin and that such lands could not be disposed by the Director of Lands under the Public Land Act. Issue: Whether possession and cultivation of a land for more than 30 years will entitle the possessor thereof of a government grant and a certificate of title. Such possession can never ripen into ownership and. exclusive and undisputed possession for more than 30years. the year the respondent filed an Application for Registration of Title over the subject property. The Solicitor General sided with Azurin. certified as such as more suitable for fishpond development. 1099 and 1546 from their predecessors-interests. After hearing however. the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto. Hence. Petition is granted. amendment or cancellation of the Homestead Patent of De Porkan over Lot no. the respondents had already acquired by operation of law 176 . open. 151 SCRA 88 Facts: Minda de Porkan and Lolita Macatindog acquired Lots Nos. As early as 1953. which was short of another 15 years from the 30-yearperiod possession requirement. The SG in the present petition avers among others that the lots in dispute could not be the subject of disposition under the Homestead and Free Patent provisions of the Public Act since they are marshy and swampy. disposable only thru lease under the Public Land Act. unless the land has been classified as alienable and disposable. 1987.computation of the period of possession. 1099 and 1546. 1546 and the Free Patent of Macatindog over Lot No. who in turn acquired said lots though a grant by the government by virtue of their proven. DE PORKAN June 18. the patents and titles issued to de Porkan and Macatindog were void insofar as the portion occupied and covered by the fishpond permit of Azurin.

not only a right to a grant over Lot No. After due notice and publication. 892. Ong (petitioner) in his behalf and as duly authorized representative of his brothers. 175746 March 12. continuous. No. The possession of a public land identified as Lot No. They alleged that they are the co-owners of the subject lot. 1099 dates back to the time of the Spanish colonial period. Alberto and Cesar. The same parcel of land has been declared in the name of the applicant and her predecessors-in-interest and its taxes has been 177 . 141. Respondent asserted that neither applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. that the subject lot is their exclusive property having acquired the same by purchase from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24. that the tax declaration appended to the application does not appear genuine and merely shows pretended possession of recent vintage. open. 1099. On January 16. represented by the Office of the Solicitor General. the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner and his brothers and orders the registration of the said parcel of land stating that evidences presented by the applicant indubitably established sufficient basis to grant the applicant for registration. opposed the application for registration of title. CHARLES L. that the subject lot is presently unoccupied. that applicants failed to adduce any muniment of title to prove their claims.) No. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.D. 2008 Facts: On July 1. petitioner Charles L. 1073. but a grant of the Government over the same alienable land by virtue of their proven. only respondent Republic of the Philippines (respondent). and that the subject lot is part of the public domain which cannot be the subject of private appropriation. Pangasinan with an area of five hundred seventy four (574) square meters. 1998. Roberto. and that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. ONG vs. that the application was filed beyond the period allowed under P. 2002. as amended by Presidential Decree (P. more or less. 1999. 1945 or earlier as required by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No.D. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12. exclusive and undisputed possession for more than 30 years. the land ceases to be public and thus becomes a private land. namely. since the Spanish colonial period. By legal fiction. Such possessions of the said public land has attained the character and duration prescribed by law as the equivalent of an express grant from the Government. Mangaldan.R. continuous and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years. No. The mandate of the law itself provides that possessors “shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title”. filed an Application for Registration of Title over Lot 15911 (subject lot) situated in Barangay Anolid.

Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. continuous. In reversing the decision of the trial court. continuous. DOMINADOR MANGCAO. Taken together with the words open. it seeks to delimit all encompassing effect of constructive possession.THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS. applicants for registration of title must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain.religiously paid. ET AL. It noted that the earliest tax declaration which petitioner presented is dated 1971. respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove that they possessed the subject lot in the nature and for the duration required by law. As held in Republic v. Consequently. the Court of Appeals found that the subject lot is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Alconaba: The law speaks of possession and occupation. JOHN M. Held: Pursuant to Section 14(1) of P. or earlier. Aggrieved. vs. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. 1999. therefore. his possession must not be a mere fiction. and (2) that they have been in open. 1529. ARTURO DE LA CRUZ. 1945.D. the law adds the word occupation. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and. Thus. LUCAS FRANCISCO. Issue: Whether possession is sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain. JR. exclusive and notorious. When. MILLER and EMILIO ESPINOSA. The said circumstances further show that the possession and ownership of the applicant and her predecessors-in-interest over the same parcel of land has been continuous and peaceful under bona fide claim of ownership before the filing of the instant application for registration on July 1. CIPRIANO 178 .D. the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify. the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-ininterest have been in adverse possession of the subject lot in the concept of owner since June 12. However. Possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires possession and occupation. Neither was petitioner able to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest actually occupied the subject lot prior to the filing of the application. ANSELMO IRENEA. 1945 or earlier as mandated by Section 14(1) of P. petitioner could not fairly claim possession of the land prior to 1971. 1529.

By that time. presented evidence and rested their case. L-16761 Facts: A parcel of land in Tigbao. Long before and at the time of the sales. they proceeded with the trial. The private oppositors offered to verify their opposition. ambiguities. 1959. On August 20. After parties had filed memoranda. After his cross-examination. On August 27. Of the oppositors. the court issued an order on January 13. 28 filed written but unverified opposition. formal defects. 1959 dismissing the unverified opposition. irregularities. 1959. initial hearing was held on June 20. Miller and Emilio Espinosa. 1957.SEQUILLO. No. Masbate was applied for registration in the Court of First Instance of Masbate on June 18. counsel for applicants called the Court's attention to the lack of verification in the opposition filed by the private oppositors and moved to dismiss the same. Thirty-five individuals appeared and expressed verbal oppositions. The act of proceeding to trial on the merits without objection is generally a waiver of all uncertainties. 1958 applicants finished adducing evidence and rested their case. PONCIANO GARCIA. were declared in default on July 8. applicants had waived the defect. except the abovementioned oppositors. 1957.R. RODOLFO DE DIOS. After notice and publication. Issue: Whether he unverified opposition is sufficient Held: Without objecting to the unverified opposition. she sold it to Francisca Mojica and Victoria Dinglasan with different sizes in areas. Only after the first witness of the private oppositors had testified and applicants' counsel had cross-examined him. Jr. Francisca Mojica 179 . On July 24. without pronouncement as to costs Motion for reconsideration was denied by order dated November 18. The Director of Lands and Bureau of Public Highways filed written oppositions. of fault or defects of any kind in the pleading of the adverse party. On June 11. was the defect of lack of verification brought up. 1958 applicants started presenting evidence and the private oppositors were given five days to file written opposition. Court of Appeals 63 SCRA 302 Facts: Felisa Kalaw was the registered owner of a parcel of land situated at Lipa City. 1956 by John M. ROXAS vs. All persons. 1958 the private oppositors presented their first witness. PEDRO TAGALOG. ET AL G. The private oppositors have appealed from both orders. Milagros.

with the consent of Santos. On March 1961. the Sheriff. Said deed was not registered. He subsequently mortgaged the lot to Leonora T. 9125 was not delivered to the vendees because it was in the possession of another person to whom the lot had been mortgaged by Felisa Kalaw. But in 1959. who conducted the sale of the foreclosed property. they are not the true owners. Santos. This was done in order to secure her indebtedness to Santos in the amount of 7000 Php. Pedro Dinglasan. Delos Angeles vs Santos 12 SCRA 622 FACTS: In 1958. The vendees-intervenors not having acquired the ownership of the land. Francisca Mojica and Victoria Dinglasan moved to intervene since they allege that they are the true owners. The vendor's Certificate of Title No. Issue: Whether Francisca Mojica and Victoria Dinglasan are the true owners of the land Ruling: No. Said deed was validly registered and a subsequent certificate of title in favor of Santos was issued. their action to vindicate ownership must fail because such action can prosper only upon proof by plaintiff that he is the owner. who assigned to Matilda Gorospe all her rights on the subject property particularly her statutory right of redemption. T-10392 issued in his name by falsifying a public document of conveyance. Torento executed a deed of First Mortgage over a parcel of duly registered land in favor of defendant-appellant Dolores M.and Victoria Dinglasan were in possession of the Lot. the first mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed and was put in auction. instituted the instant foreclosure suit against him for his failure to pay his obligation. As pointed out. The Court of Appeals certified the appeal of this Court on the ground that it involves only questions of law. Said sale was then annotated at the TCT of the subject lot. Roxas as security for a loan. Torento again executed a second mortgage. 9125 in the name of Felisa Kalaw canceled and a new transfer Certificate of Title No. Santos filed for the recovery of the deficiency resulting from the price paid for the property and its value at the public auction. The lower court rendered its decision finding that the mortgage was validly constituted and its foreclosure was in order. Roxas. Afterwhich. succeeded in having Certificate of Title No. The court then issued a writ of attachment over the properties of Torento. the intervenors did not acquire ownership of the land because their deeds of sale were not registered. where Santos was the highest bidder in the amount 3500 Php. In 1960. over the same property in favor of plaintiffs to secure a debt in the amount of 6000 Php. 180 . Caridad J.

that they and their predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels of land openly. or the wife as regards her husband's homestead by reason of the fact that some portion of her husband's title passes to her. Torrento. In the case at bar. The Certificate of Redemption was registered a on March 13. Gorospe had. 1961. who inturn inherited the same from his father. plaintiff's grandfather. it is evident that the same had been timely made. Rizal. 1960. that they declared said lands for taxation purposes in 1940under Tax Declaration No. therefore. Appellee Matilda J. a period of one year from that date within which to exercise the right of redemption assigned to her by Caridad J.issued a Certificate of Redemption in favor of plaintiffs-appellees as successors in interest of Torrento over the foreclosed property. that after the outbreak of the last 181 . cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits harvestedtherefrom. had said parcels of land surveyed on March 4 and 6. or one or more joint debtors who were not owners of the property sold. The Supreme Court then affirmed the decision of the CA and ordered Santos to deliver the owner’s certificate of TCT to the Gorospes. that Eugenio Benin. registration of the certificate of sale in favor of the purchaser at public auction was e only on October 20. Defendant-appellant. or one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by operation of law. The redemption having been made on March 10. in her answer. Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the ownership over said parcels of land. Viola. or one to whom the debtor has conveyed his interest in the property for the purpose of redemption. the term "successor-in-interest' includes one to whom the debtor has transferred his statutory right of redemption. denied that Matilda J. therefore. Gorospe is a "successor-in-interest" of the debtor Caridad J.. that plaintiffappellee Matilda J. Eugenio Benin. There is no question.and peacefully. 2429. Caloocan. BENIN vs TUASON 57 SCRA 531 Facts: The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of three parcels of agricultural lands located in Laloma. 1961 with Register of deeds. Gorospe had validly redeemed the ISSUE: Whether or not the right of redemption may be transferred or assigned by the owner? RULING: As held by the Supreme Court in Magno v. 1894. that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands in 1933. inherited from their ancestor Sixto Benin. Torrento and as such could exercise the right to redeem the property at any time within the period provided by law. and the corresponding entry and annotation made on the original of said certificate of title.adversely.

adversely. after having secured the permission of the plaintiffs. that they inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor Sixto Benin.M. as published.R. or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter. vs. L-26127 June 28. that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in 1933 Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the ownership over said parcels of land. that they and their predecessors in interest had possessed these parcels of land openly. and peacefully.. The reason is because without a new publication. Issue: Whether the plaintiff has a valid claim over the disputed property. Tuason & Co. INC. constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs. and third parties who have not had the opportunity to present their claim might be prejudiced in their rights because of failure of notice. G. Only defendant J. evacuees from Manila and other places. Inc. But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the area covered by the original application and the original plan as previously published. Eugenio Benin. cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits harvested therefrom. that they declared said lands for taxation purposes in 182 . Without a new publication the registration court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is added to the area covered by the original application. the jurisdiction of the court over the remaining area is not affected by the failure of a new publication. a new publication is not necessary. J. TUASON & CO. et al.World War. The other defendants were ordered summonedbypublication in accordance with Sections 16 and 17 of the Rules of Court.. The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all persons concerned regarding the amended application. 1974 Facts: The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the parcels of agricultural lands. 1894. appeared. In the latter case. a new publication of the amended application must be made. No. Held: If the amendment consists in the inclusion in the application for registration of an area or parcel of land not previously included in the original application. had said parcels of land surveyed on March 4 and 6. M. VICTOR BENIN. was actually served with summons. the law is infringed with respect to the publicity that is required in registration proceedings.M. The other defendants were all declared in default. and the decision of the registration court would be a nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly included land. Inc. Tuason & Co. who in turn inherited the same from his father. plaintiff's grandfather.. Only defendant J. that Eugenio Benin.

In its answer. the defendants. Tuason and Co. Issue: Whether the trial court erred when it held that the Land Registration Court was 183 . 17431 for the alleged reason that the amendment to the original plan was not published. that pursuant to the decision of March 7. with the aid of armed men. 17431. 7681 based on the amended plan. Tuason & Co. 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. Inc. that on March 7. concluded that the decision and the decree in LRC No. 1 were altered and amended. Sometime in the year 1951 while they were enjoying the peaceful possession of their lands. or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter. disregarding the objections of plaintiffs. 1914. were never published.. The plaintiffs made inquiries regarding the probable claim of defendants. evacuees from Manila and other places. and in 1953 they discovered for the first time that their lands had either been fraudulently or erroneously included. J. After trial. specifically denied plaintiffs' claim of ownership of the lands involved in each case. the lower court. 2429. It contends that the trial court erred in holding that the Land Registration Court lacked or was without jurisdiction to issue decree No. using bulldozers and other demolishing equipment. Inc. 1914 in LRC No. known as Decree No. that after the outbreak of the last World War. 7681 are null and void ab initio. Inc. by force and intimidation. the area.. Tuason & Co. 1914 a decree of registration was issued on July 6. constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs. through their agents and representatives.M.M. boundaries and technical descriptions of parcel No. in what appears as Parcel No. decreeing the registration in the names of the applicants of the two parcels of land (Santa Mesa Estate and Diliman Estate). The plaintiffs alleged that before the decision was handed down in the application for registration by the defendants.1940 under Tax Declaration No. that the amendments and alterations.. illegally entered and started defacing. the J. 1914 a decision was rendered in LRC No. and as a result plaintiffs were deprived of the rentals received from their lessees. having been rendered without jurisdiction and the plaintiffs are the owners and entitled to the possession of the parcels of land described in their respective complaints. appealed from the decision. after having secured the permission of the plaintiffs. 735 of the Land Records of the province of Rizal in the names of the original applicants for registration. which were made after the publication of the original application. by direct or constructive fraud.M. as well as the improvements. 7681 is null and void because the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to render the decision for lack of publication. and that the decision dated March 7. J. among others. demolishing and destroying the dwellings and constructions of plaintiffs' lessees. among others.

But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the area covered by the original application and the original plan as previously published. claims to be one of the heirs of Epifania Alcano. a new publication is not necessary. Oriental Mindoro. included additional lands which were not originally included in Parcel 1 as published in the Official Gazette. Held: The lower court erred when it held that the Land Registration Court was without jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No.798. covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title in the Registry of Deeds of Calapan. 7681. If the amendment consists in the inclusion in the application for registration of an area or parcel of land not previously included in the original application. the jurisdiction of the court over the remaining area is not affected by the failure of a new publication. When the lower court said that the area of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration is bigger than the area of Parcel 1 in the application as published. between the computation of the area when the original plan was made and the computation of the area when the amended plan was prepared. the law is infringed with respect to the publicity that is required in registration proceedings.600 square meters (or 879.10 square meters. Oriental Mindoro.. 1991 Facts: The private respondent.R. a new publication of the amended application must be made. and the decision of the registration court would be a nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly included land. registered owner of a parcel of land located in Canubing. as published.86 hectares). cannot be considered substantial as would affect the identity of Parcel REPUBLIC v FLORENCIA MARASIGAN G." It being undisputed that Parcel 1 has an area of more than 8. The reason is because without a new publication.10 square meters. 7681. In the latter case.without jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. filed a petition for the reconstitution of "the original and duplicate copy 184 . We believe that this difference of 27. We believe that this difference of 27. No. it did not mention the fact that the difference in area is only 27. 735. Without a new publication the registration court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is added to the area covered by the original application. The very slight increase of 27. and third parties who have not had the opportunity to present their claim might be prejudiced in their rights because of failure of notice.10 square meters would not justify the conclusion of the lower court that "the amended plan . 85515 June 6.. The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all persons concerned regarding the amended application.10 square meters is too minimal to be of decisive consequence in the determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. Calapan.

R. 1977. What it simply means is that in so far as publication is concerned." However. The Court of Appeals negates one of the principal purposes of the Decree. publication in the latter alone would not suffice.(sic)" of the said Transfer Certificate of Title on the basis of the owner's duplicate copy. the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition. 1529 was never meant to dispense with the requirement of notice by mailing and by posting. This is to accord primacy to the official publication. namely. The original copy of said title which was usually kept in the Office of the Register of Deeds of this province was destroyed by reason of the fire which razed to the ground the entire Capitol Building then housing said office on August 12. She alleged therein that she is in possession "of the title subject matter of" the petition but she. although the law mandates that it be published "once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Issue: Whether the Trial Court acquired jurisdiction over the petition Held: No. Calapan. PO vs. however. there is sufficient compliance if the notice is published in the Official Gazette. Oriental Mindoro covered by Transfer Certificate of Title and registered in the name of Epifania Alcano. Section 23 of P. From the evidence adduced by the petitioner. The Regional Trial Court however granted the reconstitution filed by the private respondent. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G. it appears that she is one of the vendees of a certain parcel of land situated in Malamig. 1971 / 40 SCRA 37 Facts: 185 . did not allege the reason why she asked for the reconstitution. which is clearly expressed in its exordium.D. t-66062 without the requisite service of notice of hearing to the adjoining owners and actual occupants of the land as required by section 13 of republic act no. The CA affirmed the Trial Court’s decision. No. 26. Petitioner appealed from said Order to the Court of Appeals because the trial court erred in acquiring jurisdiction over the instant petition for reconstitution of the original and the owner's duplicate copies of tct no. No. L-27443 July 19. to strengthen the Torrens System through safeguards to prevent anomalous titling of real property.

The publication of such notice is insufficient to vest. After the initial hearing of case. Act No. filed in CFI of Albay. 241 square meters more or less. FEWKES vs. L-29075 June 10. the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain and hear said petition. executed by the Velascos in favor of applicant. 473 requires that the "petition" for naturalization be published "in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation in the province where the petitioner resides. 9 of said Act. the appellee's "petition" for naturalization that was not published. 9 of Com. the court issued an order dismissing the application for lack of jurisdiction. 21-A of Psu-61470 (a portion of Lot No. Since the appellee’s petition for naturalization has not been published. much less to grant the same. In the case at bar. On April 15. she filed a motion to be allowed to take the requisite oath of allegiance." and the records do not show that this newspaper is of general circulation in Surigao del Norte.283 square meters. but a "notice" summarizing the allegations of said pleading. said notice was published in the "Nueva Era. Attached to the application were the tracing cloth and blue print of plans Psu-61470 and the corresponding technical descriptions of Lots 21-A and 21B of Psu-61470. of the corresponding certificate of naturalization. based on the finding 186 . the motion for reconsideration was denied on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to entertain appellee's petition for naturalization because the petition was not published in accordance with law. situated Bulusan. DOMINGO VASQUEZ . with an area of 223. Besides.R. Eldred Fewkews.et al. 1971 Facts: On 2 March 1967. G. in the trial court. 1966. Albay. the province in which the appellee resides. Libon. 1966. jurisdiction to hear and decide this case. 1383. and Lot with an area of 11. On November 14. the appealed order allowing her to take said oath and directing the issuance. NACITA VASQUEZ. which is in violation of Sec. Held: Sec. 1964.referred to as Lot No.Judgment was rendered on March 11. and the two deeds of absolute sale dated 20 June 1966 and 27 January 1967. However.an application for registration of two lots. granting the petition of Juanita Po for naturalization as citizen of the Philippines. after the notice and hearing prescribed by law. Libon PLs-763 D). an American citizen. the court issued. the certified copies of the tax declarations on said land. Issue: Whether the defect in the publication of the petition deprives the court of jurisdiction. in her favor. No.

then there was no need for further publication of the aforesaid small portions in order to vest jurisdiction on the land registration court. Cad.77 sq. This is because it is not permissible to make amendments or alterations in the description of the land after its publication in the newspapers and after the registration of the property has been decreed. In the case at bar. Therefore. boundaries and technical description of the land being registered. and that the notice of initial hearing did not delineate accurately the portions of the land involved in the registration proceeding. 21). it is the technical description of these 2 smaller lots that must be published in order that the persons who may be affected by their registration may be notified thereof. Issue: Whether the exact description of the land sought to be registered must be published in order to confer jurisdiction to the court over the res. effected by the publication and notice. and shall be published in the Official Gazette for two consecutive times.this appeal. m. 1383. what was sought to be registered was not the big parcel of land (Lot No. Held: The notice of the hearing must be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the lot being registered and the adjoining owners. Hence. Publication of the notice of hearing is considered one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court in land registration cases. but the certain portions thereof (Lots Nos. such notice and publication of the hearing enables all persons concerned having any rights or interests in the property. to come forward and show to the court why the application for registration thereof is not to be granted. instead of issuing an order of dismissal. from one Cristeta Dazo 187 . as their residence with a total area of 91. It is only when there is constructive seizure of the land. Pls-764-D or Lot No. without the publication of new notifications and advertisements making known to everyone the said alterations and amendments. s38-D.that the properties sought to be registered only formed part of a bigger tract of land which was described in the plan attached to the application. that jurisdiction over the res is vested on the court.The appellant contended that since the description of the bigger parcel of which the properties sought to be registered formed part was already published. The lower court could not merely direct the amendment of the application. REPUBLIC vs COURT OF APPEALS 236 SCRA 442 Facts: Respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348. Moreover. 21-A and 21-B). and indicating the location. situated in San Pablo City.

The court a quo rendered a decision confirming private respondents' title to the lots in question. consequently. The spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City. and as transferees of a private land. At the outset. Article XII of 188 . Issue: Whether the application for registration of title is void on the ground of foreign nationality. it is not significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or registered the parcels of land in question. 1945 or since 1937. however. they could apply for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8. for in the same proceeding. continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12. to be used by him as his residence (BP 185). It maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are presumed to be public lands under the principle that lands of whatever classification belongs to the State under the Regalian doctrine. the court may declare it public land. said properties as discussed above were already private lands. there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. This time. Held: NO. They are already private in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open. It is undisputed that private respondents. respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens. the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.m.000 sq. they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization. What is important is that private respondents were formerly naturalborn citizens of the Philippines. Thus. depending on the evidence.. Petitioner further argued that it is only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title would the land become privately owned land. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land. The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 1. petitioner submits that private respondents have not acquired proprietary rights over the subject properties before they acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the registration thereof in their favor. or one (1) hectare in case of rural land. were naturalborn citizens of the Philippines. Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of the properties in question. At the time of the purchase. before the issuance of the certificate of title.BeleN. as vendees of a private land. The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain. if urban.

The agreement of sale between Laiz and Jandoc is valid." In any event. Said agreement was entails that spouses Leyva will withdraw their opposition to the land registration case filed by Jandoc. In the registration proceedings. and also supported by an earnest money given by Laiz. The agreement was purpotedly executed in 1963 but was only notarized in 1972. FRANCISCO LAIZ and MANUELA JANDOC G.R. the Supreme Court concluded that the Agreement of Sale prevails over the alleged Compromise Agreement. The Compromise Agreement was null and void for being undated and belatedly notarized. ELIGIO T. and was given TCT over the said lot by virtue of specific performance. 1988 Facts: Petitioner Leyva had an alleged Compromise Agreement with private respondent Jandoc. Laiz was able to acquire transfer of ownership and possession of the said land by virtue of a case he filed for specific perfomance against Jandoc. The reliance of Leyva on his expert witnesses was not able to overcome the testimonies given by the three witnesses. Issue: Whether the petitioner or private respondent has a preferred right of ownership over the land in question. No. 5. Ruling: The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals which are the following: 1. Laiz was mentioned as an adverse possessor but not Leyva. private respondent Laiz executed an agreement of sale with Jandoc in 1959 involving the same parcel of land. Furthermore. 4. "the positive testimony of the three attesting witnesses ought to prevail over the expert opinions which cannot be mathematically precise but which on the contrary. are subject to inherent infirmities. LEYVA vs . Due execution of the agreement was witnessed by three credible witnesses. The RTC ruling was then affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. It has been established that the subject was lot was occupied by Laiz since 1954. it is well established that the appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower court for the latter is in a better position to 189 . 71939 January 25. 3.the Constitution. COURT OF APPEALS. Considering that private respondents were able to prove the requisite period and character of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots. On the other hand. 2. if the latter will transfer a ownership over a parcel of land belonging to Jandoc. their application for registration of title must perforce be approved. As held in our jurisprudence.

Her interest is in the 1. that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reviewed by this Court except in certain instances which have no application here. for the reopening of cadastral proceedings. amongst others. de Castro moved to intervene.” It is evident that what petitioner seeks from Supreme Court a review of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the findings of the trial court. was that petitioner lacked personality to sue.922 square meters of land situated in the City of Baguio was sought for. the Director of Lands had cancelled the award in favor of petitioner. Indeed. Because. it has long been established to the point of being elementary. The lot was awarded in her favor. DE CASTRO VS MARCOS 26 SCRA 644 Facts: The case commenced from the petition of respondent Rufino Akia before the Court of First Instance of Baguio City. She stressed the fact that she was not a mere applicant of public land but an equitable owner thereof. 190 . Baguio City. She also paid the full purchase price of the land. the sales value of the land she applied for but respondent judge refused reconsideration. Ground therefor. acting as a cadastral court. Other Motions filed by de Castro were all denied. she was an awardee who had paid to the government. Quezon Hill Subdivision. Issue: Whether De Castro have the personality or legal standing to oppose the application for registration of Akia.000 square meters allegedly included in the 15. on the ground of a "Manifestation" of counsel for the Director of Lands of stating that on October 15. But de Castro moved to reconsider.922 square meters of land specified in respondent Akia's petition. However Akia lodged a motion to dismiss petitioner's opposition to his (Akia's) petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings. A trial was made and the case was submitted for decision. It appears that petitioner Virginia de Castro filed with the Bureau of Lands Township Sales Application [TSAV-3559 (E-V-405)] covering a 1. in full. Residential Section "K".gauge credibility of witnesses. Petitioner Virginia L. where the registration in his name of 15.000 square meter-parcel of land identified as Lot 1. 1965. pursuant to Republic Act 931. Petitioner's motion for intervention was granted. Petition was denied. The motion was granted by respondent judge on the grounds that mere applicants of public land have no capacity to sue independently of the Bureau of Lands.

reservation. But. it must be recalled. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G. Marikina. leased. Marina subsequently filed on January 18. REGALADO vs. The court denied the petition on a technical ground. 1992. lease. 1992 an "Amended Application for Registration alleging. granted or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government. an award under a sales application has "the effect of withdrawing the lands of the public domain that were 'disposable' by the Director of Lands. 168155 February 15. The motion to withdraw the application was granted. No. is an awardee in the public bidding held upon her own township sales application. Marina later filed on May 28. grant or any provisional or permanent disposition by the government of the land claimed should suffice to bar reopening. 2007 Facts: Marina Regalado filed on July 14. that the alienation. that she had "by herself or through her predecessor-in-interest 191 . 1991 a motion to withdraw the application without prejudice to the refiling of the same. it is at least a provisional one. Marina filed another application for land registration before the Pasig RTC. It bears repetition to say that said petition is possible "only with respect to such of said parcels of land as have not been alienated. if the award is not a permanent disposition. Of course. The application was published on November 14. REPRESENTED BY AMADEO C. the petition for reopening is narrowed down by the specific conditions therein set forth. citing as grounds the discrepancies on the question of the survey and accession number corresponding to the survey plan of the property and for another reason that the inevitable absence of applicant from the country to arrange and assist in the intestate estate of her late widowed sister whose children [were] all minors in London. the award up to now has not been fully implemented because she has not yet complied with one condition imposed on her. if the cadastral court "shall find that all conditions herein established have been complied with. enough to prevent reopening by respondent Akia as to the land. 1987 an application for registration of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Balubad. Metro Manila. Barrio Nangka. Subsequently. REGALADO. inter alia. Marina filed a petition to reinstate the earlier application which was withdrawn. 1988 in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation. Under Republic Act 931. REGALADO AND HEIRS OF ARNULFO C.R." Thus it is." HEIRS OF MARINA C.Ruling: Petitioner De Castro has legal standing before the cadastral court. Petitioner Virginia de Castro here." The statute made it abundantly clear that judicial proceedings shall be reopened only. On March 17. reserved.

Fernandez vs Aboratigue 36 SCRA 476 Facts: Ana P. Fernandez is the owner of a parcel of land where the father of defendant Feliza Aboratigue. were allowed to stay therein. 1967 dated May 14. and adverse possession in the concept of an owner under a bona fide claim of ownership to validly register said land? Held: Marina's heirs as applicants in this land registration case "bear the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. 1994. Marina died as a result. and that after his death the said defendant. The National Housing Authority (NHA) filed an opposition on March 15. In the same Waiver. continuous. there is not proof to sustain the trial court's finding that Marina.have been in open. it claiming to be the owner of the property which it referred to as the "Balubad Nangka Project" and which had been declared as an Area for Priority Development under Proclamation No. he ceded." This they failed to discharge. other than Marina's uncorroborated testimony given in a previous attempt to have the property registered. her eldest son Arnulfo Regalado pursue the land registration case in their behalf. aunt. 1977 executed by the registered claimant Tomas Antero as Assignor in her favor. her uncle.239 square meters of the property to the NHA. 1980. but that later on they claimed to be the owners of the said portion. Arnulfo Regalado executed a Waiver of the "area covered by the National Housing Authority without prejudice to the other land subject of the petition. and waived 30. was during his lifetime employed as guard at one of the gates to the property. and other relatives have been residing in the property for more than 30 years and that she herself had been residing there for 15 years when a Tomas Antero executed the deed of assignment in her favor. In their answer to the complaint the 192 . While the case is pending. and that she acquired the land "by virtue of a Deed of Assignment dated January 3. together with her husband Restituto Bacnan. and adverse possession in the concept of owner under a bona fide claim of ownership fails. Issue: Whether Marina had been in open. continuous and notorious possession and occupation of said land which is alienable and disposable of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since 1945 or earlier". the trial court's finding that Marina had been in open. transferred. In fine. and as such was allowed to plant fruit trees in a small portion in the immediate vicinity. In addition. continuous.

ANTONIO BACAS et al. 1964 covering a parcel of land together with all the improvements found thereon. If any claim to a portion thereof is upheld. No. and such notation cannot prevail over the actual decree of registration as reproduced in the certificate. under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act. Issue: Whether a mere claim can defeat a registered title. this right of the appellants must be upheld. There is no such notation here in favor of the appellants. the "claim" here is only noted on the survey plan.R. 1612. The trial court has left the determination of such value to mutual agreement between the parties. This disposition should be modified in the sense that if they fail to agree. with right to reimbursement of the value of the improvements thereon. if upheld by the court.C. 2013 Facts: The Bacases filed their Application for Registration on November 12. they being builders in good faith. must be noted on the face of the certificate. the matter should be submitted to the said court for hearing and adjudication. 1959 the Court denied the motion and on the basis of the facts stipulated rendered judgment or the plaintiff. located in Patag. inasmuch as the improvements in the disputed area have been acknowledgment by plaintiff in her complaint as belonging to the appellants' predecessor-in-interest. They alleged ownership in fee simple of the 193 . Cagayan de Oro City with Lot No. continuous possession and cultivation of the disputed area. Held: No. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. that portion is segregated from the property applied for. L. subject only to a petition for review of the decree within one year from its issuance on the ground of fraud.. However. All claims of third persons to the property must be asserted in the registration proceedings. as basis of their claim of ownership.It is obvious that a mere claim cannot defeat a registered title. If it is included. 4354 of the Cadastral Survey of Cagayan. declaring her to be the owner of the disputed property and ordering the defendants to vacate the same. and is not included in the decree of registration and certificate of title subsequently issued to the applicant. by themselves and through their predecessors-ininterest since the year 1901. Furthermore.defendants alleged. On January 28. 182913 November 20. The rule is that the owner of buildings and improvements should claim them during the proceedings for registration and the fact of ownership.R. Record No. the claim is deemed adversely resolved with finality. and the lower court's decision allowing them to recover the value of the improvements is not now in question. G.

and in concept of owners for more than forty (40) years. Thus. Held: The Republic can question even final and executory judgment when there was fraud. based on the evidence presented by the Bacases. the Land Registration Court (LRC) rendered a decision holding that the applicants had conclusively established their ownership over the subject land and that their possession. registered its written opposition and on On April 10. With respect to the Bacases. although the lower courts might have been correct in ruling that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of law when they alleged that Camp Evangelista was an occupant. had been open.The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. uninterrupted. The RTC dismissed the complaints of the Republic they ruled that the respondents did not commit fraud in filing their applications for registration. adverse. the appeal on the Supreme Court. 1970 or one (1) year and ten (10) months from the issuance of OCT No. More specifically. the decision became final and executory. The Republic averred that the subject land had long been reserved in 1938 for military purposes at the time it was applied for and. Thus. reconveyance of lot or damages was filed by the Republic against the Bacases. a civil case for annulment. Issue: Whether or not the applications for registration of the subject parcels of land should be allowed. on September 7. and the raising 194 . 1968. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant. resulting in the issuance of a decree and the corresponding certificate of title over the subject property The LRC’s decision in both applications for registration the Republic filed a complaint for annulment of titles against the Bacases and the Chabons before the RTC. including that of their predecessor-in-interest. 0-358. No appeal was interposed by the Republic from the decision of the LRC. so. The success of the annulment of title does not solely depend on the existence of actual and extrinsic fraud. the Republic is not precluded and estopped from questioning the validity of the title. It can also question a final and executory judgment when the LRC had no jurisdiction over the land in question. it was no longer disposable and subject to registration. The director of the Bureau of Lands.property and indicated in their application the names and addresses of the adjoining owners. as well as a statement that the Philippine Army (Fourth Military Area) recently occupied a portion of the land by their mere tolerance. but also on the fact that a judgment decreeing registration is null and void. peaceful. cancellation of original certificate of title.

1957. Aringay. Jr. Issue: The sufficiency of unverified opposition. On August 27. Thirty-five individuals appeared and expressed verbal oppositions. After parties had filed memoranda. CACHERO VS. The private oppositors offered to verify their opposition. do not constitute possession under claim of ownership.thereon of cattle. was the defect of lack of verification brought up. Milagros. 1958 applicants finished adducing evidence and rested their case. the court issued an order on January 13. Of the oppositors. of fault or defects of any kind in the pleading of the adverse party. ambiguities. initial hearing was held on June 20. After notice and publication. except the abovementioned oppositors. Only after the first witness of the private oppositors had testified and applicants' counsel had cross-examined him. 1957. 1958 applicants started presenting evidence and the private oppositors were given five days to file written opposition. 28 filed written but unverified opposition. On July 24. 1959. MILLER vs. applicants had waived the defect. 1959 dismissing the unverified opposition. Miller and Emilio Espinosa. presented evidence and rested their case. The lower court rendered judgment declaring the petitioners owners of the subject land. were declared in default on July 8. possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. The Director of Lands and Bureau of Public Highways filed written oppositions. 1958 the private oppositors presented their first witness. Ruling: Without objecting to the unverified opposition. The judgment became final and executory. In that sense. formal defects. they proceeded with the trial. counsel for applicants called the Court's attention to the lack of verification in the opposition filed by the private oppositors and moved to dismiss the same. About 7 years later the Spouses Cachero filed for the registration under the Torrens Act of 195 . The act of proceeding to trial on the merits without objection is generally a waiver of all uncertainties. By that time. 1956 by John M. Masbate was applied for registration in the Court of First Instance of Masbate on June 18. irregularities. DIRECTOR OF LANDS Facts: A parcel of land in Tigbao. MARZAN 196 SCRA 601 1991 Facts: The Spouses Cachero filed a case in the CFI of La Union against the respondents for recovery of possession and ownership of 2 parcels of land in Barrio Basca. LaUnion. After his cross-examination. All persons. without pronouncement as to costs Motion for reconsideration was denied by order dated November 18. On August 20.

persons not parties to the registration proceedings filed a" petition for review of judgment and/or decree .The judgment was rendered in favor of the spouses finding that the spouses and their predecessors-in-interest had been in continuous and notorious possession of subject lots for more than 60 years in concept of owners except for a one-hectare portion of Lot No. the judgment sought to be reconsidered had already become final. Yaranon. and that the applicant spouses had been religiously paying the realty taxes on the parcels of land as owners thereof. the Director of Forestry." They alleged that they were the owners of the land designated as Lot No. Subsequently. 6860 of the Cadastral Survey and another parcel of land (50. and they had file cadastral answer. The Cacheros opposed the motion and argued that by the time the motion for reconsideration was filed. They also alleged that the petitioners fraudulently omitted to give them notice of their application for registration and that in the earlier cadastral survey. Atty. m. The petition for review was denied. The CA also declared that the Genovas are third persons who came into the case. holding that the former had no appellate jurisdiction over the matter. they appealed the case to the Court of Appeals which forwarded it to the Supreme Court. Paulina Nodo and Felix Genova subsequently died and were substituted by their heirs. The petition prayed for the re-opening. About 7 months after the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Atty. there was no decree of registration issued as regards the subject lots.the subject land (109. review and setting aside of the judgment and for the accord to them of an opportunity to prove their asserted contentions. that Tomas Cachero had inherited said lots from his late father. The Registration Court ruled that the according to the report of the chief surveyor of the Land Registration Commission. La Union. The motion was denied. Simeon Cachero. Basca Aringay. which have been the subject of cadastral proceedings. The respondents thru their counsel. Then. 6859 which they purchased sometime in 1929 and that they have been in continuous possession thereof since then. 6860 which the Cacheros had sold to Bernardino Marzan. showed that neither the Cacheros nor their predecessors-in-interest had ever entered a claim for either lot. 6859 of the same Cadastral Survey.412 square meters) identified as Lot No. Yaranon filed oppositions in said case in behalf of the respondents Tomas Cachero died before judgment and was substituted by hischildren. both lots being situated in Sitio Iriw. 196 .) identified as Lot No. It also ruled that the movants had failed to show fraud on the Cacheros' part. Lots Numbered6859 and 6860 had been declared public land for lack of any original claimant and at the cadastral hearing only the Director of Lands. filed a motion for reconsiderationon the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case and that the subject lands. These Genova heirs filed an amended petition which was also denied by the Registration Court.480 sq.

The sheriff then. Hence. Immediately.R. It was granted and now covered with an OCT issued by the Registry of Deeda. and which had resulted in no judgment or final order affecting the lands involved in a subsequent registration act under Act496. said compulsory cadastral proceedings under the Cadastral Act cannot be invoked and set up as a bar to the registration proceedings under the Torrens Act initiated more than twenty years later by the Cacheros.Issue: WON the cadastral proceedings should be deemed as a bar to the Registration Proceedings. thus. the Genovas were and are bound by the order of default issued in Land Reg. Bulacan. it had ceased to exist. filed for a petition for Writ of Possession against spouses Francisco and Basilisa Esconde. upon the courts order. DELFIN G. Moreover. A cadastral proceeding which had long discontinued and abandoned. petitioner filed a rejoinder to motion to dismiss and motion for leave of court." with the exception only of the parties who had appeared and filed pleadings in the registration case. is barred by re judicata (2) the complaint fails to state sufficient cause or causes of action for reconveyance and (3) the plaintiff is barred by prescription or laches from filing the case. a proceeding undoubtedly in rem in character. Thereafter. Delfin filed a motion for an Alias 197 . Case No. delivered possession to Delfin however he was barred in entering the premises. There being no final adjudication in the cadastral proceeding. who took over the same branch presided over judge Bautista issued an order for Writ of Possession against the spouses. BASILISA S. L-67583 July 31. N-824. Moreover. cannot be invoked and set up as a bar to the latter proceedings. ESCONDE vs.HON. Held: NO. the cadastral case mentioned commenced before the outbreak of the Pacific war. It had been abandoned and had not been continued or resumed after the war. if any. Judge constantino. on March of 1978 the opposition filed by the petitioner was denied by Judge Bautista. Bulacan. 1987 Facts: Ramon Delfin (private respondent) filed an application for a parcel of land located in Valenzuela. Subsequently. No. BARLONGAY and RAMON V. there is no reason to apply the doctrine of res judicata. as they have been occupying the said land. SAMILO N. petitioner filed a motion to quash which was denied. That default order was entered "against the whole world. Petitioner then filed complaint for conveyance against Delfin which was rebutted by the latter via motion to dismiss on the ground that (1) the cause of action. Delfin as an applicant.

writ of possession which was granted.
The sheriff turned over the possession to the representative of Delfin, however,
when the latter went to the premises he was again barred by the petitioner. Then,
Delfine asked for demolition and he moved for a second alias writ of possession
which was again, granted.
Subsequently, the writ of reconveyance filed by the petitioner was dismissed. After
which motions and motions have been filed. The second resolve the issue, a
temporary restraining order directing the sheriff and Delfin to refrain from
enforcing and/or carrying out the third alias writ of possession. Petitioner then filed
motion to amend the resolution and TRO, either nullifying third alias writ of
possession served or to issue a mandatory injunction which was denied by the said
court.
Issue:
1. Whether petitioner's cause of action is barred by res judicata; and
2. Whether petitioner's motion to admit amended complaint and for issuance of
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction is proper.
Ruling:
The petition is devoid of merit.
Land registration proceedings in this case commenced on April 14, 1969 and
decision thereon was rendered on December 8, 1969. Hence, the law in force at the
time was Act 496, P.D. 1529 (otherwise known as Property Registration Decree)
having taken effect only on Jan. 23, 1979.
Petitioner's claim that she came to know of the land registration case only upon
receipt of a Petition for Writ of Possession is completely rebutted by private
respondent's evidence. In the notice of Initial Hearing (Rollo, p. 148-a) she is one
of those cited to appear; in the Survey Notification Letter (Rollo, p. 148-c) her
husband was notified of the scheduled survey of the land as indicated by his
signature opposite his name and in the Surveyor's Certificate (Rollo, p. 148-b) her
husband was reported one of the adjoining owners present. There is no question
that notice to her husband is notice to her under the law, her husband being the
administrator of the conjugal partnership (Art. 165, Civil Code). Otherwise stated,
there was no concealment on the part of private respondent. In fact, the records
show that private respondent stated in his application for registration of title that a
portion of the land was being occupied by petitioner sometime in September 1967,
by breaking the stone wall fence without his knowledge and consent. However,
petitioner and her husband, despite the chance given them to be heard in the land
registration proceedings, opted not to appear.
Thus, as aptly stated by respondent Judge, "A land registration proceedings which
is in rem, is valid and conclusive against the whole world. The failure of the
plaintiff and her husband, despite the notice of the publication and posting by the
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sheriff of the notice of hearing, to oppose the defendant's application for
registration will bar her from filing this action."
Director of Lands vs. Santiago
G.R. No. L-41278, April 15, 1988
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari, to nullify and set aside the orders and decision of
the respondent Judge, and mandamus to order the respondent Judge to give due
course to the petitioner’s Motion for New Trial. The petitioner also prays for the
dismissal of the respondent corporation’s application for registration. On Sept. 8,
1973, an application for land registration was filed by respondent Garcia in the CFI
of Bataan. A copy of the application was forwarded to the SolGen thru the director
of Lands. On Feb. 19, 1974, the Director of lands filed an opposition to this
application, and at the same time the SolGen entered his appearance and authorized
the Provincial Fiscal to appear on his behalf at the hearing of the same.
Subsequently, respondent IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP., with the
conformity of the respondent Garcia, filed a Motion to Substitute Party Applicant
from Maria Garcia to Imperial Corp without amending the boundaries of the area
stated in the original application. Said motion was granted by the respondent Judge
Santiago. A notice of initial hearing was sent by respondent Judge to all parties
concerned, with the warning that a party who failed to appear would be declared in
default. The same notice was likewise published in the Official Gazette and posted
by the sheriff as required by law. On Jan. 23, 1975, the date of the initial hearing,
neither petitioner nor his counsel was present; an order of general default was
issued by the respondent Judge on the same date. After the reception of the
evidence for the applicant before the clerk of court, the respondent Judge rendered
the questioned decision and adjudicated the lands in favor of the respondent
corporation. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial on the grounds that
the failure of his counsel to appear at the initial hearing was excusable,a nd that the
decision was contrary to facts and to law. The motion was however denied.
Issue:
WON respondent Judge Santiago erred in decreeing the following orders and
decisions:
1. Admitting the Amended Application for Registration and adjudicating the
parcels of land in favor of respondent corporation,
2. Declaring the Director of Lands in default,
3. Denying the petitioner’s Motion for New Trial.;
Held:
The petition is GRANTED; the Order of general default against the petitioner, and
the Order denying the Motion for New Trial, the Decision dated February 17,
1975, as well as the decree of registration issued pursuant thereto, if any, are all
199

declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The respondent corporation’s subject application
for land registration is hereby DISMISSED. This decision is IMMEDIATELY
EXECUTORY. The lower court gravely abused its discretion when it granted the
respondent corporation’s application for registration, without sufficient proof that
the applicant possessed an imperfect and incomplete title that is registrable under
Sec. 48, par. b, of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Republic Act 6236,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act. The Supreme Court is not convinced with
the conclusion of the respondent Judge and with the arguments of the respondent
corporation that the latter, through its predecessors-in- interest, has been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
for at least thirty years.
First, it appears that Maria Garcia and Vicente Obdin, from whom the respondent
corporation purchased the subject lots, have pending sales applications as
evidenced in the plans submitted to the land registration court by Maria Garcia
herself. As such sales applicants, they manifestly acknowledge that they do not
own the land and that the same is a public land under the administration of the
Bureau of Lands, to which the applications were submitted. Therefore, their
possession was not that of an owner, as required by law. (The private respondents
were conspicuously silent on this point, as if they were trying to conceal this vital
fact)
More than anything else, however, registration in this instance cannot be granted
on the basis of Section 48, paragraph b, of the Public Land Act as said provision
applies exclusively to agricultural lands of the public domain. It appears from
Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1157, dated April 28, 1971, that the subject
lands…were forest lands and only later declared as alienable or disposable by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Thus, even on the assumption that
the applicant herein, through its predecessors-in-interest, had been in possession
for at least thirty years, such possession never ripened into private ownership. The
respondent Garcia and Vicente Obdin must have applied for sales patents precisely
because they wanted to acquire ownership over the subject lands. An examination
of the dates will show that the filing of the sales applications, apparently on
October 24, 1971, was done after the lands had been declared as alienable and
disposable.
The opposition or answer filed by the Director of Lands, which is based on
substantial grounds, having been formally filed prior to the issuance of the Notice
of Initial Hearing, it was improper for the respondent Judge taking cognizance of
such registration case to declare the oppositor in default simply because he failed
to appear on the day set for the initial hearing. The declaration of default against
200

the petitioner was patently invalid because when the same was made, he had
already entered an appearance and filed his opposition or answer.
The pertinent provision of law which states: “If no person appears and answers
within the time allowed, the court may at once upon motion of the applicant, no
reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default to be recorded …,”
cannot be interpreted to mean that the court can just disregard the answer before it,
which has long been filed, for such an interpretation would be nothing less than
illogical, unwarranted, and unjust
Especially in this case where the greater public interest is involved as the land
sought to be registered is alleged to be public land, the respondent Judge should
have received the applicant’s evidence and set another date for the reception of the
oppositor’s evidence. The oppositor in the Court below and petitioner herein
should have been accorded ample opportunity to establish the government’s claim.
The respondent Judge, in denying the petitioner’s Motion for New Trial, ignored
the established rule that courts should be liberal in setting aside a default judgment.
“The Court, in the exercise of wise discretion, could have restored their standing in
court and given them an even chance to face their opponents.
The Supreme Court no longer deem it imperative to order a new trial of this case
which would only prolong the litigation unnecessarily, for as it said in a recent
case, the remand of a case to the lower court for Lither reception of evidence is not
necessary where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the
records before on the records before it.
In view of the basic presumption that lands of whatever classification belong to the
State, courts must scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real
estate. But this the respondent Judge sadly failed to heed; the tax declarations and
plans submitted by the private respondents were not carefully analyzed, and the
allegations in the petitioner’s opposition to the application were so casually
ignored.

OMICO MINING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION and FREDERICK
G. WEBBER vs. JUDGE AMADOR T. VALLEJOS, in his capacity as Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, ALFREDO CATOLICO, and
LEONARDO ALCID, in his capacity as City Sheriff of Manila
[G.R. No. L-38974, March 25, 1975]
Facts:
On June 1, 1973, Alfredo Catolico, filed against Omico Mining and Industrial
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Corporation and Frederick G. Webber, the latter in his personal capacity and as
President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of said corporation, alleging
first, for the return of ten (10) certificates of stock of the corporation borrowed
from him by the defendants, and the second, for the payment of his services as
legal counsel for the corporation. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on two grounds: namely (1) improper venue, in that the case was filed in
Cavite where plaintiff is not a resident, the truth being that he is a resident of
Quezon City where he has his permanent family home; and, as to the second cause
of action, the contract of personal and professional services between plaintiff and
defendants was entered into in the City of Manila, and, therefore, the case should
have been filed in Manila in accordance with Section I of Rule 4 of the Revised
Rules of Court; and (2) lack of cause of action, in that with regard to the stock
certificates the same are in the name of Vicente Resonda; and, with respect to the
contract of personal and professional services wherein it was agreed that the
plaintiff shall head the legal department of defendant Omico Mining & Industrial
Corporation.
On June 16, 1973, the date set for the hearing of the motion to dismiss, neither the
parties nor their respective counsels appeared in court. While the motion to dismiss
was pending resolution by the court because defendants had not yet presented to
the court the required proof of service, plaintiff, on January 11, 1974, filed a
petition to declare the defendants in default that defendants had been served with
summons and copies of the complaint on June 8, 1973; that as of January 11, 1974,
or after a lapse of seven (7) months from the service of summons, defendants had
not filed their answer to the complaint. The court granted the petition and,
consequently, it received ex parte the evidence of the plaintiff and rendered
judgment in favor of Catolico. Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration but
Catolico file a motion to postpone hearing of motion for reconsideration.
On May 31, 1974, while defendants' motion for reconsideration was still pending
before the court because the defendants had not filed yet their reply to the
opposition as they had not received a copy, Catolico filed a motion for immediate
execution of judgment, alleging that said judgment had already become final and
executory because the defendants failed to have the order of default lifted; that the
motion for reconsideration was filed out of time; that there was a "manifest attempt
on the part of the defendants to delay the proceedings to afford them an
opportunity to have all their assets and shares dissipated by continuous sale of the
same to the prejudice". Thence, the court denied the defendants’ motion for
reconsideration. Defendants’ filed their notice of appeal. On July 22, Pio R.
Marcos, as President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of defendant Omico
Mining and Industrial Corporation, wrote a letter to respondent Sheriff asking that
the defendants be given a little chance to exhaust the legal remedies available to
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hold in abeyance the execution and garnishment for the reasons that defendants
were not given a chance to have their day in court in the motion for immediate
execution of judgment and that they have already appealed from the lower court's
decision and order of immediate execution.
Issue:
Whether respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in declaring the defendants in default, in receiving plaintiff's
evidence ex parte and in rendering judgment.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion when he declared the petitioners in default. The motion to dismiss was
pending before the court when such declaration was made, and it is generally
irregular to enter an order of default while a motion to dismiss remains pending
and undisposed of. The irregularity of the order of default is evident from the fact
that when the petitioners were declared in default, their time for filing an answer
had not yet commenced to run anew because on said date, their counsel had not yet
received any notice of the action taken by the court on their motion to dismiss.
There may be cases where the attendance of certain circumstances "may be
considered substantive enough to truncate the adverse literal application of the
pertinent rules violated." Inasmuch as petitioners were declared in default while
their motion to dismiss was still pending resolution, they were, therefore,
incorrectly declared in default, and the holding of the trial of the case on the merits,
in their absence, without due notice to them of the date of hearing, was a denial of
due process. Consequently, the order of default, the judgment and the order of
execution are patent nullities.
VALISNO vs. PLAN
143 SCRA 502
Facts:
Petitioners purchased 2 parcels of land from the family of Blanco’s and
subsequently declared ownership over the land for taxation purposes and took
possession thereof by assigning a caretaker over the property who built his house
thereon. Respondent Cayaba claims to be the owner of the property by virtue of a
deed of sale executed in his and Bienvenido Noriega’s favor from the heirs of
Verano and ousted the caretaker from the property and constructed an apartment
thereon. Petitioners filed an action for recovery of possession of the land. The court
decided in favor of the petitioner but on appeal, the CA reversed the decision and
dismissed the complaint of the petitioner on grounds that the description of the
property in the complaint is different from the subdivision plan provided by the
respondents with their respective area and boundaries appearing to be completely
different. The court did not find any compliance to the requirement of the law that
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the property in dispute must be clearly identified. Contrasting the evidence of the
respondent and petitioner, the court choose the respondent’s evidence as they were
able to provide a vicinity plan that shows the land position in relation to the
adjoining properties with known boundaries and landmarks. Petitioner merely
presented a sketch prepared by Dr. Blanco constituting as mere guess works.
Subsequently, the respondents filed a petition for registration of the property before
the CFI which was opposed by the petitioner. The CFI dismissed the opposition on
ground of res judicata thus this appeal before the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Motion to Dismiss filed by the petitioner should be
granted.
RULING:
The SC held that the Land Registration Act does not provide for pleading similar to
a motion to dismiss but the Rules of Court allows its application in land
registration proceeding as only suppletory when it is practicable and convenient.
Therefore, the court may sustain a motion to dismiss in land registration
proceeding as the case at bar. Noted by the court in the ordinary civil case, the
counterclaim can be taken as a complaint where the defendantbecomes the
plaintiff. The original plaintiff thus becomes defendant in the counterclaim and he
may choose to answer the counterclaim or be declared in default or file a motion to
dismiss the same. The respondent clearly opted for the last choice. The SC held
that res judicata operates in the case at bar with its requisites present in the case:
[a] the former judgment must be final, [b] it must have been' rendered by a court
having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a
judgment on the merits and [d] there must be between the first and second actions
identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. The inclusion of private
respondent Cayaba's co-owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for
registration does not result in a difference in parties between the two cases. The
employment of two different actions does not allow one to escape against the
principle of res judicata where one and the same cause of action cannot be litigated
twice. Although the first action was litigated before a competent court of general
jurisdiction and the other over a registration court is of no significance since that
both courts should be of equal jurisdiction is not a requisite for res judicata to
apply. For convenience, the SC should decide whether to dismiss the application
for registration or the opposition thereto. Because the conflicting claims of both
parties have been settled and decided by the court previously, it upheld the finality
of its decision and dismissed the petition.
Secretary of the DENR vs. Yap
G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008
Facts:
204

On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801 declaring
Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine reserve. President Marcos later
approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them
from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of
land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor Yap, Jr., and others filed a
petition for declaratory relief with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan. They declared that
they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since
June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. Respondents-claimants posited
that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay
beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it
was susceptible of private ownership.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The
OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain.
It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not
available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as
amended. On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondentsclaimants. The Republic then appealed to the CA. In 2004, the appellate court
affirmed in toto the RTC decision. On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of the
petition in the trial court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation
No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection
purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay, and other landowners in Boracay
filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They alleged that the Proclamation
infringed on their “prior vested rights” over portions of Boracay. On November
21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions.
Issue:
Whether or not the private claimants have a right to secure titles over their
occupied portions in Boracay.
Held:
NO. The petitions were DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals was
reversed.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified
land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands
are considered public forest under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the
public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest
as “a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the
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present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for
forest purpose and which are not.” Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands,
including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No.
705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity. A positive act
declaring land as alienable and disposable is required.
Secretary of the DENR vs. Yap
G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008
Facts:
On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801 declaring
Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine reserve. President Marcos later
approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them
from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of
land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor Yap, Jr., and others filed a
petition for declaratory relief with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan. They declared that
they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since
June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. Respondents-claimants posited
that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay
beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it
was susceptible of private ownership.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The
OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain.
It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not
available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as
amended. On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondentsclaimants. The Republic then appealed to the CA. In 2004, the appellate court
affirmed in toto the RTC decision. On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of the
petition in the trial court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation
No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection
purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay, and other landowners in Boracay
filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They alleged that the Proclamation
infringed on their “prior vested rights” over portions of Boracay. On November
21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions.
206

Issue:
Whether or not the private claimants have a right to secure titles over their
occupied portions in Boracay.
Held:
NO. The petitions were DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals was
reversed.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified
land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands
are considered public forest under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the
public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest
as “a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the
present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for
forest purpose and which are not.” Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands,
including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No.
705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity. A positive act
declaring land as alienable and disposable is required.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEE
G.R. No. L-64818 May 13, 1991
Facts:
On June 29, 1976, respondent Maria P. Lee filed before the then
CFI of Pangasinan, an application for registration in her favor of a
parcel of land consisting of 6,843 square meters, more or less,
located at Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The Director of Lands, in
representation of the Republic of the Philippines, filed an
opposition, alleging that neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in-interest have acquired the land under any of the
Spanish titles or any other recognized mode for the acquisition of
title; that neither she nor her predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
land in concept of owner at least thirty years immediately
207

preceding the filing of the application; and that the land is a
portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Issue:
Whether the land applied for has been in the possession of her
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest for more than 20 years and
constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" and "conclusive"
evidence required in the proceedings
Held:
No. It is incumbent upon private respondent to prove that the
alleged twenty year or more possession of the spouses Urbano
Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan which supposedly formed part of the
thirty years period prior to the filing of the application, was open,
continuous, exclusive, notorious and in concept of owners. This
burden, private respondent failed to discharge to the satisfaction
of the Court. The bare assertion that the spouses Urbano Diaz and
Bernarda Vinluan had been in possession of the property for more
than twenty years found in private respondent's declaration is
hardly the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence required in cases
of this nature.
LARAGAN VS CA

G.R. No. L-47644 August 21, 1987

Facts:
On 14 October 1968, the herein petitioners filed an application with the CFI of
Isabela for the registration of their title over a parcel of land with an area of
221,667 sq. m., more or less, situated in the Barrio of Sto. Tomas, Ilagan, Isabela.
208

The applicants alleged that they acquired said parcel of land by way of an absolute
deed of sale from the spouses Anastacio and Lucrecia Sibbaluca and that they have
been in possession thereof for more than 34 years. The Land Registration
Commission issued a notice of initial hearing. On 7 July 1969, the Solicitor
General filed a written opposition, on behalf of the Director of Lands, alleging that
the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest do not have sufficient title to the
parcel of land sought to be registered. He prayed that the land be declared public
land. On 2 August 1969, Teodoro Leano, Tomas Leano, Vicente Leano, Francisco
Leano, and Consolacion Leano filed their opposition to the application claiming
that they are the owners, pro indiviso, of the southern part of the land applied for,
with an area of 16 hectares of their deceased parents and which has been in their
possession for more than 30 years.
The trial court rendered judgment confirming the title of the
applicants over the parcel of land applied for and ordering its
registration in the names of the applicants. The oppositors
appealed to the CA. On 9 November 1977, the appellate court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court, but excluded the
southern portion of the land applied for, the appellate court
declaring such excluded portion to be public land, and part of the
public domain, in view of the failure of the applicants and
oppositors to prove registrable title over the same. The
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but
their motion was denied.

Issue:

Whether the appellate court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in declaring the parcel of land in question as public
land.
.
Held:

209

The argument is untenable. While it may be true that the Director
of Lands did not appeal from the decision of the trial court, his
failure to so appeal did not make the decision of the trial court
final and executory, in view of the appeal interposed by the other
oppositors, Teodoro Leano, Tomas Leano, Francisco Leano, and
Consolacion Leano, who also seek the confirmation of their
imperfect title over the land in question. Neither did such failure
of the Director of Lands to appeal foreclose the appellate court
from declaring the land in question to be public land, since the
oppositors and the herein petitioners are both seeking the
registration of their title pursuant to the provisions of Section 48
(b) of the Public Land Law where the presumption always is that
the land pertains to the state, and the occupants and possessors
claim an interest in the same, by virtue of their imperfect title or
continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership for the required
number of years.
Besides, it is an established rule that an applicant for registration
is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered in his name
simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose
the registration of the land. He must show, even in the absence of
opposition, to the satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute
owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering
property under the Torrens system, simply because there is no
opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any
opposition, deny registration of the land under the Torrens
system, if the facts presented do not show that the petitioner is
the owner, in fee simple, of the land which he seeks to register.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
REPUBLIC vs SAYO
Facts:
The respondent spouses filed an original application for
registration of a tract of land having an area of 33,950 hectares.
Oppositions were filed by the Government, through the Director of
Lands and the Director of Forestry, and some others. The case
dragged on for about twenty (20) years. The remaining area of
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5,500 hectares was, under the compromise agreement,
adjudicated to and acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of
Casiano Sandoval, but out of this area, 1,500 hectares were
assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their counsel, Jose C. Reyes, in
payment of his attorney's fees. In a decision rendered on 1981,
the respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement and
confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance
with its terms.
The Solicitor General contends that no evidence whatever was
adduced by the parties in support of their petitions for
registration; neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of
Forest Development had legal authority to enter into the
compromise agreement; as counsel of the Republic, he should
have been but was not given notice of the compromise
agreement or otherwise accorded an opportunity to take part
therein; that he was not even served with notice of the decision
approving the compromise; it was the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Quirino Province that drew his attention to the "patently
erroneous decision" and requested him to take immediate
remedial measures to bring about its annulment.
The respondents contended that the Solicitor General's
arguments are premised on the proposition that the disputed land
is public land, but it is not.
Issue:
Whether there was no evidence adduced by the parties in support
of their petitions for registration
Held:
Yes. There was no competent evidence adduced by the parties in
support of their petitions for registration.
The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development to
the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the
absence of evidence of title required of the private respondents

211

In the proceeding at bar. 172775 **********There are two consolidated petitions. 167707. and set aside. No. declared null and void. The first is G. What was done was to consider the compromise agreement as proof of title of the parties taking part therein.R. to prove the private character of the large tract of land subject of their application. Considerations of fairness however indicate the remand of the case to the Registration Court so that the private parties may be afforded an opportunity to establish by competent evidence their respective claims to the property. and obviously not constituting primary evidence of ownership. as they are hereby. a 212 . a totally unacceptable proposition. it not being one of the grants made during the Spanish regime. it appears that the principal document relied upon and presented by the applicants for registration. The result has been the adjudication of lands of no little extension to persons who had not submitted any substantiation at all of their pretensions to ownership. It is an inefficacious document on which to base any finding of the private character of the land in question. was a photocopy of a certification of the National Library. founded on nothing but the agreement among themselves that they had rights and interests over the land. But. But that compromise agreement included private persons who had not adduced any competent evidence of their ownership over the land subject of the registration proceeding.It thus appears that the decision of the Registration Court a quo is based solely on the compromise agreement of the parties. that Spanish document cannot be considered a title to property. Portions of the land in controversy were assigned to persons or entities who had presented nothing whatever to prove their ownership of any part of the land. The decision of the respondent Judge complained of is annulled and set aside. It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the judgment approving it must be. as this Court has already had occasion to rule. Secretary of the DENR v Yap G.R.

it is not susceptible of private ownership. Further. 213 . a petition for prohibition. Marcos issued PP 1801 declaring Boracay Island as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). It ruled that neither Proclamation No. opposed the petition of the respondents’ claiming that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of public domain. 1064issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land. The republic. Since the Island has not been classified as alienable and disposable. Yap. they contend that they or through their predecessorin-interest has been in an open. The Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands.R. Invoking Sec 3(a) or PD 705 or the revised forestry code. the DENR approved the National reservation survey of Boracay which identified several lots as being occupied by named persons. Aklan claiming that the said proclamation prevented them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes. The OSG maintained that the right of the respondent to judicial confirmation of title was governed by PD 705 and CA 141. et al. Aklan. continuous. No. Moreover. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable. The second is G. whatever possession they have cannot ripen into ownership. then later on approves PTA Circ. Facts: GR no. which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap. 3-82 to implement the said proclamation. therefore. they have the right to have the lots registered under their names. together with other respondents filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC of Kalibo. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. susceptible of private ownership. Invoking Sec 48(b) of CA 141 otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Pres. 173775. the said proclamation did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of men. as amended. and nullification of Proclamation No. The trial court cited Sections 87 and 53 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve. through OSG.petition for review on certiorari of the Decisionof the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. RTC: It upheld respondents’ right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. mandamus. On November of 1978. 167707 On April of 1976. classified as a tourist zone. exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land since time immemorial and they were paying their realty tax.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. Sacay. also. The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural. GR no. they are neither alienable nor disposable lands. the court ordered the consolidation of both cases as they involve the same issues on land classification of Boracay Island. 167707) Pres. Therefore.96 ha or agricultural land. 705. the OSG argued that they don’t have vested rights over the property because Boracay is an unclassified public forest land ursuant to PD 705. but. They appeled to the SC. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. during the pendency of the case (GR no. 1064 of May 22. Prior to Proclamation No.***** Issue: Whether or not private claimants (respondents-claimants in G. they appealed it to the CA. OSG moved for reconsideration. CA: Affirmed the decision of the lower court.R. 2006. forest or timber. 173775 However. No. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. they have been occupying the lot since time immemorial. all unclassified lands. On august of 2006.OSG moved for reconsideration but it was denied. *****On November of 2006. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership. Nonetheless. Appying this law. only agricultural lands may be alienated. it was also denied. Arroyo issued PP 1064 which classifies Boracay into 400 ha of forest land and 628. They contend that the said proclamation infringes their “prior vested right” over portions of Boracay. Except for lands already covered by existing titles. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. including that of the Boracay Island is considered as Public forest. Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. 1064.R. Gelito and other land owners filed a petition for nullification of PP1064. PD No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G. Ruling: The Court of Appeal’s decision was reversed. PD No. Of these. 705 respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. Nonetheless. Thus. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. No. such classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. the Court has time and again emphasized 214 .

the SC expressed that they are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously.that there must be a positive act of the government. Noting that millions were invested for the development of Boracay Island making internationally known ad some called it their home. report statute nor a certificate presented in court. peaceful. it cannot not be categorized as part of forestlands. and a legislative act or a statute. Thus. However. continuous. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. the CFI ordered the registration of the subject land in favor of the applicants (respondents). Antonio Valeriano et al. 1801. represented by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development opposed the application on the principal ground that the land applied for is within the unclassified region of Obando.” Director of Lands v. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. Administrative action. In the present case.. 1064. in the CFI of Bulacan. and adverse possession of the parcel of land for more than 30 years. thus this case. filed their application for the registration of a parcel of land. No. such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order. who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. The CA further opined that since the subject property is entirely devoted to fishpond purposes. 1976. investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators. 215 . Court of Appeals (129 SCRA 689) Facts: In May 10. EO. The Republic of the Philippines. he would have identified the specific limits of each.interest have been in open. Proc. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest. connected to a river and which they have converted into fishponds. This was not done in Proclamation No. Bulacan and that areas within the unclassified region are denominated as forest lands and do not form part of the disposable and alienable portion of the public domain. hereinafter referred to as the respondents. saying “Ito and batas. an administrative action. which the CA affirmed basing from the evidence that the applicants’ predecessors-in. ito ang dapat umiral. The burden of proof in overcoming such presumption is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership). or both. as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. After the hearing. there was neither a proclamation. public.

It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.) No. The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 216 . Held: YES. The case was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals which.Issue/s: Whether or not the Courts can reclassify public lands. in compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. 1529 requires publication of the notice of initial hearing. set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. Ruling: No. Issue: Whether the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory. Petition was granted. including the state. which is beyond the competence and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. Being in rem. 1989 dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction”. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. The land registration court in its decision dated June 13. In its decision. such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons. 1529.D. DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (P. the SC commented that the CFI and CA’s approval for the registration of the subject land in effect released such property from the unclassified category. The Court further emphasized the rule stating that classification or reclassification of public lands is an exclusive right vested to the Executive Department of the Government and not to the Judiciary and in the absence of such classification.

misrepresentation and illegal machinations. An issue over said lots arose when a certain Viola Azurin obtained from the then Philippine Fisheries Commission an Ordinary Fishpond Permit covering portions of Lots Nos. 151 SCRA 88 Facts: Minda de Porkan and Lolita Macatindog acquired Lots Nos. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Hence. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. exclusive and undisputed possession for more than 30years. there is no room for interpretation. the process must strictly be complied with. After hearing however.who have rights to or interests in the property. 1987. 1099 and 1546. 1099 alleging among others that the patentees secured their patents and titles through fraud. the SG stated that the disputed portions of land were actually claimed by Azurin and that such lands could not be disposed by the Director of Lands under the Public Land Act. certified as such as more suitable for fishpond development. Issue: Whether possession and cultivation of a land for more than 30 years will entitle the possessor thereof of a government grant and a certificate of title. the patents and titles issued to de Porkan and Macatindog were void insofar as the portion occupied and covered by the fishpond permit of Azurin. this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language. Azurin filed with the Bureau of Lands a complaint for correction. 1546 and the Free Patent of Macatindog over Lot No. The SG in the present petition avers among others that the lots in dispute could not be the subject of disposition under the Homestead and Free Patent provisions of the Public Act since they are marshy and swampy. who in turn acquired said lots though a grant by the government by virtue of their proven. 1099 and 1546 from their predecessors-interests. This being so. The Solicitor General sided with Azurin. amendment or cancellation of the Homestead Patent of De Porkan over Lot no. the CFI dismissed the complaints and upheld the validity of the titles/patents of de Porkan & Macatindog over the lands in dispute. There is no alternative. DE PORKAN June 18. open.The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. REPUBLIC vs. vacillation or equivocation. Time and again. there is room only for application. when the case was brought to the Court of First Instance. disposable only thru lease under the Public Land Act. 217 .

located in the province of Capiz. The CA affirmed the CFI’s decision. Director of Lands v. As early as 1953. so it cannot be the subject of the registration proceedings. the CFI ordered the registration of the title of the lots in the names of the applicants. The possession of a public land identified as Lot No. 10). Such possessions of the said public land has attained the character and duration prescribed by law as the equivalent of an express grant from the Government. but a grant of the Government over the same alienable land by virtue of their proven.1976. exclusive and undisputed possession for more than 30 years. After the hearing.in-interest have been in open. The mandate of the law itself provides that possessors “shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title”. the respondents had already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant over Lot No. They claimed that they inherited those parcels of land. the land ceases to be public and thus becomes a private land. By legal fiction. herein private respondents after finding that the applicants and their predecessors. since the Spanish colonial period. peaceful and adverse possession of the subject parcels of land under bona fide claims of ownership for more than 80 years. public. 1099 dates back to the time of the Spanish colonial period. The Director of Lands and Director of the Bureau of Forest Development opposed the application on the ground that said parcels of land were part of a timberland. citing as authority the case of Ankron vs. open.Held: Yes. in the CFI of Capiz. holding that the classification of the lots as timberland by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of proof that the said lots are indeed more valuable as forest land than as agricultural land. continuous. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 708) Facts: On July 20. 218 . Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 1099. a public dominion. Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar filed their joint application for the registration of two parcels of land. Issue/s: Whether or not the possession of forestlands or timberlands for 80 years can ripen to private ownership.

It emphasized that a positive act of the government. and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes before registration of which may proceed. the two parcels of land were not declared by the Executive Department to be alienable and disposable. occupied by IHVCP so UP. demanded the latter to pay the forest charges to it. 3990 does not empower UP to scale. In respect to the areas covered by the timber license of IHVCP. 219 . including Paete. however long. 3990. UP (200 SCRA 554) Facts: IHVCP is a company engaged in the manufacture. Said license authorizes the company to cut. stated that a parcel of forestland is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry. The said experiment station covers a portion of the timberland in Paete. citing various cases. thus it cannot be registered under private ownership. The Court. 3990 ceded and transferred in full ownership to UP the area. which is classified as forest. an office under the Executive Department.A. which was granted by the government and shall be valid for 25 years. Ruling: Yes. It renewed its timber license. The Court ruled that possession of forestlands. and collect the corresponding forest charges prescribed by the BIR. claiming that R. The Court ruled that R. Issue/s: Whether or not UP is the owner of the portion of timberland in Paete. particularly the Executive Department is needed to declassify land. which means that the Republic of the Philippines completely removed it from the public domain. who claims ownership of said portion of timberland. cannot ripen into private ownership. IHVCP v. an Act establishing an experiment station for UP. In 1964.A. and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System.A.Ruling: No. in early 1960. IHVCP rejected the demand and it filed a suit against UP. measure and seal the timber cut by it within the tract of land referred to in said Act. processing and exportation of plywood. the Congress enacted R. instead of the BIR. collect and remove timber from the portion of timber land located in certain municipalities of Laguna. In the present case.

they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar. These two petitions have their genesis in an application for confirmation of imperfect title and its registration filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz. Capiz. L-30035. filed the application for registration. In due time. the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117. the Court of Appeals held ". which provides that. petitioners in G. Roque Borre. 3 of R.747 square meters be confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui.the said Act removed and segregated it from being a public forest. "any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the Philippines. .R. The parcel of land sought to be registered is known as Lot No. petitioner in G. applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever rights and interests he may have on Lot No. The Court further cited Sec. After trial. Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry filed their respective appeals with the Court of Appeals. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527. and Melquiades Borre. No. During the progress of the trial. it was Emeterio Bereber and as to the rest of 527. the heirs of Jose Amunategui.747 square meters. but the last question that must have to be considered is whether after all. claiming that he is entitled to have said lot registered in his name. No. The Court of Appeals declared the disputed property as forest land.A.‖ The provision of the Act is clear that UP.956 square meters. 885 to Angel Alpasan. 3990. the conclusion so far must have to be that as to the private litigants that have been shown to have a better right over Lot 885 are. the title that these two (2) private litigants have shown did not amount to a registerable one in view of the opposition and evidence of the Director of Forestry 220 . it was the heirs of Jose Amunategui. HEIRS OF AMMUNATEGUI V. . At the same time. In its decision.R.703 square meters. has the right to collect forest charges and to supervise the operations of IHVCP insofar as the property of the UP within it is concerned. being the owner of the land.956 square meters to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land containing 527. DIRECTOR OF LANDS 126 SCRA 69 Facts: There are two petitions in this case. as to the northeastern portion of a little less than 117. The latter also filed an opposition. L-27873 filed an opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. and has an area of 645.747 square meters was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.

just the same to resolve the conflicting positions of the private litigants among themselves as to who of them had demonstrated a better right to possess because this Court foresees that this litigation will go all the way to the Supreme Court and it is always better that the findings be as complete as possible to enable the Highest Court to pass final judgment. this Court stating that it had felt impelled notwithstanding. but only after there had been a previous warning by the District Forester that that could not be done because it was classified as a public forest. . two (2) years after this case had already been filed in the lower Court. he had been in "‘open. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years. so that having these in mind and remembering that even under Republic Act 1942 which came into effect in 1957.’ the foregoing details cannot but justify the conclusion that not one of the applicants or oppositors had shown that during the required period of thirty (30) years prescribed by Republic Act 1942 in order for him to have shown a registerable title for the entire period of thirty (30) years before filing of the application. the decision must have to be as it is hereby reversed. that even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry had insisted on its claim all throughout that period of thirty (30) years and even before and applicants and their predecessors had made implicit recognition of that. and the only time when the property was converted into a fishpond was sometime after 1950. the 221 . the land was a classified forest land so much so that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensee before 1926 and after that. . continuous. and this can only mean that the Bureau of Forestry had stood and maintained its ground that it was a forest land as indeed the testimonial evidence referred to above persuasively indicates. preceding the filing of the application. or a bare five (5) years before the filing of the application. the result must be to deny all these applications. in order for applicant to be able to demonstrate a registerable title he must have shown "‘open. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain’. continuous. the fact must have to be accepted that during that period. "IN VIEW WHEREOF. turning back the clock thirty (30) years from 1955 when the application was filed which would place it at 1925.".

said land was already "private land" better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest classification. The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. On the other hand. The Borre complaint was for the annulment of the deed of absolute sale of Lot No. and therefore. "Forest lands" do not 222 ." Although conceding that a "mangrove swamp" is included in the classification of forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code. second and third groups are found on the land in question. 885 executed by them in favor of the Heirs of Amunategui. Furthermore. even if it is a mangrove swamp. A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. contending that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui. A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui contending that the disputed lot had been in the possession of private persons for over thirty years and therefore in accordance with Republic Act No. said lot could still be the subject of registration and confirmation of title in the name of a private person in accordance with Act No. is still subject to land registration proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of private persons for many years. 885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a "mangrove swamp. no more pronouncement as to costs. they contend that Lot 885. the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of said Code as first.application as well as all the oppositions with the exception of that of the Director of Forestry which is hereby sustained are dismissed. The petitioners also question the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in passing upon the relative rights of the parties over the disputed lot when its final decision after all is to declare said lot a part of the public domain classified as forest land. The complaint was dismissed on the basis of the Court of Appeals’ decision that the disputed lot is part of the public domain. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. it should be sustained. Issue: Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals should be sustained Ruling: Yes. 1942. another petition for review on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin. 496 known as the Land Registration Act."cralaw virtua1aw library.

N. represented by the Director of Lands. and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. To support its application. nipa palms. much less as land of the public domain. opposed the application on the ground that T.A. T. located at Sto.N. 885 does not divest such land of its being classified as forest land.A. The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative Code are found in Lot No. and that as late as 1926. the land must have been a virgin forest as stated by Emeterio Bereber’s witness Deogracias Gavacao. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Batangas and with an area of 56. the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. The appellate court found that in 1912. it must have been a thickly forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. Ruling: 223 . 1942. as amended by Republic Act No." In confirmation of imperfect title cases. Issue/s: Whether or not the applicant proved that. The Republic of the Philippines. Properties filed in the RTC of Batangas an application for the registration of a land. Tomas. T.N. the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48. The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court’s finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area.4007 hectares. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees. (555 SCRA 477) Facts: In 1999. issued by CENRO and FMS-DENR and both certifying that the land applied for was alienable and disposable. it submitted two certificates. Properties did not prove that the land was alienable and disposable. Republic v. Properties Inc. It was only sometime in 1950 that the property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District Forester that the same could not be done because it was classified as "public forest. 141. Commonwealth Act No.A. the land is alienable and disposable.have to be on mountains or in out of the way places.

20 proves that FMS-DENR has no authority to issue certificates. Court of Appeals 181 SCRA 443 Facts: In 1963. the Court cited DENR Administrative Order No. In the present case.N.4007 hectares. It is the burden of the applicant to prove that the land subject to registration is alienable and disposable and for such the applicant must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable.No. and DAO No. For the documents provided by the company. It is clear from the aforementioned DAO’s that the documents submitted by T. the Sol. Sunbeam Convenience Foods v. classifying lands to be alienable and disposable. Issue/s: Whether or not the patent issued by the Director of Lands converted the lands to be alienable and disposable from being forestlands. in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. 38 provides that CENRO can issue certificates of land classification for lands having a maximum area of 50 hectares. thus CENRO has no jurisdiction over it. The patent covers parcels of land in Bataan. 20) and DAO No. the latter registered it with the Register of Deeds and obtained an OCT. the Director of Lands issued a sales patent in favor of Sunbeam and on the same year. Properties did not provide the needed proof.A. Forestlands are part of the public dominion so they cannot be the subject of land registration cases unless they have been declassified and converted into alienable and disposable lands. so Sunbeam filed a Motion to Dismiss. which were claimed to be forestlands. T. there must be a positive act by the government. When appealed. which the CFI granted. Director of Lands v. an official proclamation by the executive department releasing the land to be alienated. instituted an action for the reversion of the said OCT. 38. DAO No. 20 (DAO No. the CA granted the petition filed by the Republic since the core issue is the classification of the lands to be forestlands. In 1976. Ruling: No. The land applied for in the case has an area of 56.N. Properties did not prove that the land is alienable and disposable.A. For a part of the public dominion to form part of the disposable lands. Court of Appeals (133 SCRA 701) 224 .Gen.

In 1977. which they acquired from their mother Soledad. which the latter claimed to be in their possession and occupation openly. Ruling: No. it reversed itself and granted the application. reclassifying the subject land as alienable and disposable from being a forestland. The Director of lands. 1961. The application was opposed by the Director of Lands (DoL) and by 25 occupants of the land.The Court affirmed the CA’s 1977 decision and acknowledged that the latter held correctly through Justice Serrano in its decision that whatever possession of the land the Salazars and their predecessors might have had prior to April 28. the Salazars claimed that their predecessors-ininterest have been in continuous. continuously. the Salazars filed an application for the registration of the 291 hectares of land (a forestland). exclusive. open. In the present case. notoriously since 1915. CA 154 SCRA 476 Facts: In 1968. To prove their ownership. non-registerable. a public dominion. REPUBLIC V. exclusively. opposed the application on the ground that 225 . 1961 cannot be credited to the thirty-year requirement. through the Solicitor General and the Director of Forestry. the point when the forestland was reclassified by the Director of Forestry to be alienable and disposable and not prior thereto since it was still a forestland. Issue/s: Whether or not the applicants proved their ownership of the land. thus. the thirty-year requirement should be reckoned from April 1961. the CA denied the application but in its 1979 resolution.Facts: In 1965. Martina Carantes for and in behalf of the heirs of Salming Piraso filed in the CFI of Baguio an application for the registration of the land. and notorious possession in the concept of owner for more than thirty years prior to their application and the siblings further presented tax declarations but the DoL still claimed otherwise. The basis of the reversal was the declaration made by the Director of Forestry in April 28. uninterrupted.

which was also affirmed by the CA. Munoz (23 SCRA 1184). cannot ripen into private ownership. no matter how long. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.where it stated that possession of forest lands. Issue: Whether the land in dispute is alienable and disposable. The CFI granted the application. As to the claim of the applicants that they have been in possession of the land since 1915. Ruling: No. 226 . Forestlands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. In its decision. the Court also addressed the CA’s ruling by citing its decision in Heirs of Amunatequi v. It also noted the failure to prove that trees are thriving in the land. ―A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. where it ruled. The Court again reiterated that there must first be a formal Government declaration that the forestland has been re-classified into alienable and disposable agricultural land. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69. The government’s failure to show that the disputed land is more valuable for forest purposes is one of the reasons for the CA’s ruling. The Court ruled that the petitioner clearly proved thru the reports and testimonies of the district foresters that the land applied for registration is a part of a forestland.the said portion land is within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve as shown in the reports and testimonies of the district foresters. 75). before private persons in accordance with the various modes of acquiring public agricultural lands can acquire it. the court cited its decision in Director of Forestry v.

and the notice was posted in conspicuous places in the City Hall of Taguig.2002. The Republic through the Director of Lands opposed the application on the ground that said land was still a part of the public domain since the land is still part of a public forest. The CFI and CA ruled in favor of Bacus. are not sufficient to change the nature of the property. 199310 Facts: Respondent Remman Ent. Bacus filed an application for the registration of a 496-m2 parcel of land in the CFI of Misamis Occidental. RTC found that the application for registration was sufficient in form and substance and scheduled an initial hearing which was published in the Official Gazette. The Court further stressed that development of forestland into residential and commercial status does not alter its legal standpoint as forestland. The CA relied on the certification of City Development Coordinator of Ozamis City. Inc. a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. LLDA avers that the subject lands are not alienable and disposable. Ruling: No. only Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor to the said application. Likewise. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.R.Republic v. Said application is comprised of two parcels of land also located in Taguig. The area is still considered forestland since it has not been declassified as such by the proper authorities. On Dec. Issue/s: Whether or not the land has been converted as part of the disposable land of the Government. who certified that the lots near and surrounding the subject land had already been registered in favor of private persons. which the CA relied on. REMMAN ENTERPRISES G. who certified that the subject land was within the commercialresidential zone and the certification of the Register of Deeds of Ozamis City. 2001. May 30. NO. Bacus (176 SCRA 376) Facts: In 1981. The Court ruled that the certifications. the Republic of the Philippines also opposed said registration since they claim that the respondents failed to prove that they and 227 . applied for a judicial confirmation of title with the RTC of Taguig. 31.

located at and below the reglamentary elevation of 12. all lands of the public domain belong to the State. or the Public Land Act. 1945 or earlier. On the other hand. exclusive. and notorious possession and occupation of the same. and notorious possession of the lands since June 12. They have presented certification from a proper government agency but failed to obtain an approval from the DENR Secretary that the land of public domain is released as 228 . Each party presented their respective witnesses. that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open. Respondents also presented documents supporting their claim over the subject parcel of lands. continuous. Ruling: Under the Regalian doctrine.D. The respondents failed to satify the above mentioned requisites. Under Sect. applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish: first.50 m.D. second. exclusive. that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12. 1945.50 meters are public lands which form part of the bed of the said lake. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. No. the Supreme Court held that the respondents failed to present incontrovertible evidence to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable Furthermore. LLDA pointed out that under RA 4850 it states that lands surrounding the Laguna de Bay. 14(1) of P. In the case at bar. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents on May 2007. No. sect. continuous. 1529. or earlier. The engineer for LLDA testified that upon aerial survey of the subject parcel of lands. as amended by P. 1073. No.their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain. 48(b) of C. No. which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. 141. it was found out that the elevations of the lots were less thatn 12. 14(1) of P.D. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision which granted the application for registration filed by the respondent.A. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect to public land acquired under Sect. and third. it also included certifications by the DENR that the said lands are alienable and disposable. which the engineer for the respondents rebutted.

389–m2Oppositor Pedro Legaspi claims that he is the owner of the eastern portion of the same parcel of land covered by Plan PSU-225872. located in barrio Minuyan. title to which is sought to be registered by Republic Cement. or earlier. covered by Plans PSU 229592 and 227659.alienable and disposable. Afterwhich. with a total area of 31. Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open. the CA ordered the registration of Lot No. for the registration in its name of a parcel of land identified as Lot No. the respondent's application for registration was denied. as the respondents only started paying taxes for the said properties in 2002 which is contrary to their claim that their predecessors-in-interest were already in possession of said lots in 1943. Plan Ap-16404. and notorious possession and occupation of the same since June 12. On appeal. the CFI ordered the registration of the parcels of land bought by Correa but Republic Cement’s application was dismissed. the second requisite was not also satisfied. 229592 and 227659 in the name of Correa allegedly because the latter failed to prove the identity of the lands he claims. 229 . Republic Cement petitioned the Supreme Court. After the trial.996 –m2.887-m2. Bulacan. 227659 and 225872 which were ordered registered in the name of private respondent Correa. The original approved document signed by the DENR Secretary must also be presented. Republic Cement Corporation v. with an area of 207. and should be attested by the legal custodian of the official records. Norzagaray. with a total area of 68. In addition. The 3 oppositors were later substituted by private respondent Moises Correa as subsequent purchaser of the aforesaid portions of said parcel of land. exclusive. Bulacan. Spouses Jose Rayo and Susana Mangahas and one Pedro Legaspi opposed the application. 2880 of the Cadastral Survey of Norzagaray. continuous. The oppositor spouses claimed that they are the owners for a period of over 60 years of the east central portion of the parcel of land. 2880 in the name of Republic Cement but excluding portions thereof as described in Plans PSU-229592. 1945. claiming that the CA erred in ordering the registration of the three parcels of land covered by Plans PSU-225872. Court of Appeals (198 SCRA 734) Facts: Republic Cement Corporation filed a petition in the CFI of Bulacan.

During the pendency of the appeal in the registration case. but as to the share of the corporation. sought to register under Act 496. through his predecessors in interest. the Government filed the corresponding record on appeal. Applicant claimed that his predecessors acquired the land by virtue of a possessory information title issued during the Spanish Regime on March 5. The application was opposed by the Government. and (b) 1/3 portion to Roman Tamayo. and declared that as to Tamayo's share. dated December 19. the Government instituted this Special Civil Action for certiorari and mandamus and the Supreme Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the lower court from issuing a writ of possession. subject to the rights of one Ariosto Santos per a manifestation submitted in court. the registration shall be subject to the final outcome of the appeal. a parcel of land indisputably included within the area reserved for military purposes under Presidential Proclamation No. Pending approval of the Record on Appeal. Ruling: Yes.Issue/s: Whether or not Correa proved the identity of the lands he claims.Andrada and others filed with the Court of First Instance a complaint against the corporation and Tamayo for reconveyance of a portion of the land in question. Hence. 1955.237. was able to establish the identity of and title to the land sought to be registered in his name. the corporation and Tamayo from exercising acts of ownership over the property. the court's decision had become final. DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS REYES 68 SCRA 177 FACTS: Alipio Alinsurin. and the register of deeds from accepting for registration documents on the land until the government shall have filed a notice of lis pendens. The technical description and the survey plan duly approved by the Director of Lands submitted in evidence by him fully describes the meters and bounds of the parcels of land involved. the lower court directed the issuance of a registration decree of the entire parcel applied for. Within the extended period. Correa. a certain Honofre A. 1/3 pro-indiviso in favor of Tamayo. The Court held that contrary to the claim of Republic Cement. 1895. and 2/3 pro-indiviso in favour of the corporation. and on motion of the corporation and of Tamayo. The lower court adjudicated (a) 2/3 portion of the land in favor of the corporation. copy of which was duly served upon the corporation and Tamayo. later substituted by Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation. The trial court assumed 230 .

IF APPELLEE WAS SERVED WITH COPYOF RECORD ON APPEAL. REPUBLIC V. — Execution pending appeal is not applicable in land registration proceedings. Pursuant thereto. and the trial court ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the original certificate of title and to issue new titles to Andrada. et al. MAXIMO 135 SCRA 156 231 . as it is violative of the explicit provisions of the Land Registration Act. but in violation of the Supreme Court's injunction (in L-27594). LAND REGISTRATION.jurisdiction over. "free from all liens and encumbrances. Such failure cannot impair the right of appeal. EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL NOT APPLICABLE INLAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS. SPS. especially if the substantial rights of the adverse party is not impaired and the appeal taken was from the entire decision which is not severable. he was served with a copy of the original. TORRENS TITLE ISSUED BASED ON JUDGMENT THAT ISNOT FINAL IS A NULLITY. — The failure of appellants to serve a copy of their notice of appeal to the counsel for one of the several appellees is not fatal to the appeal. It is fraught with dangerous consequences. as well as the amended record on appeal in both of which the notice of appeal is embodied. — A Torrens Title issued on the basis of a judgment that is not final. ISSUANCE OF TITLE DESPITE TIMELY APPEAL IS ERRONEOUS. the judgment being on appeal.LAND REGISTRATION. NOTICE OF APPEAL. which requires that a decree shall be issued only after the decision adjudicating the title becomes final and executory.where admittedly. is a nullity. FAILURE TO SERVE APPELLEE WITH NOTICE OFAPPEAL CANNOT IMPAIR RIGHT OF APPEAL. 2. 3.— The lower court acted without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of a decree of registration despite the appeal timely taken from the entire decision a quo. and decided. ISSUE: Whether or not the execution pending appeal is applicable? HELD: The court held that: 1. 4. the corporation executed a subdivision plan of the parcel subject of the land registration. Innocent purchasers may be misled into purchasing real properties upon reliance on a judgment which may be reversed on appeal. the case in favor of Andrada.. and it is on the basis of said decree that the register of deeds concerned issues the corresponding certificate of title.

The title states that the 29-hectare land was located in Barrio Yamay. Tesalona’s tax declarations stated that the land was located in Barrio Cambuga. Issue: Whether the land in question can be registered under the Torrens System Ruling: No.Facts: The Court of First Instance at Gumaca. The decision became final and executory. less 200 hectares which should be registered in the names of the Heirs of Lorenzo Consolacion. Moreover. in the names of the spouses Prudencio Maxino and Tarciana Morales. The basis of the claim of the Maxinos is a Spanish title. the possessory information title relied upon by the Maxino spouses covered only 29 hectares of land and not 885 hectares. A decree and an original certificate of title were issued. a gratuitous composition title or adjustment title issued on July 30. The spouses have not shown that a title for 29 hectares could be a valid title for 970 hectares. 1888 to Prudencio Tesalona pursuant to the Royal Decree of December 26. cannot ripen into private ownership. allegedly located at Barrio Cambuga (Anonang). Lot 1. The boundaries and areas stated in Tesalona's tax declarations reveal that a different land was covered thereby. the Republic filed with court an amended petition to annul the decision. The petition was verified by the Acting Director of Forestry. The court said that possession of public forestal lands. It is axiomatic that public forestal land is not registerable. 1884 for 29 hectares of pasture land. now Anonang. the said land cannot be registered. After hearing the judge denied the petition and ruled in favor of the spouses. ordering the registration of said land. Quezon on March 21. 1961 rendered a decision. decree and title on the ground that they are void because the land in question was still a part of the unclassified public forest. Mulanay. More than eight years later. however long. 232 .

they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. 179987 Facts: On 20 February 1998. Jr. Apart from presenting documentary evidence. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession. Lino Velazco. NO. notorious. and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Thus.R. While the subject property 233 . who testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather. Issue: Whether or not petitioners can register the subject land under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both Ruling: No. Malabanan himself and his witness. Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration.MALABANAN VS REPUBLIC G. according to their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. to appear on behalf of the State. Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land in Silang Cavite. and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty years. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco. The application was raffled to the RTC Cavite-Tagaytay City. Aristedes Velazco. The OSG duly designated the Jose Velazco.

ZAPANTA 133 SCRA 820 Facts: The Municipality of Antipolo. One of the two applicants was Conrado Eniceo. Those public structures occupy almost the entire area of the land. He had applied for registration under the Torrens system of a parcel of land containing 258 sq. the Office of the Municipal Treasurer. has considered the disputed property. 234 . The applications were approved by the Registration Court on 26 February 1980. a single application for the registration of two distinct parcels of land was filed by two distinct applicants before the then CFI Rizal. for more than 50 years now. the Integrated National Police Building. it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. Makati (the Registration Court). Branch XV. Thus. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. and the public abattoir.826 sq. m. (the disputed property) surveyed in the name of the Municipality of Antipolo. There is indication to the effect that it had been the site of the public market as far back as 1908. there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence. m. Both parcels were situated in the Municipality of Antipolo. like the Puericulture and Family Planning Center. conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. and the land they were applying for registration was a parcel containing 9. since 1920 “up to today. to be public land subject to Antipolo’s use and permission to use within the prerogatives and purposes of a municipal corporation. or at the latest. On August 8. additional public structures were built thereon. MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO V.” Gradually. The other applicant was “Heirs of Joaquin Avendaño”. 1977. its appeal was disallowed. described below. Antipolo took steps to interpose an appeal but because it failed to amend the Record on Appeal.was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982.

the appeal was dismissed on August 23. Ruling: The claim of the Avendaño heirs that they merely tolerated occupancy by Antipolo which had borrowed the disputed property from them. They forget that all lands are presumed to be public lands until the contrary is established. Antipolo filed a complaint (Civil Case 41353) at the CFI Rizal. Antipolo had also declared the disputed property as its own in Tax Declarations Nos. its Decision adjudicating the disputed property as of private ownership is null and void. It was not a bar to the action brought by Antipolo for its annulment by reason of res judicata. Upon motion of the Avendaño heirs to dismiss on the ground the Antipolo had not filed its Brief within the reglementary period. Antipolo perfected an appeal to the then Court of Appeals. The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in their names or of their predecessors-in-interest as early as 1918 does not necessarily prove ownership. since as far back as 1916. Pasig against named “Heirs of Joaquin Avendaño”. It never attained finality. in their Answer. Antipolo filed a motion for reconsideration. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. which Antipolo claimed it had not received. 993 and 454. Since the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for registration of public property of Antipolo. 1981.On May 22. erroneously presupposes ownership thereof since that time. since they had been in possession. the case was dismissed. Branch XIII. Issue: Whether the subject parcel of land was a property of public domain. It follows that the titles issued in favor of the Avendaño heirs must 235 . 909. A notice to file Brief was issued by the Appellate Court. 1983 despite the fact that before the dismissal. and their assignees praying for nullification of the judgment rendered by the Registration Court. The defendants. After a preliminary hearing on the mentioned special defense. and can be attacked at any time. Antipolo had submitted its Appellant’s Brief. pleaded a special defense of res judicata.

Rizal covered by Plan Psu-189753 of the Bureau of Lands which he acquired by inheritance from his father. in seeking the registration of the land. Vicente Reyes. Oppositors appealed contending that the land applied for was originally owned by Basilia Beltran's parents. The trial court declares Vicente Reyes the true and rightful owner of the land and orders the registration of his title. and upon their death in 1894. however. 1961 an application for registration of his title to a parcel of land situated in Antipolo." "na ipananagutan sa inutang na halagang isang daang piso. An opposition was filed by the Director of Lands. all surnamed Sierra and Antonia Santos. Cirilo. a widow. Failure of mortgagor to redeem the property does not automatically vest ownership of the property to the mortgagee. relied on his belief that the property belongs to his father who bought the same from Basilia Beltran.00 meter-wide strip of the land along Lucay Street for the latter's widening and improvement.also be held to be null and void. the amount of P100. Francisco Sierra and Emilio Sierra together with Alejandra. REYES VS SIERRA G.R. and ownership of the thing mortgaged is retained by Basilia Beltran. antichresis. Sr. may recover the loan. Aurelio. The act of applicant in registering the property in his own name upon mortgagor's failure to redeem the property would amount to 236 . 1926. borrowed from applicant's father. Apolonio. provided that the title to be issued shall be subject to a public easement of right of-way over a 2.00 and secured the loan with the piece of land in question.." etc. The mortgagee. the mortgagor. Constancio. Basilia inherited the property. Basilia Beltran." "Kahit isangla o ipagbili. No. Issue: Whether the land was mortgaged or a subject to conditional sale Ruling: The Suprem Court held that the applicant's predecessor-ininterest is a mere mortgagee. which would grant the latter the right to appropriate the thing mortgaged or dispose of it. Felimon. L-28658 Facts: Vicente Reyes filed on January 3. or pactum commission and not as an absolute sale or pacto de retro sale. Applicant. Oppositors contended that the words "isinangla. although the mortgage document evidencing the loan was non-registrable being a purely private instrument. On April 19. manifest that the document should be treated as a mortgage.

Metro Manila. The motion to withdraw the application was granted. 1926 until paid.appellee within ninety (90) days from the finality of decision. HEIRS OF MARINA C. 1992. Barrio Nangka. 1987 an application for registration of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Balubad.00 plus interest at the rate of six per cent (6%) per annum from April 19. that she had "by herself or through her predecessor-in-interest have been in open. Marina filed another application for land registration before the Pasig RTC. oppositors-appellants are directed to pay the applicant. 2007 Facts: Marina Regalado filed on July 14. the debt in the amount of P100. No. citing as grounds the discrepancies on the question of the survey and accession number corresponding to the survey plan of the property and for another reason that the inevitable absence of applicant from the country to arrange and assist in the intestate estate of her late widowed sister whose children [were] all minors in London. 1988 in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation.a pactum commissorium which is against good morals and public policy.R. and that she 237 . REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G. Marina later filed on May 28. Subsequently. The court denied the petition on a technical ground. Marina subsequently filed on January 18. On March 17. The application was published on November 14. Meanwhile. 168155 February 15. REPRESENTED BY AMADEO C. continuous and notorious possession and occupation of said land which is alienable and disposable of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since 1945 or earlier". Marina filed a petition to reinstate the earlier application which was withdrawn. inter alia. Marikina. 1992 an "Amended Application for Registration alleging. 1991 a motion to withdraw the application without prejudice to the refiling of the same. REGALADO AND HEIRS OF ARNULFO C. REGALADO vs. REGALADO.

the trial court's finding that Marina had been in open. he ceded. In fine." This they failed to discharge. it claiming to be the owner of the property which it referred to as the "Balubad Nangka Project" and which had been declared as an Area for Priority Development under Proclamation No.acquired the land "by virtue of a Deed of Assignment dated January 3. The National Housing Authority (NHA) filed an opposition on March 15. her eldest son Arnulfo Regalado pursue the land registration case in their behalf. there is not proof to sustain the trial court's finding that Marina. In the same Waiver. and waived 30. Issue: Whether Marina had been in open. While the case is pending. Arnulfo Regalado executed a Waiver of the "area covered by the National Housing Authority without prejudice to the other land subject of the petition. her uncle. 1977 executed by the registered claimant Tomas Antero as Assignor in her favor. Daclag v Macahilig 238 . aunt. continuous. 1994. transferred. continuous. other than Marina's uncorroborated testimony given in a previous attempt to have the property registered. In addition. Marina died as a result. and adverse possession in the concept of owner under a bona fide claim of ownership fails. 1980. 1967 dated May 14. and adverse possession in the concept of an owner under a bona fide claim of ownership to validly register said land? Held: Marina's heirs as applicants in this land registration case "bear the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.239 square meters of the property to the NHA. and other relatives have been residing in the property for more than 30 years and that she herself had been residing there for 15 years when a Tomas Antero executed the deed of assignment in her favor.

it is proper. the issue involved is one of ownership.R. and for this purpose. RULING: Yes. What is sought is the transfer of the property. which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name. The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision. was not owned by Maxima at the time she 239 .Respondents filed with the RTC for reconveyance. Maxima executed a Statement of Conformity in which she confirmed the execution of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and conformed to the manner of partition and adjudication made therein. a daughter of Candido and Gregoria (the owners of land) entered into a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition with the heirs of her deceased brothers.The essence of an action for reconveyance is that the free patent and certificate of title are respected as incontrovertible. Respondents had sufficiently established that Parcel One. to its rightful owner or to one with a better right.G. Mario and Eusebio Macahilig. In an action for reconveyance. The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the respondents. 1982. an OCT was issued in the name of Daclag by virtue of her free patent application. covered by OCT of which respondents' northern one half portion formed a part. Maxima. ISSUE: Whether the reconveyance of the subject land by the respondents is proper. 2008 FACTS: On March 18. No. evidence of title may be introduced. 159578 July 28. Maxima sold Parcel One to spouses Adelino and Rogelia Daclag (petitioners) as evidenced by a Deed of Sale.

Liwanag Santiago ceased to be an employee of respondent SBMA. Records show that while the land was registered in the name of petitioner Rogelia in 1984. she and her family were asked to vacate and return possession of the subject housing unit. SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY G.sold the land to petitioners. Issue: 240 . R. Said parcels of land were leased by Rodriguez to Santiago and Mateo for a period of 50 years. and that as a consequence thereof. defendant is still claiming possessory rights over said property. By virtue of the contract Santiago is occupying the land. the instant complaint for reconveyance was filed by the respondents in 1991. SBMA further alleged in its counter statement of facts that. and was thus still within the ten-year prescriptive period. as mandated by the SBMA Housing Policy. PEDRO R. the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property. And in fact defendant is using the two parcels of land for commercial and other purposes. 2006 Facts: Plaintiffs claim that co-petitioner Victoria Rodriguez is the sole heir and administrator of the estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez. since the contract between Liwanag and SBMA concluded and has not been renewed. However. Lately. No. SANTIAGO vs. Liwanag Santiago (wife of Pedro Santiago) only availed of the housing units as a privilege for her being an employee of SBMA. The petitioners further alleged that defendant having no authority to possess the land. Hermogenes Rodriguez was the owner of parcels of land registered in his name under a certificate of title denominated as Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree. Santiago is informed by the agents of SBMA that he should vacate the property because said defendant would need the same for its own use. 156888 November 20. To comply with her contractual commitments. Rodriguez now desires to recover possession of the property from the defendant. An action for reconveyance prescribes in 10 years.

we have no alternative but to uphold the ruling that Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership. assert right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property. by which means he can maintain control and. Armando G.Whether or not Spanish Titles are still admissible as evidence of ownership of lands? Ruling: It has long been settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. or other means. whether in a land registration proceeding or in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.D. Title to real property refers to that upon which ownership is based. filling. 892 which took effect on 16 February 1976. Santiago lacked the personality to claim entitlement to possession of the same. and their Spanish title remain inadmissible as evidence of their ownership of the Subject Property. It is the evidence of the right of the owner or the extent of his interest. If not. of any foreshore lands bordering 241 . 1957. non-compliance therewith will result in a reclassification of the real property. the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands covered thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 892. Rodriguez. In the case at bar. The fact that petitioners were in actual possession of the Subject Property when they filed the Complaint with the trial court on 29 April 1996 does not exclude them from the application of P. RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging. without legal or equitable title to the subject property. And. No. REPUBLIC VS CA 73 SCRA 146 Facts: On June 22. as a rule. Victoria M. 496) within six months from the date of effectivity of the said Decree or until 16 August 1976. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R.

the term "foreshore lands" refers to: The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. and to establish. Issue: Whether or not the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged area and whether or not “foreshore land” and the reclaimed area is within the commerce of man. Ordinance No. provide. Republic questioned the agreement. maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Ruling: The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the respondent court that the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged areas. and the decision was affirmed by the CA with modifications. the part of a seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm. To repeat.them. construct. It contended. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Pasay City and RREC. Pursuant to the said law. that the agreement between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the contract is outside the commerce of man. among others. Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce of man because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term “foreshore land” than that in the definition provided by the dictionary. we cannot broaden its 242 . The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project. A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream). In so doing. RA 1899. it being a foreshore land.

The land was formerly part of the Municipality of Santiago. It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. and therefore ultra vires and null and void. Under the compromise agreement. 1981. but out of this area. 1981 annulled as being patently void and rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Solicitor General.500 hectares was adjudicated to and acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval. Under the compromise agreement. has taken the present recourse in a bid to have that decision of March 5. Reyes. but had been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of Republic Act No. Heirs of Liberato Bayaua. 158. as amended by Ordinance No. filed an original application for registration of a tract of land. If the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term foreshore lands. and Philippine Cacao & Farm Products. 243 . Province of Isabela. 7454 of the Santiago Cadastre. An order of general default was thereafter entered against the whole world except the oppositors. Inc.meaning. have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899. it should have provided expressly. the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (as applicants) renounced their claims and ceded portions of land in favor of Bureau of Lands. 5.236. REPUBLIC VS SAYO 191 SCRA 71 FACTS: The spouses. The Government including the heirs of Liberato Bayaua opposed such registration. 1.500 hectares were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their counsel. much less widen the coverage thereof. Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez. The parties also mutually waived and renounced all their prior claims to and over Lot No. The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until a compromise agreement was entered into by and among all the parties. in payment of his attorney's fees. the respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance with its terms. 121. Jose C. On March 5. and the Agreement under attack. in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. Bureau of Forest Development.

March 2. Considerations of fairness however indicate the remand of the case to the Registration Court so that the private parties may be afforded an opportunity to establish by competent evidence their respective claims to the property. the decision of the respondent Judge complained of is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Republic of 244 ." It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the judgment approving it must be. who is the principal counsel of the Government. declared null and void. more or less. m. as they are hereby. after all.. are not binding until they are actually received by the Solicitor General. Situated in the Municipality of Bani. No. WHEREFORE. Inc.ISSUE: Whether or not compromise agreement is a proper remedy in confirming the title of the private respondents over a tract of land? HELD: The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development to the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the absence of evidence of title required of the private respondent. Land Registration Case No. The initial application for registration was filed for Pacific Farms.288 sq. N-109 subject of the petition is REMANDED to the court of origin which shall conduct further appropriate proceedings therein. Act 496.R. 73246. Pangasinan. the Solicitor General. DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. under the provisions of the Land Registration Act. and set aside. acting as agent of the Solicitor General in land registration cases. the area consists of 187. receiving the evidence of the parties and thereafter rendering judgment as such evidence and the law may warrant. 1993 Facts: Land involved is an island known as Tambac Island in Lingayen Gulf. It was error to disregard the Solicitor General in the execution of the compromise agreement and its submission to the Court for approval. as amended. this is the reason for our holding that "Court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal. IAC G. It is.

to the name of J. republication is required if the amendment is due to substantial change in the boundaries or 245 . as amended. to J. but were subsequently withdrawn. The opposition likewise specifically alleged that the applicant is a private corporation disqualified under the 1973 Constitution from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain citing Section 11. neither the Land Registration Act. whether the 1973 or 1987. The Director of Forest Development also entered its opposition alleging that the land is within the unclassified public land and. thru the Director of Lands opposed the application alleging that the applicant. prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease. Inc. filed a manifestation-motion to change the applicant from Pacific Farms. Other private parties also filed their oppositions. does not possess a fee simple title to the land nor did its predecessors possess the land for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of application. On the other hand. Antonio Araneta. Our Constitution. there was no republication. the petition for review. Antonio Araneta Inc. otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. We should distinguish. the decision of the lower court was affirmed on 12 December1985. Hence. In the former case.the Philippines. Article 14. requires republication and registration may be allowed by the court at any stage of the proceeding upon just and reasonable terms. On 4 October 1979. Issue: Whether the lower court erred in granting registration in favor of private respondent. the trial court rendered a decision adjudicating the subject property to J. In an amended application. was a mere attempt to evade disqualification.. Pacific Farms. 1529.. We cannot go along with petitioners' position that the absence of republication of an amended application for registration is a jurisdictional flaw. nor Presidential Decree No. Pacific Farms. respondent amended its application to conform with the mandates of the law. Despite the supposed amendment. Apparently realizing such prohibition. as applicant. Antonio Araneta. However. Inc. hence. Held: We are inclined to agree with petitioners that the amendment of the application from the name of Pacific Farms Inc. Amendments to the application may be due to change in parties or substantial change in the boundaries or increase in the area of the land applied for. inalienable. On appeal to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. Inc.

500 hectares were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their counsel. it was the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quirino Province that drew his attention to the "patently erroneous decision" and requested him to take immediate remedial measures to bring about its annulment. that he was not even served with notice of the decision approving the compromise. neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forest Development had legal authority to enter into the compromise agreement. but out of this area. under the compromise agreement. he should have been but was not given notice of the compromise agreement or otherwise accorded an opportunity to take part therein. The Solicitor General contends that no evidence whatever was adduced by the parties in support of their petitions for registration. Jose C. but it is not. Oppositions were filed by the Government. through the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry. Reyes. adjudicated to and acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval.950 hectares. The respondents contended that the Solicitor General's arguments are premised on the proposition that the disputed land is public land. in payment of his attorney's fees. the respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance with its terms. as counsel of the Republic.increase in the area of the land applied for.500 hectares was. 1. The remaining area of 5. In a decision rendered on 1981. REPUBLIC vs SAYO Facts: The respondent spouses filed an original application for registration of a tract of land having an area of 33. and some others. The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years. 246 .

and obviously not constituting primary evidence of ownership. founded on nothing but the agreement among themselves that they had rights and interests over the land. 247 . It is an inefficacious document on which to base any finding of the private character of the land in question. The result has been the adjudication of lands of no little extension to persons who had not submitted any substantiation at all of their pretensions to ownership. to prove the private character of the large tract of land subject of their application. was a photocopy of a certification of the National Library. it not being one of the grants made during the Spanish regime. it appears that the principal document relied upon and presented by the applicants for registration. There was no competent evidence adduced by the parties in support of their petitions for registration.Issue: Whether there was no evidence adduced by the parties in support of their petitions for registration Held: Yes. The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development to the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the absence of evidence of title required of the private respondents It thus appears that the decision of the Registration Court a quo is based solely on the compromise agreement of the parties. a totally unacceptable proposition. But. as this Court has already had occasion to rule. What was done was to consider the compromise agreement as proof of title of the parties taking part therein. Portions of the land in controversy were assigned to persons or entities who had presented nothing whatever to prove their ownership of any part of the land. In the proceeding at bar. that Spanish document cannot be considered a title to property. But that compromise agreement included private persons who had not adduced any competent evidence of their ownership over the land subject of the registration proceeding.

and set aside. The case was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals which. the process must strictly be complied with. The decision of the respondent Judge complained of is annulled and set aside. 1989 dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction”. Considerations of fairness however indicate the remand of the case to the Registration Court so that the private parties may be afforded an opportunity to establish by competent evidence their respective claims to the property.It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the judgment approving it must be. Petition was granted. Held: YES. 1529. The land registration court in its decision dated June 13. Issue: Whether the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. including the state. Being in rem. set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. declared null and void. who have rights to or interests in the property. The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such 248 .) No. as they are hereby. 1529 requires publication of the notice of initial hearing. such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons. DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (P. in compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. This being so.D.

On July 11.mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Pangasinan on August 30. After notice and publication. On October 6. JOSE S. Time and again. GOMEZ et.The lots were among those involved in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. 1984. pointing out that no opposition was raised by the Bureau of Lands during the registration proceedings and that the decision of August 5. Gomez owner of certain lots in Sitio Poponto Bayambang. COURT OF APPEALS. On 5 August 1981. and there being no opposition to the application. 1981. Perez. Land Registration Commission submitted a report to the court a quo stating that portions of the land sought for registration were covered by homestead patents issued in 1928 and 1929 and registered under the Land Registration Act. G. Gomez (father of Consolacion).R. this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language. vacillation or equivocation.al. There is no alternative. the court rendered its decision adjudicating the subject lots in petitioners' favor. 77770 Facts: Petitioners applied for registration of several lots situated in Bayambang. 1981 should be implemented because it 249 . wherein the Supreme Court declared Consolacion M. 1968. 1981 and the order of October 6. Chief of the Division of Original Registration. there is room only for application. there is no room for interpretation. 1981. Abran. 1981 be set aside. the trial court issued an order expressly stating that the decision of August 5. ATTY. No. Petitioners are the heirs of Teodoro Y. respondent Silverio G. 1981 had become final and directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated in the decision of August 5. He recommended that the decision of August 5. Petitioners opposed the report. the trial court issued an order of general default. VS HON. Pangasinan.

No. or set aside. he clearly acted without jurisdiction. the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course. petitioners assert. the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6 October 1981.had long become final and executory. Petitioners contend that section 30 should be read in relation to section 32 of P. Ruling: Petitioners anchor their claim on section 30 of P. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied. ordinary civil actions. incontrovertibility until after the expiration the entry of the final decree of registration. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) which provides that. or land registration in the sense of of one (1) year after Petition denied. that it may no longer be reopened. Petitioners' contention is not correct. the lower court rendered a second decision setting aside the decision dated August 5. this recourse. the court shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of title. MENDOZA VS. Unlike the adjudication of land in a cadastral proceeding does not become final. after judgment has become final and executory. 1529 in that. 1981 for the issuance of decrees. 1981 and the order dated October 6.D. CA 250 . dated 25 March 1985. After hearing.D. reviewed. This being the law. Issue: Whether the decision dated August 5. AHence. when respondent Judge set aside in his decision. 1981 had become final and executory. once the judgment becomes final and executory under section 30.

In 1968. Mendoza overlooks Section 29 of the Land Registration Act which expressly authorizes the registration of the land subject matter of a registration proceeding in the name of the buyer (Cruz) or of the person to whom the land has been conveyed by an instrument executed during the interval of time between the filing of the application for registration and the issuance of the decree of title. Issue: Whether the title can be dealt with in the name of a “third party”. upon failure of Cruz to pay Mendoza. Maria. The Court of Appeals ruling must be sustained. The contract of sale was admitted in court in lieu of the pending application for land title. The decision became final and executory. After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the decree of title by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office. the land therein 251 . Mendoza sold the land to Daniel Cruz. Second. During pendency of the application before the land registration court.84 scra 76 Facts: In 1964. Mendoza petitioned that the title issued in the name of Cruz be cancelled. it was proven that Mendoza caused the registration in the name of Cruz pursuant to their contract of sale. 29. “SEC. ordering the registration of the two parcels of land in the name of Cruz subject to the usufructuary rights of Mendoza. The land registration court ruled in favor of Mendoza on the ground that the court erred in its earlier decision in issuing the land title to Cruz – who was not a party to the application of title initiated by Mendoza. however. Cruz appealed. Bulacan. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Cruz. Ruling: Yes. is owned by Mendoza. First of all. Mendoza applied for a title. it was proven that a parcel of land located in Sta. The registration court rendered a decision in July 1965.

The interested party may. 133 SCRA 718 Facts: Mariano De Vera died in 1951. shall order such land registered subject to the encumbrance created by a said instruments. . And the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in this case show that these requirements have been complied with in this case.described may be dealt with and instruments relating thereto shall be recorded in the office of the register of deeds at any time before issuance of the decree of title. however. she made an inventory showing that De Vera’s property (located in Calasiao. JULIA CARAGAY-LAYNO VS CA 26 DECEMBER 1984. 252 . Estrada however noticed that the Torrens title under De Vera indicated that his property measures 8752 sq. m. and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the case. De Vera’s nephew (Salvador Estrada) took over as administrator of De Vera’s estate. together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the application. in the same manner as if no application had been made. A stranger or a third party may be dealt with in the land registration proceedings. . m (more or less). Pangasinan) measures 5417 sq. His widow administered his property until her death in 1966. . The only requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the court by the interested party together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the application. or order the decree of registration issued in the name of the buyer or of the person to whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments. Prior to the widow’s death. present such instruments to the Court of First Instance instead of presenting them to the office of the register of deeds. and the court after notice to the parties.

It was shown that Juliana. that the title held by Estrada was registered in 1947 but it only took them to initiate an action in 1967 therefore laches has set in. exclusive and notorious possession and in the concept of an owner of the land since 1921. Juliana averred that she and her father have been in open. continuous. The discrepancy approximates the portion of land actually being occupied by Juliana. that when de Vera registered his portion of land adjoined to that of Juliana. in her inventory before she died. Issue: Whether the disputed portion should be adjudged in favor of De Vera’s estate. Ruling: No. By that. more or less. attested that de Vera’s portion of land is only 5417 sq. agreed to have Mariano de Vera borrow her title for the purposes of Mariano obtaining a loan during de Vera’s lifetime. that they’ve been paying taxes. The error is highlighted by the fact that de Vera’s widow.He learned that the discrepancy is the 3732 sq. an unlettered woman. A recalculation must however be made to specify the exact 253 . The inclusion of Juliana’s land in De Vera’s title was erroneously done. Estrada sued to evict Juliana. m. being occupied by Juliana. m. the latter’s land was erroneously included. the only portion that can be adjudged in favor of de Vera’s estate is that which was being claimed by the widow (in her inventory).

L-17696 Facts: On November 19. 1949 by virtue of Homestead Patent No V-19 the land in question 254 . m. The homestead settlement application had been filed with the now defunct National Land Settlement administration pursuant to Executive Proclamation No. had been applied for as a homestead by the herein defendant Braulio Cosme on March 22. 1926 a sales application was filed with the Bureau of Lands by Benito Tolentino for a tract of public agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares. Their principal contention is that after the certificate of title was issued on November 10. pursuant to which he obtained Original Certificate of Title No. however. V-19 had been issued to him by the Bureau of Lands on the following August 19. which was given number 8706. situated in Barrio Callang Municipality of Gamu. the land was advertised for sale to the highest bidder and on February 15. 1953. under which certain areas of public agricultural land in Isabela were reserved for settlement purposes.3506 hectares. Province of Isabela. the applicant discovered that a portion of the land covered by his application with an area of 2.R. 1949. P-880 from the Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Isabela on November 10. the Director of Lands filed the present action on November 27. 1950. 1928 was duly awarded to the applicant pursuant to the provisions of Chapter V of the Public Land Act On January 19. should go to de Vera’s estate. 1949 and that Homestead Patent No. No. cultivation and improvement of the area applied for as well as the payment of the purchase price. and when it was verified that the land covered by the homestead patent was embraced within the area awarded to Tolentino in 1928.measure of land belonging to each: 3732 sq m should be retained by Juliana (portion which she actually occupies) and 5020 sq. DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS THE COURT OF APPEALS G. Upon investigation. for the cancellation of the homestead patent and the original certificate of title issued to the defendant Braulio Cosme. Tolentino having complied with the legal requirements as to actual occupancy. and it was upon recommendation of that office that the patent was issued by the Director of Lands. 610 promulgated in 1940. Upon protest by Benito Tolentino filed with the Bureau of Lands. the Director of Lands signed the corresponding order for the issuance of a patent in his favor. specifically that portion identified as Lot No. In accordance with the application. 8091 Pls-62. an investigation was conducted by the District Land Officer for Isabela.

and that upon the expiration of one year from the date of its issuance. No. 86 and others). be it original or a duplicate. is that. in appropriate cases and after prior administrative investigations by the Director of Lands. while with the due registration and issuance of a certificate of title over a land acquired pursuant to the Public Land Law. therefore. SOFRONIO G. proper actions may be instituted by said official which may lead to the cancellation of the patent and the title. and one of them is when the title is void. Ramoso vs. . A certificate of title based on a patent. SAYO G.came under the operation of the Land Registration Act as provided in Section 122 thereof. is still subject to certain conditions and restriction..As a matter of fact. the court cannot simply invalidate them. Obligado. L-60413 255 . even after the expiration of one year from the issuance thereof. must give way to the latter. and the consequent reversion of the land to the Government. 60 Phil. And a title will be considered void if it is procured through fraud. as long as the land disposed of is really a part of the disposable land of the public domain (El Hogar Filipino vs. Olviga.The inescapable conclusion. 22.free or sales patent. said property becomes registered in contemplation of Act 496. HON. after the lapse of one (1) year. when in conflict with one obtained on the same date through judicial proceedings.On the other hand certificate of title issued pursuant to Act 2259. Where a portion of a land subject of a land registration case are covered by titles based on homestead. and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance thereof. as when a person applies for the registration of a land in his name although he knows that the property belongs to another. becomes incontrovertible.7 A certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes of the patent to a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding. free or sales patent. a certificate of title. such certificate of title. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.in view of its nature and manner of acquisition. Ruling: No. the said title became incontrovertible. 70 Phil..R. Issue: Whether the court can invalidate the lands covered by titles based on homestead. may only be ordered cancelled under special circumstances.

256 . Then. The remaining area of 5. Under the compromise agreement. Jose C. Isabela. 4. 236. The applicants for registration presented a mere photocopy of a certification of the National Library stating that the property in question was registered under the Spanish system of land registration as private property. Reyes. 8.000 hectares. an area of 4.341 hectares.000 hectares.950 hectares tract of land but was opposed by the government including the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua . After about 20 years. the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval renounced their claims and ceded — 1) in favor of the Bureau of Lands. The respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance with its terms. 12. a compromise agreement was entered into by the parties. and 4) in favor of Philippine Cacao & Farm Products. but had been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of Republic Act No. Inc.. in payment of his attorney's fees. 1.500 hectares were assigned to their counsel.109 hectares. The land was formerly part of Santiago.Facts: Spouses Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez filed an original application for registration of 33. But. 3) in favor of the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua. an order of general default was entered against the whole world except the oppositors.500 hectares was adjudicated to and acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of Sandoval. that Spanish document cannot be considered a title to property. but out of this area. 2) in favor of the Bureau of Forest Development.

founded on nothing but the agreement among themselves that they had rights and interests over the land. informacion posesoria was considered a mode of acquiring title to public lands. public. and obviously not constituting primary evidence of ownership.it not being one of the grants made during the Spanish regime. adverse. The result has been the adjudication of lands of no little extension to persons who had not submitted any substantiation at all of their pretensions to ownership. and uninterrupted possession of the land for 20 years. Portions of the land in controversy were assigned to persons or entities who had presented nothing whatever to prove their ownership of any part of the land. a totally unacceptable proposition. subject to two conditions: first. proof of 257 . Issues: Whether the Registration Court correctly rendered decision based from the compromise agreement of the parties. What was done was to consider the compromise agreement as proof of title of the parties taking part therein. Ruling: The compromise agreement and the judgment approving it is declared null and void. Under the Spanish Mortgage Law. as here. and second. The decision of the Registration Court a quo is based solely on the compromise agreement of the parties but such included private persons who had not adduced any competent evidence of their ownership over the land subject of the registration proceeding. Whether informacion posesoria is a prima facie evidence of possession. but where. actual. the inscription thereof in the Registry of Property.

until her death sometime in 1944. he transmitted the ownership and possession thereof to his daughter and sole heir. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS et.R. interests.fulfillment of these conditions is absent. province of Nueva Ecija. mountainous and thickly forested with a heavy growth of timber of commercial quantities. REYES G. situated at the municipality of Laur. The land is largely uncultivated.957 hectares of said land consist of the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay established under Proclamation No.al. 1895. The latter in turn continued to cultivate the land thru tenants and utilized portions for pasture. that approximately 13. and upon his death in 1900. VS HON. of a vast tract of land. 237. The motion was granted by the lower court. 1964. exclusive. Director of Forestry. continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application. sought the registration of title under Act 496. On November 19. L-27594 Facts: On February 24. ownership and dominion over the property subject matter of the application. the applicant Alipio Alinsunurin. The applicant Alipio Alinsunurin filed a motion for substitution of parties. 237. SALVADOR C. the lower court rendered decision holding that the parcel of land applied for is adjudicated to and ordered to be registered in favor of: (a) Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation. It is claimed by the applicant that Melecio Padilla acquired the land by virtue of a possessory information title issued during the Spanish regime on March 5. 1966. 1955 of the President. claiming that the applicant was without sufficient title and was not in open. of the President. 1955. Maria Padilla. it having acquired all his rights. as amended. a 258 . admittedly inside the boundary of the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay. The Director of Lands. No. dated December 10. It is beyond dispute that the land subject of the application is included within the area reserved for military purposes under Proclamation No. claiming ownership in fee simple by inheritance from the late Maria Padilla. requesting that the Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation be considered as the applicant in his place. dated December 19. and the Armed Forces of the Philippines opposed the application.

the lower court approved the Amended Record 259 . the Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. Both motions were opposed by the Government. and two-thirds (2/3) pro indiviso in favor of Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation. 1967. 1967. resident of Cullit. By an order. married. Likewise. within ten days from receipt of the order. the Commissioner of Land Registration issued Decree No. Tamayo. 1966 had become final as to the share of Roman C. the lower court. the lower court required the Provincial Fiscal to file an Amended Record on Appeal. Tamayo. directed the issuance of a decree of registration of the entire land. Tamayo. 0-3151 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Nueva Ecija. The oppositors Director of Lands. Philippines. thru counsel. ruling that its decision of November 19. the applicant Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation filed a motion for the issuance of a decree of registration pending appeal. On March 16. On April 12. On March 11. two-thirds (2/3) portion.Philippine corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens. Pending the approval of the Record on Appeal. Lallo. with address at Manila. Director of Forestry and the Armed Forces of the Philippines filed a Notice of Appeal from the said decision to the Supreme Court. Filipino citizen. subject to the rights of Ariosto Santos and (b) Roman C. the Amended Record on Appeal was duly filed and copies served upon the appellees. 1967. Roman C. Tamayo. 113485 pursuant to the said order. filed a motion for the issuance of a decree of registration. 1967. one-third (1/3) portion of the said property. Cagayan. on March 15. On March 14. subject to the final outcome of the appeal. and. so as to include therein certain orders and pleadings. one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso in favor of Roman C. 1967.

was forwarded to this Court in due course of appeal. 1967. It is fraught with dangerous consequences. Thus. Ruling: The appeal taken by the Government was from the entire decision. the petitioners instituted before the Supreme Court a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction. together with the evidence and transcripts. In any event. We rule that execution pending appeal is not applicable in a land registration proceeding. which is not severable. 260 . the decree of registration issued pursuant thereto and Original Certificate of Title of the Register of Deeds for the province of Nueva Ecija.on Appeal which. Innocent purchasers may be misled into purchasing real properties upon reliance on a judgment which may be reversed on appeal. seeking to nullify the order dated March 11. the appeal affects the whole decision. As the lower court denied reconsideration of the order directing the issuance of a decree of registration. Issue: Whether the lower court acted without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of a decree of registration despite the appeal timely taken from the entire decision a quo.

as it is violative of the explicit provisions of the Land Registration Act which requires that a decree shall be issued only after the decision adjudicating the title becomes final and executory. ATTY. 1981. and there being no opposition to the application. JOSE S.R. VS HON. On 5 August 1981. On July 11. the trial court issued an order of general default. Gomez (father of Consolacion).al. and it is on the basis of said decree that the Register of Deeds concerned issues the corresponding certificate of title. Pangasinan on August 30. the lower court acted without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of a decree of registration despite the appeal timely taken from the entire decision a quo. 1984.The lots were among those involved in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. the trial court issued an order expressly stating that the decision of August 5. Pangasinan. Gomez owner of certain lots in Sitio Poponto Bayambang. the court rendered its decision adjudicating the subject lots in petitioners' favor. 1968. G. wherein the Supreme Court declared Consolacion M. COURT OF APPEALS.A Torrens title issued on the basis of a judgment that is not final is a nullity. respondent Silverio G. Perez. After notice and publication. No. Land Registration Commission submitted a report to the court a quo stating that portions of the 261 . GOMEZ et. Chief of the Division of Original Registration. Petitioners are the heirs of Teodoro Y. 77770 Facts: Petitioners applied for registration of several lots situated in Bayambang. On October 6. Consequently. 1981. 1981 had become final and directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated in the decision of August 5. Abran.

Unlike the adjudication of land in a cadastral proceeding does not become final. or land registration in the sense of of one (1) year after 262 . incontrovertibility until after the expiration ordinary civil actions. after judgment has become final and executory. Ruling: Petitioners anchor their claim on section 30 of P. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) which provides that. 1981 and the order of October 6. he clearly acted without jurisdiction. petitioners assert. or set aside. He recommended that the decision of August 5. dated 25 March 1985. 1981 be set aside.D. the lower court rendered a second decision setting aside the decision dated August 5.D. AHence. No. Petitioners contend that section 30 should be read in relation to section 32 of P. once the judgment becomes final and executory under section 30. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied. 1981 should be implemented because it had long become final and executory. reviewed. 1981 for the issuance of decrees. 1529 in that.land sought for registration were covered by homestead patents issued in 1928 and 1929 and registered under the Land Registration Act. Petitioners' contention is not correct. when respondent Judge set aside in his decision. This being the law. 1981 had become final and executory. the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course. that it may no longer be reopened. After hearing. pointing out that no opposition was raised by the Bureau of Lands during the registration proceedings and that the decision of August 5. Petitioners opposed the report. the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6 October 1981. this recourse. the court shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of title. Issue: Whether the decision dated August 5. 1981 and the order dated October 6.

DE BANUVAR G. As long as the final decree is not issued by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office in accordance with the law. the cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title. 1938 the CFI rendered a decision confirming the 263 . now appellant Cayanan. as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title and the adjudication of said lot in favor of petitioners. Felix Camaya. It prayed further for the opening of the decree of registration. No. through deceit and through intentional omission of facts. Petition denied. In the same year. Issue: Whether the case may still be reopened and the decision set aside when granted Ruling: Yes. FACTS: On March 24. it may. It was stated further that a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in favor of the other respondent appellee. however it was denied. DE LOS SANTOS 21 SCRA 1348 Facts: The title of appellee De Los Santos to Lot 56 of Porac Cadastre was confirmed by Judge Santos of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. L-22110. the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision therein rendered continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it. and the period of one year filed for the review thereof has not elapsed. HEIRS OF CRISTOBAL MARCOS vs. CAYANAN V. there was a petition for review for the said lot. It was alleged that said lot was registered in the name of appellee De los Santos through actual fraud.R.the entry of the final decree of registration.

is proper and justified. The petitioners herein admittedly took possession and occupation of portions of lot 1 prior to July 1. Psu-56145 before the issuance of the decree. 264 .interest of La Urbana. filed a petition for reconstitution of the decision of March 24. open and uninterrupted possession and occupation of the said parcel in the concept of owners since time immemorial. long before the World War II. over lot 5 and lot 1. the court issued another order granting a writ of possession in favor of De Banuvar and "against all persons who have entered and occupied portions of lot 1. 1963 when the decree in question was issued. RULING: In the opposition to the petition for reconstitution. 1938.On May 17. For this reason. adverse. on a claim that they have been in actual. and have introduced improvements thereon." On June 13. with certain reservations. the order of granting a writ of possession in favor of De Banuvar against the petitioners. the petitioners opposed the application for the reconstitution. However. Psu-56145." ISSUE: Whether the issuance of the order is proper.titles of La Urbana. During the pendency of the reconstitution proceedings. the respondent De Banuvar acquired lot 1 from de Erquiaga. 1963 the respondent court ordered the issuance of a decree in favor of De Banuvar with respect to lot 1 only. after finding that the decision in the land registration case had already become final and executory. Inc. Inc. 1960 de Erquiaga. Moreover. who was thus substituted as a party for the latter. one of the successors-in. the petitioners' alleged possession and occupation of portions of lot 1 arose prior to or during the registration proceedings. and ordered the registration of these lots in favor of the latter. They prayed that the application for the reconstitution of records be denied and that "the parcels of land in question be ordered registered in the respective names of the herein oppositors or declare the same as public land and be subdivided to oppositors who are landless.

Rule 39. 1955. DE BARROGA. regarding the execution of a judgment in civil action.et al. Furthermore. or the person in whom the land is ordered to be registered. but also against any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time before and up to the issuance of the final decree. Furthermore.One of the oppositors was Ruperta Pascual. failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been filed cannot prejudice the owner. CFI Ilocos Norte rendered a decision in Cadastral Proceeding No. There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree. The reason is . However. 1941. the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission. there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. the decree of registration was only issued on October 14. except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. 1988 Facts: On July 31. 9821 in favor of Delfina Aquino. 1979.et al. that an original certificate of title was issued in Delfina Aquino's name. ANGEL ALBANO. VS.R. Eufemia Barroga and Saturnina Padaca.. upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal. 1970. EUFEMIA VILLANUEVA VDA. 44 adjudicating a parcel of land known as Lot No. The decision in a land registration case unless the adverse or losing party is in possession.the children and heirs of Ruperta Pascual. No.On August 11. G. becomes final without any further action. L-43445 January 20.The fundamental rule is that a writ of possession can be issued not only against the original oppositors in a land registration case and their representatives and successors-in-interest. who was declared in default. and it was only on November 17. 6. brought suit in the same Court of First Instance praying 265 .. that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party.

since the right to the same does not prescribe. The appellees are entitled to said writ of possession. and particularly upon those who had actually taken part in the proceeding as well as their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding. the Court of First Instance ordered execution of the judgment on December 6.COURT OF APPEALS 5 SCRA 240 Facts: Ezequiel Santos (and his wife) is claiming ownership of Lot No. binding generally upon the whole world. et al. 9821. in their answer. litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity. and that title be adjudicated in their favor. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre by virtue of an adjudication of the cadastral court in favor of his father. resisted plaintiffs' claim and asserted their ownership 266 . Issue: Whether the Court could still issue orders despite lapse of long period of time from entry of judgment. 1975. their right thereto being imprescriptible at least as against the persons who were parties to the cadastral case or their successors-in-interest. Thereafter. MAMERTA DE LA MERCED VS. Hence. 1973. the Cadastral Court promulgated an order granting the motion of Angel Albano. The motion was thereafter denied by the court by Order dated September 22. for a writ of possession as regards Lot No. On August 8. 1975. Held: The judgment of the cadastral court was a judgment in rem. The plaintiffs appealed. this petition. 1975 was issued. Barroga's and Padaca's complaint was denied by the court. The writ of possession could properly issue despite the not inconsiderable period of time that had elapsed from the date of the registration decree. A writ of possession dated August 28.that Delfina Aquino's title be voided and cancelled. Defendants. inclusive of persons not parties thereto. despite the lapse of many years.

Plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. title of ownership on the said adjudicatee was vested as of the date of 267 . Ruling: A decree of registration and a certificate of title. was allowed to intervene and make common cause with the defendants. The cadastral court declared the lot a public land. And it is the decree of registration. after filing a homestead application therefor. Hence.. under Act 496. the Director of Lands no longer had authority to grant the homestead patent over the same to Juan de la Merced. While the court held that the land having ceased to be part of the public domain. without such an appeal having been perfected. as a consequence of which Juan de la Merced. and there being no imputation of irregularity in the said cadastral proceedings. 395 after the decision adjudicating ownership to him of the said property had already become final. a legitimate daughter of Juan de la Merced. the same as well as the certificate of title issued thereafter was null and void. Mamerta de la Merced. are two different things. ordering the issuance to Inocencio de los Santos of the certificate of title over Lot No. The certificate of title would then be necessary for purposes of effecting registration of subsequent disposition of the land where court proceedings would no longer be necessary. and. which shall be the basis of the certificate of title to be issued subsequently by the corresponding register of deeds. The title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to appeal from the decision or adjudication by the cadastral court. therefore. As we have here a decree issued by the cadastral court. directed defendants to vacate Lot.over said property as evidenced by an OCT issued to their predecessor Juan de la Merced and their continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years. Issue: Whether the property thereby affected still be lost by adverse possession. was able to obtain Original Certificate of Title. parents of plaintiff Ezequiel Santos. to be issued by the Land Registration Commissioner. that quiets title to and binds the land. the court ordered the cancellation of OCT in the name of Juan de la Merced. The court rendered a decision for the plaintiffs after making a finding the lot was part of the OCT in the name of the spouses Inocencio de los Santos and Victorina Macapagal. the filing of the instant petition for review. Holding that the cadastral court had no jurisdiction to issue the order declaring the lot public land.

on the ground that the decision ordering the decree was obtained by Busuego by misrepresenting herself to be the sole owner of the lot when in truth. a petition for the setting aside of said decree and the cancellation of the certificate issued thereunder. having acquired the same by purchase from Teodora's mother. Fausta Busuego. children of a deceased brother of Teodora. The land. Hence. which 268 . also prayed for the same relief on the allegation that their father was an undivided co-owner (with Teodora) of one-half of Lot 2497. Gapan Cadastre. DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. for all intents and purposes.the issuance of such judicial decree. BUSUEGO 12 SCRA 678 Facts: Teodora Busuego applied for a decree of registration of the Lot No. having acquired the same by descent from their father. The court dismissed the said petitions for the reason that its jurisdiction as a cadastral court being special and limited. A decree of registration was issued in favor of the applicant. and that as long as the final decree is not issued and the period of one year within which it may be reviewed has not elapsed. through their predecessorin-interest. In a separate petition. it has no authority to pass upon the issues raised in the pleadings. RULING: It has been held that the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year from entry of the final decree. the spouses Amando Joson and Victoria Balmeo filed in the same proceeding. Within one year from the issuance of the decree. Severino Busuego. were owners of one-half thereof. ISSUE: Whether the decreed issued in favor of the respondent Busuego is final. petitioners. the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree. registered property which could not be acquired by adverse possession. 2497. from that time. had become. Antonio and Rogelio Busuego. the present appeal by the petitioners.

. . and the period of one year fixed for the review thereof has not elapsed... Eland Phil. Rosauro. and Reynes(49 Phil. VS. 60 Phil. of a parcel of land which was already registered by the petitioner. 173289. the RTC granted the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the respondents on August 1999. NO. FEBRUARY 17. Inc. pursuant to Section 38 of Act 496. In the present case. 2010 Facts: On March 1998.R. may even set aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case alleging that the pleading asserting the claim stated no cause of action and that the respondents are not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. De Villa (48 Phil. 622).. As long as the final decree is not issued by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office in accordance with the law. Philippine Railway Co. ( Afalla et al v. as the petitions were filed within one year from the date of the issuance of the decree.court after hearing. The lower court nullified the title held by the 269 . Such is the ruling laid down in the case of De los Reyes vs. 227). AND HEIR OF TIBURCIO MALABANAN NAMED TERESA MALABANAN G. After a series of several motions and delays (postponements). AZUCENA GARCIA. which was later reiterated in that of Roman Catholic Bishop of Cebu vs. in fee simple. . INC. the same are properly cognizable by the court that rendered the decision and granted the said decree. Respondents contended that they are the owners. the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision therein rendered continues to be under control and sound discretion of the court rendering it. ELAND PHILIPPINES. ELINO FAJARDO. in fact was already awarded an OCT for it. 546). respomdents filed with the RTC of Tagaytay a complaint for Quieting of Title with Preliminary Injunction against the petitioner.

as provided under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure. Clearly. going by the records. A summary judgment is proper if. while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues. observed keenly that plaintiffs’ cause of action for quieting of title on the disputed parcel of land is based on the alleged fraud in the substitution of their landholdings Notwithstanding. the issue of possession is a question of fact by the interaction of the basic pleadings. as amended. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that a summary judgment. but was dismissed by the said court. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested. the aspects of possession in accordance with Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act 141. the Supreme Court stated that summary judgment covers any action with the exemption of actions for annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or legal separation. and was ordered to be cancelled including the tax declaration covering the subject land. In their motion for summary judgment. the facts pleaded by the respondents in their motion for summary judgment have been duly disputed and contested by petitioner. A "genuine issue" is an issue of fact that requires the presentation 270 . In the present case. is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. raising genuine issues that must be resolved only after a full-blown trial.petiotioners. This Court. Issue: Whether a summary judgment is the proper remedy in quieting of title. the petitioner was able to point out the genuine issues. The petitioners filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals on February 2006. proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial. the observation of this Court is that the plaintiffs were able to prove by the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence. They merely reiterated their averments in the complaint for quieting of title and opposed some issues raised by the petitioner in its Answer Ad Cautelam. and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine.Furthermore. depositions. the affidavits. the respondents failed to clearly demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of fact.

the remedy may be availed of only when. Under Article 476 of the New Civil Code. or. fictitious. or unenforceable. a cloud is thereby cast on the complainant’s title to real property or any interest therein. by reason of any instrument. where petitioners acquired their interest in the land before any final decree had been entered. in these circumstances. which decree is prepared and issued by the Land Registration Administrator. quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. claim. in fact. invalid. record.of evidence as distinguished from a sham. Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial court. The one-year period stated in Sec. an equitable title on the real property subject of the action and that the alleged cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid As long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Authority and period of one year has not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree. they can hardly be considered innocent purchasers in good faith. A petition for review under Section 32 is a remedy separate and distinct from a motion for new trial and the right to the remedy is not affected by the denial of such a motion irrespective of the grounds upon which it may have been presented. the decree becomes incontrovertible and no longer subject to reopening or review. ineffective. which appears valid but is. After the lapse of said period. the plaintiff must first have a legal. 32 within which a petition to re-open and review the decree of registration refers to the decree of registration described in Section 31. the litigation was therefore in effect still pending and. encumbrance or proceeding. voidable. the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration case continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the registration court. contrived or false claim. at least. Where the petition for review of a decree of registration is filed within the one-year 271 . Thus. It can thus be seen that for an action for quieting of title to prosper.

The petitioner should be afforded an opportunity to prove such allegation. which granted the petition of Quirino Bolanos and ordered herein respondents-appellants (J. 3622 and 3623 of the same Court of First Instance of Rizal. BOLANOS VS JM TUASON & CO. versus J. 37677 & 37686. et als. petitioners. In a previous case filed by appellant Tuason against appellees for the recovery of the possession of said land (Tuason vs.26 hectares and included in the area covered by TCT Nos. still pending appeal. declaring Original Certificate of Title No. The petition of Bolanos not to be disturbed in their physical possession was upon the ground that in the three other civil cases Nos. ) their agents and all persons acting for the in their behalf as well as all other from disturbing the physical possession of Bolanos of the parcel of land comprising of 13. 106). M.. Inc.. et al. it is error for the court to deny the petition without hearing the evidence in support of the allegation of actual and extrinsic fraud upon which the petition is predicated. 3621.period from entry of the decree. either personal or 272 . The Supreme court granted the petitioners review and reversed and set aside the ruling of the lower court. wherein appellees Bolanos had alleged among their defenses that appellant Tuason's titles were obtained "thru fraud or error and without knowledge (of) or notice. No. Tuason & co. Tuason & Co..M. Bolaños. Branch X in LRC Rec. 93 Phil. Inc. Tuason & Co. respondents.. principally for want of jurisdiction of the court that issued said original title on account of defects in the publication of the notices of the proceedings for their registration. 1965 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 735 from which the two above-mentioned titles have been derived null and void. 1971 Facts: J. M. Quirino Bolaños.. the said court has rendered a decision. 37 SCRA 223. appealed the order dated September 9. 7581.

1960 de Erquiaga. one of the successors-in. if one should be needed. in any of its aspects. Once a land registration proceeding is terminated and a corresponding decree has been issued. Psu-56145. Inc. On May 17. filed a petition for 273 .R. this Court upheld the validity of the questioned titles and affirmed the decision of the trial court "declaring defendant (now appellee Bolaños) to be without any right to the land in question and ordering him to restore possession thereof to plaintiff (now appellant) Tuason. L-22110." Issue: Whether or not the land registration court has jurisdiction to hear and to resolve issues of possession. and ordered the registration of these lots in favor of the latter. after the original registration proceedings have come to an end and a writ of possession has already been issued? Ruling: No.interest of La Urbana. Inc. September 28. No provision of the Land Registration Act (Act 496). 1968 FACTS: On March 24. 1938 the CFI rendered a decision confirming the titles of La Urbana. over lot 5 and lot 1. HEIRS OF CRISTOBAL MARCOS vs. The appealed order of September 9. 1965 is declared to have been issued beyond the jurisdiction of the court a quo and it is hereby declared null and void and set aside.thru publication to" said appellees. the only matter of possession of the land involved that remains within the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court is in regard to the issuance of the writ of possession. DE BANUVAR G. Section 112 of Act 496 which is the only provision in the said law empowering the land registration court to issue post or after-registration orders refers exclusively to amendments and alterations of the title issued and has nothing to do with possession of the land at all. No. with certain reservations.

reconstitution of the decision of March 24. RULING: In the opposition to the petition for reconstitution. and have introduced improvements thereon. the petitioners' alleged possession and occupation of portions of lot 1 arose prior to or during the registration proceedings. but also against any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time before and up to the issuance of the final decree. Moreover. is proper and justified. the respondent De Banuvar acquired lot 1 from de Erquiaga. open and uninterrupted possession and occupation of the said parcel in the concept of owners since time immemorial." ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the order is proper. the court issued another order granting a writ of possession in favor of De Banuvar and "against all persons who have entered and occupied portions of lot 1. They prayed that the application for the reconstitution of records be denied and that "the parcels of land in question be ordered registered in the respective names of the herein oppositors or declare the same as public land and be subdivided to oppositors who are landless. For this reason. 1938. the order of granting a writ of possession in favor of De Banuvar against the petitioners. long before the World War II. on a claim that they have been in actual. after finding that the decision in the land registration case had already become final and executory. there is no provision in the Land Registration Act 274 . 1963 when the decree in question was issued. who was thus substituted as a party for the latter. the petitioners opposed the application for the reconstitution. adverse." On June 13. 1963 the respondent court ordered the issuance of a decree in favor of De Banuvar with respect to lot 1 only. Psu-56145 before the issuance of the decree. The petitioners herein admittedly took possession and occupation of portions of lot 1 prior to July 1. Furthermore. During the pendency of the reconstitution proceedings. However. The fundamental rule is that a writ of possession can be issued not only against the original oppositors in a land registration case and their representatives and successors-in-interest.

Inc. INC. regarding the execution of a judgment in civil action. and MACONRDAY FARMS. Inc. being the source of its own title.. Realty further impleaded through a third-party complaint QCDF for nullity of its own title covering the same subject properties. namely Morris Carpo. There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree. and that the judge had no authority since the records which was made basis of the title was lost during the war and is pending reconstitution. However. the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission. praying therefor for the reimbursement of its purchase price paid for the said properties.. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT. or the person in whom the land is ordered to be registered. QCDF filed a fourth-party complaint against Alvendia. the same was dismissed for QCDF’s lack of 275 . (Realty). Carpo instituted a complaint before the CFI under Respondent Judge Vera against Realty and Macondray Farms. and Financing Corp. upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal. on the ground that the same was issued by a court not sitting as a land registration court but one of ordinary jurisdiction. Thus. Quezon City Dev’t. becomes final without any further action. In reply. ET AL. Rule 39. failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been filed cannot prejudice the owner. (Macondray) for the declaration of nullity of its corresponding certificate of title. 6. that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party.similar to Sec. and that it was Carpo’s title that was null for having been issued despite being covered by another title. (QCDF) and Realty Sales Enterprise. except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. INC. et al. The decision in a land registration case unless the adverse or losing party is in possession. REALTY SALES ENTERPRISE. VS. 161 SCRA 56 Facts: Two (2) parcels of land are in dispute for allegedly being covered by certificates of title and registration decrees under three (3) different entities. The reason is . In reply. Furthermore. Realty denied the allegations and countered that the Reyes Court which issued its title was performing a purely ministerial duty.

from which resulted a re-raffling of the case and later on.R. No. Each of these modes have different procedural requirements. is still within legal bounds” 2. or (2) an appeal on certiorari to the Supreme Court. a Justice appointed to the Criminal Cases Divisions cannot be assigned to the Civil Cases Divisions. 1981. There are two modes by which cases decided by the then Courts of First Instance in their original jurisdiction may be reviewed: (1) an ordinary appeal either to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals. and 5. Yes. Thus. Further. and not as a special civil action for certiorari. However. After as. On January 20. Justice Bidin was reassigned from the Fourth Civil Cases Division.“ A reading of the law will readily show that what BP 129 prohibits is appointment from one class of divisions to another class. the case was subjected to the reorganization of the Judiciary. since Realty’s title was issued when the records relative thereto was undergoing reconstitution. x x x Realty originally filed a Petition for certiorari with this Court docketed as G. Whether QCDF was properly impleaded to the case. However. The same was appealed before the High Court by Realty. Ruling: 1. L-56471 questioning the decision of the Vera Court. 4.Whether Carpo’s title is valid as against Realty’s and QCDF”s . the trial court rendered judgment annulling Realty’s and QCDF’s titles to the property in favor of Carpo. while Justice Camilon was reassigned from the Second Civil Cases Division. this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction for proper determination on the merits of the appeal. 2. the change from CA to IAC yielded a change in Justices assigned to the case. a 276 . Whether a Petition for Certiorari was the proper remedy in the case. The two therefore come from the same class of divisions to which they were appointed. a reversal of the prior decision through Carpo’s MR. Whether Carpo was an innocent purchaser for value. " It may thus be observed that even this Court treated the petition first filed as an appeal. 3. and asking that it be allowed to appeal directly to this Court as it was raising only questions of law.Whether the Special Third Civil Cases Division was conferred with jurisdiction to try and render a decision of final resolution for the Court. To the latter category belong cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved. Issues: 1. For instance. but the latter resolved to refer the case the Court of Appeals for determination of the merits. and The CA in turn set aside the trial court’s decision and issued a new one in favor of Realty.interest in prosecuting the case. the reassignment of Justices Bidin and Camilon to form the Special Third Civil Cases Division in view of the voluntary inhibition of two (2) "regular" members. Yes.

Abural. Sta. petitioners brought the case to this Court on appeal.”. 1969." Precisely. and the Original Certificate of Title was cancelled as Transfer Certificate of Title No. The records were destroyed at that stage of the case when an that remained to be done was the ministerial duty of the Land Registration Office to issue a decree of registration (which would be the basis for the issuance of an Original Certificate of Title) to implement a judgment which had become final (See Government v. He merely relies on the presumption of good faith under Article 527 of the Civil Code. there is an official report of the decision of this Court affirming both the CFI and the CA decisions. that the decree of registration in favor of the Baltazars was transcribed in the Registration Book for the Province of Rizal and that an Original Certificate of Title was issued. 26 SCRA 316). (People v. A final order of adjudication forms the basis for the issuance of a decree of registration.petition for review by certiorari is also a form of appeal. Yes. It was on the same day. at the time of sale there was as yet no Torrens title which Carpo could have relied upon so that he may qualify as an innocent purchaser for value. 996 [1919] at 1002. However. August 22. 5. Resuello L30165. 257 [1968]. No. 1970. 111 Phil. 1 SCRA 1294. by virtue of a deed executed before Iluminada Figueroa. There are however authentic copies of the decisions of the CFI and the Court of Appeals adjudicating Lots 1. 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035 to Estanislao Mayuga. 4. albeit by way of certiorari. Not being a purchaser for value and in good faith. The land registration case itself remained pending and the Court of First Instance of Rizal continued to have jurisdiction over it. Notary Public of Manila dated October 9. 303961 in the name of Carpo was issued. that the deed evidencing the sale between the Baltazars and Carpo was inscribed in the Registry of Property. x x x Thus it was error for the IAC to hold that the Decision of the Vera Court "cannot be passed upon anymore in the Court of Appeals decision because appeal and not certiorari was the proper remedy. the original registered owners. De Banuvar. Moreover. the parties thereto did not have to commence a new action but only had to go back to the preceding stage where records are available. No. Moreover. x x x Even Carpo himself cites no factual proof of his being an innocent purchaser for value. October 13. x x x Carpo bought the disputed property from the Baltazars. on October 13. policy considerations and the factual circumstances of the case compel this Court now to 277 . 1970. 134 Phil. he is in no better position than his predecessors-in-interest. Applying the doctrine in the Nacua decision to LRC Case No. it was only later. 657. 3. even as this Court agrees with QCDFC that the third-party complaint filed against it by Realty was procedurally defective in that the relief being sought by the latter from the former is not in respect of Carpo's claim. Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. 947 [1961]. 39 Phil. Ana v. Menla. 69 SCRA 35). 1970. x x x Thus.

** To rule on QCDFC's claim now is to avoid multiplicity of suits and to put to rest these conflicting claims over the property. The Estate was placed under the administration of the Director of Lands. and the Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands.. Piedad Estate was acquired by the Philippine Government pursuant to the Friar Lands Act. (It is a Friar Land. TCT No. Ltd. Controversy arising from conflicting claims over Lot 823 began after a fire gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall on June 11. NOS.) The subject parcel “Lot No. and exercised its right. however. the Barques submitted copies of the alleged owner’s duplicate of the TCT. 823 with an area of 342. 210177 actually involves 2 278 . 162335 & 162605 Facts: Piedad Estate originally owned by Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company. 1988 which destroyed records stored in the Office of the Register of Deeds. 823. QCDFC was afforded fun opportunity. Although both titles of the Manotoks and the Barques refer to land belonging to Lot No. 614. 210177 in the name of Homer Barque also covering Lot 823. In 1990. was dismissed since it failed to prosecute its case. After an. the British-Manila Estate Company. to prove its claim over the land. The certificate of title in the name of the government was OCT No. In support of their petition. Ltd. MANOTOK VS. real estate tax receipts.. 210177 was spurious.945 square meters  GRANTED  TCT No. Manotoks filed a petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar.R.rule as well on QCDFC's claim to the disputed property. It presented documentary as well as testimonial evidence. On 23 December 1903. MANOTOK opposed alleging that TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) was issued in 1991. tax declarations and a Plan Fls 3168-D covering the property. In 1996. 372302 covering Lot No. 8 years after the fire the Barques filed a petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. BARQUE G. It was even permitted to file a fourth-party complaint which. 823” is part of the Piedad Estate and is located in QC.

Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan filed a motion to intervene. In the CA.  Lot. 2004.  Manotoks filed MR  Denied in April 2006 Resolution.  Denied in June 2006 Resolution. Eventually entry of judgment was made in the Book of Entries of Judgment on May 2. it ordered the Barque title to be reconstituted. 823 and attached the findings of the NBI that the documents of the Manotoks were not as old as they were 279 . LRA found that the reconstitution of the Manotok title was fraudulent. --> Barques MR was denied  They appealed to the LRA  LRA Reversed. Hence. to which was attached their petition in intervention. Thereafter. RT-22481 (372302) pertains only to a 1 parcel of land. 823 already registered in the name of the Manotoks.945 square meters. while TCT No. The LRA denied the Manotoks’ MR and the Barques’ prayer for immediate reconstitution. 2006. Both the Manotoks and the Barques appealed the LRA decision to the CA. the Manotoks filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second MR with their MR attached. In the meantime.December 12. the Barques filed multiple motions with the First Division for execution of the judgment. They alleged that their predecessor-in-interest.945 square meters. genuine and existing” TCT No. On September 7. In 1997 – Barques’ petition was DENIED. while the Manotoks filed an Urgent Motion to Refer Motion for Possession to the SC En Banc (with prayer to set motion for oral arguments).  Case was referred to the En Banc in July 2006. Hence. 210177. with a similar area of 342. 511 covering Lot No. BUT cancellation must 1st be sought in a court of competent jurisdiction of the 1991 Manotok TCT.parcels with an aggregate area of 342. 2005. No. SC First Division  affirmed both decisions of the CA. Valentin Manahan. was issued Sale Certificate No. 2006. In 2002 and 2003  2 separate divisions of the CA both directed the RD of QC to cancel the Reconstituted Manotok Title and to reconstitute the Barques’ “valid. the Manotoks filed the present separate petitions which were ordered consolidated on August 2. Felicitas Manahan filed a motion to intervene and sought the dismissal of the cases claiming ownership of the subject property.

Barques . PURPOSE: to decide WON the title of the Maotoks should be annulled. Manahans .Their grandfather bought Lot 823 from the Government in 1919. built their houses and buildings on it.R.En Banc set aside the December 2005 1 st division decision and entry of judgment recalled and the CA’s Amended Decisions in CA-G. SP Nos. Consequently. 66642 and 66700 were reversed and set aside.The lot originally belonged to his parents but was subsequently bought by his wife. They have since occupied the land. The En Banc remanded the case to the CA. 823? Ruling: 280 . Notably lacking in the deed of conveyance of the Manotoks is the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce as required by Section 18 of the said law. Upon close scrutiny. CA’s findings  None of the parties were able to prove a valid alienation of Lot 823 from the government in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 823 of the Piedad Estate. BASIS FOR THEIR CLAIMS FOR OWNERSHIP: Manotoks .Teresita claims her father (Homer) bought land from Emiliano Setosta who had a TCT in his name. ISSUE: Who has the better right over Lot No.purported to be. the factual allegations and voluminous documentary exhibits relating to the purchase of Lot 823 by the predecessors-in-interest of the claimants revealed badges of fraud and irregularity. The CA was directed to receive evidence of and focus on the issue of WON the Manotoks can trace their claim of title to a valid alienation by the Government of Lot No. In 2008 . the Director of the Legal Division of the LMB recommended to the Director of the LMB the reconstituted Manotok Title should be reverted to the state Oral arguments were held on July 24. 1120 otherwise known as the “Friar Lands Act”. which was a Friar Land. 2007. They had a caretaker on the property but she was ousted by armed men in 1950s so they just declared the property for taxation to protect their rights. The subject land is now known as Manotok Compound.

shows on the second page a poorly imprinted typewritten name over the words “Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources”. are NULL and VOID.Manotok Appeal denied Manahan Petition for intervention denied Petition for reconstitution of the Barque title denied All the TCTs in the name of Manotoks. sourced from the National Archives. 823 is property of the National Government of the Philippines w/o prejudice to Reversion proceedings Act No. and above it an even more poorly imprinted impression of what may be a stamp of the Secretary’s approval. which name is illegible. The Manotoks are invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of the RD’s task in issuing the TCT in the Manotoks name. 1120 SECTION 18. supplies the omission of approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in deeds of conveyances over friar lands. invoked by both the Manotoks and the Manahans. Manahans and Barque. The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and/or Quezon City are hereby ordered to CANCEL the said titles.” FURTHER. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior. DENR Memorandum Order No. 29204. 22813 in the name of the buyer Severino Manotok. Defensor. 2005 by then DENR Secretary Michael T. The Manotoks contend that “we can assume that the Manotok deed of conveyance was in fact approved by the Department Secretary because the register of deeds did issue TCT No. Lot No. In their Memorandum. states that some Deeds of Conveyance on 281 . 16-05 issued on October 27. It is clear from the foregoing provision and from jurisprudence that the sale of friar lands shall be valid only if approved by the Secretary of the Interior (later the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce). the Manotoks assert that even if we were to ignore the presumption of validity in the performance of official duty. 16. the Manotoks pointed out that their photocopy of the original Deed of Conveyance No. Department Memorandum Order No.

Such certificate of sale must. (They were claiming that they fully paid!) Their basis is SECTION 15 of the Friar Lands Act. of course. It must be noted that the Manotoks miserably failed to prove the existence of the title allegedly issued in the name of Severino Mantotok after the latter had paid in full the purchase price. nor any information on the year of issuance and name of registered owner. it simply described the copy presented as “DILAPIDATED” without stating if the original copy of TCT No. their payment of real property taxes and construction of buildings.record in the field offices of the LMB do not bear the Secretary’s signature despite full payment for the Friar Land. The Manotoks did not offer any explanation as to why the only copy of TCT No. 12 and the 2nd paragraph of Section 15. “the conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser. are of no moment. subject only to the resolutory condition that the sale may be cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid for in full. Re: Manotoks. be signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. They are deemed signed or otherwise ratified by this Memo provided that the applicant really paid the purchase price and complied with all the requirements under the Friar Lands Act. Clearly. Manotoks also point out that the Friar Lands Act itself states that the Government ceases reservation of its title once the buyer had fully paid the price. the new rule Pugeda v. as evident from Sections 11. it is the execution of the contract to sell and delivery of the certificate of sale that vests title and ownership to the purchaser of friar land. 282 . could not have acquired ownership of the subject lot as they had no valid certificate of sale issued to them by the Government because their Certificate lacks the signature of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources The decades-long occupation by the Manotoks of Lot 823. 22813 actually existed in their records. As to the certification issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan. Court found that the old rule would support the Manotoks contention however. is a conveyance of the ownership of the property. Trias. 22813 was torn in half and no record of documents leading to its issuance can be found in the registry of deeds. in relation to Section 18. or the socalled certificate of sale.

was irregularly issued and. 123346 Facts: The Petition involved properties covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. LMB or National Archives.Re: Manahans. claiming that Dimson’s title. AND MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION VS. Issue: Whether the title issued in the name of CLT valid. The Manotoks asserted their ownership over Lot 26 and claimed that they derivedit from several awardees and/or vendees of the National Housing Authority. The Manotok title likewise tracedas its primary source OCT No. CLT’s claim was anchored on TransferCertificate of Title derived from Estelita Hipolito. declared the land for tax purposes. and Manotok EstateCorporatio n (Manotoks) the possession of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate. 994 which in turnencompasses 1. 283 . NO. 994.The trial court ruled for CLT. hence.CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G. For their part. 511 can be found in the records of either the DENR-NCR.R. comprising an area larger than the sovereign states of Monaco and the Vatican. Although the OSG submitted a certified copy of Assignment of Sale Certificate No. No copy of the alleged Sale Certificate No. there is no competent evidence to show that the claimant Valentin Manahan or his successors-in-interest actually occupied Lot 823. Manotoks appeal to the CA was denied. the Manotoks challenged the validity of the title relied on by CLT. the same and subsequent titles flowing therefrom are likewise void. or paid the taxes due thereon. INC. 511 allegedly executed by Valentin Manahan in favor of Hilaria de Guzman. 994. MANOTOK REALTY.the proximate source of CLT’s title.342 hectares of the Maysilo Estate.CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT) sought to recover from Manotok Realty. Hipolito’s title emanated from Jose Dimson whose title appears to have been sourced from OCT No. Inc. The vast tract of land stretches over three (3) cities withinMetropolitan Manila.

there is a case to be made for ordering the dismissal of theiroriginal complaints before the trial court.Moreover. in fact.As it appears on the record. 1917here is a marked distinction between the entry of the decree and the entry of the certificate of title. The certificate of title is issued in pursuance of the decree of registration. the mother title was received for transcription by the Register ofDeeds on 3 May 1917 based from the issuance of the decree of registration on 17 April 1917.Obviously. it is only after the transcription of the decree by the register of deeds that the certificate of title isto take effect. 994. It wasstressed that what stands as the certificate of the title is the transcript of the decree of registration made bythe registrar of deeds in the registry. the Special Division is directed to makefurther determinations based on the evidence already on record and such other evidence as may be presentedat the proceedings before it. such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date when thetitle took effect. The fact that CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No.Considering that CLT clearly failed to meet the burden of proof reposed in them as plaintiffs in the action forannulment of title and recovery of possession." These titles could be affirmed only if it can be proven that OCT No. Hipolito’s and Dimson’s— that the properties they purport to coverwere " originally registered on 19 April 1917” in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. the entryof the decree is made by the chief clerk of the land registration and the entry of the certificate of title is madeby the register of deeds. and the plaintiffmust rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim. 1917 is not the date of inscription or the date of transcription of the decree into theOriginal Certificate of Title. for such mother title isinexistent. 994 registered on 19 April 1917 hadactually existed. any title that traces its source to OCT No.The established legal principle in actions for annulment or reconveyance of title is that a party seeking itshould establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that theland sought to be reconveyed is his.Ruling: It is evident from all three titles─CLT’s. OCT No. In an action to recover. 284 .In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail. April 19. This error alone is. It appears that the transcription of the decree was done on the date it was received by theRegister of Deeds of Rizal on May 3. Thus. the property must be identified.The Court hereby constitutes a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the case on remand. 994 dated 17 April 1917 is void. sufficient toinvalidate the CLT claims over the subject property if singular reliance is placed by them on the datesappearing on their respective titles. CLT were given the opportunity to submit such proof but it did not. 994 dated 17 April 1917 casts doubton the validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent OCT.Hence.

the Court promulgated an en banc resolution that SET ASIDE the decision and resolutions of the 1st Division and RECALLED the entry of judgment. G. In due time. 511 covering the lot No 823.R. 162335 & 162605 AUGUST 24. The decision of the 1st Division was later entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment. 2010 Facts: Lot No. Ltd. 614 and was placed under the administration of the Director of Lands. The Barques and Manahans were likewise allowed to present evidence on their respective claims that may 285 . The Manahans sought to intervene in the case. Ltd. The Piedad Estate has been titled in the name of the Government under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. the Manotoks filed several motions for reconsideration with the 1st Division but these were all DENIED by the Court. 823 is a part of the Piedad Estate. and REMANDED the cases to the CA for further proceedings to determine the validity of the Manotoks’ title. 823 of the Piedad Estate.MANOTOK VS HEIRS OF HOMER L. After the promulgation of the December 12. But when the Barques moved for the execution of the decision. was issued Sales Certificate No.. BARQUE. Voting 8-6 with 1 abstention. 2008. 1904. NOS. 2006. 1903. the British-Manila Estate Company. Vicente Manahan. On December 18. as indicated in Act No. 1120 (Friar Lands Act) enacted on April 26.. and the Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands on December 23. 2005 decision. which the Court en banc accepted on July 26. which was a Friar Land. the Manotoks sought the referral of the motion to the Court en banc. Quezon City. a Friar Land acquired by the Philippine Government from the Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company. La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar. the CA received evidence with primary focus on whether the Manotoks can trace their claim of title to a valid alienation by the Government of Lot No. alleging that their predecessor-in-interest. the Court REVERSED the decisions and resolutions of the CA and the LRA.

29204 in favor of Manotoks’ predecessor-in-interest warrants the annulment of Manotok title. the absence of approval of the Secretary of Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in Sale Certificate 1054 and Deed of Conveyance No. Ruling: Yes. (Emphasis supplied. 286 . 1054 and Deed of Conveyance No. 1919 (Exh. 29204 warrants the annulment of the Manotok title. 29204 dated December 7. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior. 1932 (Exh. the the “Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated March 10. 10) was not signed by the Director of Lands nor approved by the Secretary of the Interior. Issue: Whether the absence of approval of the Secretary of the Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in Sale Certificate No. 1120 provides: SECTION 18. Vano 182 SCRA 491 Facts: Three consolidated cases are resolved. The Manotoks belatedly secured from the National Archives a certified copy of Deed of Conveyance No. the No.) Vencilao vs.have an impact on the correct determination of the status of the Manotok title. Exhibits 33 and 34-OSG-LMB contained only the signature of the Director of Lands. given that there are same parties and parcels of land in question. Section 18 of Act No. 51-A) which likewise lacks the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as it was signed only by the Director of Lands.

Issue/s: 287 . a reconveyance of property was filed against them by Vencila et al. then set aside the same order. They have acquired the land by purchase or inheritance – and in OCEN possession for 30 years b. 3) The third case involved one of the registered owners of the land who filed a petition for complaint against the occupants who refused to vacate the land and sign the Sheriff’s return. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss. The parcels of land that they own were by mistake part of Juan Reyes’ estate 2) The second case involved the death of the administratix of the estate of the owners/heirs of the land. which resulted in an OCT.. asserting that: a. The parties whose cases were dismissed appealed to the SC. The heirs of Juan Reyes moved to dismiss the case of reconveyance stating that the other parties had no cause of action and that they were barred by prior judgement already. After her death. These petitioners contend that they were not claimantsoppositors nor defeated oppositors in the said land registration case. they continued to possess the land.since there were several petitioners).1) In the first case. A writ of possession was issued by the trial court against petitioners. After the heirs tried to take possession of the property. the heirs of the late Juan Reyes filed an application for registration of the subject parcel of land. as their names don’t appear in the amended application for registration. some were not -. a TCT was issued in the name of Pedro Luspo. and another was issued in the name of several persons. They argue that they have occupied the parcels of land for more than 30 years which began long before the application for registration and that even after registration. and then reversed itself partially (some cases were dismissed.

Contempt only applies when after the sheriff dispossess or eject the occupants. No. and cause of action between the first and second actions (Land registration and action for reconveyance) 2. The judgment was based on the merits d.-Whether or not res judicata is applicable in an action for reconveyance -Whether or not the writ of possession may be issued against them considering that the petitioners were not the defeated parties in the registration case Held: 1. they enter/attempt to enter the property. requisites are present: a. the judgment confirming the title of the applicant and ordering its registration in his name necessarily carries with it the right of ownership (right to possess-may be obtained through writ of possession). The former judgment must be final b. There is identity of parties. On the issue of contempt. A final judgment is conclusive even in subsequent cases involving the same parties and their successors-in-interest as long as the ff. 288 . Res judicata applies to all cases and proceedings. the court ruled that the occupants were not guilty. including land registration and cadastral proceedings. subj matter. Note: In a registration case. A writ of possession may be issued not only against a person who has been defeated in a registration case but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree. Rendered by a court having jurisdiction on the subject matter and of the parties c. Yes. It was the sheriff’s and not the petitioners’ fault that there was delivery of possession was unsuccessful.

a petition for certiorari was filed.R. Judge Pelayo Nuevo granted the writ of possession applied for by plaintiffs after pre-trial and hearing of the motion for the issuance of said writ. Judge Leviste. L-58438 & G.R. L-60423 FACTS: Heirs of Pascual Bellosillo and Francisca Besa. acted on the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants (Bernas) on September 12. 1981. the sala vacated by Judge Nuevo was filled through the appointment of Judge Oscar Leviste. tenants. 289 . 1981. while the defendants have not shown any definite title or right over the estate as they had first claimed that they were lessees then later.R. Baldonera Bulquirin and Teofilo Berano for recovery of possession of a 33 1/3 hectare parcel of land of the Panay Cadastre and for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction to restore the plaintiffs to the possession of the land in dispute.Bernas vs Nuevo 127 SCRA 399 G. 1981 and issued an order declaring null and void the writ of possession issued by former Judge Nuevo. Lot 3382. Hence. A motion for reconsideration was filed by defendants but the same was not acted upon due to the retirement of Judge Nuevo. No. this time by the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. the same Judge also ordered the defendants to be place in possession of the property in question. Meanwhile. the defendants filed the petition for certiorari. which are two incompatible and divergent sources of right. filed a complaint against defendants Edilberto Bernas. represented by Silvestre Bellosillo. 1982. the plaintiffs subsequently filed another motion for the issuance of a writ of possession on the ground that the same is paramount for the prevention of the estate represented by Lot 3382. Hence. The motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction having been denied. No. otherwise it will be dissipated and the plaintiffs as heirs might have nothing to inherit. In a subsequent order dated April 20. On August 28. 60423. No. petitioners in G. While the petition assailing the order granting the writ of possession was pending before this Court. on December 8.

" The act of Judge Leviste issuing the orders constituted disrespect and disregard of the authority and jurisdiction of this Court. L-16995 Facts: Julio Lucero filed and was granted a writ of possession of property (based on a final decree in a land registration proceeding). Therefore. The rule is "when other persons have subsequently entered the property. as the case may be. Although the other party filed a motion to quash the writ. 290 . A person who took possession of the land after final adjudication of the same in registration proceedings cannot be summarily ousted through a writ of possession secured by a mere motion and that regardless of any tittle or lack of title of persons to hold possession of the land in question. LUCERO V. the defendants-petitioners had been in possession of the lot since 1960 under an alleged lease contract and were not a party to the original registration case of the same way back in 1930. this was granted by CFI Iloilo’s Judge Fernan. In the case at bar. The writ of possession prayed for was issued in favor of Lucero. claiming the right of possession. and none of them had been a party in the registration proceedings. the writ of possession will not issue. This notwithstanding.R. The court dismissed these as trivial arguments. No. The Loots opposed the decision on the ground that there were defects in the reconstitution of the records and that the motion was not under oath. Two motions for reconsideration were also denied. the writ was issued after pre-trial and hearing of the motion for the issuance of the writ only and not after final adjudication of the rights of the parties over the lot in controversy. the owner of the registered property or his successors in interest cannot dispossess such persons by merely asking for a writ of possession. Ruling: The Court held that when parties against whom a writ of possession is sought have been in possession of the land for at least ten years. they cannot be ousted without giving them their day in court in proper independent proceedings. and they entered into possession apparently after the issuance of the final decree. it was a patent error on the part of respondent Judge Nuevo to issue the questioned writ. He should have waited for this Court's decision before acting on said motion for reconsideration and issuing the said orders. The remedy is to resort to the courts of justice and institute a separate action for unlawful entry or detainer or for reinvidicatory action. The Loots went straight to the Supreme Court for an appeal for certiorari. LOOT G.ISSUE: Whether Judge Nuevo and Judge Leviste erred in granting the writ of possession filed by the parties.

which became a final decree on October 29. the parties contesting the facts are deemed to have waived the opportunity to question the correctness of the findings. 1988 Facts: On July of 1941. there is no period of prescription as to the issuance of a writ of possession. otherwise. IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF SALA I. Ruling: Yes. ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND. DE BARROGA AND SATURNINA VILLANUEVA VDA. ANGEL ALBANO. 1941. CHARITO ALBANO. a decision was rendered adjudicating a parcel of land in favour of Delfina Aquino. The final decree. However. This automatic process is to avoid further delay and inconvenience to a successful land registration litigant if he were compelled to commence another action to secure possession. PETITIONERS-APPELLEES. Furthermore. the issuance of the writ of possession was only a ministerial duty of the court if no writ has been issued to the registered owner yet.The writ may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a registration case. RESPONDENT. L-43445 JANUARY 20. which necessarily implied the delivery of possession of the land. 291 . the order granting the writ of possession was based on a decision promulgated on a land registration case in 1938. but also against anyone adversely occupying the land or any portion of the land.Issue: Whether or not the order granting the writ of possession was in accordance with law. the SC can do nothing. immediately empowered the court to enforce the order/judgment/decree. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOCOS NORTE. AND PEDRO ALBANO. As to the questions of fact raised by the Loots. ROSALIA ALBANO. After the final decree. ENCARNACION ALBANO. ARSENIO ALBANO. ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND. G. These must be raised at the CA of appeals. RICARDO Y. ALFREDO RAMIREZ. DE PACADA. NAVARRO. NO. EUFEMIA VILLANUEVA VDA. the decree of registration was not issued except until after 14yrs and only after 24 yrs had passed that an OCT was issued in favour of the latter. VS. MIGUEL ALBANO. JUANITO ALBANO. in effect.R. ROSITA ALBANO. Even fraud shall not be a bar to the issuance of the writ of possession.

Subsequently. 292 . Parenthetically. under Section 17 of the same Act. or his successor-in-interest. has "a perfect right not only to the title of the land. Issue: Whether or not the Court may still issue order even beyond 15 days from entry of judgment Ruling: On November 24. but also to its possession. The matter apparently ended. et. Castro filed a complaint of intervention to recover the said land. the Barroga and Padaca’s moved to quash said writ. et al.On august of 1970(after the decree has been issued but before title)." (2) he has the right. for a writ of possesson to the said land and was issued. Thereafter. Al (heirs of Delfina Aquino). portion of adjoining land which belongs to Cesar Castro. the children and heirs of Ruperta Pascual (oppositors to the cadastral proceeding) brought a suit againsts the children of Delfina Aquino. However. it shows that the Aquino’s title encroached upon a 4sq." These doctrines have since been reiterated and reaffirmed. to a writ of possession as against any "party to the registration proceeding and who is directly and personally affected and reached by the decree" (or who had been served with process therein but had not appeared nor answered). Al. et al.. The appellants argued that they had been in possession of the said land since 1941 an rayed that a new title be made out in their names.. since the decree "is to exist forever.m. No further development anent this case appears in the record. at the instance of defendant Angel Albano. the appellees.m. the record shows that on August of 1975 the Cadastral Court promulgated an order granting the motion of Angel albano et. stating that there was nothing to execute since the verdict was simply one of dismissing the complaint. v. portion of overlapped land to Castro and dismissing the complaint filed by the Barroga’s and Padaca’s. 496). Llorente. ruling that: (1) a party in whose favor a decree of registration is issued by a cadastral court in accordance with the Torrens Act (Act No. However. A judgemtn has been rendered awarding the 4sw. too. 1925 judgment was promulgated by this Court in Manlapas. the court ordered executon of judgemtn. and (3) his right to obtain a writ of possession is not subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding execution of judgments. etc.

Furthermore. This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings. upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal." the Court said some forty-three years later. The decision in a land registration case..." It also pointed out that neither laches nor the statute of limitations applies to a decision in a land registration case. The reason is . Rule 39). except insofar as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration case has become final. (Sec. no further proceedings to enforce said ownership is necessary. "is that a writ of possession can be issued not only against the original oppositors in a land registration case and their representatives and successors-in-interest."The fundamental rule.. Ana v. and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. et al. except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration... . citing Sta. becomes final without any further action.. the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. Rule 39. 6. unless the adverse or losing party is in possession. . Menla. regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action.. 6... except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment. except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom. that the 293 . it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years. . in land registration proceedings.. condition or fact. There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree. but also against any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time before and up to the issuance of the final decree. such as a land registration case. to the following effect: We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status. . This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party.

NO. 1968 Facts: The trial court granted a writ of possession in favor of Lucero stating that the writ of possession. JAIME L.judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. ET AL. failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been filed cannot prejudice the owner. There is no period of prescription as to the issuance of a writ of possession. Ruling: A writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a registration case but also against anyone adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings. L-16995. G. Consequently. may be subject to a judicial ejectment by means of a writ of possession and it is the duty of the registration court to issue said writ when asked by the successful claimant. any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time up to the issuance of the final decree. LOOT. Consequently. or the person in whom the land is ordered to be registered.R. the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission. OCTOBER 28. The issuan ce of the decree of registration is part of the registration proceedings. Issue: Whether or not the order granting the writ of possession was in accordance with law. 294 . Furthermore. and inasmuch as the final decree has already been entered. JULIO LUCERO VS. This was opposed to by oppositors Loot contending that there are defects in the reconstitution of the records and that the motion is not under oath is trivial in its nature and consequently untenable. once the final decree has been issued the issuance of a writ of possession is only a matter of course if nothing in the past has been issued in favor of the registered owner. it follows that a writ of possession should be issued in favor of the registered owner. a writ of possession was issued. The court didn’t see any merit in the same.

" As a matter of fact. but the court didn’t see any merit in the same. A motion for reconsideration was filed three times... however it was all denied. JULIO LUCERO VS. once the final decree has been issued the issuance of a writ of possession is only a matter of course if nothing in the past has been issued in favor of the registered owner. a writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a registration case but also against anyone adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings . especially considering that the latter writ is but a complement of the latter. In fact. it is supposed to end the said proceedings. Then an appeal was filed to the Supreme Court. any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time up to the issuance of the final decree. JAIME L. NO. Issue: Whether or not there is prescription with regard to the issuance of a writ of possession. in a 1948 decision. This was opposed to by oppositors Loot. it follows that a writ of possession should be issued in favor of the registered owner. ET AL. G. and inasmuch as the final decree has already been entered. In Demorar v. is not a bar to the issuance of the writ of possession applied for by the 295 . without said writ of execution would be ineffective. it was held by us that "the fact that the petitioners have instituted. may be subject to judicial ejectment by means of a writ of possession and it is the duty of the registration court to issue said writ when asked for by the successful claimant. an ordinary action with the Court of First Instance attacking the validity of the decree on the ground of fraud. 1968 Facts: The trial court granted a writ of possession in favor of Lucero. LOOT..R. Ruling:: Regarding the writ of possession. L-16995 OCTOBER 28. likewise issue. which. more than one year after the decree of registration had been issued. Consequently. a writ of demolition must. The issuance of the decree of registration is part of the registration proceedings.If the writ of possession issued in a land registration implies the delivery of the possession of the land to the successful litigant. There is no period of prescription as to the issuance of a writ of possession. Ibañez it was decided that: ".

registered owners. in Marcelo vs Mencias it was held that “If the writ of possession issued in a land registration implies the delivery of the possession of the land to the successful litigant therein. a writ of demolition must. on March 19. Bacoor.R. ALEJANDRO C." The trial court awarded the lot to the petitioners. especially considering that the latter writ is but a complement of the latter. the respondent Regional Trial Court. SILAPAN. L-72721 JUNE 16. NO. 2 under pain of demolition and to vacate the premises in favor of private respondents within thirty (30) days. On motion of private respondents. the judgment 296 . which." Moreover. and an order for the issuance of a decree in favor of private respondents was issued. Cavite. 1985. PSU-173975 situated in Digman. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the respondent appellate court committed no reversible error in holding that the writ of possession issued by the trial court and it is a necessary consequence of the adjudication of ownership and the corresponding issuance of the Original Certificate of Title. 1988] Facts: Petitioners oppose the application for registration and confirmation of title over Lot 2. EMILLANO GAWARAN. The petitioners appealed but the petition was dismissed. In a registration case. Issue: Whether or not the court is correct in issuing the writ of possession with a special order of demolition. The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the trial court and confirmed the ownership of said Lot No. on which petitioners had their residential house and a "camarin. 2 in the names of private respondents. MAGDALENA GAWARAN ET AL. VS. issued the questioned writ of possession with the complimentary directive for the oppositors to dismantle and remove their building and/or structure from Lot No. without said writ of execution would be ineffective”. [G. likewise issue. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT. HON.

The MCTC rendered a Decision dated 5 May 1999 in favor of the respondent. DILOY GR NO. In 1997. open. however. 26 August 2008. 297 . who. in 1974. Thereafter. the subject property was transferred to Eusebio Leaban’s daughter. continuous. On 15 June 1979. but also against any one unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during the registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree. Rustico Diloy. the Republic filed a motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision which was likewise denied.confirming the title of the applicant and ordering its registration in his name necessarily carries with it the delivery of possession which is an inherent element of the right of ownership. The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the respondent failed to prove her possession as required under Presidential Decree No. During the hearing of the Application for Registration of Title. REPUBLIC vs. Diloy filed an Application for Registration of Title over the subject property. the subject property was then conveyed by Pacencia Leaban to her daughter. a writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a registration case. the Republic appealed the Decision of the MCTC to the Court of Appeals. this Petition. declared the same for taxation purposes under her name. Hence. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal of the Republic. herein respondent Gregoria L. on behalf of the Republic. He was then succeeded by his son. Eusebio Leaban. and Armando Ramos as witnesses to strengthen her claim that her predecessors-in-interest had been in actual. Subsequently. It is the duty of the registration court to issue said writ when asked for by the successful party. respondent presented her father. Aggrieved. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). notorious and adverse possession of the subject property. who also filed for taxation purposes in his name from the period covering the years 1951-1969. in turn. The said Motion for Reconsideration was denied. 1529. Pacencia Leaban. by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale. Diloy. filed an Opposition to the Application for Registration of Title. 174633. 563 SCRA 413 (2008) Facts: As early as 1948. respondent Gregoria L. Crispin Leaban had already declared the subject property for taxation purposes under his name. Hence. granting her application for registration over the subject property.

the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto. the subject property became alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982. and nullification of Proclamation No. et al. 173775. Petition is granted. Held: No. Any period of possession prior to the date when the subject lot was classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Such possession can never ripen into ownership and. No. No. a petition for prohibition. The first is G.R. any occupation or possession thereof could not be considered in the counting of the 30-year possession requirement. unless the land has been classified as alienable and disposable.R. which was short of another 15 years from the 30-yearperiod possession requirement. the subject property had not yet been classified as alienable and disposable land capable of private appropriation. 172775 **********There are two consolidated petitions. Prior to its declaration as alienable land in 1982. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. Secretary of the DENR v Yap G. even if they had occupied and were in possession of the same since 1948. 1064 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying 298 . Aklan. The period of possession by the respondent of the subject property cannot be considered to have started in 1979. the respondent was in possession of the same for only 15 years. Neither can her possession of the subject property be tacked to that of her predecessors-in-interest. 167707. which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap. when the same was conveyed to her by her mother. because during those periods.Issue: Whether the respondent has acquired a registrable title. From 1982 up to 1997. mandamus. the year the respondent filed an Application for Registration of Title over the subject property. It is beyond question that the subject property was already an alienable and disposable land at the time the Application for Registration of Title over the same was filed by the respondent. The second is G. a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo.R. However.

It ruled that neither Proclamation No. Moreover. through OSG. Marcos issued PP 1801 declaring Boracay Island as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). RTC: It upheld respondents’ right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. Further. 173775 However. The Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands. it was also denied. They appeled to the SC. but. 167707 On April of 1976. the DENR approved the National reservation survey of Boracay which identified several lots as being occupied by named persons. they have the right to have the lots registered under their names. exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land since time immemorial and they were paying their realty tax. they contend that they or through their predecessorin-interest has been in an open. On November of 1978. Since the Island has not been classified as alienable and disposable. during the pendency of the case (GR no.Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land. OSG moved for reconsideration. classified as a tourist zone. Facts: GR no. opposed the petition of the respondents’ claiming that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of public domain. The OSG maintained that the right of the respondent to judicial confirmation of title was governed by PD 705 and CA 141. Arroyo issued PP 299 . they appealed it to the CA. together with other respondents filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC of Kalibo. 167707) Pres. Invoking Sec 48(b) of CA 141 otherwise known as the Public Land Act. susceptible of private ownership. CA: Affirmed the decision of the lower court. GR no. The republic. Thus. 3-82 to implement the said proclamation. Invoking Sec 3(a) or PD 705 or the revised forestry code. the said proclamation did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of men. Yap. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable. whatever possession they have cannot ripen into ownership. continuous. then later on approves PTA Circ. as amended. The trial court cited Sections 87 and 53 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve. therefore. OSG moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Aklan claiming that the said proclamation prevented them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes. Pres. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. it is not susceptible of private ownership.

Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural. Nonetheless. all unclassified lands.R. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. PD No. 2006. they have been occupying the lot since time immemorial. also. investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators. On august of 2006. only agricultural lands may be alienated.R. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G. Appying this law. They contend that the said proclamation infringes their “prior vested right” over portions of Boracay. Sacay. such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order. including that of the Boracay Island is considered as Public forest. No. who must prove that the land subject of the 300 . No. *****On November of 2006. Gelito and other land owners filed a petition for nullification of PP1064.***** Issue: Whether or not private claimants (respondents-claimants in G. they are neither alienable nor disposable lands. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. the court ordered the consolidation of both cases as they involve the same issues on land classification of Boracay Island. the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government.96 ha or agricultural land. 1064. PD No. an administrative action. The burden of proof in overcoming such presumption is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership).1064 which classifies Boracay into 400 ha of forest land and 628. Of these. Therefore. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. Except for lands already covered by existing titles. Nonetheless. Ruling: The Court of Appeal’s decision was reversed. such classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. the OSG argued that they don’t have vested rights over the property because Boracay is an unclassified public forest land ursuant to PD 705. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership. forest or timber. and a legislative act or a statute. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. 1064 of May 22. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. Prior to Proclamation No. 705. 705 respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.

1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. Eduardo Velazco. notorious. In the present case. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena. issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office. consisting of 71. which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES GR No. Lino had four sons– Benedicto. However. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15. his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite. Lino Velazco. the RTC approved the application for registration. and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than 30 years. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR). 1801. which originally belonged to his uncle. 1982. But by 1966. he would have identified the specific limits of each. 1064. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest. Thus. Magdalena.application is alienable or disposable. 179987April 29. This was not done in Proclamation No. or both. meters. Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of Cavite. Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. No.3013 established under project no. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather. Lino. as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 2009 Facts: On February 20 1998. 2002. saying “Ito and batas.324 sq. Proc. ito ang dapat umiral. report statute nor a certificate presented in court. and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open. Upon Lino’s death.” On December 3. Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001. Esteban’s wife. there was neither a proclamation. the SC expressed that they are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. EO. including Lot 9864-A. had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father.” HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties. Administrative action. Noting that millions were invested for the development of Boracay Island making internationally known ad some called it their home. 301 . Gregorio.

continuous. under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. since June 12. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1945 or earlier? 2. On February 23. the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the application of Malabanan. Issues: 1. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription? 4. exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June12. 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open.The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. exclusive. continuous. should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12. In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section14 (1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both? Ruling: The Petition is denied. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open. 1529. may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code? 3. and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. 2007. and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. 302 .

public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. under Article 422 of the Civil Code. prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. The private respondents. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree. In complying with Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth. and registrable title to. However. the municipal court had no jurisdiction and should dismiss 303 . (b) The right to register granted under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. CHING VS. The property in question consists of a residential house and lot covered by TCT No. subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. having acquired it by virtue of a valid sale. The respondents argued. proceeded to trial and thereafter rendered judgment ordering the private respondents to vacate the disputed property. arguing that the property belonged to them by right of inheritance. as the basic question was one of ownership and not of mere possession. the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable.1945” have acquired ownership of. such lands based on the length and quality of their possession. MALAYA 153 SCRA 412 Facts: The petitioners Jose Ching and Caridad Ching had alleged in their complaint for ejectment that the private respondents Cesar and Araceli Alvarado had forced their way into the disputed premises without any right whatsoever and had refused to vacate the same despite repeated demands. had challenged the claimed sale. These demands were based on the petitioners’ case that they were the owners of the said property. The municipal court. affirming its jurisdiction. in their answer. T-85126 and registered in the name of petitioner Jose Ching in the Registry of Deeds of Laguna. consider that under the Civil Code. Patrimonial property is private property of the government. (a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession.

No protest was ever filed against the Deed of Sale since 1978. Manuel. On the other hand. 2582. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. and 8131. 1941. They had one son. ZENAIDA ARCEO. Jose married Virginia Franco. Lorenzo. On appeal. The land was actually sold to him by Alvarado’s father in 1978. the Municipal Court’s decision was reinstated by the Supreme Court. Jose. With a strong evidence to back Ching’s claim. 1942 while Abdon passed away in 1953. Antonio. and Romeo. Bulacan. Esteban had five children. Esteban. Zenaida. 2595. this decision was set aside by the respondent judge. had been introduced during the trial before the Municipal Court would not deprive said court of jurisdiction to rule on the question of who had the prior physical possession. with whom he fathered six children.the complaint. or evidence of ownership. DE ARCEO. 3054. 304 . The parties just showed evidence of ownership so as to prove possession and this will not divest the Municipal Court of its jurisdiction. No. who died on September 2. HON. The mere circumstance that proof of title. ROMEO ARCEO. Escolastica died on September 16. and Sotera. RODOLFO ARCEO and MANUEL ARCEO VS. VIRGINIA FRANCO VDA. identified as lots nos. Carmelita. Cesar. the land is registered under Ching’s name in the Registry of Deeds in Laguna. Issue: Whether or not Ching is the rightful owner of the residential land. Pedro. CARMELITA ARCEO. Ruling: Municipal courts do not have jurisdiction over ownership cases. Rodolfo. But the Supreme Court held that this particular case is not an ownership case. Alvarado only filed an annulment case (which is a separate case) when the ejectment case was filed. 81401 Facts: Spouses Abdon Arceo and Escolastica Geronimo were the owners of four parcels of unregistered land (six were involved but only four were disputed) located in Pulilan. who held that the municipal court had no competence to resolve the case as it involved a question of ownership.

Issue: Whether or not the cadastral court was bereft of the power to determine conflicting claims of ownership. once accepted. 496. registration would not be possible or would be unduly prolonged unless the court first decided it. 1941. filed with the cadastral court an application for registration in their names of lots Nos. as. On August 2. had made this known to Pedro. Virginia. the Arceos executed a deed of donation inter vivos. 2582. is no longer as circumscribed as it was under Act No. worked thereon. say. the cadastral court commits no error in assuming jurisdiction over it. The fact that he paid taxes thereon is not controlling either because payment of real estate taxes does not necessarily confer title upon a claimant. Antonio. Pedro and Lorenzo specifically contested the application on lots Nos. It is not amiss to state likewise that where the issue. Lorenzo. the former land registration law. in which case. On October (or September) 27. does not amount to adverse possession because as a co-owner. et al. and Sotera are the private respondents herein while Jose's widow. 1970). for instance. 3054. Under these circumstances. sitting as a land registration court. The cadastral court rejected all three documents and distributed the properties according to the law on intestate succession. where both parties rely on their respective exhibits to defeat one another's claims over the parcels sought to be registered. The weight of authority is that a valid donation.Pedro. 1950. Ruling: We have held that under Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree. 2595. The fact that in 1941. is ineluctably tied up with the question of right of registration. In 1949. et al. On January 12.. of ownership. we cannot validly say that the lands had devolved on Virginia. becomes 305 . he had the right of enjoyment. et al. Jose had been paying taxes thereon. Virginia (Jose died on March 8. Since 1942. Jose wrested possession thereof. disposing of the properties further in favor of Jose. the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. in this case. in which the spouses bestowed the properties in favor of Jose. by way of prescription. et al. so we hold. 3054 and 8131 on claims that each of them was entitled to one-third thereof. had sought to extrajudicially divide the property is nothing conclusive because there is no showing that they. together with her children. Virginia and her children shortly went to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the cadastral court and dismissed the appeal. he took personal possession thereof. and their children are the petitioners. does not persuade us that they (through Jose) have acquired the lots by lapse of time. the spouses executed another deed of donation inter vivos. and claimed them as owner thereof. The evidence for Virginia et al. and 8131. Virginia. 1972. The fact finally that Virginia. and his use thereof can not by itself prejudice the right of his fellow co-owners..

VS. The respondent court issued an order directing the applicant to prove its contention that TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 are not proper derivatives of the original certificates of titles from which they were purportedly issued. WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATION. Respondent Ortigas instituted an action for certiorari. failure by the donee to comply with charges imposed in the donation. 1989. Respondent Dolores Molina filed an opposition. 91797 Facts: Widora filed LRC Case before the respondent (trial) court an application for registration of title of a parcel of land alleging that the parcel of land is covered by Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136 issued in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. This motion to dismiss was denied. However petitioner Ortigas filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging that respondent court had no jurisdiction over the case.irrevocable. 77652 and 77653 despite the absence of a supporting decree of registration and instead utilized 306 .. 1988 and May 19. INC. respondent court rendered the decision sought to be reviewed granting the petition for certiorari. No. except on account of officiousness. or by reason of ingratitude. WIDORA argues that respondent court erred in sustaining the validity of TCTs Nos. prohibition and mandamus of petitioner Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership. 1989 orders and ordered to dismiss the land registration case. prohibition and mandamus before respondent court praying for the annulment of the March 30.R. claiming ownership over 12 to 14 hectares of Lot 8. On November 27. OF APPEALS COURT G. and setting the case for hearing.

Florentino Pamintuan inadvertently failed to claim the lot of trial of the cadastral case. lot No. The unilateral action of respondent court in substituting its own findings regarding the extent of the coverage of the land included in TCT Nos. and conform with. PAMINTUAN VS SAN AGUSTIN G. Held: Yes. 1918. 132 was instituted. if no decree of registration had been issued covering the parcel of land applied for. and the CFI in a decision dated April 29. 5 SCRA 240 [1962]). awarded it to the respondents Nicomedes. and that certificate of title No. Court of Appeals. Consequently. L-17943 Facts: On April 19. then the certificate of title issued over the said parcel of land does not quiet the title to nor bind the land and is null and void. the petitioner herein.R. 625 was decreed in favor of Florentino Pamintuan. it is the decree of registration issued by the Land Registration Commission which is the basis for the subsequent issuance of the certificate of title by the corresponding Register of Deeds that quiets the title to and binds the land (De la Merced v.secondary evidence. That function is properly lodged with the office of the trial court sitting as a land registration court and only after a full-dress investigation of the matter on the merits. ostensibly to correct the error in. 77652 and 77653 despite the absence of a supporting decree of registration. No. the technical description found in OCT 351 based on the plan and other evidence submitted by respondent Ortigas cannot be sustained. by the CFI of Pampanga. Cadastral case No. 1919. OCT 351 which is supposedly a copy of Decree 1425. 1917. It is before the land registration court that private respondent must adduce the proof that the disputed parcels of land is legally registered in its favor. 307 . 540 covering the said lot was thereupon issued to him in June. Petitioner maintains that Decree 1425 is itself existing and available at the Register of Deeds of Manila. Issue: Whether or not the respondent trial court erred in sustaining the validity of the TCT NOs.Under Act 496. 77652 and 77653.

for reasons stated in writing and filed with the record of the case. Issue: Whether or not the court exceeded its jurisdiction in undertaking to decree in a cadastral case land already decreed in another land registration case. Florentino Pamintuan knew nothing about the adjudication of the land until the clerk of the CFI of Pampanga required him to surrender his certificate of title for cancellation. Held: The court exceeded its jurisdiction. shall be the basis for original certificates of title in favor of said persons. and shall be conducted in the same manner as ordinary trials and proceedings in the Court of Land Registration. What is understood by "settlement and adjudication" is very clearly indicated in section 11 of the Act: SEC. Orders of default and confession shall also be entered in the same manner as in ordinary cases in the same court and shall have the same effect. 11. when final. which shall have the same effect as certificates of title granted on application for registration of land under the Land Registration Act. and as it hereafter may be amended. and such decrees. may designate. 540.Maria. as now amended. and ordered the cancellation of certificate of title No. shall be applicable to proceedings under this Act. 308 . and shall be governed by the same rules. Rose and Eusebia Espinosa. 2259. Cadastral proceedings are authorized and regulated by Act No. and except as herein otherwise provided all of the provisions of said Land Registration Act. He then presented a motion to the court asking that the decision of the court in the cadastral case be set aside and that the writ of possession issued by virtue of said decision be recalled. The trial of the case may occur at any convinient place within the province in which the lands are situated or at such other place as the court. Mercedes. All conflicting interest shall be adjudicated by the court and decrees awarded in favor of the person entitle to the lands or the various parts thereof.

280 or a reduction of 293. covered by Plan Psu-9742 Amd. and that such jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of his title. In cadastral case.432 square meters. 557 with a smaller area of 2.436. the subject land located in Bataan was surveyed for Potenciano Gabriel.847 square meters. Accordingly the partition of the estate of Gabriel by his heirs was based on plan Psu-9742 Amd. Issue: Whether or not courts have the authority to order the necessary correction of an erroneous technical description and make it conform to the correct area.712 square meters was subsequently amended because it was found that certain portions of the land covered by Plan I-1054 in the name of Quimson and later transferred to Naval were included. Held: 309 . the jurisdiction of the court over lands already registered is limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in the description of the lands. L-26348 Facts: In 1916.096. The undivided portions were excluded by order of the Court and so Plan Psu. 1264 issued in the name of Potenciano Gabriel on November 1. 557 with a reduced area of 2. 1918 contained the reduced area. COURT OF APPEALS G. No. No new certificate of title was issued.729. provided.096.433 square meters. Survey Plan Psu. instead of Lot No. do not impair the substantial rights of the registered owner. The OCT No. with an area of 2. became Lot No. GABRIEL vs.9742 was amended with an area of 2. or a further reduction by 339.9742.433 square meters.and to the titles and certificate of title granted or issued hereunder. A cadastral survey was also made and the land of Gabriel.R. such corrections.

His prayer was that the land be registered in his name. respondent Belong Lutes petitioned the cadastral court to reopen Civil Reservation Case No. of certain claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared public land. Issue: Whether or not the cadastral court has power to reopen the cadastral proceedings upon the application of respondent Lutes Held: The title of RA 931 authorizes the filing in the proper court.. by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act. 1. Jr. The body of the statute. Sr.. as to the parcel of land he claims.In cadastral cases. the City of Baguio likewise opposed the reopening. Francisco Joaquin. No. 1961. GLRO Record No. in its Section 1. The subject land was among those declared public lands by final decision rendered in the November 13. L-26100 Facts: In 1961. provided such corrections do not impair the substantial rights of the registered owner. 211. under certain conditions. In this case. On May 5.R. however. speaks 310 . 557 of the Hermoso Cadastre and Lot No. 363 of Orani Cadastre which lots embody the correct technical description thereof CITY OF BAGUlO vs. in the CFI of Baguio. the lower court merely corrected the error in the technical description appearing in Plan Psu-9742 Amd. 1922 case. private petitioners Francisco Joaquin. and Teresita Buchholz registered opposition to the reopening. and that such jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of his title. On December 18. the jurisdiction of the court over lands already registered is limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in the description of the lands. They claimed themselves as farm lessees upon agreements executed by the Bureau of Forestry in their favour. so as to make it conform to the areas and technical description of Lot No. MARCOS G. 1962.

DURAN vs. Answer a. the motion to dismiss is proper in cadastral proceedings which involve land covered by a certificate of title issued pursuant to a public land patent. There thus appears to be a seeming inconsistency between title and body. or are about to be declared land of the public domain. No. The applicants filed their objection to said motion. by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act. Form and contents of answer. 1954. the oppositors filed their opposition to the application. sales or free patent covering private land is null and void as well as the claim that the lower 311 . L-16589 Facts: An application for the registration in their names of sixteen lots was filed by Jose O. alleging that the reasons for the motion to dismiss do not appear in the application but are mere assertions of the parties and that the trial court has jurisdiction to consider the application even though the lots subject matter thereof are already covered by certificates of title.R. JOSE O. by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act. Ruling: Yes. The appellants’ claim that a certificate of title based upon a mere homestead. Four years after. applicability of Rules of Court. 1954. Who may file answer. A. the lower court resolved the motion to dismiss and rendered successively the two orders of dismissal appealed from. RA 931 claims of title that may be filed thereunder embrace those parcels of land that have been declared public land. the case was heard initially and on May 5.On April 20. Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the application with respect to particular lots upon mere assertion that these lots are covered by certificates of title based merely upon the granted public land patents is correct. b. When to file answer. Duran and Teresa Diaz Vda.of parcels of land that have been. When motion to dismiss is proper. Order for speedy settlement and adjudication B. After a reply to the opposition was filed by the oppositors. Petition for Registration C. de Duran . the oppositors filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction to decree registration of the lots respectively claimed by them. BERNABE OLIVIA G.

The primary and fundamental purpose of the Torrens System of registration is to finally settle the titles to land. we have held in a long line of decisions that a homestead patent once registered under the Land Registration Act cannot be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding and that any title issued thereon is null and void. Ramon Yu. A homestead patent. Pursuant to the above purpose. 939 in Lahug. In Yu v. In Valdehueza v. et al. Respondents filed a complaint for reversion of the expropriated property. Any new title which the cadastral court may order to be issued is null and void and should be cancelled. judgment became final and executory. The parties did not appeal the decision and so. and ruled that therein petitioners.court possesses jurisdiction to try and decide the instant land registration proceedings even with respect to the lots already covered by certificates of title are without merit. Republic of thePhilippines. who hold certificates of title under the Land Registration Act becomes indefeasible. or to proceed to the partition thereof if it is owned by two or more coowners. becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens title. Republic. As the title of the respondents. there would be no end to litigation if every property covered by torrens title may still be relitigated in a subsequent land registration proceedings. Francisca Valdehueza. All that the cadastral court may do is to make correction of technical errors in the description of the property contained in its title. Republic. once registered under the Land Registration Act. That being the purpose of the law. ISSUES: 312 . were not entitled to recover possession of the lot but only to demand its fair market value. Republic. Republic and the final judgment of the Court of Appeals in Yu v. denied respondents’ right to reacquire title and ownership over the lot on the ground of res judicata.. Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of expropriation of Lot No. the Court of Appeals annulled the subsequent sale of the lot by Francisca Valdehueza. to put to stop any question of legality of title thereto. it follows that the Court of First Instance has no power or jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for the registration of the same parcels of land covered by the certificates of title of the respondents. respondents. Cebu City. and held that the latter were not purchasers in good faith. and cannot thereafter be the subject of an investigation for determination or judgment in a cadastral case. Republic of the Philippines vs CA 99 SCRA 651 FACTS: Petitioner relates Supreme Court’s decision in Valdehueza v.

None of the heirs of Isabel Iboa is in possession of any 313 . and causes of action. is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim. 1932. Considering that the sale on which respondents based their right to reversion has long been nullified. Samar. Immediately after his demise. or cause of action. Tizon FACTS: The lot is contested by petitioners-heirs of Cornelio Labrada. DIOCTON vs. Lack of legal personality to sue means that the respondents are not the real parties-in-interest. Catbalogan. in his capacity as Presiding Judge. the first three elements are present. represented by Tito V. His son succeeded in possessing the land. This is a ground for the dismissal of the case. (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits. Consequently. they have not an iota of right over the property and thus. on and by respondents-heirs of Isabel Yboa.Is the action barred by res judicata? Are respondents entitled to reversion of the expropriated property? RULING: The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final. Branch XXVII.THE HONORABLE SINFORIANO A. and (4) there must be as between the first and second action. HEIRS OF CORNELIO LABRADA represented by NATIVIDAD L. Said predecessors-ininterest had filed their respective answers in the cadastral proceedings in June. subject matter. and the HEIRS OF ISABEL YBOA. the second issue is now mooted and made academic by our determination of res judicata in this case. identity of parties. MONSANTO. demand. and that he continued his possession until 1943 when he died. Regional Trial Court. Labrada had already been in continuous possession of said lot for more than forty-three (43) years when he filed his answer in 1932. In the present case. (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. related to the ground that the complaint evidently states no cause of action. who until the present are still in possession. The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. Meliton Labrada was succeeded in the possession of said land until he himself died in 1976. and possession of the property in issue was passed to Meliton's direct heirs. have no legal personality to bring forth the action for reversion of expropriated property.

Respondent court granted respondents' motion. An appeal was filed by the petitioners. (c) the allowance or disallowance. and (f) the final order or judgment rendered in the case. in whole or in part. In these cases. trustee or guardian. After a month respondents-claimants filed their motion for the issuance of a decree contending that petitioners had failed to perfect their appeal because they failed to file a record on appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners failed to perfect their appeal because they failed to file a record on appeal. (b) determination of the lawful heirs of a deceased person or their distributive shares in the estate. (d) the settlement of the accounts of an executor. The Court provided for specific exceptions with respect to "appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court." wherein multiple appeals at different stages of the case are allowed such as when the order or judgment on appeal refers to: (a) the allowance or disallowance of a will. of any claim against the estate or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it. The conflicting parties presented both their oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective claims over the lot. The decree for the registration was accordingly ordered by respondent court. since the original record has to remain with the probate court in connection with the other various pending matters. Petitioners had moved in 1973 for the case to be heard by the now defunct Court of First Instance of Samar.portion of the questioned lot. (e) a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing in proceedings relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person or the administration of a trustee or guardian. a party 314 . RULING: Petitioners' appeal must be given due course and the issuance of a decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title were prematurely and baselessly ordered by respondent court and must be set aside. administrator. therefore. Respondent regional trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondents-claimants.

In December 1956. COURT OF APPEALS and RUFINO DIMSON Facts: Both private petitioner Fidel Silvestre and petitioner Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources seek the reversal of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals which set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bataan dismissing the complaint filed by respondent Rufino Dimson declaring null and void Homestead Patent No. Petition is granted. Respondent Dimson filed for an adverse claim over the same parcel of land. He began paying realty taxes thereon in 1957. Bataan.appealing from a specific order is required to file the corresponding record on appeal. Petitioner Silvestre filed for a homestead application for a parcel of land he has been occupying since 1927 in Hermosa. judgment is rendered (a) setting aside the questioned orders which denied due course to petitioners' appeal and ordered the issuance of a decree of registration. In 1956. Dispensing with briefs or memoranda. 1983 and to transmit to the Intermediate Appellate Court the records of the case pertaining to the disputed Lot No. he was issued a Torrens title. FIDEL SILVESTRE vs. granted by petitioner Secretary in favor of petitioner Fidel Silvestre and instead rendered judgment in favor od Dimson. 72493 and Original Certificate of Title No. Claiming that the land could not be the subject of homestead patent as it was already a private property even before World War II. 292. (b) annulling any certificate of title which may have been issued to respondents pursuant thereto. who also owns the lots 315 . In 1959. and (c) ordering respondent court to give due course to petitioners' appeal from its decision of July 11. together with the oral and documentary evidence. 1910 of the Catbalogan Cadastral survey. Dimson.

Batungbakal. First of all. that Dimson has paid realty taxes. considering that no evidence was presented by him to prove his allegation. that in 1927. ISSUE: Whether or not the “Compromiso de Venta” entered into by Batungbakal and Dimson conveyed ownership to Dimson. there was only an allegation that a Compromiso was established. Dimson also failed to show that the Batungbakal spouses his predecessors-in-interest were the actual owner of the disputed land. and that title was never issued in his name because of the outbreak of war. But even if there actually was a Compromiso. He said that Batungbakal acquired the property through a 316 . instead of belatedly suing to annul Silvestre’s Torrens title and to recover actual damages.adjoining the disputed property. argued that the land was actually adjudicated to spouses Batungbakal through a cadastral proceeding. Dimson should have made actual possession. then he could have first asserted his alleged ownership and possession and waited for Silvestre to controvert his possession and seek recovery of the land. through a “Compromiso de Venta” conveyed ownership to Dimson. Held: The alleged execution in 1927 of the Escritura of “Compromiso de Venta” in favor of Dimson by the Batungbakal spouses was not tantamount to “possession”. If Dimson had been in possession. This is further bolstered by the fact that Dimson started paying taxes on the land only in 1958 apparently in preparation for his suit contrary to his allegation in his complaint that he had allegedly paid all the real estate taxes thereon before World War II.

Thereafter.cadastral proceeding but he never showed any proof of such decree granting Batungbakal title over the disputed land.In 1953. Arturo sold two-thirds portion of the land to Guillermo Reyes and Francisco S. In 1965. 1736 for more than thirty years and have introduced improvements thereon. alleged to have been occupied since 1913 by the grandfather of applicant. adverse and continuous possession of portions of Lot No. 1736 on the ground of open. a large tract of agricultural land in Barrio Kapok.The Director of Lands likewise filed his 317 . THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. Orion. Alcantara. Bataan. BATACAN. MARIANO V. continuous. filed Lease Application with the Bureau of Lands. who. Upon the death of Vicente Rodriguez in 1924. that they have been in actual. the two waived their share in favor of petitioner Arturo Rodriguez. peaceful. Thirty-nine persons headed by Rosauro Canaria filed their Opposition to the petition for registration contending. Facts: The land in dispute is Lot No.S. COURT OF APPEALS. possession of the property was taken over by his three sons. assuming that there was a transaction between Dimson and Batungbakal. Petition granted. 1736. the property could not have been conveyed in favor of Dimson due to the fact that Batungbakal was not the owner of the land in dispute. Arturo Rodriguez together with Reyes and Alcantara filed a petition for registration of their title to Lot No. exclusive and notorious possession for more than 30 years. Military Reservation. Vicente Rodriguez. but which was rejected upon investigation that the land was classified as within the U. the land in question was deemed reverted to the public domain as it was excluded from the US-Philippine Military Bases Agreement. ANDRES REYES. AGCAOILI and DELFIN FL. In this regard.

S. Canaria filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. On this basis. 1021. the Court finds that the decision in the aforesaid cadastral case does not constitute res judicata upon a subsequent action for land registration considering the futility of filing any claim then over the land in question since the same would nevertheless have been denied because during the pendency of the cadastral case. But while the cadastral proceedings in 1927 cannot be considered a bar to the registration proceedings instituted by private respondents in 318 . the land in question was still classified as within the U. a bar to the present application by subsequent possessors for registration of title or confirmation of imperfect title over the same parcel of land. provided he thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No.R. The trial court ruled in favor of the applicants. wherein a cadastral court already declared Lot 1736 as public land. a judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public. as such. Issue: Whether or not the prior decision of the cadastral court in a proper cadastral proceeding declaring that the lot in question as public land constitute res judicata. L. Held: Res Judicata does not apply. does not preclude the same applicant from subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land.opposition alleging that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to the land applied for. 141. Record No.C. 15. Military Reservation and was deemed reverted to the public domain only in 1953. Director of Lands filed for a motion to dismiss or for reconsideration alleging that the present petition for registration was intended to reopen Cadastral Case No. When Cadastral Case No. as amended. and as long as said public land remains alienable and disposable. The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court but subsequently reversed its decision upon motion by respondents contending that the cadastral case constitutes res judicata. 15 was instituted in 1927 and terminated in 1930. The lower court ruled in favor of the applicants confirming their title. A decision in cadastral proceedings declaring a lot public land is not the final decree contemplated in Sections 38 and 40 of the Land Registration Act. Thus. and that a decision in a cadastral case constitutes res judicata. said land was not alienable nor disposable as was shown by the denial of the lease application filed then by private respondents’ predecessor-ininterest. as they have not been in OCEN possession and occupation of the land sought to be registered for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application.

Petition granted. 1923. in favor of his father.) Juan de la Merced. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre by virtue of an adjudication of the cadastral court dated December 26.) On December 28.) By virtue of the final decision dated December 26. sought recovery of ownership and possession thereof from the named defendant. and of the landlord's share in the harvests for the agricultural years 1950-1956. 395 was definitely confirmed as against the whole world. Although no such certificate was actually issued. until his death in 1931. a trustee for said lot at the time he applied for it as a homestead. the cadastral court. was the overseer of Inocencio de los Santos for a big portion of land which included Lot 395 in question and was. 2. was able to obtain therefor a homestead patent and OCT No. 3462 on October 10. after due application. 3462 issued to their predecessor Juan de la Merced on October 10. 1. 1926. including the Government. declared the same Lot 395 public land as a result of which Juan de la Merced. without reopening the case. 3.) The same cadastral court issued a decree dated December 19. 1931 and their continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years. 1923 final and directing the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the certificate of title to Inocencio de los Santos. Santos' title to Lot No. therefore. the chronology of events in the case at bar clearly negates compliance by private respondents-applicants with the thirty-year possession requirement. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Ezequiel Santos (and his wife) claims ownership of Lot No. 1925 declaring its decision of December 26. Effect of failure to appeal. As such there is not claim for an imperfect title.1965. 319 . 1923. 1931. DE LA MERCED V. 4. Defendants asserted their ownership over said property as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. d.

" The judgment in a cadastral survey. Respondents predicate their claim of ownership over the said lot on Original Certificate of Title No.5. (But in the other way. adjudicating the lot to the plaintiffs. The third and last action devolves upon the General Land Registration Office. 1931. said: -After trial in a cadastral case. and speaks in a judicial manner. Such order is made if within thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of the decision no appeal is taken from the decision. three actions are taken. their predecessor-in-interest. contending that the decision of December 26. In other words. is a judicial act. the land had become private land. The first adjudicates ownership in favor of one of the claimants. the act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the same.) With respect to the question of when title to the land in a cadastral proceeding is vested. and such registration shall be made in the office of the register of deeds for the province where the land lies. As the law 320 . in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands v. this Court.) That the complaint for recovery of ownership and possession was filed in 1952. pursuant to a homestead patent issued on September 15. 3462 issued on October 10. 1931 in favor of Juan de la Merced. by specific provision of Act 496. the property is not considered registered until the final act or the entry in the registration book of the registry of deeds had been accomplished. This constitutes the decision — the judgment — the decree of the court. in cases of public lands. The second action is the declaration by the court that the decree is final and its order for the issuance of the certificates of title by the Chief of the Land Registration Office. Issue: What is the effect of failure to appeal the decision of a cadastral court proceeding within thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of the decision? Held: There is no doubt that had the land involved herein been public. 1923. Abural. was still subject to review since there was no decree issued pursuant thereto. This office has been instituted "for the due effectuation and accomplishment of the laws relative to the registration of land. including the rendition of the decree.

Moreover. after the passage of the thirty-day period allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party of a copy of the judgment of the court adjudicating ownership without any step having been taken to perfect an appeal. conclusive. and there being no imputation of irregularity in the said cadastral proceedings. Felix L. The certificate of title would then be necessary for purposes of effecting registration of subsequent disposition of the land where court proceedings would no longer be necessary. through deceit and through intentional omission of facts" as a result of which the aforesaid decision was rendered and a decree of registration obtained on August 8. for the adjudication has taken place and all that is left to be performed is the mere formulation of technical description. 56 of the Porac Cadastre was confirmed by the Hon. CAYANAN VS. The prevailing party may then have execution of the judgment as of right and is entitled to the certificate of title issued by the Chief of the Land Registration Office. The exception is the special provision providing for fraud. ordering the issuance to Inocencio de los Santos of the certificate of title over Lot No. The issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Office is a ministerial act. then Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.says. registration of title under the cadastral system is final. on October 26. Under the foregoing pronouncement. the title of appellee De los Santos to Lot No. and indisputable. DE LOS SANTOS 21 SCRA 1348 FACTS: On May 30. 1958. 1958. covering the said lot. 1958. The 321 . As a general rule. title of ownership on the said adjudicatee was vested as of the date of the issuance of such judicial decree. 395 after the decision adjudicating ownership to him of the said property had already become final. without such an appeal having been perfected. Camaya. On December 16. The date of the title prepared by the Chief Surveyor is unimportant. the judicial decree when final is the base of the certificate of title. it was stated further that a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in favor of the other respondent. 1958. Arsenio Santos. a petition for review was filed in the same proceeding alleging that the said lot was registered in the name of appellee De los Santos "through actual fraud. the title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to appeal from the decision or adjudication by the cadastral court. As we have here a decree issued by the cadastral court.

the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree. It has been held that the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year from entry of the final decree." Afalla v. since the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree." As a matter of fact. the same are properly cognizable by the court that rendered the decision and granted the said decree. the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision therein rendered continues to be under the control and sound 322 . It was the view of the lower court: "Such being the case. While it is true that the petition states that such transfer is fictitious and. therefore. which court after hearing. This petition was denied in the order of February 9. several decisions held that: Santos v. the same cannot be favorably acted upon for the reason that the questioned lot has already been transferred to Felix L. even if the petition has been filed within one (1) year after entry of final decree. ISSUE: Whether or not the cadastral court who tried and issue a decree of registration has the power to set aside said judgment and readajudicate the land in favor of another? HELD: The case should not be filed in another CFI considering that the cadastral court is also a court of first instance. set aside the decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another person.(1959): "It is true that under previous rulings of this court. after hearing.prayer was for the opening of the decree of registration. Camaya is not an innocent purchaser. now appellant Cayanan and others. Rosauro. Camaya in accordance with section 38 of the Land Registration Act. and the period of one year fixed for the review thereof has not elapsed. 1959. may even set aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another. not for value and that Felix L. and that as long as the final decree is not issued and the period of one year within which it may be reviewed has not elapsed. which is on appeal. this question can be properly threshed out in an ordinary civil action and not in a simple petition. as the petitions were filed within one year from the date of the issuance of the decree." "In the present case. as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title and the adjudication of said lot in favor of petitioners. and until then the court rendering the decree may. Ichon. the cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title. as admitted by the petitioners. like the one at bar.: "As long as the final decree is not issued by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office in accordance with the law. pursuant to Section 38 of Act 496. appellee could have moved for the reopening of the case in the cadastral court so that he could be given an opportunity to prove his right to the land in question and get a decree in his favor.

on the ground that the title to the tract of land from which he sought to eject the defendants might well be litigated in the cadastral case then pending in the same court which included the tract of land. by virtue of a donation which he failed to accept in a public instrument as required in article 633 of the Civil Code but was dismissed. ET AL. that as long as the final decree is not issued and the period of one year within which it may be reviewed has not elapsed. S. Within this period of one year the decree may be reopened on the ground of fraud and the decree may be set aside and the land adjudicated to another party.discretion of the court rendering it. the plaintiff did not appeal. the latter could bring an action against the defendants for damages. should title to the tract of land be confirmed and decreed in the name of the plaintiff. the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree." Valmonte v. divided into lots and claimed by both the plaintiff and the defendants. which court after hearing. may set aside the decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another party." Capio v. As long as the final decree is not issued and the period of one year within which it may be reviewed has not elapsed. NARCISO DE GUZMAN. From this order of dismissal.: "that the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree. After the dismissal of the complaint." FABIAN B. Province of La Union. Nable. the court of first instance being of the opinion that. The plaintiff again brought another action with the same court for ejectment against the same defendants in the two previous 323 . This second action was dismissed.: "It should be borne in mind that the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree. the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it. the plaintiff brought another action against the same defendants for ejectment. Capio. ABELLERA VS. Facts: Fabian Abellera filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance claiming title to the hacienda found in municipality of Aringay.

on the ground (1) that it states no cause of action. and. Where there is a case for ejectment between parties who. including new or additional defendants who are the claimants of lots in the cadastral case. acting upon the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants. and (2) that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. claim the same parcel of land or lot in a 324 . not only does the plaintiff seek to have a judicial pronouncement that he is the owner of the tract of land which he claims is unlawfully occupied by the defendants but also to recover damages. and prayed for judgment declaring him the owner of the tract of land from which he had sought defendants' ejectment in the two previous cases.000 and costs. Instead of answering the complaint the defendants moved for its dismissal. but it cannot award damages to the plaintiff. for the recovery of damages from each and every one of the defendants. one against the other. the cadastral court may declare the plaintiff the owner of the lots and entitled to their possession and may issue a writ directing the sheriff to put him in possession thereof. the trial court sustained the second ground of the motion and dismissed the complaint without costs.cases . amounting all in all to P40. After hearing. Issue: Whether or not the cadastral court has the authority to award damages Ruling: No. after finding that they are. to the confirmation of their title to. as alleged in their answers. for the possession of the lots unlawfully occupied or detained by the defendants. The cadastral court possesses no authority to award damages. and for general relief. which lie within the area of the tract of land claimed by the plaintiff. On 18 June 1946. the lots in their name. In the present action for ejectment. or their successors-in-interest. for its power is confined to the determination as to whether the claimants are really entitled to the lost. and registration of.

the reasonable value of the use of the premises is P100 a month. The Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint because another case pending between the same parties over the same property. Because of said defendants' unjustified acts plaintiffs had to institute action and incur damage of P500 as expenses for court litigation. who are the plaintiffs in this case. Ruling: No. Hagonoy. taking into consideration its commercial value. It is true that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch VI) acting as a land registration court has a limited and special jurisdiction confined to the determination of the legality and propriety of the issue of title over the land subject matter of registration.cadastral case. Bulacan. and prayed that the defendants be ordered to vacate the premises and surrender unto plaintiffs the said property and defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs the amount of P500 as incidental expenses and the amount of P100 a month from the filing of this action to the time they surrender its possession to the plaintiffs. and it has no power to entertain issues of rightful possession and claim for damages emanating from ownership.00. namely Land Registration Case. as court of first instance of general jurisdiction and as cadastral court of limited jurisdiction. Medina vs Valdellon Facts: The complaint in Civil Case No. with an assessed value of P800.The defendants are family friends of the plaintiffs and were allowed to remain in the premises and to construct their residential house. San Pascual. subject to the condition that defendants will return unto the plaintiffs the premises upon demand. The plaintiffs moved for Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. 4353-M of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan alleges that spouses Dolores Medina and Moises Bernal. 325 . are the owners of a parcel of land situated at Bo. it has been customary or the practice of courts to hold a joint hearing of both the ejectment and the cadastral cases in which the same parcel of land is litigated and to render a decision in both cases in its double role. Issue: Whether or not the cadastral court has the authority to award damages. On demand. defendants-spouses refused and remain obstinate in their refusal to surrender the property in question.

therefore. [Camaya] is not an innocent purchaser. now appellant Cayanan and others. then Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. While it is true that the petition states that such transfer is fictitious and. Camaya. On December 16.CAYANAN V. 1958. this question can be properly threshed out in an ordinary civil action and not in a simple petition. as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title and the adjudication of said lot in favor of petitioners. 1958. It was the view of the lower court: "Such being the case. the cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title. appellee Felix L. like the one at bar. covering the said lot. even [if] the petition has been filed within one (1) year after entry of final decree. the title of appellee De los Santos to Lot No. 56 of the Porac Cadastre was confirmed by the Hon. not for value and that Felix L. 1958. through deceit and through intentional omission of facts" as a result of which the aforesaid decision was rendered and a decree of registration obtained on August 8. Moreover. which is on appeal." Issue: When will adjudication in cadastral case becomes final? Ruling: "It may be stated that we find had no case squarely ruling on this particular point. 326 . a petition for review was filed in the same proceeding alleging that the said lot was registered in the name of appellee De los Santos "through actual fraud. DE LOS SANTOS G. [Camaya] in accordance with section 38 of the Land Registration Act. The prayer was for the opening of the decree of registration. 1959. the same cannot be favorably acted upon for the reason that the questioned lot has already been transferred to Felix L. L-21150 Facts: On May 30. it was stated further that a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in favor of the other respondent.R. as admitted by the petitioners. on October 26. Arsenio Santos. 1958. This petition was denied in the order of February 9. No.

After the dismissal of the complaint. the plaintiff brought another action against the same defendants for ejectment. considering the fact that it is also the Court of First Instance that acts on land registration cases. the court of first instance being of the opinion that. The plaintiff again brought another action with the same court 327 . ABELLERA VS. which court after hearing. may even set aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another. the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree. NARCISO DE GUZMAN. From this order of dismissal. should title to the tract of land be confirmed and decreed in the name of the plaintiff. as the petitions were filed within one year from the date of the issuance of the decree. and that as long as the final decree is not issued and the period of one year within which it may be reviewed has not elapsed. by virtue of a donation which he failed to accept in a public instrument as required in article 633 of the Civil Code but was dismissed." FABIAN B. pursuant to Section 38 of Act 496. Upon the other hand. on the ground that the title to the tract of land from which he sought to eject the defendants might well be litigated in the cadastral case then pending in the same court which included the tract of land. S. the plaintiff did not appeal." Then came the concluding portion of the opinion: "In the present case. it has been held that the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year from entry of the final decree.The mere mention by the law that the relief afforded by Section 38 of Act 496 may be sought in 'the competent Court of First Instance' is no sufficient indication that the petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance. the latter could bring an action against the defendants for damages. Province of La Union. This second action was dismissed. the same are properly cognizable by the court that rendered the decision and granted the said decree. Facts: Fabian Abellera filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance claiming title to the hacienda found in municipality of Aringay. divided into lots and claimed by both the plaintiff and the defendants. ET AL. exercising its general jurisdiction.

for its power is confined to the determination as to whether the claimants are really entitled to the lost. and registration of. to the confirmation of their title to.for ejectment against the same defendants in the two previous cases . On 18 June 1946. the trial court sustained the second ground of the motion and dismissed the complaint without costs. for the possession of the lots unlawfully occupied or detained by the defendants. the lots in their name. and for general relief. The cadastral court possesses no authority to award damages. as alleged in their answers. Issue: Whether or not the cadastral court has the authority to award damages Ruling: No. for the recovery of damages from each and every one of the defendants. the cadastral court may declare the plaintiff the owner of the lots and entitled to their possession and may issue a writ directing the sheriff to put him in possession thereof. one 328 . on the ground (1) that it states no cause of action. acting upon the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants. not only does the plaintiff seek to have a judicial pronouncement that he is the owner of the tract of land which he claims is unlawfully occupied by the defendants but also to recover damages. amounting all in all to P40. Where there is a case for ejectment between parties who. and prayed for judgment declaring him the owner of the tract of land from which he had sought defendants' ejectment in the two previous cases. which lie within the area of the tract of land claimed by the plaintiff. after finding that they are. After hearing. Instead of answering the complaint the defendants moved for its dismissal. In the present action for ejectment. or their successors-in-interest.000 and costs. including new or additional defendants who are the claimants of lots in the cadastral case. and (2) that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. and. but it cannot award damages to the plaintiff.

4353-M of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan alleges that spouses Dolores Medina and Moises Bernal. are the owners of a parcel of land situated at Bo. subject to the condition that defendants will return unto the plaintiffs the premises upon demand. San Pascual. the reasonable value of the use of the premises is P100 a month. with an assessed value of P800. Bulacan. It is true that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch VI) acting as a land registration court has a limited and special jurisdiction confined to the determination of the legality and propriety of the issue of title over the land subject matter of registration.The defendants are family friends of the plaintiffs and were allowed to remain in the premises and to construct their residential house. Ruling: No. 329 . and prayed that the defendants be ordered to vacate the premises and surrender unto plaintiffs the said property and defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs the amount of P500 as incidental expenses and the amount of P100 a month from the filing of this action to the time they surrender its possession to the plaintiffs. taking into consideration its commercial value. it has been customary or the practice of courts to hold a joint hearing of both the ejectment and the cadastral cases in which the same parcel of land is litigated and to render a decision in both cases in its double role. The Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint because another case pending between the same parties over the same property. Hagonoy. The plaintiffs moved for Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. defendants-spouses refused and remain obstinate in their refusal to surrender the property in question. as court of first instance of general jurisdiction and as cadastral court of limited jurisdiction. Because of said defendants' unjustified acts plaintiffs had to institute action and incur damage of P500 as expenses for court litigation. and it has no power to entertain issues of rightful possession and claim for damages emanating from ownership. Issue: Whether or not the cadastral court has the authority to award damages. claim the same parcel of land or lot in a cadastral case. On demand. namely Land Registration Case. who are the plaintiffs in this case. Medina vs Valdellon Facts: The complaint in Civil Case No.against the other.00.

one Cornelio Balbin.BALBIN VS RD 28 SCRA 12 Facts: Petitioners presented to the register of deeds a duplicate copy of the registered owner's certificate of title and an instrument entitled "Deed of Donation inter-vivos. The commissioner of land registration upheld the decision of the register of deeds. namely. such that its production whenever a voluntary instrument 330 ." with the request that the same be annotated on the title. that of the registered owner himself. The final part of the annotations stated that three co-owner's duplicate certificates of title have been issued in favor or 3 buyers. registered owner of the parcel of land described in the OCT. appears to have donated inter-vivos an undivided two-thirds (²/³) portion thereof in favor of petitioners. Under the terms of the instrument sought to be annotated. Section 55 obviously assumes that there is only one duplicate copy of the title in question. The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being "legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in law” as it appears that previously annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances on the certificate are three separate sales of undivided portions of the land earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of three different buyers. Issue: Whether the decision of the Register of Deeds in refusing the request for annotation of donation proper? Ruling: Yes.

affecting the land covered by the title. it is easy to see how their integrity may be adversely affected if an encumbrance. de Ocampo and Oscar Anglo claim ownership over the same lots. particularly voluntary ones. COURT OF APPEALS 83 SCRA 453 Facts: Both Republic and respondents Alfredo V. in the case at bar. or an outright conveyance. 1926 by the late Esteban Jalandoni through his will.is presented constitutes sufficient authority from him for the register of deeds to make the corresponding memorandum of registration. If this were not so. The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a duplicate of the original. The basis of Republic's claim is that said lots were bequeathed to the Bureau of Education on September 21. is annotated on one copy and not on the others. There being several copies of the same title in existence. REPUBLIC vs. which means that both must contain identical entries of the transactions. if different copies were permitted to carry differing annotations. Republic further alleged that the said parcels of land were already registered under the Torrens System "before 1919 in a cadastral case in the name of 331 . the whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be reliable. It is essential that all the duplicate copies of the title be presented before annotations are entered.

On May 2. in view of the earlier registration of the same lands in favor of Meerkamp and Company. Republic. From the said decision. the CFI of Negros Occidental dismissed the complaint. Republic contended.Meerkamp and Company". 1961. Republic later filed with the trial court. September 28. in favor of respondent de Ocampo. 1966. Procedurally. by virtue of a donation dated November 10. The trial court dismissed the Republic's petition for lack of competent proof. 332 . 1911 from one Luis Mosquera. the records show that the Bureau of Public Schools initiated a forcible entry and detainer case against de Ocampo. 1960. After a joint trial of the cases. Respondent Anglo intervened having allegedly bought the same lots from respondent de Ocampo. de Ocampo filed an application for registration of the same two parcels of land. On appeal. However. a Petition for Relief from Judgment with Preliminary Injunction Pending Proceeding. that TCT No. that said company sold the lots to Esteban Jalandoni. Then on June 29. the Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint and adjudged the registration of the subject two lots in the name of the then applicant de Ocampo. Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal. filed a complaint against de Ocampo with the CFI of Negros Occidental for the recovery of possession of the subject lots. an appeal by certiorari was filed by the petitioner. Respondent de Ocampo averred that the lots were unregistered lands belonging to and possessed by him. 6014 was issued to the Bureau of Education when the subject property was bequeathed to it. inter alia. represented by the Solicitor General. 817 and 2509. It is admitted by Republic that it received a copy of the decision on August 13. The trial court rendered its decision on the Amended Petition against Republic. Hence. 1965 but no appeal was taken therefrom. Republic filed an "Amended Petition for Relief from Judgment and/or Review of Decree with Preliminary Injunction. that actual fraud had been perpetrated by respondent de Ocampo in securing the lower court's decision ordering the registration of the lots in his name and that the Court of First Instance no longer had jurisdiction to decree again the registration of Lots Nos.

and that the technical descriptions in the Bureau of Lands records show that the same lots were in the name of Meerkamp and Company. The resolution of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. acknowledged before one Notary Public John Boardman does not appear in his notarial book and the Provincial Assessor of Negros Occidental likewise issued a certification. The case is remanded to the said Court to give due course to and consider on its merits Republic's appeal. Authorities are in agreement that a land registration court is without jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already registered in an earlier registration case. and that the second decree entered for the same land is null and void. despite an earlier registration in the name of Meerkamp and Company. LORENZANA FOOD CORPORATION vs. His later certification states that the said lots were assessed in the name of the Bureau of Education. de Ocampo on the ground that Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 were already registered under the Torrens System before 1919.Issue: Whether the trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application for land registration of Alfredo V. stating that Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 in favor of respondent de Ocampo. COURT OF APPEALS 333 . If there is no valid and final judgment by the land registration court to speak of. then the filing of an admittedly late appeal from the decision denying the Amended Petition would be immaterial and of no moment. 817 and 2509 were never declared in the name of Mosquera. Ruling: The trial court made an express finding that the alleged deed of donation by Mosquera in favor of de Ocampo. in so far as these proceedings are concerned in view of the congenitally fatal infirmity that attaches to the main decision decreeing for the second time the registration of the same Lots Nos.

R. It was further argued that Lorenzana Food Corporation was erroneously claiming the subject property because of Lorenzana's titled property is described to be located in Barrio Talaba. No. Petitioners assail the Decision in this petition for review on certiorari as having been issued in grave abuse of discretion.E. Issue: 334 . Inc. Cavite.G. Incorporated. B. San Diego's original certificate of title. Plaintiffs Jimmy Chua Chi Leong and Albert Chua claim ownership over the parcels they respectively purchased from the heirs of Juan Cuenca. San Diego. The respondent court decided in favor of the private respondent. On the other hand. 105027 April 22.E. San Diego countered that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in the open continuous and adverse possession in concept of owner of the subject property for more than fifty years prior to Lorenzana Food Corporation's purchase of the two parcels. 1994 Facts: The controversy arose when herein appellees learned that the same parcels were being claimed by herein appellant. All parties resolutely seeking to enforce their respective claims over the subject properties. It rejected petitioners' titles because the appellees (petitioners) titles state that the properties are located in the barrio of Talaba when the properties described therein are situated in the Barrio of Niog. In answer. three civil suits for quieting of title were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor.E. It is Lorenzana Food Corporation's contention that the OCT in B. San Diego's property is situated in Barrio Niog.E. San Diego. San Diego's name is null and void because Lorenzana Food Corporation's title emanated from an OCT issued more than thirty-nine years prior to the issuance of B. B. B.E. it found the titles of private respondent unblemished by any defect.E. while B.

With these errors. Eridanus Dev’t Inc. Cambridge Realty and Resources Corp vs. The title of the appellant's predecessors-in-interest showed that the land acquired by the appellant and for which title was issued in the appellant's name was described in said title as being located in Barrio Niog. 152445 July 4. are located poles apart and were never one and the same town in the history of the province. These two barrios of the town of Bacoor. The petition for review is DISMISSED there being no showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent court. In pointing out the discrepancies in petitioners' titles. the respondent court was simply stressing that these titles cannot be upheld against the unblemished titles of the private respondent. the titles of the petitioners do not deserve the sanctity given to torrens title. 2008 Facts: 335 . The appellees are claiming property not located in the barrio as described in the technical description.Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law and grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of the lower court to uphold the validity of the land titles of private respondent. GR No. The defects appearing on the face of the titles of the petitioners are too glaring to escape the naked eye. Cavite. But appellees claim a parcel of land that is located in Barrio Niog. Ruling: We find no compelling reason to reverse this ruling. while the appellees' title described the property covered by their title as located in Barrio Talaba.

This has not been sufficiently shown by respondents’ evidence to be the cause of the overlap. was precisely to make an evaluation and analysis of the titles in conflict with each other. 336 . The foregoing properties are adjoining lots located in Barangay Valencia. upon agreement of the parties. expertise and experience. On May 30. 1989.21’deg. covered by TCT. Ruling: The case of overlapping of titles necessitates the assistance of experts in the field of geodetic engineering. The appellate court. Q-89-2636 to enjoin CAMBRIDGE from pursuing the planned subdivision and development of its property.56’55”E” in TCT 578 to “N. 07’W” in the CAMBRIDGE title can cause an overlap of respondents’ properties. these commissioners are in a better position to determine which of the titles is valid.794 square meter parcel of land covered by TCT. Quezon City. Respondent ERIDANUS is the registered owner of a 2. 1920 Likewise. Thus.992-square meter lot. and constitute the subject matter of the present controversy. and the cause thereof may be traced to a change in the technical description of the petitioner’s title (which was derived from TCT 578) when it was subdivided on November 10. Given their background. which ERIDANUS claims encroached upon its own. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS WERE ABLE TO PROVE OVERLAP AND ENCROACHMENT OF PETITIONER’S PROPERTY ON RESPONDENTS’ PROPERTIES. ERIDANUS filed Civil Case No. found that there is an encroachment.25 deg. the trial court may rely on their findings and conclusions. we cannot see how a change in the bearings of the CAMBRIDGE property from “S.Petitioner CAMBRIDGE is the registered owner of a 9. however. The very reason why commissioners were appointed by the trial court.

in this respect. Finally. the CAMBRIDGE title explicitly declares that it is derived from TCT No. nor did the latter make any move to question the placement of said monuments at the time. They have failed to lay the proper foundation for 337 . Only respondents complain about it now. Previous owners of what now constitutes the respondents’ respective lots did not complain of its presence. the Court held that a land owner may not now claim that his property has been encroached upon when his predecessor did not register any objections at the time the monuments were being placed on the claimed encroached area. if they did. if not ambiguous. as well as to uphold the law. Taking this to mind. Nerit would have known and testified to the same since he was responsible for the subdivision of the lot. It was only in 1989 that the wall became an ungainly sight for respondents. he was ambivalent. Finally. In every land dispute. The wall appears to have been built in the 1960s. In one overlapping of boundaries case. State surveyor De Lara’s testimony and Report – inconclusive and incomplete as it is – does not help or indicate any. simply does not follow. the aim of the courts is to protect the integrity of and maintain inviolate the Torrens system of land registration. a thorough examination of TCT 578 shows that it has no similar boundary and bearings with the CAMBRIDGE title. 363717/T-1823. and not TCT 578. Thus. the conclusion that a change in the technical description of the former – as compared to that of the latter – is the reason for the overlap. we cannot grant the respondents’ prayer without violating the very principles of the Torrens system. Likewise. for failure of the respondents to prove that the CAMBRIDGE title is a derivative of TCT 578. we agree with the trial court’s observation that the continuous presence of the old adobe wall diminishes the case for the respondents. The appellate court is in clear error. and yet the Madrigals (SUSANA title owners) did not complain about it. a resolution of the parties’ dispute is merely a necessary consequence.Respondents’ key witness Nerit does not believe that the CAMBRIDGE title was a derivative of TCT 578. because there is nothing in the title thereof which indicates that it was derived from the latter. and definitely far from categorical.

500. 1961. in a comprehensive report. including the southern portion.their claim of overlap. 1943. The Antipolos sold the property to Agaton Pagaduan. The first line of dispositions began with the sale by Cleto to Antonio Cereso on May 11.00. 1925. On November 26. Eugenia executed another deed of sale. All the dispositions in this line were not registered and did not result in the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of the purchasers. 338 . and not merely leave the determination of the case to a consideration of the parties’ more often than not self-serving evidence. This is precisely the reason why the trial court should have officially appointed a commissioner or panel of commissioners and not leave the initiative to secure one to the parties: so that a thorough investigation. 1962. Later. The big parcel of land was the subject of two separate lines of dispositions.) No. 1961. 2009 Facts: The subject lot used to be part of a big parcel of land that originally belonged to Nicolas Cleto as evidenced by Certificate of Title (C.T.325 square meters to respondents for P1. Cereso in turn sold the land to the siblings with the surname Antipolo on September 23.00 and the southern portion consisting of 8. 176308 May 8. in respondent’s favor. on June 5. PAGADUAN v OCUMA GR No. study and analysis of the parties’ titles could be made in order to provide. Eugenia Reyes executed a unilateral deed of sale where she sold the northern portion with an area of 32. the necessary information that will guide it in resolving the case completely. 14. on March 24. this time conveying the entire parcel of land. father of petitioners.754 square meters to Agaton Pagaduan for P500.

failed to show that they had taken possession of the said portion. however. 1544. 1456. petitioners instituted a complaint for reconveyance of the southern portion with an area of 8. if it should be movable property. by force of law. The title of the Ocumas can be traced back from Eugenia Reyes to Ruperta Asuncion to the original owner Nicolas Cleto.754 square meters. In the instant case. 1989. The respondents did not deceive Agaton Pagaduan to induce the latter to part with the ownership or deliver the possession of the property to them. Moreover. the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first possession thereof in good faith. thereby precluding petitioners’ recovery of the disputed portion.On July 26. In fact that property came from Eugenia Reyes. ISSUE: Whether or not actual fraud is committed RULING: Art. Thus. Hence. petitioners. no fiduciary relations existed between the two parties. the appellate court concluded that prescription had set in. it would be Eugenia Reyes and not the petitioners. 339 . If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees. the person obtaining it is. ART. against respondents before the RTC of Olongapo City. the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. none of the elements of actual or constructive fraud exists. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud. The property in question did not come from the petitioners. with damages. considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. if the respondents are holding the property in trust for anyone. The Court of Appeals ruled that while the registration of the southern portion in the name of respondents had created an implied trust in favor of Agaton Pagaduan. Should it be immovable property.

Should there be no inscription. Roxas as security for a loan. b. The vendor's Certificate of Title No. 1969 Facts: Felisa Kalaw was the registered owner of a parcel of land situated at Lipa City.500. Article 1544 of the Civil Code. to the person who presents the oldest title. T-10392 issued in his name by falsifying a public document of conveyance. 9125 was not delivered to the vendees because it was in the possession of another person to whom the lot had been mortgaged by Felisa Kalaw.R. For a second buyer like the respondents to successfully invoke the second paragraph. Eugenia also sold the southern portion of the land to Agaton Pagaduan for P500. 340 . instituted the instant foreclosure suit against him for his failure to pay his obligation. provided there is good faith. In this case there was a first sale by Eugenia Reyes to Agaton Pagaduan and a second sale by Eugenia Reyes to the respondents. succeeded in having Certificate of Title No.00.00. Respondents sorely failed to meet this requirement of good faith since they had actual knowledge of Eugenia’s prior sale of the southern portion property to the petitioners. 9125 in the name of Felisa Kalaw canceled and a new transfer Certificate of Title No. a fact antithetical to good faith. Roxas. Long before and at the time of the sales. Pedro Dinglasan. she sold it to Francisca Mojica and Victoria Dinglasan with different sizes in areas. Francisca Mojica and Victoria Dinglasan were in possession of the Lot. He subsequently mortgaged the lot to Leonora T. This cannot be denied by respondents since in the same deed of sale that Eugenia sold them the northern portion to the respondents for P1. the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in possession. and. in the absence thereof. it must possess good faith from the time of the sale in its favor until the registration of the same. No. On June 11. L-27234 May 30. 1959.DINGLASAN G. Registration as an operative act bringing the land ROXAS vs.

However. the intervenors did not acquire ownership of the land because their deeds of sale were not registered. they as well paid the taxes of the property. the petitioners 341 . As pointed out. The respondents also introduced improvements. The vendees-intervenors not having acquired the ownership of the land. their action to vindicate ownership must fail because such action can prosper only upon proof by plaintiff that he is the owner. Issue: Whether Francisca Mojica and Victoria Dinglasan are the true owners of the land Ruling: No. they are not the true owners. The Court of Appeals certified the appeal of this Court on the ground that it involves only questions of law. The lower court rendered its decision finding that the mortgage was validly constituted and its foreclosure was in order. Egao v CA 174 SCRA 484 Facts: The respondents claim that they are the owners of the parcel of land by virtue of the deed of sale they entered into with Roberto Marfori.Francisca Mojica and Victoria Dinglasan moved to intervene since they allege that they are the true owners.

they know that the OCT is still registered under the name of the petitioners. Petitioner answers that they are the true owner of the land by virtue of the Certificate of Title issued by the Register of Deeds pursuant to their Free Patent. PEOPLE vs. the complainants allegedly discovered from the records of the Register of Deeds that the subject property had already been transferred in the name of Mizpah Reyes. When the land was sold to the respondents. he cannot claim that he is a purchaser in good faith for value. Thus. Filipino and resident of the City of Lipa. registered in their names. They were survived by the following children. REYES 175 SCRA 597 Facts: The spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a parcel of land. Where a purchaser neglects to make the necessary inquiries and closes his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard as to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's title. single. Both are now deceased. they are not considered to be innocent purchaser as contrary to the ruling of the CA. The CA holds both Egao and Marfori to be in pari delicto for violating the 5-year restriction provided by Commonwealth 141 against encumbrance and alienation of public lands acquired thrufree patent or homestead patent. the Egaos sold the lot to Marfori within the 5-year restriction period provided by law on Free Patent. However. The CA reversed the decision on grounds that the main issue should be whether Egao can validly sell the land to Marfori who subsequently transferred the ownership to the respondents. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners validly transferred their ownership to Marfori to resolve the rights of the respondents over the land in dispute Ruling: The SC holds that based on the adduced evidence. The lower court ruled in favor of Egao. They further allegedly discovered that the conveyance was effected 342 . of legal age. Philippines". and relying on the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor. purchases the property without making any further investigation.illegally occupied portions of the land.

through a notarized deed of sale executed and signed by their parents. 343 . CA 181 SCRA 9 Facts: A Decree was issued to spouses Maximo Nofuente and Dominga Lumandan in Land Registration and Original Certificate of Title correspondingly given by the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal covering a parcel of land. 91137 was issued. His legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed a petition for administration of the estate of deceased Ching Leng and was granted. legal and equitable. the registration of the instrument of partition with the Register of Deeds is constructive notice that said heirs have repudiated the fiduciary relationship between them and the other heirs vis-a-vis the property in question. The record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests. Issue: Whether or not the prescriptive period started when the deed of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds. Ruling: The rule is well-established that registration in a public registry is a notice to the whole world. It has also been ruled that when an extrajudicial partition of the property of the deceased was executed by some of his heirs. TCT No. All persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains. included therein. Ching Leng died. they found that the signature of their parents were allegedly falsified and that accused also made an untruthful statement that she was single although she was married. CHING vs. By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng.The deed of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds. The heirs who were not included in the deed of partition are deemed to have notice of its existence from the time it was registered with the Register of Deeds. Upon examination of the document. Consequently.

R.T. No. while the latter are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world. No. or to recover title to or possession of. Ruling: An action to redeem. COURT OF APPEALS G. Sec. as amended) requires "notice to all parties in interest. and if so. like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will. for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. the judgment in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng." Since ChingLeng was already in the other world when the summons was published he could not have been notified at all and the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person. Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the former are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments. 1998 344 . a newspaper of general circulation. Summons by publication to Ching Leng and/or his estate was directed by the trial court. 117384. would a dead man or his estates be bound by service of summons and decision by publication. An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam.C. real property is not an action in rem or an action against the whole world. The title over the property in the name of Ching Leng was cancelled and a new TCT was issued in favor of Asedillo. 91137 in his favor based on possession. The summons and the complaint were published in the "Economic Monitor". it is an action in personam. 496. Issue: Whether or not an action for reconveyance of property and cancellation of title is in personam. so much so that a judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. October 21. a suit against him was filed by private respondent Asedillo for reconveyance of the said property and cancellation of T. HEIRS OF TEODORO DELA CRUZ vs. Therefore.13 years after Ching Leng's death.

on October 1986. an action for reconveyance with damages was filed by petitioners against private respondents involving a parcel of land situated in Poblacion. TCT Nos. Issue: Whether the Certificates of Title issued to private respondents should be given more weight than the long possession of the subject lands by the petitioners. the same is fictitious and falsified. The Madrids argue that neither prescription nor laches can operate against them because their title to the property is registered under the Torrens system and therefore imprescriptable. physical. Such principles. 1959. It is not a mode of acquiring ownership. The Torrens system does not create or vest title. for P4.especially considering the fact 345 . while admittedly correct.Facts: On November 20. Instead. San Mateo. The records show that the disputed property has been in the possession of the petitioners since 1959. Ruling: No. and since then they have been in actual. The Madrids denied having executed the said deed of sale and assuming that said document exists. petitioners were unable to present the original deed of sale since.000. continuous and open possession of the property.277 square meters. However. 167220 and 167256. The fact that the Madrids were able to secure TCT No. they presented a photo copy of the purported original carbon copy of the deed of sale. 167250. are subject to certain exceptions. did not operate to vest upon them ownership of the property. During the trial. Petitioners assert that the subject land was bought by their predecessor-in-interest from the private respondents. Madrid brothers. They have since been introducing several improvements on the land. 1986. Isabela with a total area of 3.00 in a deed of sale executed on May 18. and Marquez. private respondents obtained a Torrens Title over the said land.

Domingo Teokemian. Ruling: 346 . the lower court rendered judgment in favor of defendants against the plaintiff. Albertana and Felicidad Teokemian. Virgilia Orais. the one-third share of Felicidad Teokemian in her possession was sold to spouses Elanoand Felicidad Cabrera who instantly took possession of it. was sold to Andres Orais wherein Felicidad was not able to sign in the Deed of Sale. ruling that the latter can no longer recover the portion of land occupied by the past due to laches. On April 27.In 1972. 1989. Issue: Whether or not the action of the plaintiffs is barred by laches. The Court of Appeals reversed such findings upon appeal on the justification that the defendant’s action for reconveyance based on an implied trust had already been barred by prescription and that the action of the plaintiffs is not barred by laches because what was sold to the Cabreras was a definite portion of the community property.that both the Madrids and Marquezes obtained their respective TCT’s only in October 1986. a parcel of unregistered land which was owned in mutual by Daniel. In 1988. having inherited the same from their late father. twenty-seven long (27) years after petitioners first took possession of the land.In 1957. CABRERA v CA 267 SCRA 339 Facts: In 1950. daughter of the vendee issued Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title over the said property. they should have filed a judicial action for recovery of possession and not merely to have the land registered under their respective names. Virgilia Orais filed a civil case for quieting of title against Felicidad Teokemian and Felicidad Cabrera. If the Madrids and Marquezes wished to assert their ownership.

The Avilas filed a motion for a preliminary writ of injunction praying that the Bahans be enjoined and ordered to refrain and desist from gathering or continue harvesting the fruits on the land in controversy until the termination of the case. In 1960. AVILA vs. therefore. as successors-in-interest. spouses Pedro Bahan and Dominga Exsaure acquired a 1. therefore.Yes. and on the same date an Original certificate of title was 347 . peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the same. void. public. where the transferees of an undivided portion of the land allowed a coowner of the property to occupy a definite portion thereof and has not disturbed the same. private respondent Julito Bahan and company gathered coconuts from the land purchased by petitioner Magdalena Avila. In the meantime. petitioner Avila bought under a Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land . There has. They filed an action for quieting of title and damages against the Avilas. and. the Bahans' application for free patent was approved and the free patent was issued . continuous. 1971. the latter had allowed Felicidad Teokemian to occupy that one-third portion allotted to her. 1991 Facts: In 1918. No. L-45947 August 27. been a partial partition. the petitioners Avilas raised the defense of having purchased the land from a certain Luis Cabalan and from then on has been in open. the possessor is in a better condition or right.8340 hectares parcel of coconut land which was inherited by private respondents in 1965. Sometime later. the heirs of Pedro Bahan filed Free Patent Application for alot which has a total area of 6. TAPUCAR G.371 square meter parcel of land which is part of the subject property inherited by the Bahans from their predecessor. for a period too long to be ignored. In their answer. is untenable.a 4. The argument that laches does not apply because what was sold to the Cabreras was a definite portion of the community property. Undisputed is the fact that since the sale of the two-third portion of the subject property to the plaintiff.9027 hectares in its entirety. On November 3.R.

TAN vs BANTEGUI GR No.issued in the name of the Heirs of Pedro Bahan. The effect is that it is as if no registration was made at all. and the certificate of title issued under thecircumstances to such persons would be declared void subject to the right of innocent purchasers for value. Land registration is a proceeding in rem and binds the whole world. It is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of such title over a particular property. It does not give the holder any better right than what he actually has. 2005 348 . by virtue of the said certificate alone. represented by Julito Bahan. the simple possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens Systems does not necessarily make the holder a true owner of all the property described therein. especially if the registration was done in bad faith. Registration does not vest title. If a person obtains a title under the Torrens system. Issue: Whether the free patent and original certificate of title which were erroneously issued and vested ownership of lands in favor of the Bahans is proper. he does not.The free patent issued to the Bahans is erroneous because it embraced and comprised portions of lands belonging to the Avilas. become the owner of the lands illegally included. However. Ruling: No. 154027 October 24.which includes by mistake or oversight land which can no longer be registered under the system. The subsequent registration of the portion of land belonging to the Avilas by the Bahans could not make the latter owners thereof. A cadastral court has no authority to award a property in favor of persons who have not put in any claims to it and have never asserted any right of ownership thereon.

Said property was again sold by the Pereyras to the spouses Tan. they should nonetheless be invalidated. 464. She returned to the Philippines in January 1988 and executed her special power of attorneymaking Guadalupe B. The property was later sold on June 20. Considering the failure to abide by the mandatory requirements of a proceeding in personam. said property was at public auction held on November 21.] filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale. no better title than that of the original owner can be 349 . she left for the United States of America. 1984. After the trial court rendered its Decision in favor of respondents. thru her sister Guadalupe Bautista. Although preceded by proper advertisement and publication. after which. The auction sale of real property for the collection of delinquent taxes is in personam. For failure of Bantegui to pay taxes. Issue: Whether or not the auction sale was valid. Bautista (Bautista for brevity) her representative. not in rem. Ruling: The tax sale did not conform to the requirements prescribed under Presidential Decree (PD) No.” It is still incumbent upon the city treasurer to send the notice directly to the taxpayer -. considering that the procedure in tax sales is in personam.Facts: Bantegui acquired the property sometime in 1954 and rented it to spouses Caedos who resided therein until 1994. A certificate of title under the Torrens system serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears on it. Injunction and Damages with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In 1970. These transfers were unknown to Bantegui and the Caedos. mere notice by publication will not satisfy the requirements of proceedings in personam.the registered owner of the property -in order to protect the latter’s interests. otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code. While it is true that Transfer Certificates of Title have already been issued in the names of the subsequent purchasers. and joined by the spouses Caedo[. Although sufficient in proceedings in rem like land registration. Since the property was not redeemed within the one (1) year redemption period. title to said property was consolidated to the Capistranos. petitioners appealed to the CA. an auction sale is void absent an actual notice to a delinquent taxpayer. to the spouses Capistranos. Bantegui. she went back to the United States. 1988 by the Capistranos to spouses Pereyra. “[P]ublication of the notice of delinquency [will] not suffice. Quieting of Title.

From the evidence of the plaintiff. What appellant tries to point out. DEMASIADO vs VELASCO 71 SCRA 105 Facts: Plaintiff bought the land in question through pacto de retro sale from his uncle Ambrosio Demasiado which vendor a retro could repurchase within ten years after the first five years from the date of the document. and shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein (principally. Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff has clear right over the disputed lot. 496) the certificate of title covering registered land "shall be received as evidence in all courts of the Philippines. Ruling: Under Section 47 of the Land Registration Act. the plaintiff has not even proved his clear right over the whole lot. This shows that when said document was executed parties already knew that lot 5169 has been titled and it would have been easy for parties to inquire from the office of the Register of Deeds as to whether this land is titled or not. it has been established that plaintiff's claim to the land in question is premised on two unregistered documents. Based on the evidence presented by plaintiff and defendants. That which is a nullity produces no effect. Quod nullum est.assumed by the transferees. 350 . the Identity of the owner of the land covered thereby) except so far as provided" in the Act itself. the incontrovertible nature of a certificate of title applies only when the issue involved is the validity of the original and not of the transfer. Besides. Subsequent titles issued to the prejudice of the rightful owner will produce no legal effects whatsoever. nullum producit effectum. And there is no pretense that appellant comes under any of the exceptions mentioned in Section 39 of the Act. That said vendor a retro subsequently executed a deed of definite sale of same lot in favor of the plaintiff Melquiades Demasiado and his wife Jovita Pareja It is admitted that both deeds of sale though contained in a public document have not been registered in the office of the Register of Deeds. (Act No. Deeds of Sale could not be superior to the existing valid original certificate of title.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari. although the trial court did rule that said certificate "should be admitted".however. 1991. On appeal the RTC and. Espiritu Santo died and was succeeded by his heirs. David Odsigue has been in possession of the land by the tolerance of the owner of the original owner Platon Espiritu Santo. "the owner's copy of Original certificate of Title No. it did not actually rule that "they are hereby admitted. In 1989. in a sworn affidavit. COURT OF APPEALS 233 SCRA 626 Facts: Armando Angeles. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied by the appellate court. DAVID ODSIGUE vs. sent a letter of demand to David Odsigue to vacate the premises. Angeles. On January 10. considering that His Honor's ruling that said certificate. 1991. Issue: 351 . among whom was Armando Angeles. Rizal. Fernando Austria. Since 1972. 61801 is admissible". 4050 and situated at Lagundi. The MTC rendered a decision ordering the petitioner to vacate the premises. is that the trial court admitted the certificate of title invoked by appellee without the same being properly Identified. affirmed the decision of the MTC. a reconsideration and reversal of its earlier ruling rejecting the same. as co-owner and assignee of the other heirs. the CA. which must be deemed to be clearly even if not categorically. On February 8. was precisely made after originally sustaining appellant's counsel's objection to its admission. Morong. private respondent brought this suit for unlawful detainer in the MTC. stated that he tried to deliver the letter to petitioner but petitioner had refused to receive it. According to appellant. later." We believe such argument is unavailing. The letter was delivered to the Odsigue by the Barangay Captain of Lagundi. owner of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. who. which found no new matters which would warrant a reversal of its decision.

Likewise. Two years after the execution of the donation. petitioners will be required to demolish only whatever is constructed within its boundaries. Accordingly. or on October 27. Francisco Garrote left Bohol thirty years before 1966 and had never returned to that province. Fabio. Andrea accepted the donation in the same instrument. 1936. Private respondent's title (OCT No. 1934 the sisters Isabela Pondoc and Crispina Pondoc donated to Andrea Budlong in a notarial instrument their two-thirds share in the said lot in consideration of the donee's personal services to the donors.Whether or not the property sought to be recovered has been properly identified. Rizal stated that petitioner was occupying a landholding at Barangay Lagundi. 4050. BUDLONG vs. Andrea Budlong did not intervene in the cadastral proceeding. Isabela Pondoc and Crispina Pondoc died without any descendants in 1935 and 1937. Ruling: A certificate of title is conclusive evidence not only of ownership of the land referred but also its location. 4718 was issued for the said lot. The subject of these proceedings is the land covered by OCT No. Francisco Garrote 1/6.the donee. Isabela Pondoc 1/3. Isabel GarrotePondoc died and was survived by her five children named Juan. PONDOC 79 SCRA 24 Facts: On October 27. Apolinaria Benedicta and Felicidad all surnamed Pondoc y Garrote 352 . 4050) indicates that the property is located in Barangay Lagundi. Original Certificate of Title No. the certification issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer at Morong. The title shows that the lot is owned by the following coowners: Crispina Pondoc 113. She was not substituted for the donors in that proceeding. and Isabela Garrote-Pondoc 1/6.

She was allowed to sue as a pauper. She declared it for tax purposes in her name.Andrea Budlong has been in possession of the lot. 2. bamboos. it is subject to attachment and execution for the payment of debts. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that Andrea Budlong was guilty of laches and that the registration of the lot extinguished her rights under the deed of donation. Registered land is subject (a) to any alien of any description established by law on land and the b thereon. except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in the amendments hereof". The rights and liabilities which are created by law and are made applicable to unregistered land. 496. The rights arising from the relation of husband and wife are applicable to registered lands. 4718. or the rights of partition between coparceners joint tenants and other cotenants " "or to change or affect in any other way any other rights or liabilities created by law and applicable to unregistered land. therefore. 3. and that nothing in Act No. Issue: Whether or not the done ceased to be a co-owner because her name does not appear in the certificate of title Ruling: Section 70 of Act No. 496 that registered land. except as otherwise provided in Act No. Early in 1965 Andrea wanted to register the deed of donation. 496 "shall in any way be construed "to change the laws of descent. Andrea Budlong filed in the Court of First instance of Bohol an action for the partition of the said lot. She planted the lot to coconuts. 1965 asked Juan Pondoc to surrender the owner's duplicate of OCT No. LEGAL INCIDENTS OF REGISTRATION LAND 1 Registered land is subject to the same legal burdens and incidents as unregistered land and. or the interest of 353 . fake unregistered land. bananas and a mango tree. The register of deeds in a letter dated April 1. are applicable to registered land. and ownership therein. shall in all respects be subject to the same burdens and incidents attached by law to unregistered land".

Section 70 of Act No.the owner in such land or buildings. 1997. which was issued subsequent to the donation. 496 is crystal clear. as the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC. 4718. the petitioners revoked the the petitioners license and was verbally ordered to vacate the premises which the petitioner refused to do. –No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. It unmistakably provides that the conversion of unregistered land into registered land does not affect the rights of the CO-owners nor the legal rights and liabilities applicable to unregistered land G. 354 . EVANGELICAL FREE CHURCH G. the donors appear to be the co-owners and not Andrea Budlong did not extinguish at all the rights of Andrea as a co-owner. will other cotenants except as otherwise expressly provoked in Act No. An appeal to the RTC was also futile. IMPRESCRIPTIBLE Section 47.R. Fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. respondents filed an ejectment suit against the petitioner. even after a demand letter later being served. 496. who in turn filed an answer with counterclaim in the same MTC. and (c) to the rights of partition between coparceners joint tenants. On Dec. She became the successor-in-interest of the donors. covered by a transfer certificate in the name of the respondent Evangelical Free Church of the Philippines. CANA VS. The disputed property consists of a lot and a church. As a result. ATTRIBUTES i. PD 1529 Registered land not subject to prescription. Isabela Pondoc and Crispina Pondoc. The said court dismissed the parties suit and counterclaim for some technicalities. 5447. The fact that in OCT No. The deed of donation made Andrea Budlong a co-owner of Lot No. 157573 FACTS: Petitioner Elinel Caña is a former pastor assigned in the respondents affiliate Malabon Christian Evangelical Church (MCEC). Petitioner was permitted by the respondents to occupy the disputed property for the worship services of MCEC. (b) to the laws of descent.

VALDEZ 173 SCRA 534 FACTS: Petitioner-plaintiff Corporation filed a complaint against respondents. who also dismissed the same for the case being insufficient in form and substance. the Supreme Court held that an ejectment case against the petitioner was proper. VS. ISSUE: Whether or not said petitioner has lawful title to the disputed property. The evidence presented by the petitioner. It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. NATALIA REALTY CORP. Then the CA reversed the RTC’s ruling and ordered said petitioner to vacate said property. RULING: The Supreme Court was not persuaded by the petitioner’s contention that in all its pleadings. 355 . the respondents complied by attaching sufficient and relevant documents to its suit. Petitioner prayed that defendants be ordered to vacate the same land belonging to the former and to pay the reasonable compensation and financial reliefs. Therefore. petitioner failed to present competent evidence to prove his right to remain in possession of the disputed property.A review was then filed by the respondents with the Court of Appeals. Records show that the respondents have consistently asserted their ownership over the said land. Moreover. the petition for review on certiorari filed by the petitioner. with the evidence of the Deed of Absolute Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title. Thereafter. was found to be self-serving and unsubstantiated. which consisted mainly of affidavits of its members of the board. The Supreme Court held that the respondent's title over the subject property is evidence of its ownership thereof. the age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof. Hence. alleging that defendants unlawfully occupied portions of the parcels of land belonging to and registered in its name. the respondents never disputed petitioner’s claim that MCEC was the one who purchased the disputed property. In fine.

the trial court rendered a summary judgment upon finding that no valid issue was raised by defendants but only "conclusions that because they have been in actual possession for over 30 years of their respective farm lots they are entitled to be respected of such occupancy and as such the complaints should be dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a factual controversy in these consolidated cases. the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court for absence of a valid issue raised by defendants. On December 1983. Their motion was denied on a holding that the grounds therefore are not concrete. A motion for reconsideration was filed with the CA. Claiming that there is no genuine issue averred in the defendants complaint. RULING: 356 .Defendants sought the dismissal of all the aforesaid complaints for ejectment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. plaintiff Corporation moved for a summary judgment on the consolidated cases under Rule 34 of the Rules of Court. and are mere pretended denials and flimsy defences. On October 1983.

there is nothing either in Presidential Decree No. the alleged invalidity of the title of the plaintiff and their supposed acquisition of the properties by adverse possession. They relied mainly on two points. A petition for review of the decree must be presented within one year after its entry. 357 . Even assuming that said titles may still be challenged base on their claim applying Presidential Deree no. 496) are indefeasible after the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree of registration. After the lapse of one year. The certificates of title issued in the name of the plaintiff in accordance with the Land Registration Act (Act No. The rendition of the questioned summary judgment by the trial court is proper and valid. 2 which may be said to justify appellants' claim that said decree granted the ownership of said lands to them and their successors by title. The very allegations of the defendants prove that no valid issue has been tendered by them. the decree of registration becomes incontrovertible and is binding upon and conclusive against all persons. Petition was granted. Apparently.None. the present case does not provide the vehicle for that remedy since the judicial action required is a direct. and not a collateral. The certificates of title of Appellee Corporation were issued more than thirty years ago Also. attack. appellants were misled or induced to believe that they acquired the parcels of land in question when the whole country was declared by the previous regime as a land reform area. Defendants' theses are obviously puerile but they are entitled to the benefit of clarification. 2 purportedly making them and their successors owners of said land.

Defendant herein. The Court further held that since the land is registered land no title in derogation to that of the registered owner could have been acquired either by Zacarias Ciscar or his successors in interest. 926. but that of the equitable defense of 358 . an equitable one lies in favor of the Defendant and that is. 1916 and certificate of title No. that while no legal defense to the action lies. namely. Sanchez was in possession and enjoyment of the land from the time he acquired it by inheritance from Ciscar up to the time he sold it to Defendant Andres Gamponia. No hold that the defense of prescription or adverse possession in derogation of the title of the registered owner Domingo Mejia does not lie.LUCAS VS. the equitable defense of laches. This patent was transcribed in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya on July 26. the latter has also possessed and enjoyed the property from the time he bought it to date. Roque Sanchez and Defendant Andres Gamponia. 3699 was issued over the land subject of the action in the name of Domingo Mejia. ISSUE: Whether plaintiff's right of action has already prescribed by virtue of the possession of the land by the Defendant and his predecessors in interest for a period of 37 years RULING: Upon a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances. who immediately took possession thereof and enjoyed its fruits. On March 24. after the issuance of the patent but before the registration of the same. as the sale was made only 11 days after the issuance of a patent in violation of the provisions of section 35 of Act No. however. we are constrained to find. GAMPONIA 100 PHIL 277 FACTS: By the stipulation of the parties it appears that on March 13. Roque Sanchez in turn sold the land on January 21. 1916. Upon the above facts the court a quo held that the sale by the patentee to Zacarias Ciscar is null and void. free patent No. 1916. 380 issued in the name of Domingo Mejia. 1940 to Andres Gamponia. patentee Domingo Mejia deeded the land to Zacarias Ciscar. Upon his death the property was included in the distribution of his estate and adjudicated to Roque Sanchez.

or the suit is not held to be barred. U. or that the intervening rights of third persons may be destroyed or seriously impaired.00. that said Faustino C. Co Cho. been converted into a stale demand. Faustino C. (96 Phil. S. All the four elements mentioned above are present in the case at bar. et al. Respondent's defense to the action for ejectment was that he bought the disputed portion of land from a certain Capt. City of Austin et al. the original owner’s right to recover back the possession of the property and the title thereto from the Defendant has. vs. Otherwise.) The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and one is hereby entered absolving the Defendant from the action.laches.” (Penn Mutual Life Inc. for the sum of P3. the complainant having had knowledge or notice. by the long period of 37 years and by patentee’s inaction and neglect.. In other words. et al. it will not exert its equitable powers in order to save one from the consequences of his own neglect. where a court of equity finds that the position of the parties has to change that equitable relief cannot be afforded without doing injustice.600. 962. In Go Chi Gun. Cruz acquired the said 359 ... we hold that while Defendant may not be considered as having acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessors’ long continued possession for 37 years. et al. RIGHT TO RECOVER POSSESSION IS IMPRESCRIPTIBLE JM TUASON VS CA 93 SCRA 146 FACTS: It is not disputed that this case originated as an action for recovery of possession (ejectment) instituted by the plaintiff (petitioner) corporation against the private respondent Guillermo Renosa.. (2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights. giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy. (4) injury or prejudice to the Defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant. (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the Defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit. . “The reason upon which the rule is based is not alone the lapse of time during which the neglect to enforce the right has existed. but the changes of condition which may have arisen during the period in which there has been neglect. or of one under whom he claims.. vs. Co. Cruz.. 622) we held that the equitable defense of laches requires four elements:(1) conduct on the part of the Defendant. stated. of the Defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit.

Capt. he and respondent Reñosa were never able to prove transfer to ownership of the same from petitioner to Capt. Cruz and respondent Reñosa cannot be considered exactly as possessors in good faith because both of them knew at the time they entered into possession that petitioner was the registered owner of the disputed land. petitioner is entitled to possession as an attribute of ownership. that this valid right of possession was transmitted to private respondent Reñosa when Cruz sold a portion of that land in 1956. RULING: Taking into consideration the fundamental principle in law applicable to the circumstances of this case that mere possession of whatever length cannot defeat the imprescriptible title to the holder of registered Torrens Title to real property. his right as beneficiary would never arise. to Reñosa. Cruz sold to respondent 360 square meters of the 3. and that registered real property under the Torrens system cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Cruz' alleged right to the property in question. Q-177 and Q-186 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.000 square meters of land acquired by virtue of a compromise agreement in Civil Case Nos. thus 360 . Cruz. Aside from the compromise agreement as the only basis of Capt. Both Capt. as against private respondent Reñosa who merely claims a right to possess from his predecessor-ininterest Capt.000 square meters allegedly allocated to the former in the compromise agreement. The petitioner who is the registered owner of the disputed land has a right to possess and recover the same. Q-139. Q-135. Capt. and that all in all Faustino C.portion from 3. that as owner. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner in the ejectment case on the grounds that petitioner is the registered owner of the questioned land. Cruz who likewise never acquired any right to possess the disputed property. Quezon City Branch. Cruz. acquired a valid right to own and possess said land a right that he could have legally transferred to private respondent Reñosa which was also to entitle the latter to a better right to possession against the admitted registered owner of the land. Cruz to possess the property in question. ISSUE: Whether private respondent Reñosas predecessor-interest in the disputed property namely. Respondent Court of Appeals in reversing the trial court's decision based its stand on its firm belief that the compromise agreement between the petitioner and the "Deudors" created a valid right in favor of Capt. Cruz cannot be considered a possessor in good faith because as beneficiary of the compromise agreement he should be in a position to know that there were suspensive conditions attached to his possible acquisition of the disputed property and that if the conditions were not fulfilled.

petitioner is entitled to possession and initiated the correct action when it brought a case to recover possession of the same. not only because the acquisitive prescription of 10 years of possession provided under Article 1134 of the Civil Code of the Philippines has not yet transpired (private respondents 361 . that plaintiffs inherited from Mariano Dablo a parcel of unirrigated riceland in Zambales. Mariano Dablo had been in peaceful. This parcel of land is covered by Original Certificate of Title in the name of Hrs. it was issued in the name of the heirs of Mariano Dablo on and was transcribed in the Registry Book of the Resister of Deeds of Zambales. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are the legal owners of lot in question. both surnamed Dablo are their legitimate children. until the defendants illegally entered and occupied it in 1946. does not appear to be proper and apt.However.strengthening the obvious fact that the suspensive conditions imposed in the compromise agreement were never fulfilled and hence petitioner never transferred title to the reserved properties in favor of the beneficiaries therein. Neither would prescription aid the cause of private respondents. Regional trial court declared that the petitioners are the legal owners of lot in question. the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No P-3593. plaintiffs alleged that Hilariona Fortaleza Dablo is the surviving spouse of Mariano Dablo who died in 1936. that is. of Mariano Dablo. while Maria and Juanito. continuous. the remedy granted by respondent Court of Appeals. In their complaint. DABLO VS CA 226 SCRA 618 FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint for quieting of title with recovery of possession and ownership. As registered owner of the land and in the absence of any equal or better right on the part of respondent Reñosa to possess the disputed land. RULING: SC held that the private respondents are the true and rightful owners of the western portion of the land in dispute. open. public and adverse possession of the property as owner thereof since 1911 until his death when the plaintiffs succeeded in the possession of the property.

92 SCRA 389 [1979]. the Court of First Instance of Iloilo rendered judgment decreeing the registration in the above lot in favor of vendor Basilia Paccial noted that it was encumbered to the Palomillo "for the sum of TEN PESOS (P10. Inc. . As former Chief Justice Arellano so emphatically stated: "[It] shall remain in full force and effect forever. who sold it to one Palomino subject to the right of repurchase within a period of three years. The period expired without such a right being exercised. 1975).. Court of Appeals. Cleofas. and the next day Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of Salvador Pagayon which cancelled the Original Certificate of Title in favor of Paccial. is very plain and conclusive.00. Salvador Pagayon. Tuason & Co. Nor will laches bolster the claim of ownership of private respondents over this eastern portion. Ruling: The conclusiveness of a decree of registration has been stressed. vs. . Issue: Whether or not the vendee is the owner of the land.00). Earlier on January 30. An action by the registered owner to recover possession based on a Torrens title is not barred by laches. 1925.” No other conclusion would do in the opinion of former Chief Justice Araullo as "Section 38 of Act No. Peter Memorial Park. 93 SCRA 146 [1979]). J.M. Petitioner acquired the rights and interests. Inc. but also because ownership of registered land under the Torrens System is imprescriptible (St. The Deed of Sale was registered. "The effects of the decree of registration cease to exist when the title is transferred to a successor. 498 .entered the eastern portion in 1969 while the complaint to quiet title was filed on April 1. vs." The interests of the Philippines will best be served by a strict adherence to the provision of the Land Registration 362 .. the predecessor-in-interest of the other respondents in this proceeding acquired the property for the sum of P2.The Torrens title then "issued after the necessary judicial proceedings [possesses] an absolute and conclusive character.000. The original certificate of title was issued in the name of Basilia Paccial with the foregoing encumbrances and conditions annotated thereon. MELGAR VS PAGAYON 21 SCRA FACTS: A parcel of land was originally owned by Basilia Paccial.

EVANGELICAL FREE CHURCH OF THE PHILIPPINES G. to guarantee the indefeasibility of the title to the property. much of the stability that it is the purpose of the Torrens system to maintain would be a thing of the past.R. as well as the title issued as a result thereof. considering the fact that the property has passed from the hands of the original registered owner into those of clearly innocent third parties. Issue: WoN mere possession of the said property defeats a Torrens Title 363 . altered or modified after the lapse of the one year period fixed by the legal provision mentioned above. are binding and conclusive upon the whole world.Law. 96813. At the risk of stating what is obvious. The incontestable and absolute character of the Torrens title. This has to be the rule. for if even after the ownership of a property has been decreed by a land registration court in favor of a particular person and title issued may still be annulled. Elinel Caña (petitioner) is its former pastor assigned to its affiliate. The disputed property. is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. We say that land registration proceedings under Act 496 are in rem and that such proceedings.consisting of a church lot and building. However. In the instant case the above doctrine should apply with more reason. changed. 157573 FACTS: A dispute over the possession of a land claimed by a church against its former pastor sparked the commencement of this case in the trial court. Hence. 1997 requiring petitioner to vacate the disputed premises and surrender peaceful possession thereof to respondent. the object of the Torrens system. 1997. which petitioner refers to as Malabon Christian Evangelical Church (MCEC). No. a corporation existing under and by virtue of Philippine laws. Petitioner ignored the demand letter. namely. on December 1. alleged. Malabon Evangelical Free Church. Respondent permitted petitioner to occupy the disputed property wherein MCEC maintained worship services. registered in the name of Evangelical Free Church of the Philippines (respondent). respondent sought the services of a counsel who wrote a formal demand letter dated December 17. would be defeated." If it were otherwise. respondent revoked petitioner's license and verbally demanded that petitioner vacate the disputed property but the latter refused to obey." CANA VS.

As such. EAGLE REALTY CORPORATION VS REPUBLIC G. Inc. No. the true owners of the said land. petitioner cannot insist that his continued occupation thereof is lawful. It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. Moreover. a title issued based on void documents does not run against the State and its subdivisions. the de Leons.R. discovered that another title was fraudulently issued to 364 . One whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the property the moment he is required to leave (Cañiza vs. failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. Respondent's title over the subject property is evidence of its ownership thereof. Having failed to overcome herein respondent’s right of possession over the disputed property. 340 SCRA 525) Instances when defense of indefeasibility is NOT available: 1 The principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title does not apply where fraud attended the issuance of the title.” (Jimenez vs. the age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.. This Reyes acquired the land from a certain Medina who earlier acquired the said land via surreptitiously entering a false record in the records of the Land Registration Commission. Eventually. 151424 FACTS: Eagle Realty. 268 SCRA 640). bought a parcel of land from a certain Reyes in 1984 via a Deed of Sale. The Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud. Patricia. Court of Appeals.Ruing: No. This is consistent with the principle that “a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's forbearance or permission without any contract between them is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand. a company engaged in the real estate business.

ISSUE: Whether or not the TCT was validly revoked RULING: Yes. De Leon was able to have the said title annulled as well as the TCT issued to Eagle Realty by virtue of the Deed of Sale.Medina over the same parcel of land. 163566 FACTS: The subject parcels of land were inherited by Carmen. without any compulsory heir. The respondent then filed a civil case against Madelene praying that the deed of donation be nullified. Carmen even informed her tenants that Madelene would inherit the properties upon her death. including the notary public. she was present when all the signatories thereon. DE GUZMAN VS AGBALA G. An amended complaint was filed on September 15. According to Madelene. 1988 to include the transferees of the properties including petitioner 365 . Said land was the subject of a deed of donation in favor of her niece Madelene Javier Cruz. the principle of indefeasibilty of a Torrens Title does not apply when the patent and the title based thereon are null and void.R. The Director of Lands had no authority to grant a free patent over privately owned land. No. she received the rentals of the properties covered by the donation. as well as the subsequent transfers to other parties of the properties covered by the spurious donation. From that time on. who died single. signed the document.

who were the transferees of the land. P-30187 was merely collaterally attacked. P-30187 was correctly nullified RULING: Yes. P-30187 was registered on the basis of a free patent which the RTC ruled was issued by the Director of Lands without authority.spouses Raymundo and Perla de Guzman. Such decision was affirmed by the CA. This was confirmed by the handwriting expert of the National Bureau of Investigation. Although OCT No. The petitioners falsely claimed that the land was public land when in fact it was not as it was private land previously owned by Carmen who inherited it from her parents. as well as to collateral. attack. BORNALES VS. An action to declare the nullity of a void title does not prescribe and is susceptible to direct. declared the deed of donation in favor of Madelene null and void ab initio. it was still correctly nullified because the free patent on which it was based was null and void ab initio. The principle of indefeasibility does not apply when the patent and the title based thereon are null and void. in its decision. Respondent claimed that the deed of donation was fake. OCT No. Rogelio Azores. ISSUE: Whether or not OCT No. This finding was affirmed by the CA. The RTC. IAC 166 SCRA 512 FACTS: 366 .

the petitioners only acquire the right which their vendors then had. 367 . Isabel assailed the sale. Spouses Sixto and Isabel Dumolong were awarded a parcel of land. Isabel never affixed her thumbmark and that the same was not within her knowledge.In 1927. to be effective. The Torrens system of land registration should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. ISSUE: Whether or not Bornales may invoke the indefeasibility of a Torrens title RULING: No. must be made in good faith. Three months thereafter. Placida registered the Deed and a Torrens title was issued in their name. but since a Torrens was issued he should be considered as a buyer in good faith. But apparently. is Sixto’s tenant. Placida and her children executed a Deed of extrajudicial Adjudication and Sale of Real Property. If at all. Registration. In November 1978. In March 1978. Placida and Sixto begot children. it is a settled rule that the defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title does not extend to a transferee who takes it with notice of the flaws in his transferor’s title. Placida and her children sold the land to Bornales. hence entitled to some right. petitioners cannot invoke the indefeasibility of a certificate of title against the private respondent to the extent of her interest therein. Isabel argued that the acquisition of the Torrens title by Placida et al was through fraud. however was not blessed by a child. Thus. The petitioner. They were able to acquire the supposed thumbmark of Isabel. Bornales countered he was not aware of the fraudulent nature of the prior transactions. on the other hand. Their marriage. Sixto then had an extramarital affair and he cohabited with Placida who even used Sixto’s surname. Having bought the land registered under the Torrens system from their vendors who procured title thereto by means of fraud.

RO1121 had already been cancelled as early as 1969 and was presently registered in the name of respondent.HEIRS OF TIRO VS PES G. No." executed by Maxima Ochea. 170528 FACTS: Guillerma Tiro et al. the registered owners of the property who were also in possession of the same at the time of the sale. The RTC ruled that respondent was an innocent purchaser for value who relied on the correctness of the certificate of title in the name of the vendor. be declared void. that the title which was issued in the name of respondent be cancelled. But they discovered that OCT No. The RTC issued a decision dismissing petitioners’ complaint. The petitioners prayed that all the transactions emanating from the "Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs and Confirmation of Sale.R. ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in not finding that the act of the RD of registering a clearly void and unregistrable document 368 . filed before the RTC a Complaint for Quieting of Title against PES. Petitioners alleged that they are the children of the late Julian Tiro. Respondent argued that petitioners’ action for quieting of title was barred by laches and prescription. Respondent claimed that its predecessor-in-interest Pacific Rehouse Corporation acquired the subject land from the Spouses Velayo. and that the property be restored and registered in the name of the petitioners.The petitioners filed with the CA an appeal and MR but were denied. They averred that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in actual possession of the disputed land since time immemorial until they were prevented from entering the same by persons claiming to be the new owners sometime in 1995. including the transfer made in favor of the respondent.

RULING: Petitioners’ arguments are unfounded. A person is considered in law as an innocent purchaser for value when he buys the property of another. and pays a full price for the same at the time of such purchase. otherwise. A person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title of the vendor/transferor. Thus. Good faith must concur with registration because. or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property. and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property. without notice that some other person has a right or an interest in such property.confers no valid title on the presentor and his successors-ininterest.Certificates of title merely confirm or record title already existing and vested. registration would be an exercise in futility. The courts cannot disregard the rights of innocent third persons. a title procured by fraud or misrepresentation can still be the source of a completely legal and valid title if the same is in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. The indefeasibility of the torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. AGNE VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS 181 SCRA 46 FACTS: 369 . for that would impair or erode public confidence in the torrens system of land registration.

vs. therefore. And the said patent and subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto are null and void since the said land. 1974. petitioners filed a complaint against the respondents Director of Lands and spouses Agpoon with the CFI of Pangasinan for annulment of title. 23263. While the above-mentioned case was still pending. private respondent spouses filed a case in the CFI of Pangasinan for recovery of possession and damages against petitioners. that an action to annul a free patent many years after it had become final and indefeasible states no cause of action. 1971.On April 13. Their complaint states that they are the registered owners under the aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title No. when respondent spouses filed a complaint against them. Barroga. But petitioners alleged that they became the owners by accession or accretion of the respective aliquot parts of said river bed bordering their properties. issued an order dismissing Civil Case No. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court is justified in dismissing 370 . et al. The trial court rendered a decision ordering the defendants to surrender to the plaintiffs the physical possession of the land in question. On June 24. et al. Pangasinan which is now in the possession of petitioners. that they found out that the said land was granted by the Government to Herminigildo Agpoon under Free Patent No. pursuant to which OCT. cannot be the subject of a public land grant. an abandoned river bed. Petitioners alleged that the land in question belongs to them and that it was only on April 13. is of private ownership and. the aforesaid CFI of Pangasinan. Asingan. acting on the motion to dismiss filed by respondents Director of Lands and spouses Agpoon. reconveyance of and/or action to clear title to a parcel of land. 2370 was issued in the latter's name. 1971. 32209 of the parcel of land situated in Barrio Bantog. U-2649 for annulment of title by merely citing the statement in the case of Antonio.

it was Barroga's privilege to rely or not to rely upon his claim of private ownership in favor of his predecessor in interest and of whatever the latter's Titulo Real was worth.the complaint although the facts and circumstances set forth in the complaint show that the land in question was private land under Article 370 of the old Civil Code. The facts alleged in the complaint constitute a sufficient cause of action against private respondents.1880). that they are the real and lawful owners of the said land as decreed by Article 370 of the old Civil Code. Acting accordingly he applied for a free patent and was successful. Petitioners in their complaint alleged that the disputed area was formerly an abandoned river bed formed due to natural causes. but neither the allegation made in his answer that his aforesaid predecessor in interest was the absolute owner of the property covered by said Titulo Real nor his implied admission of the latter's invalidity or insufficiency are grounds for the annulment of the free patent and original certificate of title in question. 12479 issued in the name of his predecessor in interest on July 22. He decided not to rely upon them and to consider that the property covered by the Titulo Real was still part of the public domain. It is true that by filing the application for a free patent Barroga impliedly admitted either the invalidity or insufficiency of Titulo Real No. the law then in force. that since the said area was a private land. Evidently. for which reason he decided to acquire the land as part of the public domain. We may well presume that Barroga felt that he had no sufficient evidence to prove this. It must be borne in mind that the Titulo Real was not an indefeasible title and that its holder still had to prove that he had possessed the land covered by it without interruption during a period of ten years by virtue of a good title and in good faith (Royal Decree of June 25. the same could not have been the subject matter of an application for free patent. RULING: The aforesaid case of Antonio relied upon by the lower court in its dismissal order is not controlling. 1894. and that all these facts were known 371 .

the patent and certificate of title issued upon the patent are a nullity. No. The complaint alleged that sometime in 1992. the corresponding OCTs were thus issued in the name of Gregoria Martinez. Sr. If it was a private land.The indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of a Torrens title issued pursuant to a patent may be invoked only when the land involved originally formed part of the public domain. 170409 FACTS: Respondents are the heirs of the late Melanio Medina. MARTINEZ VS CA G. who during his lifetime inherited the properties from his mother.to the private respondents and their predecessor in interest. When private respondents later filed an application for land registration over the same properties. This impelled private respondents 372 . Rosa Martinez Emitaño. Gregoria Merquines. Unbeknownst to private respondents. Celedonia Martinez (Celedonia).R. petitioner. who in turn inherited them from her own mother. petitioner opposed the same. represented herself as Gregoria Martinez and as thus one of the descendants of Celedoniaand under that name applied for free patents over the properties with the CENRO.

Before the Court of Appeals. The petition is denied. the principle of title is unavailing where fraud attended the issuance of the free patents and titles. the titles of the petitioner are not considered indefeasible and incontrovertible notwithstanding the lapse of one year from their issuance since the certificate of title in this case has been issued on the basis of free patent procured through fraud manifested in the facts that Gregoria Merquines has misrepresented herself as Gregoria Martinez who happened to be one of the descendants of Celedonia. The trial court rendered a decision ordering the cancellation of petitioner’s titles. ISSUE: Whether or not titles of the petitioner are already indefeasible and incontrovertible following the lapse of one year from their issuance RULING: No.to file the instant complaint. Furthermore. the Court of Appeals ruled that the argument is untenable since petitioner employed fraud in the proceedings which led to the issuance of the free patents and the titles. Concerning the alleged indefeasibility of the titles issued to petitioner. a certificate of title issued on the basis of free patent procured through fraud or in violation of the law may be cancelled since such title is not cloaked with indefeasibility. Under the recent jurisprudence. CARAGAY-LAYNO VS CA 132 SCRA 718 373 . She argued the titles secured were already indefeasible in view of the lapse of one year from the issuance of the titles. The only issue raised at the trial was whether the free patents and land titles should be annulled due to fraud and misrepresentation in their procurement.

who lived together under one roof in the care of a common aunt. and the decedent. Prior to the widow’s death. "both orphans. exclusive and notorious possession and in the concept of an owner of the land since 1921. Juliana Caragay. that they’ve been paying taxes. Pangasinan) measures 5417 sq. His widow administered his property until her death in 1966. m. m. ISSUE: Whether or not the disputed portion should be adjudged in favor of De Vera’s estate RULING: 374 . Estrada sued to evict Juliana. In year 1951. Juliana averred that she and her father have been in open. continuous. He learned that the discrepancy is the 3732 sq. being occupied by Juliana. Mariano De Vera.FACTS: Petitioner. Mariano De Vera died. Estrada however noticed that the Torrens title under De Vera indicated that his property measures 8752 sq. m (more or less). De Vera’s nephew (Salvador Estrada) took over as administrator of De Vera’s estate. she made an inventory showing that De Vera’s property (located in Calasiao. that the title held by Estrada was registered in 1947 but it only took them to initiate an action in 1967 therefore laches has set in. were first cousins.

that when de Vera registered his portion of land adjoined to that of Juliana. Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija. Petitioner raised the sole issue of: “which of the two titles is superior. the principle of indefeasibility applies only in the claimed portion or property wherein it can be adjudged not on the illegally included area. The error is highlighted by the fact that de Vera’s widow. Iglesia ni Cristo. It was shown that Juliana. In the case at bar. attested that de Vera’s portion of land is only 5417 sq. an unlettered woman. 375 . agreed to have Mariano de Vera borrow her title for the purposes of Mariano obtaining a loan during de Vera’s lifetime. The respondent court upheld the primacy of the respondent bank’s title and ordered the cancellation of the petitioner’s title. the only portion that can be adjudged in favor of de Vera’s estate is that which was being claimed by the widow (in her inventory). the latter’s land was erroneously included.No. The discrepancy approximates the portion of land actually being occupied by Juliana. more or less. A recalculation must however be made to specify the exact measure of land belonging to each: 3732 sq m should be retained by Juliana (portion which she actually occupies) and 5020 sq. m. The inclusion of Juliana’s land in De Vera’s title was erroneously done. in her inventory before she died. m. an earlier title secured administratively or a latter title secured thru judicial proceedings?”. and the National Treasurer of the Philippines. IGLESIA VS CFI OF NE 208 PHIL 441 FACTS: This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the respondent court in the case of Development Bank of the Philippines v. should go to de Vera’s estate. By that.

C. the land is automatically brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act. Manipon. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the respondent Court denied it. 376 . No. regarding public patents and the character of the certificate of title that may be issued by virtue thereof. thereafter. that said property was acquired by the plaintiff in a foreclosure sale from Emilio Libunao in whose name the same was previously registered by virtue of a homestead patent. the certificate of title issued in virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens Title under the Land Registration Act.T. Ruling: The petitioner contends that the land covered by the conflicting titles had been possessed by Victoria Maravilla and her predecessor Mariano Padilla even several years before the Revolution of 1896 and that is why it was adjudicated as private land and ordered registered in her name in Land Registration Case No. of the CFI of Nueva Ecija .. (39 SCRA 676) Supreme Court held that once a homestead patent granted in accordance with the Public Land Act is registered pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496. Failing to obtain a reversal of the decision. the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in Section 38 of said Act. has in his favor the presumption of regularity in issuing the questioned homestead patent. the certificate of title becomes irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding. 3244. Emilio Libunao. With this as factual background.The property in question is covered by T. the petitioner attacks the validity of the homestead patent and title issued to the respondent bank’s predecessor. upon the expiration of one year from its issuance. LRC. In other words. and T.T. the petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari. is that where land is granted by the government to a private individual. In case of Lahora vs Dayang-hirang: "The rule in this jurisdiction. v. Al. that defendant acquired the said property from Victoria Maravilla who was the registered owner of a parcel of land including the land in question under O. No. Et Al. the corresponding patent therefor. The lower court declared the title of Iglesia ni Kristo as null and void.C." Applying the case of Pajomayo. Issue: Whether or not the court erred in holding that title acquired earlier by homestead is superior to that secured in a subsequent land registration proceedings. is recorded and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee. Supreme Court should add that the Director of Patents. Et. NT-14302 in the name of the plaintiff. by virtue of a decree/decision.C. being a public officer. NT-53573 in the name of defendant Iglesia ni Kristo.T.

Petitioners considered these circumstances as extrinsic fraud. No. are the registered owners of a parcel of land. 169395 of the Register of Deeds of the same city.R. the trial court ordered the reconstitution of the original and owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. RTC JUDGE G. Convinced that the jurisdictional requirements were complied with and finding merit in the petition. According to petitioners. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have personality and right to be notified of the reconstitution proceedings nor do they have any right to file the petition for annulment of judgment. 169395. 27997.A. 173891 FACTS: Amparo E. They insisted that the petition for reconstitution did not comply with the requirements found in Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act (R. their parents. LIM VS.HEIRS OF SPS. the records destroyed was the original copy of TCT No. Furthermore. Cañosa (respondent Cañosa) filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking the reconstitution of the original Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. Santos. A fired razed Quezon City Hall. Petitioners filed a verified petition for the annulment of the trial court’s decision. 169395. The lot contained an area of 795 square meters more or less and was covered by TCT No. in September 1994. They acquired it from Domingo L. Lim and Salud Nakpil Bautista. they alleged that their parents had been in actual physical possession of the property. spouses Luciano P. Cañosa alleged that there was no fraud and that the jurisdictional requirements of notice and publication had been complied with. but their motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. 26 as it failed to state specifically the boundaries of the property subject of the petition as well as the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the property. Petitioners claimed that when respondent Cañosa filed a petition for the reconstitution of TCT No. 377 .) No. Petitioners sought reconsideration of the resolution. The trial court had ex parte presentation of evidence before the branch clerk of court. TCT No. one of the petitioners applied for and was issued a reconstituted title. RT-97223. 27997 and thus.

Ruling: Petitioners are not real parties-in-interest because the reconstitution of the original and duplicate copy of TCT No. 152007 FACTS: On September 19.R. No. and having failed to do so. they discovered from the Office of the City Assessor that the title covering the land was already in the name of a certain Evans Mende by virtue of a 378 . Tagbilaran. The Court of Appeals did not dismiss the petition for annulment of judgment outright. the complaint alleges that petitioners Procopio Tapuroc and all the successors-ininterest of deceased co-owner Antonia Ebe are the co-owners.795 square meters situated in Booy. on the basis of its simple comparison of petitioners’ and respondent’s TCTs. Mere filing of a petition for annulment of judgment does not guarantee the holding of trial or reception of evidence. the latter being different from. it required respondent Cañosa to file her answer. TAPUROC VS LOQUELLANO G. and even allowed the filing of an amended answer─proof that it was predisposed to consider the arguments of both parties before it even decided to finally dismiss the petition. In fact. 169395 will have no effect on their property. One having no right or interest of his own to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party plaintiff in an action. Supreme Court does not agree. Petitioners impute error to the Court of Appeals when it dismissed their petition after it concluded. when petitioners decided to partition the subject property. that the properties covered by the two titles are entirely different. A petition for annulment of judgment may in fact be dismissed outright if it has no prima facie merit. the annulment of the assailed judgment is not warranted. its conclusion was allegedly not only flawed but was also arrived at with grave abuse of discretion and without due process. With more reason that the Court of Appeals may dismiss a petition even without a hearing if it finds that based on the averments in the petition and the responsive pleading. Bohol. thus petitioners’ petition for annulment of judgment was rightfully dismissed. that in 1992. petitioners filed a complaint against respondents. Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals should have conducted a trial and received evidence. and not even a part of the property covered by the reconstituted title. co-heirs of the original owners of a parcel of land with an area of 5. 1996.

Respondents assert that they had been in open. RULING: No. the trial court finding that the evidence adduced by the petitioners insufficient to establish their claim that the questioned Deed of Sale was a forgery. Here. the petitioners call for a review of the facts of the case. having been duly notarized by a certain Atty. plus damages. The title represented by the certificate cannot be changed.Deed of Sale executed in favor of the latter by their predecessors-in-interest in 1967. ISSUE: Whether or not the recourse of the petitioners is valid. pray for the nullification of the same Deed of Sale. ruling that petitioners are barred from filing their petition due to laches. A Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. Hence. A motion for reconsideration was filed with the CA. and that one of the alleged vendors. the cancellation of the title issued pursuant thereto and the restoration of the previous title in their names. a matter not for this Court to resolve. It must be proved by clear. ong before the purported Deed of Sale was said to have been executed in 1967. The recourse must fail. On June 7. Antonia Ebe. as a rule. Rodolfo Yap. Petitioners. Mere allegation of forgery is not evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging it. had already passed away in 1960. altered. enlarged. and peaceful possession of the land in question from the time of said sale. positive and convincing evidence. which affirmed the decision of the trial court. Being a notarial instrument. the petitioners failed to discharge their burden. and had been religiously paying the realty taxes due thereon. Their action calls for the determination of the truth or falsehood of an alleged fact. that said Deed of Sale is a forged document because the alleged vendors therein. whether fraudulently issued or not. As it is. The question on the validity of a Torrens title. 1999. continuous. More so. can be raised only in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. modified. did not sign the conveying deed. forgery cannot be presumed. or cancelled in 379 . diminished. It appears that the assailed Deed of Sale is a public document. the deed in question is a public document and as such enjoys the presumption of regularity in its execution.

The respondents file a consolidated answer moving to dismiss said case based on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Appellants' claim of acquisitive prescription is likewise baseless. the SC averred that. Act No. Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code. The action for the declaration of nullity of deed of sale commenced by the petitioners in the RTC of Tagbilaran City is not the direct proceeding required by law to attack a Torrens certificate of title. 496 provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession. Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree 20 expressly provides that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered. After the lapse of one year. under the law. prescription of ownership of lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed by special laws. 2 which may be said to justify appellants' claim that said decree granted the ownership of said lands to them and their successors by title. Petition was denied. Correlatively. Then the trial court rendered a summary judgment upon finding that there is no valid issue raised by the respondents.a collateral proceeding. the decree of registration becomes incontrovertible and is binding upon and conclusive against all persons whether or not they were notified of or participated in the registration proceedings. There is nothing either in Presidential Decree No. modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. proof of possession by the defendants is both immaterial and inconsequential. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents have a valid claim over the disputed land? RULING: The Supreme Court approved the ruling of the lower court that the certificate of title issued to the petitioners in accordance with the Land Registration Act is indefeasible after the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree of registration. but only conclusions that they have been in actual possession of the subject lands for more than 30 years. Consequently. So the respondents filed an appeal with the Intermediate Appellate Court. NATALIA REALTY VS VALDEZ 173 SCRA 534 FACTS: Petitioner. Natalia Realty. The said titles were issued to the petitioners more than 30 years ago. Furthermore. They were then ordered to vacate the lots and to pay monthly rents. 380 . filed separate ejectment cases against respondents with the RTC of Rizal for allegedly unlawfully occupying parcels of lands which were covered by the petitioners transfer certificates.

prohibition and mandamus before respondent court praying for the annulment of the March 30. 1989 orders of the trial court. that respondent court had no jurisdiction over the case. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss of petitioner Ortigas. Same with Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership (Ortigas) filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging. ISSUE: Do a Torrens Certificate of Title be subjected to a collateral attack? 381 . respondent Ortigas instituted an action for certiorari. 1988 on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over the application for registration. the land being applied for having been already registered under the Torrens System and in the name of Ortigas under TCT 77652 and TCT 77653. the parcels of land subject thereof being already covered by Torrens Certificates of Title. WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATION VS CA 201 SCRA 165 FACTS: On August 27. claiming ownership over 12 to 14 hectares and praying for a decree of registration over said portions of Lot 8. Dolores Molina filed an opposition. 334. Not satisfied. 1974.the trial court then rendered the decision in favor to Ortigas. among others. (Widora) filed an application for registration of title of a parcel of land. among others. 1988 and May 19. that TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 on their face show that they were derived from OCT 337. holding. Widows and Orphans Association. 19. appellants were misled or induced to believe that they acquired the parcels of land in question when the whole country was declared by the previous regime as a land reform area. pursuant to Decree 1425. It also prayed that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the land registration case. and that the applicant acquired said property from the heirs of Don Mariano San Pedro on December 12.Apparently. 336. more or less. 1954. Ortigas then filed a motion for reconsideration praying the respondent court to reconsider its order of March 30. Inc. It alleged that the parcel of land has an area of 156 hectares.

Also. While the law fixes no prescriptive period therefor. it is the decree of registration issued by the Land Registration Commission which is the basis for the subsequent issuance of the certificate of title by the corresponding Register of Deeds that quiets the title to and binds the land (De la Merced v. In the case at bar. A certificate of title cannot be altered. if no decree of registration had been issued covering the parcel of land applied for. Respondent court committed a procedural lapse in correcting the alleged error in the questioned TCTs. While it may be true. Manila while the lot applied for is alienable and disposable as certified by the Bureau of Lands and by the Bureau of Forestry and has an area of 156 hectares located in Quezon City four (4) kilometers away from Sta. 77652 and 77653 which are identical to the lots applied for by petitioner. Manila. no correction of certificate of title shall be made except by order of the court in a petition filed for the purpose and entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration was entered. as respondent Ortigas argues. On the other hand. Ana. then the certificate of title issued over the said parcel of land does not quiet the title to nor bind the land and is null and void. Under Act 496. it is nevertheless true that the aforesaid rule only applies where there exists no serious controversy as to the certificate's authenticity visa vis the land covered therein. Hence. the claimed origin of the questioned TCTs evidently appear to be different from what is stated therein. that a land registration court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a certificate of title. the necessity of a trial on the merits to ascertain the disputed facts. is not authorized to alter or correct the certificate of title if it would mean the reopening of the decree of registration beyond the period allowed by law. Consequently. It does not appear indubitable that the disputed 382 . petitioner maintains that Decree 1425 covers a 17-hectare lot located at Sta. Ana. the court. 5 SCRA 240 [1962]).RULING: Ortigas alleges that Decree 1425 embraces the lots covered by its TCT Nos. however. amended or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. Court of Appeals.

31 Phil. HONRADA 114 SCRA 748 FACTS. does not make the possessor the true owner of all the property described therein. 769 [1926]) this Court held that the "simple possession of a certificate of title. This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent Court of Appeals granting ex-parte the cancellation of title registered in the name of Ching Leng in favor of Pedro Asedillo. Off-hand. N-78716 was issued to spouses Maximo Nofuente and Dominga Lumandan in Land Registration Case No.852 square meters. Decree No. 2433 correspondingly given by the Register of Deeds covering a parcel of land with an area of 51. Thus. under the Torrens System. in Ledesma v. By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng with postal address at No. the TCTs do not show that they are actually derivatives of OCT 351. become the owner of the lands illegally included (citing Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby.parcels of land are properly reflected in the TCTs relied upon by private respondent. Municipality of Iloilo (49 Phil. under the Torrens System. If a person obtains a title. 590 [1915]). a certificate of title cannot be considered conclusive evidence of ownership where the certificate itself is faulty as to its purported origin. by virtue of said certificate alone. The trial court cannot be faulted for not having granted respondent Ortigas' motion to dismiss simply because the TCTs relied upon by the latter do not accurately reflect their supposed origin. which includes by mistake or oversight land which cannot be registered under the Torrens System. In May 1960. ESLANISLAO VS. he does not. 44 383 . and as the parties admit. N-2579 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and Original Certificate of Title No." As it is in this case.

Pasay City docketed as Civil Case No. Upon knowing. 6888-P for reconveyance of the abovesaid property and cancellation of T. Pasay City. He filed a verified petition on November 10. Branch XXVII. Thirteen years after Ching Leng's death.Libertad Street. or to recover title to or possession of. declaring him to be the true and absolute owner of the property and ordering alfredo ching to surrender the title to the Registry of Deeds for its cancellation. Ching Leng's last known address is No. No. 91137 in his favor based on possession. 441 Libertad Street.C. 91137 (not No.T. The trial court ruled in favor of Pedro Asedillo. ISSUE: Where to file an action for the cancellation of a title? RULING: An action to redeem. 1979. No. 1980. Pasay City. Alfredo Ching was appointed then asthe administrator of Ching Leng's estate on December 28. Ching Leng died in Boston. Inc. Pasay City a petition for administration of the estate of deceased Ching Leng. Transfer Certificate of Title No. Pasay City which appears on the face of T. on September 3. a suit against him was commenced on December 27. 1979 to set it aside as null and void for lack of jurisdiction which was granted by the court on May 29. 1966. His legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch III. United States of America. 44 Libertad Street. The title over the property in the name of Ching Leng was cancelled and a new Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in favor of Pedro Asedillo who subsequently sold the property to Villa Esperanza Development. 1978 by Pedro Asedillo with the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 91137 was issued on September 18. 1965 and letters of administration issued on January 3.C. real 384 .T. On October 19. 1961. Massachusetts. Alfredo Ching learned of the abovestated decision. 1965. as alleged in private respondent's complaint).

as amended) not in CFI Pasay City in connection with. 114 SCRA 748). supra). that is fitness to be subject of legal relations. the action was commenced thirteen (13) years after the latter's death. His juridical personality. RTC. or as a mere incident in Civil Case No. it is an action in personam. Section 112 of the same law requires "notice to all parties in interest. the judgment in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng.property is not an action in rem or an action against the whole world. like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will. The complaint for cancellation of Ching Leng's Torrens Title must be filed in the original land registration case. He was not. 496. He had no more civil personality. (70 SCRA 475) the decision of the lower court insofar as the deceased is concerned. is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. sitting as a land registration court in accordance with Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 6888-P (Estanislao v. so much so that a judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. As ruled by this Court in Dumlao v. Inc. and he could not have been validly served with summons. The ex-parte proceedings for cancellation of title could not have been held (Estanislao v. was lost through death. but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review." Since Ching Leng was already in the other world when the summons was published he could not have been notified at all and the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person. Verily. Private respondent's action for reconveyance and cancellation of title being in personam. Honrado. Pasig. An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam. to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of 385 . Quality Plastic Products. Rizal. for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. Honrado. The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name—after one year from the date of the decree—is not to set aside the decree.

dismissed. FERRER VS. without prejudice. Herein respondent Judge. against private respondents. La Union. which is immediately north of the land in question. 309504 issued on 24 January 1966 . Branch III. A-514. petitioner Gloria A. P-168. private respondents equally assert ownership over the property on account of long occupation and by virtue of Certificate of Title No. BAUTISTA 231 SCRA 748 FACTS: Under controversy is a strip of land south of Lot 1980 of the Cadastral survey of Aringay. pursuant to Free Patent No. she being the owner of Lot 1980 covered by TCT No. On 23 March 1976. a complaint for reivindicacion (Civil Case No. Ferrer filed a complaint with Branch III of the then Court of First Instance of La Union to "Quiet Title to Real Property" against herein respondents Mariano Balanag and Magdalena Domondon. Prior to Civil Case No. on the ground that the court had no authority to cancel or annul the decree and the title issued by the Director of Lands on the basis of a mere collateral attack. A-514. dated 25 November 1965. Petitioner filed for motion for reconsideration but the same was 386 . petitioner had also filed with the Court of First Instance of La Union. The case was denominated Civil Case No. A-86). T-3280. Petitioner claims its ownership by virtue of accretion. the complaint. on 10 February 1976. On the other hand. in the name of respondent Magdalena Domondon. who also handled the case.justice for damages if the property has passed unto the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.

ordinarily. RULING: Yes. not from fraud or deceit. in fact. NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY VS IAC 387 . therefore. but from the fact that the land is no longer under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands.denied. it was already private property and not a part of the disposable land of the public domain. acquired no right or title over the disputed land by virtue of the free patent since at the time it was issued in 1966. the latter's authority being limited only to lands of public dominion and not those that are privately owned. Any title thus issued or conveyed by him would be null and void. as well as to collateral attack. Herein private respondents. a title becomes incontrovertible one year after it is issued pursuant to a public grant. 309504 being an abuse of judicial discretion and an excess of his jurisdiction. An action to declare the nullity of that void title does not prescribe. Although. the rule does not apply when such issuance is null and void. The Director of Lands has no authority to grant a free patent over land that has passed to private ownership and which has thereby ceased to be public land. Petitioner claimed that the respondent judge committed an error in outright dismissing on the ground of collateral attack on Free Patent Decree No. it is susceptible to direct. The nullity arises. ISSUE: Whether or not a void title can be subject to collateral attack.

80 in favor of the petitioner. By virtue of the deed of absolute sale. private respondent have remained in peaceful. the property involved in this case. The Provincial Sheriff then caused the issuance of the notice of sale of the property in question.00 of which was paid upon the execution of the instrument. requesting for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage executed by Irenea Ramirez on May 18. adverse and open possession of subject property.157 SCRA 380 FACTS: On December 2. among others. On July 10. From the execution of said Kasulatan. and Amelita Magcamit . the spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizards. P50. T-75171 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Laguna was issued in the 388 . San Francisco.1971 under Act No. scheduling the public auction sale. Laguna. 3344.710 square meters. the counsel for the petitioner wrote the Provincial Sheriff in Sta.000. 1975." This sale with right to repurchase was recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna on December 6. NGA in its capacity as attorney-in-fact of the mortgagor sold the subject real property in favor of itself." after being credited with the P30.00 consideration of the "Kasulatan Ng Mabibiling Muli.00. for unpaid indebtedness in the amount of P63.948. Laguna. On May 2. On February 26. 1975. as owners of a parcel of land situated in Bo. T-1728 covering the property in question was issued to and in the name of the spouses Vivas and Lizardo without the knowledge of the private respondents and on April 30. sold for P30." and the balance of P40. comprising more or less 105.00 was to be paid the moment that the certificate of title is issued.00 said property in favor of spouses Melencio Magcamit and Nena Cosico.herein private respondents.000. National Grains Authority (NGA). 1971. Victoria. said Spouses executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Irenea Ramirez authorizing the latter to mortgage the property with the petitioner. 1974.000. 1974.000. On January 31. Cruz. as evidenced by "Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Mabiling Muli. covering.1972 the sale was made absolute by the spouses Vivas and Lizardo in favor of the private respondents for the sum of P90.000. TCT No. 1975. an Original Certificate of Title No. The petitioner was the highest and successful bidder so that a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor on the same date by the Provincial Sheriff. entitled "Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Tuluyan.

among others. Petitioner filed a suit for ejectment against private respondents in the Municipal Court of Victoria. After due hearing. fair and equitable under the premises. On June 4. against the NGA and the spouses Vivas and Lizardo. praying. hence. and that the title is now indefeasible. 1728. cause of action of Nena Magcamit has already prescribed. Branch III.00 which is the balance of the amount due the Vivas spouses under the terms of the absolute deed of sale but the petitioner refused to accept the payment and claimed ownership of the property in question and has no intention of disposing of the same. the National Grains Authority maintained that it is a purchaser in good faith and for value of the property formerly covered by OCT No. 1975. San Pablo City. to order it to reconvey or transfer the ownership to them under such terms and conditions as the court may find just. the trial court rendered its decision in favor of National Grains Authority the lawful owner of the property in question by virtue of its indefeasible title to the same and ordering plaintiffs to turn over possession of the land to defendant National Grains Authority. the private respondents learned that a title in the name of the Vivas spouses had been issued covering the property in question and that the same property had been mortgaged in favor of the petitioner. that they be declared the owners of the property in question and entitled to continue in possession of the same. private respondents filed a complaint before the then Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City. The private respondents interposed an appeal from the decision of the trial court to the Intermediate Appellate Court which rendered its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the trial court ordering the National Grains Authority to execute a deed of reconveyance sufficient in law for purposes of registration and cancellation of transfer Certificate of Title No.name of the petitioner on July 16. A month after. Laguna.000. The private respondents are in possession of subject property were asked by the NGA to vacate it but the former refused. Private respondent Nena Magcamit offered to pay the NGA the amount of P40. In its answer to the complaint. T-75171. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but the same 389 . and if the petitioner is declared the owner of the said property. 1974. then. but the case was dismissed.

it will be noted that the third party NGA. or sitting on the "mirador su casato. An indirect or collateral attack on a Torrens Title is not allowed. D. first as an innocent mortgagee under Section 32 of P. Unquestionably. ISSUE: Whether or not the National Grains Authority is the rightful owner of the disputed land. He is then considered as guilty of fraud and he may be compelled to transfer the land to the defrauded owner so long as the property has not passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. claims or rights arising or existing under the laws and Constitution of the Philippines which are not by law required to appear of 390 . shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted in said certificate and any of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting. namely: First. The only exception to this rule is where a person obtains a certificate of title to a land belonging to another and he has full knowledge of the rights of the true owner. It has been invariably restated by this Court. 1529 and later as innocent purchaser for value in the public auction sale. PD 1529.was denied. and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith. Once a title is registered. without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court. the owner may rest secure.Every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration.D. the NGA is an innocent purchaser for value. Liens. that the real purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality. is a registered owner under the Torrens System and has obviously a better right than private respondents and that the deed of absolute sale with the suspensive condition is not registered and is necessarily binding only on the spouses Vivas and Lizardo and private respondents. In this case. therefore." avoid the possibility of losing his land. STATUTORY LIENS AFFECTING TITLE Section 44. RULING: Yes.

or any government irrigation canal or lateral thereof. said applicant and its predecessorsin-interest having been in actual possession of the land since 1894. PD 1529 is an exclusive enumeration. Record No. this time in favor of the City of Tagaytay. have filed this original petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the order of the Court of First Instance of Cavite dated December 2. G. 1957.O.L. No. a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court on January 24. Third.record in the Registry of Deeds in order to be valid against subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of record. originally decreed in their favor in Case No. et al. pursuant to. No copy of the deed of sale was attached to the application. ROJAS ET AL VS TAGAYTAY CITY 60 OG 6 Petitioners Zosimo Rojas. for the second time. 12440 decreeing. G. 391 .. 53546.O.L. Fourth.R. 398. 141. if the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such highway or irrigation canal or lateral thereof have been determined.R. Psu-103916-Amd. allegedly acquired by purchase from Zosimo Rojas. The City of Tagaytay sought original registration of this parcel of land. Presidential No. 1. Record No. Any public highway or private way established or recognized by law. 496 or pursuant to Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act. 323 until further orders from this Court. without prejudice to the right of the government to collect taxes payable before that period from the delinquent taxpayer alone. a Sec. the registration of the same Lot No. No. Second. claiming to be the registered owners of Lot No. At the instance of herein petitioners. denying their petition to set aside the decision of June 30. 27 or any other law or regulations on agrarian reform. allegedly because it was either lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation. Any disposition of the property or limitation on the use thereof by virtue of. 1. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two years immediately preceding the acquisition of any right over the land by an innocent purchaser for value. 1958. either under Act. 323. 44. 1957 rendered in another and subsequent Land Registration Case No. restraining the respondent Judge from taking further cognizance of the aforementioned registration case No.

Psu-103916-Amd was concerned. 1957. 29 includes Lot No. 1. it being contended that such building and the land whereon it was erected are properties for public use and. Felisa and Soledad. Bernardo. 1 was part of a bigger parcel of land already decreed in a previous land registration case (Case No. hence. the filing of the instant action by the Rojas brothers for the purpose already stated above Issue: Is the granting of OCT includes Lot No. the court decreed registration of said Lot No. No. together with his present co-petitioners. and the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title upon the finality of said decision. such registration did not confer ownership upon the petitioners. 392 . Zosimo Rojas. free from any liens and encumbrances. 29) issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite in their names since December 5. No. hence are outside the scope and efficacy of the Torrens title acquired by petitioners.C. 1940. supposed vendor of the lot in question. and praying that they be allowed to file their opposition to the registration of the aforesaid lot for the reason. 1 plan Psu103916-Amd. pursuant to Section 39 of Act 496. The lower court denied this petition by order of December 2. On July 15. no actual notice was served them as requires in Section 32 of Act 496.O. all surnamed Rojas. 1? Ruling: Applicant-respondent also alleges that even granting that Original Certificate of Title No.R. 53546) and covered by an original certificate of title (O. Rec. filed in the same proceeding a petition to set aside the decision of the court in so far as said Lot No. 1957. G. an order of general default was entered by the court against the whole world. in the name of the City of Tagaytay. among others. at least insofar as that portion occupied by the City Hall of Tagaytay is concerned. that said Lot. 1957. to lift the order of general default as far as it affected them because as adjoining owners cited in the application. as amended.As nobody appeared at the hearing to oppose the application.T. Deomedes. No. 398.L. and the applicant was allowed to adduce its evidence. Manuel. 1. On June 30.

claims or rights existing or arising under the laws or the Constitution and which the statutes do not require their annotation or appearance in the registry.The aforementioned Section 39 of the Land Registration Act reads: SEC. decreeing for the second time. way. irrigation canal or lateral thereof. (2) taxes within 2 years after they become due and payable. private way established by law. or rights arising or existing under the laws or Constitution which the statutes of the Philippine Islands can not require to appear of record in the registry. 39. claims. Third. which action. that a municipal building or city hall and the land whereon it is erected may be considered as properties for public use. way. Exception. Liens. is null and void. or any Government irrigation canal or lateral thereof existing on the property even if not annotated in the certificate.(3) encumbrance or lien duly annotated in the certificate of title. and (4)any public highway. Supreme Court held. for the sake of argument. and any of the following incumbrances which may be subsisting. namely: First. private way established by law. Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration. and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free of all incumbrances except those noted on said certificate. where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such highway. 1 of subdivision plan Psu-103916-Amd. or irrigation canal or lateral thereof. Taxes within two years after the same become due and payable. Second. It is clear therefrom that even if we concede. a lot already previously decreed by a competent court in favor of the petitioners. respondent cannot validly invoke the provision of law quoted above. have been determined. sitting as land registration court. This decision is limited only to the action of the trial court. way.or any Government. b Certificate of Title is subject to servitudes. The aforequoted provision specifically enumerates the only cases that may limit the registered owners absolute title over the property: (1) liens. infavor of respondent City of Tagaytay. the registration of Lot No. DIGRAN VS AUDITOR GENERAL 64 OG 19 FACTS: 393 . under the well-accepted principle of inclusiouniusestexclusioalterius.Any public highway.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of RupertaCabucos are entitled to compensation for Lot No. the later one having been denied on June 10. 638 was subject to the Government's reservations for public use. The Banilad Friar Lands Estate was among the friar lands acquired by the Government for resale to actual tenants or occupants pursuant to Act 1120 of the Philippine Commission. 638. Sections 19. Firstly. 20 and 21 of Act 1120 and Section 39 of Act 496. A claim for compensation was filed with the Municipality of Cebu but it was still unpaid when World War II broke out. that the right to enforce the claim for compensation is barred by prescription and laches. 1963 she filed an amended claim for compensation with the Auditor General. 1909. 1963 the Auditor General desisted from rendering a decision on the amended claim on July 1. 1963 the Deputy Auditor General. 20 and 21 of Act 1120 sanction no authority for the Government to take private lands covered by said Act for public use without just compensation. Digran appealed to this Court from said decision altho on July 1. denied the claim. and fully paid to the Government. 638 into eight lots. 638-B mainly on the grounds that RupertaCabucos' title over Lot No. On February 28. Sections 19. without prior expropriation proceedings. stated above. a municipal road. 1916 Transfer Certificate of Title No. and.On June 22. lack merit. In 1951 her heirs subdivided Lot No. RupertaCabucos bought from. 1963 Raymunda S. On February 16. 638-B.RupertaCabucos died in 1940. 1963 for the reason that the case was already sub judice. such as rights of way and other public servitudes under Sections 19. 20 and 21 state: 394 . became administratrix of the estate of RupertaCabucos. 1963. Lot No. passing through Lot No. the road lot. the government constructed Mango Avenue. Sometime in 1914 or 1915. RT-3918 (T-320) was issued to her. On February 18. This decision was the subject of two motions for reconsideration. On August 7. On July 9 of the same year Raymunda S. RULING: The Government denies the obligation to give due compensation for Lot No. Digran. as stated. The grounds relied upon by the Government. 1915 by the Friar Lands Agency. a daughter of Candida Samson. 638 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate situated in Cebu City for which a formal deed of conveyance was executed in her favor on November 27.

And the Government reserves as a part of the contract of sale in each instance the right to levy an equitable contribution or tax for the maintenance of such irrigation works. reservoir. the authority to designate any tract or tracts of friar land as non-alienable and reserve the same for public use. It also subjects the land so purchased to the right of way of such canal. Needless to say. but all of such irrigation works and water supplies shall remain under the exclusive control of the Government of the Philippine Islands and be administered under the direction of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for the common benefit of those interests dependent upon them. or other irrigation works. including those with reference to the littoral of the sea and the banks of navigable rivers and rivers upon which rafting may be done. when authorized by resolution of the Commission. or other irrigation works. No purchaser or lessee under this Act shall acquire any exclusive rights to any canal. designate any tract or tracts of said lands as nonalienable. above quoted. ditch. 19. and reservoirs as now exist or as the Government may hereafter see fit to construct. 20. may by proclamation. reservoir or irrigation works. or other disposition under this Act. 21. upon resolution of the Philippine Commission. or to any water supply upon which such irrigation works are or may be dependent.SEC. reservoir. The Civil Governor. Section 21 gives the Civil Governor. And it is further provided that all lands leased or conveyed under this Act shall remain subject to the right of way of such irrigation canals. All persons receiving title to lands under the provisions of this Act shall hold such lands subject to the same public servitudes as existed upon lands owned by private persons under the sovereignty of Spain. SEC. Section 20 holds the friar lands subject to public servitudes also imposed on other lands owned by private persons. the road construction through Lot No. by accepting the certificate of sale or deed herein provided to be given. lease. SEC. the assessment of which shall be based upon the amount of benefits received. and thereafter such tracts shall not be subject to sale. 395 . Section 19 withholds from a purchaser of a friar land exclusive right to any canal. and reserve the same for public use. and each purchaser under this Act. ditch. or to any water supply upon which such irrigation works are or may be dependent which were already existing at the time of purchase. 638-B is not the servitude contemplated in Sections 19 and 20. ditches. shall be held to assent thereto. ditch.

despite repeated warnings from respondent. The spouses filed petition for review before the Supreme Court. ELISEO FAJARDO. it has not been shown that Lot No. a house and lot in Barangka. INC. 396 . Respondent filed an action to demolish the unauthorized structures. 134692 August 1. The Contract to Sell and the Transfer Certificate of Title covering the lot issued in the name of petitioners contained a Restrictive Covenant providing prohibitions such as easement of two meters in front. an owner-developer and seller of low-cost housing. Manila. 638-B was declared nonalienable by the Civil Governor prior to sale to.Moreover. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. 2000 FACTS: Freedom To Build. Marikina.. and purchase by. Petitioners. The RTC ruled against Spouses Fajardo and directed them to immediately demolish and remove the extension of their expanded housing unit that exceeds the limitations imposed by the Restrictive Covenant. second storey expansion to be placed above the back of the house and should not extend forward beyond the apex of the original building. is 6 meters back from the front property line and 4 meters back from the front wall of the house.. Inc.R. JR. and the 2nd floor expansion. No. G. sold to petitioners. in front. extended the roof of their house to the property line and expanded the second floor of their house to a point directly above the original front wall. FREEDOM TO BUILD. and MARISSA FAJARDO vs. Ruperta Cabucos so as to prevent her from acquiring ownership thereover.

HELD: The provisions of the Restrictive Covenant are valid since they are not synonymous with easements. sometimes characterized to be negative easements or reciprocal negative easements. but may also be aimed as a check on the subsequent uses of the building conformably with what the developer originally might have intended the stipulations to be. The provisions in a restrictive covenant prescribing the type of the building to be erected are crafted not solely for creating easements nor as a restriction as to the type of construction. do not result in true easements. There would have been merit in 397 . but a case of servitudes (burden). being limitations on the manner in which one may use his own property. a developer of a subdivision can enforce restrictions. Restrictive covenants on the use of land or the location or character of buildings or other structures thereon may broadly be said to create easements or rights but it can also be contended that such covenants. he would be entitled to do. a suit for equitable enforcement of a restrictive covenant can only be made by one for whose benefit it is intended. only if he retains part of the land. Thus. It is not thus normally enforceable by one who has neither right nor interest in the land for the benefit of which the restriction has been imposed.ISSUES: Whether the provisions of the Restrictive Covenant are valid. Whether respondent has the personality to enforce the provisions of the covenant. which. which is the most common easement created by covenant or agreement whose effect is to preclude the owner of the land from doing an act. Broadly speaking. even as against remote grantees of lots. if no easement existed.

shall be distinctly and accurately delineated. shall file with the Commissioner of Land Registration or with the Bureau of Lands a subdivision plan of such land on which all boundaries. waterway or open space so delineated on the plan shall be 398 . passageway or open space. city or municipality.had not the homeowners' association. province. and the latter. a memorandum to the effect that except by way of donation in favor of the national government. without requiring further court approval of said plan. allowed respondent to enforce the provisions of the restrictive covenant. each containing one or more parcels. shall cancel them together with their originals and issue in lieu thereof one or separate certificates as desired. upon the surrender of the owner’s duplicate. may also file a written request with the Register of Deeds concerned. If a subdivision plan. A registered owner of several distinct parcels of land covered by separate certificates of title desiring to have in lieu thereof a single certificate for the whole land. be it simple or complex. however. streets. confirmed by its board of directors.—Any owner subdividing a tract of registered land into lots which do not constitute a subdivision project as defined and provided for under PD No. may file a written request for that purpose with the Register of Deeds concerned. having relinquished ownership of the subdivision to the homeowners.the argument of petitioners . passageway. PD 1529 Subdivision and consolidation plans. G. –A registered owner of several distinct parcels of land embraced in and covered by a certificate of title desiring in lieu thereof separate certificates. or several certificates for the different parcels thereof. no portion of any street. SUBDIVISION AND CONSOLIDATION PLANS Section 50.that respondent. upon the surrender of the owner’s duplicates. F. the Register of Deeds shall. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. that the Register of Deeds shall annotate on the new certificate of title covering the street. shall cancel it together with its original and issue in lieu thereof separate certificates as desired. passageways and waterways. register the same in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act. SPLITTING OR CONSOLIDATION OF TITLE Section 49. duly approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration or the Bureau of Lands together with the approved technical descriptions and the corresponding owner’s duplicate certificate of title is presented for registration. and the latter. is precluded from claiming any right or interest on the same property . 957. if any. as amended: Provided. PD 1529 Splitting or consolidation of titles.

Section 50. a Simple Subdivisions. The land was formerly part of the Municipality of Santiago. REPUBLIC VS SAYO 191 SCRA 71 FACTS: The spouses. As against the government. including the technical descriptions therein. as they were before. A registered owner desiring to consolidate several lots into one or more. but had been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of Republic 399 . requiring new technical descriptions. i. nor order the cancellation of the said certificate of title and the issuance of a new one which would result in the enlargement of the area covered by the certificate of title. PD 1529 b Complex Subdivisions PD 957 REMEDIES OF PARTIES AGGRIEVED BY REGISTRATION A. Reglementary period: 15 days from receipt. or of any decree or plan. Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez. Province of Isabela. a consolidation plan on which shall be shown the lots to be affected. The Commission may not order or cause any change. filed an original application for registration of a tract of land. covering any real property registered under the Torrens system.enclosed or otherwise disposed of by the registered owner without the approval of the Court of First Instance of the province or city in which the land is situated. modification. and as they will appear after the consolidation. Upon the surrender of the owner’s duplicate certificates and the receipt of consolidation plan duty approved by the Commision. the Register of Deeds concerned shall cancel the corresponding certificates of title and issue a new one for the consolidated lots. APPEAL a. or amendment in the contents of any certificate of title. shall file with the Land Registration Commission.

7454 of the Santiago Cadastre. The parties also mutually waived and renounced all their prior claims to and over Lot No. An order of general default was thereafter entered against the whole world except the oppositors. in payment of his attorney's fees. in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. after all. this is the reason for our holding that "Court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal. 5. the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (as applicants) renounced their claims and ceded portions of land in favor of Bureau of Lands. Jose C. 1981 annulled as being patently void and rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.Act No. acting as agent of 400 . ISSUE: Whether or not compromise agreement is a proper remedy in confirming the title of the private respondents over a tract of land? HELD: The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development to the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the absence of evidence of title required of the private respondent. Reyes. The Government including the heirs of Liberato Bayaua opposed such registration.500 hectares were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their counsel. 1. It was error to disregard the Solicitor General in the execution of the compromise agreement and its submission to the Court for approval. The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until a compromise agreement was entered into by and among all the parties. and Philippine Cacao & Farm Products. The Solicitor General. It is. Inc. who is the principal counsel of the Government. Under the compromise agreement. Bureau of Forest Development. the Solicitor General. but out of this area.236. Under the compromise agreement. On March 5. the respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance with its terms. 1981.500 hectares was adjudicated to and acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval. has taken the present recourse in a bid to have that decision of March 5. Heirs of Liberato Bayaua.

the same was dismissed on the ground that the order had allegedly long become final and unappealable so the Government was estopped thru the registration made by its agents. 975. 980). the CFI of Quezon rendered a decision. thus non-registerable. ISSUE: Whether or not the Government was estopped in appealing the registration order? RULING: No. ordering the registration of 885 hectares of public forestland in favor of the Maxinos. N-109 subject of the petition is REMANDED to the court of origin which shall conduct further appropriate proceedings therein. Considerations of fairness however indicate the remand of the case to the Registration Court so that the private parties may be afforded an opportunity to establish by competent evidence their respective claims to the property.the Solicitor General in land registration cases. the decision of the respondent Judge complained of is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. receiving the evidence of the parties and thereafter rendering judgment as such evidence and the law may warrant. where it held that the Government should not be estopped by the mistakes or errors of its agents. and title on the ground that they are void because the land in question was still a part of the unclassified public forest. the Court ruled otherwise basing on its decision in Government of the U. decree. WHEREFORE." It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the judgment approving it must be. as they are hereby. The Maxinos opposed the petition. and set aside. vs. The decision became final and executory so a decree of registration and an OCT were issued. Eight (8) years after the decision was rendered. declared null and void. Land Registration Case No. Judge of 1st Inst. S. (50 Phil. The Government sufficiently proved that the parcel of land involved in the present case is a part of a forestland. The CFI judge denied the petition and when appealed. the Republic of the Philippines filed with the same CFI an amended petition to annul the decision. 401 . of Pampanga. REPUBLIC VS CA 135 SCRA 156 FACTS: In 1961. As to the ruling of CA that the government was estopped to appeal because the land was erroneously registered by its own agency. are not binding until they are actually received by the Solicitor General.

GLRO Chief Silverio Perez opposed the adjudication and petitioned for its setting aside. the court retains jurisdiction until expiration of one year from the issuance of the decree of registration. the trial court issued an order of general default. GOMEZ VS COURT OF APPEALS 168 SCRA 503 FACTS: A court ruling (Philippine Islands vs Abran) settled that 12 parcels of land belonged to one Consolacion Gomez.ii. Under the law. He discovered that the 12 parcels of land were formerly part of a titled land which was already granted by homestead patent in 1929. Despite the pendency of the appeal. Gomez et al invoked Sec. HELD: 402 . the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course. and there being no opposition to the application. the court shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of title. the court rendered its decision adjudicating the subject lots in Gomez et al’s favor. 30 and 32 of PD 1529 (Land Registration Act) which provides that after judgment has become final and executory. After notice and publication. That once the judgment becomes final and executory under Sec 30. The heirs agreed to divide the property among them. ISSUE: Whether or not to set aside the lower court’s initial ruling on approving the adjudication even after it had become final and executory. The lower court granted Silverio’s recommendation. land already granted by homestead patent can no longer be the subject of another registration. On 5 August 1981. Consolacion later died and the 12 parcels of land were inherited by Gomez et al – her heirs. The decision became final and executory hence the court directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated.

the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.145.78. Estenzo 158 SCRA 282 FACTS: On 11 November 1961. and owned by respondents Espeletas. in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration. plus the further sum of P20.000.chanroblesv On 14 June 1962. Martinezes and Pachecos. representing the Republic. pursuant to Republic Act No.00.0654 hectares of private agricultural lands situated in San Isidro.995.00 still remained unpaid despite an order directing payment thereof.00 for a farmhouse. This was supplemented by an amendatory order providing for payment of 6% per annum interest starting 14 June 1962 on the unpaid balance.150. Respondents-landowners then filed a motion in the lower court 403 . having already paid the partial sum of P206.78.145. the Land Tenure Administration. the last of which was dated 28 July 1962. or a total of P225. copra drier and warehouses. 1 The Republic.78.850. ordered to pay the balance of P205. Unlike ordinary civil actions. the lower court rendered a decision condemning the said land for P411. 1400.chanroblesi Came 12 April 1963 and the balance of P143.Yes. Leyte. accordingly. The Supreme Court has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree. Implementing orders. initiated and prosecuted expropriation proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Leyte for the acquisition of some 591. HENCE. Republic vs. the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final. for resale to tenants. was. were thereafter successively issued. the case may still be reopened and the decision set aside when granted.

010. . in addition to the two basic arguments previously raised in its oposition to respondents-landowners' motion of 10 November 1964. as of 31 August 1964. Respondents-landowners. . P85.was secured through fraud. for their part. therefore. or a total of P102. that the garnishment of the funds of the Land Authority violates Sections 14 and 21 10 of Republic Act No.98 on the interest. 3844. Before the Supreme Court could rule on the petition. (and) to cover salaries of personnel. the parties entered anew into another compromise agreement. otherwise known as the Revised Budget Act. Out of P143. because the money garnished was appropriated by Congress "for the operation and maintenance of the nineteen (19) Settlement Projects and twelve (12) Agencies under the administration of . now represented by the Land Authority." and are. however." The Republic failed again to pay its obligation in full. travelling. supplies and materials and other administrative expenses.150. pursuant to the provision of R.00 plus 6% per annum interest from 24 August 1962. in the lower court praying for issuance of an order directing the Sheriff of the City of Manila to enforce the writ of execution of 28 July 1962. dated 10 November 1964. 992. on or before said date. . agreed to renounce "any and all further claims against the former which had been recognized and ordered paid" by the lower court in its order of 26 April 1963 "in the event (of) full payment of said compromise price .150. This was opposed by 404 .00.the compromise agreement .63 only. as per agreement. This precipitated the filing of respondents-landowners' motion. The Republic. (the) Authority.chanroblesvanrob The Republic went to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction. nroblesvirtualaw The Republic moved for reconsideration of the lower court's order alleging. . A.imploring the latter to (1) annul its amended decision of 24 August 1962 on the ground that its basis . covenanted to satisfy on or before 31 August 1964 the balance of P143. and (2) resuscitate its original decision of 14 June 1962. not funds for the payment of expropriated estates.271.260.65 on the principal and P17. it was able to pay.

enacted on 8 August 1963." as in the case at bar. however.00. on or before 31 August 1964. already divested of its control over the cause when the motion of 12 April 1963 was filed.150. ISSUE: whether the lower court acted without or excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discreton in hearing the case.chanroblesvir and that it is undeniable that the petitioner Republic had not made full payment of P143.respondents-landowners who argued that Sections 14 and 21 of Republic Act No. Whatever writ of execution could be issued by the respondent judge must necessarily be predicated on the second compromise.lnrob HELD: The first plea of herein petitioner. 3844). that the Court of First Instance of Leyte lacked jurisdiction to act in the case because of Section 154 (3) of the Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. only entitled respondents to demand execution on the basis of the compromise approved by this Court. 992 "refer to voluntary expenditure and/or payment by the government official charged with custody of such funds but are not applicable to forcible seizure through garnishment pursuant to a writ of execution.chanroblesblesvirtual The lower court was. therefore. plus legal interest from 24 August 1962. this present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. is plainly without merit. and conform to the terms thereof. Such default. Said Section 154 (3) provides that Expropriation proceedings instituted by the Land Tenure administration pending in the Court of First Instance at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall be transferred and continued in the respective Courts of Agrarian Relations whereby the Republic undertook to pay the balance of the expropriation price with interest on or before 31 August 1964. it was already shorn of its jurisdiction when its controversial order of 26 405 .chanroblesvirtualawlibr Hence.

both the first compromise agreement and the amended decision embodying the same. Inc. The petitioners opposed. long before the second world war. HEIRS OF CRISTOBAL MARCOS VS DE BANUVAR 25 SCRA 316 Facts: Respondent court confirmed the titles of La Urbana. the President of the Philippines. by annulment or rescission. At the pendency of the reconstitution proceedings. However.April 1963 was issued pursuant thereto.chanroblesvirtualawl libraryanroblesvirtualaw The writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted. A petition for reconstitution was made. who was thus substituted as a party for the latter. No costs. and ordered the registration of these lots in favor of the Benuvar. over lots in questions with reservations. on a claim that they have been in actual. through the Secretary of Justice. the proper move for respondentslandowners would have been to file a separate and independent civil action to set aside. The petitioners interposed an appeal from this last order. Instead of a motion for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.The preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made permanent. For "lack of proper notices." but withheld action on the motion for immediate execution as to lot 1 "until after this order dismissing the appeal 406 . and the respondent Court of First Instance of Leyte restrained from further proceeding in its Civil Case. Let a copy of this opinion be sent to the Honorable. Respondent court dismissed the appeal "for failure to post the required bond. open and uninterrupted possession and occupation of the said parcel in the concept of owners since time immemorial." the respondent court denied the petition. ordering payment of the original award made in 14 June 1962. the respondent De Banuvar acquired lot 1 from Santiago de Erquiaga. adverse. in its later order the court reconsidered and granted the petition. All that the lower court could do under the circumstances was to enforce the amended decision of 24 August 1962.

Inc. to compel the trial court to give due course to their appeal. Inc. "Con mi exception." The judgment rendered in a land registration case becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days to be counted from the date on which the party appealing receives notice of the decision. did not have the effect of perfecting an appeal. Issue: Whether or not the decision is not yet final and executory because the La Urbana. dated March 8. 1960. De Banuvar asserted that the issuance of the decree is but a ministerial duty of the respondent court. "Recibi copia." The notation found at the foot of the last page of the reconstituted decision.shall have become final. recites that no "appeal has been taken by the Director of Lands or any private oppositors from the decision rendered. 1938 had long become final and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom. excepted from that decision.” Ruling: This contention is without merit. Con mi excepcion. Inc. after finding that the decision in the land registration case had already become final and executory. Respondent court ordered the issuance of a decree in favor of De Banuvar with respect to lot 1 only. appears to have appealed from the said decision by virtue of a notation the counsel received the same "Con mi excepcion” making the execution of the said decision impossible." The herein petitioners then filed a petition for mandamus with the Court of Appeals. appealed therefrom. The certification of the acting provincial land officer of Masbate. as may be seen from the notation of the reconstituted decision stating. 407 . This petition was finally dismissed. Supreme Court held that the decision of March 24. The petitioners opposed and contended that the decision is not final and executory because La Urbana. De Banuvar filed a motion for the issuance of a decree over lot 1. showing that the La Urbana. An appeal was not perfected by the mere notation.

1930. Floretino sold the said land to Arturo Nieto. After hearing. surveys were made by the Bureau of Lands in the municipality of Abulug. L-14643) FACTS: Bartolome Quines filed a homestead application to the Bureau Of Lands cadastral.The requirement contained in the decision of March 24. 3044. the cadastral court. 3044 was included in the award. ISSUE: Whether or not the title of Nieto. a homestead patent covering Lot No. However. 11982 in the name of Maria Florentino covering the lots awarded to her the cadastral court including Lot No. Lot No.R. 623 in his name. or on March 12. 3044 was granted to Bartolome Quines. the same Register Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. QUINES 6 SCRA 74 (G. does not detract from the finality of the decision. pending the issuance of the final decree of registration and the original certificate of title to Maria Florentino. the Register of Deeds of Cagayan. during which the tract of land applied for as a homestead by Bartolome Quines was designated as Lot No. After the surveys were completed. rendered its decision wherein Maria Florentino was awarded the lots claimed by her. on August 16. 1931.which is from cadastral proceedings. Relying upon the assurances made by the employees of the Bureau of Lands that they would take care of his homestead in the cadastral proceedings. NO. 1930 issued Original Certificate of Title No. because the segregation adverted to refers to a defined and delimited portion of the said parcel and may be accomplished anytime after the decision became final and executory. apparently because neither the Director of Lands nor any of his representatives appeared during the bearing to inform the court that it was under homestead application. cadastral proceedings were initiated in 1927 by the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan. 3044 of the Abulug Cadastre. while it does leave something yet to be done. 3044. 1938 regarding the segregation of a portion of lot 1. NIETO V. one Maria Florentino filed an answer claiming several lots including Lot No. subject of an agreement between the Director of Lands and the applicant. Bartolome Quines did not file any answer therein. 1930. on September 15. On August 29. 408 . and pursuant thereto. Six months thereafter.

237. Applicant claimed that his predecessors acquired the land by virtue of a possessory information title issued during the Spanish Regime on March 5. The exception is the special provision providing for fraud. As a general rule. after the passage of thirty-day period allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party of a copy of the judgment of the court adjudicating ownership without any step having been taken to perfect an appeal. copy of which was duly served upon the corporation and Tamayo. The lower court adjudicated (a) 2/3 portion of the land in favor of the corporation. DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS REYES 68 SCRA 177 FACTS: Alipio Alinsurin. What is the effect of failure to appeal? HELD: The court held that the title of Nieto shall prevail because a cadastral proceeding is one in rem and any decision rendered therein by the cadastral court is binding against the whole world. but 409 . and indisputable. The prevailing party may then have execution of the judgment as of right and is entitled to the certificate of title issued by the Chief of the Land Registration Office. 1/3 pro-indiviso in favor of Tamayo. the title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to appeal from the decision or adjudication by the cadastral court. including the Government. the lower court directed the issuance of a registration decree of the entire parcel applied for. and (b) 1/3 portion to Roman Tamayo. 1895. the court's decision had become final. Within the extended period. dated December 19. the Government filed the corresponding record on appeal. The application was opposed by the Government. The certificate of title would then be necessary for purposes of effecting registration of subsequent disposition the land where court proceedings would no longer be necessary. Pending approval of the Record on Appeal." Under the foregoing pronouncement. conclusive. later substituted by Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation. subject to the rights of one Ariosto Santos per a manifestation submitted in court. and 2/3 pro-indiviso in favour of the corporation.prevails over the title of Quines. sought to register under Act 496. and on motion of the corporation and of Tamayo. 1955. without such an appeal having been perfected. which is from homestead. a parcel of land indisputably included within the area reserved for military purposes under Presidential Proclamation No. and declared that as to Tamayo's share. registration of title under the cadastral system is final.

Andrada and others filed with the Court of First Instance a complaint against the corporation and Tamayo for reconveyance of a portion of the land in question. NOTICE OF APPEAL. the case in favor of Andrada. LAND REGISTRATION. especially if the substantial rights of the adverse party is not impaired and the appeal taken was from the entire decision which is not severable. et al. 2. During the pendency of the appeal in the registration case. "free from all liens and encumbrances. he was served with a copy of the original. TORRENS TITLE ISSUED BASED ON JUDGMENT THAT ISNOT FINAL IS A NULLITY. ISSUE: Whether or not the execution pending appeal is applicable? HELD: The court held that: 1. — Execution pending appeal is not applicable in land registration proceedings. the corporation and Tamayo from exercising acts of ownership over the property. FAILURE TO SERVE APPELLEE WITH NOTICE OFAPPEAL CANNOT IMPAIR RIGHT OF APPEAL. 3. IF APPELLEE WAS SERVED WITH COPYOF RECORD ON APPEAL. Innocent purchasers may be misled into purchasing real properties upon reliance on a judgment which may be reversed on appeal. as it is violative of the explicit provisions of the Land Registration Act. Pursuant thereto. the Government instituted this Special Civil Action for certiorari and mandamus and the Supreme Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the lower court from issuing a writ of possession. and the trial court ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the original certificate of title and to issue new titles to Andrada. The trial court assumed jurisdiction over. and decided. — The failure of appellants to serve a copy of their notice of appeal to the counsel for one of the several appellees is not fatal to the appeal. as well as the amended record on appeal in both of which the notice of appeal is embodied. and the register of deeds from accepting for registration documents on the land until the government shall have filed a notice of lis pendens. the judgment being on appeal.. which requires that a decree shall be issued only after the decision adjudicating the title 410 . the registration shall be subject to the final outcome of the appeal. Such failure cannot impair the right of appeal. — A Torrens Title issued on the basis of a judgment that is not final. a certain Honofre A.as to the share of the corporation. It is fraught with dangerous consequences. but in violation of the Supreme Court's injunction (in L-27594). EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL NOT APPLICABLE INLAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS. the corporation executed a subdivision plan of the parcel subject of the land registration.LAND REGISTRATION. Hence. is a nullity.where admittedly.

On March 18. 1958. the trial court denied said motion. 1958. Counsel for appellant asked the Court to hear the motion for new trial on April 2. one day ahead of the date.becomes final and executory.— The lower court acted without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of a decree of registration despite the appeal timely taken from the entire decision a quo. which latter received from former.. 4. ISSUANCE OF TITLE DESPITE TIMELY APPEAL IS ERRONEOUS.000. 1963 FACTS: On December 2. courts are given the discretion to grant or not.00 each. 1958. 411 . however. Talavera filed before the CFI of Nueva Ecija for the recovery of sum of money against Victor Mangoba and his cousin Nieves Safiru. wherein it was stated that the failure to appear at the hearing was due to accident or excusable negligence. neither Mangoba et. 1958 and the next day. so that the trial court received Talavera’s evidence in their absence. wherein they admitted some and denied other allegations in the complaint. al nor their counsel appeared. Both also interposed separate counterclaims of P1. 1957. Appellant claims that the above decision was received by him on March 25. a decision was rendered in favour of Talavera. allegedly representing the costs of B-Meg Poultry Feeds. and it is on the basis of said decree that the register of deeds concerned issues the corresponding certificate of title. the court a quo deprive him of his day in court. In the hearing scheduled on March 10. counsel having been ill of March influenza which was evidenced by a medical certificate. appellant contends that in denying the motion for new trial. RULING: Generally. TALAVERA VS MANGOBA 8 SCRA 837. In the appeal brief. Defendants presented separate Answers.

Only Francisco was able to answer. court litigations are primarily for the search of truth. A denial of this chance. May 21. This particular circumstance merits consideration. one day before the date set for its hearing. to find out the correct liability of defendant-appellant to appellee. and a medical certificate. Had not the trial court resolved the motion for new trial. Santiago. however. and another entered. et al. neither Francisco not his counsel appeared despite early notice. 1961 FACTS: On January of 1953. remanding the case to the court of origin. L-11621. is the best way to find out such truth. Furthermore. Marasigan. would be too technical.. The ends of justice could have been served more appropriately had the lower court given appellant the chance to present his evidence at least. itemized in his brief. and in this present case. Leonora and Nicolas Francisco. for the reception of appellant's evidence and for the rendition of the corresponding decision. a motion for new trial. 1963). May 31.motions for new trial and appellate courts will not delve into the reasons for the exercise of such discretion. No pronouncement as to costs. declaring Nicolas and Leonora in default. L-15237. In this particular case. should not be barred by technicalities (Ronquillo v. which were duly received and receipt for. Joaquin. it was shown that the absence of counsel was explained and immediately upon receipt of the decision. the decision appealed from is hereby set aside. ANTONIO VS RAMOS 2 SCRA 731. A trial. to counteract appellant's claim. v. After all. by which both parties are given the chance to adduce proofs. accompanied by an affidavit of merit. filed for recovery of a parcel of land against Jose. evidence was 412 . the defendant-appellant could have presented the documents (receipts of payments). since it contained allegations purporting to show the presence of good defenses. On the date of trial. 1962. Said motion for new trial could well be considered as motion to set aside judgment or one for relief. Dominga Antonio et. it appears that payments had been made by appellant to appellee. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING. The dispensation of justice and the vindication of legitimate grievances. thus. were presented. al. Hence.

29.presented by the plaintiff’s. so as to entitle his client. the court believes the negligence of the counsel is not excusable in view of his admission that he received the registry notice from the court on May 24. 1956 a judgment has been redndered in favour of the Antonio’s. in order to properly safeguard the rights and interests of their clients. 1956. Little need be added to these observations of the trial court. This Court noted that since it reconvened June 18. 1956 to inquire from the Court records or Clerk of Court about the nature of the registered notice that was sent to him on March 24. denied. until the date of the trial on Aug. the learned trial judge commented: Considering the motion for new trial and the opposition thereto. Francisco filed a motion for a new trial on September of 1956. contemplated by the Rules of Court. Feb. ample opportunity to verify the nature of the said registered notice of hearing which he allegedly misplaced upon his receipt thereof on March 24. All he had to do was examine the records of this case. alleging that their failure to appear during the hearing of the case was due to accident. 20. except to state that lawyers should always be vigilant and alert. On this point. mistake or excusable negligence. the appellant herein. L-8963. This. On August 23. counsel for the defendant Nicolas Francisco has been appearing in Court almost every week if not everyday. 1956. 1956). was denied by the court. Furthermore counsel for the defendant Nicolas Francisco had all the time from March 24. It does not constitute the accident. ISSUE: Whether or not the omission of counsel constitute an excusable mistake and negligence. mistake and excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against(Counsel lost the envelope containing the notice to the trial before he has the opportunity to open the same). This is what a diligent counsel should do as required by ordinary prudence. that he misplaced the same is also indicative of his recklessness (See Gonzales vs. however. He had therefore. Appealed to the SC. 1956. The exercise of ordinary prudence on his part could have guarded against or avoided such mistake or negligence. Counsel did not exercise ordinary prudence because he did not perform his routine job or duty of noting down the notice of hearing in his calendar. to be heard. and that it was duly registered and that its envelope shows it came from the court which made the envelope and its contents so important that he should have immediately opened the same and not just put it aside. Upon the 413 . 1956. RULING: The allegation of counsel that he forgot to note the notice of hearing in his calendar is flimsy. Francisco appealed to the CA. 1956. if he really misplaced the same. praying that the decision dated August 23 of 1956 be set aside. Amon.

the accused asserted that on 18 March 1990 he was invited by one Andoy Versoza. The victim. the police arrested him on that same morning on suspicion that he was the perpetrator of the crime. Subsequently. id. together with his two aunts. Because of his unsatisfactory explanation. appellant only answered that on his was home. 1991). proceeding towards the direction of Barangay Pogomboa. Soliven. took a tricycle and overtook the man.). heard the cry of Carmelita Caburnay. Instead. while in his house. Early the following morning. 1991). Pangasinan waiting for a ride back to his residence in Barangay Pagomboa after spending the night around the poblacion during the eve of the town's fiesta (pp. March 14. So. passed by. Prior to Soliven's knowledge of the happening. 5-6. Merly Caburnay. he went home. In his defense. a neighbor of Soliven. Appellant. he felt sleepy and lied down for a while on the field. Mayor Domingo Madrid of Aguilar was already informed of the discovery of the dead body of the victim and was able to proceed immediately to the crime site. a man smelling of liquor. (pp. May 9. in Aguilar. who appeared drunk followed the girl but Soliven did not mind. Merly.m. When asked to explain his dirty appearance and the presence of dried straws of palay at the back of his pants. At around 6:00 p. mother of his neighbor. his maong pants torn and his T-shirt stained with blood. Four days later. 1990 following the victim Merly Caburnay. Mayor Madrid lost no time. He also bore scratches on his neck and arms. of the said date. Cesar Soliven was invited to the police headquarters for the purpose of identifying the man he saw in the early dawn of March 19. PEOPLE vs DELA CRUZ 207 SCRA 632 (1992) FACTS: In the early dawn of March 19. tsn. stood beside him. Standing in front of the prison cell. When he went out of the house. the Mayor was informed that a man walking suspiciously has [sic] just left the place. tsn.lawyers specially devolve the duty to evaluate the urgency and importance of registered letters coming from the courts where they daily ply their trade. as the person he saw. who was identified later on as Eduardo dela Cruz (appellant herein). tsn. The man was identified as appellant and he was found with dirty clothes. While standing at the aforementioned place. he. There. his landlord. he learned that Merly was raped and her dead body was found in a nearby ricefield (pp. Cesar Soliven was standing at the corner of the McArthur Highway and Felomina St. to cook and prepare food for the latter's visitors. who was among the four men inside the cell. 3-4. 1990. went around the plaza and watched some 414 . was at the time of the crime only ten years old while the accused was forty-eight years old. Merly Caburnay. 4-8. Soliven pointed to appellant.

He likewise claimed that there were no rice stalks at the back of his pants when he was arrested. the presence of scratches on his neck and arms was not satisfactorily explained by the accused. the trial court found the circumstantial evidence as sufficient for conviction. Along the way. Wilma Flores-Peralta 28 and Mayor Domingo Madrid. They then strolled about the plaza for two hours. the requirements of time and place must 415 . It was duly established that. and that immediately before the incident the victim was walking alone but "was following persons.m. could not have testified on the rape and killing of the victim. In the first place. they rested for awhile near the highway beside the church and at about 5:00 a. Taken together with the other circumstances present here. of the following day. Nor is the non-presentation of the victim's companions of any help to the cause of the accused. Every objection to the admissibility of evidence shall be made at the time such evidence is offered. he decided to walk because he had no more money. Moreover. they attended mass.m. the defense has not shown any improper or ulterior motive on the part of Soliven for testifying against the accused. When he was advised by his aunts to go home. otherwise the objection shall be considered waived. It is settled that where there is no evidence. this fact serves to buttress the prosecution's case. and nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by any improper motive. Although the prosecution did not present any eyewitness. the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is thus entitled to full faith and credit. Finally.." Accordingly. In any event. ISSUES: (a) There is more than one circumstance. Thereafter.shows until midnight. Moreover.(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. who were not eyewitnesses. and(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. HELD: It is settled that for alibi to prosper. after obtaining permission from her mother. the bloodstains on the pants of the accused were testified to by Dr. Afterwards. or as soon thereafter as the ground for objection shall become apparent. she went "to the fiesta in Aguilar" with her cousin and her mother's sister-in-law. her two companions. he was arrested by the police for raping and killing Merly Caburnay. He vehemently denied having committed the crime. he drank a bottle of gin and another bottle of beer until 1:00 a. it was never established that the two companions were with the victim when she was on her way home or when she was raped and killed. the prosecution has the prerogative to determine who should be presented as witnesses on the bases of its own assessment of their necessity.

the cadastral court issued a decision adjudicating Lot No. so they appealed. The accused committed a heinous crime. 1988. It is not enough to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed. 34 Hence. He was not content with unleashing his bestial lust upon the tender and frail body of a 10-year-old. On February 23. L-4227 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Garcia claims that she and her husband. the place where the accused claims to be 32 is more or less ten meters away from the scene of the crime )a ricefield in Barangay Pogomboa). which is necessary is order that the defense of alibi may be considered. had purchased Lot No. donated the same to his son.be strictly met. They subsequently sold it under a Pacto de Retro sale to copetitioners Sps. He must pay for what he did in prison. Rosario. he also brutally inflicted upon her severe injuries which caused her untimely demise. their son. Garcia claims that there was actual fraud because Mendoza falsely claimed that his father. Cirilo Mendoza. GARCIA VS MENDOZA 203 SCRA 732 (1991) FACTS: Petitioner Mercedes A. is definitely much better than what he truly deserves. The petitioners filed with the court a petition for review of judgment but denied. 1987. Mendoza. the place where he was questioned by Mayor Madrid of Aguilar and apprehended by the police authorities is twenty meters away from the place where the naked body of the victim was found. 32080 located in San Carlos City. 33 Furthermore. WHEREFORE. and subsequently. Cirilo Mendoza. inherited the property from Hermenegildo Mendoza. who had been in possession of the lot since October 15. 31 In this case. Mendoza 416 . 1938. 32080 in favor of Dominador G. Pangasinan. who then took possession of said lot. is lacking. in Criminal Case No. the physical impossibility of the accused's presence at the crime scene. Dulcesimo Rosario and Violeta Reyes and Erlinda O. Pangasinan on April 24. that Mendoza made it appear that Lot 32080 was an exclusive property of Cirilo Mendoza. Mendoza. but he must also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time the same was committed. the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision of Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen. with costs against the accused-appellant Eduardo dela Cruz y Laoang. a place which. Another life was lost because a beast in man's clothing was on the loose. unfortunately.

11. Petitioners-appellants filed a petition to annul the judgment and/or review the decree of registration. with respect to themselves. L. Record No. made the court to believe that he is the owner" and that said judgment "was secured by means of fraud". Act No. all the provision of the Land Registration Act are applicable to cadastral proceedings as well as to the decree and certificates of title granted and issued under the Cadastral Act. ISSUE(S): Whether or not the remedy of petition for review of judgment exists or is warranted by Act No. ISSUE(S): Whether or not a petitioner for review under Section 38 of Act 496 need not be an original claimant in a cadastral proceeding and need not secure the lifting of the order of general default with respect to himself RULING: 417 . Sec. RUBLICO VS ORELLANO 30 SCRA 511 (1969) FACTS: Fausto Orellana. N-211 for Lots Nos. holding that petitioners-appellants had no personality to file their petition because they did not file an answer and were declared in default and that they should have first secured the lifting of the order of general default. "by means of fraud. Orellana filed a motion to dismiss the petition. with the Court of First Instance of Lanao. the court a quo approved the report and recommendation of the clerk of court and rendered judgment adjudicating Lots 1664 and 1665 in favor of respondent-appellee Orellana. Act 2259 clearly states that except as otherwise provided by the Cadastral Act.C.R. On 20 November 1964. on 23 September 1965. HELD: The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners. 2259 (Cadastral Act).countered that a petition for relief from judgment under Sec. 38. sustained the motion. 1664 and 1665. does not apply to a cadastral proceeding. alleging ownership of the lots adjudicated to the respondent. The court. claiming ownership and praying that the said lots be adjudged and decreed in his favor. before they filed their petition for review. filed his answer in Cadastral Case No. that respondent. IL-N-2. 496.

1965. situated in the Poblacion of Mabini. It rendered a decision reversing that of the trial court and 418 . Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals and when petitioner moved to have the appeal certified to the Supreme Court because it involved purely questions of law. and (e) that the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser. victimized by registration proceedings of their estate in land by means of fraud. judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance. 1965. (b) that he has been deprived thereof. Crisolo. and in petitioner’s instituting the land registration proceedings while said ward was confined at the National Psychopathic Hospital. followed three months later by writ of possession in favor of the spouses. of Pangasinan. Pangasinan. ordering the registration of Lots 1 and 2. (c) through fraud. The essential requisites or elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of a decree are: (a) that the petitioner has a real or dominical right. as amended. the opportunity to review the decree would be defeated if such parties would be limited to those who had filed their opposition to the petition for registration or to first require them to procure the lifting of the order of general default before they could file a petition for review. represented by his guardian. respondent-ward. CRISOLO vs. Branch VII. Pedro C.The Supreme Court ruled that a petitioner for review under Section 38 of Act 496. filed a petition for review of the decree under Section 38 of Act 496 on the ground of fraud which allegedly consisted in petitioner’s taking advantage of the insanity of respondentward to secure the execution of a deed of exchange of properties by and between the petitioner and said respondent-ward. need not be an original claimant in a cadastral proceeding and need not secure the lifting of the order of general default with respect to himself. On September 20. CA 68 SCRA 435 (1975) FACTS: On August 20. The aim of the law in giving aggrieved parties. The provision does not require that the petitioner be an original claimant who had filed an answer and because fraud might intervene precisely to prevent a person from filing an answer. the Court of Appeals denied the motion and instead sustained the allegation of fraud. Within a year from the issuance of this decree of registration. Crisolo and Soledad de G. (d) that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree. The trial court dismissed the petition and held that Section 38 of Act 496 was not applicable because respondent had opportunity to oppose the registration proceedings but abandoned his opposition. and more particularly bounded and described in the technical descriptions (Exhibits B and B-1) in the name of applicant spouses. the court ordered the issuance of the Decree.

Navarro issued a notice of initial hearing. iv. 419 . CRUZ vs. province of Rizal. the persons entitled to a review of the decree of registration are those who were fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the original registration case and not those who were not denied for their day in court by fraud. Respondents are not entitled to the remedy under Section 38 of Act 496 because respondent-ward was given opportunity to oppose the registration but abandoned his opposition. Thus. the respondent Judge Pedro C. more or less. which the law provides as the sole ground for reopening the decree of registration. situated in the municipality of Antipolo. he cannot claim that he was fraudulently deprived of his day in court to entitle him of the remedy under Section 38 of Act 496. Pasig) an application for registration (under Act 496) of five (5) parcels of land with an aggregate area of four and one-half hectares.remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings. and a petition for review of a decree of registration will be denied where the petitioner had notice of the original proceeding but failed to substantiate his claim. A homestead applicant may avail of the remedy. 1966. RULING: NO. announced his opposition to the registration of the land involved but later abandoned the same. 1966. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the re-opening of the land registration proceedings. where an oppositor. NAVARRO 54 SCRA 109 (1973) FACTS: Sometime in 1966 the respondent Alfonso Sandoval filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch II. Under date of August 1. On December 1. through counsel. Under Section 38 of Act 496.

1967. held that once a homestead applicant has complied with all the conditions essential to a Government grant. declared the respondent spouses the owners of the five parcels of land. Plan Psu-136628. but without receiving any evidence in the premises. their homestead applications thereof having been duly approved by the Bureau of lands and they having fully complied with all requirements for the acquisition of a homestead and possessed and cultivated the same as their respective private property. On March 20." The petitioners then filed a "Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration" of the mentioned order. homestead applicants. to file this petition for review. acting on the petition. On April 24. after a hearing ex parte. In Mesina vs. which was originally a public land but to which said petitioners had perfected a homestead right long before respondents secured aforementioned decrees and certificates of title. 2 and 3 for the reason that lots form a part of respective petitioner's Lot. finds the petition for review to be without sufficient merit and therefore DENIES the same.. 1967 the court ordered the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration. aforementioned Lots 1. On January 3. the Supreme Court.. but this was denied on May 25. the respondent Judge issued an order stating that "the Court . 1967. Pineda vda. and LEONCIA CABRERA are the absolute owners and possessors of.no oppositor having appeared. 420 . CELEDONIA CABRERA. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners has legal personality. petitioners ROSA CRUZ. citing Susi vs. as RULING: YES. de Sonza. 1967 the petitioners filed a "Petition for Review of Decree of Registration" in the court below alleging. that actually. Razon. among others. and/or the person having an irrevocable vested interest in. the court a quo.

the validity of the grant of title over the said properties to the private respondents. independently of the Director of Lands. Public Land Act). it is safe to assume that Bartolome Quines submitted his final proof way back yet in 1923 and that the Director of Lands approved the same not long thereafter or before the land became the subject of cadastral proceedings in 1927.2877-hectare parcel of public 421 . Quines. having complied with all the terms and conditions which would entitle him to a patent.he acquires "not only a right to a grant. even without a patent actually issued. BONIEL VS REYES 35 SCRA 218 (1970) FACTS: Petitioners therein alleged to be the bona fide actual occupants and cultivators of a 46. has unquestionably acquired a vested right in the land and is to be regarded as the equitable owner thereof. Unfortunately. 14. there was some delay in the ministerial act of in suing the patent and the same was actually issued only after the cadastral court had adjudicated the land to Maria Florentino. It is the Court’s view that the petitioners have amply alleged below such real.. Nevertheless.” In Nieto vs. but a grant of the Government. legally protected interest over the parcels in question sufficient to clothe them with the necessary personality to question. Bartolome Quines. the Court affirmed the doctrine in these words: Considering the requirement that the final proof must be presented within 5 years from the approval of the homestead application (sec.

since petitioner and his copetitioners make no claim of their application for a free patent to the land having been approved nor a patent their favor having been awarded. may then take the necessary steps towards the reversion of the land. Their claim based on alleged fraudulent issuance of title to the public land in favor of Yap should be addressed in proper administrative proceedings to the Director of Lands. SI-17618-D and located at Bo. Yap was issued. 1964. the sales patent in December. in which case within one year from entry of the decree he may in the same proceeding ask for review and the issuance of the decree in his own name and implead the adverse party. late husband of co-petitioner Mauricia Ombay had filed a free patent application for the land. P18131 on February 11. 1965. Lupon. and that as a result of such alleged fraud and collusion between Yap and the bureau personnel. 1966. the land is not claimed to be private property of petitioner nor of his co-petitioners but was admittedly formerly a part of the alienable and disposable public land awarded under sales patent to Yap. which was favorably by the land inspector of the Bureau of Lands who certified in the records the findings of his investigation as to the absence of any claimants of the land. they had no valid cause of action to file an action for annulment of Yap's patent and for cancellation of the title issued to Yap by virtue thereof. one Ramon Ombay. Yap had clandestinely filed a sales application for the very same parcel of land. to the public domain. Langka. who if he finds the claim substantiated. that sometime on September 11. and that on October 12. But here. 1965 and the corresponding original certificate of title No.agricultural land designated as Lot No. Davao province. one Rafael S. Accordingly. Petitioners prayed of respondent court that it annul Yap's title and instead award the land to them. RULING: A person claiming to have been deprived of the land or an interest therein. and petitioners may then press for favorable action on their application and the award of the land to the 422 . ISSUE: Whether or not respondent court validly dismissed the petition.

671 sq. meters in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Case No. thereto attached. appellant appears not to have appealed from the order of denial aforesaid. the petition for certiorari is hereby denied. Where to file. the spouses Bruno Papa and Valentina Agaceta. On October 10. On the same date. 1957 in the course of which an order of general default was entered. L. Although this motion was denied on October 31 of the following year. the case was called for hearing on May 16.R. filed a petition to lift the order of default as against him and praying that his opposition to the application. 1957. 423 . 1958. applied for the registration under Act 496 of a parcel of land (Psu-59688) containing an area of 37. parents of herein appellees.tenant. which is beyond respondent court's jurisdiction. WHEREFORE. 12389). however. be admitted. the latter's counsel filed a motion to set aside the order of default alleging that the reason for the nonappearance of oppositor Baldoz was his death on July 28. ISSUE: Whether or not the court in said case committed a reversible error in declaring oppositor Baldoz in default despite his having filed a written opposition which was duly admitted by it and that its order denying appellant's motion for substitution as oppositor therein has deprived him of his day in court. the court rendered judgment decreeing the registration of the parcel of land described in Psu 59688 in favor of appellees. The mere reversion of the land to the State would not entitle them of itself to an award of the land to them. After the requisite publication of the application in the Official Gazette. be substituted as party-oppositor. appellant herein. On February 16. BALDOZ VS PAPA 14 SCRA 691 (1965) FACTS: On January 7. Prior to October 1. 2215. Record No. oppositor Baldoz died. 1959.C. Baldomero Baldoz father of herein appellant. 1958. b. 1957 and praying that his son.

Hence. the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner. this petition. ISSUE: Whether the case may be reopened by the RTC? RULING: No. Mapa appealed with DANR but the appeal was dismissed. The lot was awarded to Josefa in 1934. Upon reconsideration. The regional land director rendered a decision in favor of Mapa.RULING: The court issued an order dismissing the complaint on the grounds (1) that the final judgment in Registration Case No. being in the nature of a petition for review of a decree. a decree of registration may be reopened or reviewed by the proper 424 . The Director of Lands reversed the decision. Cacao filed a letter protesting the construction of Josefa of a camarin in “Portion A” of Lot 1 of Psu-153657. In 1956. Wastrom filed for reconsideration but was denied for being filed out of time. Original Title issued in the name of Mapa pursuant to miscellaneous sales patent was issued in 1971. Wastrom filed with CFI Baguio-Benguet for judicial relief as the prescriptive period is about to lapse but such petition was denied on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Subsequent motions for reconsideration were also denied and the writ of execution in favor of Mapa was granted. filed for miscellaneous sales application. excluding Portion A from Lot 1 of Psu-153657. Josefa Mapa. Agripino Farol also transferred the rights and interests to herein petitioner Walstrom. 181 SCRA 431 FACTS: Cacao Dianson. filed for Free-patent application for Lot 1 and Lot 2 of Psu-15365. Mapa countered claiming that such area was awarded to her in public bidding. WALSTROM V. Bureau of Lands Investigator then investigated and found that Cacao sold the land to a certain Agripino Farol. cannot prosper because it was filed more than one year from the date of the issuance of the decree and because it is not based on fraud as provided for in Section 38 of Act 496. predecessor-in-interest of respondent. In 1972. MAPA JR. the DANR Secretary reinstated the order of the regional land director. 2215 is res judicata in the present action and (2) that the instant action. The present is an appeal from said order. however.

in violation of the Homestead Law. The third element. 4870 filed by Alejandro to recover the lot of his father against Jose A. (c) through fraud. Alleging res judicata. Judge Ruiz refused to dismiss the case asserting that the sale of a parcel of land was made on September 14. the land subject of the petition. (d) that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree. 1944 in violation of the five-year period within which a transfer of a homestead patent is prohibited. Reyes. 615. (b) that he has been deprived thereof. and Demetrio de Jesus. However. Petitioners allege that the controversy arose from Civil Case No. 1944. the petitioner can not aver that she was deprived of property because she did not have a real right over portion "A". Alejandro filed another complaint praying for the nullification of the compromise agreement with the allegation that it was obtained through fraud as it was made to appear before the court of first instance that the conveyance of title was made on February. petitioners prayed for the dismissal of the case. In 1968. 425 . RUIZ 30 SCRA 318 (1969) FACTS: Teodorico Cabascas. owns a parcel of land as evidenced by OCT no.Regional Trial Court upon the concurrence of five essential requisites. to wit: (a) that the petitioner has a real and a dominical right. and Demetrio de Jesus were declared to be the registered owners of the western portion of the land originally owned by the late Teodorico Cabasbas as per Original Certificate of Title No. The second element is also absent since corollary to the aforecited ruling of the DANR Secretary. Subsequent transfers were then made until the petitioners acquired ownership of the land subject of the petition. STERLING INVESTMENT CORPORATION V. 1946 when in fact it took place on September 14. and (e) that the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value The first element is patently not present because the petitioner can not allege that she has already a real and dominical right to the piece of property in controversy. the late father of respondent Alejandro Cabasbas. the records are bereft of any indication that there was fraud in the issuance of the certificates of title. Pursuant to a compromise agreement entered into by the parties. the spouses Lutgardo Reyes and Elisa A. 815. spouses Lutgardo Reyes and Elisa A. Reyes. de Kastro and Estanislawa de Kastro.

Was this not the rule there would be no end to litigations. under the opposite rule. however. whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. 1959. An order of general default was issued. mortgaged it to the spouses Ramirez to 426 . fraud is a ground for annulling a judgment. In fact. RAMIREZ VS CA 144 SCRA 292 (1986) FACTS: On September 15. petitioners-spouses filed an application for registration of a parcel of riceland in Rizal. perjury being of such common occurrence in trials. Only extrinsic or collateral. On March 30. But the settled law is that judicial determination however erroneous of matters brought within the court's jurisdiction cannot be invalidated in another proceeding. Not every kind of fraud. Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the successful party in a litigation which is committed outside the trial of a case against the defeated party. It is the business of a party to meet and repel his opponent's perjured evidence. which did not affect the presentation of the case. or his agents. the private respondents filed a petition to review the decree of registration on the ground of fraud. the court found that deeds of sale spurious. the losing party could attack the judgment at any time by attributing imaginary falsehood to his adversary's proofs. but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case. On the other hand. attorneys or witnesses. as distinguished from intrinsic. the petitioners presented parol evidence that they acquired the land in question by purchase from Gregorio Pascual during the early part of the American regime but the corresponding contract of sale was lost and no copy or record of the same was available. After trial. It further found that the respondents took possession of the land as owners after the death of Agapita Bonifacio and in 1938. intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party in a litigation during the trial.ISSUE: Whether there was an actual or extrinsic fraud rendering the judgment null? RULING: No. Thereafter. Fraud to be ground for nullity of a judgment must be extrinsic to the litigation. 1960. such as the use of forged instruments on perjured testimony. is sufficient ground to set aside a judgment.

April 7. and 427 . FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT INC. HEIRS OF TOMAS DOLLETON vs. Respondents moved for the dismissal of the eight Complaints on the grounds of (1) prescription. 170750. The petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari.00 by way of antichresis. WHEREFORE. (2) laches. and exclusive possession of the subject properties for more than 90 years until they were forcibly ousted by armed men hired by respondents in 1991 and that the subject properties from which they were forcibly evicted were not covered by respondents’ certificates of title. Petitioners claimed in their Complaints that they had been in continuous. The petitioners in this case did not merely omit a statement of the respondents' interest in the land. the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. The trial court then ordered the reconveyance of the property. They positively attested to the absence of any adverse claim therein. filed before the RTC separate Complaints for Quieting of Title and/or Recovery of Ownership and Possession with Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order and Damages against respondents. The averments in the petition for review of the decree of registration constitute specific and not mere general allegations of actual and extrinsic fraud. ISSUE: Was there an actual or extrinsic fraud? RULING: Yes.R. knowingly and intentionally made. This is clear misrepresentation.secure the payment of a loan in the amount of P400. The omission and concealment. of an act or of a fact which the law requires to be performed or recorded is fraud. when such omission or concealment secures a benefit to the prejudice of a third person. G. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. open. (3) lack of cause of action. 2009 FACTS: In October 1997. No.

The Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the RTC Resolutions. an action for recovery of ownership and possession of the subject properties. 428 . the land of which a person was deprived should be the same land which was fraudulently or erroneously registered in another person’s name. which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in other persons’ names. In both instances. or to those who claim to have a better right. if the Court considers the allegations in petitioners’ Complaints. the instant Petition is GRANTED. from which they were evicted sometime between 1991 and 1994 by respondents. The RTC dismissed the complaints of petitioners. Hence. and that petitioners were unable to prove by clear and convincing evidence their title to the said properties. which is not the case herein. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied. to its rightful and legal owners. RULING: Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree provides that a decree of registration may be reopened when a person is deprived of land or an interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation obtained by actual fraud. On the other hand. the petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. While petitioners improperly prayed for the cancellation of respondents’ TCTs in their Complaints. there is nothing else in the said Complaints that would support the conclusion that they are either petitions for reopening and review of the decree of registration under Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree or actions for reconveyance based on implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code. petitioners’ Complaints may be said to be in the nature of an accion reivindicatoria.(4) res judicata. The trial court determined that the subject properties were already registered in the names of respondents. an action for reconveyance respects the decree of registration as incontrovertible but seeks the transfer of property. ISSUE: Whether the actions instituted by petitioners before the RTC were for the reopening and review of the decree of registration and reconveyance of the subject properties. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING. Instead.

it authorized Vicente P. Petitioner failed to show the presence of these requisites. 2009) FACTS: NRSI alleged that in 1994. Tanjuatco argued that the complaint stated no cause of action against him because it was Cuevas who was alleged to have defrauded the corporation. While the application for approval in the Bureau of Lands is pending. Reconveyance and Damages. to apply on its behalf. Cuevas III. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property. No.NEW REGENT SOURCES. wherefore TCT’s were then issued in the name of Tanjuatco.. He averred further that the complaint did not charge him with knowledge of the agreement between Cuevas and NRSI. which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name. (2) the registration of the land in the name of the defendant was procured through fraud or other illegal means. to its rightful and legal owner. In an action for reconveyance. CA 149 SCRA 32 (1987) 429 . An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property. RULING: The trial court correctly dismissed petitioner’s complaint for reconveyance. April 16. Director of Lands released an Order. Cuevas assigned his right to Tanjuatco. the following requisites must concur: (1) the action must be brought in the name of a person claiming ownership or dominical right over the land registered in the name of the defendant. for the acquisition of two parcels of land by virtue of its right of accretion. INC. which approved the transfer of rights from Cuevas to Tanjuatco on 1996. TANJUATCO [G. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing petitioner’s complaint for reconveyance. To warrant a reconveyance of the land. or not later than 10 years in the case of an implied trust. or to one with a better right. Petitioner filed a Complaint for Rescission/Declaration of Nullity of Contract. 168800.R. Cuevas purportedly applied for the lots in his name to the Bureau of Lands. wrongfully registered by another. MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIAS vs. to its rightful and legal owner. and (4) the action is filed after the certificate of title had already become final and incontrovertible but within four years from the discovery of the fraud. specifically the title thereof. vs. (3) the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value. the certificate of title is respected as incontrovertible. its Chairman and President.

as a cemetery from 1934. in 1963.FACTS: Private respondent Norma Leuenberger. the petitioner defended its alleged ownership of the subject lot. about 3 ha. However. converted into a subdivision. However. Thus. 140 from her grandmother. demanding payment of past rentals and requesting delivery of the area allegedly illegally occupied by petitioner. 140. such person is by operation of law considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the persons from whom the property comes. it has been held that where the land is decreed in the name of a person through fraud or mistake. On 1964. The lower court decided in favor of the Municipality. inherited the whole of Lot No. The beneficiary shag has the right to enforce the trust. she discovered that more or less 4 ha. she donated a portion of Lot No. having bought it from Simeona Ditching in 1934. of the parcel of land. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are estopped from questioning the possession and ownership of the petitioner which dates back to more than 30 years. On 1963. 430 . was used by petitioner. In 1952. respondent filed a complaint in the CFI for recovery of possession of the parcel of land occupied by the municipal cemetery. to the municipality for the purpose of high school and had 4 ha.. RULING: It is certain that petitioner failed to present before the Court a Deed of Sale to prove its purchase of the land in question which is included in the TCT in the name of private respondent Norma Leuenberger. notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title and the trustee and his successors-in-interest are bound to execute the deed of reconveyance. respondent wrote the Mayor of the municipality regarding her discovery.

that there was no lien. Suazo. RODRIGUEZ vs TORENA 79 SCRA 356 (1987) FACTS: Valentina Quiñones. for the 431 . the said land not having passed to a third person. 1958. 2017. although not registered and annotated thereon.the predecessor-in-interest of respondents. that he had been in the peaceful. the respondents’ counsel in the cadastral case. alleging that they are pro-indiviso registered owners of the land and that the petitioner illegally. After its issuance. a complaint for ejectment and damages against the petitioner. The land was brought for registration before a cadastral court in 1922 and a certificate of title was issued on August 7. On July 9. HELD: A landowner whose property was wrongfully or erroneously registered under the Torrens system is not barred from bringing an action. 1950. maliciously.500 square meters thereof. after one year from the issuance of the decree.899 square meters thereof.043 square meters which is designated as Lot No.The petitioner claimed that the heirs of Valentina Quiñones had already sold their rights over the land as early as 1941 and 1950 either through themselves or their successors in interest. ISSUE: Whether the existence of a decree of registration is a bar to an action filed after one year from the issuance of the decree to compel reconveyance of the property in question. encumbrance or adverse claim annotated on the certificate of title so that the series of sales made in his favor.a. Purpose of an action for reconveyance. continuous and public possession of the same. and by means of force and intimidation. are valid and binding between the parties. owned a parcel of land in Davao City with an area of 39. thus making him the rightful and legal owner of approximately 27. the respondents filed with the Court of First Instance of Davao. entered the land in question and occupied approximately 27.the certificate of title was delivered to the petitioner by Atty.

After which motions and motions have 432 . The sheriff turned over the possession to the representative of Delfin. when the latter went to the premises he was again barred by the petitioner. Then. Subsequently. Such an action does not aim or purport to re-open the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration. Immediately. The sheriff then. Delfin as an applicant. Delfine asked for demolition and he moved for a second alias writ of possession which was again. on March of 1978 the opposition filed by the petitioner was denied by Judge Bautista. granted. if any. It was granted and now covered with an OCT issued by the Registry of Deeda. Thereafter. however. Moreover. Bulacan. Subsequently. Judge constantino. the writ of reconveyance filed by the petitioner was dismissed. filed for a petition for Writ of Possession against spouses Francisco and BasilisaEsconde. Petitioner then filed complaint for conveyanceagainstDelfin which was rebutted by the latter via motion to dismiss on the ground that (1) the cause of action. petitioner filed a rejoinder to motion to dismiss and motion for leave of court. but only to show that the person who secured the registration of the questioned property is not the real owner thereof. ESCONDE vs BORLONGAY 152 SCRA 603 (1987) FACTS: Ramon Delfin (private respondent) filed an application for a parcel of land located in Valenzuela. upon the courts order. who took over the same branch presided over judge Bautista issued an order for Writ of Possession against the spouses. is barred by re judicata (2) the complaint fails to state sufficient cause or causes of action for reconveyance and (3) the plaintiff is barred by prescription or laches from filing the case.reconveyance of the property in question. petitioner filed a motion to quash which was denied. Bulacan. as they have been occupying the said land. delivered possession to Delfin however he was barred in entering the premises. Delfin filed a motion for an Alias writ of possession which was granted.

There was no proof of irregularity in the issuance of title. The second resolve the issue. it is apparent that reconveyance is not the proper remedy. the Court ruled that the land should be adjudicated to the registered owner that: "Justice is done according to law. Under the circumstances in the case at bar. for the reconveyance of the property in question. after one year from the issuance of the decree. and the period of one year within which intrinsic fraud could be claimed had long expired. seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful owner. nor was it established that fraud had indeed intervened in the issuance of said title. a temporary restraining order directing the sheriff and Delfin to refrain from enforcing and/or carrying out the third alias writ of possession. often regarded as an equitable consideration (meaning compassion). DACLAG V MACAHILIG 433 . either nullifying third alias writ of possession served orto issue a mandatory injunction which was denied by the said court. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of an original certificate of title. RULING: An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him. An ordinary civil action for reconveyance does not seek to set aside the decree but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review.been filed. equity follows the law." An action for reconveyance of real property on the ground of fraud must be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. As a rule. but only to show that the person who secured the registration of the questioned property is not the real owner thereof. Petitioner then filed motion to amend the resolution and TRO. There may be a moral obligation. ISSUE: Whether or not action for reconveyance is the proper remedy. nor in the proceedings incident thereto. but if there is no enforceable legal duty. the action must fail although the disadvantaged party deserves commiseration or sympathy. The prevailing rule in this jurisdiction does not bar a landowner whose property was wrongfully or erroneously registered under the Torrens System from bringing an action. Such an action does not aim or purport to re-open the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration. Under similar conditions.

An action for reconveyance prescribes in 10 years. What is sought is the transfer of the property. to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. an OCT was issued in the name of Daclag by virtue of her free patent application. was not owned by Maxima at the time she sold the land to petitioners. Maxima executed a Statement of Conformity in which she confirmed the execution of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and conformed to the manner of partition and adjudication made therein. RULING: Yes. a daughter of Candido and Gregoria (the owners of land) entered into a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition with the heirs of her deceased brothers. evidence of title may be introduced. Maxima sold Parcel One to spouses Adelino and Rogelia Daclag (petitioners) as evidenced by a Deed of Sale. the point of reference being the date of registration of 434 . NO.R. it is proper. covered by OCT of which respondents' northern one half portion formed a part. and for this purpose. Respondents had sufficiently established that Parcel One. Mario and Eusebio Macahilig. 1982. Maxima. The essence of an action for reconveyance is that the free patent and certificate of title are respected as incontrovertible. The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the respondents.Respondents filed with the RTC for reconveyance. ISSUE: Whether the reconveyance of the subject land by the respondents is proper. 159578 JULY 28. The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision. the issue involved is one of ownership. which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name. 2008 FACTS: On March 18.G. In an action for reconveyance.

and was thus still within the ten-year prescriptive period. it would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title. The CA declared that an action for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years. when an action for reconveyance is nonetheless filed. The complaint alleged that the spouses Santos simulated the Deed of Sale dated May 16. Otherwise. Santos executed a Deed of Sale transferring the property to their son. 151016. 1989. owned a residential lot. Reconveyance and Damages[6] against the son. 1974. Annulment of Title. 435 . 6 AUGUST 2008. filed with the RTC. prescription does not commence to run against him. Cecilia Macaspac and Tarcisio Maniquiz.the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property. which does not prescribe. both heirs of Dominga Lustre. ISSUE: Whether or not the action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate of title does not exist prescribes. And in such case. a person acquiring property through fraud becomes. GR. Complaint for Declaration of the Inexistence of Contract. Records show that while the land was registered in the name of petitioner Rogelia in 1984. a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. the instant complaint for reconveyance was filed by the respondents in 1991. SANTOS VS HEIRS OF DOMINGALUSTRE. if plaintiff is in possession of the property. 1976 by forging Dominga Lustre’s signature. [37] Moreover. petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss. NO. by operation of law.561 SCRA 120 (2008) FACTS: Dominga Lustre. an action that is imprescriptible. In April 14. the prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property.A lleging that the plaintiffs’ right of action for annulment of the Deed of Sale and TCTs had long prescribed and was barred by laches. On September 20. RULING: The action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate of title was obtained by means of a fictitious deed of sale is virtually an action for the declaration of its nullity. Subsequently. Thus. Dominga Lustre mortgaged the lot to spouses Santos and later sold it to the latter. who died on October 15. The RTC denied it. 1994. They then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA).

adding that they had been in possession of the property since 1944. The records show that the tax declaration on the land had since 1921 been in the name of the spouses Gonzaga until 1944. It was originally owned by the spouses Diego and Patricia Gonzaga. The trial court sustained the plaintiffs. their grandchildren by their deceased children. after finding that their evidence remained unrebutted. invoked a sale made to them by Eliseo Gonzaga. herein respondents. Both are now dead. who acquired it in 1921. The petitioners claim the property by virtue of an alleged sale in their favor. In 1970. who had previously purchased the land from his parents. The petitioners. Rizal. In 1953. and declared them to be the owners of the disputed property. presumably with conjugal funds. the private respondents filed a complaint for recovery of the property from the petitioners in the court of first instance of Rizal. claiming that the latter had no right to the property. The Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the lower court. this time in the name of Joaquin Cabrera. the tax declaration was again changed. when it was made in the name of Eliseo Gonzaga. The petitioners claimed it was justified by their right of ownership while the private respondents contended it was a fraudulent act that did not bind them. one of their children.080 square meters situated in Cainta.CABRERA vs CA 163 SCRA 214 (1988) FACTS: The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land with an area of 4. ISSUE: Whether the action for reconveyance was prematurely filed? 436 . Both parties adverted in their respective pleadings to the petitioners' application for registration of the land under the Torrens system which was then pending in another court. survived by the private respondents. in their answer. the private respondents by right of succession.

RULING: An action for reconveyance may be filed even before the issuance of the decree of registration.273 sq. their pending action could conveniently and properly be deemed an action for reconveyance. filed within the one-year reglementary period prescribed by the Land Registration Act. 1978 private respondent filed his "Petition for Writ of Possession" against the spouses Francisco and Basilisa Esconde . And there were valid grounds. There is no reason. These grounds were not controverted at the trial. Delfin. he was barred by the petitioner from entering the property.On March 29. why one has to wait until the land is actually registered before he can sue for reconveyance. the Sheriff turned over possession of the premises to the representative of the private respondent. m was registered under the name of private respondent Ramon V. The private respondents filed their complaint because they were unwilling to recognize the registration proceedings for lack of compliance with the notification requirements. However. As it happened. The private respondents were able to establish that the transfer of the land had been made under fraudulent circumstances to their detriment as the hereditary owners of the property. 1983. providentially. Hence. Consequently.On February 13. They did not have to await its termination. ESCONDE vs BORLONGAY 152 SCRA 603 (1987) FACTS: A parcel of land with an area of 2. 437 . the registration was granted during the trial of the plaintiffs' complaint for recovery of the property. when private respondent went to the premises. indeed. They also submitted that they had not received notice of the registration proceedings and that no notice thereof had been posted on the subject land as required by law.

Respondent Judge dismissed the complaint for reconveyance because plaintiff's cause of action is barred by res judicata. after one year from the issuance of the decree. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner's cause of action is barred by res judicata. for the reconveyance of the property in question.On November 17. for the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him.private respondent asked for a writ of demolition for the removal of any construction of the Esconde family on the premises and to cite petitioner Basilisa Esconde for contempt of court. 1983. private respondent moved for a second alias writ of possession in view of the failure of the petitioner to turn over possession of the premises to private respondent. it is apparent that reconveyance is not the proper remedy because there was no proof of irregularity in the issuance of title. nor was it established that fraud had indeed intervened in the issuance of said title. Reconveyance is available in case of registration of property procured by fraud thereby creating a constructive trust between the parties.In the case at bar. but only to show that the person who secured the registration of the questioned property is not the real owner thereof. A landowner whose property was wrongfully or erroneously registered under the Torrens System is not barred from bringing an action. Such an action does not aim or purport to re-open the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration. Petitioner then filed at Regional Trial Court of Bulacan a Motion to Quash and/or to Hold in Abeyance Execution of Second Alias Writ of Possession on the ground that they have filed a civil action for reconveyance. HELD: An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another. nor in the proceedings incident thereto. 438 . and the period of one year within which intrinsic fraud could be claimed had long expired.

In 1980. thereafter her brother also asked permission if he could construct a house on the lot registered under his name. But no amicable settlement was reached. and to be used on his construction of his house. The Court agreed with the lower courts findings that it was Dolores who bought said lots and made improvements on it.HUANG vs CA G. spouses Ricardo and Milagros also filed a complaint against spouses Dolores and Aniceto for the nullification of the deed of absolute sale and quieting of title. 13 September 1994 FACTS: In 1965 Dolores Sandoval purchased two adjacent lots in Makati.Hence. Furthermore. It was shown that Dolores was the one who bought both the lots. No. from the evidence it was shown that spouses voluntarily signed and 439 . 198525. Dolores was able to obtain a deed of absolute sale with assumption of mortgage over the property with the Huangs. In March 1968. to which Dolores agreed to. as well as for the release in her favor of the owner's duplicate certificate of title in its possession so that the deed could be duly annotated on the title and/or a new certificate of title issued in her name. the Supreme Court was not impressed with the contention of the petitioners that they were not aware that what they were signing was deed of absolute sale. ruled in favor of the Sandovals. Dolores sought the help of the barangay to compel the spouses Ricardo and Milagros to execute the necessary request to the SSS for the approval of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a sufficient ground for reconveyance of ownership to spouses Dolores and Aniceto? RULING: The Supreme Court noted that it was not possible for Ricardo to have bought or constructed such improvements on the disputed lot on his earnings alone. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals who also affirmed the lower courts decision. but being advised by her sister-in-law Milagros that it is not possible to acquire two lots in only one name. The trial court consolidating the cases. the petition. as it was shown to be substantially insufficient. she registered the other lot in the name of her brother Ricardo. and even paid for the construction of a swimming pool and fencing of the subject lots.R. But on that same year. Ricardo was also given permission to mortgage said lot in order to secure a loan from SSS. Then Dolores constructed her house in the lot she bought.

read the contents of said document. Trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to
property which involves the existence of equitable duties imposed upon the holder
of the title to the property to deal with it for the benefit of another. Trust is either
express or implied. Express trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the
parties. Implied trust comes into being by operation of law. A constructive trust is
imposed where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to
convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were
permitted to retain it. The duty to convey the property arises because it was
acquired through fraud, duress, undue influence or mistake, or through breach of a
fiduciary duty, or through the wrongful disposition of another's property. On the
other hand, a resulting trust arises where a person makes or causes to be made a
disposition of property under circumstances which raise an inference that he does
not intend that the person taking or holding the property should have the beneficial
interest in the property.
In the present case, Dolores provided the money for the purchase of
Lot 20 but the corresponding deed of sale and transfer certificate of title were
placed in the name of Ricardo Huang because she was advised that the subdivision
owner prohibited the acquisition of two (2) lots by a single individual. Guided by
the foregoing definitions, we are in conformity with the common finding of the
trial court and respondent court that a resulting trust was created. Ricardo became
the trustee of Lot 20 and its improvements for the benefit of Dolores as owner. The
pertinent law is Art. 1448 of the New Civil Code which provides that there is an
implied trust when property is sold and the legal estate is granted to one party but
the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest for the
property. A resulting trust arises because of the presumption that he who pays for a
thing intends a beneficial interest therein for himself.
Petitioners are of the mistaken notion that the 10-year prescriptive period is
counted from the date of issuance of the Torrens certificate of title. This rule
applies only to the remedy of reconveyance which has its basis on Sec. 53, par. 3,
P.D. No. 1529. Reconveyance is available in case of registration of property
procured by fraud thereby creating a constructive trust between the parties, a
situation which does not obtain in this case. Therefore, the Court affirmed the
decision of the RTC, thereby dismissing the petition.

VILLAGONZALO VS IAC
167 SCRA 535 (1988)
440

FACTS:
In an action for reconveyance, RTC Leyte ordered the cancellation of
transfer certificate title in the name of private respondent Cecilia Villagonzalo.
Upon appeal with the Court of Appeals (formerly IAC), said decision of lower
court was reversed.
The appellate court found out that the private respondent was able to loan an
amount to her father in order that he can acquire said land. Furthermore, the CA
found the petitioners cause has already prescribed. The appellate court held that the
issuance of transfer certificate of title to the private respondent was already a
notice of ownership to the whole world, thereby repudiating any fiduciary or trust
relationship involved. It anchored its conclusion on doctrinal holdings that an
action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
years counted from the date when adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the
property. Due to the inaction of the petitioners, the private respondent was made
secure over her ownership on the subject land, and thereafter spent time and money
in introducing improvements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the registration of the land in the private respondents’ name
was not a repudiation of the implied trust created between her and their father.
RULING:
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the appellate court. An action for
reconveyance of real property to enforce an implied trust shall prescribe after ten
years, since it is an action based upon an obligation created by law, and there can
be no doubt as to its prescriptibility. It is likewise established that said period of ten
years is counted from the date adverse title to the property is asserted by the
possessor thereof. In the case at bar, that assertion of adverse title, which
consequently was a repudiation of the implied trust for the purpose of the statute of
limitations, took place when trasfer certificate of title was issued in the name of
private respondent.
There is also evidence of record that as far back as 1961,
private respondent refused to give any share in the produce of
the land to petitioners; that in 1963 she mortgaged the property
in her own name; and that in 1969, she leased the same to one
Ramon Valera, without the petitioners taking preventive or
retaliatory legal action. The rule in this jurisdiction is that an
441

action to enforce an implied trust may be barred not only by
prescription but also by laches, in which case repudiation is not
even required. Whether the trust is resulting or constructive, its
enforcement may be barred by laches. Petitioners were, therefore,
correctly faulted for their unjustified inaction. WHEREFORE, the
judgment of the respondent Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

ALZONA vs CAPUNITAN
G.R. No. L-10228 (February 28, 1962)
FACTS:
The parcels of land in question were part of the friar lands in
the Spanish times and were then possessed by spouses Perfecto
Alomia and Cepriana Almendras, both deceased; they were
survived survived by three children, Arcadio Alomia, Eulogio
Alomia and Crispina Alomia. Arcadio Alomia married Ildefonsa
Almeda but they did not have any children. When both Arcadio
and his wife Ildefonsa died, they were survived only by the two
sisters of Ildefonsa namely Marciana and Narcisa and also by the
nephews and nieces of Arcadio. Narcisa is the mother of herein
defendant Gregoria Capunitan married to Manuel Reyes. Eulogio
Alomia, other hand, is the father of plaintiff Gregorio and Eleuteria
Alomia while Crispina Alomia is the mother of plaintiff Cornelio
Alzona. Of the three children of Sps. Perfecto and Cepriana
Alomia, it was Arcadio and wife Ildefonsa who purchased and
possessed the lands originally claimed by their parents and was
able to acquire title to two of the four lots in question. When
Arcadio died, his widow Ildefonsa, sold the lands in question to
her niece Gregoria Capunitan (defendant) daughter of Narcisa
Almeda and cousin of plaintiffs-appellants and in whose name
new certificate of title was issued in 1928.
After Ildefonsa's death, plaintiffs herein instituted an action
in the CFI of Laguna on October 11, 1929 for the recovery of the
lots; the case was set six times for hearing during 1930. The case
was dismissed because of the non-appearance of the parties and
their attorneys. On January 23, 1931, same plaintiffs, thru same
442

counsel filed another action for the recovery of lots Nos. 332, 210,
2968 and 2524. Again, due to numerous petitions for
postponement from 1931 to 1936,nothing was done hence on
August 31, 1936, the court dismissed the case. The lower court
found that the dismissal of these two cases was not due to an
amicable settlement because of defendant's recognition of
plaintiffs' rights or to a promise to reconvey one-half of the
property to them.
ISSUE/S: Whether the right of the appellees
to ask for
reconveyance of their ½ share of the land is already barred by
prescription.
HELD:
The case at bar involves an implied or constructive trust
upon the defendants-appellees. The Court of Appeals declared
that Ildefonsa held in trust the 1/2 legally belonging to the
plaintiffs; on which condition, the defendants had full knowledge.
The sale made by Ildefonsa in favor of the defendants, was not
void or inexistent contract, action on which is imprescriptible (Art.
1450, N.C.C.). It is voidable, at most, and as such is valid until
revoked within the time prescribed by law for its revocation, and
that is undoubtedly the reason why the Court of Appeals
pronounced that "the appellees had the right to ask for a
reconveyance of their share, unless the action is barred by
prescription". The prescriptibility of an action for reconveyance
based on implied or constructive trust, is now a settled question
in this jurisdiction. It prescribes in ten (10) years. The cause of
action of the plaintiffs against the defendants accrued in 1928
when the latter purchased and took possession of the two lots
from Ildefonsa Almeda. The action, being for recovery of title to
and possession of real property, the same should be brought
within ten (10) years from 1928, or up to 1938 (Sec. 40, Act 190).
But after the dismissal of the second case on August 31, 1936,
the plaintiffs-appellants went into a long swoon only to wake up
when they filed the present action on November 28, 1949
(according to the lower court) or January 28, 1950 (according to
appellants). In the first case, 13 years had elapsed and in the
second, 14 years. In either case, the action has long prescribed.
443

Furthermore, and by the same token, the defendantsappellees being third persons, and having repudiated the trust
and expressed claim of ownership over litigated properties, by
themselves and by their predecessors-in-interest, they have also
acquired the said properties by the law of prescription (Tolentino
vs. Vitug, 39 Phil. 126; Government of the Philippines vs. Abadilla,
46 Phil. 642).

ALMARZA vs. ARGUELLES
G.R. No. L-49250 December 21, 1987
FACTS:
Lot No. 5815 of the Cabatuan Cadastre, situated in
Cabatuan, Iloilo, originally belonged to respondents' predecessorin-interest, Romualdo Grana. In 1929, he sold a 7,300 square
meters portion thereof to petitioner and her husband, the late
Leon Almarza, who since then had been in continuous, peaceful,
open and adverse possession thereof. The document evidencing
the sale between the parties was lost during the war, but
sometime thereafter, the late Laura Pancrudo, mother of private
respondents Asuncion and Gilda Arguelles, executed an affidavit
acknowledging the sale of said portion to petitioner and her
husband. On the basis of said affidavit, the Provincial Assessor
issued a new tax declaration, beginning in the year 1945 to Leon
Almarza, annotating at the back thereof the aforementioned
affidavit of the late Laura Pancrudo. The tax declaration, covering
the 7,300 sq.m. portion of Lot No. 5815 sold to petitioner and her
husband was designated as Lot No. 5815-B. On the other hand, a
new tax declaration, Tax Declaration No. 3909 was issued by th