IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHANCERY DIVISION

IN RE ESTATE OF JOSEPH L. ZIARNIK

ADVOCACY GUARDIANSHIP SERVICES,

et al.,
Plaintiffs,

No. 08 P 08140
Calendar 16
Judge David B. Atkins

v.
TAMI GOLDMAN,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THIS CAUSE COMING ON TO BE HEARD on Edwin Belz's motion to vacate the court's
order of June 19, 2014 as it relates to attorneys' fees, and plaintiffs' petition for attorneys' fees and
expenses, the court having considered the briefs submitted and the arguments of counsel, and the court
being fully advised in the premises;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Edwin Belz's motion to vacate is denied and plaintiff's petition
is granted.
Background

This action concerns various representations and statements published by defendant Tami
Goldmann on her website and blog. Plaintiffs filed this action in February 2012, claiming that defendant
is liable to plaintiffs individually and on behalf of Mr. Ziarnik's estate under theories of: (1) defamation;
(2) interference with prospective economic advantage; (3) false light; and (4) violation of privacy.
Under all four counts, plaintiffs seek injunctive relief and damages of One-Hundred Thousand Dollars
($100,000.00) per plaintiff.
Defendant retained attorney Edwin J. Belz to represent her in this matter, who filed an
appearance on defendant's behalf on March 19, 2012, and a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' amended
complaint on May 22, 2012. Nevertheless, Mr. Belz failed to file a reply in support of the motion or to
appear in court for oral argument on December 9, 2013. Accordingly, the court denied the motion to
dismiss and ordered defendant to answer plaintiff's amended complaint on or before December 23,
2013. At the next status date of January 28, 2014, Mr. Belz again failed to appear in court or to timely
file defendant's answer. Plaintiffs' then orally moved for default, which the court granted via
handwritten order prepared by plaintiffs' counsel stating, "Plaintiffs' oral motion for default is
GRANTED and default judgment is entered against defendant Tammi Goldman and in favor of
Plaintiffs on all counts of the First Amended Complaint." Default was then set for prove-up, and

continued on several occasions. On March 28, 2014, while prove-up was still pending, Edwin Belz
appeared in court to withdraw as defendant's attorney.
On April 29, 2014, defendant personally appeared and requested leave to file a motion to vacate.
Defendant claimed that she was never informed of the January 28, 2014 court date and did not discover
the order of default until April 15, 2014, after her attorney had withdrawn. Defendant maintained that
she exercised due diligence as soon as she received notice of her attorney's withdrawal, attended every
court date since that time, and filed her documents in a timely manner. She explained that she was
"mortified by her own attorney's conduct," and asked the court to grant her motion so that the case may
be decided on the merits rather than on a technicality. Plaintiffs, however, objected to defendants'
motion based on the understanding that the January 28, 2013 order constituted a valid final judgment
and that defendant had apparently failed to satisfy the requirements for vacating such a judgment more
than thirty days after the entry thereof.
The court entered a written order on June 19, 2014 granting defendant's motion to vacate based
on the following reasoning:
Under the circumstances of this action and in consideration of the issues raised in the
pleadings and defenses previously asserted in defendant's motion to dismiss the
complaint, the court finds it equitable to vacate the January 28, 2014 order/finding of
default. Defendant was justified in relying on her attorney's representations and
judgment. She should not be faulted for her attorney's negligence where it is clear that
the defendant has taken all reasonable steps to participate in these proceedings and assert
defenses to plaintiffs' claims. This is not a case where the defendant has individually
ignored court orders and deadlines, but rather appears to be an instance where the
defendant has placed her confidence in a legal professional who unreasonably failed to
protect, and eventually abandoned, the client's interests.
(Mem. Op. at 3-4, June 19, 2014) However, the court also found it prudent to condition its order on an
award of attorneys' fees and expenses that plaintiffs may have incurred as a direct result of Edwin
Belz's conduct, and to assess that award against Mr. Belz rather than defendant Goldman. Specifically,
the court stated the following:
... [I]n effort to assure substantial justice among the parties, the court also finds that
plaintiffs should be awarded any reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred between
January 28, 2014 and the date of this order. See Ward v. Rosenfeld, 204 Ill. App. 3d 908,
911-12 (4th Dist. 1990) (trial court may condition its vacating of default upon the
payment of attorney's fees and costs). Such fees include court appearances in
anticipation of final judgment and prove-up, as well [as] counsel's preparation of a
response to defendant's motion to vacate. This reimbursement of reasonable fees and
costs should be sufficient to offset any undue hardship to plaintiffs and assure and
promote future compliance with legal procedure. Further, the court finds it prudent to
assess the foregoing award against former defense counsel rather than defendant
individually. See Andreasen v. Suburban Bank of Bartlett, 173 Ill. App. 3d 333, 338 (1st
Dist. 1988) (court may allocate or apportion a fee award among parties or their counsel in
accordance with their relative fault). According to defendant's motion to vacate, it
2

appears that defendant did not even learn about the January 28, 2014 default order until
April 14, 2014, after defendant's attorney had repeatedly failed to appear for court
proceedings, neglected to file an answer to plaintiff's complaint, and withdrawn as
defense counsel with full knowledge of the default and its potential effects. For this
reason, the court finds that the court's finding of default is entirely attributable to
defendant's former attorney. See id. at 339 (court does not lose jurisdiction over
withdrawn attorneys to assess fees for prior conduct).
(Mem. Op. at 4, June 19, 2014) Accordingly, the court granted plaintiffs leave to file a detailed petition
for said fees and costs, and invited Mr. Belz to file any objection he may have in the form of a written
response thereto. Mr. Belz did, in fact, file an "answer and objection" to plaintiff's petition, as well as a
separate motion to vacate the June 19, 2014 order. The court then took these matters under advisement
for preparation of this written order.
Edwin Belz's Motion to Vacate
Unfortunately for Edwin Belz, and contrary to the position taken in his motion to vacate, the fact
that the court granted his former client's motion does not in any way excuse Mr. Belz's dereliction of
duties and the prejudicial impact his conduct has had Ms. Goldman and plaintiffs' counsel. The decision
to condition the June 19, 2014 vacation of default upon Mr. Belz's payment of attorneys' fees and costs
is reasonable under the circumstances, within this court's authority, and clearly supported by Illinois
law. See Ward v. Rosenfeld, 204 Ill. App. 3d 908, 911-12 (4th Dist. 1990); Andreasen v. Suburban Bank
of Bartlett, 173 Ill. App. 3d 333, 338 (1st Dist. 1988). Mr. Belz has failed to offer any compelling
reason to contest, let alone vacate this rather minor and procedurally appropriate sanction. Further, the
court is particularly cautious not to encourage Mr. Belz to engage in similar improper conduct in the
future. Therefore, Edwin Belz's motion to vacate is denied.
1

Plaintiffs' Petition for Attorneys' Fees

On July 28, 2014, plaintiffs counsel at Johnson & Bell, Ltd. submitted a "Petition for Attorneys'
Fees and Affidavit of Victor J. Pioli" in which plaintiffs' counsel seeks $2,120.00 for time spent
attending and preparing for court appearances between January 28, 2014 and June 19, 2014. Edwin
Belz filed an "Answer and Objection" to the petition in which he concludes, without legal citation, that
the petition fails to conform to court rules and case authority. Mr. Belz also argues that the petition is
deficient because it is predicated upon conclusory statements, improperly seeks fees incurred after Belz
withdrew as counsel, and includes hours for attendance at court status dates.
After reviewing the written submissions, the court finds that Mr. Belz has failed to offer any
convincing or legally supported argument for denying plaintiffs' petition. Plaintiffs were invited to seek
fees for attending court dates at which Mr. Belz failed to appear, and the court contemplated that the
total fees and costs would include hours logged after Mr. Belz's withdrawal since his conduct created
lingering frustrations to his client and opposing counsel. Counsel cannot simply "cut and run" and
expect to not be held responsible for the mess he left behind. Further, the court finds plaintiffs'
1

For example, the court could have justifiably extended the period subject to the June 19, 2014 award of fees to include Mr.
Belz's failure to reply to his own motion to dismiss and subsequent unexcused absence in court for the motion hearing on
December 9,2013.

calculation supported by clear and concise exhibits and premised on reasonable hourly rates. The total
of $2,120.00 is not arbitrary or unexpected, but rather a plausible sum consistent with the court's
understanding of the issues and legal expertise involved in this litigation. For these reasons, plaintiffs'
petition for attorneys' fees is granted in that attorney Edwin J. Belz is hereby ordered to pay a sum of
$2,120.00 to plaintiffs' counsel at Johnson & Bell, Ltd.
WHEREFORE, the court orders the following:
1.

Attorney Edwin J. Belz's motion to vacate the court's order of June 19, 2014 as it relates
to attorneys' fees is hereby denied;

2.

Plaintiffs' petition for attorneys' fees is granted in that attorney Edwin J. Belz is hereby
ordered to pay a sum of $2,120.00 to plaintiffs' counsel at Johnson & Bell, Ltd. by
January 30, 2015;

3.

The court finds no just reason for delaying either the enforcement or appeal of this order
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a); and

4.

This action is continued to February 3, 2015 at 10:30 A.M. for status on discovery.

Judge David B. Atkins

The Court.