Brill Encyclopedia of Early Christianity, article Gregory of Nyssa

Gregory of Nyssa (ca. 33596)

I. Life and Work
Most of the information about Gregorys life comes from his own writings, especially
his Life of Macrina. Gregory was born into an upper class Cappadocian family,
brother of Basil of Caesarea (ca. 300-379). Gregory had two more brothers, Peter,
later bishop of Sebasteia, and Naucratius, and a sister, Macrina, who was a model of
piety for Gregory and appears as a character in his dialogue On the Soul and
Resurrection. Their father was member of the Hypsistarians, a widespread sect in the
Mediterranean venerating the cult of the highest God (theos hypsistos). Gregory did
not study with famous teachers like Himerius and Prohaeresius as his brother, Basil,
did, but he was of rare intellectual gifts, as his writings manifest. As Gregory
acknowledges with gratitude (On the Creation of Man 125B), his main teacher was
his brother, Basil. Gregory married a woman called Theoseveia (On Virginity 3, GNO
256.15), who died in 381. It is likely that Gregory became a professional teacher of
rhetoric between 362 and 371 and about 372 he was appointed by his brother Basil
bishop of the small diocese of Nyssa, between Caesarea and Ancyra. He was paused
and brought to trial by partisans of Arianism (ca. 375-6), but he was restored to his
see after the death of the pro-Arian emperor Valens (378). Gregory took part in the
synods of Antiocheia (379) and in the second ecumenical synod in Constantinople
(381), where he defended the Nicene view of Gods nature against the neo-Arian
doctrine of Eunomius. Gregorys writings, which mostly stem from the later part of
his life, include treatises critical of the Arian doctrine, as had been revised by the neoArian, Eunomius, such as the voluminous Against Eunomius, a follow up to his
brothers work of the same title, ethical treatises such as On the Life of Moses, On
Virginity, The Catechetical Oration. They also include his two philosophical
masterpieces, On the Making of Man and On the Soul and Resurrection, which
contain Gregorys views on human nature, on the status of the human soul, but also
on the structure of reality, a number of exegetical works, on the Psalms, the
Ecclesiastes and the Song of Songs, and the Genesis, such as the Homilies on the Six
Days of Creation, as well as several letters and speeches. In what follows I will focus
on his philosophical views, not on his ecclesiastical ones or on his exegesis.

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II. Physics and Metaphysics

One central question in the agenda of the early Christian thinkers was that concerning
the principles accounting for the world. These are principles that account both for the
being of the world as well as for its generation. From a very early stage, Christian
thinkers denied that matter should qualify as a principle of the world and instead
maintained a strong monism, according to which God is the sole principle accounting
for the world. On this view God creates and shapes matter in such a way that the
variety of natural entities come into being at the worlds creation. This is the kind of
view that we find in Justin Martyr, Theophilus, Irenaeus, Clement, and Tertullian (see
Karamanolis ch. 2). What is missing from their arguments, however, is a theory of
matter. More specifically, they do not quite explain how in their view God brings
matter about and how this is at all possible given the ontological disparity between
God and matter, since on their admission God is an intellect, intrinsically good and
provident, while matter is disorderly and as such identified with badness. One answer
that is standardly offered is that God creates the world through the intervention of
Logos, so that God does not come in direct contact with matter, but this view requires
further elaboration in order to justify a strict monism. Besides, if God is the sole
principle of the world, he is ultimately responsible for all features of the world
including badness or evil, and this does not fit to God. Origen tried to tackle this set of
issues taking as a starting point that God is the sole principle of the world (On
Principles II.9.1, IV.4.8) in the sense that God is the singular cause accounting for the
being of the world, which has never actually come into being (ibid. II.1.3, II.3.4-5).
Yet Origen still speaks of matter as a kind of substrate that admits of qualities and is
shaped accordingly (On Principles II.4.1) without explaining what the ontological
status of this substrate is. He only suggests that God is responsible for the ability of
matter to take different forms and transform in ways that make the world beautiful
(ibid. II.1.4). Origen denied that God is responsible for badness, and he advanced an
elaborate argument to the effect that the only cause of it is man (see Karamanolis ch.
4). The question of the status of matter and Gods relation to it was addressed by Basil
and in more depth by Gregory.
Basil on the one hand denies the existence of formless matter while on the
other he takes issue with those who argue that God is the creator of the world only in
the sense that he is the cause of its being and not of its generation. Thus Basil denies
both the coeternity of God and matter and the coeternity of God and the world; for the

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former thesis undermines Gods omnipotence and freedom, while the latter
undermines Gods ontological status as a unique entity. Basil argues instead first that
matter in so far as it is privation, is bad, which means that matter cannot be a principle
of something as ordered and good as the world, and, second, he argues against those
who portray God as a cause of coeternal creation that they thus deny Gods
willingness to create the world, which, he claims, is suggested by the relevant
vocabulary of Genesis (On Hexaemeron I.17, 17C). The question that Basil leaves
unanswered, however, is how exactly we should understand Gods creation of the
world including matter, which in his view occurred in a timeless moment and all at
once (On Hexaemeron I.1, I.6). Basil argues that there is no need to assume a
substrate, as Origen did, for, he claims, the world is the ordered totality of the
qualities we find in it; these qualities make up all things in the world (ibid. I.8, 21B).
Basil, however, does not explain how this is the case and especially what keeps these
qualities together. Gregory will address precisely these questions and offer some
interesting answers, which I sketch below.
Gregory maintains that matter as such does not exist, either as a formless
substrate that pre-exists creation or as a substrate that God brings about and then
shapes in order to create the world. What rather exists, Gregory argues, are qualities
such as hot, cold, light, heavy and so on, and their convergence or combination
constitutes what we call matter (Apology for Hexaemeron 69C). The qualities
themselves are not of material nature either; rather, Gregory argues, they are concepts
(ennoiai) or thoughts (nomata) in Gods intellect, where they have always existed
(Apology 69C). On this view, God did not actually create matter in order to create the
world but rather he created the world and everything in it out of his own thoughts and
through an act of will. The implication of this view is that material bodies are not
made up of matter but of intelligible entities, the qualities, the logoi.
Gregory has an interesting argument in support of this view. Material entities,
he claims, are constantly transformed: the water of the rain makes the earth humid,
the sun makes humidity evaporate, that is, it turns humidity into air and so on
(Apology 93B-96A). When fire burns oil, for instance, Gregory argues, it is not only
that fire consumes the humid element and turns it dry, but the mass of oil is also
diffused into the air as dry dust, and this is why the smoke of a lantern blackens
anything that lies above it (ibid. 97B). This means, Gregory continues, that the oil
does not disappear but rather becomes transformed into different material elements,

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such as dust, which in his view shows that matter consists of the qualities that emerge
in the bodys dissolution (97CD). Instances of dissolution of material bodies show
that from one body several different elements come about, such as air, water, dust,
and so on. Gregory argues that this is precisely what constitutes a body (Against
Eunomius II.949, GNO 259.26-260.25).
This view has an epistemological aspect. In Gregorys view, our perception of
bodies is nothing more than one kind of dissolution of them. We, humans, Gregory
suggests, come to know material entities by distinguishing and by combining the
logoi that constitute them. When we get to know an object around us, Gregory claims,
this happens by sense-perceiving distinct aspects of it, such as its color, its weight, its
size, its texture etc. (On the Making of Man 212D-213A). These distinct aspects
amount to distinct qualities (logoi) that make up each object. We distinguish the
various qualities of an object, Gregory claims, despite the fact that these are presented
to us united and we never confuse the quality of color with that of weight, for instance.
The epistemic distinctiveness of logoi is not an illusion, Gregory suggests, but rather
the consequence of their being distinct in reality, and this is so because ultimately
qualities are distinct in Gods mind as distinct thoughts. The fact that sensible entities
are made up of combination of qualities does not mean, according to Gregory, that
creation amounts to the combination of the logoi, the qualities or reasons, in Gods
mind. The logoi are rather combined when they are outside Gods mind and they give
rise to what we call matter. In this sense the constituents of matter have their patterns
in Gods mind but matter as such does not. This does not mean, however, that God is
not responsible for the combination of logoi; rather, God is responsible for their
combination in the sense that he is the one who established them (On the Soul and
Resurrection 124CD); as soon they were established in Gods mind, they were
projected out of it, and this projection amounts to the worlds creation (Apology for
Hex. 72A-73A, 77CD). In this sense God is the creator of the material world without
being creator of matter. Matter is for Gregory not an entity but rather an
epiphenomenon resulting from the combination of qualities that constitute bodies. In
this way Gregory answers the question of how an immaterial, intelligible, entity like
God gives rise to matter. In his view, the question is misguided because the world is
not material but rather is constituted of intelligible entities, the reasons or qualities
(logoi) that stem from the divine mind.
Gregorys theory has ostensible affinities with Plotinus and especially

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Porphyrys relevant views (see Karamanolis 105-106). There has been much
discussion as to whether Gregorys theory is close to Berkeleys idealism, according
to which everything that exists is mental and material entities are not-existent or
closer to the position of John Locke, who holds that material entities are made up of
qualities and all we know of them are their nominal essences, that is, their attributes,
not their real essences (see Sorabji 287-294, Hibbs, Hill). Gregory, however, did not
deny the existence of material entities, but he only denied the existence of matter. He
is thus closer to John Lockes position. However, Gregorys theory serves aims quite
distinct of those of other ancient or modern philosophers. His metaphysical theory
allows him to defend the possibility of the resurrection of the body, because the
human body, like all bodies, is also made up of qualities, which constitute its
corporeal nature (On the Soul and Resurrection 45AC). If the qualities of the human
body can be combined and dissolved, they can also be recombined, and in this sense
the human body is restored The resurrected human body will be more refined that our
original one, as it will be purified from the non-rational side, what Gregory calls
non-rational life (On the Soul and Resurrection 148BC). Gregory thus replies to
pagan critics such as Celsus and Porphyry who criticized the Christian doctrine of the
resurrection of the body as absurd.
Gregory was much concerned with the question of the nature of Christian God.
Early Christians since Justin Martyr were speaking of the mediation of God-the Son,
the Logos, in the creation of the world by God-the Father, and they tried to argue that
the three persons of the divine trinity, God, Son, and Spirit are one substance in three
persons (Tertullian, Apologeticum 21.11-13, Adversus Praxean 3.8). The question,
however, was how exactly the unity of the three divine entities is to be understood.
Gregory follows his brother Basil in advocating Athanasius view that God is one
substance (homoousios) and yet exists in three hypostaseis or divine persons, Father,
Son, and Spirit. To understand that, we need first to realize that Basil and Gregory
distinguish sharply between substance (ousia) and hypostasis; the latter is an entity
ontologically depended on substance, such as the heating effect of fire (e.g. Plotinus,
Enn. V.1.6.30-34). Basil makes that clear when he argues that the difference between
substance (ousia) and hypostasis is the same as that between the common (koinon)
and the particular (idion), as for instance between the living being and the particular
man (Basil, Letter 236, Loeb vol. III, p. 400-402). Gregory argues along the same
lines that all men share the same account of substance (logos ts ousias), while they

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have different features (idimata) that make them different hypostaseis (Against
Eunomius I.227, GNO 93.8-10). Another example he uses in this regard is that of gold
vis--vis golden objects. We speak of gold in singular (chrysos), Gregory suggests,
even when we deal with many golden objects (chryseoi). There is one gold despite the
fact that there are many golden objects and there are many individuals who have the
nature of man, like Peter, John, and Mary for instance, but only one substance, man,
that is manifested in them (To Ablabius 132B; see further Maspero 1-27). Similarly
with God, there is one substance, God, existing in three individuals, Father, Son, and
Spirit. The fact that each one of the hypostaseis is God does not mean that we deal
with three Gods, because the substance is one, in the same sense that we do not have
three manhoods or three golds when we are confronted with three men or three
golden objects (see further Zachhuber 70-92, Turcescu) . Gregory argues for the unity
of the divine substance by also pointing out that God acts in a unified way, which
represents the unified divine will (thelma; To Ablabius 128A), without which there
would not be unity and order in the world.
Much as he speaks about the substance of God, Gregory is nevertheless eager
to highlight the infinite nature of God, of which we are bound to have only a limited
knowledge, and he insists that we can only do justice to Gods infinity only if we use
negative terms (Against Eunomius II.9536, GNO 263.21265.10; Life of Moses
376D377B). Gregory indeed fosters negative theology stressing the infinity of God
in many of his writings (e.g. Against Eunomius II.554; see further Drrie 877-882).
Gregory contrasts the beings of the creation that exist in space and time with God who
transcends them all In Gregorys terminology creation and created beings exist in
extension or space (diastma), while God does not (Against Eunomius II.368).

II. Fate and Free Will

One question that puzzled early Christians and their pagan contemporaries alike was
that of the existence of badness in the world. Instances of badness include disease and
death, accidents that can impair humans, natural catastrophes, and also vice. If God is
the sole principle of reality, then he must also be the author of all evils, but that does
not fit to God, whose essential feature is goodness and whom Platonists identified
with the Form of the Good of the Republic. The problem emerges in different form
even for those who maintain that God is the highest but not the sole source of reality,
because in such a case God is still responsible for allowing the existence of principles

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such as matter from which evils possibly stem and for collaborating with them.
Gregory of Nyssa takes up the line of earlier Christian thinkers, mainly Origen and
Basil, according to which God is not the author of evils and that badness is simply a
privation of goodness. Gregory argues at length in favor of this view in his work
Against Fate. Gregory denies that badness or evil exists naturally as an element
inherent in the constitution of beings (On the Soul and Resurrection 116C, 120AB),
because, he argues, this would mean that God allowed for that, and this is impossible
given that Gods nature is good (ibid. 120A). For Gregory badness comes into being
only with mans choices (ibid. 120C), which means that Gregory objects to Origens
theory according to which the human soul descends into the body because already in
its disembodied state, as an intellect, can opt for badness. Gregory argues that man
has to power to choose (prohairetik dynamis) only when the soul is embodied. This
power (prohairesis), Gregory suggests, handles our impressions and oversees
everything we do (On the Song of Songs, GNO VI.345-6). Thanks to prohairesis, man
is father of himself, as Gregory puts it, that is, he or she decides about the kind of
self, virtuous of vicious, one would like to have in the same way that natural birth
brings about different kinds of animals, male and female (Life of Moses 328B). In this
sense man can realize in his intellect everything he wants, as God is also able to do
(On the Soul and Resurrection 124B). Gregory actually speaks as if the power to
choose, our prohairesis, is what eventually choses the kind of life we lead and the
kind of character we have and in this sense it amounts to ones fate (Against Fate
GNO III.2, 56.17-18). Gregory argues that against the fatalism of his interlocutor,
according to which there is a connection of all things in the world (sympatheia) such
that the movements of the planets determine human characters and lives (ibid. 37.1438.10).
Gregorys argument against the fatalist position focuses on the role of natural
causes. He claims that human nature and astral nature are completely distinct and
their natural movements are equally distinct and independent (Against Fate, GNO
III.2, 40.23-41.5). Gregory goes on arguing that the movement of celestial spheres is
like any other movement in nature and as such it does not create time more than any
other, let alone fate (45.11-46.5). If we want to predict someones future, Gregory
suggests, we do not have to look at the heavenly bodies but at ones individual
features, which result from natural causes that are in operation in humans and often
leave signs in them (ibid 49.20-50.11). Astrologists, Gregory claims, eliminate natural

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causes and instead attribute natural phenomena to causes foreign to their nature.
Gregory adduces the example of an earthquake, which, he claims, has nothing to do
with fate or with the movements of heavenly bodies, but rather is a geological
phenomenon with specific natural, i.e. geological, causes (ibid. 54.12-55.17).
By taking this line, Gregory joins the pagan tradition of explaining natural
phenomena with reference to their corresponding natural causes rather than a
Christian one that often favors a theological explanation of them, as is that we find in
Scripture, where earthquakes are often presented as events suggesting the presence or
the wrath of God (Exodus 19:18, Isaiah 2:29, Matthew 24:7-8). Gregory resembles
Seneca who also argues that geological phenomena are governed by natural laws (Nat.
Quaest. III.16.4) and that such phenomena contribute to cosmic harmony (ibid.
III.29.4). Like natural phenomena, Gregory suggests, human behavior should also be
explained in terms of natural, human, causes, and in Gregorys view the main cause
involved in explaining human behavior and human choices is prohairesis, the
intellectual ability to choose. It is this that shapes human lives and which is ultimately
responsible for happiness or misery in life.

III. Epistemology
Gregory defended his theory of the divine persons and divine substance also from an
epistemological point of view in response to challenges advanced by the neo-Arian,
Eunomius. Eunomius apparently claimed that the difference in substance between the
persons of the divinity is suggested by the different names applying to them, such as
Father, Son, and Spirit (Basil, Against Eunomius II.1.5-9). For in his view the name
Son suggests that this is a created kind of substance. Eunomius advocated the more
general view that names reveal essences of things, since they are provided by God and
fit to the natures of things (Gregory, Against Eunomius II.198, GNO 282.30-283.2).
Gregory accuses Eunomius of drawing on the naturalistic theory of names outlined by
Hermogenes in Platos Cratylus (ibid. II.404-406, GNO 344.13-17). Gregory argues
that Eunomius view makes God a grammarian who teaches the names of things to
the first humans, but this, he continues, is an impossible view, since names according
to Scripture are human creations (Genesis 2.19-20; Against Eunomius II.402, GNO
342.26-344.3) and the evidence of different languages corroborates that (ibid. II.4068; see further Karfikova). In the case of God, Gregory argues, names such as Father

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and Son but also unbegotten (agenntos) and begotten (genntos) do not
designate different substances but only different properties (Against Eunomius II.9167, GNO 232.19-26, From Common Notions 180CD). The names we apply to God
form part of our own concept of God, which cannot be grasped by one name, since
God, Gregory claims, is a cluster concept, consisting of many properties (Against
Eunomius II.145, GNO 267.21-7). We name God differently depending on the
perspective we take at a given moment (ibid. II.475-6, GNO 364.23-365.24). The
application of many names to God does not contradict the simplicity of his substance
(ibid. II.148, II.163-4). God is infinite and no names will ever exhaust his properties
(II.192-5).
Gregorys conception of Gods nature informs further his epistemology.
Gregory maintains that that secure knowledge can be attained only with regard to true
beings (On Fate 161D) or real beings (Life of Moses 333C) and such a being is only
God (ibid.). This knowledge is not through the senses but through the intellect.
Knowledge of sensible, created, entities cannot be secure since such beings are
subject to change. Gregory speaks about this kind of knowledge that is achieved
through sense perception. As we will see below (psychology), Gregory holds that
human soul is of intellectual nature, that is, an intellect, which shapes the entire
human nature. Human intellect, Gregory argues, unlike Gods, operates through
bodily organs, that is, through the senses, which Gregory likens to the many entrances
a city have (On the Making of Man 152CD). The point of the comparison is that all
senses lead to the intellect and all sense date are brought to the intellect. Gregory
makes the stronger claim that occurs also in the Theaetetus (184d-185b), according to
which it is the intellect that knows through the senses (On the Making of Man 152A).
Gregory appears to maintain that sense perception is intellectual in two senses, first
insofar as the intellect makes a judgment on the basis of the sense data that receives
from the senses, and, second, insofar as the body including the sense organs are
shaped by the intellect in ways proper to each member of the body. This is suggested
by the analogy of the musical instrument that Gregory uses (ibid. 149BC). A musical
instrument is shaped by music and it can function properly only by a musician.
Similarly the human body has been shaped by the intellect and functions properly
when guided by the intellect (cf. 161AD, 168CD; see also below, psychology). An
ethical implication that follows is that if we neglect our intellect, this amounts to an
alienation from our human nature (ibid. 164A).

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Psychology
Gregory investigates systematically the nature of soul in and its function in the body
in two of his main works, namely On the Making of Man and On the Soul and
Resurrection. Both works were written the same period of Gregorys life, in 379 and
381 respectively. The aim of the latter, a dialogue between his sister Macrina and
Gregory, is to demonstrate that the soul survives the death of the body and
reincarnates in a resurrected body. The setting of the work is strongly reminiscent of
Platos Phaedo Macrina, like Socrates in the Phaedo, speaks of the soul and its
immortality while facing death (see Apostolopoulos). The aim of On the Making of
Man on the other hand is to show that the human nature is essentially rational, since
the human soul that shapes human nature is an essentially rational entity.
Gregory embraces the view that the human soul consists of three parts, reason,
spirit and appetite, and indeed he uses the Platonic imagery of the charioteer in the
Phaedrus (253c-254d) to underscore that (Life of Moses 36CD, On the Soul and
Resurrection 49BC, On Virginity 404D). Gregory actually defends the partite model
of soul in On the Soul and Resurrection and claims that the two non-rational parts
play an important role in life, which is, among other things, to contribute to attaining
virtue if they let being guided by reason (On the Soul and Resurrection 57A). For he
argues, in accordance with Republic IV, the appetitive and the spirited part of the soul
are driven by non-rational desire, not by the good, but they can be educated by reason
and steered towards the good (ibid. 64D-65A). But, as with Platos tripartite soul, the
question is what maintains the unity of the soul that accounts for the unity of our
experiences.
Gregory argues that it is the intellect (nous) that holds human nature together
unifies it (synechei; On the Making of Man 164AB) and shapes it (ibid. 149BC).
Gregory considers the intellect as the form of the body, the absence of which results
in formlessness (amorphia; ibid. 161D). The intellect, Gregory argues, permeates the
entire body, which is its instrument, as a power (dynamis) and applies to each of its
parts through activities that are proper to it (161B), that is, bodily activities are
determined by intellect (164BC). This means that the intellect is not locally present in
the body, and Gregory indeed criticizes those who localize the soul or its parts in the
body, as is the case with Plato in the Timaeus. In his On the Soul and Resurrection
Gregory, or more precisely Macrina, also criticizes the materialist models of the

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souls nature and existence in the body of Stoics and Epicureans, and sets out to
present an alternative view regarding the manner in which exists in the soul. Macrina
argues that the soul exists in the human body in the same sense in which God exists in
the world. God, she claims, is present in the world by arranging together (synarmozei)
the whole world through a power that goes through it and maintains everything (28A),
which is reminiscent of the way God is presented in ps-Aristotles De mundo (398b711); similar, she argues, is the case with the soul, for man is a small world
(mikrokosmos) that contains all elements and each part complements the others in
making up a whole (28BC).
Macrina defines the soul as a created substance, living, intellectual, which
through itself provides a faculty of life and a faculty of cognition of perceptible things
in a body equipped with organs and potentially perceiving as far as nature can admit
(On the Soul and Resurrection 29B). This definition makes clear that soul does not
pre-exist the body, but rather exists together with the body, which the soul informs
and qualifies. In On the Making of Man Gregory claims that there is no point in which
the soul exists without body or the body without soul, for, he argues, the soul is
already contained in the male sperm (ibid. 253BD). Gregory actually claims that there
is no way of separating soul and body as there is no way of separating form and
matter in an artifact (ibid. 253C). Embryos too have a soul, as their movement and
nourishment shows (On the Soul and Resurrection 125B-128B). Gregory suggests
that the soul comes into being together with a suitable body that the soul shapes and
develops. Gregory illustrates his thought with the analogy of a sculptor. The sculptor,
Gregory claims, starts carving form on matter but he does not impose that form all at
once; rather, he gradually improves on it until its perfection (On the Making of Man
253BC). What guides the perfection of the form is the form itself, which has already
shaped the body partly and which exists in the sculptors intellect. The soul then is for
Gregory the form of the body, a view reminiscent of Aristotles thesis in De anima.
The question of how Gregory understands this form is partly answered by the
definition given by Macrina and cited earlier (On the Soul and Resurrection 29B),
which suggests that for Gregory the soul is of intellectual nature. He speaks of the
soul proper (kyris psych) or true soul (aleths psych) as an intellectual one (noera;
On the Making of Man 176BD). This soul Gregory argues, mixes with the body
through the senses and it is ultimately the soul i.e. the intellect that perceives through
the senses (138D-140A, On the Soul and Resurrection 29D-32A). Gregory argues that

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the soul qua intellect shapes the body in two main ways; first, it shapes the body so
that it can be used as an instrument of reason (On the Making of Man 148C). The
human body has a certain posture, hands instead of another set of feet, etc. This
arrangement is due to the shaping effect of reason (136B, 144AC), which makes man
similar to God (136C). The second way in which the intellect shapes the body is by
informing the senses. Our senses operate by means of concepts, by means of which
we cognize. Macrina suggests that when we perceive the sun, a vessel floating, our
perceptions are shaped by concepts and responsible for this is the intellect that hosts
the concepts (37B). The intellect for Gregory translates sense data in a conceptual
form. This is not a transformation of them, since these are already reasons (logoi), yet
the human conceptualization adds to them aspects absent in sense perception (e.g. a
cake is enticing). The sense organs would not serve the intellect unless the human
body as a whole had not been shaped so as to be the body of a rational creature. The
intellect is not actually in or mixed with the body, since it is incorporeal but is present
in it as form and through its activities.

Ethics and Politics

Like all early Christian thinkers, Gregory is much concerned with the question of how
man should live in order to attain happiness and salvation and his psychological and
metaphysical views outlined above have ethical implications. This becomes clear in
Gregorys On the Making of Man where he speaks at length about the universal
human nature and he outlines its main features (On the Making of Man 178D-185D).
All men, he argues, equally share Gods image, which means that they all have an
equal share in the intellect. This involves the ability we all have to be, like God,
masters of ourselves and able to choose (to autokrates kai autexousion), which is an
ability that is not affected by the difference in sex that pertains only to men (185AC).
This view that all men share the same human nature has the interesting corollary that
no man is slave by nature. This is a view we already find in Justin (Dial. 134. Cf. 2
Apol. 1), in Clement (Paed. I.6.31, Strom. V.5.30.4) and in Basil (On Holy Spirit 20),
and is in accordance with with Pauls statement that there is neither slave nor free,
neither woman nor man in Christ (Galatians 3:28). Yet it was first Gregory who
explicitly condemned slavery as an established practice in his contemporary society.
Gregory does this at length in his fourth homily on the book of Ecclesiastes (GNO
V.336.10-20). He argues that this practice indicates excessive arrogance, since some

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people assume that they are masters of humans, which is only fit to God, and
ultimately goes against Gods law, which wants all men equal (antinomothetein; ibid.
335.7).
Gregory maintains that man is made in the image of God and that has
consequences for the kind of life that humans should live (On Virginity XII.2, p. 408
S.C.). Two of Gregorys most important ethical works are On the Life of Moses and
On the Inscriptions of Psalms. In the latter he describes mans end as beatitude
(makariotes; 25), which he understands as likeness to God (homoisis t the; On the
Inscriptions 26), an ideal that is suggested already by Plato (Theaetetus 176ab; see
further Merki). This, however, Gregory claims, can be achieved only through the
corroboration by divine grace (On Virginity XII.2, p. 410 S.C.). Gregory maintains
that ethical life consists of three stages, separation from evil, ascent towards
intelligible matters, and finally likeness to God (On the Inscriptions 26), a view
reminiscent of the degrees of virtue and ethical life that we find in Plotinus (Enn. I.45) and Porphyry (e.g. Sentences 32). Gregory adopts the Platonist distinction of an
inner and an outer man, namely the man as soul/intellect and as a compound of soul
and body (Plato, Republic 533d, Plotinus, Enn. I.2.1, I.4.16, Porphyry, On Knowing
Yourself fr. 274-5 Smith, On the Creation of Man 236A). Gregory claims, however,
that when we ascend to virtue and ultimately to God, we cease being a duality of soul
and body and become one, for both soul and body are then united to the good (On the
Beatitudes GNO p. 165). Gregory conceives this ascent as an effort on the part of man
to reach out to God (On the Song of Songs 15, GNO p. 6). This reaching out
(epektasis) of man towards God is paralleled with Abrahams search for God (Against
Eunomius GNO II.89, 253.17).
Gregory followed Origen in holding that all humans will be finally restored
and their punishment will not be eternal. Origen held that ultimately Gods Logos will
prevail in the world and will bring everything to perfection, including the sinful souls
of humans (Against Celsus VIII.72). Gregory maintains that Gods punishment aims
only to remove badness from the world and in this sense it is only a means of
education and cannot be everlasting (On the Soul and Resurrection 100BC, 108A,
148A; see the extensive study of Ramelli).

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Reception
Gregorys work exercised considerable influence in later generations of Christian
thinkers. Some of his works were translated into Syrian and Arabic, quite early on,
and later also in Latin (see Drrie 871-873). It is an indication of Gregorys profound
influence on Byzantium that the patriarch Germanos (715-30) suggested that
Gregorys writings should be cleansed from aspects of Origens doctrines, such as in
particular the doctrine of restoration (apokatastasis), which Gregory maintains in
several of his works (see above).

George Karamanolis

Bibliography
Editions
Migne, J., Patrologia Graeca, vols. 44-46
Jaeger, W. et al., Gregorii Nysseni Opera, Leiden 1960Editions Sources Chrtiennes (various editors)

Bibliographical list
Altenburger, M. Mann, F., Bibliographie zu Gregor von Nyssa, Leiden/N.York
1988

Secondary Literature
Apostolopoulos, Ch. Phaedo Christianus. Studien zur Verbindung und Abwgung des
Verhltnisses zwischen dem platonischen Phaidon und dem Dialog Gregors von
Nyssa ber die Seele und die Auferstehung, Frankfurt a.M. 1986
Cavarnos, J., The Relation of Body and Soul in the Thought of Gregory of Nyssa, in H.
Drrie, M. Altenburger, U. Schramm (ed.), Gregor von Nyssa und die
Philosophie, Leiden 1976, 60-78
Corrigan, K., Evagrius and Gregory. Mind, Soul and Body in the 4th Century, Surrey
2009
Drrie, H., Gregor von Nyssa, Reallexikon fr Antike un Christentum, vol. 12 (1983),

Brill Encyclopedia of Early Christianity, article Gregory of Nyssa

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63-895
Drobner, H. R., Gregory of Nyssa as Philosopher: De anima et resurrectione and De
hominis opificio, Dionysius 18 (2000), 69-101
Cherniss, H., The Platonism of Gregory of Nyssa, N.York 1930
Gaith, J., La conception de la libert chez Grgoire de Nysse, Paris 1953
Hibbs, D., Was Gregory of Nyssa a Berkelyan Idealist?, British Journal for the History
of Philosophy 13.3 (2005), 425-435
Hill, J., Gregory of Nyssa, Material Substance and Berkeleyan Idealism, British Journal
for the History of Philosophy 17 (2009), 653-683
Karamanolis, G., The Philosophy of Early Christianity, Durham/London 2013
Karfikova, L., Der Ursprung der Sprache nach Eunomius und Gregor vor dem
Hintergrund der Antiken Sprachtheorien (CE II 387-444 ; 543-553), in L.
Karfikova, S. Douglas, J. Zachhuber (ed.), Gregory of Nyssa : Contra
Eunomium II, Leiden/Boston 2007, 279-305 (Suppl. to VC 82)
Kckert, Ch., Christliche Kosmologie und Kaiserzeitliche Philosophie, Tbingen 2009
Ludlow, M., Gregory of Nyssa Ancient and (post)modern, Oxford 2007
Maspero, G., Trinity and Man: Gregory of Nyssas Ad Ablabium, Leiden/Boston 2007
(Suppl. to VC 86)
Mateo-Seco L. F. and G. Maspero (ed.), The Brill Dictionary of Gregory of Nyssa,
Leiden/Boston 2010
Meredith, A., Gregory of Nyssa, London 1999
Peroli, E., Il Platonismo e lanthropologia filosofica di Gregorio di Nissa, Milano 1993
Peroli, E., Gregory of Nyssa and the Neoplatonic Doctrine of the Soul, Vigiliae
Christianae 51 (1997), 117-139
Ramelli, Gregory of Nyssas Position in Late Antique Debates on Slavery and
Poverty, and the Role of Asceticism, Journal of Late Antiquity 5 (2012), 87-118

Brill Encyclopedia of Early Christianity, article Gregory of Nyssa

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Ramelli, I., The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis, Leiden 2013 (Suppl. to VC vol.
120)
Rist, J., On the Platonism of Gregory of Nyssa, Hemarthena 169 (2000), 129-151
Sorabji, R., Time, Creation and the Continuum, Ithaca New York 1983
Streck, M., Das schnste Gut. Der menschliche Wille bei Nemesius von Emesa und
Gregor von Nyssa, Gttingen 2005
Turcescu, L., Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of the Divine Persons, Oxford 2005
Zachhuber, J., Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa, Leiden/Boston/Kln 1999