EngineThrustHazardsintheAirportEnvironment

Boeingcommercialairplanesareequippedwithenginesratedfrom18,000to
nearly100,000lbofthrust.Suchthrustlevelsprovideforsafetakeoff,flight,and
landingoverawiderangeoftemperatures,altitudes,grossweights,andpayload
conditions.However,theexhaustwakefromtheseenginescanposehazardsin
commercialairportenvironments.Operatorsandairportauthoritiesmustcarefully
considerthesehazardsandtheresultingpotentialforinjurytopeopleanddamage
toorcausedbybaggagecarts,servicevehicles,airportinfrastructure,andother
airplanes.
PowerHazardAreas
Whenmodernjetenginesareoperatedatratedthrustlevels,theexhaustwakecanexceed
375mi/h(325knor603km/h)immediatelyaftoftheengineexhaustnozzle.Thisexhaust
flowfieldextendsaftinarapidlyexpandingcone,withportionsoftheflowfieldcontacting
andextendingaftalongthepavementsurface(fig.1).Exhaustvelocitycomponentsare
attenuatedwithincreasingdistancefromtheengineexhaustnozzle.However,anairflowof
300mi/h(260knor483km/h)canstillbepresentattheempennage,andsignificantpeople
andequipmenthazardswillpersisthundredsoffeetbeyondthisarea.Atfullpower,the
exhaustwakespeedcantypicallybe150mi/h(130knor240km/h)at200ft(61m)beyond
theairplaneand50to100mi/h(43to88knor80to161km/h)wellbeyondthispoint.
Oneapproachtorelatingthesevaluestoairportoperationsistoconsiderthehurricane
intensityscaleusedbytheU.S.NationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdministration.A
Category1hurricanehassustainedwindsof74to95mi/h(64to82knor119to153km/h).
Atthesevelocities,minimaldamagetostationarybuildingstructureswouldbeanticipated,
butmoredamagetounanchoredmobilehomesandutilitystructureswouldbeexpected.An
idlingairplanecanproduceacompactversionofaCategory3hurricane,introducingan
enginewakeapproaching120mi/h(104knor192km/h)withtemperaturesof100F(38C).
Thiswakevelocitycanincreasetwoorthreetimesasthethrottlesareadvancedandthe
airplanebeginstotaxi.
AttheextremeendoftheintensityscaleisaCategory5hurricane,withwindsgreaterthan
155mi/h(135knor249km/h).Residentialandindustrialstructureswouldexperienceroof
failure,withlowerstrengthstructuresexperiencingcompletecollapse.Mobilehomes,utility
buildings,andutilitieswouldbeextensivelydamagedordestroyed,aswouldtrees,shrubs,
andlandscaping.Atratedthrustlevels,ajetenginewakecaneasilyexceedthesustained
windsassociatedwithaCategory5hurricane.
MaintenanceActivity
Highenginethrustduringmaintenanceactivitycancauseconsiderabledamagetoairplanes
andotherelementsintheairportenvironment.Anexampleofthisproblemoccurredafteran
airplanearrivedatitsfinaldestinationwithalogentryindicatingtheflightcrewhad
experiencedanomalousengineoperation.Subsequentevaluationresultedinreplacementof
anenginecontrolcomponent,followedbyanenginetestandtrimruntoverifyproperengine
operation.Theairplanewaspositionedonanasphaltpadadjacenttoataxiway,withthe
pavedsurfaceextendingfromthewingtipsafttotheempennage.Duringthehighpower
portionofthetestrun,a20by20ft(6.1by6.1m)pieceoftheasphaltimmediatelyaftof
theenginedetachedandwasliftedfromthepadsurface.This4in(10.2cm)thickpieceof
asphaltdriftedupandintothecoreareaoftheleftengineexhaustwake,whereitshattered

intonumeroussmallerpieces.Thepiecesweredrivenaftatsubstantialvelocity,strikingthe
aftfuselageandleftoutboardportionofthehorizontaltail.Themaintenancecrewwas
alertedtotherampdisintegrationandterminatedtheenginerun.Subsequentinspection
foundthattheoutboard4ft(1.2m)ofthelefthorizontalstabilizerwasmissing,aswasthe
entireleftelevator.Correctiveactionincludedreplacingthestabilizerandleftelevatorand
repairingholesinthefuselage.
ForeignObjectDamage
Foreignobjectdamage(FOD)causedbyhighenginethrustcanaffectairportoperationsas
itrelatesto
Airplanestructure.
Flightcontrols.
Equipmentandpersonnel.
Airplanestructure.
InanincidentrelatedtoFODcausedbyhighenginethrust,Boeingwasinformedthata737
hadlandedataEuropeanairportandtheflightcrewhaddiscoveredsignificantdamage
duringtheirwalkaroundinspection.Damagedareasincludedtherighthorizontalstabilizer
leadingedgeandlowersurfaceandelevatorlowersurface.Uponinspection,apieceof
bricklikepavingmaterialwasfoundembeddedwithinthestabilizerstructure.Shortlybefore
theFODwasidentified,theBoeingFieldServicerepresentativeattheoriginatingairportwas
notifiedofrunwaythresholddamage.Subsequentcorrelationoftheseeventsmatchedthe
brickpavingmaterialextractedfromtheairplanewithidenticalmaterialformerlylocated
alongtherunwaythreshold.Thepavingmaterialwasliftedandblownaftbytheengine
exhaustastheairplaneturnedontotherunwayfortakeoff(seephotographsbelow).Repair
includedreplacementofthestabilizer,elevator,elevatortab,andstabilizertobodyclosure
panels.
Flightcontrols.
FODcanalsoaffectflightcontrolsystemcomponentinteractionandsystemdisplacement
force,whichareintimatelyrelatedtoproperlyfunctioningprimarycontrolsurfaces.Inmost
airplanes,theelevatorispoweredbyindependenthydraulicsystemsthroughpowercontrol
units.Someairplanesofferothermodesthatallowmanualelevatoroperation.Inan
unpoweredmode,aerodynamicbalancepanels,linkages,andhingesinteracttoassistin
elevatordeflectionagainstairloads(fig.2).Theseelementsmustworktogethertoensure
thatactualelevatordisplacementisproportional(andrepeatable)withrespecttothecontrol
columndisplacement,therebyprovidingaconsistentpitchresponse.Thisinterrelationshipof
proportionalresponseissufficientlyimportantthataviationregulatoryagenciesimpose
certificationrequirementsprohibitingairplaneresponsereversalandrequiringairplanepitch
responsetobeproportionaltocontrolcolumndisplacement.
EvensubtleFODtotheexternalportionsoftheelevatorcanchangethesurfacebalance
andaltertheairflowcharacteristicsinawaywhichmayinducesurfaceflutter.Thisdynamic
anduncommandedmovementofthesurfacecangrowinbothamplitudeandfrequency,
causingadditionaldamage.Portionsofthesurfacemaybedestroyedbytheviolenceofthe
inducedmotion.Ifthismotionisgreatenough,itcanbecoupledintonearbyairplane
structureandcausecollateraldamage.Inexceptionalcases,controlsurfacefluttercould
leadtolossofairplanecontrol.
Equipmentandpersonnel.
FODalsohasthepotentialtoaffectthemanyaspectsoframpoperations.Theseoperations
subjectpeople,baggagecarts,servicevehicles,andairportinfrastructuretoinjuryand
damage.

Forexample,unsecuredbaggagecartscanbedisplacedbytheexhaustofpassing
airplanes,causingairplanedamageorinjurytopersonnel(see"ForeignObjectDebrisand
DamagePrevention"inAerono.1,Jan.1998).Engineinletsrepresentapotentialpersonnel
ingestionhazard(see"EngineIngestionHazardsUpdate"intheJan.Mar.1991Airliner
magazine).Airplanereversethrustoperationsandtheuseofreversethrusttomovean
airplanewillincreasethepowerhazardareaandrequireparticularcaretoensurethat
peopleandequipmentareadequatelyprotected(fig.3).
"TaxiOperationsByMaintenancePersonnel"(Apr.June1988Airlinermagazine)discusses
theincreasedriskofinjuryanddamagefrominadequateclearancebetweentheairplane
andsurroundingobjects.
PrecautionarySteps
Understandinganairplane'scharacteristicsandcapabilitiesiscrucialtoprotectingthe
airplane,thepersonnelworkingaroundit,andtheairportenvironmentfromthedangersof
highvelocityexhaust.Operatorsshouldtakeprecautionstopreventdamageorinjuryinthe
followinghazardousareasorduringhazardousactivities:
Powerhazardareas.
Maintenanceactivity.
Airportenvironment.
Powerhazardareas.
Theseareas(fig.4)aredescribedextensivelyintheapplicableAircraftMaintenanceManual
(AMM).Additionalreferencescanbefoundinthe"MaintenanceFacilityandEquipment
Planning"and"AirplaneCharacteristicsforAirportPlanning"documentsprovidedtoeach
operator.Thedocumentsincluderesourcesthatdescribeengineexhaustvelocityplatform
areas.Theseareasillustratethehorizontalextentoftheenginewakehazardand
representativeexhaustvelocitycontours,providinginvaluableinformationforserviceand
supportequipmentlocationplanning.Thedocumentsalsocontainauxiliarypowerunit(APU)
exhaustwakedata,engineandAPUnoisedata,andengineinlethazardareas.
Maintenanceactivity.
TheAMMforeachmodelisawelldocumentedsourceofprecautionaryinformationonsuch
topicsasenginemaintenancerunups,taxioperationsbymaintenancepersonnel,and
relatedengineactivities.Operatorsshouldrefertotheprocedures,practices,and
precautionsintheapplicableAMMwhendevelopingtheiroperatingspecifications,
operations,maintenance,andengineeringpractices.
Airportenvironment.
Operatorsshouldconsultwiththeresponsibleairportauthoritytoensurethatrampareas,
runwayaprons,andenginerunupareasarecompatiblewiththeintendedairplane
operations.Furtherinformationaboutthedesignandmaintenanceoftheairport
infrastructureisavailableintheICAOAerodromeDesignManualandAirportCharacteristics
DataBank.OthersourcesincludetheU.S.FederalAviationAdministration150Series
AdvisoryCirculars(severalofwhicharedescribedintheaccompanyingchart).
SUMMARY
Thousandsofsafetakeoffsandlandingsoccurthroughouttheworldeveryday.Each
operationtakesadvantageofthebenefitssuppliedbythehighthrustlevelsofmodernjet
engines.However,duringtaxiandmaintenanceactivity,thissamethrustcapabilityandits
relatedexhaustwakecanbecomeahazard,whichcanbeintensifiedbylackofawareness
abouthowtheexhaustwakeaffectsthesurroundingenvironment.Techniquesand
precautionsdesignedtohelpoperatorsdealwithhighthrustexhaustwakesareavailablein
Boeingpublicationsandotherdocumentsources.Operatorsshouldusethisinformationto

developthenecessaryoperationalproceduresandshouldaddresstheenginewakehazard
issueintheirsafetyawarenessandtrainingprograms.

JetBlastDamageandInjuries
Thefollowingexamplesreflectasampleofeventsfromthepast30yearsthatreportedly
involvedjetblastandillustratetherangeofpotentialdamageandinjuries.
FlyingObjectDamage
Anairplanewasstopped900ft(274m)fromaparkingareaontheflightrampforan
engineperformancerunup.Duringrunupofengineno.3,largesectionsofasphalt
overlaywerebrokenlooseandblownaft,withpiecesstrikingbothupperandlower
surfacesofthestabilizerleadingedgeverticalfinandbodyintheareaoftheauxiliary
powerunitinlet.
HorizontalStabilizerDamage
Thetowerreportedthatanairplanetookoffusingtherestrictedareaofarunway.The
enginethrusttoreupapproximately197to328ft(60to100m)ofasphalt,andseveral
largechunksstrucktheuppersurfaceoftherighthorizontalstabilizerandthelower
surfaceoftherightverticalstabilizer.
Duringrunup,thelefthorizontalstabilizeronanairplanewasdamagedwhenalarge
pieceofasphaltliftedandimpactedthelowersurfaceofthestabilizer.Approximately
20in2(129cm2)ofthelowerskinwasdestroyed,andfourstringerswerebroken.The
forwardandaftsparswerenotdamaged,norwereribs13and14.Theskinwascut
backfromthefrontspartotherearsparandapproximately7in(17.8cm)inboardof
rib13and7in(17.8cm)outboardofrib14.
Anairplaneexperienceddamagetothehorizontalstabilizerduringamaintenance
enginerun.Theairplanewaspositionedfortherunwithasphaltextendingfromclose
tothewingtrailingedgestobeyondtheempennage.Duringthehighpowerpartofthe
run,asphaltliftedfrombehindtheleftengineandbrokeintopieces,sendinglarge
fragmentsintotheaftfuselageandoutboardhorizontalstabilizer.Theoutboard4ft
(1.2m),includingtheelevator,wasshearedoff,andtheentirestabilizerrequired
replacing.Theinitialsectionofasphaltthatliftedwasasheetabout20ft2(1.9m2)and
4to5in(10.2to12.7cm)thickbeforebreakingintopieces.Therewerenoinjuries.
JetBlastDamage
Afterarrivalandwhiletaxiingintothegate,anairplaneblewanearbyhelicopterintoa
parkedairplane.
Whiletaxiingfortakeoff,anairplanereportedlymadeasharprightturnontoataxiway.
Blastfromenginesno.3andno.4blewamaintenancestandintoengineno.2of
anotherairplane.Thestandimpactedtheenginefancowl,resultingina6by1in
(15.2by2.5cm)puncture.Inaddition,theengineno.1cowlwaslayingunderthe
engineandwasblownacrosstheramp,causingdamagetothelatchingmechanism.
Afterabortingthetakeoff,aflightreturnedtothegatebecauseofoverheatedbrakes.
Thetwoinboardengineswereshutdownforthetaxi.However,themaximum
allowableN1,40percent,wasrequiredfortheairplanetomaneuverintothegate.The
enginethrustresultedinjetblastthatthrewtwoDC8containersintothewindshieldof
avehiclebeingdrivenbyanairlineemployee.
InjuriesandFatalities

Afterpushbackfromthegateatthestartoftaxi,jetblastfromanairplaneoverturned
severalloadedbaggagecarts,andonecartfellonabaggagehandler.Several
coworkersliftedthecarttofreethetrappedworker.Theindividualwashospitalized
withinjuriesthatincludedadislocationandmultiplefractures.
Maintenancepersonnelwereperforminghighpowerrunupsattheenginerunupbay
withintheoperator'stechnicalarea.Enginesno.1andno.2wereat1.3engine
pressureratio,withenginesno.3andno.4atidle.Thejetblastoverturnedand
pushedapickuptruckfor165ft(50m).Thetruckwasthrownoverasteelguardrail
andupa33ft(10m)embankment.Theoperatorofthetruckwasthrownclearbut
sustainedafracturedfemurandfacialandchestinjuries.
Accordingtopreliminaryinvestigationreports,anairplanedepartedfromthegateand
proceededalongtheinnertaxiwaytoacrossover,whereitwaitedforclearanceonto
therunway.Theairplanewasstationaryforsometimebeforecontinuingonthe
taxiway.Anairlineoperator'svehiclewasreportedlytravelingwestontheouterservice
roadbetweencrossovers.Afterstoppingtoverifythattheairplanewasstationary,the
vehicleallegedlypassedbehindtheairplane.Atthesametime,theairplanewasasked
toexpeditetotherunwayandbeganapplyingpower.Whethertheairplanebeganto
movewasnotestablished.Accordingtoeyewitnessaccounts,thetruck,occupiedby
twoairlineemployees,wasrolledoverthreetimesbythejetblast.Thedriverofthe
vehiclediedtwodayslater.Thevehiclewasapickuptruckwithalowcapoverthe
backend,whichwasevenwiththetopofthecab.Thetruckhadclearedthetailand
wasapproximately200ft(61m)behindtheairplane.Itstartedtorollwhenitwas
behindengineno.3.
StructuralDamage
Anairplanesustainedheavystructuraldamagetothe46sectionandempennage
sectionsduringahighpowerenginerun.Therightenginepropelledlargepiecesofthe
taxiwayintothesesections.
TurbulenceDamage
Duringaninstrumentlandingsystemapproach,turbulencedamagedtheroofsofthree
houses.Rooftilesfell,damagingacarandslightlyinjuringtwopeople.

ExhaustHazardAccident
ThefollowingistheabstractofAircraftAccidentReportNTSBAAR7112writtenbytheU.S.
NationalTransportationSafetyBoard.Itsummarizesafatalcommercialairplaneaccident
nearNewYorkCitythatwaslaterdeterminedtobecausedbyexhausthazard.Thereport
concludedthattheintroductionofnewlargejetaircraft"...causedconsiderableerosionalong
mosttaxiwaysandrunways.AccordingtoNewYorkPortAuthoritypersonnel,theproducts
ofthiserosion,piecesofasphalticmaterial,rocks,etc.,werebeingblownontotaxiways,
ramps,andrunways,makingitdifficulttokeeptheseareasclean."
ATransInternationalAirlinesDC863F,N4863T,FerryFlight863,crashedduringtakeoffat
JohnF.KennedyInternationalAirportat1606e.s.t.,September8,1970.
Approximately1,500ftafterstartingtakeoff,theaircraftrotatedtoanosehighattitude.After
2,800ftoftakeoffroll,theaircraftbecameairborneandcontinuedtorotateslowlytoan
attitudeofapproximately60to90abovethehorizontalatanaltitudeestimatedtohave
beenbetween300and500ftabovetheground.Theaircraftrolledabout20totheright,
rolledbacktothelefttoanapproximateverticalangleofbank,andfelltothegroundinthat
attitude.Theaircraftwasdestroyedbyimpactandpostimpactfire.Elevencrewmembers,

theonlyoccupantsoftheaircraft,diedintheaccident.
The(NationalTransportationSafety)Boarddeterminesthattheprobablecauseofthis
accidentwasalossofpitchcontrolcausedbytheentrapmentofapointed,asphaltcovered
objectbetweentheleadingedgeoftherightelevatorandtherighthorizontalsparweb
accessdoorintheaftpartofthestabilizer.Therestrictiontoelevatormovement,causedby
ahighlyunusualandunknowncondition,wasnotdetectedbythecrewintimetorejectthe
takeoffsuccessfully.However,anapparentlackofcrewresponsivenesstoahighlyunusual
emergencysituation,coupledwiththecaptain'sfailuretomonitoradequatelythetakeoff,
contributedtothefailuretorejectthetakeoff.

AirportPlanning,Design,andOperationReferences
Airplaneoperationsintheairportenvironmentaredocumentedinmultiplereferencesfrom
manysources,includingindustryorganizationsandairplanemanufacturers.These
referencescontainabroadrangeofrelevantresources.AmongthetopicsSQUAREussed
areairportdevelopmentplanning,airportmarking,groundoperations,serviceequipment,
andterminal,ramp,taxiway,andrunwaydesign.
InternationalCivilAviationOrganization(ICAO)
Annex14,Aerodromes,volumeI:Specificationsonthephysicalcharacteristicsoftheairport
movementareaincludingrunway,taxiway,andapronareasfirefightingequipmentand
safetymeasuresassociatedwithinstalledequipment.
Annex15,AeronauticalInformationServices:Noticetoairmen(NOTAM)bulletins,which
containinformationonphysicalchangestotheairport,airportservice,orhazards.
AccidentPreventionManual:Developmentandmaintenanceofaccidentprevention
programs.
AerodromeDesignManual(fiveparts):Airportrunways,taxiway,aprons,andholdingareas
designedtocontributetosafeairplaneoperations.
AirportServicesManual(nineparts):Airportservices,includingmaintenanceoftheairport
physicalconditiontoensuresafeoperations.
InternationalAirTransportAssociation(IATA)
AirportHandlingManual:Safetyprecautionsinaircrafthandlingoperationsandaircraft
pushbackproceduresandrecommendationsforrampmarking.
U.S.FederalAviationAdministration(FAA)
AdvisoryCirculars:The150seriesofFAAAdvisoryCirculars(AC)onmultipleaspectsof
airportplanning,airportdesign,construction,maintenance,airportsafetyequipment,and
operationalsafety.
AC150/530013,AirportDesign:FAArecommendationsforairportdesign.
AC150/53206D,AirportPavementDesignandEvaluation:Designandevaluationof
pavementatcivilairports.
AC150/53355,StandardizedMethodofReportingAirportPavementStrength:Useof
thestandardizedICAOmethodtoreportpavementstrength.
TheBoeingCompany
AirplaneCharacteristicsforAirportPlanning:Issuedasindividualdocumentsapplicabletoa

specificmodelormodelfamily,suchasthe757.Informationtoassistengineersinairport
design,includingairplanedimensionaldata,pavementloadinginformation,condensed
airplaneperformance,jetenginewakevelocity,andtemperatureandnoisedata.
MaintenanceFacilityandEquipmentPlanning:Issuedasindividualdocumentsapplicableto
aspecificmodelormodelfamily,suchasthe767.Informationonsuchtopicsasnoise
hazardareas,powerhazardareas,andengineexhaustwakevelocitydata.
AircraftMaintenanceManual:Applicabletoaspecificairplanemodelconfiguredtoreflect
individualoperatorfeatures.Theaircraftgeneralsectionsdetailsafepracticescovering
airplanegroundoperations,taxiing,enginepowerhazardareas,andprecautionarypractices
tobeobservedduringmaintenanceactivitiesthatrequireengineoperation.
Airlinermagazine:
"EngineIngestionHazards,"JanuaryMarch1991.
"RampRash,"AprilJune1994.
"Runways,"JulySeptember1985.
"Taxiing,"AprilJune1988.
Aeromagazine:
"AerodynamicPrinciplesofLargeAirplaneUpsets,"JulySeptember1998.
"ForeignObjectDebrisandDamagePrevention,"JanuaryMarch1998.
DouglasServicemagazine:
"AirportForeignObjectDebrisPrevention,"secondissue,1994.
Other
"DesignofConcreteAirportPavement"byRobertG.Packard,publishedbythe
PortlandConcreteAssociation.

Figure4.

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