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A Brief Introduction to Differential Games

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ISSN: 2010-1791

journal homepage: http://icoci.org/ijpms

L. Gmez Esparza, G. Mendoza Torres, L. M. Saynes Torres.

Facultad de Ciencias de la Electrnica. Benemrita Universidad Autnoma de Puebla.

1. Introduction

The theory of dynamics games is concerned with multi-person decision making. The

principal characteristic of a dynamic game is that involves a dynamic decision process evolving

in time (continuous or discrete), with more than on decision maker, each with its own cost

function and possibly having access to different information. Dynamic game theory adopts

characteristics from game theory and optimal control theory, although it is much more versatile

than each of.

Differential games belong to a subclass of dynamic games called games in the state space.

In a game in the state space, the modeler introduces a set of variables to describe the state of a

dynamic system, at any particular instant of time in which the game takes place. The systematic

study of the problems of differential games was initiated by Isaacs in 1954.

After development of the maximum principle of Pontryagin's maximum principle, it became

clear that there was a connection between differential games and optimal control theory. In fact,

the differential game problems are a generalization of the optimal control problems in cases

where more than one driver or player. However, differential games are conceptually much more

complex than optimal control problems in that it is not as what constitutes a solution. There are

different kinds optimal solutions for problems such as differential games minimax solution,

Nash equilibrium, Pareto equilibrium, depending on the characteristics of the games (see e.g.,

Tolwinski (1982) and Haurie, Tolwinski, and Leitman (1983)).

We present some results on differential games cooperative and non-cooperative differential

games, and theirs "optimal" solutions. In particular we will study those that relate Pareto

equilibrium and Nash equilibrium (non-cooperative games), although other types of cooperative

and non-cooperative games, for example, commitment games, Stackelberg games, to name a

few.

2. Preliminary in optimal control theory

As mentioned above, optimal control problems are a special class of differential games

played and a cost criterion. In this section we study some basic results on optimal control theory:

dynamic programming and the maximum principle, since these results are determining in

dynamic game theory.

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ISSN: 2010-1791

In general, the optimal control problem (continuous time) can be defined as follows

(1)

where

is called the objective function or cost criteria. This is, in own words, the problem is find the

admissible control , which Maximizes the objective function, subject to the state equation and the

control constraints

(2)

Usually the set

is determined by constraints (physical, economic, biological, etc.) on the

values of the control variables

at time . The control is called the optimal control

and , determined by means of state equation with

, is called the optimal trajectory or an

optimal path.

2.2. Dynamic Programming and the Maximum Principle.

Dynamic programming is based on Bellman's principle of optimality (Richard Bellman in

1957 stated this principle in his book on dynamic programming)

An optimal policy has the property that, whatever the initial

state and initial conditions are, the remaining decision must

constitute an optimal policy with regard to the outcome

resulting from the first decision.

Let us consider the optimal control problem (1). The principle of maximum can be derived from

Bellman's principle of optimality (see [45]). We state the principle of maximum as follows

for the optimal control

problem (1), and we assume that

and are continuously differentiable in and continuous in

and . Then, exists an adjoint variable

that satisfies

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ISSN: 2010-1791

(3)

(4)

(5)

where the so-called Hamiltonian is defined as

(6)

The maximum principle states that under certain assumptions there exists for every optimal

control path

a trajectory

such that the maximum condition, the adjoin equation, and

transversality condition (eq. 4) are satisfied. To obtain a sufficiency theorem we augment these

conditions by convexity assumptions. This yields the following theorem.

Theorem 2. Consider the optimal control problem given by the equation (1), (2), (3) and define

the Hamiltonian function like in (7), and the maximized Hamiltonian function

(7)

Assume that the state space is a convex set and that is continuously differentiable and

concave. Let

be a feasible control path with corresponding state trajectory

. If there exists

an absolutely continuous function

such that the maximum condition

(8)

the adjoint equation

(9)

(10)

is concave and continuously

differentiable with respect to for all

, then

is an optimal path. If the set of feasible

controls,

does not depend on , this result remains true if equation (10) is replaced by

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ISSN: 2010-1791

(11)

3.

The general -player (deterministic) differential game time is described by the state equation

(12)

and the cost functional for each player

(13)

for

that is the prescribed duration of

the game,

is the initial state known by all players. Let

called

trajectory space of the game. The controls

are chosen by player for all

, here

is named an admissible strategy set for player . Then the problem can be stated as follows

For each

, player

the cost functional (profits)

such as to minimize (or maximize)

subject to the state equation (13).

It is assumed that all players know the state equation as well as the cost functionals.

Example 1. In a two-firm differential game with one state variable

time according to the differential equation

in which

are scalar control variables of firm 1 and 2, respectively. The state variable

represents the number of customers that firm 1 has at time and

is the constant size of the

total market. Hence

is the number of customers of firm 2. The control variables

are the firm`s respective advertising effort rates at time . The differential equation, in this case, can

be interpreted in the following way: the number of customers of firm 1 tends to increase by the

advertising efforts of firm 1 since these efforts attract customers from firm 2. On the other hand, the

advertising efforts of firm 2 tend to draw away customers from firm 1.

Payoffs are given by

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ISSN: 2010-1791

in which

represent firm i's unit revenues. The second term in the integrand of is a convex

advertising cost function of firm . Feasibility requires that

and

are not negative. Each

firm wishes to choose its advertising strategy over

so as to maximize its payoff. The payoff is

simply the present value of a firm's profit on the horizon.

Remark. In this game, the rival firm's actions do not influence a firm's payoff directly but only

indirectly through the state dynamics.

In many problems the control function

information structure, which is denoted by

where

, and is defined as

is nondecreasing in .

of all suitable mappings as follows

belongs to

for

of player

Some types of standard information structures that arise in deterministic differential games are

stated in following definition.

we say that s information is

401

(i) open-loop if

(ii) closed-loop if

(iii)

memory less perfect state if

(iv) feedback if

, for

ISSN: 2010-1791

,

for

The following theorem provides a set of conditions under which the problem given by

equations (12) and (13), admits a unique solution for every -tuple

Theorem 3. Let the information structure for each pair be any one of the information patterns of

the definition above. Furthermore, let

then if

(i)

is continuous in

for each

,

(ii)

(iii)

for

uniformly Lipschitz in

is uniformly Lipschitz in

is continuous in for each

the differential equation (12) admits a single state trajectory for every

, and furthermore this unique trajectory is continuous.

,

and

, so that

In this section we fix the initial state

As mentioned above, the differential games can be classified in two classes: Cooperative

games and non-cooperative games. In a cooperative game the players wish to cooperate to reach a

result that will be beneficial to all.

3.2.1 Pareto Equilibrium

Definition 2. Let us consider a game with players. Let

) be the player cost function,

given the initial state

and that the players follow the multi-strategy

. Let

be the set of admissible strategies for the player

and

and

(14)

where

. An admissible strategy

is called Pareto-optimal if there is if it does not exist another

such that

(15)

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ISSN: 2010-1791

Figure 1.

We can to see in figure 1, that the pair ( , ) with the cost vector V=V( , ) is not a Pareto

equilibrium, since there exist other points in that are "below" V.

Let

be the set of Pareto equilibrium (which supposed to be not empty). The set of vectors

The following theorem provides one method to study the existence of Pareto equilibrium.

(16)

that minimizes

, i.e.

(17)

then

is a Pareto equilibrium.

3.3. Non-cooperative Games

In a non-cooperative game the players act independently and each one wishes to optimize his

own objective function, i.e. players are rivals and all players act in their own best interest, paying no

attention whatsoever to the fortunes of the other players.

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ISSN: 2010-1791

3.3.1. Two person Zero-Sum Differential Games

Consider the state equation

(18)

We may assume all variables to be scalar for the time being. In this equation, we let

denote the controls applied by players

and , respectively. We assume that

where

and

and

which player

wants to maximize and player

wants to minimize. Since the gain of player

represents a loss to player , such games are named zero-sum games (because the sum of their cost

functional is identically zero). Thus, we are looking for admissible control trajectories

and

such that

(20)

The solution

is known as a saddle point but some authors call it the minimax solution.

Here

and

stand for

and ,

, respectively.

3.3.2. Nash equilibrium

First, we consider the case

Definition 3. Let

to the strategy

as

(two players)

(21)

Similarly, the set of the optimal responses of player 2 to a strategy

as

(22)

A multi-strategy

404

Equivalently,

ISSN: 2010-1791

is a Nash equilibrium if

(23)

and

(24)

In our words, in Nash equilibrium, a player can't improve his situation if he alters his strategy

unilaterally.

Generalizing to any finite number

Definition 4. A multi-strategy

the following inequalities hold for all

in

The interpretation of a Nash equilibrium solution is as follows: If one player tries to alter his

strategy unilaterally, he can't improve his performance by such a change. In this sort of situation

each player is just interested in his own performance, that is, the game is played non-cooperatively.

Definition 5. Let we consider a dynamical game with players and let it be

objective function for the player

since the initial condition of the game is

in the time

. Let it be

, a markovian multi-strategy, that is to say, each

markovian (or feedback). It's said that is a perfect Nash Equilibrium if, for each

any initial condition

, is hold that

the

it is

and

(25)

where the infimum is calculated above all the marcovians strategies

of the player .

equilibrium for anyone that it will be the initial condition of the game. In this case, some authors

say that the Nash equilibrium is perfect in the sub games (sub game perfect). Observe that to solve

(23) or (24) substantially we would to solve an OCP for each . This suggests that, in principle, we

can use technical like the principle of the maximum or dynamic programming to find Nash

equilibrium.

We will formulate the maximum principle for the case

. We will to consider a

differential game with

players, state space

, and actions set

, for

.

The dynamical model is

(26)

for all

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ISSN: 2010-1791

, where

measurable function of

to . The players wish "to maximize" the objective functions

Let

be the

is a

is a Nash equilibrium and that

is the corresponding path, then are

hold the following necessary conditions for each

the adjoints equations are

We can note that this reduce the problem to one border problem with two border conditions

that in some instances it can be solved explicitly. For example, Clemhout and Wan (1974) consider

games three-linear, called thus because the Hamiltonian is linear in the state, in the controls, and in

the variable attaches. Also, Dockner et al. (1985) identify several types of differential games that

they are soluble, in the sense of the fact that they can be determined balances of Nash of open loop,

either explicitly.

Example of perfect Nash equilibrium

Let us consider a differential game with

players and finite horizon . To save on

notation, denote the control variables of the two players by and instead of and . The state

space is

, the initial state is a fixed number

, and the set of feasible controls is

for player 1 and

for player 2. The objective functionals are

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ISSN: 2010-1791

and

Let us first try to find open-loop Nash equilibrium of the above game, that is, a pair

where

and

are the strategies for player 1 and player 2,

respectively. If player 2 chooses to play

then player 1's problem can be written as

Maximize

Subject to

Since

(27)

to the maximization of

the problem

Maximize

Subject to

with

(28)

, where

and

(29)

407

where

ISSN: 2010-1791

still to be determined.

can be written as

Maximize

Subject to

(30)

Denoting by the costate variable of player 2, the Hamiltonian function for this problem is

given by

. Maximization with respect to

yields

if

and

if

. If

then

, independently of . These properties imply that the maximized Hamiltonian function is

given by

The adjoin equation and transversality condition for player 2's problem are

Using

(31)

The boundary value problem consisting of (28) and (31) has a unique solution which is given

by

with

from (29). The function

is easily seen to be non-positive and

strictly increasing on

It depends on the parameters

and whether

for all

or whether

) can be smaller than

for some

. Because of the monotonicity

of

, however, we know that in the latter case there exists a number

such that

for

and

for all

Careful analysis of (31) reveals that such a

number exists if and only if

and

. We summarize our results as follows. There exists

a candidate for an open-loop Nash equilibrium, given by

408

where

and

ISSN: 2010-1791

To verify that the above candidate is an open-loop Nash equilibrium it suffices therefore to

prove that

is an optimal control path in player 2's problem. This, however, follows from

theorem 2 by noting that

for all , which shows that the maximized Hamiltonian

function

) of player 2's problem is a concave function with respect to . This concludes

the derivation of an open-loop Nash equilibrium for this example.

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