You are on page 1of 23


4670 June 18, 1966

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act to promote and improve the
social and economic status of public school teachers, their living and working conditions, their terms of
employment and career prospects in order that they may compare favorably with existing opportunities in
other walks of life, attract and retain in the teaching profession more people with the proper qualifications,
it being recognized that advance in education depends on the qualifications and ability of the teaching
staff and that education is an essential factor in the economic growth of the nation as a productive
investment of vital importance.
Sec. 2. Title Definition. This Act shall be known as the "Magna Carta for Public School Teachers" and shall
apply to all public school teachers except those in the professorial staff of state colleges and universities.
As used in this Act, the term "teacher" shall mean all persons engaged in classroom teaching, in any level
of instruction, on full-time basis, including guidance counselors, school librarians, industrial arts or
vocational instructors, and all other persons performing supervisory and/or administrative functions in all
schools, colleges and universities operated by the Government or its political subdivisions; but shall not
include school nurses, school physicians, school dentists, and other school employees.
Sec. 3. Recruitment and Qualification. Recruitment policy with respect to the selection and appointment of
teachers shall be clearly defined by the Department of Education: Provided, however, That effective upon
the approval of this Act, the following shall constitute the minimum educational qualifications for teacherapplicants:
(a) For teachers in the kindergarten and elementary grades, Bachelor's degree in Elementary Education
(b) For teachers of the secondary schools, Bachelor's degree in Education or its equivalent with a major
and a minor; or a Bachelor's degree in Arts or Science with at least eighteen professional units in
(c) For teachers of secondary vocational and two years technical courses, Bachelor's degree in the field
of specialization with at least eighteen professional units in education;
(d) For teachers of courses on the collegiate level, other than vocational, master's degree with a specific
area of specialization;
Provided, further, That in the absence of applicants who possess the minimum educational qualifications
as hereinabove provided, the school superintendent may appoint, under a temporary status, applicants
who do not meet the minimum qualifications: Provided, further, That should teacher-applicants, whether
they possess the minimum educational qualifications or not, be required to take competitive examinations,
preference in making appointments shall be in the order of their respective ranks in said competitive
examinations: And provided, finally, That the results of the examinations shall be made public and every
applicant shall be furnished with his score and rank in said examinations.
Sec. 4. Probationary Period. When recruitment takes place after adequate training and professional
preparation in any school recognized by the Government, no probationary period preceding regular

appointment shall be imposed if the teacher possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided,
however, That where, due to the exigencies of the service, it is necessary to employ as teacher a person
who possesses the minimum educational qualifications herein above set forth but lacks the appropriate
civil service eligibility, such person shall be appointed on a provisional status and shall undergo a period
of probation for not less than one year from and after the date of his provisional appointment.
Sec. 5. Tenure of Office. Stability on employment and security of tenure shall be assured the teachers as
provided under existing laws.
Subject to the provisions of Section three hereof, teachers appointed on a provisional status for lack of
necessary civil service eligibility shall be extended permanent appointment for the position he is holding
after having rendered at least ten years of continuous, efficient and faithful service in such position.
Sec. 6. Consent for Transfer Transportation Expenses. Except for cause and as herein otherwise
provided, no teacher shall be transferred without his consent from one station to another.
Where the exigencies of the service require the transfer of a teacher from one station to another, such
transfer may be effected by the school superintendent who shall previously notify the teacher concerned
of the transfer and the reason or reasons therefor. If the teacher believes there is no justification for the
transfer, he may appeal his case to the Director of Public Schools or the Director of Vocational Education,
as the case may be. Pending his appeal and the decision thereon, his transfer shall be held in abeyance:
Provided, however, That no transfers whatever shall be made three months before any local or national
Necessary transfer expenses of the teacher and his family shall be paid for by the Government if his
transfer is finally approved.
Sec. 7. Code of Professional Conduct for Teachers. Within six months from the approval of this Act, the
Secretary of Education shall formulate and prepare a Code of Professional Conduct for Public School
Teachers. A copy of the Code shall be furnished each teacher: Provided, however, That where this is not
possible by reason of inadequate fiscal resources of the Department of Education, at least three copies of
the same Code shall be deposited with the office of the school principal or head teacher where they may
be accessible for use by the teachers.
Sec. 8. Safeguards in Disciplinary Procedure. Every teacher shall enjoy equitable safeguards at each
stage of any disciplinary procedure and shall have:
a. the right to be informed, in writing, of the charges;
b. the right to full access to the evidence in the case;
c. the right to defend himself and to be defended by a representative of his choice and/or by his
organization, adequate time being given to the teacher for the preparation of his defense; and
d. the right to appeal to clearly designated authorities.
No publicity shall be given to any disciplinary action being taken against a teacher during the pendency of
his case.
Sec. 9. Administrative Charges. Administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a
committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized
representative who should at least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as
chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher's

organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated by the Director of Public
Schools. The committee shall submit its findings and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools
within thirty days from the termination of the hearings: Provided, however, That where the school
superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of the committee shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Education.
Sec. 10. No Discrimination. There shall be no discrimination whatsoever in entrance to the teaching
profession, or during its exercise, or in the termination of services, based on other than professional
Sec. 11. Married Teachers. Whenever possible, the proper authorities shall take all steps to enable
married couples, both of whom are public school teachers, to be employed in the same locality.
Sec. 12. Academic Freedom. Teachers shall enjoy academic freedom in the discharge of their
professional duties, particularly with regard to teaching and classroom methods.
Sec. 13. Teaching Hours. Any teacher engaged in actual classroom instruction shall not be required to
render more than six hours of actual classroom teaching a day, which shall be so scheduled as to give
him time for the preparation and correction of exercises and other work incidental to his normal teaching
duties: Provided, however, That where the exigencies of the service so require, any teacher may be
required to render more than six hours but not exceeding eight hours of actual classroom teaching a day
upon payment of additional compensation at the same rate as his regular remuneration plus at least
twenty-five per cent of his basic pay.
Sec. 14. Additional Compensation. Notwithstanding any provision of existing law to the contrary, cocurricula and out of school activities and any other activities outside of what is defined as normal duties of
any teacher shall be paid an additional compensation of at least twenty-five per cent of his regular
remuneration after the teacher has completed at least six hours of actual classroom teaching a day.
In the case of other teachers or school officials not engaged in actual classroom instruction, any work
performed in excess of eight hours a day shall be paid an additional compensation of at least twenty-five
per cent of their regular remuneration.
The agencies utilizing the services of teachers shall pay the additional compensation required under this
section. Education authorities shall refuse to allow the rendition of services of teachers for other
government agencies without the assurance that the teachers shall be paid the remuneration provided for
under this section.
Sec. 15. Criteria for Salaries. Teacher's salaries shall correspond to the following criteria:
(a) they shall compare favorably with those paid in other occupations requiring equivalent or similar
qualifications, training and abilities;
(b) they shall be such as to insure teachers a reasonable standard of life for themselves and their
families; and
(c) they shall be properly graded so as to recognize the fact that certain positions require higher
qualifications and greater responsibility than others: Provided, however, That the general salary scale
shall be such that the relation between the lowest and highest salaries paid in the profession will be of
reasonable order. Narrowing of the salary scale shall be achieved by raising the lower end of the salary
scales relative to the upper end.

Sec. 16. Salary Scale. Salary scales of teachers shall provide for a gradual progression from a minimum
to a maximum salary by means of regular increments, granted automatically after three years: Provided,
That the efficiency rating of the teacher concerned is at least satisfactory. The progression from the
minimum to the maximum of the salary scale shall not extend over a period of ten years.
Sec. 17. Equality in Salary Scales. The salary scales of teachers whose salaries are appropriated by a
city, municipal, municipal district, or provincial government, shall not be less than those provided for
teachers of the National Government.
Sec. 18. Cost of Living Allowance. Teacher's salaries shall, at the very least, keep pace with the rise in the
cost of living by the payment of a cost-of-living allowance which shall automatically follow changes in a
cost-of-living index. The Secretary of Education shall, in consultation with the proper government entities,
recommend to Congress, at least annually, the appropriation of the necessary funds for the cost-of-living
allowances of teachers employed by the National Government. The determination of the cost-of-living
allowances by the Secretary of Education shall, upon approval of the President of the Philippines, be
binding on the city, municipal or provincial government, for the purposes of calculating the cost-of-living
allowances of teachers under its employ.
Sec. 19. Special Hardship Allowances. In areas in which teachers are exposed to hardship such as
difficulty in commuting to the place of work or other hazards peculiar to the place of employment, as
determined by the Secretary of Education, they shall be compensated special hardship allowances
equivalent to at least twenty-five per cent of their monthly salary.
Sec. 20. Salaries to be Paid in Legal Tender. Salaries of teachers shall be paid in legal tender of the
Philippines or its equivalent in checks or treasury warrants. Provided, however, That such checks or
treasury warrants shall be cashable in any national, provincial, city or municipal treasurer's office or any
banking institutions operating under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
Sec. 21. Deductions Prohibited. No person shall make any deduction whatsoever from the salaries of
teachers except under specific authority of law authorizing such deductions: Provided, however, That
upon written authority executed by the teacher concerned, (1) lawful dues and fees owing to the
Philippine Public School Teachers Association, and (2) premiums properly due on insurance policies, shall
be considered deductible.
Sec. 22. Medical Examination and Treatment. Compulsory medical examination shall be provided free of
charge for all teachers before they take up teaching, and shall be repeated not less than once a year
during the teacher's professional life. Where medical examination show that medical treatment and/or
hospitalization is necessary, same shall be provided free by the government entity paying the salary of the
In regions where there is scarcity of medical facilities, teachers may obtain elsewhere the necessary
medical care with the right to be reimbursed for their traveling expenses by the government entity
concerned in the first paragraph of this Section.
Sec. 23. Compensation For Injuries. Teachers shall be protected against the consequences of
employment injuries in accordance with existing laws. The effects of the physical and nervous strain on
the teacher's health shall be recognized as a compensable occupational disease in accordance with
existing laws.

Sec. 24. Study Leave. In addition to the leave privileges now enjoyed by teachers in the public schools,
they shall be entitled to study leave not exceeding one school year after seven years of service. Such
leave shall be granted in accordance with a schedule set by the Department of Education. During the
period of such leave, the teachers shall be entitled to at least sixty per cent of their monthly salary:
Provided, however, That no teacher shall be allowed to accumulate more than one year study leave,
unless he needs an additional semester to finish his thesis for a graduate study in education or allied
courses: Provided, further, That no compensation shall be due the teacher after the first year of such
leave. In all cases, the study leave period shall be counted for seniority and pension purposes.
The compensation allowed for one year study leave as herein provided shall be subject to the condition
that the teacher takes the regular study load and passes at least seventy-five per cent of his courses.
Study leave of more than one year may be permitted by the Secretary of Education but without
Sec. 25. Indefinite Leave. An indefinite sick leave of absence shall be granted to teachers when the
nature of the illness demands a long treatment that will exceed one year at the least.
Sec. 26. Salary Increase upon Retirement. Public school teachers having fulfilled the age and service
requirements of the applicable retirement laws shall be given one range salary raise upon retirement,
which shall be the basis of the computation of the lump sum of the retirement pay and the monthly
benefits thereafter.
Sec. 27. Freedom to Organize. Public school teachers shall have the right to freely and without previous
authorization both to establish and to join organizations of their choosing, whether local or national to
further and defend their interests.
Sec. 28. Discrimination Against Teachers Prohibited. The rights established in the immediately preceding
Section shall be exercised without any interference or coercion. It shall be unlawful for any person to
commit any acts of discrimination against teachers which are calculated to (a) make the employment of a
teacher subject to the condition that he shall not join an organization, or shall relinquish membership in an
(b) to cause the dismissal of or otherwise prejudice a teacher by reason of his membership in an
organization or because of participation in organization activities outside school hours, or with the consent
of the proper school authorities, within school hours, and (c) to prevent him from carrying out the duties
laid upon him by his position in the organization, or to penalize him for an action undertaken in that
Sec. 29. National Teacher's Organizations. National teachers' organizations shall be consulted in the
formulation of national educational policies and professional standards, and in the formulation of national
policies governing the social security of the teachers.
Sec. 30. Rules and Regulations. The Secretary of Education shall formulate and prepare the necessary
rules and regulations to implement the provisions of this Act. Rules and regulations issued pursuant to
this Section shall take effect thirty days after publication in a newspaper of general circulation and by such
other means as the Secretary of Education deems reasonably sufficient to give interested parties general
notice of such issuance.

Sec. 31. Budgetary Estimates. The Secretary of Education shall submit to Congress annually the
necessary budgetary estimates to implement the provisions of the Act concerning the benefits herein
granted to public school teachers under the employ of the National Government.
Sec. 32. Penal Provision. A person who shall willfully interfere with, restrain or coerce any teacher in the
exercise of his rights guaranteed by this Act or who shall in any other manner commit any act to defeat
any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred
pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
If the offender is a public official, the court shall order his dismissal from the Government service.
Sec. 33. Repealing Clause. All Acts or parts of Acts, executive orders and their implementing rules
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly.
Sec. 34. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Act is declared invalid, the remainder of this Act or
any provisions not affected thereby shall remain in force and in effect.
Sec. 35. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved: June 18, 1966

CAMARAO, Fedeserio C.

Complaint; Nepotism



Julian O. Marquez, Jr., Professor, Technological University of the Philippines

(TUP), Manila, files a complaint against Fedeserio C. Camarao, President, that
University, for Nepotism.

In his sworn affidavit-complaint, Professor Marquez decries as nepotic the

designation made by President Camarao of his wife, Dr. Gloria C. Camarao, Professor
VI, College of Science, as Assistant to the Vice President for Academic Affairs (AVPAA)
on Research, Extension and Graduate Education, same University. He further notes
that the designation order issued by President Camarao, stating that Dr. Camarao will
remain as a core faculty of the College of Science is a ploy to circumvent the law,
hence, considered `nepotism in disguise.

The TUP Order No. 45, s. 2001 which is adverted to above reads in full, as

To help strengthen research and extension at the level of the colleges in the main
campus and the graduate program of the University, Dr. Gloria C. Camarao, Professor
of the College of Science, is hereby designated as Assistant to the Vice President for
Academic Affairs (VPAA) on Research, Extension and Graduate Education.

As Assistant to the VPAA, Dr. Camarao shall perform the following


Assists the VPAA in matters pertinent to the planning,

implementation and advancement of research and
extension in the Manila campus, and the graduate
education of the University;


Assists the Coordinators of research and extension in

the colleges and the Coordinators of graduate
education in the development of programs/projects
that are aligned to the identified University directions
in research, extension and graduate education;


Assists in strengthening of the capabilities of the

colleges and external campuses, the faculty as
researchers, thesis advisers, and extension
specialists; and



Perform other related tasks as directed by the higher


Dr. Camarao will remain as a core faculty of the College of Science.

Apparently, in compliance with civil service law and rules, President Camarao
apprised this Commission, in a letter dated July 19, 2001, of the fact of his having
designated his wife, the surrounding circumstances thereof, and the justifications for the
same. The letter states:

This is a report in compliance with Section 49(b) of Article X of PD

807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Law, which exempts teachers,
among others, from the rule on nepotism.
I had appointed my wife, DR. GLORIA C. CAMARAO, as
Professor 6 in the College of Science of this University (Annex A). She
had been appointed to a teaching position. No other appointment, let
alone an administrative appointment as defined and/or contemplated by
law, had been extended to her.
Being a university teacher -- an academic rather than and
administrative personnel -- she has to perform the conventional and
commonly accepted triologic functions of instruction, research and
extension. Thus, in line with the performance of these three academic
functions, it was just proper, natural, and logical that she had likewise
been recommended by no less than the Vice President for Academic
Affairs (VPAA) to do certain specific academic tasks as enumerated in the
letter-request of VPAA Josefino Gascon dated July 2, 2001 (Annex B) and
which tasks are essentially reflected in the TUP ORDER No. 45, s. 2001
(Annex C), issued by me, which designated her as assistant (technical
rather than administrative assistant) to the VPAA on research, extension,
and graduate education without additional compensation -- tasks which
are not simply supportive of but rather essentially constitutive of her
academic and/or teaching job.
Section 59 of the Administrative Code of 1987 expressly provides:

Sec. 59. Nepotism -- (1) All appointments in the national,

provincial, city and municipal governments or in any branch or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, made in favor or a relative of the appointing or
recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the
persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby
As used in this Section, the word `relative and members of the
family referred to are those related within the third degree either of
consanguinity or of affinity.
(2) The following are exempted from the operation of the rules on
nepotism: (a) persons employed in a confidential capacity; (b) teachers;
(c) physicians; and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
Provided, however, That in each particular instance full report of such
appointment shall be made to the Commission.
x x x
As a general rule, nepotism is proscribed in the civil service. Public policy
appears to be the paramount consideration behind the prohibition. In the light of the
adverse and oftentimes demoralizing effects of the practice of patronage in the
workings of the civil service, especially on employees morale, merit and fitness rather
than family bonds or ties, should be, as much as practicable, the singular determinant in
effecting appointments and other personnel actions.

Essentially, as spelled out under the above-quoted provision, there arises

nepotism when an appointment is issued to a relative of either the appointing or
recommending authority, the head of the office or the immediate supervisor of the
The relationship subsisting between the appointee and the official
concerned, either by blood kinship or by fact of marriage, should, however, fall within
the proscribed third civil degree for there to be nepotism, otherwise the same cannot
properly be imputed.

Lest it be misconstrued, the rule against nepotism operates not only with regard
to appointments but its coverage extends just as well to other personnel actions such as
promotion and designation. So held by the Supreme Court in one case:

Petitioner, however, contends that since what he extended to his

brother is not an appointment, but a DESIGNATION, he is not covered by
the prohibition.
Public respondent disagrees, for:
`By legal
contemplation, the prohibitive mantle on nepotism would include
designation, because what cannot be done directly cannot be done
indirectly. We cannot accept petitioners view. His specious and tenuous
designation between appointment and designation is nothing more than
either a ploy ingeniously conceived to circumvent the rigid rule on
nepotism or a last-ditch maneuver to cushion the impact of its violation.
The rule admits of no distinction between appointment and designation.
Designation is also defined as `an appointment or assignment to a
particular office; and `to designate means `to indicate, select, appoint, or
set apart for a purpose or duty. (Laurel vs. Civil Service Commission,
203 SCRA 195) (Underscoring supplied)
Nonetheless, the prohibition is not one sheathed in ironclad armor. It does not
purport to be absolute. On the contrary, as can readily be discerned from the language
of the law, certain exceptions therefrom are recognized. Confidential employees,
teachers, physicians and members of the military are expressly outside the purview of
the stricture. Thus, even if the appointee is related within the prohibited degree, say, to
the appointing authority, but it happens that his appointment pertains to a position of
confidential nature, no case for nepotism may be found to lie.

In the case at bar, there is no question that the appointment of Dr. Camarao as
Professor VI, even though issued by her husband, does not amount to nepotism. In
fact, Professor Marquez does not assail the propriety of the said appointment. Perhaps,
this is because of the implicit recognition or acknowledgement, and rightly so, of the fact
that as Professor VI, she can be considered as a teacher within the contemplation of the
exemption. What is actually being challenged on the ground of nepotism was the
subsequent designation of Dr. Camarao as Assistant to the Vice-President for Academic

So then, did her designation as AVPAA remove Dr. Camarao from the ambit of
the exemption? In other words, did her status as a teacher change following her
designation so as to place her already within the reach of the prohibition?

The ultimate resolution of the case evidently rests on the determination of what
the term teacher means, under the contemplation of the provision on nepotism.

On this score, it is necessary to bear in mind a fundamental rule in statutory

construction that statutes which are in pari materia or relating to the same subject
matter should be reasonably construed together in order to come up with a complete
and coherent legal system. Every statute should be so construed and harmonized with
other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. x x x For the assumption
is that whenever the legislature enacts a law it has in mind the previous statutes relating
to the same subject matter, and in the absence of any express repeal or amendment
the new statute is deemed enacted in accord with the legislative policy embodied in
those prior statutes. Provisions in an act which are omitted in another act relative to the
same subject matter will be applied in a proceeding under the other act, when not
inconsistent with its purpose. (Agpalo, Statutory Construction [3rd Edition], pp. 209210; citing the cases, inter alia, of Valera vs. Tuason [80 Phil. 823]; and Corona vs.
Court of Appeals [214 SCRA 378]).

Conformably with the above canon of statutory construction, and since the
exempting clause on nepotism envisages or speaks of teacher, then recourse maybe
had to other existing laws, which similarly treat of teachers, in order to shed light on the
real import or meaning of the word.

On such law is the Republic Act No. 4670 or the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers. Under Section 2 thereof, it defines teacher, to wit:

x x x (T)he term `teacher shall mean all persons engaged in

classroom teaching, in any level of instruction, on full-time basis, including
guidance counselors, school librarians, industrial arts or vocational
instructors, and all other persons performing supervisory and/or
administrative functions in all schools, colleges and universities operated
by the Government or its political subdivisions; but shall not include school
nurses, school physicians, school dentists, and other school employees.
(Underscoring supplied)
A cursory perusal of the provision above-quoted evinces that a teacher,
contrary to laymans perception, does not solely and exclusively pertain to one engaged
in classroom instructions. A school personnel in a state university or college clothed or

vested with functions relating to supervision and administration is likewise deemed to be

a teacher.

Using the above as yardstick, it becomes ineluctable that Dr. Camaraos

designation as AVPAA did not render her less of a teacher. Her added duties and
responsibilities, entailed by her designation, of assisting the Vice President for
Academic Affairs and other school officials in such areas as planning, implementation
and advancement of research and extension; development of programs/projects aligned
to the identified goals of the University; and strengthening of capabilities of the colleges
and satellite campuses -- all these partake of the nature of administrative work, which
forms an integral part of the multifarious roles of teachers, going by the language of the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.

Moreover, Dr. Camaraos designation states that she will remain a core faculty of
the College of Science. Rather than view this as an ingenious scheme to circumvent
the rule on nepotism, as what Professor Marquez seeks to impress, this is just a natural
consequence considering that designation merely implies the temporary imposition of
additional duties and responsibilities (Section 6[e], Rule III, Revised Omnibus Rules
on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions, as amended). Dr. Camarao did not
lose her professorial position just because of her designation.

All told, the Commission finds no prima facie evidence to sustain the imputation
of nepotism in the designation of Dr. Gloria Camarao by Dr. Fedeserio C. Camarao.

WHEREFORE, the present complaint is hereby DISMISSED.

Quezon City,

October 16, 2001





Attested by:

Director III



Republic Act No. 7877

Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall value the dignity of every individual,
enhance the development of its human resources, guarantee full respect for human
rights, and uphold the dignity of workers, employees, applicants for employment,
students or those undergoing training, instruction or education. Towards this end, all
forms of sexual harassment in the employment, education or training environment are
hereby declared unlawful.
Section 3. Work, Education or Training-Related, Sexual Harassment Defined. - Work,
education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer,
employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor,
coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral
ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands,
requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether
the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, reemployment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual
favorable compensation, terms of conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to
grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which
in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect said employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the employee's rights or privileges under existing labor
laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for
the employee.
(b) In an education or training environment, sexual harassment is committed:
(1) Against one who is under the care, custody or supervision of the offender;
(2) Against one whose education, training, apprenticeship or tutorship is entrusted to the

(3) When the sexual favor is made a condition to the giving of a passing grade, or the
granting of honors and scholarships, or the payment of a stipend, allowance or other
benefits, privileges, or consideration; or
(4) When the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment
for the student, trainee or apprentice.
Any person who directs or induces another to commit any act of sexual harassment as
herein defined, or who cooperates in the commission thereof by another without which
it would not have been committed, shall also be held liable under this Act.
Section 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-related, Education or
Training Environment. - It shall be the duty of the employer or the head of the workrelated, educational or training environment or institution, to prevent or deter the
commission of acts of sexual harassment and to provide the procedures for the
resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual harassment. Towards this end,
the employer or head of office shall:
(a) Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in consultation with and joint1y
approved by the employees or students or trainees, through their duly designated
representatives, prescribing the procedure for the investigation of sexual harassment
cases and the administrative sanctions therefor.
Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to prosecution in the proper courts for
unlawful acts of sexual harassment.
The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to this subsection (a) shall include,
among others, guidelines on proper decorum in the workplace and educational or
training institutions.
(b) Create a committee on decorum and investigation of cases on sexual harassment.
The committee shall conduct meetings, as the case may be, with officers and
employees, teachers, instructors, professors, coaches, trainors, and students or
trainees to increase understanding and prevent incidents of sexual harassment. It shall
also conduct the investigation of alleged cases constituting sexual harassment.
In the case of a work-related environment, the committee shall be composed of at least
one (1) representative each from the management, the union, if any, the employees
from the supervisory rank, and from the rank and file employees.
In the case of the educational or training institution, the committee shall be composed of
at least one (1) representative from the administration, the trainors, instructors,
professors or coaches and students or trainees, as the case may be.
The employer or head of office, educational or training institution shall disseminate or
post a copy of this Act for the information of all concerned.

Section 5. Liability of the Employer, Head of Office, Educational or Training Institution. The employer or head of office, educational or training institution shall be solidarily liable
for damages arising from the acts of sexual harassment committed in the employment,
education or training environment if the employer or head of office, educational or
training institution is informed of such acts by the offended party and no immediate
action is taken.
Section 6. Independent Action for Damages. - Nothing in this Act shall preclude the
victim of work, education or training-related sexual harassment from instituting a
separate and independent action for damages and other affirmative relief.
Section 7. Penalties. - Any person who violates the provisions of this Act shall, upon
conviction, be penalized by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month nor more than
six (6) months, or a fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000) nor more than
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000), or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion
of the court.
Any action arising from the violation of the provisions of this Act shall prescribe in three
(3) years.
Section 8. Separability Clause. - If any portion or provision of this Act is declared void
or unconstitutional, the remaining portions or provisions hereof shall not be affected by
such declaration.
Section 9. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, other
issuances, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 10. Effectivity Clause.- This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
complete publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

Back to top

Art. 148 Revised Penal Code. Direct Assault

I. There are two kinds the first being: Without a public uprising by employing force or intimidation to attain
any of the purposes of rebellion or sedition. This is very rare. It is the second form which is commonly

II. Second kind is committed when, without a public uprising, the offender: (i) Attacks (ii) Employs force
(iii) Seriously intimidates or seriously resists (iv) Any person in authority or his agent (v) while engaged in
the performance of official duties or on the occasion thereof (vi) knowing him to be such.

III. Requirements:

A. There must be an attack or employment of force or serious intimidation, upon the person of the
victim. This includes any offensive or antagonistic movement of any kind, with or without a weapon.
This may be an actual physical contact or the instilling of fear or threat of an evil on the person of the
victim, but not on his property.
1. Examples: boxing, pointing a gun, brandishing a weapon, shouting and berating, challenging to a
fight, throwing an article at him
2). The degree of force required depends on whether the victim is a PIA or APIA. In case of a PIA
actual forced is not necessary because mere laying of hands is sufficient, such as by pushing or
shoving him or pulling at his collar. If he were an APIA, actual force is required because mere
laying of hands would constitute simple resistance
3). As to intimidation and resistance the same must be serious and actual whether the victim is a
PIA or APIA otherwise the offense is resistance and disobedience under article 151.

B. The offended party must be a PIA or a APIA and has not yet been separated from the service. Thus
the crime is committed even if at the time of commission the PIA/APIA is on leave, on vacation, or
under suspension, but no when he has retired or was dismissed or removed.

1. The following are PIAs:

a). Any person directly vested with jurisdiction i.e he has the power to govern, execute the
laws and administer justice
b). Teachers, professors and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly
recognized private schools, colleges and universities. They must be within the school
premises during school hours or are actually performing the tasks outside the school
c). Lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such

Note that teachers and lawyers are PIAs only for purposes of Direct Assault and Resistance
and Disobedience but not for purposes of Indirect Assault

d). Under the Local Government Code: (a) the Punong Barangay, (b) Sanguniang Barangay
members and (c) members of the Lupong Tagapamayapa

2. The following are APIAS:

a. Those who, by direct provision of law, or by election or by appointment, are charged with
the maintenance of public order and the protection of life and property ( AGENTS PROPER)
such as :
(i). Law Enforcement Agents such as the PNP and the NBI irrespective of their rank
(ii). Barangay Tanods
(iii).Municipal treasurer being the agent of the provincial treasurer
(iv). The postmaster being the agent of the Director of Posts
(v). But Members of the AFP are not included

b. Any person who comes to the aid of PIAs who is under direct assault. ( AGENTS BY
Note that if a teacher or lawyer is the person who comes to the assistance of the PIA,
then he is considered as an APIA.

3. Thus private persons may be victims but to a limited extent: (i). when they are considered by law
as PIAs or APIAs such as teachers and lawyers (ii). and those who come to the aid of PIAs

C. The accused must know the victim is a PIA/APIA which fact must be alleged in the Information
1. There must be a clear intent on the part of the accused to defy the authorities, to offend, injure or
assault the victim as a PIA/APIA

IV. Time of the Assault:

1. If the assault is during the occasion of the performance of official duties the motive of the accused
is immaterial. As long as the victim was assaulted in his office or in the premises where he holds
office, or even while on his way to office, it is not required that he was actually doing an act
related to his duties

If not on the occasion then the motive is important as the assault must be because of the past
performance of official duties by the victim. The length of time between the performance of the
duty and the time of the assault is immaterial. If the motive cannot be established, there is no
direct assault but some lesser offense.

V. Rule When Material Injury Results: The crime of Direct Assault aims to punish lawlessness and
defiance of authority and not the material injury which results from such defiance. When material injury
however results, the following are the rules:

1. Where death, serious or less serious physical injuries result, they are to be complexed with direct
assault. Example: A policeman was shot death while directing traffic: the crime is Homicide with Direct
2. If only slight physical injuries are committed, the slight physical injury is a qualifying circumstance
separate offense if the victim is a PIA but it will be absorbed if the victim is an APIA ( PP. vs. Acierto,
57 Phil. 614)

VI. When the Attack does not Constitute Direct Assault:

1. If both accused and victim are PIAs/APIAs and they contend or there is conflict arising from the
exercise of their respective functions or jurisdictions. Examples:
(a). A fight between the Incumbent Mayor and the Acting Mayor as to who shall occupy the office
(b). NBI vs. Police concerning who shall take custody of a suspect

2. Where the PIA/APIA act with abuse of their official functions, or when they exceed their powers
they are deemed to be acting in a private capacity. They become aggressors and the accused has a
right to defend himself

3. Where they voluntarily descend to matters which are purely personal. But not when the PIA/APIA is
dragged down to purely personal matters by the accused.

VII. Qualified Direct Assault:

1. When the accused lays hand upon the victim who is a PIA
2. When the accused is himself a Public Officer or employee
3. When the assault is with a weapon

epublic of the Philippines

November 29, 1967
G.R. No. L-20216
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
TIBURCIO BALBAR, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Pedro M. Belmi for defendant-appellee.
Makalintal, J.:
On August 20, 1960 defendant-appellee Tiburcio Balbar allegedly entered the room where
schoolteacher Ester Gonzales, complainant herein, was conducting her classes. Without warning
and right after complainant had finished writing on the blackboard, defendant allegedly placed
his arms around her and kissed her on the eye. Shocked, complainant instinctively pushed Balbar
away and tried to flee. Defendant allegedly brought out his daga (a local dagger) and pursued
complainant, catching up with her before she was able to get out of the room. Defendant
embraced her again, at the same time holding on to his daga. They both fell to the floor, as a
result of which complainant sustained slight physical injuries.
Two informations, one for Direct Assault Upon A Person in Authority and another for Acts of
Lasciviousness (Criminal Cases Nos. 823 and 841 respectively) were filed by the Assistant
Provincial Fiscal against defendant before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, the latter
charge upon written complaint filed by the offended party duly sworn to before the Clerk of
The information for Direct Assault Upon A Person in Authority is hereunder quoted:

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Tiburcio Balbar of the crime of Assault
upon a Person in Authority, committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in Barrio Camba, Municipality of Lian, Province
of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault Miss Ester Gonzales, a
public school teacher in the school building of Lian, duly qualified and appointed as such and
while in the performance of her official duties or on the occasion therefor, by then and there
pulling his dagger, braced and kissed, and repeatedly trying to embrace and kiss the said teacher,
Miss Ester Gonzales. That the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of
having committed it inside the public school building and during school classes.
The information for Acts of Lasciviousness reads:
At the instance of the offended party in the above-entitled case the undersigned Assistant
Provincial Fiscal accuses TIBURCIO BALBAR of the crime of acts of lasciviousness committed
as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in the Barrio of Cumba, Municipality of Lian,
Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused with the deliberate intent to satisfy his lust, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of lasciviousness on the person of Miss Ester
Gonzales, a public school teacher, by then and there placing himself close to her, embracing and
kissing her against her will and by means of force, and as a consequence thereof said offended
party fell to the floor resulting to her injury which caused her pain and tenderness on the right
side of the trunk on the posterior surface of the right arm which injuries may require 3 to 4 days
to heal; that the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstance that the same was
perpetrated inside the public school building and during class hour.
The accused filed separate motions to quash, contending that (a) with respect to Criminal Case
No. 823 for Direct Assault, the information does not charge a sufficient cause of action and that it
charges two offenses in a single complaint; and (b) with respect to Criminal Case No. 841 for
Acts of Lasciviousness, . . . that the accused would be placed in double jeopardy and that the
complaint charges two offenses. On August 16, 1962, over the opposition of the Assistant
Provincial Fiscal, the court a quo issued an order quashing the two informations. Said the court:
After reading the informations in both criminal cases, the Court agrees with counsel that the acts
committed by the accused as alleged in the two informations constitute one offense.
As regards the motion to quash filed in Criminal Case No. 841, the grounds alleged in support
thereof are: (1) that the accused would be placed in double jeopardy; and (2) that the criminal
complaint charges two offenses. Without discussing the merits of these grounds above-quoted,

the Court believes that the information filed in Criminal Case No. 841 should be dismissed or
quashed for the reason that the offense charged therein is already absorbed in the offense charged
in Criminal Case No. 823.
Thus, the dispositive portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, it is the opinion of this Court that the information in Criminal Case No. 823
which charges only unjust vexation or physical injuries should be quashed for the reason that the
same is within the original jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace. And, as to the information in
criminal Case No. 841, the same should likewise be quashed on the ground that the acts
complained of is already included in Criminal No. 823.
From this order, the Government interposed the present appeal.
Stated differently in the rationale of its order, the court a quo quashed Criminal Case No. 823 on
the following ground: That while the offense is designated as direct assault, nevertheless the
main allegations of the information may at most constitute unjust vexation for the reason that an
important element of the crime of direct assault is conspicuously absent in the information. This
essential element is the knowledge of the accused that the victim is a person in authority. . . .This
being the case and since . . . sufficient allegations are contained in the information in question to
hold the accused responsible for an offense, the Court believes that the information is sufficient
in substance to at least constitute unjust vexation or physical injuries.
Direct assault is committed by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, . . . shall
attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents,
while engaged in the performance of official duties or on occasion of such performance. (See
Art. 148, Revised Penal Code.)
By express provision of law (Com. Act No. 578, now part of Article 152 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1978), teachers, professors, and persons charged with
the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities shall be
deemed persons in authority, in applying the provisions of Article 148. This special
classification is obviously intended to give teachers protection, dignity, and respect while in the
performance of their official duties. The lower court, however, dismissed the information on the
ground that there is no express allegation in the information that the accused had knowledge that
the person attacked was a person in authority. This is clearly erroneous.
Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the accused knew that fact,
since she was in her classroom and engaged in the performance of her duties. He therefore knew
that she was a person in authority, as she was so by specific provision of law. It matters not that
such knowledge on his part is not expressly alleged, complainants status as a person in authority
being a matter of law and not of fact, ignorance whereof could not excuse non-compliance on his
part (Article 3, Civil Code). This article applies to all kinds of domestic laws, whether civil or
penal (De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15) and whether substantive or remedial (Zulueta vs.
Zulueta, 1 Phil. 254) for reasons of expediency, policy and necessity.

With respect to the dismissal of the information for Acts of Lasciviousness, we agree with the
conclusion reached by the court a quo. Although it is true that the same acts may constitute more
than one offense, we are of the opinion, upon an examination of the events which gave rise to the
filing of the two aforementioned informations, that the offense of Acts of Lasciviousness does
not appear to have been committed at all.
It would be somewhat difficult to lay down any rule specifically establishing just what conduct
makes one amendable to the provisions of article 439 (now article 336) of the Penal Code. What
constitutes lewd or lascivious conduct must be determined from the circumstances of each case.
It may be quite easy to determine in a particular case that certain acts are lewd and lascivious,
and it may be extremely difficult in another case to say where the line of demarcation lies
between such conduct and the amorous advances of an ardent lover. (U. S. v. Gomez, 30 Phil. 22,
The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and
the environmental circumstances. In the instant case, considering the manner, place and time
under which the acts complained of were done, even as alleged in the information itself, lewd
designs can hardly be attributed to accused. The factual setting, i.e., a schoolroom in the presence
of complainants students and within hearing distance of her co-teachers, rules out a conclusion
that the accused was actuated by a lustful design or purpose or that his conduct was lewd or
lascivious. It may be that he did embrace the girl and kiss her but, this of itself would not
necessarily bring the case within the provision of Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the order of the court a quo quashing the information for Direct Assault is
hereby set aside and this case is remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits; and with
respect to the dismissal of the information for Acts of Lasciviousness, the same is hereby
affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.
Dizon, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., and Reyes, J.B.L., J., took no part.