During Gen. Sharifs visit to Washington late last year.

The
army chief made a positive impression:
Sen. John McCain, the chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, said he sees (Raheel)
Sharif as a very superior individual.
By:Zaid Hamid

President Barack Obama shakes hands with Afghanistan's President Ashraf Ghani following their news conference in the East Room
of the White House in Washington, Tuesday, March 24, 2015. Ghani represents Obama's last, best hope to make good on his
promise to end America's longest war by the time he leaves office, keeping just a thousand or so troops at the embassy to
coordinate security. (AP Photo/Susan Walsh) | ASSOCIATED PRESS

WASHINGTON -- After their first official meeting earlier this month, Afghan
President Ashraf Ghani and President Barack Obama faced cameras together in
the East Room of the White House. One man's country had once given Osama
bin Laden safe haven to plan 9/11; the other's destroyed that refuge and
propped up an entirely new government in Afghanistan, losing over 2,000
soldiers and spending over $1 trillion in the process. Standing side by side,
Ghani and Obama sought to show that the U.S. investment in a secure
Afghanistan would ultimately prove successful.

Optimism about U.S.-Afghan relations was high, with U.S. officials and analysts

describing Ghani as just the ally the U.S. needed to stabilize Afghanistan and
finally end the Taliban insurgency.

But the outcome of the U.S. effort will not depend only on leaders in Kabul
and Washington. Afghanistans future also relies on a third player, a volatile
actor that has interchangeably assisted and undermined Washingtons
efforts in the region: Pakistan's army.
The U.S. and Afghanistan have known for years that peace will not be
possible unless the Pakistani military wants to make it happen. The
army command is almost solely responsible for the countrys national security,
even though there is an elected civilian government in Islamabad. The military
also holds the key to Afghan stability, since it would be the key interlocutor in
any peace agreement between Ghanis government and the Afghan Taliban,
with whom the Pakistani army has maintained close ties.
The trouble is that no one is sure what the military will do.
The Huffington Post interviewed a number of Pakistani politicians, retired
military officials and analysts who suggested that the increasing focus on
regional stability has allowed the military to exercise more dominance than it
has at any point since 2008, when the last period of direct army rule ended. The
armys recent moves, these experts argue, show that it is keen to reassert its
power, despite its insistence that it supports the civilian leadership.
For the U.S. and Afghanistan to rely more heavily on Pakistans army would
affirm this creeping control. Moreover, the military is among the U.S.s most
controversial counterterror partners: For years, it has maintained that it is
helping the U.S. fight extremists in Afghanistan, even while its ties to some of
those very extremists are publicly known.
Despite all this, both Kabul and Washington are now warming to the idea that
Pakistans military can fix the region's troubles, rather than exacerbate them.
One of Ghani's first visits abroad after taking office was to Pakistan -- and
his first stop therewas the military headquarters in Rawalpindi. In the wake
of continued skepticism,Ghani has expanded intelligence cooperation, entrusted
the Pakistan army with training Afghan cadets and, allegedly, frozen an arms
deal with Pakistan's chief regional rival, India.

At the joint press conference, Obama noted the improved coordination between
the three countries and commended Ghanis "bold leadership in reaching out to
Pakistan, which is critical to the pursuit of peace."
As the U.S. prepares to end its longest-ever overseas war, the Obama
administration faces a question that could pit Americas historic values against
its security interests: Is it willing to trust Pakistans army -- and to compromise
democratic civilian rule in Islamabad -- in exchange for a secure Afghanistan?

akistani armed forces march during the Pakistan Day parade in Islamabad on March 23, 2015. Their procession marked the first
formal military march on Pakistan Day since military rule last ended. (Photo: Metin Aktas)

The elected government remains in place but has few powers, and no longer
rules the country," wrote Ahmed Rashid, a prominent Pakistani analyst, in the
New York Review of Books' Apr. 2 issue. "The media, opposition political parties,
Parliament, and the intelligentsia are trying to resist the gradual military
takeover but they are weak and ineffectual.
Pakistan watchers say Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who gained power in May
2013 in the country's first-ever democratic transition, has seen his authority
steadily eroded by a charismatic leader who shares his name but is no relation:
army chief Gen. Raheel Sharif. Since he landed the job in November 2013, the
general has become a darling of U.S. policymakers and solidified his popularity
among the public by getting

tough on the Pakistani Taliban. Sharif has also engaged more with Kabul -- a
shift facilitated by Ghani, who is much more willing to cooperate with
Pakistan than his predecessor, Hamid Karzai.
Still, many Pakistanis are alarmed by the military's expansion of power.
Nazish Brohi, a Karachi-based researcher and activist who has studied the
Taliban-affected Swat region in northwestern Pakistan, told HuffPost earlier this
year that she worried the country's civilian leadership was "ceding space" to the
army. Even before Gen. Sharif took charge, she said, the military had been
using security concerns to justify consolidating its power. She believes that the
Pakistani Taliban's massacre of

more than 130 schoolchildren in Peshawar in December 2014 made that

approach even more effective.
"If you say no to one [security-related measure], it's seen as a rejection of
everything: you're saying no to the push against terrorism, and hence you're
siding with the terrorists," she said.
Asked about Gen. Sharifs more aggressive targeting of the Pakistani Taliban,
Brohi said she does not doubt the army's present commitment to fighting the
extremists. Still, she and others are wary of becoming too enamored -particularly because, as she emphasized in a January op-ed, the last period of
military rule in Pakistan did not prevent extremist expansion.
Brohi pointed specifically to a constitutional amendment, passed after the
Peshawar attack traumatized the country, that set up a separate system of
military courts for terror suspects. Critics of the law say it damages the
countrys fragile judicial system, violates international legal standards and
leaves citizens vulnerable to abuse.
According to Brohi, the law's success is especially alarming because it showed
elected representatives willingly handing over power to the military. "We've had
coups before, she said. "This time it's through the democratic process."

Pakistani army troops arrive to conduct an operation at the Peshawar military school under attack by Pakistani Taliban gunmen on
Dec. 16, 2014. (Photo: Mohammad Sajjad)

An incident earlier this month involving the Muttahida Qaumi Movement, one of
the political parties that supported the military courts law, illustrated just how
costly the militarys expansion of control might be. Although the MQM has a
controversial record, having previously been linked to murders and organized
crime, it has garnered praise as a rare and consistent anti-extremist voice and
has traditionally frustrated the army with its talk of democracy.
Haider Abbas Rizvi, one of the party's leading parliamentarians and its chief
spokesman, told HuffPost in January that his party embraced the military courts
because "in extraordinary times we have to take extraordinary measures." Rizvi
said he saw "goodwill" from army leadership and was not concerned about the
possibility of a full military takeover.
But then the army came for his party. On March 11, a paramilitary force
controlled directly by the military stormed into the party's headquarters and
raided homes in the surrounding neighborhood. The army said the raid
uncovered hidden arms and suspected murderers. Residents of the area claimed
they were subjected to excessive force. Rizvi called the incursion "a
transgression of authority."
Pakistan's security services have cracked down on the MQM before, so it was no
surprise that the group remained in the army's crosshairs even after it
expressed support for the military courts. But the incident came at a time when
the military has said its chief focus is terrorism. The incident sparked concern
about how broadly Rawalpindi might start defining terrorist elements, given its
growing power -- and whom it could confidently target with impunity.

Pakistani paramilitary officials escort handcuffed Aamir Khan, a leader of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement political party, out of a
court in Karachi on March 12, 2015.

Yet as controversial and damaging as the militarys actions may be, its future
moves will matter greatly as Pakistan and Afghanistan prepare for a future
without the U.S. serving as referee.
Ghani has recognized this importance in recent months by trying to show
goodwill towards Gen. Sharif. And the Pakistani military has reciprocated. In a
striking first for an army that has long scorned Afghanistan's capabilities,
it directly requested Afghan assistance with the Pakistani Taliban after the
Peshawar school attack. After Afghan forces captured six militants connected to
the massacre, Pakistans army publicly gave the Afghans credit for their
success.
The new cooperation is a notable shift from previous years, when Kabul and
Islamabad would accuse one another of harboring extremists, particularly
during Karzai's tenure.

Retired Maj. Gen. Mahmud Ali Durrani, a former Pakistani national security advisor
and ambassador to the United States, noted the unprecedented level of dialogue
between Gen. Sharif and the new Afghan administration.

"On counterterrorism operations, on working with Afghanistan, it seems the

military here is taking a lead," he told HuffPost.

But Durrani also noted that this improved relationship notably excludes Pakistans
elected civilian leadership.

"The political leadership has to also get into the issue," he said. Asked whether he
was confident in the civilian government, he chuckled. "That's a bad question, if
you get what I mean."

Security cooperation and high-level meetings are taking place between the two
neighbors for the first time in years, and both Kabul and Washington
are anticipating that Rawalpindi could facilitate long-awaited peace talks with
the Afghan Taliban. The extremist group sought refuge in Pakistan after the
U.S. invaded Afghanistan, and its leadership has maintained relations with the
Pakistani army. That connection has survived even as the homegrown Pakistani
Taliban -- the group behind the Peshawar attack -- has become more powerful
and directly challenged the military.
Washington policymakers have become more receptive to the idea of the
Pakistani army serving as an intermediary with the Taliban, a marked departure
from the U.S.s prior posture. Previously, many in the U.S. had accused the
army of tacitly helping to hide al Qaeda operatives and supporting the
insurgency inside Afghanistan, saying the military had no genuine interest in
improving the security situation. But with the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan
looming, Washington is more willing to concede that Rawalpindis muchmaligned ties to extremist groups can be used to push fringe groups to the
negotiating table

President Barack Obama smiles as Afghanistan's President Ashraf Ghani speaks during their joint news conference on March 24,
2015. Photo: Jacquelyn Martin

Indeed, its easier to be positive about Pakistan these days, particularly after

Gen. Sharifs visit to Washington late last year. The army chief made a positive
impression:

Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
said he sees

Sharif as a very superior individual.

Sharif sold his story to U.S. policymakers, Durrani said, and conducted
effective damage control.
A top Senate aide told HuffPost that the army chief went as far as committing to
U.S. lawmakers that he would clear out elements of the military who were
suspected of supporting extremists -- including in the seemingly untouchable
Inter-Services Intelligence. That promise tacitly acknowledges Pakistan's earlier,
more controversial approach to Afghanistan and, if fulfilled, would be a crucial
shift.
Whether or not they want Gen. Sharif to play such a central role, Kabul and
Washington seemed to have reached a similar conclusion: Working with his
army is better than not consulting it at all.
The question is not what [Pakistan] can or cant do, the question is
what happens if you exclude Pakistan from the conversation," said
Shamila Chaudhary, who served as Obama's National Security Council
director for Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2010 and 2011, and is now a senior
fellow at the New America Foundation. "Pakistan is very good at playing a
spoiler role in any of these kinds of conversations, and when theyre excluded
from the conversation or excluded from having the information after the fact,
thats very frustrating for them because so much of this impacts their national
security posture.
Still, if the U.S. begins once again to lean on Pakistans military, it will be a
complex and controversial process.

Washington famously cooperated with Pakistan's last two military dictators.

Working with Gen. Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s to counter the Soviets in
Afghanistan, the CIA helped to forge the Taliban, while the U.S. turned a blind
eye to the general's flailing democratic opposition. The Bush administration
adopted a similar approach after 9/11, when it treated then-dictator Gen.
Pervez Musharraf as a chief counterterror ally, only pressuring him to engage
with opponents once his rule already seemed to be in jeopardy.
The message to Pakistanis was clear: With the military in charge of those issues
that the U.S. cared about, it would be the military that the U.S. reached out to.
Pakistan's army has been accused for years of supporting terror groups, chiefly
those targeting neighboring India, and some of these allegations have been
verified by former U.S. intelligence officers. Many in the U.S. suspected that
American aid money was going to the very forces the U.S. was relying on
Pakistan to help fight.
Those suspicions reached their peak in 2011 after the U.S. discovered Osama
bin Laden hiding comfortably in a compound outside Abbottabad, Pakistan. The
raid led to a devastating breakdown in U.S.-Pakistan relations. Pakistanis saw it
as an illegal breach of sovereignty, while to many in the U.S., the incident
proved that Pakistan had been using billions in aid to foster extremist forces in
the region. Musharraf, who led the country from 1999 to 2008, later admitted
as much. Whoever wishes to be angry, let them be angry -- why should we
bother? he said in an interview with Pakistani television.
U.S. lawmakers remain aware of that misadventure even as they now express
increasing support for the military leadership. Weeks after Gen. Sharif's
Washington visit, Congress inserted a provision into the 2015 National Defense
Authorization Act that requires Pakistan to clearly show how it is aiding U.S.
counterterror efforts before it can receive aid. The caution indicates that while
Washington seems more willing to rely on Sharif, the trust remains tentative.
Still, an unreliable Pakistan seems better than no Pakistan at all.
With relations on the mend, officials have been less shy about praising the
Pakistani army: Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said last
year that intelligence cooperation was on the upswing," largely thanks to new
leadership in Islamabad and Gen. Sharif's efforts to smooth ruffled feathers.

Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Sen. Richard Burr (R-N.C.) spoke to

HuffPost earlier this month about what Pakistan can offer the United States.

They provide us eyes and ears that we dont have, Burr said. With all of our
partners, we have trust but verify. I think its no different with Pakistan.
Theyre a vital partner in sharing intelligence with [the] U.S.
Weve always had concerns about the intelligence agency in Pakistan and what
theyve been up to, said Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), chair of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, referring to the secretive ISI. I think we need to understand
these relationships with our eyes wide open and understand theres going to be
some frailties and things that dont exactly work out.

Pakistani Army Chief Gen. Raheel Sharif at the change of command ceremony in Rawalpindi on November 29, 2013, during which
he took over the countrys most powerful institution.

But with Washington happy to once again ramp up cooperation with Pakistans
military for security reasons, concerns about internal threats to democracy are
unlikely to gain much traction.

Our main interests there are counterterror and national security issues,
said Chaudhary, noting that all of those issues that the U.S. cares about in
Pakistan are all kind of in the domain of the intelligence service and the
military.

Even though U.S. leaders have praised the countrys democratic transition,
Chaudhury said, Washington knows its most critical partners in
Pakistan are in Rawalpindi's garrisons.

We are dressing it up with other stuff," she said. "But we should never kid
ourselves [democracy and development] are not the real reasons
were in Pakistan."

That leaves the U.S. once again hoping -- despite the troubled history and
warnings from within Pakistan -- that the Pakistani military will help facilitate
a stable future for the entire region.

But national security hands know that the regions deep fissures will not be
resolved by granting more power to men with guns.
At the end of the day, youre not going to change the tribal regions until you
get economic development, said Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), a prominent
member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. You cant just hold it by
force alone. So an inclusive Pakistani government that can empower people is
the ultimate antidote to this.