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People Vs.

Judge Ayson
175 SCRA 216
July 7, 1989
Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station. It was
alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an
investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and
Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees'
Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the
amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds
of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however
this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty.
Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos written admission and statement, to which defendants argued
that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not
admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have
counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.
Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission and statement
of accused.
No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination (only to witnesses other
than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not present in case at bar).
This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in
any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be a witness against
himself. It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." the
right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It
cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to
appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows
or should know. He must claim it and could be waived.
Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include:
he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.
nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But
unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained
as a result of interrogation can be used against him.

In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of CAMILO L. SABIO v.
G.R. No. 174340 17 October 2006,
Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time invoked Section 4(b)
of EO No. 1: No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or
staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.
No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the
House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of
investigatory power to the committees and it means that the mechanism which the Houses can take in order to
effectively perform its investigative functions are also available to the committees.
It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The
Courts high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled
that the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch. Verily, the Court reinforced
the doctrine in Arnault that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper
subject for investigation and that the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21.
Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress power of inquiry. This cannot be
countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress power of
inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as
proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends to government agencies created by Congress and
officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish. PCGG belongs to this
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact; or it creates or
establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect violates the
Constitution or its basic principles.
Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is inconsistent with the
constitutional provisions on the Congress power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21), the principle of public
accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of access to public
information (Art. III, Sec. 7).
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any
constitutional basis.