You are on page 1of 54

G.R. No.

L-14689

July 26, 1960

GENERAL MARITIME STEVEDORES' UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET


AL., petitioners,
vs.
SOUTH SEA SHIPPING LINE, ET AL., respondents.
Felix S. Falgui for petitioners.
Antonio T. Tirona for CIR.
Carlos E. Santiago for respondent Union.
German G. Lee for respondent Shipping Line.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review an order the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR),
dated September 23, 1958, dismissing the petition for certification election filed by the
General Maritime Stevedores' Union, later referred to as GMSU, and its co-petitioners, as
well as the order of the court en banc denying the motion for re-consideration. The
purpose of the petition to review is set aside the order of dismissal and to give due course
to GMSU petition for certification election.
Acting on a petition dated October 23, 1953 of the United Seamen's Union of the
Philippines, later referred to as USUP, in case No. 43-MC, the CIR issued an order dated
February 28, 1955, directing that an election be held among the unlicensed members and
crew of the respondent South Sea Shipping Lines, later referred to as Shipping Lines. In
said order, the USUP and GMSU were considered eligible to be voted for. The
certification election was held on April 15 and June 10, 1955, after which the CIR issued
another order dated June 17, 1955, certifying USUP as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the laborers and employees of the Shipping Lines. On June 28, 1957, a
collective bargaining agreement was entered into between the Shipping Line and the
USUP. Art. 10 of the agreement provided as follows:
This Agreement shall take effect on July 21, 1957, to continue in full force and effect for
two (2) years until July 20, 1959 and thereafter for another period of two (2) years, unless
either party shall notify the other in writing not less than sixty (60) days prior to the
expiration date hereof of its intention or election to terminate the agreement as of the end
of the current term.
GMSU insists that the agreement entered into was but a renewal of an agreement between
the USUP and Shipping Line entered into sometime in 1955. This statement seems to
have been confirmed by the Shipping Line in its answer where it stated that "after the
above-mentioned order (referring to the order dated June 17, 1955) or to be specific, on
June 28, 1955, a collective bargaining agreement. ... entered into between the
respondent."

On April 30, 1958, that is a little more than two years after the holding of the last
certification election, GMSU and its co-petitioners filed with the CIR a petition for
certification election, Case No. 546-MC, later numbered as Case No. 547-MC, alleging
that there were two labor unions, to which were unlicensed crew members of the
Shipping Line, namely, the GMSU and the USUP; that as members of the GMSU
petitioners constituted 10% of all the unlicensed crew members of the Shipping Line; and
that there had not been a certification election within twelve months before the filing of
the petition.
The Shipping Line in its answer, expressed its attitude of strict neutrality and its
willingness to abide by the order of the CIR although in its amended answer, it also
alleged that it considered the existing collective bargaining agreement between itself and
the USUP as binding until annulled.
The USUP intervened and filed a motion for dismissal of the petition claiming that there
was an existing collective bargaining agreement between itself and the Shipping Line
entered on June 28, 1957, for a period of two years up to July 26, 1959, which period was
reasonable, and which agreement contained reasonable conditions of employment, and
that the existence of such agreement barred another certification election. As already
stated, the CIR granted the motion to dismiss and refused to give due course to the
GMSU's petition for certification election.
To support its order, the CIR invoked the "contract-bar rule", explaining that the then
existing contract between the Shipping Line and the USUP, which was for a period of two
years, up to July 20, 1959, contained provisions regarding wages, closed shops, check off,
grievances, machinery and other conditions regarding employment relationships.
According to the CIR, these circumstances plus the fact that there was no showing that
the contracting union was company dominated support the validity and reasonableness of
the agreement between the Shipping Line and the USUP, the duly certified bargaining
representative, and that the existence of such contract barred the holding of a certification
election. The CIR further stated:
The "contract-bar rule" is procedural which this Court in its discretion may apply or
waive as the facts of any given case may demand in the interest of stability and fairness in
collective bargaining agreements. (Case No. 54 MC-Cebu, PCLUE, vs. Caltex, June 25,
1957). the facts of the present case considered,, it is the opinion of this Court that the
policies of the Industrial Peace Act of promoting stable, sound employer-employee
relations is effectuated by collective bargaining agreement of reasonable duration. The
contract between the intervenor and the company falls under this criterion.
The GMSU, however, equally maintains that it is mandatory for the CIR to order a
certification election once a petition is signed and submitted by at least 10% of all the
workers in a bargaining unit; and it is also shown that no certification election had been
held within twelve months prior to the filing of such petition pursuant to the provisions of
Section 12 (b) and (c), Republic Act No. 875, the pertinent portions of which read:

(b) Whenever a question arising concerning the representation of employees, the Court
may investigate such controversy and certify to the parties in writing the name of the
labor organization that has been designated or selected for the appropriate bargaining
unit. ... Such a balloting shall be known as "certification election" and the Court shall not
order certifications in the same unit more often than once intwelve months. The
organization receiving the majority votes casts in such election shall be certified as the
exclusive bargaining representative of such employees.
(c) In an instance where a petition is filed by at least ten percent of the employees in the
appropriate unit requesting an election, it shall be mandatory on the Court to order an
election for the purpose of determining the representative of the employees for the
appropriate bargaining unit.
The GMSU has expressed fear that if a certification election was not held as per its
petition, the agreement between the respondent under its renewal clause, may again be
renewed with or without modification by the parties as a result of which, the existence of
the contract as renewed may again be utilized as an argument for barring a subsequent
petition for certification election, thereby completely depriving petitioners of the right
and opportunity to prove that they constituted the majority of the workers and employees
of the Shipping Line.
What is meant by the "Contract-Bar Policy"? When ever a substantial number of
employees in an appropriate bargaining agreement desires to be represented by a union or
organization other than that which had negotiated a collective bargaining contract with
the management, the CIR is faced with the dilemma of the right of contract or the right of
representation:
Whenever a contract is urged as a bar, the Board is faced with the problem of balancing
two separate interests of employees and society which the act was designated to protect;
the interest in such stability is as essential to encourage the effective collective
bargaining, and the sometimes conflicting interest in the freedom of employees to select
and change their representatives. In furtherance of the purpose of the act, we have
repeatedly held that employees are entitled to change their representatives, if they so
desire, at reasonable intervals, or controversy, that a collective bargaining contract may
preclude a determination of representatives for a reasonable period. (Reed Roller Bit Co.,
72 NLRD 927).
It sometimes occurs that representation petitions are brought when a bargaining contract
already exists. There is then a question of whether the Board shall respect the contract
and let it constitute a bar or institute proceedings despite the contract. (Bowman, Public
Control of Labor Relations, p. 135.)
As a solution to this problem, there are three possibilities:

One solution of the problem would be to hold that a collective bargaining agreement
valid when made is a bar to a new certification throughout its existence, regardless of the
length of its term. . . .
A second solution is to hold that employees may shift their allegiance during the term of
the agreement but that the contract continues in force with the new union simply
replacing the old. . . .
The solution to the problem which the National Labor-Relations Board has adopted lies
between the extremes: "The board has normally refused to proceed to an election, in the
presence of a collective bargaining contract where the contract granted exclusive
recognition is to be effective only for a reasonable period and was negotiated by a union
representing at the time a majority of the employees (in an appropriate unit) prior to any
claim by a rival labor organization". (Cox, Cases on Labor Law, pp. 497-498).
The National Labor Relations Board, later referred to as the Board, which is the
counterpart of our CIR, regards the conflict as one which requires it to strike a balance
between the desirability of achieving stability in industrial relations secured through
bargaining, on the one hand, and the benefits flowing from the grant to employee full
freedom in their choice of representative, on the other.
But the conflict implicit in the situation is so clear that the Board has recognized the
necessity for some solution. While it is apparent that the board will not allow the
existence of an agreement to preclude all change, on the other hand has not suggested
absolute abrogation of the contract. (51 Yale Law Journal p. 470, Change of Bargaining
Representative).
In resolving this conflict, the Board "initially took the unqualified view that the existence
of agreements was no bar to certification of bargaining representatives." (Teller, Labor
Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Vol. 2, p. 901). So, in the Matter of New England
Transportation Co. (1936) 1 NLRB 130, the Board directed an election despite existing
contracts between the company and an employees' association:
The whole process of collective bargaining and unrestricted choice of representatives
assumes the freedom of the employees to change their representatives, while at the same
time continuing the existing agreements under which the representatives must function. ...
These representatives are, of course, free to bargain with respect to the termination of an
existing contract.
The above ruling gave support to the doctrine of substitution whereby a change of
representatives would alter an existing contract only by "substituting the new union for
the old under its substantive terms" (51 Yale Law Journal, Change of Bargaining
Representatives, p. 466). However, the Board subsequently took the position that a
collective bargaining agreement of reasonable duration is "in the interest of the stability
of industrial relations", a bar to certification elections. (Vol. 2, Teller, Labor Disputes and
Collective Bargaining, p. 902). Thus, evolved the "contract-bar policy".

In adopting the "contract-bar policy", the Board, however, was careful in refusing to
announce an inflexible rule as to its authority, and whenever possible, it avoided a
determination of the contract's effect on its power of certification election:
. . . Again the Board is bounded by no stereotyped procedure; rather, the Board exercises
discretion to let the circumstances determine whether proceedings shall go on. . . .
This Board action was not charted by Congress, but the dilemma of right of contract or
right of representation is real. The resolution of the dilemma is not to decide whether the
primary purpose of the Act is to insure employee freedom to choose representatives, or to
encourage collective contracts, for either choice leaves an unsatisfactory situation. Hence
the Board's compromise seems wise, even though it is in a sense contradictory. Such
Board flexibility and the refusal to draw sharp rules open the door to criticism, but the
dilemma demonstrated the necessity of giving broad discretionary power to an
administrative agency. (Public Control of Labor Relations, Bowman, p. 135, 137).
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, recognizing the Board's power to promulgate
rules and regulations to carry out the purpose of the Act, gave the Board broad discretion
to apply the "contract-bar policy", as it saw fit, thus:
The Board's rule that the existence of a valid written and signed bargaining agreement
between an employer and an appropriate bargaining representative is a bar to a
certification proceedings for a different representation, if applicable to the facts in this
case, is a procedural rule which the Board in its discretion may apply or waive as the
facts of the given case may demand in the interest of stability and fairness in collective
bargaining agreements. The Board is not the slave of its rules." National Labor Relations
Boardvs. Grace Co. 184 Fed. 2nd p. 126 (U. S. Circuit Ct. of App., 8th Circuit.)
Where "contract bar policy" of National Labor Relations Board, along with exceptions
thereto, as applicable to representation proceedings, were solely of board's creation, board
could reasonably expand or restrict such policy as it saw fit. (Syllabus) Kearney &
Treacker Corp. vs. National Labor Relations Board, 210 Fed. 2nd p. 852 (U.S. Circuit Ct.
of App., 7th Circuit)
During the period "when the techniques and potentialities of collective bargaining were
first being slowly developed under the encouragement and protection of Federal
Legislation", the Board laid greater emphasis upon the right of laborers to select their
respective frequently than upon prolonged adherence to the bargaining agreement.
(General Motors Corporation, 102 NLRB 1140). As a result, when the contract-bar policy
was first initiated, only one-year contracts were held to be a bar to certification election.
(e.g., M & J Tracy, Inc. 12 NLRB 936 (1939); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 8
NLRB 508 (1938) Hubinger Company, 3 NLRB 802)
The net result of the Broad's viewpoint that collective bargaining agreements of
reasonable duration will constitute a bar to certification, but that agreements unduly long
which have been in effect for at least a year will not constitute a bar is, when read in

connection with the cases, equivalent to the rule that collective bargaining agreements
prevent proceedings for a period of one year from the time of their execution. (2 Teller,
Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, p. 905).
Thus, in the case of Superior Electric Products Co., NLRB (1948), the collective
bargaining agreement of one year duration entered into at the time when the contracting
union represented a majority of the respondent-employees was held to be a bar to
certification election. And in the Metro Goldwyn Mayer case, 7 NLRB 662, involving
collective bargaining agreement of five years duration, the Board granted the petition for
election filed after the agreement had run one year with a reiteration of its belief that
employees' "choice of their representatives could not be shackled for an unduly long
period just because of the existence of a contract." However, in 1947, the Board held that
thereafter, it would regard a two year contract as a bar to an election until its expiration,
because collective bargaining had:
So emerged from a stage of trial and error (that) the time has come when stability of
industrial relations can better be served, without unreasonably restricting employees in
their right to change representatives, by refusing to interfere with bargaining relations
secured by collective agreements for two years' duration. (Matter of Reed Roller Bit Co.
72 NLRB 927 (1947).
In the light of our experience in administering the Act, we believe that a contract for a
term of 2 years cannot be said to be of unreasonable duration. ... For large masses of
employees collective bargaining has but recently emerged from a stage of trial and error,
during which its techniques and full potentialities were being slowly developed under the
encouragement and protection of the Act. To have insisted in the past upon prolonged
adherence to a bargaining agent, once chosen, would have been wholly incompatible with
this experimental and transitional period. It was especially necessary, therefore to lay
emphasis upon the right of workers to select and change their representatives. Now,
however, the emphasis can better be placed elsewhere.
HOWEVER, in 1953, the same Board announced that:
The time has arrived when stability of labor relations can be better served, without
unreasonably restricting employees in their right to change representatives, by holding as
a bar collective bargaining agreements even for 5 years' duration (when) a substantial part
of the industry concerned is covered by contracts with a similar term.
In the case of General Motors Corporation, 102 NLRB 1140 (1953), involving a five
years contract, the Board refused to order a certification election despite the lapse of more
than 2 1/2 years since the agreement became effective. From all this, it may be seen that
the National Labor Relations Board has not adopted an iron-clad policy, rigid and fixed,
but rather one to be applied according to the changing conditions and industrial practices.
In this jurisdiction, we have had occasion to apply the "contract-bar policy". In the case
of Philippine Long Distance Employees' Union vs. PLDT and Free Telephone Workers

Union, 97 Phil., 424; 51 Off. Gaz. [9] 4519, through Mr. Justice Bengzon, we made the
following observation:
It is interesting to note in this regard that in the United States, where we copied the
present Industrial Peace Act, an existing collective bargaining contract with a union is a
bar to subsequent certification election when ... it has a definite and reasonable period to
run and has not been in existence for too long a period (history, industry and customs may
affect reasonableness of the contract term ... . (Werne Law of Labor Relations, p. 27
citing U.S. Finishing Co. 63 NLRB 575). Normally, the National Labor Relations Board
have been in existence for more than years, as no obstacle to determining bargaining
representatives. (Werneop cit. pp. 28-29, citing several cases.)
. . . as this contract between the Company and the petitioner was signed December 1,
1951, it had been in operation more than two years in August, 1954 when the certification
election was ordered. It is thereforeno bar to the certification even under American Labor
Laws.
In a subsequent case, Acoje Mines and Acoje United Workers Union vs. Acoje Labor
Union and Acoje Mining Co. Inc., 105 Phil., 814; 56 Off. Gaz. (6) 1157, on the issue of
whether or not upon submission of a petition for certification election by at least 10% of
all the workers in a bargaining union, it is mandatory for the CIR to order a certification
election with no exceptions, pursuant to Section 12 (c), Republic Act No. 875, through
the same Justice, we made the following statement:
The above command of the Court is not so absolute as it may appear at first glance. The
statute itself expressly recognizes one exception: When a certification election had
occured within one year. And the judicial administrative agencies have found two
exceptions: where there is an unexpired bargaining agreement not exceeding two
years and when there is a pending charge of company domination of one of the labor
unions intending to participate in the election.
After reviewing the cases decided by the NLRB of the United States and our cases, we
have arrived at the conclusion that it is reasonable and proper that when there is a
bargaining contract for more than a year, it is too early to hold a certification election
within a year from the effectivity of said bargaining agreement; also that a two year
bargaining contract is not too long for the purpose of barring a certification election. For
this purpose, a bargaining agreement may run for three, even four years, but in such case,
it is equally advisable that to decide whether or not within those three or four years, a
certification election should not be held, may well be left to the sound discretion of the
CIR, considering the conditions involved in the case, particularly, the terms and
conditions of the bargaining contract.
We also hold that where the bargaining contract is to run for more than two years, the
principle of substitution may well be adopted and enforced by the CIR to the effect that
after two years of the life of bargaining agreement, a certification election may be
allowed by the CIR; that if a bargaining agent other than the union or organization that

executed the contract, is elected, said new agent would have to respect said contract, but
that it may bargain with the management for the shortening of the life of the contract if it
considers it too long, or refuse to renew the contract pursuant to an automatic renewal
clause.
On September 15, 1959, while this case was still pending in this Tribunal, petitioner filed
a manifestation to the effect that the contract between the USUP and the Shipping Line
had expired on June 28, 1959, and that the same had not been renewed. We asked for the
comment of the other party. the respondent United Seamen's Union in its counter
manifestation dated July 6, 1960, stated that the collective bargaining agreement
involved, executed on July 28, 1957, was automatically renewed for a period of two years
from July 28, 1959 to July 28 1961, pursuant to the automatic renewal clause, for the
reason that neither party notified the other in writing not less than sixty days prior to the
expiration date, of its desire to terminate the agreement. So, it would appear that the
contract will still be effective up to July 28, 1961, that is to say, about a year from today.
According to the claim or contention of the petitioners the bargaining agreement of July
28, 1957 was but a renewal of the same or similar agreement of July 1955, so that the
bargaining agreement has been in existence for about five years, which is too long a
period within which a certification election has not been held.
In view of the foregoing, we believe and hold that the appealed order of the CIR
dismissing the petition for certification election and refusing to allow the selection of a
new bargaining agent, was valid under the circumstances obtaining at the time. However,
inasmuch as there has been a renewal of the bargaining agreement for another two years
and because it seems that the present agreement is but a renewal of the one entered into
way back in 1955, so that until the expiration of the present agreement, about six years
shall have passed, it is advisable that a new certification election be held. For this
purpose, this case is hereby remanded to the CIR, so that the petition for certification can
be entertained, admitted and given due course, and that a certification election be held,
with the understanding that if a bargaining agent other tan the one that negotiated and
executed the present bargaining contract, is elected, said new agent would have to respect
the present bargaining agreement, but without prejudice to its negotiating with the
company for a shortening of the period of the life of the contract, refuse to renew it when
it expires, if it so desires, and otherwise represent and protect the interest of the members
of the bargaining unit, all of course, within the terms and purview of the bargaining
contract. No costs.
G.R. No. L-8138

August 20, 1955

PLDT EMPLOYEES' UNION, petitioner,


vs.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY FREE TELEPHONE
WORKERS' UNION, (PAPLU),respondents.

Julio R. Tingzon, Jr., Pedro M. Icamina and Oscar G. Nolasco for petitioner.
Perkins, Ponce Enrile and Associates for respondent company.
Cid, Villaluz and Associates for respondent union.
BENGZON, Acting C.J.:
On September 30, 1953, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, a public
utility corporation locally organized, filed in the Court of Industrial Relations a petition
for certificate under section 12 of Republic Act No. 875. It alleged that, a week before, it
received from the Free Telephone Workers' Union notice of its desire to bargain
collectively; that until the receipt of such notice, the Company believed the only
legitimate labor organization existing therein was the PLDT Employees Union with
which it had signed a collectively bargaining agreement still in operation; and that said
Company was in no position to determine which of the two Unions represented the
majority of the workers. Therefore it requested that an investigation be conducted for the
purpose of determining the proper collective bargaining agency for its employees, and in
the event such investigation fails to determine the proper agency that an order be issued
requiring the holding of a certification election.
Upon its petition, the PLDT Employees Union was allowed to intervene, and on October
21, 1953 it submitted a motion to dismiss, which as amended, claimed that it had a
collective bargaining agreement in force until September 14, 1954, and that a favorable
action by the Court on the petition would permit another labor organization in the same
establishment to present to the employer another set of demands and compel said
employer to bargain with it during the lifetime of an existing bargaining
agreement, thereby infringing the constitutional provision against impairment of
contracts.
The Free Telephone Workers' Union-hereafter designated respondentasserting that it
represented the preponderant majority of the employees, manifested its willingness to let
the investigation proceed; and answering the Employees' Union's motion to dismiss, it
contended that the existing collective bargaining agreement constituted no legal
objection, inasmuch as no certification election had been held within the preceding
twelve months. As to the alleged impairment of the existing collective contract, it argued
there was no such impairment, because 'the contract is between the company and the
employees represented by the intervenor union who are the principals and can change
their agent at will" by a majority which it is desired to ascertain.
After considering the pleadings and the arguments, the Hon. Arsenio Roldan, Presiding
Judge, dismissed the petition in December 1953 principally for the reason that the
collective bargaining agreement between the intervenor and the company will expire on
September 14, 1954, and that before such date it may not be changed nor amended.
The respondent Workers' Union asked for reconsideration, which the intervenor opposed.
On August 9, 1954 the Court of Industrial Relations in banc, by majority vote, set aside
the order of dismissal and remanded the case for "determination of the appropriate

collective bargaining unit, (agency) after which the holding of a certification election in
accordance with law should be ordered", (if necessary).
Hence this petition for reviewwhich takes the place of an appeal from the order of the
Court of Industrial Relations.
It is the general rule that only final judgments or orders are appealable to this Court. An
interlocutory order may not be appealed. (Rule 41 sec. 2) "An order or judgment is
deemed final when it finally disposes of the pending action so that nothing more can be
done with it in the trial court. In other words, a final order is that which gives an end to
the litigation . . . when the order or judgment does not dispose of the case completely but
leaves something to be done upon the merits, it is merely interlocutory. For instance an
order denying a motion of dismissal founded on lack of jurisdiction . . .is merely
interlocutory,"1 and is not appealable.
It would seem from the foregoing that this petition for review or appeal of the intervenor
is premature, the order denying its motion to dismiss not being a final order. The
Industrial Court still had to determine the proper bargaining agency or direct a
certification election. There was something to be done in the Industrial Court.
We are aware, of course, that the law permitting appeals to this Court from "any order" of
the Court of Industrial Relations does not in any line employ the word "final". But it is
reasonable to suppose that Congress did not intend to disregard such well-known rule of
orderly procedure, which is based partly upon the convenience of the appealing party
itself, in the sense of forestalling useless appeals. In this case for example, if instead of
appealing, the intervenor allowed the investigation to continue, and later it is declared to
be the proper bargaining agency, then this appeal would have been useless. If it is not so
declaredthen perhaps2 it is time to appeal; not before. Before that time it may not claim
to be aggrieved by the order remanding the case for ascertainment of the labor union
which represents the majority.
The assertion that the appealed order impairs petitioner's collective bargaining agreement
is unfounded, because the tenor of the order precisely contemplates that any bargaining
agreement between the Telephone Company and the newly-found bargaining agency will
have effect only after September 14, 1954 when the (then) existing collective agreement
could be properly terminated.
On this point petitioner insists the respondent Court could not say the contract would
expire on September 14, 1954, in view of the following stipulation in the bargaining
agreement:
that it is hereby mutually agreed upon by the parties that the duration of this Agreement
shall be for a period of one year, counting from the date of its signing by said
parties, with the understanding that it shall be considered renewed or extended from year
to year thereafter, unless it is terminated by any one of the parties in writing to the other
at least thirty days before it is proposed to expire.

Petitioner takes the position that, far from automatically ceasing on September 14, 1954,
the contract is automatically renewedunless it is denounced by one of the parties. Yet
when the court mentioned September 14, 1954, it merely meant that according to the
contract on that date it may be denounced or substituted by one of the parties; and the
Telephone Company by filing the petition obviously and foresightedly manifested its
intention to terminate such contract with petitioner, if and when, it is found that said
petitioner no longer represented the majority of the Company's employees. 3 Furthermore,
as explained by the Industrial Court.
"If a certification election is not held immediately, the agreement may be renewed with or
without modification by the parties thereto and again it may be used as an argument to
bar the subsequent holding of a certification election. The result would be to deprive
entirely the Free Telephone Workers' Union (PAFLU) of an opportunity to prove that it,
and not the PLDT Employees Union, has the majority status and, therefore, entitled to
represent all the employees of the Company for collective bargaining purposes.
It is interesting to note in this regard that in the United States, where we copied the
present Industrial Peace Act an existing collective bargaining contract with a union is a
bar to subsequent certification election when . . . it has a definite and reasonable period to
run and has not been in existence for too long a period (history, industry and customs may
affect reasonablesness of the contract term . . ..) (Werne Law of Labor Relations p. 27
citing U. S. Finishing Co. 63 NLRB 575.) Normally, the National Labor Relations Board
is inclined to regard long-term contracts, which have been in existence for more than two
years, as no obstacle to determining bargaining representatives. (Werne op. cit pp. 28-29
citing several cases.)
A contract which provides for automatic renewal in the absence of notice by one of the
contracting parties of intention to alter, modify or terminate it prior to a specified period
preceding the termination date, will operate as a bar to an election. However, this rule
does not apply where a contesting union has given timely notice to the employer or filed
a petition with the Board reasonably prior to the specified date for automatic renewal.
(Werne, op. cit p. 29 citing several Labor Board cases.)
Explaining its position in detail, the National Labor Relations Board said in the case of
Reed Roller Bit Co. 72 N. L. R. B. 927:
Whenever a contract is urged as a bar, the Board is faced with the problem of balancing
two separate interests of employees and society which the Act was designed to protect:
the interest in such stability as is essential to encourage effective collective bargaining,
and the sometimes conflicting interest in the freedom of the employees to select and
change their representatives. In furtherance of the purposes of the Act, we have
repeatedly held that employees are entitled to change their representatives, if they so
desire, at reasonable intervals; or conversely, that a collective bargaining contract may
preclude a determination of representatives for a reasonable period.

In the light of our experience in administering the Act, we believe that a contract for a
term of 2 years cannot be said to be of unreasonable duration. We have already held that
2-year contracts are presumptively of reasonable duration. In applying this rule, we have
not discovered any compelling conditons which indicate that such agreements unduly
limit the right of employees to change their representatives. Moreover, in entertaining
rival petitions several months before the expiration of the numerous 1-year contracts
which are made, we have found in many instances the contracting parties, having
composed their differences and executed collective bargaining contracts after the
expenditure of much time, effort and money, can feel truly secure in their respective
positions only for the brief period of approximately 8 to 9 months.
For large masses of employees collective bargaining has but recently emerged from a
stage of trial and error, during which its techniques and full potentialities were being
slowly developed under the encouragement and protection of the Act. To have insisted in
the past upon prolonged adherence to a bargaining agent, once chosen, would have been
wholly incompatible with this experimental and transitional period. It was especially
necessary, therefore, to lay emphasis upon the right of workers to select and change their
representatives. Now, however, the emphasis, can better be placed elsewhere. We think
that the time has come when stability of industrial relations can be better served, without
unreasonably restricting employees in their right to change representatives, by refusing to
interfere with bargaining relations secured by collective agreements of 2 years' duration.
(Mathews, Labor Relations And The Law (1953) p. 191-192.)
Now then, as this contract between the Company and the petitioner was signed December
1, 1951, it had been in operation more than two years in August 1954 when the
certification election was ordered. It is therefore no bar to the certification even under
American labor views.
By the way, this is not to hold that as a matter of law in this jurisdiction the two-year
period is a definite term within which bargaining contracts are not to be disturbed.
Indeed, the statute providing that certification elections shall not be ordered oftener than
once a year, (Sec. 12 (b) R. A. 875) might give ground to the argument that a collective
bargaining agreement between the employer and a labor union representing the majority
of the laborers may be terminated, after a year, by a new majority organization. The
quotations are herein made merely to exhibit some considerations that have influenced or
may influence the courts in the exercise of their discretion in the matter.
Anent the alleged impairment of its contract, petitioner should keep in mind the modern
concept embodied in the New Civil Code, that labor contracts being impressed with
common interest are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining,
strikes, lockouts etc. (Art. 1700.)
In view of the foregoing, this petition for review should be denied. To avoid
misunderstandings however, it should be made clear that the next step is for the court a
quo to determine after a speedy and appropriate hearing upon notice, the labor union that

represents the majority of the such majority, then said court may order a cetification
election in accordance with legal provisions.
Petition denied with costs.

[G.R. No. 107792. March 2, 1998]

SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA PERMEX (SMP-PIILU-TUCP), petitioners,


vs. THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
LABOR,
PERMEX
PRODUCER
AND
EXPORTER
CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated October 8, 1992 and
order dated November 12, 1992, of Undersecretary of Labor and Employment
Bienvenido Laguesma, ordering a certification election to be conducted among the
employees of respondent company.
The facts of the case are as follows. On January 15, 1991, a certification election was
conducted among employees of respondent Permex Producer and Exporter Corporation
(hereafter referred to as Permex Producer). The results of the elections were as follows:
National Federation of Labor (NFL)

- 235

No Union

- 466

Spoiled Ballots

- 18

Marked Ballots

Challenged Ballots

9
-

However, some employees of Permex Producer formed a labor organization known


as the Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex (SMP) which they registered with the
Department of Labor and Employment on March 11, 1991. The union later affiliated
with the Philippine Integrated Industries Labor Union (PIILU).
On August 16, 1991, Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex-Philippine Integrated
Industries Labor Union (SMP-PIILU), wrote the respondent company requesting
recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of employees at the
Permex Producer. On October 19, 1991 Permex Producer recognized SMP-PIILU and,

on December 1, entered into a collective bargaining agreement with it. The CBA was
ratified between December 9 and 10, 1991 by the majority of the rank and file employees
of Permex Producer. On December 13, 1991, it was certified by the DOLE.
On February 25, 1992, respondent NFL filed a petition for certification election, but
it was dismissed by Med-Arbiter Edgar B. Gongalos in an order dated August 20, 1992.
Respondent NFL then appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. On
October 8, 1992, the Secretary of Labor, through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma,
set aside the order of the Med-Arbiter and ordered a certification election to be conducted
among the rank and file employees at the Permex Producer, with the following choices:
1. National Federation of Labor
2. Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex
3. No union
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but its motion was denied in an order dated
November 12, 1992. Hence, this petition.
Two arguments are put forth in support of the petition. First, it is contended that
petitioner has been recognized by the majority of the employees at Permex Producer as
their sole collective bargaining agent. Petitioner argues that when a group of employees
constituting themselves into an organization and claiming to represent a majority of the
work force requests the employer to bargain collectively, the employer may do one of two
things. First, if the employer is satisfied with the employees claim the employer may
voluntarily recognize the union by merely bargaining collectively with it. The formal
written confirmation is ordinarily stated in the collective bargaining agreement. Second,
if on the other hand, the employer refuses to recognize the union voluntarily, it may
petition the Bureau of Labor Relations to conduct a certification election. If the employer
does not submit a petition for certification election, the union claiming to represent the
employees may submit the petition so that it may be directly certified as the employees
representative or a certification election may be held.
The case of Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. Ferrer-Calleja,[1] cited by the
Solicitor General in his comment filed in behalf of the NLRC, is
particularly apropos. There, the union also requested voluntary recognition by the
company. Instead of granting the request, the company petitioned for a certification
election. The union moved to dismiss on the ground that it did not ask the company to
bargain collectively with it. As its motion was denied, the union brought the matter to
this Court. In sustaining the companys stand, this Court ruled:
...Ordinarily, in an unorganized establishment like the Calasiao Beer Region, it is the
union that files a petition for a certification election if there is no certified bargaining
agent for the workers in the establishment. If a union asks the employer to voluntarily
recognize it as the bargaining agent of the employees, as the petitioner did, it in effect
asks the employer to certify it as the bargaining representative of the employees A
CERTIFICATION WHICH THE EMPLOYER HAS NO AUTHORITY TO GIVE, for it

is the employees prerogative (not the employers) to determine whether they want a
union to represent them, and, if so, which one it should be. (emphasis supplied)
In accordance with this ruling, Permex Producer should not have given its voluntary
recognition to SMP-PIILU-TUCP when the latter asked for recognition as exclusive
collective bargaining agent of the employees of the company. The company did not have
the power to declare the union the exclusive representative of the workers for the purpose
of collective bargaining.
Indeed, petitioners contention runs counter to the trend towards the holding of
certification election. By virtue of Executive Order No. 111, which became effective on
March 4, 1987, the direct certification previously allowed under the Labor Code had been
discontinued as a method of selecting the exclusive bargaining agents of the workers.
[2]
Certification election is the most effective and the most democratic way of determining
which labor organization can truly represent the working force in the appropriate
bargaining unit of a company.[3]
Petitioner argues that of the 763 qualified employees of Permex Producer,
479 supported its application for registration with the DOLE and that when petitioner
signed the CBA with the company, the CBA was ratified by 542 employees. Petitioner
contends that such support by the majority of the employees justifies its finding that the
CBA made by it is valid and binding.
But it is not enough that a union has the support of the majority of the employees. It
is equally important that everyone in the bargaining unit be given the opportunity to
express himself.[4]
This is especially so because, in this case, the recognition given to the union came
barely ten (10) months after the employees had voted no union in the certification
election conducted in the company. As pointed out by respondent Secretary of Labor in
his decision, there can be no determination of a bargaining representative within a year of
the proclamation of the results of the certification election. [5] Here the results, which
showed that 61% of the employees voted for no union, were certified only on February
25, 1991 but on December 1, 1991 Permex Producer already recognized the union and
entered into a CBA with it.
There is something dubious about the fact that just ten (10) months after the
employees had voted that they did not want any union to represent them, they would
be expressing support for petitioner. The doubt is compounded by the fact that in sworn
affidavits some employees claimed that they had either been coerced or misled into
signing a document which turned out to be in support of petitioner as its collective
bargaining agent. Although there were retractions, we agree with the Solicitor General
that retractions of statements by employees adverse to a company (or its favored union)
are oftentimes tainted with coercion and intimidation. For how could one explain the
seeming flip-flopping of position taken by the employees? The figures claimed by
petitioner to have been given to it in support cannot readily be accepted as true.
Second. Petitioner invokes the contract-bar rule. They contend that under Arts. 253,
253-A and 256 of the Labor Code and Book V, Rule 5, 3 of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, a petition for certification election or motion for intervention may be

entertained only within 60 days prior to the date of expiration of an existing collective
bargaining agreement. The purpose of the rule is to ensure stability in the relationships of
the workers and the management by preventing frequent modifications of any collective
bargaining agreement earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the stipulated
original period. Excepted from the contract-bar rule are certain types of contracts which
do not foster industrial stability, such as contracts where the identity of the representative
is in doubt. Any stability derived from such contracts must be subordinated to the
employees freedom of choice because it does not establish the kind of industrial peace
contemplated by the law.[6] Such situation obtains in this case. The petitioner entered into
a CBA with Permex Producer when its status as exclusive bargaining agent of the
employees had not been established yet.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and order of the respondent Secretary of
Labor are AFFIRMED.
[G.R. No. L-8049. May 9, 1956.]
BUKLOD G SAULOG TRANSIT, Petitioner, vs. MARCIANO CASALLA, ET
ALS., Respondents.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
On 7 December 1953 the Respondents, 65 in number, employees of the Saulog Transit,
Inc., filed in the Court of Industrial Relations a petition for a certification election,
alleging that the total number of employees in the Saulog Transit, Inc. was 583; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat there were two labor organizations which represented the
employees in the Saulog Transit, Inc., to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary the Buklod g
Saulog Transit and the Saulog Transit Employees Union (PFL); chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand that the certification election prayed for was for the purpose of
determining the sole bargaining representative of the employees in the Saulog Transit,
Inc. On 23 December 1953 the president of the Buklod g Saulog Transit filed its answer
stating that on 1 (15) July 1953 a collective bargaining agreement had been entered into
by and between the Buklod g Saulog Transit, a duly registered union with the
Department of Labor, on the one hand, and the Saulog Transit, Inc., on the other; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat on 5 December an election was held peacefully and orderly,
the result thereof having been forwarded to the Department of Labor, against which
election and the result thereof no protest as regards the legality thereof was lodged; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat having acquired a juridical personality from the time of its
registration, on 15 July 1953 the Buklod g Saulog Transit entered into a collective
bargaining contract already referred to covering the well-being of the members of which
the Respondentswere still members. On 16 February 1954 the Saulog Transit, Inc. filed a
pleading entitled Appearance and Manifestation averring that the allegation that
the Respondents constituted 10 per cent of the total number of employees of the Saulog
Transit, Inc. was for the Court to determine; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that it had
dealt and had been dealing with the Buklod g Saulog Transit in accordance with a

collective bargaining agreement entered into by and between them, the Buklod g Saulog
Transit representing the employees of the Saulog Transit, Inc. as an industrial unit.
After hearing, on 17 May 1954 the Court rendered judgment directing
cralaw that a certification election be held among the employees and/or laborers of the
Saulog Transit, Inc. at Pasay City, in accordance with section 12 of Republic Act No. 875,
and in conformity with the Rules promulgated by this Court on September 4, 1953.
All the employees and/or laborers whose names appear in the list submitted by the
company and marked as Exhibits E to 7, attached to the records of this case, minus
the supervisory personnel composed of the General Manager, Assistant General Manager,
the two guards, one shift foreman, and one accountant, shall be eligible to vote.
Let a copy of this order be furnished the Department of Labor for its information and
guidance.
A motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court in banc on 12 July 1954,
the Buklod g Saulog Transit prays for a review of the order of the Court of Industrial
Relations dated 17 May 1954 and the resolution of the Court in banc dated 12 July 1954
denying its motion for reconsideration.
The logical inference that may be drawn from the order appealed from is that the Court of
Industrial Relations could not determine or at least was in doubt as to which of the two
labor unions named in the petition was the true choice of the laborers or employees of the
Saulog Transit, Inc. to represent them in all their dealings or for the purpose of collective
bargaining with their employer as regards the rates of pay, wages, hours of employment
and other conditions of employment, and for that reason the trial court ordered a
certification election pursuant to section 12(b), Republic Act No. 875.
The
Court
of
Industrial
findings:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Relations

made

the

following

From the evidence, the following are explicit in the pleadings and documents as well as
the testimonies submitted by the parties. It appears that the Saulog Transit, Inc. is
engaged in the transportation business in Manila and surrounding cities and employs 583
workers including supervisory personnel; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat there exists in
the company two unions, namely, the Buklod g Saulog Transit, the intervenor in this
case, and the Saulog Employees Union (PFL); chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat
thePetitioners numbering 65 are all employees of the company; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat there exists a collective bargaining contract (Exhibit 10) dated
July 15, 1953, between the Saulog Transit, Inc. and the Buklod g Saulog Transit with a
supplementary agreement (Exhibit 10-1) entered into on January 10, 1954, a month
after the petition for certification election was filed and already being investigated by this
Court.
The fundamental issue to be resolved in the present case is whether or not an order of
certification election shall issue on the basis of the evidence established.
By stipulation of the parties it was agreed in open Court that instead of a petition for
certification election confined to drivers and conductors as the appropriate bargaining
unit in the Saulog Transit, Inc., the parties have agreed on the employers unit.

At the hearing on January 16, 1954, counsel for Petitioner manifested in open Court that
out of the 65 signatories to the petition, 3 are inspectors and inasmuch as the inspectors
are supervisors he moved that they be stricken out of the petition, thereby leaving a total
of 62 signatories to the petition.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The evidence show that a total of 583 are employed in the Saulog Transit, Inc. Out of said
number, the Court holds that the following should be excluded as they come within the
disqualifying category of supervisors, namely, one (1) assistant General Manager; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarytwo (2) guards; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryone (1) shift
foreman; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand one (1) accountant. With regards to the 28
inspectors, which counsel forPetitioners contends to be supervisors without presenting
evidence on the matter, the Court is of the opinion that inspectors in transportation
business by the nature of their work do not fall within the category of supervisors under
Section 2 (k) of Republic Act No. 875.
On the basis of those retractions, intervenor maintains that the Petitioner can only lay
claim to forty-two (42) on their side and, therefore, this number no longer constitute ten
(10%) per cent of all the employees in the company minus the supervisory personnel. On
the subject of these retractions during the hearings of this case by the signatories to the
petition, the Court cannot help but entertain doubts that it was their free and untrammeled
will without pressure from without (within). It is to be noted that during one of the
hearings of this case, counsel for intervenor presented a letter (Exhibit A) dated
December 23, 1953, purportedly signed by 53 signatories to the petition addressed to
Marciano Casalla, president of the Saulog Employees Union (PFL) and one of
the Petitioners in this case, wherein it was stated that what they signed before Marciano
Casalla was not what they really signed for. During the next hearing on January 19, 1954,
counsel for Petitioners presented a document (Exhibit B) dated January 9, 1954,
addressed to the Court and purportedly signed by 21 out of the 53 signatories of the letter
marked as Exhibit A, wherein it was stated that when the company knew of their
signatures to the petition for certification election, they were told to sign the letter
(Exhibit A) or else they will lose their jobs.
Marciano Casalla testified at the hearings on January 19, 1954, when confronted with the
aforementioned documents, that the signatories of Exhibit A told him that they were
forced to sign said letter. Asked by counsel for intervenor how the signatories were forced
to sign, he testified that some of the signatories told him that they did not like to
sign; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat some told him they have to be rendered drunk first
before they could sign; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that some could not ask for vale
in the company unless they signed. (Recross examination of Marciano Cassalla, t.s.n., p.
27, hearing of January 19, 1954.).
Again at the hearing on February 4, 1954, 16 signatories to the petition for certification
election present signified in open court their desire for a certification election. Counsel
for intervenor in an effort to refute what they have previously testified regarding their
desire for a certification election presented affidavit previously signed by some of them.
Feliciano Ignacio when shown the affidavit (Exhibit D-1) he previously signed stated
that he signed said affidavit in his desire to work; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryP. de Luna

testified that he signed the affidavit (Exhibit 3) believing that it was for the return of
the fund deposits and there was nothing mentioned about certification election; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryGallardo testified that he signed the affidavit (Exhibits D-3 and
D-4) in his desire to be employed; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryA. Alde testified that he
signed the affidavit because he wanted to be assigned to a trip; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryN. Alcantara testified that he signed the affidavit because he was
afraid to be rejected in his work.
From the demeanor of the witnesses in the witness stand and the testimonies of the
above-mentioned witnesses, the Court believes that those retractions could not destroy
the desire of all signatories constituting, at least, ten (10%) per cent of the employees in
the appropriate unit desiring a certification election. The manner in which the retractions
were obtained more than convinces the Court of the need for a certification election so
that the doubt as to the true bargaining representative will be finally resolved. Republic
Act No. 875 states the remedy - a certification election. Besides, it should be noted that
section 12 of Republic Act No. 875 speaks of the ten (10%) per cent at the time of the
filing of the petition. Retractions and withdrawals, therefore, after the petition is filed
cannot affect the number of the Petitioners at the time the petition is filed.
Intervenor also offered in evidence a collective bargaining agreement it had with the
Saulog Transit, Inc., marked as Exhibit 10 and contends that it is a bar to the petition
for certification election. A careful scrutiny of such contract reveals that it does not touch
in substantial terms the rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of
employment of all the employees in the company but seeks to establish merely a
grievance procedure for drivers, conductors and inspectors who are members of the
Buklod g Saulog.
xxx

xxx

xxx

From the evidence on record, it appears that a supplementary contract (Exhibit 10-1)
providing for increase in pay, fixing of guarantee deposits nor conductors and drivers,
granting of loans to immediate members of the family of the union employees in case of
death, and granting daily bonus to drivers and conductors who have reached their daily
quota of collection, have been executed between the Saulog Transit, Inc., and the Buklod
g Saulog Transit cralaw
In its brief the Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Industrial Relations erred in
holding that it did not lose jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding the fact that
the Respondents (Petitionersin the court below) were reduced to less than 10 per cent of
the appropriate unit; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (2) the Court of Industrial Relations
erred in its interpretation of section 13, Republic Act No. 875, relative to the kind of
collective bargaining agreement which would constitute a bar to a certification election,
and in declaring that Exhibit 10 (whether by itself or as supplemented by Exhibit 10-1)
did not constitute a sufficient bar to a certification election. In support of its petition filed
in the Court of Industrial Relations the Petitioner Buklod g Saulog Transit raised the
following questions:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Does the collective bargaining agreement between the Buklod and the Saulog Transit,
Inc. (consisting of Exhibits 10 [and] 10-1) conform as to contents to the bargaining

contract contemplated in Section 13 of Republic Act 875? If so, is it a bar to certification


election? (Exhibits 10 and 10-1 are Annexes D and E, respectively.)
2. What is the effect of the holding of certification election on the collective bargaining
agreement previously entered into by the parties mentioned in Question 1?
The first error the Petitioner claims the Court of Industrial Relations committed is not
well taken, not only because of the rule laid down in cases decided under section 4,
Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended by section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 559,
consistently followed and maintained in this jurisdiction, 1 to the effect that the Court of
Industrial Relations acquires jurisdiction of an industrial dispute upon the filing of a
petition by 31 employees or laborers bringing such dispute to the Court for determination,
and that a diminution in number by retraction or withdrawal of any of them does not
divest it of its jurisdiction already acquired, but also because as found by the Court of
Industrial Relations, the retraction by some members who originally had signed the
petition was not of their own free will. The petition filed by 65 laborers or employees of
the Saulog Transit, Inc., was sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Industrial
Relations, for their number was more than 10 percent of the laborers and employees of
the Saulog Transit, Inc. 2
It is argued that under and pursuant to section 13, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 875,
which provides that
In the absence of an agreement or other voluntary arrangement providing for a more
expeditious manner of collective bargaining, it shall be the duty of an employer and the
representative of his employees to bargain collectively in accordance with the provisions
of this Act. Such duty to bargain collectively means the performance of the mutual
obligation to meet and confer promptly and expeditiously and in good faith, for the
purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours, and/or other terms and
conditions of employment, and of executing a written contract incorporating such
agreement if requested by either party, or for the purpose of adjusting any grievances or
question arising under such agreement, but such duty does not compel any party to agree
to a proposal or to make concession.
there was no need or reason for ordering a certification election, because on 15 July 1953
thePetitioner Buklod g Saulog Transit and the Saulog Transit, Inc. had already entered
into a collective bargaining agreement, as shown by Exhibit 10.
The provisions of section 13, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 875, contemplate a
situation not only where there had been no agreement entered into by and between
employees or laborers and employer or management as to terms and conditions of
employment, but also where there had been an agreement that leaves out many or some
matters on which the parties should have stipulated, if the collective bargaining
agreement is to achieve its purpose and aim industrial peace. 1
The trial court found that the collective bargaining agreement entered into by and
between the Saulog Transit, Inc. and the Buklod g Saulog Transit on 15 July 1953
(Exhibit 10; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryAnnex D) does not touch in substantial terms
the rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment of all
the employees in the company but seeks to establish merely a grievance procedure for

drivers, conductors and inspectors who are members of the Buklod g Saulog. And even
in the supplementary agreement (Exhibit 10-1; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryAnnex E),
there is no clear-cut stipulation as to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions or employment. 2 In their reply the Respondents claim that such an
agreement (Exhibit 10; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryAnnex D) and the supplementary
agreement (Exhibit 11; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryAnnex E) have not been identified and
offered in evidence and should not be taken into consideration. The trial court took,
however, into consideration both agreements and found that the first agreement being
incomplete does not bar a certification election; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand as to the
supplementary agreement the Court held that it having been entered into after the filing of
the petition for a certification election the same cannot and does not bar a certification
election. The affidavit filed by the President of the Buklod g Saulog Transit (Annex F) is
not mentioned in the order and resolution appealed from. It is clearly an effort on the part
of the Petitioner to supply what was lacking in the two agreements already mentioned.
The contention that as section 13, Republic Act No. 875, does not require that the
agreement be in writing unless either party request that it be reduced to writing, thereby
insinuating that there had been a verbal understanding before the written agreement was
entered into, has no bearing and effect in a case where there is a written agreement which
the Court of Industrial Relations found incomplete. In these circumstances we are of the
opinion that the collective bargaining agreement entered into on 15 July 1953 is no bar to
a certification election at the instance of at least 10 per cent of the employees in an
appropriate collective bargaining unit, pursuant to section 12, paragraphs (a), (b) and (c),
Republic Act No. 875.
The second question raised by the Petitioner in support of its petition filed in the court
below need not be passed upon. It has not arisen. Any pronouncement thereon would be
obiter and not binding.
The order and resolution appealed from are affirmed, with costs against the Petitioner.

[G.R. No. 111245. January 31, 1997]

SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA PACIFIC PLASTIC, petitioner, vs. HON.


BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA, Undersecretary of Labor, and MALAYANG
NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG PACIFIC PLASTIC, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari to set aside the resolution, dated May 14,
1993, of respondent Undersecretary of Labor and the order of the Med-Arbiter of January
31, 1993, dismissing the election protest of petitioner Samahan ng Manggagawa sa
Pacific Plastic (SAMAHAN) and upholding the election of respondent Malayang
Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Pacific Plastic (MNMPP) as the sole and exclusive

bargaining representative of the rank and file employees at the Pacific Plastic
Corporation.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner SAMAHAN and respondent MNMPP are labor unions of rank and file
employees at the Pacific Plastic Corporation (PPC) in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. On
August 24, 1990, MNMPP filed a Petition for Certification Election, alleging that there
were more or less 130 rank and file employees at the PPC whom it was seeking to
represent. [1] SAMAHAN countered by seeking the cancellation of MNMPPs union
registration. As a result, MNMPPs petition to be certified as the bargaining agent was
dismissed. MNMPP appealed to the Secretary of Labor who, on March 5, 1991, reversed
the decision of the Med-Arbiter and ordered the holding of a certification election among
the rank and file employees of the PPC. The PPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration but
its motion was denied. Accordingly, the representation officer of the Secretary of Labor
held a pre-election conference on May 6, 1991, during which the PPC was required to
submit the list of its rank and file employees based on the company payroll three (3)
months prior to the filing of the petition. As respondent company failed to submit the
list, it was given a stern warning by the Department of Labor (DOLE) that should it fail
to appear at the next conference on June 3, 1991, the list to be submitted by petitioner
MNMPP would be used as basis for determining the eligible voters. [2] But the PPC again
failed to appear at the conference, prompting the Department of Labor Industrial
Relations Division (DOLE-IRD) to issue a final warning. [3]
Petitioner SAMAHAN also failed to appear at the June 3, 1991 conference. On June 18,
1991, it moved to defer the conference, alleging that proceedings for the cancellation of
union registration of MNMPP were still pending resolution before the Med-Arbiter which
constitute a prejudicial question and that there existed a collective bargaining agreement
between PPC and SAMAHAN which was a bar to the certification election. [4]
MNMPP opposed the motion, contending that the cancellation case had already been
finally decided by the DOLE and that the execution of the subject CBA during the
pendency of the representation case did not bar the holding of a certification election. [5]
On August 23, 1991, the DOLE-IRD summoned respondent company once more,
reiterating its warning that should the company fail to submit the list of its rank and file
employees, the list to be submitted by private respondent MNMPP and petitioner
SAMAHAN would be adopted as the list of qualified voters and the companys right to
the exclusion proceedings would be deemed waived. [6]
But again PPC did not comply with the DOLE order. Meanwhile, on September 23,
1991, SAMAHAN and MNMPP agreed to hold the certification election on October 29,
1991 on the basis of the list of employees submitted by MNMPP, without prejudice to the
submission by petitioner SAMAHAN of its own list on October 17, 1991. [7] Thereafter,
they agreed to postpone election to await the list of employees requested from the Social
Security System. [8]

On September 10, 1992, upon motion of MNMPP, the certification election was finally
set for October 6, 1992. But SAMAHAN objected despite its agreement with MNMPP
on September 23, 1991 to hold an election using the list furnished by the SSS. [9] It also
objected to the participation of a third labor union, Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino
(KAMAPI) which in the meantime had filed a motion for intervention. Thereafter,
SAMAHAN filed a Manifestation/Motion that it was not participating in the certification
election and asked that the certification election held on the same day be nullified for the
following reasons: (1) it did not receive notice of the certification as required by law; (2)
its opposition to KAMAPIs motion to intervene and its opposition to setting the date of
the certification election had not been resolved; (3) there were discrepancies in the list of
voters submitted by the SSS; and (4) SAMAHANs President moved to strike out his
signature at the back of the official ballot. [10]
The certification election was held on October 6, 1992. Over SAMAHANs objection
KAMAPI was allowed to participate. The following were results of the election: [11]
No. of Eligible Voters..98
Malayang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic,...56
Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic..2
Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino...0
No Union1
No. of Spoiled Ballots cast.3
Total no of Votes Cast..62
On October 9, 1992, SAMAHAN protested the result of the certification election
alleging the same grounds alleged by it in its Manifestation/Motion of October 6, 1992.
On October 15, 1992, MNMPP opposed the petition raising the following arguments: (1)
that the mere filing of a motion for intervention will not suspend the holding of a
certification election under Rule V, 5 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code; (2) that the results of the election showed that intervenor was resoundingly
repudiated by the employees; (3) that it failed to specify the alleged discrepancies in the
list of employees furnished by the SSS; and (4) that matters not raised during the election
are deemed waived pursuant to Rule VI, 3 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code. [12]
In his order dated January 31, 1993, the Med-Arbiter, Tomas F. Falconitin, dismissed
the election protest of SAMAHAN and upheld the election of MNMPP as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of all rank and file employees at the PPC. On March 12,
1993, SAMAHAN appealed to the Secretary of Labor. It argued that its opposition to
KAMAPIs Motion for Intervention should first be resolved before a certification election
could be held and that the contract-bar rule should be applied. In addition, it contended
that the use of the SSS list was in violation of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code which prescribe the use of the company payroll as basis for the voters list.
On May 14, 1993, Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma denied the appeal of
SAMAHAN and affirmed the decision of the Med-Arbiter. SAMAHAN moved for a

reconsideration, but its motion was denied on July 29, 1993. Hence, this petition
for certiorari.
Petitioner contends:
1. The certification election held on October 6, 1992 is null and void on the ground that
only 62 out of 130 employees participated in the activity.
2. The SSS lists indicating 98 covered employees cannot be used as substitute for three
(3) monthly payrolls [sic] required for the purpose of determining the qualified voters and
the majority vote needed in an election.
3. Hon. Bienvenido Laguesma committed a serious error amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in upholding the election of respondent officers [sic] despite the absence of
majority support which is 65 out of 130 admitted members in the bargaining unit.
4. Hon. Bienvenido Laguesma had abused his discretion in sustaining the med-arbiter
despite the absence of any legal or factual support when he could otherwise declare
failure of an election, thereby constituting his acts to have been done in excess of his
authority amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and therefore his resolution and order issued
pursuant thereof are considered to be null and void. [13]
The petition has no merit.
First. The certification election held on October 6, 1992 is valid. Art. 256 of the
Labor Code provides that in order to have a valid election, at least a majority of all
eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The certification election results
show that more than a majority, i.e., 62 out of a total of 98 eligible voters included in the
list of employees obtained from the SSS, cast their votes. Hence, the legal requirement
for a valid election was met.
The bone of contention actually concerns the propriety of utilizing the list of
employees furnished by the SSS as basis for determining the total number of eligible
voters in the bargaining unit. Petitioner claims that, according to the Implementing
Rules, the basis for the list of eligible voters should have been the payroll three (3)
months preceding the filing of the petition for certification election and that if this was
done the 62 votes cast would be short of the majority because, instead of only 98
employees as shown in the SSS list, there were actually 130 as alleged in MNMPPs
petition for certification election.
The contention is without merit. As petitioner itself says, the figure 130 is based on
the allegation that MNMPP made in its petition for certification election that it was
supported by at least 25% of the members of the bargaining unit. [14] Such statement was a
mere approximation of the size of the bargaining unit that the petitioning union seeks to
represent and cannot be used against MNMPP for this reason.
It should ideally be the payroll which should have been used for the purpose of the
election. However, the unjustified refusal of a company to submit the payroll in its
custody, despite efforts to make it produce it, compelled resort to the SSS list as the next

best source of information. After all, the SSS list is a public record whose regularity is
presumed. In Port Workers Union of the Philippines (PWUP) v. Undersecretary of
Labor and Employment, [15] this Court underscored the policy of the Labor Code of
encouraging the holding of a certification election as the definitive and certain way of
ascertaining the choice of employees as to the labor organization in a collective
bargaining unit. In Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services World
Federation of Trade Unions v. Laguesma, [16] we reiterated this policy thus:
It bears stressing that no obstacle must be placed to the holding of certification elections,
for it is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented. We have held that whenever
there is doubt as to whether a particular union represents the majority of the rank and file
employees, in the absence of a legal impediment, the holding of certification election is
the most democratic method of determining the employees choice of their bargaining
representative. It is the appropriate means whereby controversies and disputes on
representation may be laid to rest, by the unequivocal vote of the employees
themselves. Indeed, it is the keystone of industrial democracy.
Insistence on the application of the Omnibus Implementing Rules could defeat this
policy. Worse, it could facilitate fraud by employers who can easily suppress the payroll
to prevent certification elections from being held. This Court has therefore consistently
adhered to the principle announced in U.E. Automotive Employees v. Noriel [17] that where
it concerns the weight to be accorded to the wishes of the majority as expressed in an
election conducted fairly and honestly, certain provisions that may be considered
mandatory before the voting takes place become thereafter merely directory in order that
the wishes of the electorate prevail. Considering all the arguments presented above, we
find no substantial reason to nullify the certification election conducted on October 6,
1992 on the basis of a mere technicality which finds no justification considering the facts
of the case nor upon close examination of the true intent of the law to remove all
impediments to the conduct of certification elections.
At all events petitioner must be deemed to have waived the objection based on this
ground, considering that this objection was raised for the first time in petitioners appeal
from the decision of the Med-Arbiter dismissing petitioners protest. [18] Even then,
petitioners objection to the use of the SSS list was not that this was contrary to the
requirement of the Implementing Rules that the payroll three (3) months prior to the
filing of the petition should be used but rather that the list contained some
discrepancy [19] an allegation which petitioner failed to substantiate.
At the latest, petitioners objection to the use of the SSS should have been raised
during the elections and formalized in its election protest. We agree with private
respondent MNMPP in its Opposition to SAMAHANs election protest dated October 15,
1992 that under the Implementing Rules, grounds of protests not raised before the close
of the proceedings and duly formalized within five (5) days after the close of the election
proceedings are deemed waived. [20]
Second. Petitioners contention in its Motion for Deferment of Pre-election
Conference was that the CBA between it and the PPC signed during the pendency of the

representation proceedings, rendered the certification election moot and academic. Rule
V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, 4 provides:
The representation case shall not, however, be adversely affected by a collective
bargaining agreement registered before or during the last 60 days of a subsisting
agreement or during the pendency of the representation case.
This rule was applied in the case of ALU-TUCP v. Trajano [21] where we held that the
representation case will not be adversely affected by a CBA registered before or during
the freedom period or during the pendency of the representation case. In ALU v.
Calleja, [22] we also held that a CBA, which was prematurely renewed, is not a bar to the
holding of a certification election. Hence, the CBA entered into between petitioner and
PPC during the pendency of the representation case and after the filing of the petition for
certification election on August 24, 1990, cannot possibly prejudice the certification
election nor render it moot.
Third. With respect to petitioners claim [23] that the proceedings for the cancellation
of MNMPPs union registration was a prejudicial question, suffice it to say that as held in
Association of Court of Appeals Employees vs. Cal1eja, [24] certification election can be
conducted despite pendency of a petition to cancel the union registration certificate. For
the fact is that at the time the respondent union filed its petition for certification, it still
had the legal personality to perform such act absent an order directing its cancellation.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 95013 September 21, 1994
TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES/FEBRUARY SIX MOVEMENT
TUPAS/FSM), petitioner,
vs.
HON BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA, TRANSUNION CORPORATION-GLASS
DIVISION, AND INTEGRATED LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILOPHILIPPINES), respondents.
Alar, Comia, Manalo and Associates Law Offices for petitioner.
Arcaya & Associates for Transunion Corp.-Glass Division.
Francisco A. Mercado, Jr. for Integrated Labor Organization (ILO-Phils.)

PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Trade Unions of the Philippines-February Six Movement (TUPAS-FSM) seeks
the reversal of theResolution, dated July 25, 1990, rendered by then Secretary of Labor

and Employment Ruben D. Torres, In OS-MA-A-5-167-90, which dismissed the petition


for certification election filed by petitioner TUPAS-FSM for being prematurely filed. 1
The controlling facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On March 23, 1990 TUPAS-FSM filed a petition for certification election with the
Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), for the
purpose of choosing a bargaining representative for the rank-and-file employees of
Transunion Corporation's industrial plant, situated in Canlubang, Laguna, known as
the Transunion Corporation-Glassware Division. Petitioner had then secured a
Certification
,
dated
March 22, 1990, issued by Tomas B. Bautista, Jr., Director IV of DOLE (Region IV), that
"Transunion Corporation" has no existing collective bargaining agreement with any labor
organization. 2
It appears, however, that before the filing of said petition, or on November 15,
1989, Integrated Labor Organization (ILO-Phils.) was duly certified by DOLE as the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Transunion
Corporation-Glassware Division. 3 On November 28, 1989, a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) was the forged between Transunion-Glassware Division and ILO-Phils.
covering the company's rank-and-file employees, The CBA, with a five-year term from
December 1, 1989 to December 1, 1994, was ratified by a great majority of the rank-and
-filers on December 8, 1989. 4 In the meantime, the President of ILO-PHILS died. An
inter-union conflict followed and the subject CBA was filed with DOLE, for registration
purposes, only on March 14, 1990, more or less, three (3) months from its execution.
Finally, on May 4, 1990, the Certification of Registration was issued by DOLE through
Regional Director Romeo A. Young. 5
ILO-Phils., intervened in the certification election proceedings initiated by TUPAS-FSM.
It opposed the petition in view of the existing CBA between ILO and the Transunion
Corporation-Glassware Division. It stresses that the petition for certification election
should be entertained only during the freedom period, or sixty day before the expiration
of the CBA. Med-Arbiter Orlando S. deal Cruz dismissed the petition on the ground of
prematurity.
TUPAS-FSM appealed contending: (1) that pursuant to Article 231 of the Labor Code.
CBAs shall be file with the Regional Office of the DOLE within thirty (30) days from the
date of signing thereof; (2) that said requirement is mandatory, although it would not
affect the enforceability of the CBA as between the parties thereto; and (3) since the CBA
was filed outside the 30-day period specified under Article 231 of the Labor Code, the
prohibition against certification election under Article 232 of the same Code should not
apply to third parties such as petitioner.
As stated earlier, the Secretary of Labor and Employment affirmed the impugned Order
of the Med-Arbiter, ruling that the belated submission of the CBA was excusable and that
the requirement of the law was substantially complied with upon the filing of a copy of

the CBA prior to the filing of the petition for certification election. TUPAS-FSM then
filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was also denied, Hence, this petition
for certiorari where petitioner alleged:
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS
AMOUNTING TO LOSS OF JURISDICTION; and
THE RESOLUTION IS CONTRARY TO THE FACTS AND THE LAW.
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioner raises both factual and legal issues in this present petition.
First, the factual issues. Relying on the March 22, 1990 Dole Certification issued by
Director Bautista, Jr., supra, petitioner insists there was no existing CBA between
Transunion Corporation and any labor organization when it filed its petition for
certification election on March 23, 1990. To further strengthen its position, petitioner
charges that the filing of the CBA was antedated to march 14, 1990, to make it appear
that the same was already existing and filed before the filing of the petition for
certification election. Petitioner also claims that since Article 231 of the Labor Code
mandates DOLE to act on the CBA filed in its office within Five (5) days from date of
filing thereof, the subject CBA was filed on April 30, 1990, or five (5) days before its
registration on May 4, 1990.
The argument deserves scant consideration. It is elementary that the special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court can be availed of to nullify or
modify the proceedings before the concerned tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial functions who has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. This Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its function to
examine and evaluate the probative value of all evidence presented to the concerned
tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned decision, resolution or order. 6 Following
this hoary rule, it is inappropriate to review the factual findings of the Med-arbiter and
the Secretary of Labor, regarding the date of filing of the CBA on March 14, 1990 prior
to the filing of the petition for certification election; the company's voluntary recognition
and DOLE's certification of ILO-PHILS. as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the rank-and-file employees of Transunion Corporation-Glassware
Division; and the subsequent registration of the CBA. They are binding on this Court as
they are supported by substantial evidence. In contrast, petitioners bare allegation
pertaining to the "antedating" of the date of filing of the CBA is unsubstantiated and
based purely on conjectures.
It is crystal clear from the records that the rank-and- file employees of private
respondent's Glassware Division are, at present, represented by ILO-PHILS. Hence,
petitioner's reliance on the March 22, 1990 Certification issued by Director Bautista, Jr.,
is misplaced. The existence and filing of their CBA was confirmed in a Certification,

dated April 24, 1990, issued by Director Romeo A. Young of DOLE-Region IV. 7 The
Certification of ILO-PHILS. "as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-andfile workers of Transunion-Glassware Division," means it shall remain as such during the
existence of the CBA, to the exclusion of other labor organizations, including petitioner,
and no petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be
entertained, nor shall certification election be conducted, outside of the fifty-day freedom
period immediately before the expiry date of the five-year term of the CBA. 8
We now resolved the legal issue. Petitioner points out that the subject CBA was filed
beyond the 30-day period prescribed under Article 231 of the Labor Code. It also insists
that under Article 232 of the Labor Code, the prohibition on the filing of a petition for
certification election applies when the CBA had been duly registered and, in this case,
since the CBA was not registered in accordance with the Art. 231, the prohibition will not
apply. We disagree.
Article 231 an s232 of the Labor Code read:
Art. 231. Registry of unions and file of collective agreements. - . . . .
Within thirty (30) days from the execution of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, the
parties shall submit copies of the same directly to the Bureau or the Regional Office of
the Department of Labor and Employment for registration accompanied with verified
proofs of its posting n two conspicuous places in the place of work and ratification by the
majority of all the workers in the bargaining unit. The Bureau or Regional Office shall act
upon the application for registration of such Collective Bargaining Agreement within five
(5) days from receipts thereof. The Regional Office shall furnish the Bureau with a copy
of the Collective Bargaining agreement within five (5) days form its submission.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 232. Prohibition on Certification Election. The Bureau shall not entertain any
petition for certification election or any other action which may disturb the administration
of duly registered existing collective bargaining agreement affecting the parties except
under Articles 253, 253-A and 256 of this Code.
Corollary thereto, Article 253-A of the same Code reads:
Art. 253-A. Any Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter into
shall, insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five (5) years. No
petition questioning agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be
conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside the sixty-day period
immediately before the date of expiry of such five year term of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. . . . .
It appears that the procedural requirement of filing the CBA within 30 days from date of
execution under Article 231 was not met. The subject CBA was executed on November

28, 1989. It was ratified on December 8, 1989, and then filed with DOLE for registration
purposes on March 14, 1990. Be that as it may, the delay in the filing of the CBA was
sufficiently explained, i.e., there was an inter-union conflict on who would succeed to the
presidency of ILO-PHILS. The CBA was registered by the DOLE only on May 4, 1990.
It would be injudicious for us to assume, as what petitioner did, that the said CBA was
filed only on April 30, 1990, or five (5) days before its registration, on the unsupported
surmise that it was done to suit the law that enjoins Regional Offices of Dole to act upon
an application for registration of a CBA within five (5) days from its receipt thereof. In
the absence of any substantial evidence that DOLE officials or personnel, in collusion
with private respondent, had antedated the filing date of the CBA, the presumption on
regularity in the performance of official functions hold.
More importantly, non-compliance with the cited procedural requirement should not
adversely affect the substantive validity of the CBA between ILO-PHILS and the
Transunion Corporation-Glassware Division covering the company's rank and file
employees. A collective bargaining agreement is more than a contract. It is highly
impressed with public interest for it is an essential instrument to promote industrial peace.
Hence, it bears the blessings not only of the employer and employees concerned but even
the Department of Labor and Employment. To set it aside on technical grounds is not
conducive to the public good.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the impugned July 25, 1990 Resolution, and August 23, 1990
Order of Secretary Ruben D. Torres and Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma.
respectively, in OS-MA-A-5-167-90, is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioned.

[G.R. No. 120505. March 25, 1999]

ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES (AIUP),


JOEL DENSING, HENEDINO MIRAFUENTES, CHRISTOPHER
PATENTES, AND ANDRES TEJANA, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION
(NLRC),
CENAPRO
CHEMICAL
CORPORATION and/or GO SING CHAN in his capacity as Managing
Director, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
The Petition for review on Certiorari at bar seeks to reinstate the Decision [1] of the
Labor Arbiter insofar as it ordered the reinstatement and payment of backwages of the
four petitioners herein. The said decision was affirmed[2] in toto by the NLRC. On
February 21, 1995, however, upon motion for reconsideration of the respondent company,
the NLRC came out with a Resolution [3] modifying its decision, by deleting therefrom the

award of backwages, ordering payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, and


declaring the loss of employment status of petitioner Joel Densing.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Joel Densing, Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana, the
petitioner herein, were casual employees of respondent CENAPRO Chemicals
Corporation. In the said company, the collective bargaining representative of all rank and
file employees was CENAPRO Employees Association (CCEA), with which respondent
company had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Their CBA excluded casual
employees from membership in the incumbent union. The casual employees who have
rendered at least one to six years of service sought regularization of their
employment. When their demand was denied, they formed themselves into an
organization and affiliated with the Association of Independent unions in the
Philippines (AIUP). Thereafter, AIUP filed a petition for certification election, which
petition was opposed by the respondent company. The CCEA anchored its opposition on
the contract bar rule.
On May 4, and July 3, 1990, the union filed a notice of strike, minutes of strike vote,
and the needed documentation, with the Department of Labor and Employment. The
notice of strike cited as grounds therefor the acts of respondent company constituting
unfair labor practice, more specifically coercion of employees and systematic union
busting.
On July 23, 1992, the union proceeded to stage a strike, in the course of which, the
union perpetrated illegal acts. The strikers padlocked the gate of the company. The areas
fronting the gate of the company were barricaded and blocked by union strikers. The
strikers also prevented and coerced other non-striking employees from reporting for
work. Because of such illegal activities, the respondent company filed a petition for
injunction with the NLRC, which granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO),
enjoining the strikers from doing further acts of violence, coercion, or intimidation and
from blocking free ingress and egress to the company premises.
Subsequently, or on July 25, 1990, to be precise, the respondent company filed a
complaint for illegal strike. The day before, July 24, 1990, petitioners filed a complaint
for unfair labor practice and illegal lockout against the respondent company.
In a consolidated Decision, dated September 10, 1993, the Labor Arbiter declared as
illegal the strike staged by the petitioners, and dismissed the charge of illegal lockout and
unfair labor practice. The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiters decision was to the
following effect:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the strike
illegal and as a consequence thereto, the officers who participated in the illegal strike
namely: Oscar Enicio, Jaime dela Piedra, Lino Isidro, Ariel Jorda, and Jose Catnubay
are declared to have lost their employment status. CENAPRO is directed however to
reinstate the other workers, except Ireneo Sagaral, Artemio Guinto, Ruben Tulod,
Marcelo M. Matura, Gilbert Holdilla, Cesar Buntol, Rey Siarot, Lucio Nuneza, Jose
Basco, Grevacio Baldespinosa, Jr., Cresecente Buntol, Dennis Pepito, Florencio Pepito,

Edwin Raymayrat, Daniel Canete, and Vivencio Sinadjan who executed quitclaims in
favor of CENAPRO and cenapro is being absolved from the charges of illegal lockout
and unfair labor practice.
SO ORDERED.[4]
In short, five (5) union officers were declared to have lost their employment status,
fifteen (15) union members were not reinstated because they executed quit claims in
favor of the respondent company, and six (6) workers, Rosalito Bantulan, Edward
Regner, Joel Densing Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana,
were ordered to be reinstated.
On October 8, 1993, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order excluding Rosalito Bantulan
and Edward Regner from the list of those to be reinstated and to be paid backwages. The
remaining four (4) workers, Joel Densing, Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes,
and Andres Tejana, are the petitioners here.
On October 5, 1993, the respondent company appealed the aforesaid insofar as it
ordered the reinstatement of some of the strikers.
On October 7, 1993, the petitioners also appealed the same decision of the Labor
Arbiter.
Pending resolution of the said appeals, petitioner AUIP filed with the Labor Arbiter a
Motion for Execution of the Labor Arbiters Decision directing reinstatement of some of
its members. The motion was granted in the Order dated October 15, 1993.
On December 7, 1993, respondent company presented a Manifestation/Motion
praying that instead of reinstatement, it be allowed to pay separation pay to petitioners.
On December 16, 1993, petitioners presented a motion for payroll reinstatement,
which motion was opposed by the respondent company, alleging mainly that the
circumstances of the case have strained the relationship of the parties herein, rendering
their reinstatement unwise and inappropriate. But such opposition was overruled by the
Labor Arbiter. In his Order of March 23, 1994, the same Labor Arbiter issued a second
writ of execution directing actual, it not payroll reinstatement of the strikers.
On April 6, 1994, respondent company appealed the second order for the
reinstatement of the strikers, placing reliance on the same grounds raised in support of its
first appeal.
In its Decision dated August 15, 1994, the NLRC affirmed in toto the Labor Arbiters
decision, dismissed both the appeal of private respondent and that of petitioners, and
reiterated the Labor Arbiters Order for the reinstatement of the herein petitioners, Joel
Densing, Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana. The said
decision disposed and directed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, these appeals are DISMISSED, and the decision
of the Labor Arbiter is AFFIRMED in its entirety.

Appellant Cenapro Chemical Corporation is hereby ordered to immediately comply with


the Labor Arbiters Order dated March 23, 1994 and to release the salaries of four (4)
appellant-workers namely Joel Densing, Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes,
and Andres Tejana from October 15, 1993 and continue paying them up to the time this
decision has become final and executory, less earnings earned elsewhere.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Respondent company moved for reconsideration of that portion of the NLRCs
decision ordering the reinstatement of the said strikers. Acting thereupon, the NLRC
modified its Decision of August 15, 1994, by ordering the payment of separation pay in
lieu of the reinstatement of the petitioners, deleting the award of backwages, and
declaring the loss of employment status of Joel Densing. The dispositive portion of the
said Amendatory Resolution, ruled thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Commission promulgated on August 15, 1994 is
hereby MODIFIED. In view of the reinstatement to complainants Henedino Mirafuentes,
Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana, appellant-movant CENAPRO Chemicals
Corporation is directed to pay them the amount equivalent to one (1) month pay for every
year of service and without backwages. As regards Joel Densing, he is declared to have
lost his employment status.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Hence, the present petition, theorizing that respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in:
1) Entertaining the second appeal of the respondent company dated 6 April
1994 (the first appeal dated 5 October 1993) which was based on similar grounds.
2) reversing its earlier Resolution of the first appeal promulgated 15 August
1994 by way of another contradictory and baseless ruling promulgated on 21
February 1995.
3) Depriving Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana of
their to reinstatement and backwages; and
4) Depriving Joel Densing of his right to reinstatement or separation pay with
backwages.
It is decisively clear that although the grounds invoked in the two appeals were the
same, the said appeals were separate and distinct remedies. Filed on October 5, 1993, the
first appeal was from the decision of Labor Arbiter Nicasio Aninon, dated September 10,
1993, seeking loss of employment status of all union members who participated in the
illegal strike. The second appeal, dated April 6, 1994, was, in effect, an opposition to the
second writ of execution issued on March 23, 1994. The second writ pertained to the
order to effect immediate actual or payroll reinstatement of the four petitioners
herein. The said appeals were acted upon separately by the NLRC, which did not act with
grave abuse of discretion in entertaining such appeals.

When they filed the notice of strike, petitioner cited as their grounds therefor unfair
labor practice, specifically coercion of employees and systematic union busting. But the
said grounds were adjudged as baseless by the Labor Arbiter. The court quotes with
approval the following findings of Labor Arbiter Aninon, to wit:
x x x In fact, in the undated Joint Affidavit of Oscar Enecio, Edgardo Regner,
Christopher Patentes, Edgar Sanchez, Ariel Jorda, and Jaime dela Piedra, the workers
stated that what they considered as harassments and insults are those when they were
scolded for little mistakes and memoranda for tardiness. These acts, if really committed
cannot be considered as harassment and insults but were ordinary acts which employers
have to do as part of their administrative supervision over their employees. Moreover,
Oscar Enecios testimony that some of his fellow union members like vice-president
Jaime dela Piedra, Christopher Potentes and Herodino Mirafuentes, were also harass
when they were made to work another eight (8) hours after their tour of duty deserves
scant consideration not only because it is uncorroborated but he could not even give the
dates when these workers were made to work for sixteen (16) hours, how many instances
these happened and whether or not the workers have actually worked,[7]
The court discerns no basis for altering the aforesaid findings which have been affirmed
by the NLRC.
The court is not persuaded by petitioners allegation of union busting. The NLRC
correctly ruled that the strike staged by petitioners was in the nature of a unionrecognition-strike. A union-recognition-strike, as its legal designation implies, is
calculated to compel the employer to recognize ones union and not other contending
group, as the employees bargaining representative to work out a collective bargaining
agreement despite the striking unions doubtful majority status to merit voluntary
recognition and lack of formal certification as the exclusive representative in the
bargaining unit. It is undisputed that at the time the petition for certification election was
filed by AIUP, the petitioner union, there was an existing CBA between the respondent
company and CCEA, the incumbent bargaining representative of all rank and file
employees. The petition should have not been entertained because of the contract bar
rule. When a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance
with Article 231 of the Labor Code, a petition for certification election or motion for
intervention may be entertained only within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of the
said agreement.[8] Outside the said period, as in the present case, the petition for
certification election or motion for intervention cannot be allowed. Hence, the
conclusion that the respondent company did not commit the alleged union busting.
From the gamut of evidence on hand, it can be gathered that the strike staged by the
petitioner union was illegal for the reasons, that:
1) The strikers committed illegal acts in the course of the strike. They formed
human barricades to block the road, prevented the passage of the respondent
companys truck, padlocked the companys gate, and prevented co-workers from
entering the company premises.[9]

2) And violated the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)[10] enjoining the union
and/or its members from obstructing the company premises, and ordering the
removal therefrom of all the barricades.
A strike is a legitimate weapon in the universal struggle for existence. [11] It is
considered as the most effective weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to
improve the terms and conditions of their employment. [12] But to be valid, a strike must be
pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means for the attainment of social
justice is never meant to oppress or destroy the employer. The law provides limits for its
exercise. Among such limits are the prohibited activities under Article 264 of the Labor
Code, particularly paragraph (e), which states that no person engaged in picketing shall:
a) commit any act of violence, coercion, or intimidation or
b) obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employers premises for lawful purposes
or
c) obstruct public thoroughfares.
Even if the strike is valid because its objective or purpose is lawful, the strike may
still be declared invalid where the means employed are illegal. For instance, the strike
was considered illegal as the strikers formed a human cordon along the side of the Sta.
Ana wharf and blocked all the ways and approaches to the launches and vessels of
Petitioners.[13]
It follows therefore that the dismissal of the officers of the striking union was
justified and valid. Their dismissal as a consequence of the illegality of the strike staged
by them finds support in Article 264(a) of the Labor Code, pertinent portion of which
provides: x x Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any
x x union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. x x
Union officers are duty bound to guide their members to respect the law. If instead
of doing so, the officers urge the members to violate the law and defy the duly constituted
authorities, their dismissal from the service is a just penalty or sanction for their unlawful
acts. The officers responsibility is greater than that of the members.[14]
The courts finds merit in the finding by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that the
respondent company committed no illegal lockout. Lockout means temporary refusal of
the employer to furnish work as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.[15]
As observed by the Labor Arbiter, it was the appellant-workers who voluntarily
stopped working because of their strike. In fact, the appellant workers admitted that nonstriking workers who wanted to return to work were allowed to do so. Their being
without work could not therefore be attributed to the employers refusal to give them
work but rather, to the voluntary withdrawal of their services in order to compel the
company to recognize their union.[16]

The next aspect of the case to consider is the fate of the four petitioners
herein. Decisive on the matter is the pertinent provision of Article 264 (a) of the Labor
Code that: x x any worker x x who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal
acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. x x It can be
gleaned unerringly from the aforecited provision of law in point, however, that an
ordinary striking employee can not be terminated for mere participation in an illegal
strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the strike [17] and the
striker who participated in the commission of illegal act must be identified. But proof
beyond reasonable doubt is not required. Substantial evidence available under the
attendant circumstances, which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal,
may suffice.
In the landmark case of Ang Tibay vs. CIR,[18] the court ruled Not only must there
be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion.
Respondent company contends that sufficient testimonial, documentary and real
evidence, including the photographs supposedly taken by a certain Mr. Ponce, were
presented at the arbitration level. It is argued that the said pictures best show the
participation of the strikers in the commission of illegal acts in the course of the strike. In
connection therewith, it is worthy to point out the sole basis of the NLRC for declaring
the loss of employment status of petitioner Joel Densing, to wit:
ATTY. PINTOR:
Q: Now, Mr. Ponce, on page 1 of your affidavit, paragraph 4 thereof, you alleged
that: While in the gate, I saw several strikers of Cenapro blocked its gate and
prevented the truck from proceeding to its destination. Who were these several
workers you referred to, in this affidavit of yours?
WITNESS:
A. The strikers.
HON. LABOR ARBITER:
Q. Are you referring to the complainants in this case who are now present?
WITNESS:
A.

Yes, sir, I am referring to AIU members.


HON. LABOR ARBITER:
Make it of record that the witness is referring to the five persons inside the court
namely: Rosalino Bentulan, Ariel Jorda, Ranulfo Cabrestante, Jose Catnubay
and Joel Densing.[19] (emphasis supplied).

All things studiedly considered, the court is not convinced that the quantum of proof
on record hurdled the substantiality of evidence test [20] to support a decision, a basic
requirement in administrative adjudication. If the said pictures exhibited before the
Labor Arbiter portrayed the herein petitioners performing prohibited acts during the

strike, why were these pictures not exhibited for identification of petitioners? Petitioners
could have been identified in such pictures, if they were reflected therein, in the same
manner that the lawyer who examined Mr. Ponce, asked witness Armamento to identify
the Sheriff, Mr. Leahmon Tolo, thus :
ATTY. PINTOR:
Q - I refer your attention Mr. Armamento to Exhibit 16. There is a person here
wearing a short sleeve barong tagalog. Can you please tell the Honorable office if
you will be able to identify this person?
WITNESS:
A - Yes, this is the Sheriff, Mr. Leahmon Tolo.[21]
The identification of the alleged pictures of the strikers, if properly made, could have
been categorized as substantial evidence, which a reasonable mind may accept as
adequate to support a conclusion that Joel Densing participated in blocking the gate of
respondent company.
Verily, the uncorroborated testimony of Mr. Ponce does not suffice to support a
declaration of loss of employment status of Joel Densing. This could be the reason why
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, in its decision dated August 15, 1994, upheld the
reinstatement of Joel Densing.
The contention of petitioners that the factual findings by the Labor Arbiter, as trial
officer in the case, deserves much weight is tenable. The NLRC is bound by the factual
findings of the Labor Arbiter as the latter was in a better position to observe the demeanor
and deportment of the witnesses. "Absent any substantial proof that the trial courts
decision was based on speculation, the same must be accorded full consideration and
should not be disturbed on appeal.[22]
Premises studiedly considered, we are of the ineluctable conclusion, and hold, that
the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in declaring the loss of employment status of Joel
Densing.
As regards the other petitioners, Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and
Andres Tejana, their reinstatement is warranted. In its resolution, the NLRC adjudged
petitioners as not entirely faultless in light of the following revelation of Mr. Ponce, to
wit:
ATTY. PINTOR:
Q. Mr. Ponce, I will refer you to a picture previously marked as our Annex
H. Showing to you the said picture. In said picture, three are persons who are
lying on the road. Can you please identify who are these persons?
WITNESS:
A.

They are the strikers.


ATTY. PINTOR:
Q. Are you referring to the AIU strikers the complainants in this case?

WITNESS:
A. Yes, Sir.[23]
For the severest administrative penalty of dismissal to attach, the erring strikers must be
duly identified. Simply referring to them as strikers, AIU strikers complainants in
this case is not enough to justify their dismissal.
On the issue of reinstatement and payment of salaries, the court also find for
petitioners. Telling on the monetary award is Article 223 of the Labor Code, the pertinent
of which reads:
x x x In any event, the decision of the labor arbiter reinstating a dismissed employee
shall be immediately executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be
admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his
dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the
payroll. The posting of bond shall not stay the execution of the reinstatement provided
therein. x x x
The NLRC Resolution of February 21, 1995 does not state any plausible ground or
basis for deleting the award for backwages. The mere fact that the petitioners were not
entirely faultless is of no moment. Such finding below does not adversely affect their
entitlement to backwages. As opined by the NLRC in its Decision of August 15, 1994,
affirming in its entirety the conclusion arrived at by the Labor Arbiter the only option
left to the appellant-company is whether to physically reinstate appellant workers or to
reinstate them on the payroll.
The unmeritorious appeal interposed by the respondent company, let alone the failure
to execute with dispatch the award of reinstatement delayed the payroll reinstatement of
petitioner. But their long waiting is not completely in vain, for the court holds that their
(petitioners) salaries and backwages must be computed from October 15, 1993 until full
payment of their separation pay, without any deduction. This is in consonance with the
ruling in the case of Bustamante vs. NLRC,[24] where payment of full backwages without
deduction was ordered. The four petitioners herein are entitled to reinstatement absent
any just ground for their dismissal. Considering, however, that more than eight (8) years
have passed since subject strike was staged, an award of separation pay equivalent to
one (1)month pay for every year of service, in lieu of reinstatement, is deemed more
practical and appropriate to all the parties concerned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the Resolution of NLRC, dated
February 21, 1995, is SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the Labor Arbiter of October 8,
1993 REINSTATED, with the modification that the petitioners, Joel Densing, Henedino
Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana, be paid full backwages computed
from October 15, 1993 until full payment of their separation pay. The payment of
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, is hereby authorized. No pronouncement as to
costs.
G.R. No. 79025. December 29, 1989.

BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioner,


vs.
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, and
BENECO EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION, respondents.
E.L. Gayo & Associates for petitioner.

CORTES, J.:
On June 21, 1985 Beneco Worker's Labor Union-Association of Democratic Labor
Organizations (hereinafter referred to as BWLU- ADLO) filed a petition for direct
certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file
employees of Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as BENECO) at
Alapang, La Trinidad, Benguet alleging, inter alia, that BENECO has in its employ two
hundred and fourteen (214) rank and file employees; that one hundred and ninety-eight
(198) or 92.5% of these employees have supported the filing of the petition; that no
certification election has been conducted for the last 12 months; that there is no existing
collective bargaining representative of the rank and file employees sought to represented
by BWLU- ADLO; and, that there is no collective bargaining agreement in the
cooperative.
An opposition to the petition was filed by the Beneco Employees Labor Union
(hereinafter referred to as BELU) contending that it was certified as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of the subject workers pursuant to an order issued by
the med-arbiter on October 20,1980; that pending resolution by the National Labor
Relations Commission are two cases it filed against BENECO involving bargaining
deadlock and unfair labor practice; and, that the pendency of these cases bars any
representation question.
BENECO, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss the petition claiming that it is a
non-profit electric cooperative engaged in providing electric services to its members and
patron-consumers in the City of Baguio and Benguet Province; and, that the employees
sought to be represented by BWLU-ADLO are not eligible to form, join or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing because they are members and joint owners of the
cooperative.
On September 2, 1985 the med-arbiter issued an order giving due course to the petition
for certification election. However, the med-arbiter limited the election among the rank
and file employees of petitioner who are non-members thereof and without any
involvement in the actual ownership of the cooperative. Based on the evidence during the
hearing the med-arbiter found that there are thirty-seven (37) employees who are not
members and without any involvement in the actual ownership of the cooperative. The
dispositive portion of the med-arbiter's order is as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a certification election should be as it is hereby


ordered to be conducted at the premises of Benguet, Electric Cooperative, Inc., at
Alapang, La Trinidad, Benguet within twenty (20) days from receipt hereof among all the
rank and file employees (non-members/consumers and without any involvement in the
actual ownership of the cooperative) with the following choices:
1. BENECO WORKERS LABOR UNION-ADLO
2. BENECO EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION
3. NO UNION
The payroll for the month of June 1985 shall be the basis in determining the qualified
voters who may participate in the certification election to be conducted.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, pp. 22-23.]
BELU and BENECO appealed from this order but the same was dismissed for lack of
merit on March 25,1986. Whereupon BENECO filed with this Court a petition
for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and /or restraining order, docketed as
G.R. No. 74209, which the Supreme Court dismissed for lack of merit in a minute
resolution dated April 28, 1986.
The ordered certification election was held on October 1, 1986. Prior to the conduct
thereof BENECO's counsel verbally manifested that "the cooperative is protesting that
employees who are members-consumers are being allowed to vote when . . . they are not
eligible to be members of any labor union for purposes of collective bargaining; much
less, to vote in this certification election." [Rollo, p. 28]. Petitioner submitted a
certification showing that only four (4) employees are not members of BENECO and
insisted that only these employees are eligible to vote in the certification election.
Canvass of the votes showed that BELU garnered forty-nine (49) of the eighty-three (83)
"valid" votes cast.
Thereafter BENECO formalized its verbal manifestation by filing a Protest. Finding,
among others, that the issue as to whether or not member-consumers who are employees
of BENECO could form, assist or join a labor union has been answered in the affirmative
by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 74209, the med-arbiter dismissed the protest on
February 17, 1987. On June 23, 1987, Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) director Pura
Ferrer-Calleja affirmed the med-arbiter's order and certified BELU as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees of BENECO.
Alleging that the BLR director committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction BENECO filed the instant petition for certiorari. In his Comment
the Solicitor General agreed with BENECO's stance and prayed that the petition be given
due course. In view of this respondent director herself was required by the Court to file a

Comment. On April 19, 1989 the Court gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.
The main issue in this case is whether or not respondent director committed grave abuse
of discretion in certifying respondent BELU as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representtative of the rank and file employees of BENECO.
Under Article 256 of the Labor Code [Pres. Decree 442] to have a valid certification
election, "at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes.
The labor union receiving the majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified as the
exclusive bargaining agent of all workers in the unit." Petitioner BENECO asserts that the
certification election held on October 1, 1986 was null and void since membersemployees of petitioner cooperative who are not eligible to form and join a labor union
for purposes of collective bargaining were allowed to vote therein.
Respondent director and private respondent BELU on the other hand submit that
members of a cooperative who are also rank and file employees are eligible to form,
assist or join a labor union [Comment of Respondent Director, p. 4; Rollo, p. 125;
Comment of BELU, pp. 9-10; Rollo pp. 99-100].
The Court finds the present petition meritorious.
The issue of whether or not employees of a cooperative are qualified to form or join a
labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining has already been resolved and
clarified in the case of Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. vs. Ferrer Calleja, et
al. [G.R. No. 7795, September 26,1988] and reiterated in the cases ofBatangas-Electric
Cooperative Labor Union v. Young, et al. [G.R. Nos. 62386, 70880 and 74560 November
9, 1988] and San Jose City Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. v. Ministry of Labor and
Employment, et al. [G.R. No. 77231, May 31, 1989] wherein the Court had stated that the
right to collective bargaining is not available to an employee of a cooperative who at the
same time is a member and co-owner thereof. With respect, however, to employees who
are neither members nor co-owners of the cooperative they are entitled to exercise the
rights to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiation as mandated by the 1987
Constitution and applicable statutes.
Respondent director argues that to deny the members of petitioner cooperative the right to
form, assist or join a labor union of their own choice for purposes of collective bargaining
would amount to a patent violation of their right to self-organization. She points out that:
Albeit a person assumes a dual capacity as rank and file employee and as member of a
certain cooperative does not militate, as in the instant case, against his/her exercise of the
right to self-organization and to collective bargaining guaranteed by the Constitution and
Labor Code because, while so doing, he/she is acting in his/her capacity as rank and file
employee thereof. It may be added that while the employees concerned became members
of petitioner cooperative, their status employment as rank and filers who are hired for
fixed compensation had not changed. They still do not actually participate in the

management of the cooperative as said function is entrusted to the Board of Directors and
to the elected or appointed officers thereof. They are not vested with the powers and
prerogatives to lay down and execute managerial policies; to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees; and/or to effectively recommend
such managerial functions [Comment of Respondent Director, p. 4; Rollo, p. 125.]
Private respondent BELU concurs with the above contention of respondent director and,
additionally, claims that since membership in petitioner cooperative is only nominal, the
rank and file employees who are members thereof should not be deprived of their right to
self-organization.
The above contentions are untenable. Contrary to respondents' claim, the fact that the
members-employees of petitioner do not participate in the actual management of the
cooperative does not make them eligible to form, assist or join a labor organization for
the purpose of collective bargaining with petitioner. The Court's ruling in the Davao City
case that members of cooperative cannot join a labor union for purposes of collective
bargaining was based on the fact that as members of the cooperative they are co-owners
thereof. As such, they cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining for "certainly an
owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners." [Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao
City, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, et al., supra]. It is the fact of ownership of the cooperative,
and not involvement in the management thereof, which disqualifies a member from
joining any labor organization within the cooperative. Thus, irrespective of the degree of
their participation in the actual management of the cooperative, all members thereof
cannot form, assist or join a labor organization for the purpose of collective bargaining.
Respondent union further claims that if nominal ownership in a cooperative is "enough to
take away the constitutional protections afforded to labor, then there would be no
hindrance for employers to grant, on a scheme of generous profit sharing, stock bonuses
to their employees and thereafter claim that since their employees are not stockholders [of
the corporation], albeit in a minimal and involuntary manner, they are now also coowners and thus disqualified to form unions." To allow this, BELU argues, would be "to
allow the floodgates of destruction to be opened upon the rights of labor which the
Constitution endeavors to protect and which welfare it promises to promote." [Comment
of BELU, p. 10; Rollo, p. 100].
The above contention of respondent union is based on the erroneous presumption that
membership in a cooperative is the same as ownership of stocks in ordinary corporations.
While cooperatives may exercise some of the rights and privileges given to ordinary
corporations provided under existing laws, such cooperatives enjoy other privileges not
granted to the latter [See Sections 4, 5, 6, and 8, Pres. Decree No. 175; Cooperative Rural
Bank of Davao City v. Ferrer-Calleja, supra]. Similarly, members of cooperatives have
rights and obligations different from those of stockholders of ordinary corporations. It
was precisely because of the special nature of cooperatives, that the Court held in the
Davao City case that members-employees thereof cannot form or join a labor union for
purposes of collective bargaining. The Court held that:

A cooperative ... is by its nature different from an ordinary business concern being run
either by persons, partnerships, or corporations. Its owners and/or members are the ones
who run and operate the business while the others are its employees. As above stated,
irrespective of the number of shares owned by each member they are entitled to cast one
vote each in deciding upon the affairs of the cooperative. Their share capital earn limited
interest. They enjoy special privileges as-exemption from income tax and sales taxes,
preferential right to supply their products to State agencies and even exemption from the
minimum wage laws.
An employee therefore of such a cooperative who is a member and co-owner thereof
cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining for certainly an owner cannot bargain
with himself or his co-owners.
It is important to note that, in her order dated September 2, 1985, med-arbiter Elnora V.
Balleras made a specific finding that there are only thirty-seven (37) employees of
petitioner who are not members of the cooperative and who are, therefore, the only
employees of petitioner cooperative eligible to form or join a labor union for purposes of
collective bargaining [Annex "A" of the Petition, p. 12; Rollo, p. 22]. However, the
minutes of the certification election [Annex "C" of the Petition: Rollo, p. 28] show that a
total of eighty-three (83) employees were allowed to vote and of these, forty-nine (49)
voted for respondent union. Thus, even if We agree with respondent union's contention
that the thirty seven (37) employees who were originally non-members of the cooperative
can still vote in the certification election since they were only "forced and compelled to
join the cooperative on pain of disciplinary action," the certification election held on
October 1, 1986 is still null and void since even those who were already members of the
cooperative at the time of the issuance of the med-arbiter's order, and therefore cannot
claim that they were forced to join the union were allowed to vote in the election.
Article 256 of the Labor Code provides, among others, that:
To have a valid, election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have
cast their votes. The labor union receiving the majority of the valid votes cast shall be
certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of all workers in the unit . . . [Italics supplied.]
In this case it cannot be determined whether or not respondent union was duly elected by
the eligible voters of the bargaining unit since even employees who are ineligible to join a
labor union within the cooperative because of their membership therein were allowed to
vote in the certification election. Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that
respondent director committed grave abuse of discretion in certifying respondent union as
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of
petitioner cooperative.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed resolution of
respondent director is ANNULLED. The certification election conducted on October 1,
1986, is SET ASIDE. The Regional Office No. 1 of San Fernando, La Union is hereby

directed to immediately conduct new certification election proceedings among the rank
and file employees of the petitioner who are not members of the cooperative.
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN
HOTELS,
RESTAURANTS
AND
ALLIED
INDUSTRIESMANILA
PAVILION HOTEL CHAPTER,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 181531


Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO,*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,** and
PERALTA,*** JJ.

- versus SECRETARY OF LABOR AND


EMPLOYMENT, BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS, HOLIDAY INN MANILA
PAVILION HOTEL LABOR UNION
AND ACESITE PHILIPPINES HOTEL
CORPORATION,
Respondents.

Promulgated:
July 31, 2009

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries Manila
Pavilion Hotel Chapter (NUWHRAIN-MPHC), herein petitioner, seeks the reversal of
the Court of Appeals November 8, 2007 Decision[1] and of the Secretary of Labor and
Employments January 25, 2008 Resolution[2] in OS-A-9-52-05 which affirmed the MedArbiters Resolutions dated January 22, 2007[3] and March 22, 2007.[4]
A certification election was conducted on June 16, 2006 among the rank-and-file
employees of respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel (the Hotel) with the
following results:
EMPLOYEES IN VOTERS LIST = 353
TOTAL VOTES CAST

= 346

NUWHRAIN-MPHC
HIMPHLU

= 151

= 169

NO UNION

SPOILED

SEGREGATED

22

In view of the significant number of segregated votes, contending unions,


petitioner, NUHWHRAIN-MPHC, and respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavillion Hotel
Labor Union (HIMPHLU), referred the case back to Med-Arbiter Ma. Simonette
Calabocal to decide which among those votes would be opened and tallied. Eleven (11)
votes were initially segregated because they were cast by dismissed employees, albeit the
legality of their dismissal was still pending before the Court of Appeals. Six other votes
were segregated because the employees who cast them were already
occupying supervisory positions at the time of the election. Still five other votes were
segregated on the ground that they were cast by probationary employees and, pursuant to
the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), such employees cannot vote. It
bears noting early on, however, that the vote of one Jose Gatbonton (Gatbonton), a
probationary employee, was counted.
By Order of August 22, 2006, Med-Arbiter Calabocal ruled for the opening of 17
out of the 22 segregated votes, specially those cast by the 11 dismissed employees and
those cast by the six supposedly supervisory employees of the Hotel.
Petitioner, which garnered 151 votes, appealed to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment (SOLE), arguing that the votes of the probationary employees should have
been opened considering that probationary employee Gatbontons vote was tallied. And
petitioner averred that respondent HIMPHLU, which garnered 169 votes, should not be
immediately certified as the bargaining agent, as the opening of the 17 segregated ballots
would push the number of valid votes cast to 338 (151 + 169 + 1 + 17), hence, the 169
votes which HIMPHLU garnered would be one vote short of the majority which would
then become 169.
By the assailed Resolution of January 22, 2007, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment (SOLE), through then Acting Secretary Luzviminda Padilla, affirmed the
Med-Arbiters Order. It held that pursuant to Section 5, Rule IX of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code on exclusion and inclusion of voters in a certification

election, the probationary employees cannot vote, as at the time the Med-Arbiter issued
on August 9, 2005 the Order granting the petition for the conduct of the certification
election, the six probationary employees were not yet hired, hence, they could not vote.
The SOLE further held that, with respect to the votes cast by the 11 dismissed
employees, they could be considered since their dismissal was still pending appeal.
As to the votes cast by the six alleged supervisory employees, the SOLE held that
their votes should be counted since their promotion took effect months after the issuance
of the above-said August 9, 2005 Order of the Med-Arbiter, hence, they were still
considered as rank-and-file.
Respecting Gatbontons vote, the SOLE ruled that the same could be the basis to
include the votes of the other probationary employees, as the records show that during the
pre-election conferences, there was no disagreement as to his inclusion in the voters list,
and neither was it timely challenged when he voted on election day, hence, the Election
Officer could not then segregate his vote.
The SOLE further ruled that even if the 17 votes of the dismissed and supervisory
employees were to be counted and presumed to be in favor of petitioner, still, the same
would not suffice to overturn the 169 votes garnered by HIMPHLU.
In fine, the SOLE concluded that the certification of HIMPHLU as the exclusive
bargaining agent was proper.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by the SOLE by
Resolution of March 22, 2007, it appealed to the Court of Appeals.
By the assailed Decision promulgated on November 8, 2007, the appellate
court affirmed the ruling of the SOLE. It held that, contrary to petitioners assertion, the
ruling in Airtime Specialist, Inc. v. Ferrer Calleja [5] stating that in a certification election,
all rank-and-file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, whether probationary or
permanent, are entitled to vote, is inapplicable to the case at bar. For, the appellate court
continued, the six probationary employees were not yet employed by the Hotel at the time
the August 9, 2005 Order granting the certification election was issued. It thus held

that Airtime Specialist applies only to situations wherein the probationary employees
were already employed as of the date of filing of the petition for certification election.
Respecting Gatbontons vote, the appellate court upheld the SOLEs finding that
since it was not properly challenged, its inclusion could no longer be questioned, nor
could it be made the basis to include the votes of the six probationary employees.
The appellate court brushed aside petitioners contention that the opening of the 17
segregated votes would materially affect the results of the election as there would be the
likelihood of a run-off election in the event none of the contending unions receive a
majority of the valid votes cast. It held that the majority contemplated in deciding
which of the unions in a certification election is the winner refers to the majority
of valid votes cast, not the simple majority of votes cast, hence, the SOLE was correct in
ruling that even if the 17 votes were in favor of petitioner, it would still be insufficient to
overturn the results of the certification election.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution of
January 25, 2008, the present recourse was filed.
Petitioners contentions may be summarized as follows:
1.

2.

3.

Inclusion of Jose Gatbontons vote but excluding the vote of the six other
probationary employees violated the principle of equal protection and is not in
accord with the ruling in Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja;
The time of reckoning for purposes of determining when the probationary
employees can be allowed to vote is not August 9, 2005 the date of issuance
by Med-Arbiter Calabocal of the Order granting the conduct of certification
elections, but March 10, 2006 the date the SOLE Order affirmed the MedArbiters Order.
Even if the votes of the six probationary employees were included, still,
HIMPHLU could not be considered as having obtained a majority of the valid
votes cast as the opening of the 17 ballots would increase the number of valid
votes from 321 to 338, hence, for HIMPHLU to be certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent, it should have garnered at least 170, not 169, votes.

Petitioner justifies its not challenging Gatbontons vote because it was precisely
its position that probationary employees should be allowed to vote. It thus avers that
justice and equity dictate that since Gatbontons vote was counted, then the votes of the 6
other probationary employees should likewise be included in the tally.
Petitioner goes on to posit that the word order in Section 5, Rule 9 of
Department Order No. 40-03 reading [A]ll employees who are members of the
appropriate bargaining unit sought to be represented by the petitioner at the time of the
issuance of the order granting the conduct of certification election shall be allowed to
vote refers to an order which has already become final and executory, in this case the
March 10, 2002 Order of the SOLE.
Petitioner thus concludes that if March 10, 2006 is the reckoning date for the
determination of the eligibility of workers, then all the segregated votes cast by the
probationary employees should be opened and counted, they having already been
working at the Hotel on such date.
Respecting the certification of HIMPHLU as the exclusive bargaining agent,
petitioner argues that the same was not proper for if the 17 votes would be counted as
valid, then the total number of votes cast would have been 338, not 321, hence, the
majority would be 170; as such, the votes garnered by HIMPHLU is one vote short of
the majority for it to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent.
The relevant issues for resolution then are first, whether employees on
probationary status at the time of the certification elections should be allowed to vote,
and second, whether HIMPHLU was able to obtain the required majority for it to be
certified as the exclusive bargaining agent.
On the first issue, the Court rules in the affirmative.
The inclusion of Gatbontons vote was proper not because it was not questioned
but because probationary employees have the right to vote in a certification election. The
votes of the six other probationary employees should thus also have been
counted. As Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja holds:

In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the


appropriate bargaining unit, whether probationary or permanent are
entitled to vote. This principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor
Code which states that the labor organization designated or selected by
the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be
the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for purposes of
collective bargaining. Collective bargaining covers all aspects of the
employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified
union binds all employees in the bargaining unit. Hence, all rank and file
employees, probationary or permanent, have a substantial interest in the
selection of the bargaining representative. The Code makes no
distinction as to their employment status as basis for eligibility in
supporting the petition for certification election. The law refers to
all the employees in the bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible
to support the petition is to belong to the bargaining unit. (Emphasis
supplied)

Rule II, Sec. 2 of Department Order No. 40-03, series of 2003, which amended
Rule XI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, provides:
Rule II
Section 2. Who may join labor unions and workers' associations. - All
persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises,
including employees of government owned or controlled corporations
without original charters established under the Corporation Code, as well
as employees of religious, charitable, medical or educational institutions
whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization
and to form, join or assist labor unions for purposes of collective
bargaining: provided, however, that supervisory employees shall not be
eligible for membership in a labor union of the rank-and-file employees
but may form, join or assist separate labor unions of their own. Managerial
employees shall not be eligible to form, join or assist any labor unions for
purposes of collective bargaining. Alien employees with valid working
permits issued by the Department may exercise the right to selforganization and join or assist labor unions for purposes of collective
bargaining if they are nationals of a country which grants the same or
similar rights to Filipino workers, as certified by the Department of
Foreign Affairs.
For purposes of this section, any employee, whether employed
for a definite period or not, shall beginning on the first day of his/her
service, be eligible for membership in any labor organization.

All other workers, including ambulant, intermittent and other


workers, the self-employed, rural workers and those without any definite
employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and
protection and other legitimate purposes except collective bargaining.
(Emphasis supplied)

The provision in the CBA disqualifying probationary employees from voting


cannot override the Constitutionally-protected right of workers to self-organization, as
well as the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules on certification
elections and jurisprudence thereon.
A law is read into, and forms part of, a contract. Provisions in a contract are valid
only if they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
[6]

Rule XI, Sec. 5 of D.O. 40-03, on which the SOLE and the appellate court rely to
support their position that probationary employees hired after the issuance of the Order
granting the petition for the conduct of certification election must be excluded, should not
be read in isolation and must be harmonized with the other provisions of D.O. Rule XI,
Sec. 5 of D.O. 40-03, viz:
Rule XI
xxxx
Section 5. Qualification of voters; inclusion-exclusion. - All employees
who are members of the appropriate bargaining unit sought to be
represented by the petitioner at the time of the issuance of the order
granting the conduct of a certification election shall be eligible to
vote. An employee who has been dismissed from work but has contested
the legality of the dismissal in a forum of appropriate jurisdiction at the
time of the issuance of the order for the conduct of a certification election
shall be considered a qualified voter, unless his/her dismissal was declared
valid in a final judgment at the time of the conduct of the certification
election. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Section 13. Order/Decision on the petition. - Within ten (10) days from the
date of the last hearing, the Med-Arbiter shall issue a formal order

granting the petition or a decision denying the same. In organized


establishments, however, no order or decision shall be issued by the MedArbiter during the freedom period.
The order granting the conduct of a certification election shall state
the following:
(a)

the name of the employer or establishment;

(b)

the description of the bargaining unit;

(c)

a statement that none of the grounds for dismissal enumerated in the


succeeding paragraph exists;

(d)

the names of contending labor unions which shall appear as follows:


petitioner union/s in the order in which their petitions were filed,
forced intervenor, and no union; and

(e)

a directive upon the employer and the contending union(s) to


submit within ten (10) days from receipt of the order, the
certified list of employees in the bargaining unit, or where
necessary, the payrolls covering the members of the bargaining unit
for the last three (3) months prior to the issuance of the
order. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx

Section 21. Decision of the Secretary. - The Secretary shall have


fifteen (15) days from receipt of the entire records of the petition within
which to decide the appeal. The filing of the memorandum of appeal
from the order or decision of the Med-Arbiter stays the holding of any
certification election.
The decision of the Secretary shall become final and executory after
ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the parties. No motion for
reconsideration of the decision shall be entertained. (Emphasis supplied)

In light of the immediately-quoted provisions, and prescinding from the principle


that all employees are, from the first day of their employment, eligible for membership in
a labor organization, it is evident that the period of reckoning in determining who shall
be included in the list of eligible voters is, in cases where a timely appeal has been
filedfrom the Order of the Med-Arbiter, the date when the Order of the Secretary of L
abor and Employment,
whether affirming or denying the appeal, becomes final andexecutory.

The filing of an appeal to the SOLE from the Med-Arbiters Order stays its
execution, in accordance with Sec. 21, and rationally, the Med-Arbiter cannot direct the
employer to furnish him/her with the list of eligible voters pending the resolution of the
appeal.
During the pendency of the appeal, the employer may hire additional
employees. To exclude the employees hired after the issuance of the Med-Arbiters
Order but before the appeal has been resolved would violate the guarantee that every
employee has the right to be part of a labor organization from the first day of their
service.
In the present case, records show that the probationary employees, including
Gatbonton, were included in the list of employees in the bargaining unit submitted by the
Hotel on May 25, 2006 in compliance with the directive of the Med-Arbiter after the
appeal and subsequent motion for reconsideration have been denied by the SOLE,
rendering the Med-Arbiters August 22, 2005 Order final and executory 10 days after the
March 22, 2007 Resolution (denying the motion for reconsideration of the January 22
Order denying the appeal), and rightly so. Because, for purposes of self-organization,
those employees are, in light of the discussion above, deemed eligible to vote.
A certification election is the process of determining the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of
collective bargaining. Collective bargaining, refers to the negotiated contract between a
legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all
other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit.[7]
The significance of an employees right to vote in a certification election cannot
thus be overemphasized. For he has considerable interest in the determination of who
shall represent him in negotiating the terms and conditions of his employment.
Even if the Implementing Rules gives the SOLE 20 days to decide the appeal from
the Order of the Med-Arbiter, experience shows that it sometimes takes months to be
resolved. To rule then that only those employees hired as of the date of the issuance of
the Med-Arbiters Order are qualified to vote would effectively disenfranchise employees

hired during the pendency of the appeal. More importantly, reckoning the date of the
issuance of the Med-Arbiters Order as the cut-off date would render inutile the remedy
of appeal to the SOLE.
But while the Court rules that the votes of all the probationary employees should
be included, under the particular circumstances of this case and the period of time which
it took for the appeal to be decided, the votes of the six supervisory employees must be
excluded because at the time the certification elections was conducted, they had ceased to
be part of the rank and file, their promotion having taken effect two months before the
election.
As to whether HIMPHLU should be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent, the
Court rules in the negative. It is well-settled that under the so-called double majority
rule, for there to be a valid certification election, majority of the bargaining unit
must have voted AND the winning union must have garnered majority of the valid
votes cast.
Prescinding from the Courts ruling that all the probationary employees votes
should be deemed valid votes while that of the supervisory employees should be
excluded, it follows that the number of valid votes cast would increase from 321 to
337. Under Art. 256 of the Labor Code, the union obtaining the majority of the valid
votes cast by the eligible voters shall be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of all the workers in the appropriate bargaining unit. This majority is 50% +
1. Hence, 50% of 337 is 168.5 + 1 or at least 170.
HIMPHLU obtained 169 while petitioner received 151 votes. Clearly, HIMPHLU
was not able to obtain a majority vote. The position of both the SOLE and the appellate
court that the opening of the 17 segregated ballots will not materially affect the outcome
of the certification election as for, so they contend, even if such member were all in favor
of petitioner, still, HIMPHLU would win, is thus untenable.
It bears reiteration that the true importance of ascertaining the number of valid
votes cast is for it to serve as basis for computing the required majority, and not just to
determine which union won the elections. The opening of the segregated but valid votes
has thus become material. To be sure, the conduct of a certification election has a

two-fold objective: to determine the appropriate bargaining unit and to ascertain


the majority representation of the bargaining representative, if the employees desire
to be represented at all by anyone. It is not simply the determination of who between
two or more contending unions won, but whether it effectively ascertains the will of the
members of the bargaining unit as to whether they want to be represented and which
union they want to represent them.
Having declared that no choice in the certification election conducted obtained the
required majority, it follows that a run-off election must be held to determine which
between HIMPHLU and petitioner should represent the rank-and-file employees.
A run-off election refers to an election between the labor unions receiving the two
(2) highest number of votes in a certification or consent election with three (3) or more
choices, where such a certified or consent election results in none of the three (3) or more
choices receiving the majority of the valid votes cast; provided that the total number of
votes for all contending unions is at least fifty percent (50%) of the number of votes cast.
[8]
With 346 votes cast, 337 of which are now deemed valid and HIMPHLU having only
garnered 169 and petitioner having obtained 151 and the choice NO UNION receiving
1 vote, then the holding of a run-off election between HIMPHLU and petitioner is in
order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 8,
2007 and Resolution dated January 25, 2008 of the Court of Appeals affirming the
Resolutions dated January 22, 2007 and March 22, 2007, respectively, of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment in OS-A-9-52-05 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

The Department of Labor and Employment-Bureau of Labor Relations


is DIRECTED to cause the holding of a run-off election between petitioner, National
Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries-Manila Pavilion Hotel
Chapter (NUWHRAIN-MPC), and respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel Labor
Union (HIMPHLU).