Are powerand poli|csqener c to att

frore than
ve rse to powersklqgteE
and potrtrcs norgan zal ons,
Do some .ir.umstances

orheE

Power and potitics tn

organizations

Whyis powersuch a d lficull th ng

1o

deatwilh in organizations?
s everyone able to qa n orrercise
power in organ zations?

]ASE STUDY

Fawtey Ridge

: . i 1r al,q r980s many porllecii is srer,. abolllo become

, .: ol{rh Fa rs c Polle.hr r las one Atth s tm. hor1eler
-- .:! lndtrlhe.oil.o oT oca aulrorlesaidlhevsl Drovded
:: :

:ed ilrthercducal0i lNAFElmmses $orkotsub del]ree

:rasbecomnqce3rliratth$ eve oloorkuasreoadedby

:.i

_r:rsiheorov

' :

re

ceolLoca auttort! nsttulors tmLid0r\i

ien ur !mles flhere rlas r0 aLlemaT!e

hands ol lhe

:.:'

d n Far re lhere frere seYeE compctcnl0lhe6 I

-r '.:l ani srt vhch uJas desqraled a NAFE s te uy lreAsset
_
:: :1 r,ou d reve lolhe oca authorr][henll]e!decdedoilhe
: :.c 3l0i lra: s dYorceaidalmody Farse.urcxy
: .:::ore ol rls many slcs a !ar.o!s al Fa! e! Fdq. af ata ol

.:

-rla

and rapd ! apprec!1 nq

r vaue ard

.-.:r.erlonhdcoiteno0raryr)rc$arolndtl

- : .t

5trr 0iasa

ne[ !ilenlk! d need su.h ai ass-Al qYe]

r*0lor bu di!l!04.e.lr!1the stems a nosl ei. N!ey

aone

: r!

comeryalve!

The

Fa

rre Polechi. oi

xosr s

a.ce$rol

rms an nallprryal.o

iadequaletnanca a..ouilalr lx
nadeq!alemonlornqolqMll! nappropraleorrysci ic.o modalol

oroan?aloralst[lctureu/il]i

research a.d stall frlro rere roi!!iomedard

uiderpedormarce
po t.?ed and (ho had lreJ to resftt . scuee? i0 0T resofces

tun sd abolt rrudura .ranlc by !r0rD ig deoartmeits nto

lacures comb$n-osomeollhcm remo!iqnaryorlhe16lrcadsaid

o 'qo

o doo'

'oo D% 6

.'

e'

ib l'

arponhexs Theneuireadsr echarge0rthxro

and nrema

s.oro!ttr0 co(!p10r 0l lhe od !ua. ard dcdlyaiy

sac(or Lfdemerlo maice i reatlr rq commtn.nts sulrervs0i
resen.lr orqra ly mon,lor ig Trre, uere.cqr red l0 lrsNcl eEr!'th
and I usl no oie Koslremoled some dcp!ty d.ed0rs .re3ed ier
reads nho r/er lrs ooirl ca all atcs ard [r1] io.on5tluei.y r thc
a.ademc.omm!r l! lrere enl rery a.aouilab.lo the d reclof
rn ss

ons

10

i!

DerekE ollfras iopo xedasheadollrre il'Aparlmenl ol .onl nenla

He sras reialveylourq al 35 1o tre 3 read. blt he \!r.s

maiaqemdrl

_,0

dali me .ounes lor ma b.sncssleope 0oythenlhest

qua llal0n onered las reladed 0rr.a I as benq

I, xr

:::

r,Iir]o(lpurposes and!hsr3soiy5oeimxollir!

eroercmed

i.ofse

adm n

lrallrr

d 3 so tud a 0oc0

ptbl.alors

,],

0ll!3s po t.a yanft [!i a s0 rad a persona conr lmE.l l0

ig i.r oom,1q ulir a iqr hand on the 1'er
Ear ! n h s renra artaiey Fdqe the d re.lfi l0d oei'.k tial lle

daiaq

-.

:'.:ioc a.ord

re.tor Pa! Kosl tad

t8ke r oler the reus oi

: : t {r ch ne d some leryspeclc cha enqes Kosilos

: :::. oLrstaud ng.ar0dale lor lie drc.totsh !: rre had
- l.frrmentoi a, s des a lnorolqh !rd sland irr 0l
., . r'r proiedrc aid commnee rork and an a m0s1 lncanr!,
.
: i .mpl m nsi.qs and qommenl Po c! Perso.a y. he fras a
' : : : sNeaker ai erLrdte. charm iq hosl and iha rmai bll aso
: -- sss o ce he made a decson kost iherlel1 a sltrctre ol
i : : :r:.i1,! 16 0 onarlldomscremoresurlrseleE
::-:: !3lms

lnam a

and

acadedc readlloexpode

sterasortcttnaica.ortro rvtt.arniqsiolbe rqprorery

at thc on y ray lo !'ol on 10p ol th s lis l0

iemo cyr Laicislrre lre ectu4r niharoe lourommaryolllre
*an jel a stroig a eg srce clr rus cLos"q io rel remerl age ad t lras
accouited lor lo lrle.enlre

oo .'oD.

oo' oj

od oP o' o "'

D cklellreasvatroulh.raionac HerradtoLiirrhe
eav nll ear
alia rs olThe centr.lo ire drl rey proirer ayr 1o tra lron{i and re
trlenloied 3rd sial to be ded.aled The r r.clor dd iol s2e llfal [,al
y lrll

and r-.eded

1o

be

cear!

coilro ol far! er Rdre

aod iherelor-A

ct

:}iI1

CORECONCEPTS

-tE E l'ld to be emoved The 9an were, howele devored to cy.il Ai this poinl Derek lhe head ol the departinonl whtctr offuo ed
I rr
.Tr lruri bv rhe way reype(ev-odhmbenq realed
sGasoneo sthreesubdvstons w3s called n lo lhe dire{tfl s oti c.
I hiehEle
n.rdent Derel nendedrorryl0 wilhWiliamFsherthedeputydrecto.ThepostonwasoulnedSpai:
I _a'd} a.(ordinq lonqsaboutttrs
0 n(F es As parr or h6 pokv ot openness and in the po lrechn c u,as al a premium Faw ey Bidqe was a va uab e
| rrrretrenr n stGErh'spdnnn9,Derekhadbequn
possbe propeowhchunderpresentusagetheiewunve6[ywoudosean..
I _-_-'es and prcrilies w th s s afi on three s res ontodrs(us.
oh(h rhe
vest nq day t was mporaive that the propeo be saiequarded by
|
153

art

1]l..;jlmnropemhd.Aftsrafunqlohs5rlull.tmesbndtFawey

brnqnq]lsusageloradvanc-id(deqreeorequilaent

evei)workupi.

l:,corhokeveradsstsdtunedDerp(hrd6[edrhemro(onsider over 60 per cent. The on y viab e proposl on wou d t]e to tEnster the
l s(enaros ndudnqposrbe.6ureoremerou6es tanquases and bus ness deqrees (ior r,tr ch Derek3 depairment wa;
l .,=,era
'vhal
te
rme rh s tFated ttonqlhe Eape!ie I b{ame a srory tha tre respom btel, brary hotd ngs. suppoirslafl and anguage absoverto:;
I ri{hncr%5rorroselhesre
one oi the ,udmts, a neEpaper Fawteysle.sludentswoudhavelobebusedsirmeslorlhercas=

'{rler plb lshed rhE srorv and Derel round hrnset s n nq Ec nq ai

: qf DUb i meerng wrh rh. dean rhe d redor and 300 ra F nudenh.
Kosl \!as br anl rn h s hand ng oi an explos ve situat 0n and chose

_:linCenythalco$re,,,asaOossb

y and $gqesled thal il was

:_-:becauseofgovemmenlpocyHesugqesledlhatthestudents
:-_.-corganneapotca obby, and lhe polirechn c would

.:-

re lIas cheered

10

901vever there was a

supood
the echo at lhe end oi lhe meet ng
g

rou

ndswelr

o1 rese

nlment bu dinq up

Shon,

aiter a thrce m e joumey ior n0s1

depanneiht|0 ste, shaws pad(

01

thorn to reach the prcsenl

irom which heywoutd have to L.r^,:

so naccess b e Derek looked q unr. The d recto, r$ss_.::

hmsomewhalh0towly We halen,l made the dec sion yel. I anJ,th.:
Faw ey being

emerqes thal c

eary ndcaleslhatlhswildamagelheqlatilyot

edlElonofthestrdeniswewonl wedarent do
s

tlalion

t.

hewtroe

s very de mle as I m sure y0! apprec ate. But everllh ng

s neloltab e Wo rk

oss y wdr Wilia m and see \rhar you can

0 at

e point t,s our on y opt 0n

-j,s r! /socral on (IlA) wh would mean sludenh would have 10
.84
adapEd rmm stephs Nlead
same aid
m por.
-:,: ioa dfre'enr site rorc6ses ftesrudents who had nor been ..;,;j;;aioe.;fu.;i;;c,i;;;.'0',;;,,,",,,,,",
:::'

:t s incrdenl

Kosl allempled to acqufe a

c

b!

ding Jrom the Ten

Sou RcE:

rrr:Jled mounledaveryellectvecampaqnoidenonstralois

&a,ei630)67

11

997)

3s

::!:lrandeafehandeventuallytheTAp!ledout0llhedeat Nor rheseidlado rrsc$rudlapp.

I
2
3
4

@lu

s6ter nthexhao@r

Whoappea.s!o have power in this situation?

situarion?
Whatare the sources ol the r power?
What k nd of poweris it?
Wha! are the obv ous co.fLiclsof interest and howwoutd you expecr peopte to
behave as a resutt?

Attempt to answer rhese questions before you read on. 'rley), are o'scusseo
discussed lat=
Ee

!I

the chapter underAna\ses.

lntroduction
Power and orgeizational poljtics a.e indisputable parts of everyday
:veryday life, of er
.rsocial relationship im{inable, and are at the heart oforganization. Everyone t. !
deal with orwill be a1lecred b/ power andpolitics jn their orguizations. We rLci !
organ,zations in which diferences, particularly those that engender
lgender antagor*
strch as tlose .reited around categorizations, are inscribed within olgaDiaE.-r
discourses. Some common categoriations include minager or
)r emPloyee,
empluyee, sulsr
su1<rr
or subordinare, leader or follower, male or female, headqudters or branch, pr(]*
tio. oradminkrririon and so on.,Ihe muttiple identities and competirg disco:
that these categorizations create are a significant part ofhow power and pohtic! zin orguizations because they produce diferetrt interest groups. We often rake !rj4
so to speak when we see ourselves in these designations. ]1le nature

oforguDi::E

powe!ddpoliticsis shapedbyhowwe see ouBelves o. aresituatedwithin

ated within p.rt-_:s
p.rr--:s
discourses of power which give rise to differential power relations. power j :d

POWERANO POLITICSIN ORGAN ZAT]ONS

2?9

something anyone holds, owns or can gather it is.bo!c ill else i relational efect.
The potenti.l or opportuniry to resist pover is v ied, often complex and can be
subde, but ultimately, comes down to how rve choose to deal with who we are in relition to others (CIegB et al. 2oa6 2r7 27).
Organizations are 6elds of contestntion an.l we e .ll positioned in pdicul.r
ways in relation to potentiil powerstrtrggles. ftere are manyeximples ofsuchpower
struggles: siJikes ov.r redundancy payments or pension schemes Guch as the one
thatshut down a massive BP oil pipeli.e at Grangemouth in ScotlindinApril2008),
problcms in enforcing equal employment opportunity policies Gee Chapter 2),
disputes over noisy or dirty facilities; 6ghts over the si?e of omces or titles given to
positions, conllicts over patronaSe and preferential treatment, nepotrsm (jobs for
family member, and fivouritism (prefcrential treatment ior onci liie.dr, clashes
over closures and relocations, and rnis,nanagement by senior management and
boards. Po e! is expcrienced, interp.eted and dealt with difercndy by each indindtral or group as wcll as across culturai contexts, ,s we discussed in Chapter 3
tbrough the concept of power distance.
Power is an elusive yet important phenomenor formanagers to understand.It is
oneofthenost ch.llenSingdimensionsofhuln relationships. Power and influenc
.reoften glorified inmanyways rs sought-aIier 'prizes I and there are many texts and
stories, movies ind media messages that see wealth and success as a means to power,
ratherthinthe revers. Butpower is not usurlly talked aboutopenly: people areoften
lelucta t to classify themselves as being politielly motivated or cravinS powet
feeling that to do so would automatically qualify them as being 'Machiavellian' or a
highly instrumentil and.uthless pe6on (Clegg:nd Hardy 2006). But power is part

of the reality of

orgrnizations. Understanding how particulir orSanizatioDal

discourses are shaped is
esenti.l pirt ofundeBtanding the r.iitional nature of
power ind politics, especialiy how we illplayourpart in creating and sustainingsuch
relations (Buchanan .nd Brdham 2008).

'Ihough we present a rage of diffcrent views md approaches to power in this

propose that a rclational approach to powe. provides the student of
've
management and organizations with a better understanding ofthe subdeties ofpower
and resinance. We nart from the position that orga.izations are structures o(
conmand, and as sl]ch ffeat. many ofthe sources ofdiscontent and resistance thit
chapter,

become asso.iatedwith power andpolitics. Hier.rchicil otgdiz.tions, such as many

large public nnd privnte sector organizatio.s, ire ilso strrcturs ol deJsenee, wherc
those at the top speat bothrrand to tbose below th.n. OrgmizitioNare ilso sinrturet ol desie ot aspiat,o s) as those bclow seek to rise in the hierdchy in order to
receive deference and respect themselves in terms ofrewards and reco8nitions for
past achievements. All too often, those rvho rise in the hierarchyp.s on the unpleisantness and resentments associatedwith having being subjected to thecommand of
others without havinghad anyone to whon they couid legitimately give comminds.
when they reach positions of autho.ity (and command), thy often forget what it
wasliketobethe one who had to obey and whose voice was seldom, ifever, heard in
the right'or 'hish' places. Deference produes some of the key relational problems in

organizations demonstrated in power struggles and organizntional politicking.

Commlnd structures are not tliings or objects but the rdidfioralJiilds within which
many oraanizational dramas ire acted out and these cnn be erperienced in tems of
connraifis dnd lintits
ow ciro,.a (Clegg et al. 2006: 259). These command struc'
tures do not hrve a life ofiheir own but rather 3re created and sustained through
discouses, both mundme ud extnordinarily porvertul, such as those ftarned around
proft, shareholdervalue, new managerialisnl enterprise .1nd so on.

PART

CORE CONCEPTS

'Ihis chapter reviews the behdrioutul, political and tudi.dl appro.ches t. :.ra
lhese are also often refened to as the nrstr second and thid dimensions c: :.

(Lukes 1974, 1986). To this has been added a foulth dimension (see Hard. .*
Our reldtioxdl vielr of power h noi quite the same, as it is an dlteflrdn:. :: -_a
approach. lt does not p.esent a dimensional vlew of power, that might alrerii -::=,
that power is a thing or object to which diferent perspectjves can be taken.:_:4
power itselfis .orsir"rctcd in the rrays that lee approach it. The more adipt;: . a
approacl! the more adequate it is likely to prove for dealingwith energing o::-r:*
iional ieilities. Diverse ideas and perspectives are appareDt within each ati.rc.
but by f.r the most popular in the nanagement discourse have been thos. a-j c

also.a-.'

aligned with the behaviour.i.nd politicalvjews, asNe shallsee.WeNill

some other approaches that do not necesarilyfit neatly nrto the four{a)-.'l:,,(described above but have hid signiEcint influence oD the topic. Ilese are
grouped under unitaryand pluialist vie',s ofpower that have been develop.':.+
cially in the US managenent literahre and, rather difl-erentl, in the Britnh in. --- a

g.:-:}

Approaches to power
MaxWeber, whose theory ofbureaucracy contained a very complcx view ofaur:: -.
left no doubt th.t power was a pervasive force in organi,ations (see Chaf::: Weber's notion ofritional-legal authoritystated that arthoritywas rot autom:::'
accepted by indn iduals bui had to be earDed and Ieg,timated in order for q st.'
domnration to erist (Wetrer 1964: r24, t52 3, 324-9). By legitimation, he :the execution oftules or orders in such a Naythatpeople believed that the orc:: r
connands issued rvere L,inding on them and desirable to imitate or follo( \?was not advocati.g that those in commardh:d automatic authority, but ntht::.r
fiere were conditions rnd rules that had to be adhered to,n order to mL-audroriry Once a leader leSitimated his or her authorit, Weber believed th:: :r
r{ould tre mirrored in thc followeB' willingness to cary out the leader! ordi.. commands based on willing compliance. weber clearly recognized the potent,::polver struggles nr his own theory ofbureaucraq! especially in the .ole ofp.:=
sional expertJ and seasoncd bureaucrats .ctin8 iD self-interested ways. Webe: ,:
principalll concerned rrith ho\" ptrbljc sector organizations (bureaucLacie, .r.:::
and nranltained the authorityrclitions betweenpoliticians and bureaucrats and r::
the consequences r"ere ofnot actingwith integrityand legitinacy (see Rrlop lc:
Chipter 6). Weber s theories are more ,lidcly recognized in organization theon ::
org.nizational behaviour (OB), particuiarly in Europe atrd Australia, but less s. :mny years in ihe US.
Even so, the domirant aPProaches to Potuer in m.ny OB .nd management t.r
espccj.lly those emannting liom the US, hav. all emphasized belraviour, an: I
outcomes, as the key to understanding power llese approaches have struggle:::
preserve the notioDs ofauthoritythaiWeberProposed, taking amuch narroiter r::"
ofauthorityind ofteD simpry callingit positional powerl Webcr wis not the onll r:.
to scc .uthority as critical to understanding power Steven Lukes (197a) b..,
Pow.t: A Radieal View, vhlch becnme one ofthe most widely cjted books on :ii
topic, rvas heaviiy influenced by political sociology and political science and a de!::i
to nove beyond rjgid class-based views otpower to understand social and polrti;
issues. His work has also been incorporated into organization theory, OB r::
nanageoent per se wjth varying modifications (for exadple Dlnford 1992j IE:'
aDd Fulop 1992). Others inthe organizationalstudies 6eld (for example Clegg I95:
have also theorized on power, drawins on Lukes and othe6, to dev.lop m.::

POWERAND POLIT CS

comple& sociologic.lly informed accounts ofpowel In fact, Lukes (1974) iderriied

three dimensions' of powe., to 1,hich other theorists (for exatuple Bur.eil I98E,
Clegg 1989j IGights rnd Vurdubakis l99a) added, de facto, a fourth. Cynthia Hirdy
(I99a) was one of the lirst explicitly to deyelop a fourth dimension ofpowei Lukes
integrated three dominant views ofpower aDd he termed these the ore-, iPo rnd
three.dinensiondl ,ietus oJ po,,r Table 6. I provides . summary ofthese three dimcn
sions aswellasthe fourth or relational approach to porver
FollowiDg Lukes, a one-dinersio,4l view ofpower, the beharioural vietu (.xenpli
6ed by Robert Dahl 1957), takes a focus on behivionr in the makiDs ofdecisions
over which there is overt contlict ofinterests.In other words, A has thepower to get
B to do something B would not otherwise do. A t,o,d,fiersio,al peBpectn e, incor

porating the ,r,-duc6io,-mati,g riew, as t.ken by Peter Bacharach and Morton

Baratz (I962), involves rhe consideration of ways in which decisions are prevented
from being taken onpotenti.lissues ofpubl,cconcern overwhich there is observable
connici ofinterest$.In odrer words, A preveDts B fron realizing that B has aproblen,
through deception, triclery and orher illegitimate tactics, and thus B cootnrues or
begins to dowhathe or she would not otherwise do.IfB had been given the informa,
t,on or the opportunityto raise isues and be party to discusioDs, instead ofbeing
duped, B might ict di{erently. The second dimension of power is considered more
fuily in Chapter 14, in wbich we consider noD-decisjon m.king and the mobilizition
ofbias byporrerfulpeople in orderto structure agendas ro protcct their interests aDd
The third ol these dimcnsions, the rdt)i l structural rie, of Lukes, is that power
includes the capacity to determjne decisive socialization processesr and therefore the
power to Produce reality.In otherwords, A educates and persuades B io accept their
role in the order ofthings, dd lot to perceile anyconllict ofinterest.ln organizations,
and in a much reduced form, this is close to the managenent ofmeaning' approach to
leadership and organiationil culture (Anthony 1994) mentioDed h Chapter 3. In
criticizing the behavioural and political approaches jn general, the radical or iltree"
drm.rrordlview ofpower draws attention to the unobtrustue, but nonetheles insid
ious methods of nanipulation and influence lsed h organizations to ensure that
power, authority and.ontrol renain in the hands ofmaoagelialgroups who represert
dominant intcrests, such as capital (Clegg and Dunkerley 1980: 197-8).

Going beyond Lukess analysis, wc suggest a fourth approach to power that, as

mentioned eidier, we have labelled the /elatio al aIproa.l. Power in this view exists
not as a properry ofA or B, but as a qualrty ot$e relationship Lren{een them and in
particular contexts. Each is enpowered in some ways and limited in oihers, by the
relationship. Bothmasterand slave, for example, are constrained to behave in particular ways by the roles assigned to them aodthe fact that they exist in th 'institution'
of slavery. Neither can escape these encumbrances without dimculty nor a6ord to
take then lightly. ftus, rather than seeing power as held by the powerful and exercised to enforce conformity among the powerless, itis more instructive to attend to
'those contextually specific practices, techniques, piocedures, forns of klowledge
routinely developed in.ttempts to shape the conduct of others' (Knights andVurdubak-is 1994: 174j see also Gergen 1989, 1992, Hady 1994, Buchanan and Badhan
1999: 173 5j Buchanan and Badham 2008, 174 9). Whereas the third dimension of
power is still seekjng to identirywho holds power, the fouith aPProach sees lol,eras
implicated in many micro practices of daily life, sucb as surveillance and monitoing
of employees through seeningly benign techDologies and techniques and various
discourses thatpervade organizations, such !s work life balance, baby-booners, and

'Iabk 6.1

Four

drytun&.:

ta

pawi
Of gnnd theonel ofposer in
pohnal e.onomy focuses on

Decision nalqngbehaviour
overt confl i.t (observable).
subjective (peiceived) nterestsseenas

policyprelren.es reverled inpolitical

qlaliGed .ritique of behaviour

Includes non-decisiotr making.

How potenlial issues .rc Noided.

Howco lid n rvoided,
lntersts manilest .s gri*ances and
mr pulated through policl.

Rldn

l mctnralvi.w

nails or dr

Politi.al

Power c.n be felt ahhouSl

aBendas. Thn is a

univerd fact:
They coniiDl how

isues

e defined

and

de

The dominanr are in conhol ofsocializ.tion

Prc.esses aDd

hmmd

Ngative beh.viour .nd resistance

not

Ofbeh.viour.l focus, insists on

nnportance ofsocial nrtrctu.e and
ideolog, or powerful ideas.

becius

of commDn ideology and beliefs

False.onsiousness, mana8ement

ConIrr'

of merni.g, unobtrlsive conkol.

b.. rr.. u n.otu.,ou'

rerl'nreren' drReI lrom.ub,e.rne one.
be l.'ren'

nanipulation md iDfluedce used to control

and suPPtss interesrs ol certain gouPs.
Rlatioml

approach

howpwe!

lower is involved in elerything we do

rlwars ibdns resisidce.
Not only the donindt rre powerful, it is
Elational.
Confict is relativ.
lsues are defi.d by dncou^s thr shaPe

ofstructurc

tnowledge.

everrryhere rnd not the prcperl,

olso called dominant groups,

'Discouse' includeslo.allyvarnble
contqtsi Practices, institutions, lechDiques,
and so on, Nothing is univesal.

looks at

Fou.ault

depends on knowledSe, but also

influen.a how Imowledge is

someiims coordinated,
like th Mxica. wave at

I6wer is a capillary lolce, moving

--

PoWEF AND PoL TICS lN oRGAN ZATIoNS

233

Whilc the above present very specific so.ioiogi.dl views ofPower, olherPersPe6tives have been put aorw.rd in OB ind maflngement theory, such as thc sr,tar./ and
pl!/alisl views ofpower, and the principle ol rmPo,tffc,t. lle notion ofa unitary
and pluralist view oapowet initiilly introduced in US Politic.l science, was devcloped in relation to organizations from the rvork ofAlan Fox ( 1974) and rvas extended
by Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgin (1979: 204,388) to dilferenti:te the radicnl
view ofpower Irom others and also align it with studies ofconflict (see Chapter 12
for a fuller discusion). the unit!.y ed pluralist distjn.tion was common in the
indu(rial relations litrature, wherc it provided a usetul tnxonomy for understanding
conflict in workplaces (Hall 1972:237 40; Child 1973: l86i Fox 1974: 250, Nightingale 1974; Lupton 1978.81 8, Farnhm.nd Pimlott 1979: 53, Honour and Mainrveing lgsz: rtsi Kclly 1982:173-88; Dawson 1986: l8-36). OBrndmeagenent
also inco.porated th,s tpology !t an edly st.8e (for examPle Robbins 1974). 'Ihe
unitary aPproach gcneraliy treah Power as an abemtion and thre.t to the organPa_
tion, reinforcingthe idea ofm.nigcrial prerogative and authority. Pluralists focus on

ideDtifying various sour.es ofpowerin orderto explain the nature oforguizational

politics. They champion the idea thit power is ivailable to all in orSanizitions and it
is up to individualsto take advantage ofthe oPPortunities affordedthemto move uP
the hierrrchy and secure the status and pr.stige isociated with.deer mobility. Illis
highly individualistic ind msculinist !ie9 ofpowerstands in stdk contrast to more
.ritical views ofpower, such as those olfered by Lukes' third dinension and others
such as the fourth or relational aPProach to powei
It would, however, be dilicuh to suggest thit Lules 6.st dimension of power
(Hddy rnd Leiba-O Sullivan 1998: 461) comPletely encomPasses the unit&y.nd
pluralist views ofporvei Lules'theorywas derivedftom a very dilfere.t theoreticil
tradition to that found in many OB and maniSement texts.Indeed, the third dimen_
sion ofpower ofers a critique oftheunjtaryand pluralist assumPtions found i! many
ofthese textr and certainly the sc.onddimension is Erely recognized in mainstream
texts. Furthermore, considention ofthe foorth .PProach to Power introduces a more
reflexive view of power, which focuses on its relational asPects and how discursivc
pra.ticcs, such is tilking, writing, argui.g (Gergen 1989, 1992) and disciPli.ary
pra.tices, such as tools of surveillance dd issessment (for exanPle Performance
measurement), shape people:s identities and the 6eld force ofrelationv (Buchanan
and Badham 1999: I73, also Clegg 1998, Chan 200r : Part I II ). For the sike ofclarit,
we will use the typology developed by Lukes in the rcmainder ofthe chaPten but
extend it to include some studies thrt do not neatly fit into it od are better seen as

pdt ofthe plulalist tradition.

bhaviouraLview of power and authorily

fte

bchaliouril vi.rv ofpooer

has

mmy divcrse ioterPretations. ln Robert Dahli

(1957) rvork, and that ofLukes, the concept was used to cxplain how Policymiking
alfected interest group politics and the decision'makjng Prictices ofpoliticians and
dreN hcwily ofl politi.al sciencc to er?lain how power nDd Politics inte6ect. Thc
concept ofpo{er crcpt into the OB ud managem.nt liternture under the.egis ofthe
unitary view ofpowcr. This approich presents managementt authority .s being relatively lutomatic, its legitimacy emctioned tbrough hierarchical relitions, rules and
plocedures within an organizatio and exemPlified by their leadership roles ln the
unitary npproach, the exercise ofPorrerissen negatively afld is associited rvith the
illegil use offorce, coercion and threats. 11,e unitdy (orritional) orginizitionis one
in which maDagers cmphasize the importance ofcommon goals and Purposes lt is
presuned that those at the top of the hie.ar.hy have the riSht to make all the critic.l

PART

CORECONCEPTS

dechionsand th.t the ruthority to do thaisvcstedin theposition and ofi.e oi..r

man.gement. Contrictu.l .greeftenc bi.d cveryon. to thc pdnciplc of a ti,: i
rvork for a fiir dayls pay: The go,ls of profitability and emcicncyare the sam.::

and the contract of .mploynent binds subordirites to n common nDn:i:-purpose. Titles, form.l li.es of communicntion, organizitio.al charts, con-.-:.
rules ud policies.U v.st authoriry in managenent nnd its p.erogative o,r, ::-

or{r:
-

thesc systems ofco,nmand, Porrer bis no plice h the unitiry or rational

tion. Atrthorityprevnik. Overt povcr struggles, hence v,sible conflict, rre $m:::

brealdor{n of authority relationships and the stability that the organiz:::: - ,

designed to achieve (Velasqnc, 1988: 303-5). ftey sign.l r poientinl chill.::- :
managernenti authoritya.d theirrightto exe.cise ibsolutc control intheint.::- :
Inainttningconce.tcd actionG) to achieve organizationalgoils (Forsterand 8:: "r.
1996:139).
Thc conccpt ofauthonty, as subs.ribed to in thc unitary approlch, js n::_-bound up with notions ofobedience, trust, mutual respect, paternalism, dis.::.,:.
command and control. Many approaches to leadership cven today harc ::'-assumptions. For example, Douglas Mccregor's ( I960) f.mous llcory X nr:. r
leadcrship (descnbcd in Chapter lo)captures one dimension ofthc unitrr)'\::: i
authority: its coercivc, discipli.ary, forcing, policing and punishmcnt aspc.. -J
TreoryY nodel, by contrast, focuses on the manipulative Jod cajoling appi(.::: :
lead.rehip Even though Mccregor advocated partiipatory p.acticcsunder i:::X the use of more subtle forms of control and a more vclvet glove' appN: r :
authoriry he still maintiined that the ercrcise ofauthoritywrs rhe.bsoiui. t:.::-..
tilc of m.nrgement. Oiher leidership theorists (for example Bl.ke ind ll:jr
1978, ilso s.e Chapter l0) ilso shirc n unitnry perspective, because they:,:r:
supportivc and p.rticipative leadeGhip stylcs in ivhich authority must be rri.-g
try sutlordinltes and inb.liDces in power or power issues wil not irjse. U. -n
views ofpower see poweras being dysfunctional be(ruse it is usuilly isso.iirt: ,
=
conflict and is thrs defined is being diverSent from good m.nagenent p.:---j
(Forster and Browne 1996: 139). fter wis indeed i major stream ofliteraturr - :!
US and UK that delcloped thc unitnry and plu.alist viervs ofco.flict from .:nuch ofthe viex,ofpowerwis also deriyed (see Frith and Fulop 1992, Chaft.: ]te pluralist approiches chrmpioned in the US shifted .ttention liom autho-- -rfocus onpositio. power and the bronder:ccessto innuence availablc to allrn.i:
izatioDs.'Ihese appronches emphasize the dynlmics ofpowerand influence jn,:*
interictions. According to onc view ofplurJism, my partner to an exchanSe Li:: !
wher. someonc does something for another person) enters into a dependen.r :tionship. All interactio,rs are co.sideredto involve erchange, and hen.e depeni.:-of

Thus to gain icceptance i.to any group usually involves giving up some lieedc: r
rights in order to belo!19. Acco.ding to some pluralists, exchange involves qu..::l
abou! the g?c! of,nflue.ce thnt vill be tolcr.ted or rejected, andhowdepend.rmightbe creatcd orncutralizcd. Forsomephralists, influence means the use off.,:
which is associated with acquiring c.nrin resources thnt help create depend.i:.
Dependency is the obveEe of poBer: dependency can weaken or strengrhen f .-i.
(Pfefer 1981: 99-115, Handy 1985: I18-19, Dawson 1986: 1s9). ftere rr. :ryersions of the exchinge model of porver tbat assumc people are conscious .::.
power plays going oD arouDd them. Th.y usually involve iDdividuah (as per D=
otre.dimensional view ofpower, often releded to as A and B)orgroups (forerr=:'
departments orsub'uoits) doing something they $ould not othemisc have don.
influence becn absent. Plur.lists generi ly co centrate on expliinirg overt fof-. r
influcnce (that is, influence thJt most pdies ire aivire of) iod the pover resoL:=

POWERANO POLITICS IN ORGAN ZATIONS

to.reate unequal dependency relatiorships. 'Ile approach presumes individuais

are generally awarc ofthe influelce being exerted over them because it is usualllassociated with some form of overt conflict. There are many di{Ierent versio.s ofhow
influence can work, and in much of the literature there is a dilirerentiation between
used

managing power up, do\{n.nd

icros

the hierarchy.

Power of tower p.riicipants

Early plurilist srudies in the US focused attention on the eaercise of poler among
groups leho were described as lower participants. David Mechanict (1962) famous
study descrbed how lower padcipants in various organizations gained influencc
over their superiors by usng power lesources such as information, Pe6ons and
instrumentalities to build up dependency relationsbip!. Mechanic defined these
resources as follows: ,,rr,,,rion refers to knol"ledge of organizational Procedrres,
rules andresources;persorr means h.ving access to expets ornnPotant individualsj
nstrunentalities relates to control over physicai resources such as equipment,
machines or facilities. He argued that icce$ to these resources was not solely
dependent on a personi; positionin the hierarchyand that lower participants could,
through srch things is eFort, interest ind even attractiveDess, increase their access to
these resources, thereby m.kirg others deperdentuponthem. ftese'others can and
did include senior stalf (Mechanic 1962).
Mechani.s study showed how hospital attendants were able to create a depe.dency relationship between themselves and doctors through resolvingproblems asso
ciated rvith the administration of wdds. Attendants assumed the administratile
responsibilities of the ward jn exchange for having aD inc.eased say in decisions
aIfecting patie.ts, for ex.mple schednling ofthe operating theatre. Doctors disliked
doing admnriskative work &d gtidly tiaded'these dutieswiththe attendants, bul in
so do,ng helped build a dcpendency relationship. Iis was a quid pro quo arrange
ment in ,hich attendints gained some inlluence through then efforts and interest ir
routine administration. 'ftis .lso increased their access to inform.tion (power)
resources aDd made them indispensable to the doctors, who came to defer to the
atteDdants on matters oFroutineward admiristratioD. The price oflimiting the influ
ence ofattendants (lowet participants) would have meant extra work and efi'ort on
the part ofdoctors in an area of hospital .dministration that did not intercst them.
Doctors had discretionary control overthese tasks and were able to unoficially d.te
gate these responsibilitles. Hadhospital rules and procedures prevented this, attend
ants mightnothavebeen able to fteate the dependency relationshiP. Ifa ward persor,
for instaDce, had objected to these informal practices, then Power strlggles and

connictsl,ould iDev,tably hare arisen.

Pluralists from withio the US tradition, t{ith its stroDg anti-union and collective
birgaining orientation, argue that lower P.rticipants in any organization can gain
some control over power resources and thts exert some inlluence over thei. suPerion.
MechaDic gives the example of prison guards bending rules or allowing violations of
regulations (for example possession of certain illegal itens) ln order to extract coop
eration fron nrmates. Logically, guards should tryto enforce sa.ctions and Punish
rnent against hmates who breakrules and regulations, but at the riskofaPPearing to
l.ckauthorityand the abilitlto command obedience should prisoners fiot or sinply
r.fuse to conpba So informal Practices avoid the types of confrontation aDd conflict
issociated with thewin-lose s,tuations that waideE mightlre aBious to circumvent.
fte studyofthepower oflowerparticipadts highlights ihe geDeric Dature ofdePend
ency and erchange relationships nr organizations. Tr.nslated into everyday practice,
plualists suggest that managers or supervisors who hive nothing of relevaDce or

236

PARI

COFECONCEPIS

re\i(in.::',

vnlue to krde lrith thcir employees or subordinates rnight encounter

beunnbleto extract cooperation orsitislictory performince fromlowerpartr.:::':
:
Supervisors rvho have no input, for cxa,Dple, into the promotion or saiiry
their stafwiu probilrly Iackinfluerce and be heavily dependent upon subo';.:j
to set tbinss done (Dawson 1986: I6l).

r.r::.

Power aesources and stralegies among manaqers

None ofthc studies mcntioned so far has directly eximincd the methods ofini:-:::
used by supervisory o. rnnnagriai groups. Table 6.2 describes some ofthe f :---.
dreorists {ho have dcait w,th this aspect ofpowei John French aDd Bertram F.: -,
( l9s9) typolog of po"r attempted to explain how subordinrtes react to mr.=-

power (thcy did not difcrentiate power frorn illluence). 'Ilus

co*6r i:r '

rcflected in a subordinate s fear olpu,iishment or negatile consequcnces othr. : ' :r

actions. Re',ardpoNcr is associatcd vith a belietthat benefits will florv from cor: r.
with NaDaSements orders. Rcr,",t po,.r js snnihr to charisma, invokjn! .: a
identincation Nidr a,nanagerj it is one ofthe most clTectivewiys ofgaining i; ---i
.nce. l.?crt rowel mcans that a subordinate iccepts thc superior knoNleia: r .
manaScr l.gitntrrte prpe,'is probibly similir to iuihority or the acccptan;. ,
manager s position and tbe rights and responsibilities associated wth it. This t\: : s
olpowcr identines tlre nrdividualpower resources ofminagers and thcir er,-i: r
subordinates, and does not crylain how or whcn thcse rcsources crn bc used

Tdble6.2 Ddtlapnb

of

pawr

ptr.y(tn.. tnr

.Eentut

Creation oa\ens of obligation

Building olreputltion D
cxpert, fo deri.g identi rl.atio n

6ams to rcsist iuthonF

Lames to colnter

6ums tobuild

rcsistE

pow*b*

cEaringdependcnceby

m.ling otheE believe th.

UsinS

fomal turhonty (rhat

sd!r.riNlo.l'6edtomtryeFrith Jl.i,Fulop(1992) Confli.r J pds* ln.$rni;toi\;in fulop,

Il,nl.tnno.fo,,ldfunitr8r!n ii ,{ Cnn.,,, liar, l\l.lb.ui,r., nft.nilhn, p 225.

l-. rrirh Fnth, F. rnJ

Hqrrrd, H

A more complcx tuodel emerged in Chnrles Handys typology ofpo$e: ":;

still, howcver, concentrated on explaining individuil sources olpower, bur ::-=
the diftension of itrl,or' ( H.ndy I 98s: 1 t 8 36). Handy s typology adrin..:
=
plurilist IgLrment byscparatingpower resources from methods ofinflue.ce. i:. !!
poidted otrt that poser is not an absolute fictor in a social relitionship, but e: -depending on its sdience or relerancc to .nother individual, the bilinc. oa:..-:
be[reen trto i.diliduals Gcmember even prkners have power) rnd the ..::
placcd on power (for exrdplc managers can most afect thcir dn ctsubordinr:.. ::

POWERAND POLITICS]N OR6AN ZATIONS

2A?

not othe6) (Hardy 1985: 121). Exhibit 6.1 outlines Handy's typolo$a A1t the
resources can be used positivel, that is, to gainpromotionsr support peere, achieve
results, or negatively that is, to obstruct, hinder or disrupt. Handy contends that not
everymanager canhope to succeed in acquiritrg all power resources (hence nethods

ofinfluence). the nost common ones are resource and position power, althoughin
Chapte! I0 on leadership, it is argued that expert and pelson.l power are becoming
more important as people moye away fton hierarchical forms oforganization (see

EXHIBIT 6.1

\\
l.

Handy's typotogy of power

Pof,.r rlsourots

Phys ca , resou rces, pos lion, expen

2. il6fli0d ol iillu.n.e
l,latd

peMna

Force exclrange, ecology tules and procedures pemuasion, maOnet sm

al powet and inflrence

Power Ph,5iE

tl
hlluence Force

Besource

force

Position

Exchange Buesand

Emoqy

Physca

{./

prccedures

Force

Bu ynq, stand oler lrerson

Threah bu

b6s
Besource

pnwer

Benef ts

orhe6 usuarryconlaned n

tuchanqe

lob conlmcls and so oi Need nol

be material for erample g vino
slalus 0r rccogn t on or n! ted lo

Barganinq and negotatnq

01r\]

Env

evei

roimenla constraints such

nois,sue, organ:alonal struclure.

cl nale

lor
on,

posl0n aned resource power

.lilro

fl

s,,stefis 0r rnotual on schemes

Eco

Entt"amenhaodrghlsoione! Bueand
examp e

physrcal pun slirnenl

calollnq 0r brbng,lor erample mcenlve

erclusive clubs

Poslon

ng

who loses hs or hertsml)er

over nlormal

and so on

l0slllule tu es and procedures aid

proedures mcl llkelyto

be used bythosewth

pos ion poMr

iqhl oi access rghlloor9anze

Expert

power

knowedge,speca

sllGiligor Percuasoi Logc powerotargumenlandevidence

resoume
oi iacts

edumt 0n souqhl.ailer
Persona

pourer Chftsma,asdescrbedbyWeber

S.IUBCE Adapled ,rom

r093t

F q

ue 3

page

Maqnersm Anraclon popuaitycharm(pe6onat

or experr pNer ls usuar sornce)

33 o, Cia.r6 Hmdy ,rddrslandrg o.ornzardrs (Peig!

1999

8@ks

976 4h

ed

corylqhlochir4H.idvt9T6 t93r r935 r993

,//'i

t\

According to Handy, thechoice ofvarious methods ofi uence will also depend
t)?e ofenvnonment in which a manager works. For qample, j! a consultancy
firm, upert power and persuasive influence are thought to be the most potent. In
fact, Hindy ( 1985: 152) bel,eves that these are the prefened or mosr eFective combinatjons in many moder. organizations. He has a nunber of other dlmensions to his
typology dealing with how subordinates react and cope with iDfluence.
John Kotter (1977) and HenryMintzberg (1989) have ako presented interpreta,
tions ofthe more overt foms ofpower and inlluence available to managers. Mintz,
bery's political ganes nodel contains a nunber of conmon tactics oi strategies that
on the

2AA

PART

CORECONCEPTS

de considered efective in protccting onet position, while simultaneously cotr

rvith potential threats and uncert.inty ftom various stak.holders. Gases to b:r
pow.r bases involve such thinSs.s: securing r powerful sponsor or 'star'; buildinaa
'empne with subordinates, securing control of resources, .nd flaunting onet e\tise or authority. Mintzberg advocates that, phyed in moderation, these 8ame. healthyi in exces they are cotrsidered destructive to the survivalofthe organiz!:(Kotter 1977. 128-43, Mintzberg 1983: t88 2l7j Mintzberg 1989:238, Kqs;i
Case 1990).
Both Table 6.2 .1nd Exhibit 6. I repiesent some of the cla$ics in the pluralist -ofpower but they are by no meaDs dhaustive and new ones continue to emerg.

Buchanan and Badh.m 1999 for an *cclent sumndy). For example, in 1992,lePfefer was advocating a seven-point plan togettbings done through the use oaF.a=
and iniluence including: decide your goals, diagnose patterns of dependenc:

:r.

intcrdependence, including which iddividuals are influentialj establish then e i ,

your goals, identify then powerbases and your own, determine effective strareE
and choose a course ofaction (.itcd in Bu.hanan and Badham 1999. 148). O'ja
have developcd sirnilar or more elaborate approaches, such as the one des$ibe: Bristol Voss (1992, cited in Bu.hanan dd Badbam 1999. 178, afld 2008: 30:
who included the following:

r
r
t
r
r
r
r
r
r
r

focus on the job to build your credit

skils of obsen.tion lnd listening

skiUs to id.ntify opinion leaders and fence sitteB (rn4 we rvould rdd, the
.osers'or those seekinS approvaland patron.ge from theirseniors)

b::':

,udge personalities and interests

ability to develop unobtrusive partnerships and use reciprocity
avoid blatantusc ofpower
negotiation skills and knowing when to push and when to pull back or concea
abilityto hike the boss lookgood
not alienating superiore by saying 'no'
developing loyal and competent subordin.tes who make you look good

David Buchanan and Ri.hird Badharn (1999,2008), having reviewed a: t

naior theones of power, camc up with thek own in respect of how change ;S.c

could use power to a6ect mijor organizationnl chlnges. fteir nndings raise !n.dimension to the study otpower that we will consider in Chapter 13, thJt is. rpower is related to or used during organizatioml change events. The issue of.lla+
as well as the identification ofpower resources rnd taciics aDd their deplo\-,:r
raises the queslion of how power can be benclicial to an orglnization. The notr.:
'
empowerment did much to lend legitinncy to the idei that powcr is an inteEE &
vital part oforganizations and theirmanagementand, frr from being a negatire a--is essentill for chaDSe and innovation.

'Ile

li-pr=
(rvlich shc refcrcd to as the last dirty 1,ord h management') sytronymous r=
cntrep.encLrrship and innovation, and later with empowerment. In her edll i:=.
t,on of enteprefleurs or change masters, she referred io middle m:nagers r!
concept ol empowerment owes much to the lvork of Rosabeth Moss
(1977a, 1977b, 1979,1982,1983, I 989a, 1989b) who initially nade the rerm

io change and innovate, so that new strat..a

products, work methods and structu.es could be created. ftere was no dou:: E
successfully uscd poreer resour.es

PoWERAND PoLmCSIN 0RGAN ZATIoNS

239

Kantert mind that organizations can only survive if they empower their middle
nmage6. For Kdter, mdagers who ocupypositions that do not Sive them acces
to vital power resources, h.nce makinS them highly visible and successful, were more

likely to become ituckers'who were unable to innov:te or plomote chinge. Many

bureaucratically strutured positions, she argue4 bred powerlessness becaus they
provided few opportunities to act or work other than in a routine way.
For Kanter three important power resources were needed md these consisted
three 'lines' or methods of access:

ol

oJsupply Mar.ale$have the epacity to bring in thc thngs that then own depdtefmple m.teri.ls, money or resouces, to dishibute as rewnrds.
Lin6 of i"krnatioa:'lo he etrective, managers need to be 'tu the know' in both the
informal and the formal sense.
Liies ol suppon: tn a {onal franework, a manager's iob paEmtem treed to allow
for non ordindy action, for a show ofdiscretion or exercise of iudgemeDt. And,
informally, managers need the bachng of other important ligures in the organizition whose t&it approval becomes another resource they bring to their oM work
unit (Kinter I983: 134)Lines

ments need, for

.
I

In many rspects Kanter's ehpowering sbitegies are more or less a hybrid ofthose
mentioned in Table 6.2. She identified four key empowering strategies available to
middle namgers. The 6rst ofthese was 'ride the right coat.tails'-hich meant wo*ing
with soneone who has clout .nd is successtul. This also relates to giining sponsorship
(or mentoring) and succeeding by being associated with other successful managers in
the organization. 'Monument building'was about creatinS or red.nging departments
or dilisions to prcmote uncertainties and provide nerv rewards for loyal subordinatet
(for exanple a new position).'High vjsibitity'was associ.ted with risk taking and
solvinS critical problems or coping vith m.ertainties. 'P.er allid.es' related to
building rctwo.ks md establishinS supportive relationshjps with those moving up the
Iadder. Ka er ( 1977b) identined these strategies as masculine ones, not readily available to women. Koter Ms on. of ahe 6rst theorists to consider a.d malyse diversity
as a dimension ofpow.r relitions. We $,ill return to this point shortba
Kantert ipproach was.lso difereflt from other pluralists because she re(ognized
structure as an ihpo{ant factor in empowering managen. She acknowledged that
enpowering was not solely dependent on individual initiitives or actions, butwas
limited or hanpered by inappropriate nructures that havc to be chdged by senior
management. As .lrerdy stated, powerlessness was idenlined by her wrth bueau'
cratic structures and vllues. knter maintained that powr resources must cnculatc
ed if they did not th.n the more negative and desructive aspects of conoi.t and
powerle$n.ss would engulf an orgdization.
Krnter ( 1989c, cited in R.gins 1997: 487) pointed out that mentoring relationships help prot6g6s to develop power resor.es in dd across the org ization and
provide training' for protges in developing their political skills and influence. As
Kanter noted, mentors can also provide challeaging assignments and place their
prot6gas in hiShly visible positioDs where they c.n d.velop qpert powcr ud be
noticed by those who count in tems ol career development. Moreove4 mentors
provide 'reflected power'to protagds and the nentors influetrce cnn augment that of
prctt86s, both in terms ofthe resources they get rnd the protection they receive 6om
adverse organizational events or forces. Mentors provide career developnent and
advscement opportunities (Kanter 1977b, r989c, cited in Ragins 1997:487).
Kanter's wo.k narked aw.tershed in the theorizingaboutpower and did much to
attenuate the negatives associated with the Machiavelliin view of power According

--..1

290

PART

CORE CONCEPTS

to Buchanan and Badham (1999; 132, 138, 200s Chapter 4), one of rhe didi.-::i
of confronting rhc issue ofpowe.isto engage with both irs dark or neqatile s,:: !
$etr

r.,r.bencF,,r, Jnd ne!c\dry..pe(r\ tn r\c,,,retr, K.,fle, .rieJroo,c.._

the ncgative and destrucrive eliects ofpoweriessress by presenting empor@rm:. 2

a highly nriegr.tive, almost unitary corcept G.e atso Fulop l99rr. rn (.-_approach, empowernent, with iis focus on open communication, coun\ell:r: al

) deJtrng., br.t i.jbo,nq "r r _

"ppe-'to,rrrordt,r\.\uggen.rheeadotdr
'oflN o'polilE.rl anoeu\flng1. MoreJrer, lhc poL.i-rt rJ. i., .he..rr..:
e

alrWs urdurcoed bf Fticipative styles invohed with persuasion, team .r:-:q.

and conseDsus. Howerer, Buchanan and Badhrn suggesr that this trtopianl:., :s

ro..kno\ledge rhJt

drrTerenr

,ppro.che.arercededino,g,ni..,t,o".ro.t....ar

changc and irnorhtion and sometimes this might iequire aulocraric action.

I:. ,i

oo ro derelop their oun approach to the ,politi.at entrepreDeu. (Buchanr: a

Badharn2008i 238 42)r which expticiriy acknowtedqes the Machiaveltian ete_.5
or po^er ,,. s( l a. rch ,orrJ .nd ertrrcrt ,.ew. oip;"* rerhdp, hhere r : -.

workhas be.n most r.vealingis in its focus on the gendere,t natur; ofpoi,er
Gende. and empowermenr

Ore ofthe key_proposrtio.s of empowerment rei

es

to menror,ng.lvlento!.:

.,

higlhg.rdereder.ron.l-rp.a.hougt-rhe,r.,rlure\.t.roob{u,erhr..q.\\t.-r
(loo8: l2o\ nor,, dmerro.ngre,.,on.hip,e*enrr \ rbour rpowerr.,,
..: -r

identifying reith a young.r veBion ofhimsetf' Gee atlo Krnter l977br t6_1
Rose Ragins (1997) rese.rch inro mentoring, esp.cially thc impact of direrj:
mentoiing relationships and hence emporverment, found that
ms ;

:_r
r
-: r
;en.ler
I.rcro, ,1.u.ce.,tul dnd un.u(.e*tuI mcntolng oLr.orne.. Rc8in. d?\ m_ r
p.ual\t per,pecr,\e. roe\rrnine hor rjrerrriei mertonng eLrror.hrp. I ..,..=
US o.ganizrtions were workjng. All ihe ,pproaches meDtioned in Tible 6.2 r. .. e
tially blind or neutral to diveBity i$ues as jDdeed is the titerature in generit .:,-

tionsbeingHatch 1997j Buchinau andBadhan 1999,2003 Chapter SJ.

Infomal nntoring .elarionships ire the main rypes of;ento.jDg ii.::
-Rigins, but she did acknowledge that some o.ganizations
estabtished::
mentoriDg programmes as well. Ragins aryues that nrformal menroring rehr--r :i
are not easy to form anongpeopte fron divemc backgrolnds. DiveNiaed
m.:::?

-elarron,n,p. de rho'e n,.otv 1g Dcople iron

drflerel pow.r rnd .ra.1... 'g oip. I b.\ed 01 gender. ,crLdlirv ,e ohaoitr.v o. erhnjcrn _ .ee Brg . .
. ^+oq) P.ople ir rl.e'e rel-hon'hrp. r.udlt) lrdrLmo,. d,lficu.r lorden .": -j
roer.Jro her Ven o"insreh.,on,nrp.wirt-peopteoi.,hihrtt-racrerir...-'.
ndtu. /rhrl F._To,e lomogcneou. ,el trion,n,p.r .rcJre porerralh greJr, . -. Jnd er\e ior rl,o\. ,nvol\ed. Rrsin, poinh jo,e.eJ,.h rh.,r na, iound rt- - _

gerd*

o aos
ty

motori.g retationships face p.rticul.r problems. rn .-:. Ragins (1997: a99), women reported betng reluctant t: -r
mentoring relationships with n.n for fear that this approaci by ttren: cr_: mce

study cited

construedasas.xualadvancebythemalementororothersintheoroanntrij..

._

iarb, social activities outside work (for eranple playing gotf) are Iu'moe tr:_:. : :
divqsified motoring relatio.s than those involvjDgpeNons ofthe same genj::
A 1996 study 01461 womeD execurives nr dre USA (RagnB 1997: 49- :--_n
Catalyst 1996) found that even women who atiributed their success to r:-:: .
nentor also claimed that they had consistently to .xceed perfornance erpe;::: :,
and present themselves rn ways that made male co{,ork 6 feel contoriai.. .:
theh.JoaD Marg.etta (I997, r9) has coinedthe term tomfo( svndrofte, io r:i--.
i idnge oljtrol(ir, oftcn,Lbue.ode, o.rcelurs,ha ire t,(c') ro.,RrLr n..-. -{

POWER AND POLII CS

benveen mcn and women.lhe comfort iyndrome covers feelinSs and enrotions aDd
gender st.reotypes such a! fenr,prejudice, env, grecd and aggressiveness in rvomen.
Ragins (1997:492) ilso indicates that dn ersity lbr 3ny individual or group usually

cohprises multiplc identities (for cxample an ethnic mile,

i,d

womin who is ilso

m.tle who,lso has n dislbility) and therefore, tbe splitinto homogeneous

diversincd mcntoring relatioDships is in some wiys iD artificialconstruct which

lesbian,

simpliiits whrt arc often extiemely complex relitionships. RaSins also citcsrese&ch
in the USA (Ely 199s) ivhich fouDd that privatc sectororganizationsivith l;wNomen
in positions ofpower were more likely to support and Fosier stercotypical gcnder
roles as opposed to firms with morebalatrced representition.
Ruth Simpson (1997: SI22) lends support to Ragins'dndhgs l,y citing research
i. the UK which lound that women rvho typicJly form i minority (20 per cent or
less ofthe rotil workforce for any milority makes them tokeD members) nnd them,
selves being marginalized and excluded through stereotypes. Stereotypes cin be
polan,ed or exaggcrated to create boundarics bet$een groups, .ssimilated into !
groups subculture or evcn nore widely idopted in the orgi.iz.rtion. vvomen tend to
bc isolated in these cultures, but $e noncthel.s still highlyvisible (Simpson, .,ting

Kanter I977b). Some of tlre st.reotypic.l role traps cD ibclude: Nothcr rolc
(confortrble and caring), the seductress (sexy and drngerous), the pet ($reet but
inconpetent) I md for those who do not conform to these, thc 'non maidcD (asexual
and strid.no' (Simpson 1997; sl22). Sinpson.ites rcsearch b) i{a.shll (199s)
connrming evidence oa rolc traps beidg uscd in corporations to marginalizc and
exclude women fron power aDd influence through these,nformal processes. h her
study of 100 women minagers who trerc MBA grnduates, Simpson found tro evidencc
of role traps but rrther strenuous c$orts being made by Nomen to ivoid tbese role

trips by ovcrperforming or performing well above expcctations. Moreover, people

rvith

a higher so.ioeconomic status orbackground receive nore carcer dcvelopment

support from mcntors than do people with a lower socioeconomic brckground
(Ragins 1997: SoZ .rting Whitely et al. I99 l ). ftis is covered by the old adrge it i,
notNhat you know but who you know:As Ragins (1997: 507) also points out, eveD
groups that have similar demogriplic characteristics c.n experience diferetrces in

values, attitudes and beliefs among their members.

Paul Gollim (1997:25 6), writing on sti(selection inAustralii, notes how thc
apparent ufldervaluing ofwomen io Aust.alirtr busnresses merns thrt it would probably take a.oths 170 years to achieve equil representation between the sexes nr
managcnent. He quotes reseirch showingthat between 1995 and 1996 the propor-

tiofl ofrvomco in management positions had de.hred. Tlris trcnd continues in most
OECD countries. He : so cited research showing that 73 per ccnt of Au(raliin
rvomen managers leare their jobs because oflimited clreer opportunitics. In other
words, notonlyis the pool oimentors avulable to otherwomen not expindnrg, but
the problems wjth diverse m.ntoring rel.tionships rre probablyalso taung thcir toll
(Flett 2007). Gollam (1997: 25) suggcsts th.t when one Iooks it mimgemcnt ir
Australii, one is still conaront.d with an image ofihc'old boy networkl Similar trends
are appuent in thc UK (see also Chapter 2) wherc a DrtioDil siudy in 1995 found
only 5 pe! cent ofwomcn were.t the serior levels and only 3 per centwere dncctors
ofbo.rds (Simpson 1997: S 121) and ngures for 2007 nrdicite thit femile represent
ation at the highest levels ofpublic, piivite.nd voluntarysecton clusters between I0
per cent and 30pcr cent (sec Chipter2 fordetailed disctrssion).In Simpson:s stodl
(mentioned earlier), the single Sreatest birier thrt women expericnced in ih.i.
cireers rvrs the presence ofthe ment.lub: In her study, token women ( omen in
the minority) recorded a mucb higher i.cide.c. ofhavinS expcrienced th. menls

292

PART

CORECONCEPTS

club

as a barrie! to c&eer advancemert than those women in organna-::

greatergenderbalance (non tokenvonen). Simpson (1997: S122, citin! a?Maddockand Prkin 1994) says the nent club can operate to separate:::
women through sexual innuendo Genstjoke, and coDversations domrn;r:: thi.gs as sport. These tactics, which ire often ritualized, act to exclude\rc:informal encounters where importanr information is exchanged, often a$e,-_1
sions and, ultimately, careers (Sinpson 1997. S127).
Empowerment became one of the buzz-lyords of the 1990s in manr r-,
managemeDt and business. Yet Cynthia Hardy and Sharon Leiba-O'Sulli!.:
463) suggest that managenentrarelyintroduces empow.rment straregies jr :i
share poweror create a more democratictuorkplace. ftis applies equallrto:.
Rrrher, enponerm
u'u:lly rsoc.ared rrrl: :
"omen.
ment's goals ofimproving productivity, lowering costs orindeasing cusro-::
faction. In fact they argue that there are two mai! approaches ro empor.:i
adopted in busioess. The 66t entaik delegating power and auihoriq ::
enployees s'ho thrive on siress and challenges and can !e kusted to use f:'.
the berent ofthe organization.
'fte second is when enporvernent is used by management is a mori:: -di
sirategy ind not to share power ftis entails using open communicitjon. r-.i@"
tional goal setting and leadeElip to increase the commirmeDt and iNoh.--

people to their organizatioDt success (Hardy and Leiba-O'sulliva! 199! -!.

Instead of focusi.g oD the dclegatiorl and sharing of power, rhis mor,r::3a

:.rt
r-:a

approach to empowerment seeks to give people encouragement ind feedbt:,

them tolearn, provides themwith emotionil supportto alleviate stres an{l
and createspositive emotionalresponsesto organizational goals.
ls a yen :-,?r,
view ofpowerbecause iis nain aim is to addre$ the feelings ofpo',erlessne'.
people and imbalances in power aDd certainly neglects the problefts
face.As one ofBuchanan and Badham s respondents notes, shouldthole
individuals empowered stirt to come up u,ith solutions not ac.eptable to
ment, then the organization would have ... to deal with that problem' (Badhr-

lis

r-,:q
ron:r
go!: -a
rr-"}
a

Buchanan 1999: 1221.

D.vid Collins (2000: 213 49) develops an argumeDt based on the }ori :' :
lite Harvie Ramsay (1977) that participition and empowerment initiatilrs:-: :<
of longeL wave historic.l fluctuaiions in economic and social conditions. *.means that management periodically needs to tighten and relax its merL.:. r
.ontrol nr order to mainta,n efFectiveness aDd hence its longnerm objc.-:.: ,
securing and remaining in control. Similar argumenrs are made by Grint lti_.
1997b) and Barley and Kunda (1992). For Collins, empowerment rhen n ..-simplyaproductofmanagementiniti.tive, nor apasing fad, butpart ofthe hrs:::a
unfolding of cycles ofcontroland is occasioDedb, in rcsponse to oranricipat,ir rsubordinate action rather than being . cause of subordinate aciion.
Collins does not consider gender in his discussion ofempowerment, and:have been no other attempts to our knowledge to consider gender, equal oppo-. rordiversityinitjitives as cyclical. But over the rime ofa career rhere js some e\i:..r
thai women cxpedence empowerment diferenrl)r Wajcman (1998) not* ::
women, in puticular, run out ofmentob as they rise tp the organiz.tion. Not c:- :
this because there are fewer women at this level, but aiso because those men \rh. !a
comfort.bl.withwomen and less involved wirh the nens club net\rorks also te:::,
have alimit to theirprogress.As one ofher respondents obserles:

My first role models were not women, they irere men who nurtured fte i.
career ... who rr.re definitelynot threatened by me, who I found to bc tibr.::::

293

rnen.whenyou getto the top thoseknd ofmenseemtohavefallenbythewayside

sornewhe.e, and quite frankly manyofthe men at the top are not that appeiling.

(wajcman 1998, I29)

ln one ofthe compuies WajcnaD studied, a formal womens networkwas set up

to compensate for the lack ofinformal networking opportunities which males had,
yetit sufered from friction because the needs otjunior aDd senior women appeared
to be diFerent. As one ofher respondents observed:
Women ... who've been incredibly conpetitive -.. have not wanted to help
anybody along the way until they felt that they had hit the glass ceiling. And then
theytrade oFthe support forotherwomenbyusingtheirsupport [i.e. the support
of other wonenl to get them through lthe glass ceilingl. Suddenly rtt bh what
cinl do for you;'And you klow that the hidden agenda in this is,'what I want you
to dofornel (Wajcm.n I998: I30)

EXHIBIT 6,2
The unwrittn rutes of success

\
Work comes f

lyou are

2:

above any persona or larn y concem

a man and aJalher you can break

b/eak nub

Rulo

6l

nue

and be a Eeal quy ilyou re awoman and you

you re not ser ous aboul your tulu re

t0nghourcmearequremenliyolllbosswantsyouandyourenolllrereheorshewllearnq!cky
t0 wanl s0m"aone \i/ho s

Rule

3:

Take credlt

Rule

3.r

f you re a man and you breakF! e 3 because you qave credil lo a woman you inrmed ale y gel mme

ffl

what

cred t for youM

wo

s (no mater

because ol

Bule 3 behaviour s

yor

lrM tanqenliaiyor r0l0)and

la rness and firagnanim

disgusring re resullinq lailure

managernentand the poss

10

ly thal lhewords'qood

v.ll

run lrom whatdoesn

you're awoman aid y0u lhinkllral

tule 3 res! ls I perpelualmddre

mghl eleilLra y p.ecede your name 0n llre

1o ow

od

otherhand.loonrucherercseolthsrLrreqelsyoulhehardtooseepilrretaqgressveandtliora

qub4r

Therc s ony one career n your ie aid ony one palh iyou gep off

8ul04ar

ll l1)u are a man aid you break Fue 4,you were prcbablydownszed: lough
you brcke RLie 4 because you are a womaa who stayed home w

$!e

Bul5r

Th

person but a bad

be1

you re

outol

rk,

uck.

lwon t huir you

your clr dren ior a wh e, you are a

lor iurure emp oymern to say nohmq ol advancernent

s s about hierarchy Yourlob

make your boss look 90od andyour boss! job s

h ruke

h s

0r

her boss look 9@d

nuh6r
souficE

//)

The goal is lo oet

ose

P lrl. Kema (r 9971 L{rra, r{drr

1o

the loo as possib e There is no end lo what

D@ twuka.uMate:wm

wdk ard

/&fl&

yr!

are supposed

1o

aclr eve

N4v Yoi( Hdrds 3 sloughroi

(\

Such a self-seNing attitude ofmanipulative politics, using others to one: own ends,
competing b/ other meaN and piomoting onet own uierests at all times eve! when
ostensibly promoting those of others is merely conforming to whit McKenna ( I997)
c.lls the 'uNritten rules ofsuccessl in which success h little to do with loy.1ry dedicatioD, excellence or hard work. McKenna, discussed by Buchanan dd Badhm
( 1999: 123-5) spells ouf somewhat cynically, these unwritten rules (Exhibit 6.2).
McKenDa perhaps overstates the caser but puts forward a strong argument that
wome! need to feminize work by challenging these unwritten rules and, iather tho

291

PAR'I

CORECONCEPTS

! man as mady ofwajcmanls respordcflts feel they have to do, res-:

ion, share i.formation and redeline success in te.ms ofthev.lu. of$h::.
produced ratbcr tban .onformance to the existing systemis requiremenk.
McKen.a, ifcmpowermert means simply being given permission to behav. h.i:..
managing like

collabor

;:

min, it

is

not thc way fonyrrdi cmpowerment needs to be re gcndered.

Politicat view of power

Bichirach and Biratz's (I962) work grcw out ofpolitical $ciencc and public po -and deilt with isuesrelated to commtrnitypolitics and struggle ind the mobilirr: r:
ofiDterests h rither sinister \ays by po$dtul groups. The political viely of po.hclped shili focus rway from individual lccounts ofpowe. to look more broldl,
i,rstitutionxl prictices thrt change the bises ofpowcr in orginizntions ind
difl;rent forms ofpolitic\ andpowerrelitionships. On.ethefocus shifted to sub-:--:
powcr, the erpl.natio.s and dynmics iflyolved in powerako chrnged.

c!.-

Stlategrc continqency v ew of power

Sociologists ind orgarizrtional theorists sought to idcntify the types of

i llue.r
:

used bydepartments or sub-uniis in orB.ni2ations to coMte. controland esiabl

p.tter.s of rcsistance. llis type ofcollcctile influencc is considered to be differd.:
nriry respects from individual mcthods of influenc.. Michel Croziers lindnr-t
study,'Ilt Bo.nucrdtu Ph!,o,E"o ( 1964), examincd a group of maintenincs
in the trench tobacco industry ind provided importnnt ins8hts into sub-unit por.
rnd the rolc ofunions and other social forces ,n shapingporcr relltions.ln the '- :

r:-

the concern with sub unit powerpaved the way for n strategic contingency !ie\ :
pohr Drawing on Croziers work, thc stategic contingency theorists .rgued :the maintenancc nea controlled and autho.ized the repiir ind maint.ninc. :
michines. Specdy r.pair ofbreakdowns and proper mainten..cc helped to rei-:
unccrtainties for managemcnt and other workers, for a number of intedeh:.:
rcasons- The plint used technologies rnd work piocesses thit were interdepend..-.
so that ifa macbinc broke down the rvhole plant rvould grind to a halt. The main::.
ince men also succcssfully rcsist.d attcmpts to routnrize iheirwork through plan:=:
orpreventive miintenance ind used thcirunion to forestall the nrtroductiod ofil:.

native or snbstitute methods to .arq' r-_

maintenincc. Thus they irerc very inUuc.:
trecluse th.y remiined central to lvork flon .
coped with unccrtainties ind were abh ::
prerent strbstitute methods or activities be,::
introduced. Their jobs ncre non'routinc r:
the dependencc on tlem ryas verystrong.:
lcvels within thc plant had to defer to th.:
decisions and demands, while they remiin::

stratcgically jmportant or were able to cc1

with criticnl uncertainties (Hickson et

1971; also sec below).

Subsequent studies hive supportcd

:::

irsoment that lor sub-units the impo!t::'

power resource\ te .. kdlit), copiig r:1
nrceltd,tt:t and nan.sfinit tdr,liit (Hick!. :

ind

Mcculiough 1980). Howcv.n

HicksoD et al. (t971) sugSest, these po\r.:

st.ategic coDtingencics

x.

always susceptible to erosion, especirlly through routinization and the introduction

of Dew technology. A sales department, for example, which attracts i highvolune ol
orders during an ecoDomic recession is likely to have increased influence and power
It acts to rcduce uncertainty in the o.ginization by guaranteeing future gorvth ind
profits. Bythe same token, ifthe depirtment secures a number oflong-term orders,
theD it might become stutegicillyless importaDt. Sut-unitpower isyiriable (contingent) atrd managers will.lways hile to deal with sub-units or dep.rtments thlt have

strategic importance to the or8lnization. The strutcgic contingency approlch to

power gives imple clucs .s to how sob unit members foste. dependencies ind the
strategies managers cln use to deil with these dcpendency or power rehtionships.
Where it licks some sense ofcross-cultural relevince is its failure to recognizc the
iEportance ofunions ind industrial relations systems that cir curtd the power of
nmiSers in order to minimize the salience of.ertain contingencies, a view not
stronSly put in the US literature.
The potilicat organ zation

the politicd perpective viervs orglnizitions as coalitions of individuals or grcups

who ar. by .Dd large puBuing their orvn rge,dJs and interpretJtions ofrvhat consti
tute appropriate or valid goals (Biiley 1970: 19 22i Cl\\d 1973: 192j Burrell and
Morgin 1979: 202-5). Conflicts o[ interest rrise in prcdictab]e ways becluse of the
interdependencies and po$er diferenti.Is thit ire structured or built into organiza
tions throtrgh such thiogs as the division oflabourand task speciali,ation. $ese help
to create horizontal and vertic.l dependencies. InterdependeDce isalso fostered by the
technologies adopted in orgdizations, pdticulirly the extent to (hich they cin be
either substituted or routinized or used to skill ordeskil orgatrizitionrl members.
Organizations also hde limitcd resour.s or operate under conditions ofscar.ityThn mcans that rew.rds and opportunities ec .erer adequ e to meet .lcryonei
eapectations, thus conflict and polver struggles remain endemic.

hrough centriliza'

tion or decentralization, powerresour.es can bc cither concenirited at the top olthe

organiration or allond to tlorv down the hi.rar.hy. Organizitional nembers Nill
react to either situation, rvith the probibility ofconflict being greater in deccntralized
structures. Figure 6.1 surnmarizes some ofthecommonsoorcesofconflictandpoi{er
struggles in pol,tical organizations. As Figure 6.1 shows, conilict derives from both
internal and enernal infl uences on organizational embers.
The conceptofthe seminal politicnl organization \as ,Iso cvideflt in Alvin Gouldnerii (19S4) and Cro?ier: (1964) works. Both ofthese works emphasi2e thc wiys in
which nrutures (for example division oflabour, rules, technology) both conrtrain
and cnnble ceitain strategies or tactics of organi?ational menbcrs.
Gouldne.conductedresearch into the efectsofrules and his rrork identified three
diferent ry?es ofburciucritic prttern which can existjn the workplace, depcndinS
on how rules are estnblished in the firstplace: punishment-centred, mo.k and represenhtive rules. In the mock pattern, rules erist but are ignorcd by both st.rft and
managenetrt (for example no smokins rules werc breached). In the repr.scntative
pattern, rules are mutuilly agreed to and acceptcd as fin by all (for exmple using
safety clothing in a toxic industry). In the puoishment-centred pattern, one pa(y
imposes rules against the others wishes, generiting conflict and powerstruggles (for
example abolishingteabreaks to save money). Gouldflerirescarch ifl agypsum mine

in the USA tughliShted howdifficult itwas for manageme.t to eliminate pcrks and
privilegcs ind chanSe mock rules. Changing rules against pilfering eve.tunlly led to
bitter industrial conflicts and the finJ closure ofthe mine. According to Couldnet
burelucracy is man-made and is i tunction of human strivingi it is the outcome of a

296

PARrl

CoRECONCEPTS

contestberseen thosewho wrnt rtrnd tho\e who do nor'fquoted rn Salam-_

r47). To simplypresume that all rules could be agreed to and exercised br 3:*

th. top of the hierarchy

ignores manipulation, dissent and reiection c:

(Gouldner 1954:20; Byrt 1973.49, Lansbury and Spillane r9$: 105-6, Pu=:

r983:20-4).

,lasL

Di,ierent al on ofwork lasks

lo'v r onor labourand
cperialDanonl

Errernatin,tuer.:::_

lseE./" .-,.--.

2 rl,r.ogeneo.rgoals
ld'spdrare v'eG/prFre' e-(es ber*een

t"*L',

,/
l. lnterdependi.e
koord'r o", (oope6ton,
rr.grar'on o, wor(l

ndiv,duad.dvisionsl

--^

4. Ueterogeneoos beL!_:
abour techaologr

ConlLrcl
lo

kanon'ng, compel'l

sagrenen

lLro(e,deproyre-'

/'

dilfeen.es belwee-

abour

' l.prdr("iporen.al

on

.onilrdst

Dst.blronol
d.pends on importan.e of

Pot

fts,lact csand slraleg

es

{barga n ng neqotial onl

Fioure

6.1

Condilions l0r lhe use ol power

solRcE adaoled kon Je1te, Plefts

16h

Ax

Kur

iq qa

(r

s31l

Po6

orqar&rens L.mlo: P(man o 69 d4e

ooed

Graene siealrer Lr-

,i: .

Nee Sourh War6

Gouldner's study was a descriptive piece ofresearch that attehpted to dr8' a.

tion to the mmner in which n les could be interpreted and acted upon &fer*:. r.
all *ithin orgmi,ations. lt did not adopt a managerial peBpectiv &d tried tc !:t!
that rules had signincantly dillerent meanings for workem and managere. 'Ile :
management tried to iDstitute bureiucratic procedures (stricter ruies, regda)t

dd dh.iplin.ry

measures), the more workers resented the abolition ofpractics

ud favouritism, even though these were dehimer.z
improling productivit)'. Gouldner's study was one of the first to approa.-::
problem ofcontroland authonty from an action approach, byfocusingon the
tance ofmeaning slstems, as also pointed out byWeber (Silverman 1970)while Gouldnert work higl ighted the prcblem ofroles and authorit, the

were based on npothm

r
i.:,i-:,t
s

by Crozier (1964) created even more doubts .bout the nature of authonF

power. Crozier set out to study how authority wrs actu.lly exercised in ldge ors&
zations, especially in areas in which it was not alwiys easy to replace people or
nate their tasks. He did not start from the premise that people's actions were one:r=

e-*

to rule followinS or complying with .uthority, but rather 6om the alsumptior

::z

through the organization! effort to .limimte the .liscretion ofemployees, some ::

oluncertaintywillremain, and such uncertaintyis thebreeding ground for efo:-r E

POWERAND POLITCSIN ORGAN

achieve some, hou'ever slight, self

ZATONS

291

control.It supported the aiew that the fiDal siruc

ture of an oiganizatjon ... is the result of these negotiations, interpretatjons in which

organizatjonal membe6 actively strive to resist some directions and control' ( Salamitr

1979:116).
In the case of Crozier's maintenance men, ihei exPertise afld ibility to repair
machines enabled then to avoid the olheNise tight regulatory system ihat aPPlicd
to other areas ofproduction and, through theit union, resist routinizitioD ofmain
tenance procedues. Power struggles ensued between the maintenance men and
manigement, with the latier attemPting to legain control through increasing the .ules
and regulations afectjng the work of the maintenance men Howelen Croziernoted
that even these actions of senior management were P.rtially constrained try cultural
norns in French soclet, which ftowned upon such thhgs as oPen exercise of

authorityorfacelo-face conflict (Reed 1985: 159-61).

In the political organization, human agency or actions give shaPe and meaning to
structure.'Ihe interests oforganizauonal participants are implicated in some way nl
the social relations and sLuciures that they exPerience as either en.bling or
constlaining ihem. In strch an organization, the rules ofthe game, tbe prizes'and
conduct dpected ofParticiPdts are very nuch a Degotiated process in which the
struggle for power, to limit, reslst or escaPe it, is in endemic feature (Reed 1985:
I41 6i Clegg l9s9: 207). I1e political orgadizaiion, whether labeiled 'innovativel
'entrepreneurial' or 'divisionalizedl is infused with power relitions and the Politics

Mjnkberg his argued that politicized organizations musi include both internal
ard extem,l coalitions, such as shareholders, unions, governments, baDks, suPPlicrs
and customers. To beapoliticized organization, jn Mtutzbergt view,meaDs enduring
orexperiencingconflictstreiweeninternalande ernalcoalitions.He siys atomPlete
political arena' exlsts when an organization experie..es severe and uncontrollabie
conflicts between internal and extemal coaliiions. He aues th.t conflicts hale
predictable forns, depending on their intensity (level olhostilities), Pervasiaeness
(how wldespread) .nd duration (brjef or lasting). Accofd,ng to Mintzbe, few
otganizations can survive very intense, highly Pervasive and lasting conflictsi thev
self-destruct. Political rrenas (or politlcized organization, are enduring configura
tions and emerge wh.rever orgaDizations are whollyorPartisllycaPtured oriNaded
by obvious and visible conilicts. By this deEnition, every orga.ization is a Political
arena (Pfefler 1981: 154 76, Mint2berg 1983i 420 66,197-502).
Theorists such

as

K.nter

have proPosed that the successful Political organization

must institutionalize power by developing emPowering sirategies and structures

(Kanter I983,1989a,I9s9b, Mintzb.rg I989:237 302). Icnter argued ihat in the
post'entrepreneurial organization, tradiiional coocePts of hier3rchy, tash specializa
tion and even departments would gile way to mote complex arld fluid struciures in
Nhich interdependence rrould take on new forrl1s. Power, she felt, was becomi.g
more decentralized in these organizations. KaDteridentined four trends.s indicative
ofa new form ofpolitical organization which emerg.d in the 1990s:

r.

ftont the traditjonal hierarchies to

Proiects, business units,
joint rentures wjth odrer companies,labou managetuent forums and str.tegic
p.rtnershiPs with suPpliers or customers. These were creating ne1, centr.s of
Relntionships of influence at

fluid structures such

as

powo wre

nittiq

Peetnetworks, cros functional

power that cut acro$ ihe chaln of connand in quite dive6e a'ays. Middle
m.nagers and supervjsors wete beconing idvolved in nany noe oos'bounduv
relationdrips, that is, icross departmentt .ompanies, suPPlie6 ald so on Gc.
also Chapters 11

.nd 16).

2.

I created
.e through a|."dd

Ilre devclopments mentioned in poinr

tdkiig

d.tio n"rl eriti,lg tlLE

grcatn

*ni

E.

wr\\

ol

dn- .. c

Crossfunctio.:

--,

tionships pl.ced min.gers in morc dilersc coalitions and as a result thr -- t

to rcdefine itsigDm.nts, tasks, jobs and interdepcndencies increased. D: .r

3.

tion iDd r.sponsibilit/ lor more skategi.ally important decision\ .becomilg more dispelsed sincc senior manigement lras unable to m:::-r
tight control ov.r thcse morc complex, mcss/ and ruid arrangements. R.: --tions i.side and outsidc orginizations rrere becomi,rg:n important sou::. r
poNer ind innuence.
Polih.al sliit associated with netrvorking, bargaining, negotiating .nd I,!-- : :.
alliin.eswere becoming is important for success ar technicalexpertise
citions (see Bolman ind Deal1991.207-19).

4.

I^tctnnl rcloronships

were becoming as

impoilint

or.:-

and vitxl to success as

!::.-j

fordeveloping a cirecrnnd gainin8 power and iniluence. lDfonnil n.:..

and coilitions \rer. esscntial to the emporrcred m:nagci
ones

:-r

I(anter'.s model ofthe politicil orgi.ization propos.s the institutionaliztr:::'

power .nd interests so thit politics beco,nes a norm.l part of managenent nr::.:e
rnd daily practices.'Ihis view his been critici,cd ibov. forits unitarist leanrr.-.
its hckofittention to othcr foms ofpowerthat remain uncxplored.

The radiaat view of power and domination

Behiviourists, plurilists ind empowe.ment theorists hivc been crjticDr: ::
dumber of counts, but primarily for their asu,Dption that powcr is widel). d,.:---a
and not concentrited in the h:nds ofu elite group.'lh.y propagate the rir, :r
therc arc diverse rpheres ofi,fluence (for exmple networks or coalitioni) :ii- :
gencrally accessiblc to all who rvish to prrticip.te in power gimes (Bud. jMorga. 1979: 2I6)i they {ail to de.l with polver dlsp.rities between Sro!:: ::
cramplc, ,r the pluralist model, the birgiining or negotiating processes are .::- r
'tools'lor rertonng equility in thc poser bases betwecfl various stikeh::-including maDigement. It is argued thrt having balan.ed powc. bases bet\r..: ?
lirious g.oups crentes ch.cks and counterch.cks that lead to the stabilir\ :: >
powcr system within organizations.
h n)oie dircct terms, the one- and two,dimensioDal vicws ofpowen i!: ::-.
similar approaches, do notfocus ideqMtelyondre fi.t tbat in orgrnizitions :. i:i
ties cxht between the polverofdre ma.iged and those who man:ge them.l::.I.trly in lhe pluralist :pproaches popular in the U$ the doninant group, b.:.ownen/managcr, arc seen rs iust another por{cr group rvhose porver.:- }
contcsted just is easily as anyonc else. In this vcin, su.h ipproaches ire soi :: r
ideological tools ofsubordinition ind legitimatiofl, used semi purposne\.to.:::
tion subordinatcs jnto.cccpting the st,rtur quo and bclievingthltpo$,eris r r..: --j
circulatnrgfor ill to us. ((irkbridc 198S; 277).
TIre issue ofdomin.tion is i criticalonc bccause it r.ises thc problem oftl. -.tionship betrvectr authority a.d poDer, and the digerent types ofinflucnce tI::: r
irom each. Plurrlists in gcnerrl are weikin tbeir aDilysis ofauthority and hr:= I
to address the deeperand more co,npl.xispects ofdomination ind controlin..-

r/Jrion..CleggJndDunlcrley(1980,+Hi'ugge+rhatrllorgrn',rr'"n'1.r,-,-motric systems or identinable powcr groups thlt ire str.tcgicrlly positioned n.: : -.to pliypowergrm.s but deinc thc veryrules ofsuch gmes. To put this into..::.-Clegg argues thit in iny gim. ofchess, the queetr is more powertulby virtue i: r'
rules ofthe grme: she hrs more moves and options than a pNvn or a castle.l:,: a

POWERAND FOLIT CS N OF6ANLZAT ONS

positioned this way has more power to interpret the rules by which to play the game
or mike more stiategicmoves (Clegg 1989:2i0). From thisview cvery orginiz.tion
repiesents i system (or systens) of dominatlon. Domination is arother s,.y of
describirg thebasis oflegitimacyand acceptince of authority within orguizations.
It is .rgued that any system of domination is sust.ined by often unobtrusive or
unquestioned methods of conEol that are accepted .s legitimate. Legitinacyderives
from internalized norms which provide a broad base for compliance' ( Dawson 1986.
150). Ilese internalized norms can lead to u.questioning compliance w,th such
things as recruitment procedures and job descriptions, even though these nay be
discflminatory in nature and consistently di$dvantage particllar groups.'IheI carl
be parts ofthe storylines used in organizations, especiallybysenior management, to
justify why things are as they are.
Pluralists, and those who operate from the one- aDd two-dimensioDal views of
power, make no reference to systems ofdomination.In facl because nanypluralists
treat power and authority as two ditrerent ihjngs, collapsing or jgnoring authority
altogether, they create the impre$ion that bargaining, negotiatiDg and developing
dependency relatiolships afford ambirious and astute individuais sone real gains
and advantages. In the c,se ofiower participants, for exanple, efort and interest are
said to increise powerresources (control over infornation, persons and irstrumed
talities) and hence lead to influence. 'Ihe question hrs to be asked, however: innu
ence to do wh.t? Lower participants, such as ward attendants, may indeed gain
discretioniry control over mrd administration but doctors continue to have the
authority to change the rules, procedures, policies and technologies (for exmple
computerize job, and conLol appolntment .nd ieview procedurcs. Docto6 can
cacumvent the influence of the ward attendants if they choose. If a dependency ielationship becomes a prcblematical one, then authority and power can crush the
endealous oflowerparticipants. Mechanic in factpresented h,s theo.y to showhow
managers could enhance their control over aspiring lower participants. The same
could be said of the sub-unit power perspective. In this vein, pluralists reinforce
poryer dilIerentials in organizations, often keeping lower participants in theirplaces
(Clegg and Dunkerley 1980:438-44, Ryan 1984:37).
Following on from ihe previous poinl the one- and two-dimensioDal views
emphasize oiert methods of influence (strategies and rercue, while ignoring
covert forms ofinfluence.ltey suggest that power struggles usually follow from the
e$orts ofindividuals or groups to secure scarce resources and maxinize theiradvantage against other groups. While organizations are continually subject to conflicts,
upheavals and change, they are also subject to constraints thatare often so enkenched
that ihey are taken for gruted and Dot questioned. From ihe radical point of view,
constraints act to rejnforce the status quo ud maintain qstems of domination.
Constraints come mainlyin the form oftechnology adninistrative rules and proce
dures, structure (hierarchll division of labou, andideologies (Clegg and Dunkerley
1980.444-5lj Hickson andMccullough 1980:27 55j Pfefer 198I: I79 225, Ryan
1984: 29-40; Dawson 1986, I45 65).
Take the example ofrales. For maDy years rules and policics relating to recruit'
ment based on seniority were accepted and unchallenged in many organizations,
eren though these poiicies discouraged the merit principle and rapid promotion
among young and talented employees. he individuals nost llkely to change these
rules were usuaily those ln senjor positions who most bene6ted liom them.In other
words, actions can be constrained by s.emingly entrenched policies. Many structures, procedures ind rules reflect the lnterests oFthose who have a stake in nan!
taining the strtus quo.

Simil&ly, iccoldingio the radical view, ideological constraints can act to F:..tbe status quo and miintatu theb.lioce ofporrerand authority$ithin an o:.r_.:
tioD. ldeological constriints pirtly rcfcr to the critical forms ofmea.irg that r:: ::tioned or legitimated in the l.nguagc, symbols, rituals ind practices ofan o.gar,::: -,
Kantcr alludes to tbk whe! she refers to the 'rites of pnssage to lenior ma. as. - =
being cssentiilly a ftasculine rituil (sponsorship, patronage) from which rvor: - r
generallyexcluded. Simiiuly, from a radic.l pcrspectivc, sexin categorizatior. . =
workplace also act as an idcological .onstraint ensuring thrt gender relaticr-:,mirror femilc subordination. It is Dow generally iccepted that labellins .-: ,
nisculine ind using male st.ndrds for job descriptions hrve kept rvome: : t
participatiDg in certain occuprtions .nd de!.lue thc rvork they perform lF-it
1987, I 991 ). A! Erving Gollman says offemrle subordinatlon:

Th.

cxpression

ofsubordination d domination through this smrm oi::.::

. mere tricing or symbol o. rituilistic aflirmatio. - =

tional means is more than

hicrirchy. These erpressions considerably constitutc the hicrarchyi the\

shadowandsubstance. (Gotrmrn I979: 6)

:.i :

Lrstly, pluralists h.1ve argucd that power and influ.nce are isociited rrt::
iorms of conflict. I1c extent of such conflict or knowledge of the criti.:.
a(ecting an individual vanes. Horvetcr, piuralists sould contend thit ifth.:.

visitrlc connict betwccn partics, then power is not normilly involved or ber! .r
cised. In the case ot Crozierls maintcnance m.n, .onfli.t and porv.r oc.:-,: !
tandemj the mcn kncw the .ritical ,ssucs aDd the actions that$cre in thenf:J .-jests. they sougbt and used influenc ind powet to sccure a strategi. aii:---:
horvcver, Bithout thcir collective po$,er (union stength) they ftight ha\: -! :
accept the decisions of managcrs and deler to tbeir authority.
Accordjng to the ridical vic,v, pluralists cinnot explain how more corert : - o
influcnceare used to manipulateindividuals, so theyare uDablc toidentilrth: ---J
issucs

thatmaygrarelya$ectthem. Suppose employees itnchenicalplint are ::-.:

highcr salrries and bonuses in exchinge for iDcreased productivity so thnt :::.- E
on ncworders and conkacts cnn be net. ftese orders ind contracts requne !:.:--E
and processing highly toxic substances. To incrcise productivity and profita!:: - 1
compi.y dccides to continue with its @nent safety stnndards eveD thoui. - =
toxic substances are bciDshitrdled. The compiDy adviscsworkcB that cune.: .r-standards are adequrte and ippropriite ev.n though some jnformation aer-::. :
managcment riises some serious dotrbts ibout oDe ofthe substinces. In this .:-. :.
best intcrest ofwork.rs (herlth and so on) does not becohe an jssue, it h:i :<
sryprcssed. 'Ihe best irterests thit arc put Fonelrd in these situations rre -:--..::
mentls. Power has bcen exercised but connict is unlikcly to arise.lhe dccisio: i-:'
manigers is not likely to bechallenged.'theyhrve used influence to minimize i: -:,-

and poiential disruptions to nork. 'Ihis

forn of

influence

(ma,ipuhti.: '!

dependcd on both tbe exercisc oFautborityand porv.r (Luk.s 1974).

It is sometimes difrcult to establish vhat h in the b.st interest oa \Lor^._ tuanagcr. Ho$'cver, Clcgg ( 1 989) points out dl.rt in tuost power sbuggles, ori:-.:
tional outflankidg'is likciy to occur this means the outflanked (usually thoi. =
limjtedpor{er) cither have an absence ofhowlcdge (tbey are ignorant) orth.: ---.
suflicient krowledge of a kiDd that consistertly discourages resistancc, all..'::{
s)stemsofdoninationtoprevail.lntermsofignoanceorabse.c.ofknonleds::l

thlt a power game is in pl:. icoDtrist, sumcient knowledge of the outcomc of course,i ol i.tion (its prr::r.
outcome and benefits) can enrurc that porver gimes arc Non'vithout thegaft.. .
can extend to the outfla.ked not evcn knowing

POWEF AND POLITCS N OR6AN

ZAI ONS

301

being played (Cless 1989:221 3). when whistle-blowers are publiciy condemned
and sacked for tLeirpurported disloyaltyand cla,rdestine actio.s, this provides sufficient knorvldge ofthe costs ofresistance and the limitcd likelihood ofsuccess lo
deter otherwould-bewhistle-blowere (Chzer and Glazer 1989; see Chapter 8).
How would the questionsraisedat the beginning ofthe chapterbe answered from
the radical perspectivei

Th .etational approach to powea

At this point it is importantto address the distinctionbetween conrciotrs ind unconscious res,stanceas, following from the radicalvicw,itappearsthitsubjective circumstances tbemselves prove

resirtint to cc4rintypesofchangeinwaysthatare

notfully

understood by the subjects themselves. Clegg (1994; 29s) obscrves that 'organizationil oudlanking'(thc sortofmoves wlrich occur in thc second and particularly the
third dimensions ofpo$er to prevent resistancc ansi.g) is sotnething that occurs
prior to resistance because resistance requires consciousness. 'Ihis ,s only partiall)'
true, ns Clegg irnplicitly acknowledges. He obscrves that'people can exer.ise po$er
without knowing that they are doiog soi but fails to ]ink this with the Foucauldian
view oapowernnd resistance !s a continuity or force everpresent in social situations
(Barbilet 1986,531; Clegg 1994:308).More recently, Clegg et al. have chrified this

point by st.ting the following:

we expericnce power not

as a thing bqt a rclation. And we are qqitc capable of

understanding the relation and accepting it nonetheless because, for practical
reasoff, most ofour socialkro{tedge has to be based in thosc relatiors in which
we nre involved and thistendsto reproduce these relations. We cannoteasilydeny
those lelations we experiencc every day ... most lpeoplelwould become chronr
cally insecure. (2006: 221)

The relatioral approach to power distinguishes frictional resistance (imposing

Iimits on power through m absence ofpositive interest in thegoals ofponer) from
intendedordnedresistance (notedby Clegg 1994: 286). This at le.st le.ves the door
aiar for the con.eptualization o[an unawareness that one! actions are afecting the
irterests ofpower in any vay. But as Clegg et al. (2006: 221) state, the sGject is
work in progress Gic)whose interests a.e produced as somethingseemingly
re,l only in the name ofcertair nntagonisms that are alwals alreldy therel If power is
a relational llon, then the nedium through which it novs may be more or lcss
conductive, and that medium is subjective consciousness shaped by the history of
pastnctions nnd past decisions, prtterned practices and previoDs instances ofniking
sense ofhowthingsfittogethei Po,er in this approachdoes not existasapropertyof
Aor B, but is a quality ofthe relitionship beh{een tbem. EachpersoD is cmpow.red
in certiin rvnys, each limited in others by the relntionship (Linstead 19971 69). Thus
the relitional ipproach ittempts to explain sites ofdillerences and sites of.esistan.e
andsteps outside the hegemonic view of porver (see Gergen 1989, 1992). Although
conscious resistance is perhaps the most important t),pe of resistance, every day
always

chanSe agents face the rellity ofunconscious resistance in assessing reidifless for
chanSe by all sorts ofindividuils itr orginiations. Even when the subject (be thk a
mnrger orsomeone eke) is consciouslyresistiDg, theythemselv.s may not be a$tre
of the motivitional sources ol that resistance. Often dre discussions thit take plice
during the phnni.g and ngotiation of chmge ire ambiguous - questions that are
apparently comnonplace
interpretd as resistint, minigers' routine rctivities are
interpreted is power plays. Change itsellis often mess, confused andpiradoxical, to
the extent thit organizatio.al members do not renlly knorv whetherth.y ire resisting

r.

302

it or not, and 6nd lt ditrcult to artlculate theirpositions. Palt ofthis is reflected ir::,.
dlverse local .ccounts th.t people have ofachange situation, and the srorylines i::
adopt Gee Chapter l).
How individual resistece becomes collective reshtance is a perennial prot'-:However, the work of Elias Canetri, the Nobel Prize-winner, on crowds and re\ : ,
tions ofers . breikthrough jn understanding. Powr can be defined, Canetti ur-q.i :
the cxpression oforder through command. Aconnand consists oftwo dimens:::momentum and stlng.'Ihe momentum forces tlre recipient to act, in.ccordance r=
the command.'Ihe sting remains behind,mute, invjsible, unsuspected ardma;c:
reveal lts existence by some faint scarcely perceptible recalcitr.nce befor. :=
conmand is obeyed' (Canetti 1987: 354). fte sting sinks deeper into the pr:i::
who has canled out the command, and even though they might feel une.!: :
unhappy about the command no immediate actioD is taken to avenge it. The ell. -: l
the sting might rcmain hidden for yeirs before it comes to light, waiting for -i
chance to be avenged. Freedom from control, in this sense, is not being able t. .:
oneself of commands by carying them out then passing them on, but of avoi-:
them altogetherin the 6rstplace (in C1eg8t orgini,ationat sense, outflankiogr::.
than resistance). ]1re longer it takes to rid oncselfofthe connandr ifat all, the::\
free that person is (Canetti 1987:355).]tis drive to reproduce previous situa!.1
but in reverse,'is one ofthe chief sources ofenergy' in humanactivit, Canetti ars:Robert Cooper (1990:49) notes that this desire for rcveisal can play an explan.::rolein human molivaiion, which trinsforms it from an individual characteristi. :: ,
social product, such as avengilg i command.
lle reversal ofthe sting is in most cases defeted, olten for years or decades, e.::.
Canetti argues, generations. 'Ihe sting is the object,on to an obeyed comma!. r
occasioned act ofdeference, but organizations are structures of deference. Oi.. .
connand is experiencedwithout having a clearsource, it is dispersed among seri:
people, a group appeirs to give the command, orthe commandis not crisply deri..:
Iven when a clerr command froft a single commander is discernible, it mar a
possible for the recipicnt to avoid.ariying it out, or carry it out in such a wa)'r.::
subvert it (Collinson 1994). If the recipient is forced to cary otrt the comn:i
agairst hjs or her wjll, .nd fecls th,s stingl the drive to reversil of the sting is ir.-'
tably deferred although not indelinitelyj sometimes it can even be jmmedi.te.
Org.njzations are a pariicularly eflrective wayofdomesticatingcommands (Cdi=
1987:355-7) andpelpetuatingdeference overtime.In i senser organizations ope.:
on the basis that instead ofkjllingthe faithtul dog, the master feeds it, ashe or she Lr:
does w,th the faithful servant o. Norker Nevertheless. even when thh return in
=;
becomes transforned into salaries, rewards ed pension schenes, even rnemler: :
of dclusive clubs, every command contains the same threat- It is a modified thrd
but there are stated penalties fo. non-compliuc. and these can be ve.y heary' (Can:=
1987:357). Ofcourse, the fact that the command is given and the sting invoked :-:
the victim remains alive, means th.t there can be recoil or pain to the giver oa:-:
command, which Canetti calls'tLe uiety of command:This is an interestiDg din::
sion to the understandingofstress (and lerd&burnout), which goes beyond seeinr:
as a by-product ofunhealthypractices, to be rem.died by counselling or theraD: i:,
an inevitable conditioD of onek position in the deference structure, the tensr::
produced by the chronically deferred stingand the giving ofcommands.
If we look at the ways in which corporate cultures are allegedly established r:
iransmitted, a great deal ofthe success of these tultures' is not cultured behaviou. j
the sense of shared understanding and problen solving established oyer time, fj
crowd behaviour associated with the alleviation of the fea. of the stins. ln fact, r:

POWERANO POLITICS N ORGAN ZAI]ONS

cultnal dimensions oforganizations are importantly shaped by the nyriad of

303

acts

that invoke the deferred return ofa sting. Every organization's culture is imPlantd
md dispersed with deferred stings that caD be released as collective g.ievances if
ciictrmstinces pemit. Sites ofresistance might not emerge for some time, hidden in
the corporite nemoryofmanypeople's di$erent exPeriences ofa delerred sting.
Finail, we should also consider the notion ofreciProc.tion implicit in the sting,
because reciprocation implies a relationship, giving each Participant sone kind of
power over the othei ReciProcation .lso defiDes acts of defererce. Marcel Mauss
(1990) argues ihat there are three aspects to gift giving that create reciprocation: the
obligation to give, the obligation to receive, and the obligation to reciplocate Thus
on gift giving occasioDs, one is not able to refuse to give, and, dependnrg on the
particular society or setiing, gift giving is ofter a necessaryway to explore and build
relationsbips. lfa gift is ofiered, it must be received in the aPProPriate manner, and
the recipient cannot refuse it without giling great ofence both socially and personall)r 'Ihen, having receiyed the gift, the recipient is placed in debt and is thus in a state
ofdeference createdbythe apparent londness ofthe other But as Maus emphasizes,
this riiualized giving is not a kindly or voiuntiry.ct but an obligatoryone and hence
there must be reciprocation on ihe part of the recipient ftis obligatory forn of
reciprocatioD is intended to restore the imbalance created by the asynmetrical situation beLween the giaer and recipient, and reverses the sting ofthe deferential burden
placed on the recipient. It cotrld be iogically ,nlerred that if the gift is not received
appropriatelyi the potential recipient escapes deference and the sting of a deferential
burden.'ftey escape indebtedn.s to anotherand the need to dealwith aPotentiilly
asymmekical Porrer relation.
fhe notion ofreciprocation is i very complex one .nd is revisited in ChaPter 9
when we discuss commitnent and trust.It varies cross culturally and may be seen as
an important key to international industrial relations diliererces (Westwood et al.
2004). However, an illustration wlll help explain how reciprocatioD caD becomc I
sourceofa deferred sting.In many org.nizatioDs people often feel that they not only
contribute their labour, as defined iniob contracts, agreenents and various Packages,
but also give a gift'to the organization in ihe folm ofsuch things as loyalry bust,
commitment, dedication,long houre (.bove what is Paid for or expected), Personal
sacrifices Guch.s time away from family or othervalued relationships) and so on.If
there is no adequate recompense forthese gifts oflabourlthis can causepeoPle orer
time to feel ihe sting ofan improperly reciprocated deference relationshiP Persons
who are not being idequately recompensed (appreciated, rewarded or given some
recognition they seeD can develop an unconscious desire for reve6al (as mentioned
earlier, and this might motivite them or otheB to avenge the situxiioD, everl ifthis
occurs sorne yeds doM the line. [tis can happen in many ways, but the end resultis
xn act ofresistance or retrliation by an individuil or grouP who seeks to bring the
iqmmetrical Power relationshiP into some temPorary or Pernanent b.lalce to

The failure on th. part ofthe employer, in this examPle, to recognize that they
hive this added debt to the enployee - that the employer is being Per.eived by the
employee to be in a state of deference to them sows the seeds offuture reshtance.
'Ihe siing of the deferential burden is not being accePted or even recognized by
enployers, who mlght fall back on the employment contract, awards and agreements
to define the basis oftheir reciprocal relationshiP or obligation to their emPloyees.
Employees, onthe otherha.d, might struggle nany ye.6 with an unconscious sense
that they are not receiving adequate or just recomPense for the gift they have oF.red
in the workplace. Subconsciously they wani rec,Piocation for the gift, but the reh

30' : PARTI

CORECONCEPTS

tionship night well be defined by one prrty (the employeL) as not beins a !:: ; r,r
situation at all. ]le problem is that org.nizations operate both formalh.:: .:rs
mally with the idea of reciprocition which underpnrs such things !s 3-- e
commitment.ln ihe relational appioach to powet nanyinstances ofpoliti.: r:-r
on the part ofjndividuals and groups can be seen to occur in retaliation eitl:: : . &
sting associated with aD 'unwelcome' command or to nnbalances arising i::.
reciprocation of the defered sting.

Voice and voicing

A consjderition ofrcsisiance in relation to orgarizational success and failurelr:. ::
fon{ird by political economist Albert O. Hirschman in 1970, and his thr:: :-formulition of.r,t,,oi.e and lo./aitr was later extended to
(Rusbu::: "egL.t
1982). It has hid considerible innuence in erplainirg everything from loter :': l
to consumer behaviour, .mptoyee retertion and romantic relations. When ar : -:j
i/rriol r. dccl,nrrg,r pdro rd,tre. rdle.ro.deh !uch J. erplo)ee.,.Jno:.i
servicc clicrk feel that they a.e not receiving the quality of deiivery t:.:j

manigement, relationship, service and so on and be.ome in some way diss;:: -1

Hirschnini argumentw$ that organizations recover from decline to the e\te:::r
they can prelent .ari perftanent movement iw.y from the organization !:enable roi.e rttempting to improye it ro bring ibout change. With political::- this seems clear cnough voters nay jn ldlalt, continue to vote for their parq ..=:
les ofits policies (taditional Labour and Cons&vatile voters in the UK)i n:1 -=
and lotc for the othe. partl depending on its policies at aparticular momenr I :
the so called fwingseats'in certai! UK constftuencies, or oD the occ.sion oa ::
slides whete a party proyes populir, rs in 1987 iconsen atilel and 1997 i]-ab.:
memb&s ofthe patynayexitand bre.k al,.y.nd form their own parry (as d::-i
Soci.l Denooatic Pa.ty lion Labour in th. 1980r, or they may lobby inr :i
pcrhrps elen foming influence grotrps within the parb/ to create change (r. iBlairand others did successtullywith New Labourin the I990r. Regarding or-i
zational enplofes this might seen to be a dated formulation given rhe e\te:: r
downsizing in the r980s aDd I990s, and the emergence of nexible irn! :::
networked organizationr (Davjs Blake er a1.2003). But ihe argument stillholi.:custom.6 and investorl, in aworldwhere relationship marketing, productbra.:::
.nd investor commuDicatioD have prioritized loyalq.. Eyen in downsized o.ga:tions with outsourcing and temporary stafi, tbere is a core componentl{hose co:bution isvalued highly and whose voice is not only desired, but demands express::-Where change is constant, involvement reduces the cosrs and negative efilcti r
inplementation. Orginizational culture and idenrityare important here. Neglc.r :!.
passive-negative strategy could be seen as a form of exit, but difers bcause :: :
passive. Some commentators may ctassify it as a forn ofiesistance, butithas mor. r
the characterota form ofresignation. It can be shown by putting in less e{Iort, b,!.:NorkiDg at a relationship, not trI,Dg to improve things, and letting thiDgs fall af:(Rusbult et al. 1982). Empohrment, suneillance.nd performance monitorins I
l"e haye discussed earlier, crn be seen as organizational cont.ol strategies to Limit a-.
posibilities for neglect, ilthougb psychologicallyit r.mains a fundamenral respori.

option (Withey ind Cooper 1989). E,ifas an acrive negative stlateg, and,on. r
an active constructive strategy have been rvell erplored in a .ange ofstudies, iltholLlroisyexiii car occur and whistle-blowing' shou's sinilar hybridity, and rhere mis::
just t,e erceptionally attractive condirions on oferin rhe market for certiin indivir
uals thrt do not reflect on the orgaDizationt failure (for example, a huge influ.:
rnoney from a ncw ou'ner rnade Chelsei Footbrll Club able to lruy taienr thr:

Minchester United, Liverpool lnd Arscnal could Dot rliord, beating them to the
signatures ofseveril keypliyers, but thcsc clubsrenimed excellentiod coDtinued to
rvnr trophies). Exit may occur from dissitisfiction, or arom failed ittemPB to use
voice. Lotulry, seemingly passive constructile, where prtielce d quiet or iftPlicit
supportisfeatured, crnalsobc seen ascntrapment, wh$e market coDditions, 'Solden
lund.ufsl demography or other factors remole options for exit. Hirschman dcveloped thishst concept ritherpoorlyand despite itsrvidespreid Jpplication therc is r
nccd for further reserrch into its contemporaryfeatures, isthere is with new lorms of
voice emergiDg vir intrinets, blogs, Nilis, online communities, mobiles/PDAs ind

othc.foms oflCTs.
'Voic. is an .xpluatory concept was taken up in an org:nizrtional contcxt in
rolition to pirticipition in decision Daking and subscquentlyin r.latio! to enrpowerment, although the dimcnsio. ofHirschmlns reflcctionson politicil choices didnl
ertend as far is orgini2itioml democracy - ind in tc.ms ofthe concept of sitisfrc
tion'employees w.re consid.red rather less than customers or oth.r stakeholders in
this respect. WLfi. employces were involved in team initiatives, lestruciuring or
qunlity improvement ererciscs, itwas more often is a means ofextending miDrSement control or in.reasing operational efliciencythan i.fieasin8 th.irserse ofrvellbcnrg and contentment. The concept oi voice indicated dilfereot sets o[ often
cornpeting intcrests, and dovetailedrvith the pluralist understandinSoforg.nizition.
But the infieasing dilersity ofthe rvorkforce u,as alrcrdy beginning to put narow
plurrlist understanding of voice under st.iirl, and in the 1990s the concept of
palyphory (Geek polrpho ,.i - muy-voiced) was adopted from the $ork orRussiin

litcriry critic Mikhail Baultin, nho devcloped it from the dneteenth-ccntuty

GcrmaDUriter Otto Ludwjg in his studies ofDostoevsky aDd Rabelnis. Polyphonn in

Bitltint haDds, indicates i text in rvhjch
thcie are severrl chiricters' nories, told [iom
thc perspective ofeach, aDd the author does

not adjudicatc between them, does not

subsume them under an iuthorirl master
nnr.ative, nor displace them altogether b/ a
monophonic tcxt telhrg only the iuthori

ll),o,li,ll,. . ,,-^..

"*'*'

point ofview. Polyphony then can become a

mctaphor for orgDirationil communicition
in wbich the voices of others :re heird equill,
rrther thu bcing forced into denying their
o(n divereit, .nd its potentiil creativity.
Divid Boje (199s) orcrs a netnphor for
the polyphonic orgrniz.tion dEt goes n little
lurthel Hc argues thit orgrnizations rre
complexes of stories, sortretimes runnnrg in
prrillel, sometimes intersccting, sometimes
clnshing, The beginning of one story miSht
be the niddle ofanother story or the rnd of
yet another one. He draws thc analogy with a Los Angeles phy, ?nnara. Ile play
trkes pla.e in

house, in rvhich scenes rre played simult,neously in diferent rooms.

When the audicnce watches a scene in one roon, when it ends they can choose to
tbllow one ol th e cha.actcrs, or stay where they are |nd see who comes ir. Ilerc rre
Iiter!Uythousands of.ombinitions that an ind,vidual menber ofan audierce could
choose, and each would ofi'er a different itrsight i.to Nhat wis h.ppeninS. In such
circumstances, itwouidbe impossible cverto get thc full picturc: Brt Boje (1995)

306

PAFT

coREcoNrEpTs I
argues that organizations are not iust a collection ofstories and trajecro.:_

tend to be conposed ofdeparimenrs, brancles a.d sectioDs, a,yofwljch j!

collection or t}eaire ofsrories. A iargel organization is a meta-tbeatre ofdrr-:
rana/o of Ta,natus ot a Tondrd land. Boje (199s) applies rhis Detaphoi r.

:e

.,

:.

Disney organization, where management attempted to ovetide the conte:j:

stories with its own dominant perspective, and as Boje shows, failed to suppres:-j
underlying connict.
'Ihe problem with polyphony is ofcourse rhatwhile equality can occurin nor._j
and pla)s, polyphony can only ever be metaphoricat in pradice, as there are ah'rireal power diFerences between people in the real world. We all have sto.ies, but N.
don't all have an equal chance ofmakingour srory stick. 'Ihere is no reason to a$un:
that simply hearing the voices ofthe powerless nillpromote change (Kornberger::
al. 2006). Nevertheless, several calls for polyphonic organizing have been mac:

Mary-Ann Hizen ( 1993, 1994) w.s one ofthe earliest to explicate Bakhtin at leng:
although her interpretations are applied somewhat loosely to the orsanizatior:
context. Dennis Mumb). (1987, 1994) developed work on multiple !.(atives
-:
stle$ed the importance ofvoices beingequallyvalid inpolyphonic texts, despite L::
problems we have noted. Daved Bary and Michael xlmes (1997) nade a case r:
stlategy to be developed not as a top-down monophonic nanative, bur as a result o::
process in which di$erent stakeholders meet to craft i sbategy that remains open::

dialogue- ]1lis produces an approach that is concerned

,ot uith

defending

o.:.

perspective, as in pluralism, but in surfacing and addressing distincrions in persp.:

tive dd approach. As Boje (2008, 77) notes, polyphony can tre manipulated

m.nagenent, used as a neans of getting input to decisions but without relinquishr:

power in fact it extends management control over the process (phillips 199:
Pilmd and Dunford I996j Payne and Cariton 2002). Bate (2000) explores r.:
process ofchange in a hospit.l and ideniiEes significant emotion schemas withi: ;
variety ofsubculturalvoices. For Boje (2008), polphonic approaches have aflirm.:
that stakeholder 'dialogues' remain hegemonic, and thatpotruhonyis applied me!:
phorically. Various attempts to move beyond this position have been nade, in deEoping more socially conplexnotions ofdialogue, socialpoeiics (Cunlitre 2002)a::
from a more materialistic perspective, nultiplicity as discussed in the wo* ofGi[Deleuze (Linstead and Itanem 2OO7). ltese approaches are srill bei.g developed.
One practical attempt to mediate perspectives, to showbothhow employees res:.:
and how they reproduce the torporare machinel has been made by Daretr Mccab-_
In his ethnographic study ofa bank .nd its call centres, he argues thai work in r.:
viewed from the top, at a safe distance lisl about feelingless, mmeless membewho scurry around doing the makers"bidding. No one sufere, for empioyme::
and pay are ample reward for these digits on legs. fte cogs whirl, the machi:.
splutters, profits are made and all is well. Yet, vietued

fron

the bonom, bedevjle:

though it is with problens of interpretation, the demands of the nachine xi

perceived as stifling, gruesome and gratuirous. One-dimensional processors c:
sellers are shunted, stunted and squeezed into place. (Mccab.zo07t 222)
For Mccabe (2007), it is important to give voice to the perspecrives from ti:
bottom, to rip away the layers ofcoinfortable living that divides these worlds and::
indicate that conditions can ud should be otherwise' (ibid). If not dactly pot.
phonic, he argues for greater voice and p.ovides rich evidence to support his ier
But his work was conducted in e industry where, since much of the neldwork n..

rTaroNc

307

conducted, simik wort has been outsourced to the deveiopiDs world. Giving voice
his been avoided by globalization.

lobaI power retal,ons

we have not in this .hapter looked closely at how power circulates beyond orgmiza"
tional boundaries at state and institutional levels, although there is considerabl. literature that reflets on this empirically in organization studies drawing on political
theory ecoflomicr, populatiofl ecology and institutional theory to assess the impact
of policy changes on the performance of organizational populations. But we don t
want to close the hapter without brieoy reflecting on the broader transnational
issues of power. Ulrich Beck (2005) attempts to captur th tenrions along two
dimensions. One dis of what he calls the ,raffnational political arena is sketc\ed
between creaiive rists shouldered by slobal business actors from which they seek to

proft if successful; ad

on the other hand the /o/id purli. sprtre that contains rather
generally the relative stabilities and structural diversities of civil society and symbolic
diversities of culture. 'Ihe second axis bridges the ver'present possibilities and realities of ,iolcdd, propasated ud rndiated by specifc rnilitary iflterventions, and &e
potentinl for the estlblishnent offlormsforhuman existence, regulated through the
hw Within these boudr.ies, Beck .rgues, what he calls the rcwly emelging tosmopolitil regime' takes shape in response to forces that are beyond domestic and
fo.eign politics, with nation st.tes and societies influenced bytransnational power
centes, ato6 and political6elds. ]1is is presented in Figure 6. 2. A more polemical
expression ofthe same concerns is shown in Figure 6.3, derived by expatrding Arund-

hati Roy's metaphor that th. developing world is doninated by either the Western
cheque-booL or its eruise ,l,isrLs (Roy 2oo l, 20oa). 'Ihese images fit two ofBecki, four
points perfectly, and for the others, Western cultural hegemony can be symbolized

W the Coca-Cola bottle (ot the Big Mac, as Coc.-colonization dd McDonildiation

have both been idennfed as core procexes ofglobaliation - B eriee .nd Linstead
2001), and the rule oflawby its lciis, which ofcourse can jnclude Guantanamo Bqa

I--,";x::r:*"-,.".r
lransnahonat power centr.3,
acto.s and pol li.atl eldsi
interaction behreen 5ide ellecls:

tl
Figurc6,2 Tlretransnatonalpoitcalarna
SoURCE Ane,

Ui.h B&k

12005)

ArLMr, De 6&brr0r

&mt do.

Po ly

0 I l4

30r

PART

CORECONCcPTS

F.!m
delopment

locorloEte
@rullion y
<
Empie.nd
rutrh'd.

^.---.
-.....

CM-

Figure 6.3 Anoherway

ol

ook ng

l::FEmhum.n

tht!

ro

[E

coitainmenl

of

J.l

mn-huNns
{cuanhnamoBayl __,---

alit

'Ihe .,,cr!. boolr indicates the flexible boundary betweeo tunds fo. Aeleloprand corporate corruptioD (an interesting case is Enron's involvement nr the Inpower i.dNtry in a gcneEtingprcject that prcved disast.ous fo. all concemed).;r
cr"r/ise ,ns/e underscores dre move since 1989, with two Gulfwars and the r'-:
AIghanist,, in particular, ftom a cold war to George W. Busht'pre-emptive war'$ hyou are iustined in striking 6rst if you believe you mEht at som. timc in the tuture
=
hit. Ofcourse, thereis i con.ection between the cruise missile and the cheque b.\{
in that the milit.ry has close relitions with industry af,d the militry indun !
complex of the 1950s is currendy difrent but .live and we[. CorporatioDs su.h a
Halliburton ind the Carlyle Group in the US $ert i close innue.ce on for.ign poi,--.
md big A$eri.an corporations benented hugely f.om contracts related to the recr-:
struction of Iraq alier the second Gulfwd. fte Coke boftle represents, d noted, $i;
has been called Coca-colonization by postcolonial tleorists, which is the continur.
colonizition of the ninds ofthe developing world by inserting postcolonial subie---'
into a discourse ofneeds and valucs that is cssentially Western and oriented towu.
increasingly conspicuous consumpt on. Thc idil, rather than the coud, represents r
rule oflawthnthas begun to.each beyond the realrn of de6ning and poli.ing hulr
rights. Now the very definitior ofwhat is fu a, is at stake, and forthose defined i
outside that boundary (terorists, ertrernists and so on) those riShts no longer en!t. ..
was demonstrated both inaspectsofthe conduct ofthe second Gultwar and the tre:
ment ofprisoneB detained inboth Iraq and Guantanamo Ba)l
Inthe centralspace oiBeck'sliberal cosmopolitanismwe 6nd thewarp andr(elt.:
the struggle ofwhat hxve been cnlled enpird and mrititldc, although this is by n.
means a simple opposition. Enpire is ir'acephalous supranationil order'(Hardt an:

Negri 2000, 2004) m.de ofn pyramid oftransnrtional corporations, transnatione

org.rnizations, tranepoliticil orginizations .nd advanced capitalist .dtions and is fx
from Beckt relitilely bcnign cosmopolitan nexus (Lotritrgcr 2004: 12). Mlititudd r:
harder to denne but could bc seen, in e6ect, as everything that cscapes the reach o:'
empne - everywhere that workers autonomize, where people resist comrnodification, where people communicatc outsid. the normil channcls of authority ani
control, or ryh$epeople ee just too poor to counl the peasantry who subsist belo$
the lvorking class, orwhathive been called the pr.:.afl.l because their existence is so
precarious, andwho are outside therea.hes ofthe consumersociery fte multitude
comprises the protcsters at the CATT and WTO mcetings who coordirate vii the
Internet as rvell as thore rvho have never used a telephone in theirlives.It is:

POWERAND POLITICS IN OR6ANIZAIIONs

309

force deEtred less by what it produ.es than by irs virtualit, itspol.,lial to p.oduce
afld produce itseif . .. hybrid, ,uid mutant, deterritorialized, just like immaterial
workers of the postmodem worl4 md yet in a myst..ious wa, it is supposed to
encomp.ss the world poo.which replaced the working-class at the bottom ofthe
a

l.ddei (Lotringer 2004: 14)

What Hardt and Negri conkoveBially attempt to do is aque that people resist
capitalism bybeing, or nndingways to be, out ofits reach. ftey are well aware ofthe
dark side of globali,atiof,, and see in the multiform niiure ofhurnanity the best vay
ofresistingit, but how that night be achieved in practice is still the subjectofmuch

'nre cnse stuily below goes on to explain how Derek and the deputy director,
William Fisher, sought to handle the transfer ofstudents and courses to Fawley tudge.
It rahes i$ues particularlysensitive to the relational approah to powei

CAsE STUDY

:B

Fatftey Rl(tga - lhe

move 'l

whW amlaporova mmedalevcaLledlhemesdentolthe

:tu!.ls

Union Ed Gnmiey. Ed agreed lo cone w lh rcpresnhlryes ol

b b. herd w h wi am and Derek,

lavd Burand, the dean Ed wam6d hem rhal llr s move would be
r'.,:ou a and lhe un od wou d liqhl Ll. Arl we ask you lo do is come
l and keep an ooen m 0d' he sa d andunless}1)uaqreero[@
.rrdoanylhnS Theslafl wereasornvled,asl,orestrdenlslike,1o

iE

:omminee l0 an open meerrng

r':

r.

r :r?ded The uidelstddlnq was lhal sludeils' lJn on rcrresentar ves

r: ::a,l (academr and nm academic) had pr onry ol adm ssrcn, lhen
-,

rhe meeing ire stude0ls mounled a vnubnl campalqn.

\,'/o

ng padyuenraway

They lnen held anolher queslion and anslller

uD

cameupwlh
whal hey mu d.

sesion. hdividual shl,

werc mcou.aged lo come to see oeLAk i t[ey had concefis. oorek

v

siled rhe sile fieauenlly ro la k lo slafi Ihere Gradual y the ooDosrl on

lhe chanqe, despile coiinulng demmslralons,

e6poraled

qroup nor even the sludenh woud say rhal il coud nol q0 ahead Then
Derek sel up a clrange plmnino g,oup lo maoage he chanOe. A s le
head was appoinred. be nq one ol

$e mmben ol sra,i

tir

had oen

Anl mo!

Brs

scheduhq he buses and negoliahng lho conlmh wilh Ihe bus

co.opany we all (hleqa&d and wekly ques[m and answ sess]ons

conl nued Fequesh lor resourcas and 10 ow-up plans were constan y

Nere pinred and appeared all orer lhe mm pus 0n lhe day ol
_aexng
here was a arge demonstral0n outs de lhe meeing room

r. .:dne.s and clranls irom over 200 sludents The meelho room was
ztd and Wrliam and Derek leed Ihe c.owd, r6ol!i.g to rcPr
*i re lhe drynoss ol thef hrcah wil! am out ned llre pressur"q on the
l3r

s Parx srte

liiere lhe

meel ng took phce and

To-9 arlemalw acclmmodatDn

G ii datt me space and peiry

:.

eqa,d

f,iaryone

es.

0l compemenlary resources Ne added

.2

we

laie, desp(e dre

nrar

h4

'lere

ho

'day

ansing colnecred

10

knN

v/as:

Uw sould

peop e be ailecled by

sludenE' union

abso L rely slop such a move be ng

r" d

Eacn group

rould

look

al b @n

ooa qua ry muld be afleded bad y. lhe move \4ou d nol lake
leil lo rts 0.m prolessionaljudOemenl lo

ofiwise, fie gop Ms

$ ngs were reqwed lo make rhe

move a success and

:mandDerekwoudnogobalelhercsourcswlhlhemtlulion.

wfi te

nrove Folb$ u0 meerngs

wre

held and

were inslilul onaDed as oarl o1 lhe c0!rse rw ew and evalual on

orcce{urss The s le rras se{ured as an assel and Ed Gr mley lhe

lo oacome he dill culliB such a

r,

men

rhe supoon

technicians secrelaies, academ cs and sludents

Derek look over lo prooose thal rhe meehog determ ne a mrldno

,:.re rhal

remMl

plsh I

1..e and so on and dec de on lsfiteraiorevaualionolthe

- i then lhe Oroup rep{esnlali!s \muld mel logether and gain n
p, sl oi the mNe as a wh0le Al th s p0 nl fhe grcup cou d say hal
Ee

rhe

lhar r co! d nol go thio4h filhour

on and requ renenls, slall relocalions rcsources tmnsoon

.-ar

the aedemlc stali shned to dismant e aid rcmo lhe equipmenl when

he p lo suppod lhe nove bul nol 10

'rofi rvilhn ench 0l Ihe group6.

ra:

lhe s1afl lhal one Saluday when lhe Langua0e hbs wore to be /e o.ated

1o

ir^al they noeded

rr

Dlace ove.lhe surnmer recess

and

n:^ a mm? Whal did hey ,tu

-.,e N0! d rrnpose? wral Nould

-.

he prcb ems ol
od ftal Fawle, had

relned unlillhe Dlrysicalmove look

oerck c a med rre had done very [nb, but such was lhe commimeol ol

The mole went smoothly and Derek s lob became lo respond to and
re ay requesls lom llre slle head and olhers lo dea w th any problems

:re purpos was

:.,-q1

He a so poinled

10

no one

mosl opposed l0 lha move. and oher pads ol the move down ro

ala lab e soace could be laken uo by slLrdenls ln lhe lh.ee days

:rJ,r

oiresl ons lollowod The

recodmendal ons and willonr and Derek {ollowed

flesde{

no

mlled DoEk lo conqaluhte hrm on

-1d'( \o*

'o-'d rLp oee. do_p ie sa 0

widrcoisutatonrqhllrcmlhewodqo. Thedeao DavdBudand,

o'1a

remarked on

im mFesiE he rrad iound lhe hands

oli approach lo

hw d li cuh lre le I I musl ha! been ,or Derek and Wil

ded ve Neveidr e ess desD le lhe success. Derek slil lell

chanqe aod
not to be

sm

m.asines

and wihin

mrhrhs he had lelr lhe n$rn

.0 cr. Md!.{ -oa5b0 q t- rdoj

.ommidJrdduDqemnalmmt stfi6

hnlr

atrldd ot@MahrRafi

am

rro (emrr

conscorceers

5 HowweLL do you lhink the change was managed?

6 Howwas con,lct anticipated and deall with?
7 What lorms ot power were al rc.k here, and who used them?
8 Whywas 0erek uneasy?
Anatyses
Let us take . look at how ach of the views of power we have discussed would run
sense ofthe Fawley tudge cise and the questions asked ebout the.ase at the be=ning of rh chaptr. The questions would be ansered &fercndy depending on
approach one adopts.

a unitaryview it could b concluded from the case study that as commur-=

was widely used in open meetings, interpersonal problems were over.oand unioDs were in.luded, all was well.lhere was : cohmon strategic focus,

From

tior

tr-

all rnembere working in a coherent and coodinated fashion to reach a comrr

objective, and consensus over those common objectives prevails because oanotion of r common set of norms add Elues. Kost's earlier actions were entr:.a
iustinable as the exercise ofmanagemertt dght to manage, bringitrg the olgiE
tion back under conEol in everyonet interest. Politics and power struggles w.a:
be seen as dysfunctional, detractinS from achievi.g tbegoals ofmanaSement -=.
move to Fawley Ridge.

Itr a plur.list view, power is seen to be difused throuShout the orgadzation ui ,

grcups or coalitions have power and no one group is wholly sovereign. Itr the lstudy a pluralist dallsis would contetrd that .ll rhe key partis $ere known, the issA
were clear and visible and all groups were potentiatly.ble to influence the decie-t.
nakiDg processes. Con{ict was overt as interest groups barSaifled over the decia!-

ar
Ls

maling proceses, vis-)-vis scarce resources, In the cas study we ce see

organi?ational politics iNolves efort by variour actors to mobilia interest 8rcups
coalitions. 'Ihe ase study also highlights how orga rational chang can ttueate.
existing power bases atrd resource alo.ation and thus political adion will octu
alemonsLated the importance ofusing extemal pressure goups.
The pluralilt view would also incorporate Luks' two-dimeEional view ofp!'r=

whih would emphasize such things as non-decision making. An exanple ofrL r

thecaseis here Kost does not bring into the public arna rhe reisons why he inr..}
to move students to the Fawley tud8e site. Once Kost has'made'this decision, et l.+
thing else becomes 'academic; so to speak, to iustify th decisionKanter would focls on how Kost does or does not provide adequare pc*
resources (for enmple Xnes of information) to his heads of department. She r c-:<
focus on how managere at Fawley tudge might develop strategies to get ahead su- gaining high visibility ud being seen to be solving problems for the organiar-i
This is cle ly what Derek is doing in trying to solve problerns for Kost, $.: 'removiDg' Cyril. knter $,ould also focus on the structures at Fawley Ridge ej c
would see the bureaudatic structure, with its hierarchy and .ommatrd stru.-='r
(Kostt new direct reports who were political appointees), as problematic!: a.
bound to create powerlessness for some ofthe bld guard' managers. Kanter sa$ :ij

POWERAND POLjT CS NORGANTZATONS

sort of'monument building' creating or rearranging depirtments

taintyand builds loyalty (and fea, among subordinates.

this

311

ensdresuncer_

would argue iNisit le polver is used and exercised in such a wav

that the best interests of a group or groups are not l,eing servedi in that they are
umble to form conscious preferences or choices around issues, and thus they are
never consciously ible to formulate or understand their real interests.

ln

ln the

ew, Lukes

case study, a radical view would argue that Kost was able to hide the 'real'

issues by usiog arguments appareotly b.sed on

uncontestible educational principles

and not allowing them to come to the surface, consequentlythe real interests ofthe
groups were neverdisctrssed. Choices t eie made and acceptedas aresultofthe use

ofinvisitrlepowerandthe domination and control ofoutcomes orchesiratedbyKost.

Kost, by setting up a system ofdomination,w.s able to create asetofvalues to advantage some individuals or groups over others. Derek and the nere heads ofdePartment
are co'opted' in Kost's new system, and are asked rePeatedly to accePt his ratiomlizations and the government's to save Fairisle Polytechnic. Kost does not encourage
open debate but creates a Aimate' for all to mistrust each other and accePt no one
from the o1d guard'as an ally.

This view would argue that there is resistancePresent, and Fairjsle Polytechnic shows

examples ofthe sting working at different levels. 111e deference relationsllp, uDderscored emphatically by the governmentt aPPrcach to academic stali, being seen as
the source of conmands, which led to dePressed salaries, largei clases, fewer
resources aDd deteriorating buildings, wis the source ofthe stings exPerienced bv

individuals Acade,nic stafhad been conplyDg with sPecinc connands with vhich
they were not in agreement for some time, but Kosti accession and his h.rdline
aPProach to dealingwith PerceivedProblemswas seen tobe qualitatively much more
severe. Asense ofiniustice and uDrest was prevalen! coupled with a sense ofdislocation as the hierarchy seemed to eDgineer a split between de.ns and the dnectorate
influence wis not moving uPwards, only command was moving downwards ln this
situation, a sPecific command does not have to be directlvgiven as long as the recip'
ient Perceives what is said to be a command or to rest on a commaDdwhichis veiled
behindrhetoric Kosti policies were tu.ning the stalT into a crowd
lle dnector, in apparently aslang Derek to talk to Cvril about early rctirementr
was giving a.onnand. Derek felt jt, did not want to catry it ou! but nevertheless
complied with the deference order and Performed Persuasive\4 Cvril, fot his Part,
could see tbat hewasbeing made an o$er he could not refuse, he would be renoved
from iris position in sone other way ifhe stayed and his present situationwas unten_
able. Cyril was, in efect, beins given the command Go l' and he knew it. So did the
rest ofhis stafi, and Derek, through the hierarchy, w.s seen as the commander'Ihe
episode involving Cyril and his sta$would notbelostfrom the corPorate memoryi ii
wo!]d tre remenberedbymany othere who over time might feel the sme sting ofan
improperly re.iProcated deference relationshiP Cyril and his staffs gift oflabour
(long service,loyalt, dedication)were not being seen by Kost as valuable orworthwhile. Derek's Position in taiking to and trying to ,EcorPorate ihe statfinto his stra_
tegic thinking was something that was diflicult for them to aPpreciate, given iheir
history and the Particular Past actions, Past decisions and patierns ofPractices that
jnter
had characterized theirrcsPonse to being managed.lhev ilmost instinctnlv
line
words,
hiding
behind
preted this intervention as yet inother Piece ofcommand

PART

CORECONCEPTS

a
-l

and some ofthed at lcast decided to lishback theywould not mildly clrry out
perceived command to plan for their own demisc. ]le stings ofrecent eveflts r':
be returned in a demand for accou.t.bility not oFthcm to their maDaSers, b-:
the man.gers to the bodypublic.
Kost handled this perfectly in t1,o ways. One was that he dellected thc retu-:
stingonto awiderbod)ajust asistingcanbc passedon dorm the hierarchy, so r.:---

insomecircumstances,c.nbedcflectcdupthehierrrchy.lhisrestorcdthebal:::.:
constraints under which he rvrs labouring. Second, is Cinetti emphisn.. :.
perceived the lirge githeringt need to beconre a crowd, rndbyskilfuluse olrL:r:--

sting\6 thus g.nerrlized and disperscd, its i:=:

icityand foc$ ind hence its returnibility dissip.tcd.
Unfortunately, for reasons which ccrtlinly included the nccd to try to cor: : -

he made them one. nre perceived

quickdecision,KostwisunibletoivoidthishtheTextil.lndustryAssociiiion:,'

r- '

episode. Tlle sting of his recent connands $as benrS felt by the students, the
phcre ofslspicionwis rife, ind thc appirent command to movc to the TIAbL::E
whi.h wis presented is non'negotiable, produ.ed a .hallenge l,hich built on th. .---latedstings (m.uyolthem reachidg back beyond thc timc) ad produced
becone i crowd. Thc shrdcnts fomed themselves nrto a crol{d through slogal. :-.!
were ablc to focN on i closely d.lined issue, which resdted in thcn successKost $,isely chos. to stay out ofthe l-:wley tudge n.gotiations- He realizrd
had been seen to be the archit.ct ofthc TIA defcrt and that the students.

tht.i:, :

i:; t
r-:ia
withsucccss, ould rclish inother confro.tition. Hc also intuitively knew thar :: ' r
wisc to scek.onsensus before a decision ltns presented or pclceivcd to hrrr :
ade. Although ther. was opposition, tLe consistent refusal of Derek and \l'rll::- :
commit lh.mselves lo a decision until the pnrticipi.ts had thought through : :'
aspccts indgatkred therelev.nt infornation was successful in .emoving the:: a
B ithout comma.d ihere c.m be no sti.g, and rvithout a focus for rerer\ri - :r
cannot bc returned. fte decision was rcnoved from thc command structure.'i r
rsa$ reversed - the critena, once jointly set, trecamc lhe .uthority, aDd as thc n f, :!
group trindated tbe criteria into imperativrs, the tornDanders' ficilitrted :::imperatilcs by tikingupward or honzontal .ctio..
Why then was Dcrek uncas/? was this not a succe$ful ex.mple ofavoidira:.
sting and return? Substantially yes, trut Derek knew tlat thc situition $r! -:complex. No one knerv th.1t the site lvrs likely io be aviluablc issei.lhit posi--.-hrd never been put forward is one oFthe criterir.t issuc rs, ifit had become F-:.knowledge, the local council would ha\ .ried 'foul' on the move as i subt.--.1
Once thc move was cstablished and the process seen to be thorough, it coul: :.
defended rlong nith the siie. Derek knc$,thit despite the fact that there (is::Deed forspace.t Shaw's Pirk, the real cstate vilue ofFawlcywas the miin relson. r :
evcr bec.me apparent that this had becn the case, and that in fict there had !'..- .
reiled commrnd behind thc proccss, it would tre s.en as nothin8more than a pi.r: .
successful

brinkmdship Itany ittempt

\ras made to d.comnission rnd dispo:: .'

the site soo! after v.(ing d., or othe. deals weie done ryith the same etIc.t. r_
\vould retrospcctively evokc the sting .nd possibly its immcd,atc retur.. The ro:quences for st.frehtions, cspeciilly given the way in which norale hid been i: .
tilcly afccted by the move, could h*c been disastrous. So Derck really .esc .r .-.
judgem.nt to see it the follow-up procedures were maintiined, the proft:.::
resources miteriilizcd, and the style ofchi.ge ma,a8cmcntwas cnbedded as ari:'
acteristic fertur. ofthe institution rither than i happybit ofexpcdiency.
One interesting question to poDder is: Why are ill thc ley playcrs in the ;:-.
nal.i Fawley Ridge is i realese study although pseudo.yms hivebeen used. Gi,.-

POWERAND POLT CS N ORGANIZATLONS

313

the discussion in Chipter 3 on sender, what do you think would hive hippened
Derekhad been a woman manager?

if

It is generally conceded thrt plurulists ofrer r more conprehensive vry ofdealing

with orguizational problems thin do unitiry ipproaches. Through adoptingsuchan
approach to power, managers hcve r wider rrnge ofunderstindings lnd techriques
by which to dell with the diverse probtems confronting them. Cle.rly, i pluralist
maniger is still better equipped to de.l with conflict and pove. than is a unit&yone.
The u.itary approach belonged to an era ofmanagement in which conformity ind
rutbority vere seen as mutually selfieinforcing and unchallengeable. That era no
ionger exists, aithough managcrr may act as though rt docs.
Even though the political perspective illows for a deeper understanding ofinterests andpowen it is still onlyn pnrtial account oforgani?ational politics. The pluralist
vjew ofpower tcnds to blur or conceal practices ofdomination found in organi?atlons, thereby often distorting sources ofreal power. lssues oldomination:trdcontrol
are not readily deak rvith in a pluralist or behaviounst framervork. The pluralist presentntion of the political orginizition, in its virious formn rests on the premise th.t
there is relatively equal access byall to the power resources ind strategies that ulti.
matelyaccount for who succeeds, wins orgets ahead. $e discussioD on mentoring
.Ihe
and diversity suggests the latter view is subject to criticism.
more deeply
ntreNhed and penisive systems of domiortion that are structurcd into many
organizational systens ed proceses are denied or neglected bypluralists.
the radical view ofpower ittempts to redress the naive pluralist and behaviourist
assumptions that organizations are level playing 6elds' in rvhi.h powcr struggles are
contested on relatively equal footings. Instend, the radicnl viery argues that much of
what happens in organizatioos is aboutsustainiflgman.gcrialdomiflaflce and control
overthe workforce.lhus, manyofthe techniqLres and methods ofconflict resolution
ofiered by pluralists are considered to be manipulative strategies used by nanagemnt to we.Ien the collectivc porver oflabour (unions). Ridical theorists lyould be
looking to push for signincant changes in power relationships between minageme.t
and workers throughthe crention ofmore denocratic work organizations.
lhe fourth approach argues that porver is dispersed, that everyone has some
power, thatesistance is bom nlongside power, and that porver is relationJ. Althou8h
the playing field is not level, and the advnntnge is to the powertul, this is not a static

and unchanging situatjon ofdonination. What is oecess.lry is to understand how

discourse and argument come together with power to de6ne Inowledge, and on the
basis ofknowledgepeopleact. So rather than looking at how iction iscontrclled, this
approach loots at how knowledSe is produced, how the powerful are advantaged in
shaping Inowledge through discourse, and horsresistanc. can begin from insignificant orjgins - even to topple the Berlin Wall. Of course, the critical analysis of
discourse atrd the production ofknowiedge also Iead to more open and denocratic
organizations, but rlso emphnsize howl.amingneeds to occurin an awnrenessofthe

relntionship between knowledge and power.

We

will now

go

bickto

the questions iaised at the bginning ofthe cL.tptel

Gryergto questionsaboutorganizationatpowerand potitics

I.

Are power and politics gene c to all orgadzations? fte user is yeslat least
in the pluralist, radical and rchtionil peBpectives on power and politics. Each of
tbese ofers ditrercnt accounts ofwhy dris might be the case, dd all ofthem suggest

314

PARI1

coRE coNcEpTS

difterent strategies orways ofaddressingpo erissues. Only the unitnry apf::r

implies that the normal state of events is to have no politics or powcr stn<r..
The pluralist liew is some$hat ambivalent on this point, prefening to s..
=
power and politics managed for the good of the organization. Nohvithstr:=
the insights dras.n from the radical and relatioDal views of power ind f. :most managcment strategies are donrinated by unitary assumptionr ahr-;
pluralismis often the rhetoric nanagers use when they talk of power rnd a. -:while their theories in use are often unitary. Both thc unitrry and plurilisi.
provide a tonfort zone'for dealing with power and politics, suggesting th.:',:{e P6ctices or activities thnt maDage6 cm ultimtcly control and rcmeir: -: ,
extendtheargunent further, these arc ihe dominant discourscs of mrnage=- :
vhich certain relationships are already 6xed so to speak, or dimcuk to chi-E
This is not the case with thc radicd view, which implies that me.geme:: . z
agent ofcapital (or capitalism) ed as a collective group is responsible ::-

=
oi:-:-:
tional politics. From this perspectilc, orga.izations ire de.ply embeddec i=turcs ofdomination ind the discourse is cl..rlyoppositional in its stance t!-- -5
manlgement as a Sroup The relational view prescots power ind resistr:r .
generic to social relations within command structures and never totJil) .:.: ,
lable or solvrble by rnanagement alone. Man.gers would need to be hightr i;-;
in rcllective practice and critical thinking (see the lntrodtrction) ifthel s--r :
undcrstand the relitional view of power and act from its assumptionr. ::.ft
engiSe in various disoGive practices (for cxmple trading local a.d i--rr
accounts) that can become the basis lor qucstioning assumptions and \:
r
power iDbalances .nd er"loitations thit giv. rise to power strugSles and

tli.king
2.

that often appe& entrenched md highly resistant to cbange.

Do some circumstances more than oihers give rise to power stru&cld a

politics in organizdtions? 'fte answer again is i qualined 'yes: I1c .r: ir

oalysis under each perspective addresses this question. The circumstai.- -r

are idendned are based on vilue assumptions .1nd particular frames ol R:.-::r
peculiar to each approach. However, the relational view of power prc*::

=:

most complex and subtlepe6pective on the circumstances that might gn-:<

power ud the resistince to it, particul.riy thc notions ofthecommrnd.
-_pr

ti:

3.

is power such a difrcult thing to deal'with in organizatiotrsi Tha:...:

from the fact that managers often favourthe unitary or plurrlist vie\rs . i; r.as thcir preferred 'stock of k owledge' on the topic. As Kanter slrs -.'managers atso treat 'power' as a dirty wordl something to be denicd. j:,-anddis.dded (Kanter 1979.6s).Funhermore,managerrreoftenrelu.-;- :
aralyse or dcal with the rnorc complex sources ofpower and resistrn.e ::i6ed in the radical and relational views ofpowei Miny are unable to t:;;:. :
enyironment that rvorld help thern to raise debate, discussion and i::r:-

Wty

relating to power issues. Ultimatel, managers who believe thcy havc porr:: :authority) do not often feel compelled to question it, sh . it or surre.:- :r
prestige and status often uscd to embellish thei. positions, particular;t :: :.
senior levels (see Chapter l0).
4. Is everyone able to gain or qercise powe. in organizaiionsi Thre :: :appronches are circumsPect on this point. Only the unit&y approach r! :!against thjs idea, secing it as deviant or aberint for individuals to pu6:: :a
interests through power and politics.'Ihe phralists ir.likelyto pres.ntthr:..j
ization as a level playnrg field with checks and balances in plice to ensr: ',-

snartorclevernanagerscanadvancethemselvesortheirc

.ersthrou!:::.:

see i level playing field at all and feals that

powerful
&e
outllanked
or outmanoeuvred by dominant grcups
the
always
interests.
The
relational
.pproach
does
not suggest that there isnecessarilya
and
level playing field, but that there de opportunities to ente! powe. relations ihat
can allect certain wins to groups that the radical view would normally view as
powerless. fte radical or three dimensjonal view is more conce.nedwith aggregated or collective power of groups, such as management, olganizations, govern-

and

politics.]1le radicalview does not

Iess

ment,thestateandunionstowhomit.ttributesaformofcollectiveconsciousness
or ideologl. Ilte fourth approach is more focused onihe pre$ure pointswithin
these relations and does not accept amonolithic oraggregated viewofpowei It
does aclnowledge that people can act collectively to avenge a grievance (or
defercd sting) ifcircumstancespemit. One suchcircumstance cin be the imbal'
ance in reciprccation.

It would be a very unwise manager rvho did not seriously contemplate the answeB
to these questions, and who did not, as a result, st&t to reflect on his or her own
a$umptions and practices in relation to organizational power ind politics.

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