DOUBLE SALE

The first purchaser is necessarily a purchaser in good faith. Such good faith subsists
and continues to exist even if the first purchaser subsequently is informed of the existence
of a second sale. The governing principle here is first in time, stronger in right. The
knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyers good
faith and the right to register first. But conversely, knowledge gained by the buyer of the
first sale defeats his rights even if he be the one to register first as he then acts in bad
faith. It has to be noted that knowledge is tantamount to registration. (Carbonell vs. Court
Of Appeals, 69 SCRA 99)

Where one of two conflicting sales of a piece of land was executed before the land
was registered, while the other was an execution sale made after the land had been
registered, what should apply is Section 35, Rule 39 (not Article 1544) which provides that
purchaser of execution sale acquires only the rights of the judgment debtor to the property
as of the time of the levy. Therefore, a prior sale, although unregistered cannot be
deemed to be automatically cancelled upon subsequent issuance of the Torrens title over
the land. (Dagupan Trading Co. vs. Macam, 14 SCRA 99)
Knowledge of a prior transfer of a registered property by a subsequent purchaser
makes him a purchaser in bad faith which vitiates his title and creates no right as against
the first purchaser. The knowledge contemplated here must be continuing- from the time
of acquisition until the title is transferred to him by registration a failing registration by
delivery of possession. The second buyer must show continuing good faith and innocence or
lack of knowledge of the first sale until his contract ripens into full ownership through prior
registration as provided by law. (Cruz vs. Cabana, 129 SCRA 656)
As between two purchasers, the one who registered the sale in his favor has a
preferred right over the other who has not registered his title, even if the latter is in actual
possession of the immovable property. (Tanedo vs. Court Of Appeals, 252 SCRA 80)
Article 1544 does not apply to land not registered under the Torrens system. The
provisions in Act No. 3344 should be made applicable, which states that registration of
instruments affecting unregistered lands is without prejudice to a third party with a better
right. This is because the purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriffs execution sale only
steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and merely acquires the latters interest in the
property sold as of the time the property was levied upon. (Radiowealth Finance Co. vs.
Palileo, 197 SCRA 245)
BREACH OF WARRANTY

As a general rule, there is no implied warranty in a sale of second hand goods.

However, this general rule is not without exceptions. Article 1562 of the Civil Code states

that where the buyer expressly or by implication makes known to the seller the
particular purpose for which the goods are acquired and it appears that the buyer relied
on the sellers skill or judgment, there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be
reasonably fit for such purpose. In the certification that the machine was in A1 condition
must be considered an express warranty and their binding on the seller. Such condition or
certification was a condition sine qua non for the release of the petitioners loan which
was used for the payment of the purchase price. Seller must be bound by it. (Moles vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 169 SCRA 777)
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION
Where the true intention of the parties show that the transaction shall secure the payment of the
debt, such a transaction shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage under paragraph 6 of Article 1602.
Settled is the rule that to create the presumption enunciated by Article 1602, the existence of one
circumstance is enough. (Ramos vs. Court Of Appeals, 180 SCRA 635)

While in ordinary sales for reason and equity a transaction may be invalidated on the
ground of inadequacy of price or when such inadequacy shocks ones conscience as to
justify the courts to interfere, such does not follow when the law gives to the owner the
right to redeem as when a sale is made at public auction, upon the theory that the lower
the price, the easier it is for the owner to effect the redemption. And so it was aptly said
that when there is the right to redeem, inadequacy of the price should not be material
because the judgment debtor may redeem the property. (De Leon vs. Salvador, 36 SCRA
567)

Co-heirs may redeem the shares sold by any of their co-heirs within 30 days from
written notice of the sale. However, strict application of this legal mandate would amount
to injustice when there is an actual knowledge though no written notice is given. In such
case, mere technicality should not defeat the purpose of the law, i.e. to notify the
redemptioners whose actual knowledge is equivalent to notice. (Alonzo vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 259)
While it is true that written notice by the vendor is required by law under Article
1623, it is equally true that the same Article 1623 does not prescribe any distinctive method
for notifying the redemptioner so long, therefore, as the latter is informed in writing of the
sale and the particulars thereof, the 30 days for redemption starts running and the
redemptioner has no real cause to complain. (Etcuban vs. Court Of Appeals, 148 SCRA 587)

Lease

When rental is paid monthly and the term had not been expressly agreed upon, the
lease is understood under Article 1687 to be terminated or terminable from month-tomonth. An extension by the contract of lease may only be sought by the tenant before, not
after, the termination of the lease. (Yek Seng Co. vs. Court Of Appeals, 205 SCRA 305)

Although the lease is on a month-to-month basis and may be terminated at the end
of every month, in the absence of proper notice to vacate, the lease continues to be in
force and cannot be deemed to have expired as of the end of the month automatically.
Neither can the non-payment of the rent be ground for termination without a demand to
pay and to vacate. (Yap vs. Cruz, 208 SCRA 692)