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University of San Carlos

College of Law

LABOR RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS
(FINALS)
Submitted to:
Atty. Jefferson M. Marquez

Submitted by:
Dana Flynch R. de Lira
EH 406

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TOPIC 12: RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION.....................................................................6
SAN MIGUEL CORP., VS. MANDAUE PACKING PRODUCTS, G.R. NO. 152356, AUGUST 16, 2005............6
GSIS VS. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS, G.R. NO. 170132, DECEMBER 6, 2006............8
DIOKNO VS. CACDAC, G.R. NO. 168475, JULY 4, 2007.......................................................................... 9
SAN MIGUEL CORP. EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO VS. SAN MIGUEL PACKAGING PRODUCTS EMPLOYEES
UNION, G.R. NO. 171153, SEPT. 12, 2007.......................................................................................... 11
DONG SEUNG INC., VS. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, G.R. NO. 162356, APRIL 14, 2008...............16
DEL PILAR ACADEMY ET AL., VS. DEL PILAR ACADEMY EMPLOYEES UNION, G.R. NO. 170112, APRIL 30,
2008.................................................................................................................................................. 18
S.S. VENTURES INTERNATIONAL INC., VS. SS VENTURES LABOR UNION, G.R. NO. 161690, JULY 23, 2008
.......................................................................................................................................................... 20
INGUILLO ET AL, VS. FIRST PHIL SCALES INC., ET AL., GR NO. 165407, JUNE 5, 2009.........................22
STA LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL CORP., VS. SOLE ET AL., GR NO. 162355, AUGUST 14, 2009..............26
MARIWASA SIAM CERAMICS INC. VS. SECRETARY OF DOLE, ET AL., G.R. NO. 183317, DECEMBER 21, 2009
.......................................................................................................................................................... 28
GENERAL MILLING CORP VS. CASIO ET AL., GR NO. 149552, MARCH 10, 2010..................................30
THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA VS. NATL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTEL ETC., GR NO. 178296, JANUARY
12, 2011............................................................................................................................................ 33
LEGEND INTERNATIONAL RESORTS LTD., VS. KILUSANG MANGGAGAWA NG LEGENDA, G.R. NO. 169754,
FEB. 23, 2011.................................................................................................................................... 35
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER CHEMICAL SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILS FOR
EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (SMCC-SUPER) ET AL., VS. CHARTER CHEMICAL AND COATING CORP., G.R.
NO. 169717, MARCH 16, 2011........................................................................................................... 36
SAN MIGUEL FOODS VS. SAN MIGUEL CORP SUPERVISORS AND EXEMPT UNION G.R. NO. 146206 AUGUST
1, 2011.............................................................................................................................................. 38
BPI VS. BPI EMPLOYEES UNION-DAVAO CHAPTER, GR NO. 164301, OCTOBER 19, 2011 RESOLUTION ON
THE MAIN DECISION OF AUG. 18, 2010.............................................................................................. 40
OCTAVIO vs. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY.......................................................42
NATIONAL UNION OF BANK EMPLOYEES vs. PHILNABANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION.........................44
TOPIC 13: RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATE LABOR ORGANIZATION............................................46
RIVERA VS. ESPIRITU, G.R. NO. 135547, JANUARY 23, 2002...............................................................46
SAN MIGUEL CORP., VS. NLRC, G.R. NO. 119293, JUNE 10, 2003........................................................49
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA SULPICIO LINES VS. SULPICIO LINES, G.R. NO. 140992, MARCH 25, 2004
.......................................................................................................................................................... 51
NOTRE DAME OF GREATER MANILA VS. LAGUESMA, G.R.NO. 149833, JUNE 29, 2004.......................53
MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 140518, DECEMBER 16,
2004.................................................................................................................................................. 55
UNIVERSITY OF IMMACULATE CONCEPCION VS. SEC. OF LABOR, G.R. NO. 151379, JANUARY 14, 200556
CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER VS. NLRC, G.R. NO. 147080, APRIL 26, 2005...........................................58
PLDT VS. MANGGAGAW NG KOMUNIKASYON SA PILIPINAS, G.R. NO. 162783, JULY 14, 2005..............60
LIGHT RAILWAY TRANSIT VS. VENUS, JR., G.R. NO. 163782, MARCH 24, 2006.....................................61

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UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 169632, MARCH
28, 2006............................................................................................................................................ 63
SUKHOTAI CUISINE & RESTAURANT VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 150437, JULY 17, 2006...........64
PHILCOM EMPLOYEES UNION VS. PHIL. GLOBAL COMMUNICATION, G.R. NO. 144315, JULY 17, 2006..67
FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY-DR. NICANOR REYES MEDICAL FOUNDATION VS. FEU-NRMF EMPLOYEES ASSO.,
G.R. NO. 168362, OCTOBER 12, 2006................................................................................................ 68
GSIS VS. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS, G.R. NO. 170132, DECEMBER 6, 2006..........71
BIFLEX PHILS., INC., LABOR UNION VS. FILFLEX INDUSTRIAL & MFG., CORP., G.R. NO. 155679, DECEMBER
19, 2006............................................................................................................................................ 72
MANILA HOTEL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS. MANILA HOTEL CORP., G.R. NO. 154591, MARCH 5, 2007,
CITING GRAND BOULEVARD HOTEL VS. DACANAY, G.R. NO. 153665, JULY 18, 2003...........................74
FACULTY ASSOCIATION OF MAPUA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 164060,
JUNE 15, 2007................................................................................................................................... 76
PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORP., VS. PILIPINO TELEPHONE EMPLOYEES ASSO. G.R. NO.160058, JUNE 22, 2007
.......................................................................................................................................................... 77
LANDTEX INDUSTRIES VS. CA, G.R. NO. 150278, AUGUST 9, 2007....................................................79
SAN MIGUEL FOODS INC., VS. SAN MIGUEL CORP EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO , G.R. NO. 168569, OCTOBER
5, 2007.............................................................................................................................................. 80
TOYOTA MOTOR PHILS WORKERS ASSO.VS. NLRC, G.R. NO. 158786, OCTOBER 19, 2007..................82
YOKOHAMA TIRE PHILS VS. YOKOHAMA EMPLOYEES UNION, G.R. NO. 159553, DECEMBER 10, 2007. 86
PHIL. AIRLINES INC. VS. PHIL AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, G.R. NO. 142399, MARCH 12, 200887
STEEL CORP. VS. SCP EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL G.R. NO. 169829-30, APRIL 16, 2008..........................88
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION VS. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK ET AL., G.R. NO.
161933, APRIL 22, 2008.................................................................................................................... 91
SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA SAMMA-LAKAS SA INDUSTRIYA NG KAPATIRANG HALIGI NG ALYANSA
(SAMMA-LIKHA) VS. SAMMA CORP., G.R. NO. 167141, MAR. 13, 2009................................................93
HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILS., (HYATT REGENCY) VS. SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT(NUWHRAIN) G.R. NO. 165756, JUNE 5, 2009..................................................................................... 94
TEODORICO S. MIRANDA, JR. VS. ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. (ATI) AND COURT OF APPEALS GR NO. 174316
JUNE 23, 2009................................................................................................................................... 96
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS RESTAURANTS AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES-MANILA PAVILION
HOTEL CHAPTER VS. SOLE, ET AL. G.R. NO. 181531, JULY 31, 2009...................................................97
A. SORIANO AVIATION VS. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION OF A. SORIANO AVIATION ET AL. G.R. NO. 166879,
AUG. 14, 2009................................................................................................................................. 100
YSS EMPLOYEES UNION-PHIL TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION VS. YSS
LABORATORIES INC. G.R. NO. 155125, DECEMBER 4, 2009..............................................................103
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) VS. DINNAH VILLAVIZA, ELIZABETH DUQUE,
ADRONICO A. ECHAVEZ, RODEL RUBIO, ROWENA THERESE B. GRACIA, PILAR LAYCO, AND ANTONIO JOSE
LEGARDA, G.R. NO. 180291, JULY 27, 2010...................................................................................... 105
PICOP RESOURCES INC. VS. TANECA ET. AL., G.R. NO. 160828, 09 AUGUST 2010............................107
INSULAR HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL VS. WATERFRONT INSULAR HOTEL-DAVAO, G.R. NO. 174040-41,
SEPTEMBER 22, 2010...................................................................................................................... 109
CITREK EMPLOYEES LABOY UNION-FFW VS. CITREK ELECTRONICS INC. G.R. NO. 190515, 15 NOVEMBER
2010................................................................................................................................................ 111

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SOLIDBANK CORP. VS. GRAMIER, ET. AL, , G.R. NO. 159460-61, NOVEMBER 15, 2010......................113
FADRIQUELAN ET AL VS MONTEREY FOOD CORP., G.R. 178409, JUNE 08, 2011...............................115
MIGUEL DELA BARAIRO, PENA PETITIONER, VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND MST MARINE SERVICES
(PHILS,), INC. RESPONDENT, G.R. NO. 189314, JUNE 15, 2011.........................................................115
MAGDALA MULTIPURPOSE & LIVELIHOOD COOPERATIVE VS. KILUSANG MANGGAGAWA NG LGS ET AL, G.R.
NOS. 191138-39, OCTOBER 19, 2011.............................................................................................. 116
ABERIA ET AL., VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATION COMMISSION ET., [G.R. NOS. 154113, 187778, 187861,
AND 196156 DECEMBER 7, 2011].................................................................................................... 119
PICOP RESOURCES, INCORPORATED VS DEQUILLA, ET. AL. ; GR NO 172666; DECEMBER 7, 2011....120
C. ALCANTARA & SONS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 155109, SEPTEMBER 29,
2010, NAGKAHIUSANG MAMUMUO SA ALSONS-SPFL (NAMAAL-SPFL), AND ITS MEMBERS WHOSE NAMES
ARE LISTED BELOW, PETITIONERS, VS. C. ALCANTARA & SONS, INC., RESPONDENT. G.R. NO. 179220122
DIGITAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILS INC. vs. DIGITEL EMPLOYEES UNION ET AL..........................124
AUTOMOTIVE ENGINE REBUILDERS vs. PROGRESIBONG UNYON NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA AER. . .125
HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL vs. HON. STO TOMAS ET AL...........................................................128
VISAYAS COMMUNITY MEDICAL CENTER vs. YBALLE, ET AL..............................................................130
PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES INC. vs. PHILTRANCO WORKERS UNION-ASSOCIATION OF GENUINE
LABOR ORGANIZATIONS.................................................................................................................. 131
WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY-PHILS. vs. WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY-PHILS., FACULTY & STAFF ASSOCIATION. 132
TABANGAO SHELL REFINERY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP......134
TOPIC 14: UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE..........................................................................136
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION vs. CONFESOR...................................................138
PHILIPPINE CARPET EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. HON. STO. TOMAS..............................................142
ST. JOHN COLLEGES, INC. vs. ST. JOHN ACADEMY FACULTY EMPLOYEES UNION................................145
SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INC. vs. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO...................148
PUREFOODS CORP. vs. NAGKAKAISANG SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG PUREFOODS RANK AND FILE150
GENERAL SANTOS COCA-COLA PLANT FREE WORKERS UNION-TUPAS vs. CCBPI(GEN. SANTOS CITY) ET
........................................................................................................................................................ 152
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY ET AL. vs. DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION...............154
TUNAY NA PAGKAKAISA NG MANGGAGAWA SA ASIA BREWERY vs. ASIA BREWERY, INC...................156
MANILA MINING CORP. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-FFW vs. MANILA MINING CORP............................158
PRINCE TRANSPORT ET AL. vs. GARCIA ET AL.................................................................................. 160
PARK HOTEL ET AL. vs. SORIANO ET AL........................................................................................... 162
GOYA, INC. vs. GOYA, INC. EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW.........................................................................162
BAPTISTA ET AL. vs. VILLANUEVA ET AL........................................................................................... 164
TH SHOPFITTERS CORP. ET AL. vs. T&H SHOPFITTERS CORP. UNION................................................166
TOPIC 15: REVISED GUIDELINES OF THE NCMB FOR THE CONDUCT OF VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION
PROCEEDINGS.........................................................................................................168
SANYO PHILIPPINE WORKERS UNION-PPSLU vs. CANIZARES............................................................168
NAVARRO III vs. DAMASCO............................................................................................................... 170
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION vs. NLRC.............................................................................................. 171

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........................................182 TABIGUE ET AL.......... 177 UNION OF NESTLE WORKERS CAGAYAN DE ORO FACTORY vs......................... NLRC................... ABOITIZ JEBSEN MARITIME INC....................... NESTLE PHILIPPINES INC......................... 175 SILVA ET AL vs.. VS..................................................192 7K CORP.......................... PAHAGAC ET AL.... ET AL......................... NLRC.... COBARRUBIAS...... INTERNATIONAL COPRA EXPORT CORPORATION...............................................................183 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY vs........................................................................189 LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY vs....................................................... THE LEPANTO CAPATAZ UNION........... vs........................ ALBARICO................................ BEGUALOS....................... 187 CAONG......................................... 188 ESTATE OF DULAY vs............................................. vs... JR........................................................................... 195 5 ..................................................................PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS INC................. 185 TENG vs.. vs........

Petitioner company filed a motion to dismiss the petition for certification election on the sole ground that the respondent union is not listed or included in the roster of legitimate labor organizations. VS. and (5) a list of all the rank-and-file monthly paid employees of the Mandaue Packaging Products Plants and Mandaue Glass Plant prepared by Bathan and attested by Sagun. again prepared by Bathan and attested by Sagun. MANDAUE PACKING PRODUCTS. petitioner filed a comment. NO. Rodriguez and attested by Sagun. In the petition. The sole ground relied upon for the dismissal was the Med-Arbiter’s Opinion that as of the date of filing of the petition on 15 June 1998. the date it submitted the required documents.R. The following documents were attached to the petition: (1) a Charter Certificate issued by FFW on 5 June 1998 certifying that respondent as of that date was duly certified as a local or chapter of FFW. (2) a copy of the constitution of respondent prepared by its Secretary. the Med-Arbiter issued an Order dismissing respondent’s petition for certification election. respondent did not have the legal personality to file the said petition for certification election. identifying itself as an affiliate of Federation of Free Workers (FFW). two of respondent’s officers. Rule VI of the New Rules Implementing the Labor Code which deems 6 . Wilfred V. respondent stated that it sought to be certified and to represent the permanent rank-and-file monthly paid employees of the petitioner. AUGUST 16. and that the ground relied upon in the Motion to Dismiss was a mere technicality. Respondent union. In turn. citing Section 3. respondent has acquired legal personality as a labor organization or worker’s association. were actually supervisory employees. Bathan and attested by its President. Petitioner also propounded that contrary to respondent’s objectives of establishing an organization representing rank-and-file employees. signed by respondent’s treasurer Chita D. wherein it reiterated that respondent was not a legitimate labor organization at the time of the filing of the petition. respondent instead filed a Position Paper wherein it asserted that it had complied with all the necessary requirements for the conduct of a certification election.TOPIC 12: RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION SAN MIGUEL CORP. it having submitted all the required documents. and it was hoped that the submissions would facilitate the listing of respondent under the roster of legitimate labor organizations. (4) a certification signifying that respondent had just been organized and no amount had yet been collected from its members. 152356.[9] Petitioner cited Article 245 of the Labor Code. Respondent then submitted to the BLR the same documents earlier attached to its petition for certification. filed a petition for certification election with the DOLE Regional Office. Opting not to file a comment on the Motion to Dismiss. Respondent union appealed the Med-Arbiter’s order to the DOLE which reversed the same.. namely Vice-President Emannuel L. which provides that supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees. The DOLE concluded that respondent acquired legal personality as early as 15 June 1998. After which. (3) a list of respondent’s officers and their respective addresses. G. as well as their exercise of various supervisory functions. In support of this allegation. Sagun. the Chief of LRD-DOLE Regional Office issued a Certificate of Creation of Local/Chapter certifying that from 30 July 1998. Rosell and Secretary Bathan. 2005 Facts: On 15 June 1998. petitioner attached various documents evidencing the designation of these two officers in supervisory roles. Noel T. Agreeing with the petitioner company. The accompanying letter stated that such documents were submitted in compliance with the requirements for the creation of a local/chapter pursuant to the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.

there is a practical reason for sanctioning a less onerous procedure for the registration of a local/chapter. and the names and addresses of the companies where the locals or chapters operate and the list of all the members in each of the companies. and not from the issuance of a certification to such effect by the Regional Office or Bureau. which in turn. Section 3. which takes place only after the Bureau of Labor Relations or its Regional Offices has undertaken an evaluation process lasting up until thirty (30) days. Rule VI. within which period it approves or denies the application. and more importantly. In this case. On the other hand. under it such local/chapter is deemed to acquire legal personality “from the date of filing” of the documents enumerated under Section 1. In the ordinary course. The fact that the local/chapter acquires legal personality from the moment the complete documentary requirements are submitted seems to imply that the duty of the Bureau or Regional Office to register the local/chapter is merely ministerial.Acquisition of legal personality by local chapter. Once the national union or federation acquires legal personality upon the issuance of its certificate or registration. Rule VI. The local/chapter relies in part on the legal personality of the federation or national union. it should have been FFW. Ruling 1. Rule VI of Department Order No. upon registration. Section 3. which should have submitted the subject documents to the Regional Office. Whether or not the union has already acquired legal personality at the time of its filing for certification election. Book V. 9. a federation or national union is required. Issues: 1. Whether or not the union’s president and secretary are supervisory employees and thus barred from membership in that union. 9 provides when the local/chapter acquires legal personality. no such period of evaluation is provided in Department Order No. – A local/chapter constituted in accordance with Section 1 of this Rule shall acquire legal personality from the date of filing of the complete documents enumerated therein. 9. there is no good reason to deny legal personality or defer its conferral to the local/chapter if it is evident at the onset that the federation or national union itself has already through its own means established the local/chapter. The SC held that the union has already acquired legal personality at the time of its filing for certification election. to establish proof of affiliation of at least ten (10) locals or chapters which are duly recognized as the collective bargaining agent in the establishment or industry in which they operate. Nonetheless. the Regional Office or Bureau shall issue in favor of the local/chapter a certificate indicating that it is included in the roster of legitimate labor organizations. 2. and not respondent. It is thus very clear that the issuance of the certificate of registration by the Bureau or Regional Office is not the operative act that vests legal personality upon a local/chapter under Department Order No. Upon compliance with all the documentary requirements.that a local/chapter acquires legal personality from the date of filing of the complete documentary requirements as mandated in the Implementing Rules. its legal personality cannot be subject to collateral attack. Apart from promoting a policy of affiliation of local unions with national unions. a labor organization is deemed to have acquired legal personality only on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration. It is evident based on this rule that the local/chapter acquires legal personality from the date of the filing of the complete documentary requirements. DOLE’s ruling was also affirmed by the CA. had already undergone evaluation and approval from the Bureau of Legal Relations or Regional Office. In fact. 9 for the application of a local/chapter. such is evidenced by the 7 . the manner by which respondent was deemed to have acquired legal personality by the DOLE and the Court of Appeals was not in strict conformity with the provisions of Department Order No. as compared to the national union. Admittedly. In contrast. Such legal personality is acquired from the filing of the complete documentary requirements enumerated in Section 1.

The SC held that they are not supervisory employees and are thus qualified to join the rank-and-file union. discharge.R. GSIS VS. This may. transfer. issued by FFW. Given a ready and standard form to accomplish. therefore. among others. the charge of fraud. this does not prove the existence of fraud. effectively recommends managerial actions if the exercise of such recommendatory authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. intended to mislead anyone. Hence. The Charter Certificate expressly acknowledges FFW’s intent to establish respondent as of 9 June 1998. Under the law. the date the complete documents were submitted. of administrative charges against some 110 union members for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. G.” It argued that the organized demonstrating employees did nothing more than air their grievances in the exercise of their “broader rights of free expression” and are. false statement or misrepresentation cannot be sustained. The Charter Certificate expressly states that respondent has been issued the said certificate “to operate as a local or chapter of the [FFW]”. be outweighed by his other functions which are not specified in the evidence. 170132. The plea for reconsideration was. or appellee union for that matter. layoff. in the interest of the employer. not amenable to administrative sanctions.’” Finally. 2006 Facts: This case has its genesis when the manager of GSIS issued a memorandum directing a number of its employees who are union members to show cause why they should not be charged administratively for their participation in the October 4 to October 7. If this was appellee union’s intention. This being the case. it would appear that his functions are more routinary than recommendatory and hardly leave room for independent judgment. NO. there being appropriate issuances outlawing such kinds of mass action. 021316. 8 . In the case of Emmanuel Rossell. coupled with the nature of the evaluation. 2004 mass action. The union’s counsel sought reconsideration of said directive on the ground. which in turn are used as basis for reclassification.” A supervisory employee is “one who. In the case of Noel Bathan. On this limited point. false statement or misrepresentation. Section 10 of which exhorts government agencies to “harness all means within their capacity to accord due regard and attention to employees’ grievances and facilitate their speedy and amicable disposition through the use of grievance machinery or any other modes of settlement sanctioned by law and existing civil service rules. DECEMBER 6. however. appellant’s evidence shows that he undertakes the filling out of evaluation reports on the performance of mechanics. appellant’s evidence does not show his job title although it shows that his recommendations on disciplinary actions appear to have carried some weight on higher management. that the subject employees resumed work in obedience to the return-to-work order thus issued. assign or discipline employees. suspend. On the other hand. In this case.Charter Certificate dated 9 June 1998. an essential element of fraud. a managerial employee is “one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS. recall. The union then filed with the CA a petition for prohibition against the GSIS on the ground that its members should not be made to explain why they supported their union’s cause since the Civil Service Resolution No. petitioners assert that the filing of the formal charges are but a natural consequence of the service-disrupting rallies and demonstrations staged during office hours by the absenting GSIS employees. otherwise known as the Guidelines for Prohibited Mass Action. Because good faith is presumed in all representations. the SC consider it permissible for respondent to have submitted the required documents itself to the Regional Office. he may qualify as a supervisory employee within the meaning of the law. Assuming that Bathan is a supervisory employee. not merely his job title. effectively denied by the filing. Petition is denied. false statement and misrepresentation in order for these to be actionable is intent to mislead by the party making the representation. It is also wellsettled that the actual functions of an employee. however. it would have refrained from using a more precise description of the organization instead of declaring that the organization is composed of ‘rank and file monthlies’. are determinative in classifying such employee as managerial. and attached to the petition for certification election. there is no proof to show that Bathan. 2. “all employees not falling within the definition of managerial or supervisory employee are considered rank-and-file employees”. and proper that respondent’s legal personality be deemed existent as of 15 June 1998. supervisory or rank and file.

Ruling of the CA is reversed. economic or otherwise. With the view we take of the events that transpired on October 4-7. i. mass leaves. pickets and acts of similar nature. from 6 a. A smaller number.m. for instance. The right of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations only. about these rights as including the right on the part of government personnel to strike ought to be. The record of attendance for the period material shows that. not to mention the compelling spirit of professionalism exacted of civil servants by the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Indeed. demonstrations. walkouts. 9 . 2004. To say that there was no work disruption or that the delivery of services remained at the usual level of efficiency at the GSIS main office during those four (4) days of massive walkouts and wholesale absences would be to understate things. The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes. trashed. The Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the provision “in accordance with law. walkouts. adding that public employees going on disruptive unauthorized absences to join concerted mass actions may be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. by law. implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which “enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions. while 538 participated in the mass action on the third day. joined the fourth day activity.. regulate the use of this right.m. mass leaves. what respondent’s members launched or participated in during that time partook of a strike or. 306 employees. Executive Order 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of government workers to organize. what contextually amounts to the same thing. walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service” by stating that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in government service shall be observed. and other forms of mass action that will lead in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.. a prohibited concerted activity. however. by themselves or through their employees’ organization. 707 employees left their respective work stations. Any suggestion. for four straight days. all government officers and employees from staging strikes.The CA ruled in favor of the union and held that the filing of administrative charges against the union members is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion which may be the proper subject of the writ of prohibition. on the first day of the protest.” This is a clear manifestation that the state may. or forty eight per cent (48%) of the total number of employees in the main office (1. without including the right to strike. It may be that the freedom of expression and assembly and the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances stand on a level higher than economic and other liberties. Ruling: The SC held that the mass action staged by or participated in by said GSIS employees partook of a strike or prohibited concerted mass action. leaving the other employees to fend for themselves in an office where a host of transactions take place every business day. The phrase “prohibited concerted activity” refers to any collective activity undertaken by government employees.e. On the second day.756) took to the streets during office hours. to 2 p. 851 employees. Issue: Whether or not the mass action staged by or participated in by said GSIS employees partook of a strike or prohibited concerted mass action. but by no means an insignificant few. it includes mass leaves. as it has been. participating KMG members and other GSIS employees staged a walk out and waged or participated in a mass protest or demonstration right at the very doorstep of the GSIS main office building. with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands or force concessions. or even deny certain sectors such right. And to place the erring employees beyond the reach of administrative accountability would be to trivialize the civil service rules.

On 14 May 2003. et al..). Escall. Nardito C. Acorda. Edgardo G. Maclit. Jaime T. Nardito C. orderly. On 24 April 2003. which was subsequently consolidated with the Petition of Daya. Reynaldo Reyes. private respondents Jimmy S. Subsequently. On 8 May 2003. NO. the certificates of candidacy of Nardito C. c) Declare Failure of Election. Marcelino Morelos. et al.) filed a Petition with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE-NCR against petitioners to nullify the 7 May 2003 election on the ground that the same was not free. Section 4(a)(6) of the FLAMES Constitution and By-Laws (CBL) by allowing non-members to aid them in their campaign. Lemuel R. the records show that a subsequent election was held on 30 June 2004. Alfredo J.Their acts of solicitation for support from non-union members were deemed inimical to the interest of FLAMES. On 6 May 2003. the COMELEC proclaimed the following candidates. and Faustino Ermino (Daya. private respondents Jimmy S. According to the COMELEC.It was docketed as Case No. Armando Yalung. Arnaldo G. Alvarez. filed with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE-NCR. Rogelio Cervitillo. along with Ong. which was participated in and won by herein private respondents Daya. DOLE-NCR Regional Director Alex E. and the earlier Petition of Ong. and a certain Leandro M. Meanwhile. the COMELEC rejected Jimmy S. On 30 April 2003. et al. along with private respondents Johnson S. Jose Vito. the COMELEC issued a Decision. Alvarez. Maximo A. Escall. et al. Edwin Layug. Tayao. G.. a Petition to: a) Nullify Order of Disqualification. the FLAMES Executive Board created the Committee on Election (COMELEC) for the conduct of its union elections scheduled on 7 May 2003. 10 .On 12 April 2003. Cirujano.). petitioners filed a Petition with the COMELEC seeking the disqualification of private respondents Edgardo Daya. Maraan issued an Order directing DOLE personnel to observe the conduct of the FLAMES election on 7 May 2003. et al.. Ong. Reynaldo Espiritu. Alberto Alcantara. and Jaime T. Evangeline Escall.DIOKNO VS. Antonio de Luna. Jr. and peaceful. On 1 April 2003. declaring Daya. Alfredo J. Caoc. Alvarez.Petitioners and private respondents are members of FLAMES. officially disqualified to run and/or to participate in the 7 May 2003 FLAMES elections. Luzmindo D. Jr. et al.. Tabilog filed a Petition before the Med-Arbitration Unit of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).R. et al. and Jaime T. b) Nullify Election Proceedings and Counting of Votes. Valeriano (Ong. et al. private respondents Daya. Valeriano were similarly rejected on the basis of the exclusion of their department from the scope of the existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA). and d) Declare Holding of New Election to be Controlled and Supervised by the DOLE. On 7 May 2003.. Valeriano filed their respective certificates of candidacy. CACDAC. Macapulay as members. Cadavona. and petitioners Jaime C. Ongs candidacy on the ground that he was not a member of FLAMES. 2007 Facts: The First Line Association of Meralco Supervisory Employees (FLAMES) is a legitimate labor organization which is the supervisory union of Meralco. Reyes. Ragasa and Gil G. including some of herein petitioners as winners of the elections.The employees assigned to the aforesaid department are allegedly deemed disqualified from membership in the union for being confidential employees.. Jose O. Tong as its chairman. another group led by private respondent Gaudencio Jimenez. et al. Leandro Tabilog.The COMELEC was composed of petitioner Dante M. Ong. Alfredo J. et al.Meanwhile. On 2 May 2003. Bonifacio F. Pablo Lucas. violated Article IV.. Jr. Mendoza and Romeo M. NCR-OD-0305-004-LRD. Escall. Daya. Gavino R. JULY 4. Nards Pabilona. Vidanes. de Vera (Jimenez. 168475.

The Court of Appeals, in the aforesaid case, rendered a Decision dated 12 January 2007, upholding the
validity of the 30 June 2004 elections, and the declaration of herein private respondents Daya, et al., as the
duly elected winners therein.
On 7 July 2003, Med-Arbiter Tranquilino B. Reyes, Jr. issued a Decision in favor of private respondents, Daya,
et al.However, the petition of Jimenez, et al.,was dismissed because it was premature, it appearing that the
COMELEC had not yet resolved their protest prior to their resort to the Med-Arbiter.Finally, the Petition of
Ong, et al., seeking to declare themselves as bona fide members of FLAMES was ordered dismissed.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal before the Director of the BLR.On 3 December 2003, the Director of
the BLR issued a Resolution, affirming in toto the assailed Decision of the Med-Arbiter.Petitioners elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari.The Court of Appeals found petitioners appeal
to be bereft of merit. The appellate court held that the provision relied upon by the COMELEC concerns the
dismissal and/or expulsion of union members, which power is vested in the FLAMES Executive Board, and
not the COMELEC.It affirmed the finding of the BLR Director that the COMELEC, in disqualifying private
respondents Daya, et al., committed a procedural shortcut.

Petitioners sought a reconsideration of the 17 June 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals, but the same was
denied
Hence, the instant Petition.

Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the jurisdiction of the
BLR to take cognizance of the case and then upheld the ruling of the BLR Director and Med-Arbiter,
nullifying the COMELECs order of disqualification of private respondents Daya et al., and annulling the 7
May 2003 FLAMES elections.

Ruling:
The Petition is devoid of merit.We affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals upholding the jurisdiction of the
BLR.Article 226 of the Labor Code is hereunder reproduced, to wit:

ART. 226. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS. The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions
in the regional offices of the Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their
own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all
disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces
whether agricultural or nonagricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of
collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary
arbitration.

This Court in Bautista v. Court of Appeals, interpreting Article 226 of the Labor Code, was explicit in
declaring that the BLR has the original and exclusive jurisdiction on all inter-union and intra-union
conflicts.We said that since Article 226 of the Labor Code has declared that the BLR shall have original and
exclusive authority to act on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, there should be no more doubt as to
its jurisdiction.As defined, an intra-union conflict would refer to a conflict within or inside a labor union,
while an inter-union controversy or dispute is one occurring or carried on between or among unions. More
specifically, an intra-union dispute is defined under Section (z), Rule I of the Rules Implementing Book V of
the Labor Code, viz:
(z) Intra-Union Dispute refers to any conflict between and among union members, and includes all disputes
or grievances arising from any violation of or disagreement over any provision of the constitution and bylaws of a union, including cases arising from chartering or affiliation of labor organizations or from any
violation of the rights and conditions of union membership provided for in the Code.

The controversy in the case at bar is an intra-union dispute.There is no question that this is one which
involves a dispute within or inside FLAMES, a labor union.At issue is the propriety of the disqualification of
private respondents Daya, et al., by the FLAMES COMELEC in the 7 May 2003 elections.It must also be

11

stressed that even as the dispute involves allegations that private respondents Daya, et al., sought the help
of non-members of the union in their election campaign to the detriment of FLAMES, the same does not
detract from the real character of the controversy.It remains as one which involves the grievance over the
constitution and bylaws of a union, and it is a controversy involving members of the union.Moreover, the
non-members of the union who were alleged to have aided private respondents Daya, et al., are not parties
in the case.We are, therefore, unable to understand petitioners persistence in placing the controversy
outside of the jurisdiction of the BLR.The law is very clear. It requires no further interpretation.The Petition
which was initiated by private respondents Daya, et al., before the BLR was properly within its cognizance,
it being an intra-union dispute. Indubitably, when private respondents Daya, et al.,brought the case to the
BLR, it was an invocation of the power and authority of the BLR to act on an intra-union conflict.

The Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 June 2004, and its Resolution dated
10 June 2005 in CA are AFFIRMED.
SAN MIGUEL CORP. EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO VS. SAN MIGUEL PACKAGING PRODUCTS
EMPLOYEES UNION, G.R. NO. 171153, SEPT. 12, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner is the incumbent bargaining agent for the bargaining unit comprised of the regular
monthly-paid rank and file employees of the three divisions of San Miguel Corporation (SMC), namely, the
San Miguel Corporate Staff Unit (SMCSU), San Miguel Brewing Philippines (SMBP), and the San Miguel
Packaging Products (SMPP), in all offices and plants of SMC, including the Metal Closure and Lithography
Plant in Laguna. It had been the certified bargaining agent for 20 years – from 1987 to 1997.

Respondent is registered as a chapter of Pambansang Diwa ng Manggagawang Pilipino (PDMP). PDMP
issued Charter Certificate No. 112 to respondent on 15 June 1999.5 In compliance with registration
requirements, respondent submitted the requisite documents to the BLR for the purpose of acquiring legal
personality. Upon submission of its charter certificate and other documents, respondent was issued
Certificate of Creation of Local or Chapter PDMP-01 by the BLR on 6 July 1999. Thereafter, respondent filed
with the Med-Arbiter of the DOLE Regional Officer in the National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR), three
separate petitions for certification election to represent SMPP, SMCSU, and SMBP.8 All three petitions were
dismissed, on the ground that the separate petitions fragmented a single bargaining unit.9

On 17 August 1999, petitioner filed with the DOLE-NCR a petition seeking the cancellation of respondent's
registration and its dropping from the rolls of legitimate labor organizations. In its petition, petitioner
accused respondent of committing fraud and falsification, and non-compliance with registration
requirements in obtaining its certificate of registration. It raised allegations that respondent violated
Articles 239(a), (b) and (c) and 234(c) of the Labor Code. Moreover, petitioner claimed that PDMP is not a
legitimate labor organization, but a trade union center, hence, it cannot directly create a local or chapter.
On 14 July 2000, DOLE-NCR Regional Director Maximo B. Lim issued an Order dismissing the allegations of
fraud and misrepresentation, and irregularity in the submission of documents by respondent. Regional
Director Lim further ruled that respondent is allowed to directly create a local or chapter. However, he
found that respondent did not comply with the 20% membership requirement and, thus, ordered the
cancellation of its certificate of registration and removal from the rolls of legitimate labor organizations.
Respondent appealed to the BLR.

While the BLR agreed with the findings of the DOLE Regional Director dismissing the allegations of fraud
and misrepresentation, and in upholding that PDMP can directly create a local or a chapter, it reversed the
Regional Director's ruling that the 20% membership is a requirement for respondent to attain legal
personality as a labor organization.
Invoking the power of the appellate court to review decisions of quasi-judicial agencies, petitioner filed with
the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated 9 March 2005, dismissed the petition and affirmed the Decision of
the BLR
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

12

Issues:
1. Whether or not the private respondent is required to submit the number of employees and names of all
its members comprising at least 20% of the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate

2. Whether or not PDMP as a trade union center is a legitimate labor organization and has the power to
create a local or chapter

Ruling:

There is merit in petitioner's contentions.

A legitimate labor organization is defined as "any labor organization duly registered with the Department of
Labor and Employment, and includes any branch or local thereof."The mandate of the Labor Code is to
ensure strict compliance with the requirements on registration because a legitimate labor organization is
entitled to specific rights under the Labor Code, and are involved in activities directly affecting matters of
public interest. Registration requirements are intended to afford a measure of protection to unsuspecting
employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to
control union funds or use the labor organization for illegitimate ends.Legitimate labor organizations have
exclusive rights under the law which cannot be exercised by non-legitimate unions, one of which is the right
to be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining
unit for purposes of collective bargaining. The acquisition of rights by any union or labor organization,
particularly the right to file a petition for certification election, first and foremost, depends on whether or
not the labor organization has attained the status of a legitimate labor organization.

The procedure for registration of a local or chapter of a labor organization is provided in Book V of the
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 9 which took effect on 21
June 1997, and again by Department Order No. 40 dated 17 February 2003. The Implementing Rules as
amended by D.O. No. 9 should govern the resolution of the petition at bar since respondent's petition for
certification election was filed with the BLR in 1999; and that of petitioner on 17 August 1999.
The applicable Implementing Rules enunciates a two-fold procedure for the creation of a chapter or a local.
The first involves the affiliation of an independent union with a federation or national union or industry
union. The second, finding application in the instant petition, involves the direct creation of a local or a
chapter through the process of chartering.

A duly registered federation or national union may directly create a local or chapter by submitting to the
DOLE Regional Office or to the BLR two copies of the following:
(a) A charter certificate issued by the federation or national union indicating the creation or establishment
of the local/chapter;
(b) The names of the local/chapter's officers, their addresses, and the principal office of the local/chapter;
and
(c) The local/chapter's constitution and by-laws; Provided, That where the local/chapter's constitution and
by-laws is the same as that of the federation or national union, this fact shall be indicated accordingly.
All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified under oath by the Secretary or the Treasurer of
the local/chapter and attested to by its President.

The Implementing Rules stipulate that a local or chapter may be directly created by a federation or national
union. A duly constituted local or chapter created in accordance with the foregoing shall acquire legal
personality from the date of filing of the complete documents with the BLR. The issuance of the certificate
of registration by the BLR or the DOLE Regional Office is not the operative act that vests legal personality

13

upon a local or a chapter under Department Order No. 9. Such legal personality is acquired from the filing
of the complete documentary requirements enumerated in Section 1, Rule VI.

Petitioner insists that Section 3 of the Implementing Rules, as amended by Department Order No. 9,
violated Article 234 of the Labor Code when it provided for less stringent requirements for the creation of a
chapter or local. This Court disagrees.

Article 234 of the Labor Code provides that an independent labor organization acquires legitimacy only
upon its registration with the BLR:

Any applicant labor organization, association or group of unions or workers shall acquire legal personality
and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon
issuance of the certificate of registration based on the following requirements:

(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;
(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address of the labor organization, the minutes of
the organizational meetings and the list of the workers who participated in such meetings;
(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the
bargaining unit where it seeks to operate;
(d) If the applicant union has been in existence for one or more years, copies of its annual financial reports;
and
(e) Four (4) copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant union, minutes of its adoption or
ratification, and the list of the members who participated in it. (Italics supplied.)

It is emphasized that the foregoing pertains to the registration of an independent labor organization,
association or group of unions or workers.
However, the creation of a branch, local or chapter is treated differently. This Court, in the landmark case of
Progressive Development Corporation v. Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, declared that
when an unregistered union becomes a branch, local or chapter, some of the aforementioned requirements
for registration are no longer necessary or compulsory. Whereas an applicant for registration of an
independent union is mandated to submit, among other things, the number of employees and names of all
its members comprising at least 20% of the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate, as
provided under Article 234 of the Labor Code and Section 2 of Rule III, Book V of the Implementing Rules,
the same is no longer required of a branch, local or chapter. The intent of the law in imposing less
requirements in the case of a branch or local of a registered federation or national union is to encourage
the affiliation of a local union with a federation or national union in order to increase the local union's
bargaining powers respecting terms and conditions of labor.

Subsequently, in Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Trajano where the validity of Department Order No. 9 was
directly put in issue, this Court was unequivocal in finding that there is no inconsistency between the Labor
Code and Department Order No. 9.As to petitioner's claims that respondent obtained its Certificate of
Registration through fraud and misrepresentation, this Court finds that the imputations are not impressed
with merit. In the instant case, proof to declare that respondent committed fraud and misrepresentation
remains wanting. This Court had, indeed, on several occasions, pronounced that registration based on false
and fraudulent statements and documents confer no legitimacy upon a labor organization irregularly
recognized, which, at best, holds on to a mere scrap of paper. Under such circumstances, the labor
organization, not being a legitimate labor organization, acquires no rights.

This Court emphasizes, however, that a direct challenge to the legitimacy of a labor organization based on
fraud and misrepresentation in securing its certificate of registration is a serious allegation which deserves
careful scrutiny. Allegations thereof should be compounded with supporting circumstances and evidence.
The records of the case are devoid of such evidence. Furthermore, this Court is not a trier of facts, and this
doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases. Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-

14

" On the other hand. The law is very clear on this matter. this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain questions indirectly impugning the legitimacy of PDMP. the legitimacy of PDMP is being impugned. Firstly. which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters. or for participating in the formulation of social and employment policies. which is to apply the law. and programs. Anent the foregoing. we find no legal justification to support the conclusion that a trade union center is allowed to directly create a local or chapter through chartering. and includes any branch or local thereof. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not include the power to correct by reading into the law what is not written therein. was enacted in 1972. and is duly registered with the DOLE in accordance with Rule III. as has been held in a long line of cases. its legal personality as a legitimate labor organization subsists. considering that labor plays a major role as a socio-economic force. and rules that PDMP cannot directly create a local or chapter. 9481. 6715. its legal personality cannot be subject to collateral attack. Petitioner's argument creates a predicament as it hinges on the legitimacy of PDMP as a labor organization. Secondly. and recently. The Implementing Rules stipulate that a labor organization shall be deemed registered and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration. a trade union center is any group of registered national unions or federations organized for the mutual aid and protection of its members. Once a union acquires legitimate status as a labor organization. 5. as amended. It bears to emphasize that what is being directly challenged is the personality of respondent as a legitimate labor organization and not that of PDMP. both statutory and regulatory. Presidential Decree No. Corollarily. Article 212 (h) of the Labor Code. are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality. Apropos. Section 2 of the Implementing Rules.This Court reverses the finding of the appellate court and BLR on this ground. 15 . Still. Once a certificate of registration is issued to a union. the same contention premises that a trade union center cannot directly create a local or chapter through the process of chartering. we take this occasion to reiterate the first and fundamental duty of this Court. standards. The labor organization or workers' association shall be deemed registered and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration. such as the BLR. In the process. defines a legitimate labor organization as "any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE. it being a trade union center. the provisions of the Labor Code and the Implementing Rules have been subject to several amendments. It may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with Section 5 of Rule V. The aforementioned provision is enunciated in the following: Sec. the legal personality of a legitimate labor organization. cannot be subject to a collateral attack. for PDMP cannot create a local or chapter as it is not a legitimate labor organization. Book V of the Implementing Rules. but may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with these Rules. by Republic Act No. Such legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack. it being a trade union center. The Labor Code was first amended by Republic Act No. PDMP is granted all the rights and privileges appurtenant to a legitimate labor organizationand continues to be recognized as such until its certificate of registration is successfully impugned and thereafter cancelled or revoked in an independent action for cancellation. After an exhaustive study of the governing labor law provisions.Effect of registration. this line of reasoning attempts to predicate that a trade union center is not a legitimate labor organization. Being a legislation on social justice. Until the certificate of registration of PDMP is cancelled. 442. FED-11558-LC by the BLR on 14 February 1991. This being a collateral attack. PDMP was registered as a trade union center and issued Registration Certificate No. for assisting such members in collective bargaining.judicial bodies. better known as the Labor Code. petitioner postulates that respondent was not validly and legitimately created. albeit indirectly. it continues to be recognized as such until its certificate of registration is cancelled or revoked in an independent action for cancellation. such as PDMP. and they continue to evolve.We now proceed to the contention that PDMP cannot directly create a local or a chapter.

and the principal office of the local/chapter. the names of its officers and their addresses. The term trade union center was first adopted in the Implementing Rules. Otherwise Known as the Labor Code of the Philippines" lapsed into law on 25 May 2007 and became effective on 14 June 2007. this fact shall be indicated accordingly. namely Article 234-A. it shall be sufficient that the fact of ratification be included in the minutes of the organizational meeting. while a "national union" or "federation" is a labor organization with at least ten locals or chapters or affiliates. This law further amends the Labor Code provisions on Labor Relations. is composed of a group of registered national unions or federations. for assisting such members in collective bargaining. provided that where the ratification was done simultaneously with the organizational meeting. or for participating in the formulation of social and employment policies. issued by a duly registered federation or national union and reported to the Regional Office in accordance with Rule III. (b) The names of the local/chapter's officers. approved by the Board of Directors of such union. the provision indicating the procedure for chartering or creating a local or chapter. even as it was amended by Republic Act No. 9. Section 2-E of these Rules. 9 mentions two labor organizations either of which is allowed to directly create a local or chapter through chartering – a duly registered federation or a national union. the term trade union center was never mentioned under Presidential Decree No. The Implementing Rules. Department Order No. and (d) A copy of its constitution and by-laws and minutes of its ratification by a majority of the presidents of the member organizations. and (c) The local/chapter's constitution and by-laws. each of which must be a duly certified or recognized collective bargaining agent. Evidently. and is duly registered with the DOLE in accordance with Rule III. and the list of member organizations and their representatives who attended such meeting/s. The same rule provides that the application for registration of an industry or trade union center shall be supported by the following: (a) The list of its member organizations and their respective presidents and. 442. (b) The resolution of membership of each member organization.Chartering and creation of a local/chapter. as amended by Department Order No. the industry where the union seeks to operate. Article 234 now includes the term trade union center. 9. 9 defines a "chartered local" as a labor organization in the private sector operating at the enterprise level that acquired legal personality through a charter certificate. 9. 9481 or "An Act Strengthening the Workers' Constitutional Right to Self-Organization. the minutes of its organizational meeting/s. in the case of an industry union." 16 . – A duly registered federation or national union may directly create a local/chapter by submitting to the Regional Office or to the Bureau two (2) copies of the following: (a) A charter certificate issued by the federation or national union indicating the creation or establishment of the local/chapter. provided that where the local/chapter's constitution and by-laws is the same as that of the federation or national union. 442. provide that "a duly registered federation or national union" may directly create a local or chapter. Culling from its definition as provided by Department Order No. As Amended. Department Order No. still makes no mention of a "trade union center. a trade union center is any group of registered national unions or federations organized for the mutual aid and protection of its members. under Department Order No. Republic Act No. but interestingly.Incidentally. All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified under oath by the Secretary or the Treasurer of the local/chapter and attested to by its President. standards. The provision reads: Section 1. a trade union center. and programs. 6715. Section 2 of the Implementing Rules. Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. their addresses. on the other hand. (c) The name and principal address of the applicant.

G. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. Absent the institution of safeguards. Our only recourse. and thus assure the rights of workers to self-organization. A person. as shown in a Sinumpaang Petisyon. Thus. 2008 Facts: Petitioner filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).R. This Court deems it proper to apply the Latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Therefore. and SMPPEU-PDMP DROPPED from the rolls of legitimate labor organizations. 9. the power granted to labor organizations to directly create a chapter or local through chartering is given to a federation or national union. it has no power to directly create a local or chapter. When certain persons or things are specified in a law. other exceptions or effects are excluded. and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein. the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. contrary to Section 1. Secretary of Department of Labor and Employment. The Certificate of Registration of San Miguel Packaging Products Employees Union–Pambansang Diwa ng Manggagawang Pilipino is ORDERED CANCELLED. SMPPEU-PDMP cannot be created under the more lenient requirements for chartering. NO. VS. then a trade union center is without authority to charter directly. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS. it becomes a convenient device for a small group of employees to foist a not-sodesirable federation or union on unsuspecting co-workers and pare the need for wholehearted voluntariness. 162356. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. Petition is GRANTED. there was no mention of a trade union center as being among the labor organizations allowed to charter. object or thing omitted must have been omitted intentionally. The mandate of the Labor Code in ensuring strict compliance with the procedural requirements for registration is not without reason. but must have complied with the more stringent rules for creation and registration of an independent union. contract. However. and that.. the law could have so easily and conveniently included "trade union centers" in identifying the labor organizations allowed to charter a chapter or local. In sum. If its intent were otherwise. It has been observed that the formation of a local or chapter becomes a handy tool for the circumvention of union registration requirements. by interpretation or construction. which is basic to free unionism. an intention to exclude all others from its operation may be inferred. or will. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Region IV a Petition for cancellation of the union registration of respondent union on the grounds that the List of Officers and Constitution and By-laws which the respondent union attached to its application for union registration contain the union secretary's certification but the same is not under oath. APRIL 14. including the 20% membership requirement. The ruling of this Court in the instant case is not a departure from the policy of the law to foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong and united labor movement. Costs against petitioner. as previously discussed. series of 1997. As a legitimate labor organization is entitled to specific rights under the Labor Code and involved in activities directly affecting public interest. as amended by Department Order No. Such is the case here. If a statute specifies one exception to a general rule or assumes to specify the effects of a certain provision. as this Court has enunciated in Progressive Development Corporation v. Rule VI of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code. Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom.Also worth emphasizing is that even in the most recent amendment of the implementing rules. The rule is restrictive in the sense that it proceeds from the premise that the legislating body would not have made specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. DONG SEUNG INC. although PDMP as a trade union center is a legitimate labor organization. 148 out of approximately 200 employees-members have since 17 . it is necessary that the law afford utmost protection to the parties affected. What is expressed puts an end to what is implied. is to exact strict compliance with what the law provides as requisites for local or chapter formation. be extended to other matters. it may not. it is not this Court's function to augment the requirements prescribed by law. since under the pertinent status and applicable implementing rules. Under this maxim of statutory interpretation.

which interprets the requirement under Article 235. the Bureau has devised and transmitted to the Regional Offices the appropriate official registration forms. To prevent inconvenience to the public. insisting that the BLR acted with grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to respondent union’s appeal despite its having been filed out of time. However. The Bureau shall act on all applications for registration within thirty (30) days from filing. of the prescribed forms. shall remain in the roster of legitimate labor organizations. 235. to wit: Pursuant to Rule XVII. as the case may be. The CA found respondent union’s appeal to have “substantially complied with the requirements provided by law. BLR Reg. the certification issued by respondent union’s secretary may be notarized either separately or along with the main application. Form No. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the BLR when it declared respondent’s union registration valid. Sr. The requirement that the union secretary certify under oath all documents and papers filed in support of an application for union registration is imposed by Article 235 of the Labor Code. (Emphasis supplied) The BLR explained that under the foregoing Advisory. All requisite documents and papers shall be certified under oath by the secretary or the treasurer of the organization. S. Series of 1997 x x x. The BLR noted that respondent union correctly availed of the second option: 18 . Respondent union appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations BLR gave due course to the appeal and granted the same. particularly to the applicants. some applications have been submitted without using the forms prescribed by the Bureau. to wit: Art. considering that applicants are not yet fully familiar with the forms in spite of orientation and seminar conducted. In reversing DOLE Region IV. the BLR cited its Advisory. DOLE (Region IV) Regional Director Ricardo Martinez. and attested to by its president.denounced respondent union for employing deceit in obtaining signatures to support its registration application. the Regional Offices are hereby advised that applications submitted with supporting documents which are separately notarized need not comply with the notarization requirement under Part I or Part II. some applicants comply with the requirements by having their supporting documents separately notarized. Action on application. [T]he Bureau of Labor Relations is empowered. In lieu of submitting a notarized application using the official forms. After its motion for reconsideration was denied by the BLR. 1998. Section 1 of Department Order No. as the case may be.” including the chartering of locals or chapters. it ordered that NAMAWU-Local 188. the absence of notarization under Part I or Part II of the appropriate forms shall not be a basis for denying applications where it appears that all the required supporting documents have already been notarized or attested. x x x Accordingly. The CA dismissed the petition and the motion for reconsideration which was subsequently filed by the petitioner. Ruling: The BLR found respondent union’s appeal tardy yet gave due course to it on account of its inherent merit. Accordingly. particularly the following: xxxx 5. delisted from the roster of legitimate labor organization the Charter Certificate [of] NAMAWU-Local 188. consistent with the State policy to promote unionism. dated October 14. petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari. to “devise or prescribe such forms as are necessary to facilitate the process of registration of labor organizations x x x. 1998 For Chartering Locals/ Chapters xxxx Part I of each of the first seven forms is a space provided for the notarization of the application x x x. 09. 5-LOC-LO.

the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the Arbiter’s ruling. On appeal. NO. all that Article 235 requires is that the secretary’s certification be under oath. DEL PILAR ACADEMY EMPLOYEES UNION. Cavite. it upheld the UNION’s right to agency fee..R. Robles notarized such application on 8 February 1999 at Cavite City.) All the other supporting documents to the charter certificate issued by the National Mines and Allied Workers Union were certified true and correct by the secretary and attested to by the president. refused to effect deductions claiming that the non-union employees were not amenable to it. the petition is DENIED. DEL PILAR ACADEMY ET AL. APRIL 30. In gist. D. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the union that DEL PILAR should have deducted the union fees from the non-union employees citing article 248 of the Labor Code. in its October 14. [respondent] x x x submitted all the documentary requirements for the creation of a local/chapter in accordance with Section 1. Traversing the complaint. which is to forestall fraud and misrepresentation. including the secretary’s certification. on the other hand. having been notarized as provided in the BLR official forms. DEL PILAR.A perusal of the registration records of the [respondent] revealed that respondent’s registration application was sufficient in form and substance. More importantly. DEL PILAR alleged that the proposal cannot be considered unfair for it was done to make the provision of the CBA conformable to the DECS’ Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. Thus. Another factor which militates against the veracity of the allegations in the Sinumpaang Petisyon is the lack of particularities on how. Based on its interpretation of Article 235.O. the BLR. The UNION then assessed agency fees from non-union employees. such interpretation of the BLR is accorded great weight by the Court for it is said agency which is vested with authority and endowed with expertise to implement the law in question. 1994. G. (Atty. It justified the non-deduction of the agency fees by the absence of individual check off authorization from the non-union employees. It does not prescribe a specific manner of its notarization. 9 series of 1997. assign no credence to the Sinumpaang Petisyon for it is a mere photocopy. [28] (Emphasis supplied) Indeed. from the standpoint of compliance. This is a reasonable interpretation considering that the form of notarization contemplated in said Advisory adequately serves the purpose of Article 235. what needs to be established is that the specific act or omission of the union deprived the complaining employeesmembers of their right to choose. Rule VI. 1998 Advisory. The CA and BLR. an educational institution operating in Imus. 2008 Facts: Respondent Del Pilar Academy Employees Union (the UNION) is the certified collective bargaining representative of teaching and non-teaching personnel of petitioner Del Pilar Academy (DEL PILAR). the UNION and DEL PILAR entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) granting salary increase and other benefits to the teaching and non-teaching staff. however. Manuel E. WHEREFORE. Such details are crucial for in the proceedings for cancellation of union registration on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation. As regards the proposal to amend the provision on summer vacation leave with pay. 170112. On September 15. and requested DEL PILAR to deduct said assessment from the employees’ salaries and wages. VS. DEL PILAR denied committing unfair labor practices against the UNION. allows for the wholesale notarization of a union’s application for registration and recognizes the effects thereof even on the attachments. The other ground cited by DOLE Region IV in canceling the registration of respondent union is that the latter allegedly committed misrepresentation in securing the signatures of its members. when and where respondent union perpetrated the alleged fraud on each member. the genuineness and due execution of which cannot be reasonably ascertained. but did 19 .

: The employee's acceptance of benefits resulting from a collective bargaining agreement justifies the deduction of agency fees from his pay and the union's entitlement thereto. the grant of annual salary increase is not the only provision in the CBA that benefited the non-union employees. Joaquin viz. Contrary to what DEL PILAR wants to portray. The system is referred to as check off. no requirement of written authorization from the non-union employees is needed to effect a valid check off. it ordered DEL PILAR to deduct agency fees from the salaries of non-union employees. from the employees' wages for direct remittance to the union. and if so.not consider DEL PILAR’s failure to deduct the same an unfair labor practice. as agency fees. the CA upheld the UNION’s right to collect agency fees from non-union employees. As explained by this Court in Holy Cross of Davao College. On July 19. namely. Ruling: The collection of agency fees in an amount equivalent to union dues and fees. paragraph (o). additional compensation for overload units or teaching assignments in excess of the 23 hour per week limit. Accordingly. justifying the collection of. it then went to the CA via certiorari. Inc. and the UNION’s entitlement to. The UNION’s motion for reconsideration having been denied. affirming with modification the resolutions of the NLRC. It also negotiated for entitlement to summer vacation leave with pay for two (2) months for teaching staff who have rendered six (6) consecutive semesters of service. v. agency fees. Hon. For the non-teaching personnel. 20 . the UNION worked for their entitlement to fifteen (15) days leave with pay. from employees who are not union members. whether an individual written authorization is necessary for a valid check off. deriving from the established principle that non-union employees may not unjustly enrich themselves by benefiting from employment conditions negotiated by the bargaining union. The argument cannot be sustained. These provisions in the CBA surely benefited the non-union employees. Article 248(e) makes it explicit that Article 241. When so stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement or authorized in writing by the employees concerned. Like the Arbiter and the NLRC. especially in this case where the non-union employees receive several benefits under the CBA. but did not adjudge DEL PILAR liable for unfair labor practice. the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules recognize it to be the duty of the employer to deduct the sum equivalent to the amount of union dues. [requiring written authorization is inapplicable to non-union members. but quasi-contractual. the CA rendered the assailed decision. DEL PILAR urges this Court to reverse the CA ruling insofar as it ordered the deduction of agency fees from the salaries of non-union employees. limitations on teaching assignments to 23 hours per week. In this aspect. the legal basis of the union's right to agency fees is neither contractual nor statutory. No requirement of written authorization from the non-union employees is necessary if the non-union employees accept the benefits resulting from the CBA. and payment of longevity pay. is recognized by Article 248(e) of the Labor Code. 2005. arguing that such conclusion proceeds from a misplaced premise that the salary increase arose from the CBA. The UNION negotiated for other benefits. However. Issue: Whether or not the UNION is entitled to collect agency fees from non-union members.

S. JULY 23. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. Ventures International. the petition alleged the following: (1) The Union deliberately and maliciously included the names of more or less 82 former employees no longer connected with Ventures in its list of members who attended the organizational meeting and in the adoption/ratification of its constitution and by-laws held on January 9. On March 21. SO ORDERED.S. is in the business of manufacturing sports shoes. the Union filed with DOLE-Region III a petition for certification election in behalf of the rank-and-file employees of Ventures. a recourse which appeared to have been forwarded to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR).. the Union interposed a motion for reconsideration. 2000 in Mariveles. this petition for review under Rule 45. 82 of which belong to terminated Ventures employees. (3) No organizational meeting and ratification actually took place. the BLR Director rendered on October 11. is a labor organization registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). VS. 2000. or 418 of the total 2. (Ventures).R. the BLR. On August 21. SS VENTURES LABOR UNION. Mariveles. granting the Unions appeal and reversing the decision of Dione.S. 2000. on the other hand. In a Decision dated April 6. Bataan.197-employee complement. Five hundred forty two (542) signatures.Despite Venturesmotion to expunge the appeal. Regional Director Ana C. 2002 a decisionin BLR-A-C-60-6-11-01. then the remaining valid signatures would only be 418. Bataan. VENTURES INTERNATIONAL INC. Ventures filed a Petition to cancel the Unions certificate of registration invoking the grounds set forth in Article 239(a) of the Labor Code. NO. (2) The Union maliciously twice entered the signatures of three persons namely: Mara Santos. G. 2003. Aggrieved. which is very much short of the 439 minimum (2197 total employees x 20% = 439.Ventures then went to the Court of Appeals (CA) on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Since more or less 82 of the 500[3] signatures were forged or invalid. 161690. On October 20. over the objection of Ventures which filed a Motion to Expunge. and the Union forged the signatures of these 82 former employees to make it appear they took part in the organizational meeting and adoption and ratification of the constitution. a PEZA-registered export firm with principal place of business at Phase I-PEZA-Bataan Export Zone. appeared on the basic documents supporting the petition. Respondent S. Although it would later find this motion to have been belatedly filed. SP No. are AFFIRMED.WHEREFORE. 2001. and Karen Agunos.S. Hence. Raymond Balangbang. 86868. gave it due course and treated it as an appeal. Inc. 2008 Facts: Petitioner S. Ventures Labor Union (Union). and (4) The Unions application for registration was not supported by at least 20% of the rank-and-file employees of Ventures. Issue: 21 . Ventures sought reconsideration of the above decision but was denied by the BLR. Ventures motion for reconsideration met a similar fate. the petition is DENIED. dismissing Ventures petition.R.4) required by the Labor Code. Dione of DOLE-Region III found for Ventures. the CA rendered a Decision.

The Court. the registration may be canceled or the union may be decertified as the bargaining unit. should not have been counted as attendees in the meeting and the ratification proceedings immediately afterwards. if a withdrawal from union membership done after a petition for certification election has been filed does not vitiate such petition. It must also be shown that there was misrepresentation. in which case the union is divested of the status of a legitimate labor organization. the issuance to the Union of Certificate of Registration No. It cannot be over-emphasized that the registration or the recognition of a labor union after it has submitted the corresponding papers is not ministerial on the part of the BLR. We are not persuaded. As aptly noted by both the BLR and CA. a union should be denied recognition as a legitimate labor organization. The right to form. After a labor organization has filed the necessary registration documents. being no longer connected with the company. Ventures draws attention to the inclusion of 82 individuals to the list of participants in the January 9. 234 of the Labor Code have been sedulously complied with. Second. according to Art. the Court is inclined to agree with the CA that the BLR did not abuse its discretion nor gravely err when it concluded that the affidavits of retraction of the 82 members had no evidentiary weight. it is not enough to show that the union includes ineligible employees in its membership. the separate hand-written statements of 82 employees who. Among the grounds for cancellation is the commission of any of the acts enumerated in Art. Ventures faults both the BLR and the CA in finding that there was no fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the Union sufficient to justify cancellation of its registration. In this regard. while withdrawal after the filing of such petition is considered to be involuntary and does not affect the same. has in previous cases. The assailed inclusion of the said 82 individuals to the meeting and proceedings adverted to is not really fatal to the Unions cause for. 239(a) of the Labor Code. these mostly undated written statements submitted by Ventures on March 20. III. Ruling: The petition lacks merit. first. join. If the unions application is infected by falsification and like serious irregularities. or seven months after it filed its petition for cancellation of registration. among other documents. Prescinding from these considerations. shall not be abridged. Now then. Section 3 of the Constitution and such right. The Court need not delve into the question of whether these 82 dismissed individuals were still Union members qualified to vote and affix their signature on its application for registration and supporting documents. especially those appearing on the face of the application and its attachments. or assist a union is specifically protected by Art. a union is considered a legitimate labor organization endowed with the right and privileges granted by law to such organization. RO300-00-02-UR-0003 necessarily implies that its application for registration and the supporting documents thereof are prima facie free from any vitiating irregularities. said that to decertify a union. Once registered with the DOLE. We have in precedent cases said that the employees withdrawal from a labor union made before the filing of the petition for certification election is presumed voluntary. as determined by the BLR. Far from it. While a certificate of registration confers a union with legitimacy with the concomitant right to participate in or ask for certification election in a bargaining unit. 2000 organizational meeting.Whether or not there was fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the Union sufficient to justify cancellation of its registration. the allegations of falsification of signatures or misrepresentation with respect to these individuals are without basis. as aptly 22 . Ventures submits that the 82. 2000. false statement. 2001. alleged that they were unwilling or harassed signatories to the attendance sheet of the organizational meeting. Sec. XIII. 8 of the Constitution and Art. such as fraud and misrepresentation in connection with the adoption or ratification of the unions constitution and like documents. Ventures makes much of. such as the adoption or ratification of the constitution and bylaws or amendments thereto and the minutes of ratification of the constitution or by-laws. 246 of the Labor Code. it becomes mandatory for the BLR to check if the requirements under Art. partake of the nature of withdrawal of union membership executed after the Unions filing of a petition for certification election on March 21. Essentially. in gist. or fraud in connection with the application for registration and the supporting documents. Suffice it to say that. is it not but logical to assume that such withdrawal cannot work to nullify the registration of the union? Upon this light.

we can accord concurrence to the following apt observation of the BLR: [F]or fraud and misrepresentation [to be grounds for] cancellation of union registration under Article 239 [of the Labor Code]. the members of FPSILU ratified the CBA in a document entitled RATIPIKASYON NG KASUNDUAN. 165407. Costs against petitioner. 2009 Facts: First Philippine Scales. 1991.S.Any applicant labor organization x x x shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based on the following requirements: xxxx (c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate. the procedure for acquiring or losing union membership and the determination of who are qualified or disqualified to be members are matters internal to the union and flow from its right to selforganization. A certification election is exclusively the concern of employees and the employer lacks the legal personality to challenge it. Accordingly. The cancellation of a unions registration doubtless has an impairing dimension on the right of labor to selforganization. In its Comment.the delay has gone far enough and can no longer be allowed to continue. Bergante and Inguillo. effected without malice. 1991 until September 12. unless it has in the meantime lost its legitimacy for causes set forth in the Labor Code. FPSI and First Philippine Scales Industries Labor Union (FPSILU) entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement. In fact. even without the 82.. WHEREFORE. the Union points out that for almost seven (7) years following the filing of its petition. the petition is DENIED. In 1991. RO300-00-02-UR-0003. to our mind. a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing of weighing scales.. 234. provide a valid reason to cancel Certificate of Registration No. would still meet what Art. 1996. 23 . ET AL. GR NO. Ventures Labor Union shall remain in the roster of legitimate labor organizations. the relevancy of the 82 individuals active participation in the Unions organizational meeting and the signing ceremonies thereafter comes in only for purposes of determining whether or not the Union. jurisprudence frowns on the employers interference in a certification election for such interference unduly creates the impression that it intends to establish a company union. FIRST PHIL SCALES INC. INGUILLO ET AL. On September 19. To our mind. (FPSI). VS. The CA is right when it said that Ventures should not interfere in the certification election by actively and persistently opposing the certification election of the Union. The Decision and Resolution dated respectively of the CA are AFFIRMED. the double entries are no more than normal human error. signed the said document. 234(c) of the Labor Code requires to be submitted. the nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members. S. the duration of which was for a period of 5 years starting September 12. Inc. employed Bergante and Inguillo as assemblers. If this be the case. JUNE 5. As the Union tenably explained without rebuttal from Ventures. Even the labor arbiter who found for Ventures sided with the Union in its explanation on the absence of malice. Requirements of Registration.observed by the CA. who were members of FPSILU. to wit: Art. The bare fact that three signatures twice appeared on the list of those who participated in the organizational meeting would not. no certification election has yet been conducted among the rank-and-file employees.

(4) causing damage to FPSI by deliberately slowing down production.During the lifetime of the CBA. Such a stipulation is not only necessary to maintain loyalty and preserve the integrity of the union. and Vicente Go. upon the recommendation of the union. Having ratified their CBA and being then members of FPSILU. Bergante. care of the President. The collective bargaining agreement in this case contains a union security clause-a closed-shop agreement. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the remaining complaints of Bergante and Inguillo and held that they were not illegally dismissed. Yolanda Tapang." The following day. Go. respectively. the complainants owe fealty and are required under the Union Security clause to maintain their membership in good standing with it during the term thereof. CA’s decision: The employer FPSI did nothing but to put in force their agreement when it separated the disaffiliating union members. formerly FPSILU's President and Secretary for Finance. instead of in the name of FPSILU. Inguillo and several FPSI employees joined another union. the Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa (NLM). and (2) Inguillo (Inguillo complaint). Inguillo. on the following grounds: (1) disloyalty to the Union by separating from it and affiliating with a rival Union. two (2) separate complaints for illegal dismissal. Grutas. seeking the termination of the services of the following employees. Indeed. Some of the complainants agreed to amicably settle their cases. the NLM-KATIPUNAN. (Grutas) and Inguillo. a Writ of Execution was issued to collect the adjudged amount from NLMKATIPUNAN. it is at the same time postulated that such rights shall not injure the right of the labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein. The executive board and members of the FPSILU addressed a document denominated as "Petisyon"to FPSI's general manager. for brevity). Inguillo filed with the NLRC a complaint against FPSI and/or Policarpio (respondents) for illegal withholding of salary and damages. after which their complaints were submitted for resolution. like the one at bar.00 pertaining to the union dues erroneously collected from the employees. x x x the dismissal of the complainants pursuant to the demand of the majority union in accordance with their union security [clause] agreement following the loss of seniority rights is valid and privileged and does not constitute unfair labor practice or illegal dismissal. NLM-KATIPUNAN filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) an intra-union dispute against FPSILU and FPSI. Yolanda Tapang. Subsequently. In said case. (3) depositing Union funds in the names of Grutas and former Vice-President Yolanda Tapang. which was affiliated with a federation called KATIPUNAN (NLMKATIPUNAN. were directed to submit their respective position papers. 1996. It also ordered the officers and members of NLM-KATIPUNAN to return to FPSILU the amount of P90. Gerry Trinidad. reinstatement and damages were filed against respondents by: (1) NLM-KATIPUNAN. but is allowed by the Magna Carta of Labor when it provided that while it is recognized that an employee shall have the right of self-organization. Both complaints were consolidated with Inguillo's prior complaint for illegal withholding of salary. Trinidad. the Med-Arbiter decided in favor of FPSILU. the remaining complainants. Amparo Policarpio (Policarpio). as no amount was recovered. preventing the Union to even attempt to ask for an increase in benefits from the former. He explained that the two clearly violated the Union Security Clause of the CBA when they joined NLM-KATIPUNAN and committed acts detrimental to the interests of FPSILU and respondents. Shirley Tapang and Lucero (Grutas complaint.000. Gilbert Lucero. Upon finality of the Med-Arbiter's Decision. as a specie of closed-shop arrangement and trenchantly upheld the validity of the action of the employer in enforcing its terms as a lawful exercise of its rights and obligations under the contract. 24 . the latter also affirmed the decision of NLRC. herein complainants. However. Bergante and Inguillo. Bergante. Affirmed by NLRC and when elevated the case to CA. respondents terminated the services of the employees mentioned in the "Petisyon. Shirley Tapang. which was not present in this case. notices of garnishment were issued to United Coconut Planters Bank and to FPSI for the latter to hold for FPSILU the earnings of Domingo Grutas. (2) dereliction of duty by failing to call periodic membership meetings and to give financial reports. namely: Grutas. On May 16. Jr. and (5) poisoning the minds of the rest of the members of the Union so that they would be enticed to join the rival union. the Supreme Court has for so long a time already recognized a union security clause in the CBA. which was pending before Labor Arbiter Manuel Manansala. a requirement which ceases to be binding only during the 60-day freedom period immediately preceding the expiration of the CBA. for brevity). Bergante.

It is a very effective form of union security agreement. It can also be inferred that they disaffiliated from FPSILU when the CBA was still in force and subsisting. c) Organization of or joining another labor union or any labor group that would work against the UNION. which is applied to and comprehends "closed shop. 97 Phil. 184). A closed-shop. who are union members as of the effective date of the agreement. (2) authorized causes under Article 283. "Union security" is a generic term. and. as well as other acts 25 . There is union shop when all new regular employees are required to join the union within a certain period as a condition for their continued employment. the enforcement justified petitioner’s dismissal. Ruling: Yes. namely: (1) just causes under Article 282. no person may be employed in any or certain agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or she is.Hence. (3) termination due to disease under Article 284. This Court has held that a closed-shop is a valid form of union security. or who thereafter become members." "union shop. Essentially. as can be gleaned from the documents relative to the intraunion dispute between FPSILU and NLM-KATIPUNAN.A closed-shop agreement is an agreement whereby an employer binds himself to hire only members of the contracting union who must continue to remain members in good standing to keep their jobs.. Article II of the CBA pertains to Union Security and Representatives. XXX XXX The aforesaid provision requires all members to maintain their membership with FPSILU during the lifetime of the CBA. In view of their disaffiliation. it welds group solidarity. Any employee/union member who fails to retain union membership in good standing may be recommended for suspension or dismissal by the Union Directorate and/or FPSILU Executive Council for any of the following causes: a) Acts of Disloyalty. and such a provision in a collective bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution. It is "the most prized achievement of unionism. may be defined as an enterprise in which. By holding out to loyal members a promise of employment in the closed-shop. and (4) termination by the employee or resignation under Article 285. this petition." "maintenance of membership" or any other form of agreement. Aguinaldo's Echague Inc. by agreement between the employer and his employees or their representatives. b) Voluntary Resignation or Abandonment from the UNION. In their Petition. Issue: Whether or not the enforcement of the aforesaid Union Security Clause justified herein petitioners' dismissal from the service. the dismissal from employment based on the same is recognized and accepted in our jurisdiction. becomes. Bergante and Inguillo assail the legality of their termination based on the Union Security Clause in the CBA between FPSI and FPSILU. on the other hand. Records show that Bergante and Inguillo were former members of FPSILU based on their signatures in the document which ratified the CBA." It adds membership and compulsory dues. There is maintenance of membership shop when employees. While the said provisions did not mention as ground the enforcement of the Union Security Clause in the CBA. the Labor Code of the Philippines has several provisions under which an employee may be validly terminated. must maintain union membership as a condition for continued employment until they are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit or the agreement is terminated. which imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting employment. for the duration of the agreement. (National Labor Union v. remains a member in good standing of a union entirely comprised of or of which the employees in interest are a part. which provides: The Company hereby agrees to a UNION SECURITY [CLAUSE] with the following terms: XXXXXX 5.

Bergante and Inguillo were undisputably former members of FPSILU. We hold that all the requisites have been sufficiently met and FPSI was justified in enforcing the Union Security Clause. In the case at bar. Their then affiliation with FPSILU was also clearly shown by their signatures in the document which ratified the CBA. for the following reasons: First. Without a doubt. depositing union funds in the names of Grutas and former Vice-President Yolanda Tapang. the stipulations in the CBA authorizing the dismissal of employees are of equal import as the statutory provisions on dismissal under the Labor Code. notice and hearing prior to dismissal. preventing the Union from even attempting to ask for an increase in benefits from the former. the Court expounded on the effectiveness of union security clause when it held that it is one intended to strengthen the contracting union and to protect it from the fickleness or perfidy of its own members. and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the union's decision to expel the employee from the union or company. (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA. and poisoning the minds of the rest of the members of the Union so that they would be enticed to join the rival union. It is this clause that provides labor with substantial power in collective bargaining.e.. provided such enforcement is not characterized by arbitrariness. FPSI was justified in applying the Union Security Clause. They abandoned FPSILU and even joined another union which works against the former's interests. In Caltex Refinery Employees Association (CREA) v. instead of in the name of FPSILU care of the President. petitioners were among the 93 employees who affixed their signatures to the document that ratified the CBA. Brillantes. as it was a valid provision in the CBA. in terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the Union Security Clause. the employer needs only to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is applicable. They cannot now turn their back and deny knowledge of such provision. The Court is now tasked to determine whether the enforcement of the aforesaid Union Security Clause justified herein petitioners' dismissal from the service. In Del Monte Philippines. To safeguard the rights of the employees. In like manner. the existence and validity of which was not questioned by either party.by failing to call periodic membership meetings and to give financial reports. We emphasized that the enforcement of union security clauses is authorized by law. Inguillo was the Secretary of Finance. In this security clause lies the strength of the union during the enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement. FPSILU acted on its prerogative to recommend to FPSI the dismissal of the members who failed to maintain their membership with the Union. dereliction of duty . the underlying reason why his salary was garnished to satisfy the judgment of the Med-Arbiter who ordered NLM-KATIPUNAN to return the Union dues it erroneously collected from the employees. a "Petisyon" was submitted to Policarpio. Once affiliated with NLM-KATIPUNAN. the union becomes gradually weakened and increasingly vulnerable to company machinations. that is. There are two (2) aspects which characterize the concept of due process under the Labor Code: one is substantive––whether the termination of employment was based on the provisions of the Labor Code or in 26 . and always with due process. We have said time and again that dismissals pursuant to union security clauses are valid and legal. This is evident from the intra-union dispute filed by NLM-KATIPUNAN against FPSILU. Moreover. In fact. Bergante and Inguillo proceeded to recruit other employees to disaffiliate from FPSILU and even collected Union dues from them. FPSILU's decision to ask for the termination of the employees in the "Petisyon" was justified and supported by the evidence on record. FPSILU cited other grounds committed by petitioners and the other employees which tend to prejudice FPSI’s interests. they committed acts of disloyalty to the Union when they failed not only to maintain their membership but also disaffiliated from it. Second. causing damage to FPSI by deliberately slowing down production. For without such safeguards. Aside from joining another rival union. and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy to give protection to labor.allegedly detrimental to the interest of both FPSILU and FPSI. group solidarity becomes uncertain. i. Third. asking for the termination of the services of employees who failed to maintain their Union membership. subject only to the requirement of due process. since a CBA is the law between the company and the Union.

It was issued Certificate of Creation of a Local Chapter. Med-Arbiter Bactin ordered the dismissal of the petition due to inappropriateness of the bargaining unit. [CLUP-SLECCWA] claimed that no certification election has been held among them within the last 12 months prior to the filing of the petition. Lucia East Commercial Corporation and its Affiliates.000. In the meantime. where the dismissal is for a cause recognized by the prevailing jurisprudence. The records are bereft of any notice that would have given a semblance of substantial compliance on the part of herein respondents. for violating Bergante and Inguillo's statutory rights.On 20 November 2001. VS. Robsan East Trading. limiting its membership to the rank-and-file employees of Sta. or ineffectual. In the present case. AUGUST 14. IV on 22 June 2001 covering the same employees. [CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union] reorganized itself and re-registered as CLUP-Sta. Corollarily. on the other hand. It alleged that [SLECC] employs about 115 employees and that more than 20% of employees belonging to the rank-and-file category are its members. 2009 Facts: On 27 February 2001. on 10 October 2001. the other is procedural . in behalf of its chartered local. this Office granted the motion and affirmed the dismissal of the petition. Lucia East Commercial Corporation and its Affiliates Workers Union appealed the order of dismissal to this Office on 14 September 2001. GR NO. is complied with as long as there was an opportunity to be heard. it has not been recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent of [SLECCs] employees. Lucia East Commercial Corporation. Accordingly. As in the case of Agabon v. The requirement of a hearing. respondents however did not comply with the requisite procedural due process. namely [SMSLEC].It averred that it has voluntarily recognized [SMSLEC] on 20 July 2001 as the exclusive bargaining agent of its regular rank-and-file employees. On 22 November 2001. Confederated Labor Union of the Philippines (CLUP). the required two notices that must be given to herein petitioners Bergante and Inguillo were lacking.accordance with the prevailing jurisprudence. STA LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL CORP. the absence of the statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal or render it illegal. The first notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought. SLECC filed a motion to dismiss the petition. CLUP-Sta. The Court has always underscored the significance of the two-notice rule in dismissing an employee and has ruled in a number of cases that non-compliance therewith is tantamount to deprivation of the employee’s right to due process. SLE Cinema. and that collective bargaining negotiations already commenced between them. National Labor Relations Commission. Home Gallery and Essentials. and not necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted.. 27 . respondents should indemnify them the amount of P30. On 21 August 2001.the manner in which the dismissal was effected. while the second notice informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. instituted a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of Sta. [CLUP-SLECCWA] filed the instant petition. In fine. The affiliate companies included in the petition were SLE Commercial.. Planet Toys. On the same date.00 each as nominal damages. We hold that while Bergante and Inguillo's dismissals were valid pursuant to the enforcement of Union Security Clause. Lucia East Commercial Corporation Workers Association (herein appellant CLUPSLECCWA). SOLE ET AL. The employer must furnish the employee two written notices before termination may be effected. and while there is another union registered with DOLE-Regional Office No. CLUP-Sta. Bowling Center. SLE Department Store. On 31 January 2002. procedural due process in the dismissal of employees requires notice and hearing. 162355. Lucia East Commercial Corporation and its Affiliates Workers Union [CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union]moved for the withdrawal of the appeal.

On 29 November 2001. the concept of a bargaining unit. The fundamental factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are: (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine). comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees. or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule). Contrary to petitioners assertion. (3) prior collective bargaining history. limiting its members to the rank-and-file of SLECC. We explained the concept of a bargaining unit in San Miguel Corporation v. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union subsequently re-registered as CLUP-SLECCWA. indicated to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law. However.(2) affinity and unity of the employees interest. Ruling: The petition has no merit. Any applicant labor organization shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration. this Court has categorically ruled that the existence of a prior collective bargaining history is neither decisive nor conclusive in the determination of what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit. a CBA between [SMSLEC] and [SLECC] was ratified by its rank-and-file employees and registered with DOLE-Regional Office No. IV on 9 January 2002. and (4) similarity of employment status. Bargaining Unit The concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization are different from. consistent with equity to the employer. Legitimate Labor Organization Article 212(g) of the Labor Code defines a labor organization as any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment. Upon compliance with all the documentary requirements. However. such as substantial similarity of work and duties. the Regional Office or Bureau shall issue in favor of the applicant labor organization a certificate indicating that it is included in the roster of legitimate labor organizations. A Legitimate Labor Organization Representing an Inappropriate Bargaining Unit CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Unions initial problem was that they constituted a legitimate labor organization representing a non-appropriate bargaining unit. We see no reason to overturn the rulings of the Secretary and of the appellate court. employees in two corporations cannot be treated as a single bargaining unit even if the businesses of the two corporations are related.SLECC cannot ignore that CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union was a legitimate labor 28 . where we stated that: A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer. but related to. Issue: Whether or not the appellate court committed a reversible error when it affirmed the Secretary’s finding that SLECCs voluntary recognition of SMSLEC was done while a legitimate labor organization was in existence in the bargaining unit. Laguesma.

which happens when the employer is requested to bargain collectively. Inc. petitioner Mariwasa Siam Ceramics. 183317. decide whether CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union represented an appropriate bargaining unit. On August 26. 2005. The petition is DENIED and AFFIRM the Decision promulgated of the Court of Appeal MARIWASA SIAM CERAMICS INC. ET AL. filed a Petition for Cancellation of Union Registration against respondent. G. The exception to this rule. the employer is a mere bystander and cannot oppose the petition or appeal the Med-Arbiters decision. revoking the registration of respondent.R. Inc. THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SLECC IS TO FILE A PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATIONOF CLUP-SLECC AND ITS AFFILIATES WORKERS UNION AND NOT TO IMMEDIATELY COMMENCE VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION PROCEEDINGS WITH SMSLEC. THUS. and delisting it from the roster of active labor unions. unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation. filed a motion to oppose CLUP-SLECCWAs petition for certification election. 2009 Facts: On May 4. VS. by themselves. SECRETARY OF DOLE. Region IV-A. false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) to (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code.CLUP-SLECC AND ITS AFFILIATES WORKERS UNION FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION ON 27 FEBRUARY 2001 AND THIS PETITION REMAINED PENDING AS OF 20 JULY 2001.. In petitions for certification election. HAVING BEEN VALIDLY ISSUED A CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION. DECEMBER 21. SLECC. respondent Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Mariwasa Siam Ceramics. THE SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS AND RESULTING REGISTRATION OF A CBA EXECUTED BY SLECC AND SMSLEC ARE VOID AND CANNOT BAR CLUP-SLECCWAS PRESENT PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION. SLECCs Voluntary Recognition of SMSLEC The employer may voluntarily recognize the representation status of a union in unorganized establishments. 29 . SLECC WAS NOT AN UNORGANIZED ESTABLISHMENT WHEN IT VOLUNTARILY RECOGNIZED SMSLEC AS ITS EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVE ON 20 JULY 2001. CLUP-SLECC AND ITS AFFILIATES WORKERS UNION. is not present in the case before us. SLECCS VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION OF SMSLEC ON 20 JULY 2001. the Regional Director of DOLE IV-A issued an Order granting the petition.organization at the time of SLECCs voluntary recognition of SMSLEC. On June 14. SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS HAVING ACQUIRED JURIDICAL PERSONALITY WHICH MAY NOT BE ATTACKED COLLATERALLY. SLECC and SMSLEC cannot. The inclusion in the union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation of registration. 2005. NO. 2005. EMPLOYERS PARTICIPATION IN A PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION We find it strange that the employer itself. (SMMSCIndependent) was issued a Certificate of Registration as a legitimate labor organization by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). claiming that the latter violated Article 234 of the Labor Code for not complying with the 20% requirement. and that it committed massive fraud and misrepresentation in violation of Article 239 of the same code.THUS.

2007. In a Decision dated June 14. It is. this petition based on the following grounds— Issues: 1. hence. but the CA denied the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the BLR denied it in a Resolution dated February 2. We reserve the Order of the respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations. Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred when it ruled that private respondent union did not commit misrepresentation. hence the subscription requirement has not been met. In other words. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was likewise denied. imperative that we peruse the affidavits appearing to have been executed by thes affiants. whereas withdrawals made after the filing of the petition are deemed involuntary. coercion or for valuable consideration. it becomes apparent that such employees had not given consent to the filing of the petition. however. but more importantly. much less the circumstances that constituted such force and deceit. the names of employees supporting the petition are supposed to be held secret to the opposite party. the BLR granted respondent’s appeal. that the affidavit does not mention the identity of the people who allegedly forced and deceived the affiant into joining the union. It is worthy to note. and the pro forma affidavits were ready to be filled out with the employees’ names and signatures. the affidavits were written and prepared in advance. Logically. The petitioner insists that respondent failed to comply with the 20% union membership requirement for its registration as a legitimate labor organization because of the disaffiliation from the total number of union members of 102 employees who executed affidavits recanting their union membership. Whether or not private respondent union complied with the 20% membership requirement 2.Aggrieved. not only was this allegation couched in very general terms and sweeping in nature. It would be otherwise if the withdrawal was made after the filing of the petition for it would then be presumed that the withdrawal was not free and voluntary. viz. respondent appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR). 2006. Evidently. it appearing undisputably that the 31 union members had withdrawn their support to the petition before the filing of said petition.— On the second issue—whether or not the withdrawal of 31 union members from NATU affected the petition for certification election insofar as the 30% requirement is concerned. the distinction must be that withdrawals made before the filing of the petition are presumed voluntary unless there is convincing proof to the contrary. Moreover. any such withdrawal or retraction shows voluntariness in the absence of proof to the contrary. it was not supported by any evidence whatsoever. Ruling: The petition should be denied. In appreciating affidavits of recantation such as these. Petitioner sought recourse with the Court of Appeals (CA) through a Petition for Certiorari. Indeed. The reason for such distinction is that if the withdrawal or retraction is made before the filing of the petition. our ruling in La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory v. The presumption would arise that the withdrawal was procured through duress. thus. fraud or false statement. Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations11 is enlightening. 30 .

For the purpose of de-certifying a union such as respondent. the minutes of the election of officers.. 2005. Further.When the withdrawal or retraction is made after the petition is filed. For fraud and misrepresentation to be grounds for cancellation of union registration under the Labor Code. Even if the total number of rankand-file employees of petitioner is 528. 2005. The cancellation of a union’s registration doubtless has an impairing dimension on the right of labor to selforganization. in connection with the election of officers. In this case. the nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members. we agree with the BLR and the CA that respondent could not have possibly committed misrepresentation. the minutes of ratification. In the instant case.W. is that the employees were not totally free from the employer’s pressure. Therefore. the list of voters. provide a valid reason to cancel respondent’s certificate of registration. the affidavits of recantation were executed after the identities of the union members became public. Nevertheless. They possess no probative value. to our mind. 2005. we cannot give full credence to these affidavits. The bare fact that two signatures appeared twice on the list of those who participated in the organizational meeting would not. but they were all sworn before a notary public on June 8. especially as it was able to comply with the 20% minimum membership requirement. It does not mandate that a union must maintain the 20% minimum membership requirement all throughout its existence. and which contain allegations unsupported by evidence. the employees who are supporting the petition become known to the opposite party since their names are attached to the petition at the time of filing. Amutan resigned from petitioner only on May 10. It is likewise notable that the first batch of 25 pro forma affidavits shows that the affidavits were executed by the individual affiants on different dates from May 26. still very much above the minimum required by law. 169 employees would be equivalent to 32% of the total rank-and-file workers complement. or false statements. the fact remains that at the time of the union’s application for registration.e. it would not be unexpected that the opposite party would use foul means for the subject employees to withdraw their support. following jurisprudence. only two names should be deleted from the list since Diana Motilla and T. or. and so the voluntariness of the employees’ execution of the affidavits becomes suspect. The purported withdrawal of support for the registration of the union was made after the documents were submitted to the DOLE. even assuming the veracity of the affidavits of recantation. it must be shown that there was misrepresentation. respectively. The logical conclusion. Article 234 of the Labor Code merely requires a 20% minimum membership during the application for union registration. after the union filed a petition for certification election on May 23. since the names of the members were attached to the petition. while respondent declared that it should only be 455. false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto. 2005. Region IV-A. i. 2005 until June 3. therefore. The alleged failure of respondent to indicate with mathematical precision the total number of employees in the bargaining unit is of no moment. Since the total number of rank-andfile employees at that time was 528. Two names were repeated in respondent’s list and had to be deducted. the affiants were members of respondent and they comprised more than the required 20% membership for purposes of registration as a labor union. Thus. it still cannot be denied that the latter would have more than complied with the registration requirement. 31 . out of the four names alleged to be no longer connected with petitioner. fraud. which were executed under suspicious circumstances. Respondent asserts that it had a total of 173 union members at the time it applied for registration. Accordingly. or after respondent’s registration had already been granted. 2005 and May 17. While it is true that the withdrawal of support may be considered as a resignation from the union. the legitimacy of respondent as a labor organization must be affirmed. At best. but the total would still be 171 union members. or failure to submit these documents together with the list of the newly elected-appointed officers and their postal addresses to the BLR. the total union membership at the time of registration was 169. these affidavits are selfserving.

et al. Gabiana gave Casio. 1992. for unfair labor practice. The Company. Casio.. CASIO ET AL. Paulino Cabreros. Edilberto Mendoza and Antonio Panilag (Pino. on February 29.. were illegally dismissed without any valid? Ruling: In this case.” Pressured by the threatened filing of a suit for unfair labor practice. et al. et al. MAINTENANCE OF MEMBERSHIP – All employees/workers employed by the Company with the exception of those who are specifically excluded by law and by the terms of this Agreement must be members in good standing of the Union within thirty (30) days upon the signing of this agreement and shall maintain such membership in good standing thereof as a condition of their employment or continued employment. informing the company of the expulsion of Casio. GMC issued a Memorandum dated March 24. Jumaoas. was made by 32 . Ma. and moral and exemplary damages. et al. Bartolome Auman. namely.The petition is DENIED. the Voluntary Arbitrator was convinced that Casio. IBMLocal 31. et al. 149552. particularly. 1992 terminating the employment of Casio. Costs against petitioner. et al.75 to P201. while his co-respondents were union shop stewards. 1992 and placing the latter under preventive suspension for the meantime. the termination of legitimate union officers. MARCH 10. respondents Virgilio Pino. In a letter dated February 24.” Through the same letter. 1992 a Complaint against GMC and Pino. were regular employees of GMC with daily earnings ranging from P173. “be immediately dismissed from their work for the interest of industrial peace in the plant. charging Casio. issued a Resolution expelling Casio. shall terminate the services of any employee/worker who fails to fulfill the conditions set forth in Sections 3 and 4 thereof. upon written request of the Union. Pino. because even though the dismissal of Casio. Issue: Whether Casio. with copies of the Affidavits of GMC employees Basilio Inoc and Juan Potot. The Union shall absolve the Company from any and all liabilities. through its officers and board members. pecuniary or otherwise. and length of service varying from eight to 25 years.50. Gabiana then wrote a letter dated March 10. The effectivity of the said CBA was retroactive to August 1. 1992. et al. 1991. et al. next sought recourse from the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Branch VII by filing on August 3. Fidel Valle.Casio was elected IBM-Local 31 President for a three-year term in June 1991. GMC acceded to Gabiana’s request to terminate the employment of Casio. three days from receipt thereof within which to file their answers or counteraffidavits. the IBM Regional Director for Visayas and Mindanao. et al. et al. GENERAL MILLING CORP VS. Dominador Booc. et al. 1992. Remegio Cabantan. subject however. while the Court of Appeals believed the opposite. GR NO. Loreto Gonzaga. Casio. However. with “acts inimical to the interest of the union.). GMC Vice-President for Engineering and Plant Administration. from the union pursuant to the Resolution dated February 29. On November 30. illegal dismissal. et al. to the provisions of the Labor Laws of the Philippines and their Implementing Rules and Regulations. et al. entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with GMC. Rodolfo Gabiana (Gabiana). and responsibilities to any employee or worker who is dismissed or terminated in pursuant thereof. Casio. from the union. addressed to Eduardo Cabahug (Cabahug). Section 6. 1991. The CBA contained the following union security provisions: Section 3. effective April 24. 1992 of IBM-Local 31 officers and board members. et al. Gabiana likewise requested that Casio. et al. Luna P. et al. were legally dismissed. refused to acknowledge receipt of Gabiana’s letter. Subsequently. 2010 Facts: The labor union Ilaw at Buklod ng Mangagawa (IBM)-Local 31 Chapter (Local 31) was the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of GMC in Lapu-Lapu City. furnished Casio. as officers and members of the IBM-Local 31. et al. illegal suspension. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

who are union members as of the effective date of the agreement.GMC pursuant to a valid closed shop provision in the CBA. becomes. except those employees who are already members of another union at the time of the signing of the collective bargaining agreement. There is union shop when all new regular employees are required to join the union within a certain period as a condition for their continued employment. the other is procedural – the manner in which the dismissal was effected.” or any other form of agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting employment. was indeed illegal. Inc. Another cause for termination is dismissal from employment due to the enforcement of the union security clause in the CBA. These requisites constitute just cause for terminating an employee based on the union security provision of the CBA. on the other hand. remains a member in good standing of a union entirely comprised of or of which the employees in interest are a part. and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union to expel the employee from the union. Moreover. The Court is therefore constrained to take a second look at the evidence on record considering that the factual findings of the Voluntary Arbitrator and the Court of Appeals are contradictory. having been done without just cause and the observance of procedural due process. the Court laid down the grounds for which an employee may be validly terminated. x x x. 248. the employer needs only to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is applicable. a stipulation in the CBA authorizing the dismissal of employees are of equal import as the statutory provisions on dismissal under the Labor Code. Union security clauses are recognized and explicitly allowed under Article 248(e) of the Labor Code. no person may be employed in any or certain agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or she is. must maintain union membership as a condition for continued employment until they are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit or the agreement is terminated. A closed shop. 285. and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. It is State policy to promote unionism to enable workers to negotiate with management on an even playing field and with more persuasiveness than if they were to individually and separately bargain with the employer. for the duration of the agreement. 282. National Labor Relations Commission. Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall stop the parties from requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment. Unfair Labor Practices of Employers.” “maintenance of membership. the company still failed to observe the elementary rules of due process. which provides that: Art. the law has allowed stipulations for “union shop” and “closed shop” as means of encouraging workers to join and support the union of their choice in the protection of their rights and interest vis-à-vis the employer. There is maintenance of membership shop when employees. There are two aspects which characterize the concept of due process under the Labor Code: one is substantive – whether the termination of employment was based on the provision of the Labor Code or in accordance with the prevailing jurisprudence. v. since “a CBA is the law between the company and the union and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy to give protection to labor. et al. the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals. (3) termination due to disease under Art. thus: Under the Labor Code. which is applied to and comprehends “closed shop.” In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union security clause.284. The dismissal of Casio. “Union security” is a generic term. an employee may be validly terminated on the following grounds: (1) just causes under Art. or who thereafter become members. In Alabang Country Club. x x x xxxx (e) To discriminate in regard to wages. After a thorough review of the records. and (4) termination by the employee or resignation under Art. 33 . (2) authorized causes under Art. may be defined as an enterprise in which. by agreement between the employer and his employees or their representatives. (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA. and.283. hours of work.” “union shop. For this reason.

The law requires the employer to furnish the employee sought to be dismissed with two written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (1) a written notice apprising the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought in order to afford him an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of counsel. it is the finding of the company that IBM-Local 31 did give Casio. et al. et al. in the letters dated March 10 and 19. and (2) a subsequent notice informing the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. offices. from the union.There is no question that in the present case. was supposed to file their answer or counter-affidavits. This procedure is mandatory and its absence taints the dismissal with illegality. GMC. The Court has stressed time and again that allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence because mere allegation is definitely not evidence. et al. to terminate the employment of Casio. the opportunity to answer the charges against them. et al. et al. This argument is without basis. if he desires. or that Casio had the authority to receive the same letter-notice on behalf of the other employees similarly accused. did not receive any other communication from GMC. et al. can ask GMC to terminate the employment of the employee/worker who failed to maintain its good standing as a union member. et al. in expelling Casio. started to run and had expired. et al. – which appears to be lacking in this case. et al. et al. the IBM Regional Director for Visayas and Mindanao. Casio. et al. All that was stated in the IBM-Local 31 Resolution dated February 29. because the presumption applies only to public officers from the highest to the lowest in the service of the Government. 1992. twice requested GMC. that Casio willfully refused to accept the said letter-notice. due process. It’s worthy to note that Casio. et al. It is the third requisite – that there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of IBM-Local 31 to expel Casio. by IBP-Local 31. were expelled only five days after the issuance of the letter-complaint against them. GMC cannot dispense with the requirements of notice and hearing before dismissing Casio. The Court is likewise unconvinced that the said three-day period was sufficient for Casio. were accorded due process by IBM-Local 31. the acts of Pino. 1992. It is similarly undisputed that IBM-Local 31. The records of this case are absolutely bereft of any supporting evidence to substantiate the bare allegation of GMC that Casio. Contrary to the position of GMC. bureaus. by written request. 1992. It straight away acceded to the demand of IBP-Local 31 to dismiss Casio. et al. of the charges against them or that they were given the chance to explain their side. The failure of GMC to make a determination of the sufficiency of evidence supporting the decision of IBMLocal 31 to expel Casio. Casio. et al. is a direct consequence of the non-observance by GMC of procedural due process in the dismissal of employees. from the union. The Court cannot find proof on record when the three-day period. by its own admission. GMC contends that as an employer. with acts inimical to the interest of the union was properly served upon Casio. the CBA between GMC and IBM-Local 31 included a maintenance of membership and closed shop clause as can be gleaned from Sections 3 and 6 of Article II. within which Casio. In the case at bar. As a defense. 1992] was dropped or left in front of E.” It was not established that said letter-complaint charging Casio. There is nothing on record that would indicate that IBM-Local 31 actually notified Casio. its only duty was to ascertain that IBM-Local 31 accorded Casio. was that “a copy of the said letter complaint [dated February 24. to prepare their defenses and evidence to refute the serious charges against them. et al. Irrefragably. departments. et al. expelling Casio. but they refused to avail themselves of such opportunity. et al. through Gabiana. IBM-Local 31. An employee is entitled to be protected not only from a company which disregards his rights but also from his own union the leadership of which could yield to the temptation of swift and arbitrary expulsion from membership and hence dismissal from his job. The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of procedural due process. 34 . and. do not enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. as a necessary consequence of their expulsion from the union. et al. The rights of an employee to be informed of the charges against him and to reasonable opportunity to present his side in a controversy with either the company or his own union are not wiped away by a union security clause or a union shop clause in a collective bargaining agreement. except the written notice of termination dated March 24. as officers and board members of IBM-Local 31. did not conduct a separate and independent investigation to determine the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the expulsion of Casio. even when said dismissal is pursuant to the closed shop provision in the CBA. and/or its political subdivisions.

. THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA VS. The Regional Director has ample discretion in dealing with a petition for cancellation of a union's registration. If reinstatement is not viable. prior to the termination of their employment An employee who is illegally dismissed is entitled to the twin reliefs of full backwages and reinstatement. Consequently. 6715. The pre-election conference resumed on January 29. Petitioner moved to archive or to dismiss the petition due to alleged repeated non-appearance of respondent. The latter agreed to suspend proceedings until further notice.. 1995. but also to accord the expelled union members procedural due process. as declared by GMC..e. i. In awarding separation pay to an illegally dismissed employee. After all.In sum. Petitioner prayed that respondent's Certificate of Creation of Local/Chapter be cancelled and its name be deleted from the list of legitimate labor organizations. 1996 and ordered the holding of a certification election. it was held a year later. On appeal. though belatedly. 2000. et al. WHEREFORE. Under Republic Act No. computed from the time their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement but if reinstatement is no longer possible. petitioner filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration of respondent. 1998. The pre-election conference was not held as initially scheduled. are entitled to backwages and separation pay considering that reinstatement is no longer possible because the positions they previously occupied are no longer existing. or on February 20. 2011 Facts: On October 11. The respondent's registration as a legitimate labor union should not be cancelled. the amount to be awarded shall be equivalent to one month salary for every year of service. the backwages shall be computed from the time of their illegal termination up to the finality of the decision. but it was denied on September 23. having been compelled to litigate in order to seek redress for their illegal dismissal. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. et al. separation pay is awarded to the employee. 1996. particularly. With the submission of the required documents by respondent. petitioner discovered that respondent had failed to submit to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) its annual financial report for several years and the list of its members since it filed its registration papers in 1995. et al. JANUARY 12. Issue: Whether or not the non-submission of financial reports warrant the cancellation of the respondent’s registration Ruling: No. The Med-Arbiter granted the petition on February 14. on the ground of the non-submission of the said documents. the law requires the labor organization to submit the annual financial report and list of members in order to verify if it is still viable and financially sustainable as an organization so as to protect the employer and employees from fraudulent or fly-by-night unions. Casio. It is sufficient to give the Regional Director license to treat the late filing of required documents as sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law. It further requested the suspension of the certification election proceedings. 1996. 2000. notice and hearing. 1997. the Court finds that GMC illegally dismissed Casio.. because not only did GMC fail to make a determination of the sufficiency of evidence to support the decision of IBM-Local 31 to expel Casio. et al. employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled to full backwages. Subsequently. in a Resolution dated August 15. are entitled to the award of attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award. GR NO. 178296. affirmed the Med-Arbiter's order and remanded the case to the Med-Arbiter for the holding of a pre-election conference on February 26. on May 19. Thus. NATL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTEL ETC. in lieu of reinstatement. inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. respondent filed with the Department of Labor and Employment-National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) a petition for certification election. determining whether the union still meets the requirements prescribed by law. 35 . Casio. the instant petition is hereby DENIED. the DOLE Secretary. the purpose of the law has been achieved.

The more substantive considerations involve the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association and right of workers to self-organization. and peaceful concerted activities. However. 9481. the cancellation of a certificate of registration is the equivalent of snuffing out the life of a labor organization. An overly stringent interpretation of the statute governing cancellation of union registration without regard to surrounding circumstances cannot be allowed. ILO Convention No.e. It is undisputed that appellee failed to submit its annual financial reports and list of individual members in accordance with Article 239 of the Labor Code. the rights of all workers to self-organization. lest they be accused of interfering with union activities. deemed it preferable if such actions were to be taken only as a last resort and after exhausting other possibilities with less serious effects on the organization. Worse. 36 . merely because of the negligence of the union officers who were responsible for the submission of the documents to the BLR. expulsion from membership. 87. which is true in our jurisdiction. the existence of this ground should not necessarily lead to the cancellation of union registration. in fact.) No. i. is tantamount to dissolution of the organization by administrative authority when such measure would give rise to the loss of legal personality of the union or loss of advantages necessary for it to carry out its activities. Also involved is the public policy to promote free trade unionism and collective bargaining as instruments of industrial peace and democracy. act with circumspection in treating petitions for cancellation of union registration. it loses . Labor authorities should.. In resolving the petition. which we have ratified in 1953. Otherwise. Article 239 recognizes the regulatory authority of the State to exact compliance with reporting requirements. The amendment sought to strengthen the workers' right to self-organization and enhance the Philippines' compliance with its international obligations as embodied in the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. particularly the right to participate in or ask for certification election in a bargaining unit. which provides: ART. the right to appeal to a judicial body. provided that judicial safeguards are in place. all the employees belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit should not be deprived of a bargaining agent. Reportorial Requirements. and cancellation of registration for that matter. It has. involve serious consequences for occupational representation. Yet there is more at stake in this case than merely monitoring union activities and requiring periodic documentation thereof. 87. i. therefore. and xxx xxx Failure to comply with the above requirements shall not be a ground for cancellation of union registration but shall subject the erring officers or members to suspension. For without such registration. which in our case is the BLR. 9481 inserted in the Labor Code Article 242-A. No.A. Section 3 of the Constitution. Thus. consideration must be taken of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article XIII.as a rule . it has nonetheless reminded its members that dissolution of a union. The union members and.its rights under the Labor Code. It is worth mentioning that the Labor Code's provisions on cancellation of union registration and on reportorial requirements have been recently amended by Republic Act (R. indeed.A. 242-A. it can render nugatory the protection to labor and social justice clauses that pervades the Constitution and the Labor Code. Although the ILO has allowed such measure to be taken." The ILO has expressed the opinion that the cancellation of union registration by the registrar of labor unions. provides that "workers' and employers' organizations shall not be liable to be dissolved or suspended by administrative authority. collective bargaining and negotiations.e. it would lead to an unconstitutional application of the statute and emasculation of public policy objectives. pertaining to the non-dissolution of workers' organizations by administrative authority. Labor authorities should bear in mind that registration confers upon a union the status of legitimacy and the concomitant right and privileges granted by law to a legitimate labor organization..-The following are documents required to be submitted to the Bureau by the legitimate labor organization concerned: xxx xxx (c) Its annual financial report within thirty (30) days after the close of every fiscal year.We cannot ascribe abuse of discretion to the Regional Director and the DOLE Secretary in denying the petition for cancellation of respondent's registration. Thus. or any appropriate penalty. R.

it was not a legitimate labor organization. from taking appropriate measures to correct its omissions. 23. we note that on 19 May 2000. Since its membership included supervisory employees. It also claimed that its legitimacy as a labor union cannot be attacked collaterally. 2001.KML being a legitimate labor org. For the record. 2001: dismissed KML’s petition for certification election. Legend moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that it is not a legitimate labor organization because its membership is a mixture of rank and file employees and supervisory employees.R. 70 employees who were claimed to be among those who attended its organizational meeting were either at work or elsewhere. Ordered the immediate conduct of the certification election. a petition for certification election. FEB. have already resigned. 2001. With this submission. x x x Such constitutional guarantees should not be lightly taken much less nullified. 2011 Facts: June 6. 2001 when in reality some of them were either at work. we do not view with favor appellee's late submission. the Supreme Court ruled: As aptly ruled by respondent Bureau of Labor Relations Director Noriel: "The rights of workers to selforganization finds general and specific constitutional guarantees. G. the certification election could still proceed because the required number of total rank and file employees necessary is still sustained. In National Union of Bank Employees vs. KML alleged that it is a legitimate labor organization of the rank and file employees of Legend. November 7.Moreover. 169754. appellee has substantially complied with its duty to submit its financial report for the said period. and that the November 7. It was issued its Certification of Registration by DOLE on May 18." At any rate. KML’s legitimacy as a union cannot be attacked collaterally. Office of the Secretary of DOLE May 22. NO. Issues: Whether Legend has timely appealed the March 26. appellee had submitted its financial statement for the years 1996-1999. 2002 decision: reversed Med. CA denied MFR.. 2002 decision and is still pending. San Fernando. 2002 decision (re: cancellation of union registration) 37 . It also alleged that it filed a petition for cancellation of union registration of KML which was granted by the DOLE Regional Office. submission of the required documents is the duty of the officers of the union. after having failed to meet its periodic obligations promptly. 2001. To rule differently would be to preclude the union. 2002 decision upholding the legitimacy had long become final and executor for failure of Legend to appeal. 2001 decision was reversed by the BLR March 26. KML filed with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE. it could properly file a petition for certification election. KML also committed acts of fraud and misrepresentation when it made it appear that certain employees attended its general membership meeting on April 5. The presence of supervisory employees does not ipso facto render the existence of a labor organization illegal.Arbiter’s decision. Med Arbiter judgment September 20. KILUSANG MANGGAGAWA NG LEGENDA. Legend filed MFR stating that it has appealed to the CA the March 26. MFR was denied in a resolution dated August 20. Punctuality on the part of the union and its officers could have prevented this petition. or were abroad. Legend filed a Motion for Reconsideration. VS. Mixed membership is not one of the grounds for dismissal of a petition for certification election. 2002. Pampanga. LEGEND INTERNATIONAL RESORTS LTD. Minister of Labor. KML was also guilty of fraud and misrepresentation. The March 26. 2002: a final order of cancellation is required before a petition for certification of election may be dismissed on the ground of lack of legal personality. CA: held that the issue on the legitimacy of KML as a labor organization has already been settled with finality. KML argued that even if the supervisory employees were excluded from membership. A healthy respect for the freedom of association demands that acts imputable to officers or members be not easily visited with capital punishments against the association itself. It would be unreasonable for this Office to order the cancellation of the union and penalize the entire union membership on the basis of the negligence of its officers.

MARCH 16. it still had the legal personality to perform such act absent an order directing the cancellation. DOLE: Granted petitioner union’s petition for certification election. Med-Arbiter: Dismissed the petition for certification election because petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization. KML’s MRF was denied.Yes.No. 169717. 2002 decision. 2002 decision of the BLR and reinstated the November 7. 2001 decision) Whether the legitimacy of the legal personality of KML can be collaterally attacked in a petition for certification election Held: 1. VS. On June 30. An order to hold a certificationelection is proper despite the pendency of the petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of the respondent union. reversed March 26. 2011 Facts: Petitioner union filed a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of the respondent company witht eh Mediation Arbitration Union of the DOLE-NCR. The appellate court gave credence to the findings of the Med-Arbiter that petitioner union failed to comply with the documentation requirements under the 38 . KML moved for reconsideration but it was denied with finality. 2002 resolution (a final order of cancellation is required before a petition for certification election may be dismissed on the ground of lack of personality. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization because of failure to comply with the documentation requirements set by law. 2002 decision) SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER CHEMICAL SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILS FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (SMCC-SUPER) ET AL. 2002 decision has not yet attained finality considering that it has timely appealed to the CA and which at that time is still pending resolution. It also held that the list of membership of petitioner union consisted of members who performed supervisory functions. 2. 2002 a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the March 26. NO. presence of supervisory employees does not render it illegal) and the August 20. Under Article 245 of the Labor Code. including its filing of the petition for certification election and its demand to collectively bargain. 3. G.NO. The legitimacy of the legal personality of KML cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for certification election proceeding. According to ACA vs Calleja.R. a certification proceeding is not a litigation in the sense that the term is ordinarily understood. said supervisory employees are prohibited from joining petitioner union which seeks to represent the rank-and-file employees of respondent company. Court of Appeals: Nullified the decision of the DOLE. The rationale is that at the time the union filed the petition. The charter certificate and "Listahan ng mga Dumalo sa Pangkalahatang Pulong at mga Sumang-ayon at Nagratipika sa Saligang Batas" were not executed under oath and certified by the union secretary and attested to by the union president as required by Section 235 of the Labor Code. There is no basis for Legend’s assertion that the cancellation of KML’s certificate of registration should retroact to the time of its issuance or that it effectively nullified all of KML’s activities. Such legal personality may not be subject to a collateral attack but only through a separate action instituted particularly for the purpose of assailing it. CA reversed the March 26. SC affirmed the May 22.. KML filed a petition for certiorari before the SC which was denied. The decision to cancel KML’s certificate of registration became final and executory and entry of judgment was made on July 18. and the inclusions of supervisory employees within petitioner union. 2005. Legend timely filed on Sept 6. CHARTER CHEMICAL AND COATING CORP. but an investigation of a non-adversarial and fact-finding character. 2002 decision (KML’s legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. The March 26. 2006.Whether the cancellation of KML’s certificate of registration should retroact to the time of its issuance (it was cancelled in the November 7.. 2001 decision cancelling the certificate of registration of KML.

considering that petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization. series of 1997. No. the Court ruled that it was not necessary for the charter certificate to be certified and attested by the local/chapter officers.[22]which was decided under the auspices of D. the Sama-samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi at Authorization and Listahan ng mga Dumalo sa Pangkalahatang Pulong at mga Sumang-ayon at Nagratipika sa Saligang Batas are not among the documents that need to be submitted to the Regional Office or Bureau of Labor Relations in order to register a labor organization. As readily seen. this fact shall be indicated accordingly. However. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union. provides: Section 1. Series of 1997. 356 (1996). Rule VI of the Implementing Rules of Book V. 9. and the principal office of the local/chapter. The then prevailing Section 1. It. Ruling: The petition is meritorious. we believe that the same doctrine 39 . likewise.O. Mandaue Packing Products Plants-San Miguel Corporation Monthlies Rank-and-File Union-FFW (MPPP-SMPPSMAMRFU-FFW). All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified under oath by the Secretary or the Treasurer of the local/chapter and attested to by its President. (b) The names of the local/chapter's officers. 331 Phil. Whether the alleged failure to certify under oath the local charter certificate issued by its mother federation and list of the union membership attending the organizational meeting [is a ground] for the cancellation of petitioner [union's] legal personality as a labor organization and for the dismissal of the petition for certification election. 2.While this ruling was based on the interpretation of the previous Implementing Rules provisions which were supplanted by the 1997 amendments. as amended by D. Petitioner union concedes and the records confirm that its charter certificate was not executed under oath. Thus. it has no legal right to file a petition for certification election. and (c) The local/chapter's constitution and by-laws provided that where the local/chapter's constitution and by-laws [are] the same as [those] of the federation or national union. Hon. 9. their addresses. Issues: 1.A duly registered federation or national union may directly create a local/chapter by submitting to the Regional Office or to the Bureau two (2) copies of the following: (a) A charter certificate issued by the federation or national union indicating the creation or establishment of the local/chapter. The charter certificate need not be certified under oath by the local union's secretary or treasurer and attested to by its president. the CA held that the issues as to the legitimacy of petitioner union may be attacked collaterally in a petition for certification election and the infirmity in the membership of petitioner union cannot be remedied through the exclusion-inclusion proceedings in a preelection conference pursuant to the ruling inToyota Motor Philippines v.Labor Code. Chartering and creation of a local chapter -. No. upheld the Med-Arbiter's finding that petitioner union consisted of both rank-andfile and supervisory employees. in San Miguel Corporation (Mandaue Packaging Products Plants) v. Id. the above-quoted rule indicates that it should be executed under oath. Laguesma. we ruled In San Miguel Foods-Cebu B-Meg Feed Plant v. As to the charter certificate. Moreover.O. Whether the alleged mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employee[s] of petitioner [union's] membership is [a] ground for the cancellation of petitioner [union's] legal personality and dismissal of [the] petition for certification election.

it may exercise all the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization. petitioner union's charter certificate need not be executed under oath. . (Mandaue Packaging Products Plants) v. 2. The mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees in petitioner union does not nullify its legal personality as a legitimate labor organization. supervisory employees are not eligible for membership in a labor organization of rank-and-file employees. Instead. petitioner union sought to represent the bargaining unit consisting of rank-and-file employees. there is a prohibition against the mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in one labor organization. may file the petition. 2(c) of the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules . No. In accordance with this ruling. it does not make sense to have the local/chapter's officers x x xcertify or attest to a document which they had no hand in the preparation of. Specifically. Considering that the charter certificate is prepared and issued by the national union and not the local/chapter. the Labor Code does not provide for the effects thereof. that the appropriate bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees shall not include supervisory employees and/or security guards. among others: xxxx (c) description of the bargaining unit which shall be the employer unit unless circumstances otherwise require. The CA found that petitioner union has for its membership both rank-and-file and supervisory employees. unless such mingling was brought about by misrepresentation. Thus. Who may file. In San Miguel Corp. and provided further. series of 1997 (1997 Amended Omnibus Rules).Any legitimate labor organization or the employer. their addresses.A. what the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules requires is a plain description of the bargaining unit. Consequently. which involved a petition for 40 . However. false statement or fraud under Article 239 of the Labor Code. (Emphasis supplied) By that provision. Any mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file employees in its membership cannot affect its legitimacy for that is not among the grounds for cancellation of its registration.that the petition for certification election indicate that the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees has not been mingled with supervisory employees . But the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules was further amended by Department Order No. and (3) its constitution and by-laws-. More to the point is Air Philippines Corporation v. 9. Mandaue Packing Products Plants-San Miguel Packaging Products-San Miguel Corp.was removed. (2) the names of its officers. Monthlies Rank-and-File Union-FFW. any questioned mingling will prevent an otherwise legitimate and duly registered labor organization from exercising its right to file a petition for certification election. when filed by a legitimate labor organization. shall contain. the Court held that after a labor organization has been registered.obtains in this case. and its principal office. It was the Rules and Regulations Implementing R. it would be improper for the DOLE to deny recognition to said local or chapter on account of any question pertaining to its individual members. when requested to bargain collectively. Under Article 245 of the Labor Code. the Court explained that since the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules does not require a local or chapter to provide a list of its members. Bureau of Labor Relations.the last two requirements having been executed under oath by the proper union officials as borne out by the records. 6715 (1989 Amended Omnibus Rules) which supplied the deficiency by introducing the following amendment to Rule II (Registration of Unions): Sec. the requirement under Sec. it validly acquired the status of a legitimate labor organization upon submission of (1) its charter certificate. The petition.

working conditions. much less oppose. Mainit Lumber Development Company Workers Union – United Lumber and General Workers of the Phils. for the purpose thereof is to determine which organization will represent the employees in their collective bargaining with the employer. an employer is a mere bystander to any petition for certification election. which the collective interest of all the employees. petitioner union was not divested of its status as a legitimate labor organization even if some of its members were supervisory employees. In G. SAN MIGUEL FOODS VS. location of work. it had the right to file the subject petition for certification election. false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) and (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code.[21] In National Association of Free Trade Unions v. Petitioner union correctly argues that its legal personality cannot be collaterally attacked in the certification election proceedings. the application of the “community or mutuality of interests” test. it cannot interfere with. SAN MIGUEL CORP SUPERVISORS AND EXEMPT UNION G. and Otis constitute a single bargaining unit. petitioner employer filed the Omnibus Objections and Challenge to Voters. NO. the employer cannot have any partisan interest therein. 146206 AUGUST 1. taking into account the “community or 41 . the process by filing a motion to dismiss or an appeal from it. thereby allowing their participation in the certification election. which is not contrary to the one-company.) Petitioner’s contentions are erroneous. The legal personality of petitioner union cannot be collaterally attacked by respondent company in the certification election proceedings. indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.R. consistent with equity to the employer. and other relevant conditions do not affect or impede their commonality of interest. and the determination of the employees who belong to the category of confidential employees Ruling: 1ST issue (Certain factors. 110399. The choice of their representative is the exclusive concern of the employees. one-union policy. No. As a result.R. The employer's only right in the proceeding is to be notified or informed thereof. such proceeding is non-adversarial and merely investigative.cancellation of union registration filed by the employer in 1999 against a rank-and-file labor organization on the ground of mixed membership: the Court therein reiterated its ruling in Tagaytay Highlands that the inclusion in a union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation. the Court explained that the employees of San Miguel Corporation Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao. questioning the eligibility to vote by some of its employees on the grounds that some employees do not belong to the bargaining unit which respondent seeks to represent or that there is no existence of employer-employee relationship with petitioner.[22] the Court. mode of compensation. such as specific line of work. ISSUE: The ff issues were raised when the case reached the SC: the inclusion of employees in supervisor levels 3 and 4 and the exempt employees in the proposed bargaining unit. comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees. 2011 FACTS: A certification election was conducted and on the date of the election. San Fernando. As we explained in Kawashima: Except when it is requested to bargain collectively. not even a mere allegation that some employees participating in a petition for certification election are actually managerial employees will lend an employer legal personality to block the certification election. An appropriate bargaining unit is defined as a group of employees of a given employer. unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation.

as their access to confidential information may become the source of undue advantage.[28] Confidential employees. and Otis[25] of Magnolia Poultry Products Plant involved in “dressed” chicken processing and Magnolia Poultry Farms engaged in “live” chicken operations.that is. Said employees may act as a spy or spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement. form and assist any labor organization to managerial employees. determine. Corollarily. as perceived by petitioner. As Human Resource Assistant. because if allowed to be affiliated with a union.”[27] 2nd Issue (PAYROLL MASTER NOT CONFIDENTIAL. 42 . Confidential employees are defined as those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity. the specific tasks of each division are actually interrelated and there exists mutuality of interests which warrants the formation of a single bargaining unit. Although they seem separate and distinct from each other. the Court affirms the finding of the CA that there should be only one bargaining unit for the employees in Cabuyao. and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee . hence.[23] Certainly. there is a mutuality of interest among the employees of the Sawmill Division and the Logging Division. or with the custody. hence. the latter might not be assured of their loyalty in view of evident conflict of interests and the union can also become company-denominated with the presence of managerial employees in the union membership. The rationale for their separate category and disqualification to join any labor organization is similar to the inhibition for managerial employees. San Fernando. and other relevant conditions do not affect or impede their commonality of interest. although Article 245[30] of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join. such fact does not apply to the position of Payroll Master and the whole gamut of employees who. in regard (2) to persons who formulate. such as specific line of work. Certain factors. handling or care and protection of the employer’s property. [33] In this regard. applying the ruling to the present case.[32] Having access to confidential information. Their functions mesh with one another. PERSONNEL ASSISTANT CONFIDENTIAL!!) HUMAN RESOURCE ASSISTANT and A confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate. such as accounting personnel. The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who. considering their respective positions and job descriptions. and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations. the confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor. mode of compensation. location of work. are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential records.mutuality of interests” test. One group needs the other in the same way that the company needs them both. has access to salary and compensation data. should be excluded from the bargaining unit. it follows that he cannot be excluded from the subject bargaining unit. and the supervisor must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations. The CA correctly held that the position of Payroll Master does not involve dealing with confidential labor relations information in the course of the performance of his functions. jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and.[24] Thus.[31] Confidential employees are thus excluded from the rank-and-file bargaining unit. ordered the formation of a single bargaining unit consisting of the Sawmill Division in Butuan City and the Logging Division in Zapanta Valley. Kitcharao. the same is not decisive or conclusive. working conditions. Other factors must be considered. but the distinctions are not enough to warrant the formation of a separate bargaining unit. This is so because the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights. Since the nature of his work does not pertain to company rules and regulations and confidential labor relations. confidential employees may also become the source of undue advantage. The test of grouping is community or mutuality of interest.[29] However. the CA correctly ruled that the positions of Human Resource Assistant and Personnel Assistant belong to the category of confidential employees and. Agusan [Del] Norte of the Mainit Lumber Development Company. in the normal course of their duties. There may be differences as to the nature of their individual assignments. become aware of management policies relating to labor relations is a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the “confidential employee rule. are excluded from the bargaining unit. [26] The two criteria are cumulative. It held that while the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be reckoned with in determining the appropriate bargaining unit.

the president of the Union requested BPI to implement the Union Shop Clause of the CBA and to terminate their employment pursuant thereto. As regards a Personnel Assistant. It bears stressing that a certification election is the sole concern of the workers. to be effective. A labor bargaining representative. or on March 31. join the Union as a condition of their continued employment. This Article and Plan of Merger was approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 7. in the discharge of their functions. Respondent Union then sent notices to the former FEBTC employees who refused to join. The general rule is that an employer has no standing to question the process of certification election. Issue: 43 . with their status and tenure recognized and salaries and benefits maintained. decisions rendered in such proceedings can attain finality. and implementation of company programs. Later. Section 2) of the existing CBA between petitioner BPI and respondent Union.[34] the scope of one’s work necessarily involves labor relations. who may hereafter be regularly employed by the Bank shall. The former FEBTC rank-and-file employees in Davao City did not belong to any labor union at the time of the merger. hence. 2011 RESOLUTION ON THE MAIN DECISION OF AUG.New employees falling within the bargaining unit as defined in Article I of this Agreement. herein petitioner. The proceedings for certification election are quasi-judicial in nature and. 2000. 18. Therefore. some of the former FEBTC employees joined the Union. must owe its loyalty to the employees alone and to no other. within thirty (30) days after they become regular employees. both gain access to vital labor relations information which outrightly disqualifies them from union membership. Respondent BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter . 2010 Facts: On March 23. since this is the sole concern of the workers. [37] Law and policy demand that employers take a strict. 2000. respondent Union invited said FEBTC employees to a meeting regarding the Union Shop Clause (Article II. and securing legal advice for labor issues from the petitioner’s team of lawyers. assistance to management during grievance meetings and administrative investigations. recruitment and selection of employees. as well as those who retracted their membership. however. Pursuant to the Article and Plan of Merger. while others refused. OCTOBER 19. 164301. The parties both advert to certain provisions of the existing CBA. including those in its different branches across the country. and FEBTC. The bargaining representative of employees should be chosen free from any extraneous influence of management. 2000 by and between BPI. which includes: Section 2. and called them to a hearing regarding the matter. GR NO. all the assets and liabilities of FEBTC were transferred to and absorbed by BPI as the surviving corporation. hands-off stance in certification elections. the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas approved the Articles of Merger executed on January 20. were hired by petitioner as its own employees. therefore. It is understood that membership in good standing in the Union is a condition of their continued employment with the Bank. access to employees' personal files and compensation package. 2000.Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank (hereinafter the "Union. Union Shop . When these former FEBTC employees refused to attend the hearing. an employer lacks the personality to dispute the same. FEBTC employees. some of those who initially joined retracted their membership." for brevity) is the exclusive bargaining agent of BPI’s rank and file employees in Davao City. and human resource management. [38] The only exception is where the employer itself has to file the petition pursuant to Article 258 [39] of the Labor Code because of a request to bargain collectively.[40] BPI VS.[35] one's work includes the recording of minutes for management during collective bargaining negotiations. After the meeting called by the Union. BPI EMPLOYEES UNION-DAVAO CHAPTER. Prior to the effectivity of the merger.

who are union members as of the effective date of the agreement. may be defined as an enterprise in which. They are covered by the Union Shop Clause. employees who at the time the union shop agreement takes effect are bona fide members of a religious organization which prohibits its members from joining labor unions on religious grounds. However. collective bargaining and negotiations and peaceful concerted actions including the right to strike in accordance with law. this condition is a valid restriction of the freedom or right not to join any labor organization because it is in favor of unionism. By holding out to loyal members a promise of employment in the closed shop. on the other hand. the Constitution guarantees to them the rights "to selforganization. In other words. Indeed. All employees in the bargaining unit covered by a Union Shop Clause in their CBA with management are subject to its terms. remains a member in good standing of a union entirely comprised of or of which the employees in interest are a part. There is maintenance of membership shop when employees. by agreement between the employer and his employees or their representatives. The sole category therefore in which petitioner may prove its claim is the fourth recognized exception or whether the former FEBTC employees are excluded by the express terms of the existing CBA between petitioner and respondent. it wields group solidarity. No allegation or evidence of religious exemption or prior membership in another union or engagement as a confidential employee was presented by both parties. becomes." "maintenance of membership" or any other form of agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting employment. In the case of Liberty Flour Mills Employees v. Inc. the situation of the former FEBTC employees in this case clearly does not fall within the first three exceptions to the application of the Union Shop Clause discussed earlier. and. There is union shop when all new regular employees are required to join the union within a certain period for their continued employment. has even held that a union security clause in a CBA is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution." It adds membership and compulsory dues.. When certain employees are obliged to join a particular union as a requisite for continued employment. as in the case of Union Security Clauses. This Court. To this end. a closed shop agreement is an agreement whereby an employer binds himself to hire only members of the contracting union who must continue to remain members in good standing to keep their jobs. Liberty Flour Mills. for the duration of the agreement. the following kinds of employees are exempted from its coverage. no person may be employed in any or certain agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or she is." "union shop. confidential employees who are excluded from the rank and file bargaining unit. under law and jurisprudence. Moreover. "Union security" is a generic term which is applied to and comprehends "closed shop." There is no question that these purposes could be thwarted if every worker were to choose to go his own separate way instead of joining his co-employees in planning collective action and presenting a united front when they sit down to bargain with their employers. A closed-shop. or who thereafter become members. we ruled that: It is the policy of the State to promote unionism to enable the workers to negotiate with management on the same level and with more persuasiveness than if they were to individually and independently bargain for the improvement of their respective conditions. and employees excluded from the union shop by express terms of the agreement. on occasion. It is "the most prized achievement of unionism. must maintain union membership as a condition for continued employment until they are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit or the agreement is terminated. 44 .Whether or not the former FEBTC employees that were absorbed by petitioner upon the merger between FEBTC and BPI should be covered by the Union Shop Clause found in the existing CBA between petitioner and respondent Union. the purpose of a union shop or other union security arrangement is to guarantee the continued existence of the union through enforced membership for the benefit of the workers. employees already in the service and already members of a union other than the majority at the time the union shop agreement took effect. Ruling: Yes. It is for this reason that the law has sanctioned stipulations for the union shop and the closed shop as a means of encouraging the workers to join and support the labor union of their own choice as their representative in the negotiation of their demands and the protection of their interest vis-à-vis the employer. namely.

they will enjoy all these CBA benefits upon their "absorption. this Court finds it reasonable and just to conclude that the Union Shop Clause of the CBA covers the former FEBTC employees who were hired/employed by BPI during the effectivity of the CBA in a manner which petitioner describes as "absorption. BPI’s employment of these absorbed employees was not under exactly the same terms and conditions as stated in the latter’s employment contracts with FEBTC. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY [G. although in a sense BPI is continuing FEBTC’s employment of these absorbed employees. Laws and jurisprudence promote unionism and afford certain protections to the certified bargaining agent in a unionized company because a strong and effective union presumably benefits all employees in the bargaining unit since such a union would be in a better position to demand improved benefits and conditions of work from the employer. he was promoted to the position of Sales System Analyst 2 and his salary was increased to P13. This further strengthens the view that BPI and the former FEBTC employees voluntarily contracted with each other for their employment in the surviving corporation. is not to protect the union for the union’s sake." A contrary appreciation of the facts of this case would. 2002. who were parties in the court below. no longer contested the adverse Court of Appeals’ decision. In the hierarchy of constitutional values. On February 1. in fact. be in the best interests of the former FEBTC employees for it unites their interests with the majority of employees in the bargaining unit." Thus.00. He insisted that when he was regularized as a supervisory employee on January 1. Octavio claimed entitlement to salary increases per the CBAs of 1999-2001 and 2002-2004. the Court is not unmindful that the former FEBTC employees’ refusal to join the union and BPI’s refusal to enforce the Union Shop Clause in this instance may have been based on the honest belief that the former FEBTC employees were not covered by said clause. assuming said clause has been carried over in the present CBA and there has been no material change in the situation of the parties. He became a member of GUTS. settled jurisprudence has already swung the balance in favor of unionism. such as the Union Shop Clause involved herein. February 27. even if they impinge upon the individual employee’s right or freedom of association. When Octavio was regularized on January 1. No. In the interest of fairness. they are required to join the certified bargaining agent. lead to an inequitable and very volatile labor situation which this Court has consistently ruled against. undoubtedly. 2001. As BPI employees. In the case at bar. 2013] Facts: On October 1. he became entitled to receive the 45 . there were benefits under the CBA that the former FEBTC employees did not enjoy with their previous employer.R. 175492. Nonetheless. OCTAVIO vs. 2001. this Court has repeatedly held that the right to abstain from joining a labor organization is subordinate to the policy of encouraging unionism as an instrument of social justice. there is even greater reason for the union to request their dismissal from the employer since the CBA also contained a Maintenance of Membership Clause. We are indeed not being called to balance the interests of individual employees as against the State policy of promoting unionism. 2000. Their joining the certified union would. It encourages employee solidarity and affords sufficient protection to the majority status of the union during the life of the CBA which are the precisely the objectives of union security clauses.000. he was receiving a monthly basic salary of P10. PLDT hired Octavio as Sales System Analyst I on a probationary status. in recognition that ultimately the individual employee will be benefited by that policy.As the Union likewise pointed out in its pleadings. In the case of former FEBTC employees who initially joined the union but later withdrew their membership. since the employees. The rationale for upholding the validity of union shop clauses in a CBA. we believe the former FEBTC employees should be given a fresh thirty (30) days from notice of finality of this decision to join the union before the union demands BPI to terminate their employment under the Union Shop Clause. since the former FEBTC employees are deemed covered by the Union Shop Clause.00. which supposedly has gathered the support of the majority of workers within the bargaining unit in the appropriate certification proceeding. A final point in relation to procedural due process.730. In sum.

2002 and onwards. do not constitute an act of unfair labor practice as would result in any discrimination or encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization. Hence.730. This. Octavio's basic salary was adjusted to the minimum salary of the new position. Mr. E) Applying the above-mentioned policy. xxx Aggrieved. they considered the same as the most practicable and reasonable solution for both management and union.00 across-the-board increase for 2002 as stipulated in the CBA of 2002-2004. 1999. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the Complaint of Octavio and upheld the Committee Resolution. In fact. He thus prayed for an additional award of damages and attorney's fees. Octavio filed before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC a Complaint for payment of said salary increases.000.00. when the Union-Management Grievance Committee came up with the Committee Resolution. he being a member of GUTS. 2001.000.00.00 1st year increase retroactive January 2002. he should have received an additional increase of P2.00. Issue: a. the GUTS-CBA was concluded and Mr.00 the P2. according to Octavio.00 which was given him due to his promotion on February 1. Whether the employer and bargaining representative may amend the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement without the consent and approval of the employees. C) Upon the effectivity of his promotion on February 1.500.000. 2002.00. b.000. Octavio's basic salary was recomputed to include the P2. PLDT countered that the issues advanced by Octavio had already been resolved by the Union-Management Grievance Committee when it denied his claims through the Committee Resolution. it discriminated against him by refusing to grant him the same salary increase.000. Octavio averred that the CBA cannot be the subject of further negotiation as it has the force of law between the parties. PLDT claimed that the NLRC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide Octavio's claims. c. Moreover. the grant of across-the-board salary increase for those who were regularized starting January 1. amounts to diminution of benefits.730. If so. At any rate. which is P13. The CA declared the Committee Resolution to be binding on Octavio. Octavio claimed that PLDT committed an act of unfair labor practice because. PLDT unilaterally decided to deem as included in the said P3.730. In addition. 2002. Finally. 2002 and the exclusion thereto of those who were regularized on January 1. Moreover.00 as provided for under the CBA of 1999-2001 which took effect on January 1. Whether merit increases may be awarded simultaneously with increases given in the Collective 46 . his basic monthly salary was adjusted to P13. the said Committee Resolution had already become final and conclusive between the parties for failure of Octavio to elevate the same to the proper forum. The committee failed to reach an agreement. Octavio's salary at the time of his promotion and before the conclusion of the GUTS CBA was P10.across-the-board increase of P2.730. D) In June 2002.00 apart from the merit increase of P3. while it granted the claim for salary increase of 18 supervisory employees who were regularized on January 1. and because he failed to question its validity and enforceability. whether the said agreement is binding [on] the employees. However. the minimum salary of the new position. The resulting basic salary was P12. Then pursuant to the CBA of 2002-2004. Management position deemed adopted which is read as follows: xxx B) Mr.

2013] Facts: Philippine National Bank (PNB) used to be a government-owned and controlled banking institution. were represented for collective negotiation by the Philnabank Employees Association (PEMA). the Committee’s resolution is not a modification of the CBA. the denial of his claim for salary increase did not violate Article 100 of the Labor Code against diminution of benefits. Moreover. August 12. and agency fee from the salary of the rank. being government personnel. That has the effect of making the Committee’s resolution binding upon him. Moreover. 174287. and that PNB shall directly credit the amount to NUBE’s current account with PNB.Management Grievance Committee. From the denial of his claim by the UnionManagement Grievance Committee. his recourse pursuant to the CBA was to elevate his grievance to the Board of Arbitrators for final decision. Here. PEMA affiliated with petitioner National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE). In 1996. Later. the Securities and Exchange Commission approved its changed status as a private corporation. the Board of Directors of NUBE-PEC adopted a Resolution disaffiliating itself from NUBE. adopting the name NUBE-PNB Employees Chapter (NUBE-PEC). Clearly.PEC and its disaffiliation with NUBE. PHILNABANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION [G. Following the expiration of the CBA. he instead filed a complaint with the arbitration branch of the NLRC nine months after the resolution of the Union. 2001. he departed from the grievance procedure mandated in the CBA and denied the Board of Arbitrators the opportunity to pass upon a matter over which it has jurisdiction. which is a labor federation composed of unions in the banking industry. NUBE. 2002 a petition for certification election among the rank-and-file employees of PNB. NATIONAL UNION OF BANK EMPLOYEES vs. Thereafter. 1997 to December 31.00 of the P65.00 union dues per month collected by PNB from every employee. Its rankand-file employees. Finally.R. he is deemed to have waived his right to question the resolution of the Committee. By failing to abide with the procedure prescribed by the CBA. 47 . His complaint must therefore fail. it involving the interpretation and implementation of the pertinent provisions of the CBA. two significant events transpired – the independent union registration of NUBE. Even assuming there is diminution of benefits. Pursuant to Article V on Check-off and Agency Fees of the CBA. during the effectivity of the CBA. No. A collective bargaining agreement (CBA) was subsequently signed between NUBE-PEC and PNB covering the period of January 1. Said resolution is a product of the grievance procedure outlined in the CBA itself.and-file employees within the bargaining unit who are not union members. the Philnabank Employees Association-FFW (PEMA-FFW) filed on January 2. Bargaining covers a process of finding a reasonable and acceptable solution to stabilize labor-management relations to promote stable industrial peace. being the Federation union. agreed that PNB shall remit P15. While the petition for certification election was still pending. PNB shall deduct the monthly membership fee and other assessments imposed by the union from the salary of each union member. NUBE-PEC was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the PNB rank-and-file employees. Article 100 does not prohibit a union from offering and agreeing to reduce wages and benefits of the employees as the right to free collective bargaining includes the right to suspend it. a public sector union.Bargaining Agreement Ruling: The claim of an individual employee for salary increase under the terms of the existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) is a matter subject of the grievance machinery.

It only gives rise to a contract of agency. The right of the local union to exercise the right to disaffiliate from its mother union is well settled in this jurisdiction. 48 . PEMA sent a letter to the PNB management informing its disaffiliation from NUBE and requesting to stop. Acting thereon. both parties be allowed to use the name "PEMA" but with PEMAFFW and NUBE-PEC be denominated as "PEMA-Bustria Group" and "PEMA-Serrana Group. 2003. x x x [A] local union may disaffiliate at any time from its mother federation. local unions are considered principals while the federation is deemed to be merely their agent. in view of its independent registration as a labor union and disaffiliation from NUBE. the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court subject to exceptions. Local unions do not owe their creation and existence to the national federation to which they are affiliated but. in the alternative. However. praying that. When supported by substantial evidence. being a separate and voluntary association. Hence. PNB informed NUBE of PEMA’s letter and its decision to continue the deduction of the P15. As such principals. Whether there was a valid disaffiliation is a factual issue. including the right to seek certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent in the appropriate employer unit. is free to serve the interests of all its members including the freedom to disaffiliate or declare its autonomy from the federation which it belongs when circumstances warrant. On the same date. effective immediately." respectively. Admittedly. to secure justice for themselves. the resolution of which. does not result in it losing its legal personality altogether. the common bargaining power of local unions for the effective enhancement and protection of their interests.On June 25. where the former acts in representation of the latter. A local union has the right to disaffiliate from its mother union or declare its autonomy. unaided by other support groups. to the will of their members. It is elementary that a question of fact is not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. NUBE-PEC filed a Manifestation and Motion before the Med-Arbitration Unit of DOLE.00 fees. in turn. there are times when without succor and support local unions may find it hard. the check-off of the P15. by collective action. Issue: Whether PEMA validly disaffiliated itself from NUBE. on July 4. the unions are entitled to exercise the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization. the Court finds no cogent reason to apply these recognized exceptions. but stop its remittance to NUBE effective July 2003. inevitably affects the latter’s right to collect the union dues held in trust by PNB. Ruling: We deny the petition. 2003. however. The sole essence of affiliation is to increase. its name as appearing in the official ballots of the certification election be changed to "Philnabank Employees Association (PEMA)" or.00 due for NUBE. instead. Such. PNB also notified NUBE that the amounts collected would be held in a trust account pending the resolution of the issue on PEMA’s disaffiliation. A local union. absent any showing that the same is prohibited under its constitution or rule. in accordance with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association.

the Article nonetheless provides that when the nature of the organization renders such secret ballot impractical. there would be no restrictions which could validly hinder it from collectively bargaining with PNB. Granting. In this case.In the case at bar. We uphold PEMA’s disaffiliation from NUBE. Third. First. On the other hand. Conspicuously. Consequently. in effect. there would be no longer any reason or occasion for PNB to continue making deductions. other than citing the opinion of a "recognized labor law authority. why PEMA’s board of directors merely opted to submit for ratification of the majority their resolution to disaffiliate from NUBE. non-compliance with the procedure on disaffiliation. by PEMA's valid disaffiliation from NUBE. Second. Also." A contract between an employer and the parent organization as bargaining agent for the employees is terminated bv the disaffiliation ofthe local of which the employees are members. "[to] gather the general membership of the union in a general membership to vote through secret balloting is virtually impossible. The obligation of an employee to pay union dues is coterminous with his affiliation or membership. naturally. TOPIC 13: RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATE LABOR ORGANIZATION 49 . Also.. This being so. "The employees' check-off authorization. there is nothing shown in the records nor is it claimed by NUBE that PEMA was expressly forbidden to disaffiliate from the federation nor were there any conditions imposed for a valid breakaway. including the supposed expulsion of Serrana et al. even if declared irrevocable. PEMA is not precluded to disaffiliate from NUBE after acquiring the status of an independent labor organization duly registered before the DOLE. that Article 241 (d) is applicable. the vinculum that previously bound the two entities was completely severed. and most importantly. Since PEMA had validly separated itself from NUBE. being premised on purely technical grounds cannot rise above the employees’ fundamental right to self-organization and to form and join labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining. therefore. The moment that PEMA separated from and left NUBE and exists as an independent labor organization with a certificate of registration. NUBE loses it right to collect all union dues held in its trust by PNB. any act performed by the former that affects the interests and affairs of the latter. from where [PEMA] [derives] its membership. is good only as long as they remain members of the union concerned. the union officers may make the decision in behalf of the general membership. are scattered from Aparri to Jolo. NUBE did not dispute the existence of the persons or their due execution of the document showing their unequivocal support for the disaffiliation of PEMA from NUBE. manning more than 300 branches in various towns and cities of the country. is rendered without force and effect." NUBE failed to quote a specific provision of the law or rule mandating that a local union’s disaffiliation from a federation must comply with Article 241 (d) in order to be valid and effective. it was entirely reasonable for PNB to enter into a CBA with PEMA as represented by Serrana et al. conformably with Article 241 (d) of the Labor Code. for argument’s sake. the former is no longer obliged to pay dues and assessments to the latter." hence. as amended. Without said affiliation. the employer has no link to the mother union. still. there is no merit on NUBE’s contention that PEMA’s disaffiliation is invalid for non-observance of the procedure that union members should make such determination through secret ballot and after due deliberation. As NUBE was divested of any and all power to act in representation of PEMA. NUBE did not even dare to contest PEMA’s representation that "PNB employees." It is understandable.

then President Estrada issued Administrative Order No. On July 22. Labor and Employment. Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of PAL. PALEA agrees. Faced with bankruptcy. apart from transferring shares of stocks of the company to employees reads that: xxx 3. ratified. The pertinent portion of said plan. After a few more negotiations. mediation (for) the purpose of arriving at a total and complete solution of the problem. Transportation and Communication. PALEA went on strike to protest the retrenchment measures adopted by the airline. 1998. being founded on public policy. may not be waived. As a result. 16 creating an Inter-Agency Task Force (Task Force) to address the problems of the ailing flag carrier. 135547. when PAL and PALEA agreed to a more systematic reduction in PAL’s work force and the payment of separation benefits to all retrenched employees. This offer was rejected by the members of PALEA. 2002 Facts: On June 5. nor waiver. x x x. and Tourism. which affected 1. provided the following safeguards are in place: a. In order for PAL to attain (a) degree of normalcy while we are tackling its problems. Foreign Affairs. the following was agreed upon and further ratified by PALEA and PAL: “x x x 4.” Conciliation meetings were then held between PAL management and the three unions representing the airline’s employees. PAL pilots affiliated with the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP) went on a three-week strike. PAL shall continue recognizing PALEA as the duly certified bargaining agent of the regular rank-and-file ground employees of the Company.” Seven officers and members of PALEA filed a petition to annul the agreement entered into between PAL and PALEA on the ground that it violates the constitutional rights of employees to self-organization and collective bargaining. JANUARY 23. b.899 union members. On August 28. a duly organized registered union of PAL. (to) the suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA for a period of ten (10) years. The Task Force was composed of the Departments of Finance. subject to the ratification by the general membership. 1998.R. The ‘union shop/maintenance of membership’ provision under the PAL-PALEA CBA shall be respected. Issue: 50 . To assure investors and creditors of industrial peace. 1998. ESPIRITU. PAL’s financial situation went from bad to worse. It was “empowered to summon all parties concerned for conciliation. with the Task Force as mediator. causing serious losses to the financially beleaguered flag carrier. The strike ended four days later.RIVERA VS. PAL management submitted to the Task Force an offer by private respondent Lucio Tan. G. together with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). of a plan to transfer shares of stock to its employees. and mounting pressure on the worker’s due to PAL’s imminent closure. PAL adopted a rehabilitation plan and downsized its labor force by more than one-third. we would request for a suspension of the Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) for 10 years. NO.

may be negotiated not later than three years after the execution. includes the right to suspend it. including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement. in effect. prohibits the parties from waiving or suspending the mandatory timetables and agreeing on the remedies to enforce the same. as the exclusive bargaining agent of PAL’s ground employees. it was PALEA. said agreement satisfies the first purpose of Article 253-A. Either case it was the union’s exercise of its right to collective bargaining. insofar as the representation aspect is concerned. This argument is devoid of merit. The primary purpose of a CBA is the stabilization of labor-management relations in order to create a climate of a sound and stable industrial peace. after all. The other is to assign specific timetables wherein negotiations become a matter of right and requirement. but preventing the latter’s closure. be for a term of five (5) years. Ruling: The SC held that the agreement is both constitutional and in consonance with public policy.Whether or not the PAL-PALEA agreement. Petitioners submit by agreeing to a 10-year suspension. Nothing in Article 253-A. that voluntarily entered into the CBA with PAL and opted for the 10-year suspension of the CBA. PALEA. Inasmuch as the agreement sought to promote industrial peace at PAL during its rehabilitation. The questioned proviso of the agreement reads: a. hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment. In the instant case. A CBA is “a contract executed upon request of either the employer or the exclusive bargaining representative incorporating the agreement reached after negotiations with respect to wages. The SC found no conflict between said agreement and Article 253-A of the Labor Code. amounting to unfair labor practice. One is to promote industrial stability and predictability. Petitioners claim the agreement’s unconstitutionality saying that violates the worker’s right to selforganization and collective bargaining hence violating the “protection to labor” policy laid down by the Constitution: ART. abdicated the workers’ constitutional right to bargain for another CBA at the mandated time. PAL shall continue recognizing PALEA as the duly certified-bargaining agent of the regular rank-and-file ground employees of the Company.” The assailed PAL-PALEA agreement was the result of voluntary collective bargaining negotiations undertaken in the light of the severe financial situation faced by the employer. insofar as representation is concerned. 253-A. while the other provisions. with the peculiar and unique intention of not merely promoting industrial peace at PAL. a CBA has a term of five years.x x x All other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution. Article 253-A has a two-fold purpose. 51 . Terms of a Collective Bargaining Agreement. – Any Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter into shall. stipulating the suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA unconstitutional and contrary to public policy. Petitioners further allege that the 10-year suspension of the CBA under the PAL-PALEA agreement virtually installed PALEA as a company union for said period. Under this provision. The right to free collective bargaining. except for representation.

the representation limit for the exclusive bargaining agent applies only when there is an extant CBA in full force and effect. 1994. The next day. including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters. Hence it issued separate letter-orders to both union groups. JUNE 10. the contract must be upheld. this time through its president Galvez. exclusive bargaining agent of petitioner’s daily-paid rank and file employees. (2) labor-only contracting. 1998. IBM filed another notice of strike. NLRC. On April 11. SAN MIGUEL CORP. (6) harassment of union officers and members. we are of the view that the PAL-PALEA agreement dated September 27. the parties agreed to suspend the CBA and put in abeyance the limit on the representation period. 52 . The CBA also included a mutually enforceable no-strike no-lockout agreement. (4) dismissal of union officers and members. 119293. alleging Galvez’s lack of authority in filing the same. Its objective is to assure the continued existence of PALEA during the said period. filed with the NCMB a notice of strike against petitioner for allegedly committing: (1) illegal dismissal of union members. Petitioner company thereafter filed a Motion for Severance of Notices of Strike with Motion to Dismiss. G. (3) violation of CBA. and (5) other acts of unfair labor practice. The Galvez group subsequently requested the NCMB to consolidate its notice of strike with that of the Colomeda group. In the instant case. We also do not agree that the agreement violates the five-year representation limit mandated by Article 253-A.. and (8) other acts of unfair labor practice. In sum. (7) non-recognition of duly-elected union officers. through its vice president Colomeda. on the grounds that the notices raised non-strikeable issues and that they affected four corporations which are separate and distinct from each other. IBM. Under said article. Under the principle of inviolability of contracts guaranteed by the Constitution. Under Article 248 (d) of the Labor Code. dominate.R. Petitioners’ contention that the agreement installs PALEA as a virtual company union is also untenable. NO. The NCMB thereafter found that the real issues involved are nonstrikeable. converting their notices of strike into preventive mediation. We are unable to declare the objective of union security an unfair labor practice.” The case records are bare of any showing of such acts by PAL. 2003 Facts: Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and respondent Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM). raising similar grounds: (1) illegal transfer. is a valid exercise of the freedom to contract. a company union exists when the employer acts “[t]o initiate. assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization. (4) contracting out of jobs being performed by union members.The aforesaid provision clearly only shows the intent of the parties to maintain “union security” during the period of the suspension of the CBA. the law has allowed stipulations for “union shop” and “closed shop” as means of encouraging workers to join and support the union of their choice in the protection of their rights and interests vis-à-vis the employer. (3) violation of CBA. It is State policy to promote unionism to enable workers to negotiate with management on an even playing field and with more persuasiveness than if they were to individually and separately bargain with the employer. (5) labor-only contracting. executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) under which they agreed to submit all disputes to grievance and arbitration proceedings. For this reason. (2) illegal transfer. Petition is dismissed. to which the latter opposed. VS.

Drilon ruling. be they actual or threatened. the Colomeda group notified the NCMB of the results of their strike vote. 1994. The MOA. illegal lockout and illegal closure. It found that the circumstances at the time did not constitute or no longer constituted an actual or threatened commission of unlawful acts. while separate preventive mediation conferences were ongoing. entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the respondent-union. denying the petition for injunction for lack of factual basis. On May 27. as proof of the union’s alleged threat to revive the strike. and sought to dismiss the injunction case in view of the cessation of its picketing activities as a result of the signed MOA. In reply. the NLRC issued the challenged decision. on May 23. The NCMB however found these grounds to be mere amplifications of those alleged in the first notice that the group filed. the Colomeda group filed with the NCMB a notice of holding a strike vote. Petitioner opposed by filing a Manifestation and Motion to Declare Notice of Strike Vote Illegal. Hence.98 million in daily lost production. signed in the presence of Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) officials. 1994. expressly stated that cases filed in relation to their dispute will continue and will not be affected in any manner whatsoever by the agreement. NCMB issued a letter again advising them that by virtue of the PAL v. which favored the holding of a strike. consequently invalidating any subsequent strike for lack of compliance with the notice requirement. the NLRC on June 13.[21] Petitioner. The strike paralyzed the operations of petitioner. where additional grounds were set forth therein. however. Respondent thereafter moved to reconsider the issuance of the TRO. Two days after the declaration of strike.On May 16. 1994 resolved to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) directing free ingress to and egress from petitioner’s plants. After due hearing and ocular inspection. petitioner company filed with NLRC an amended Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order. 1994. NCMB Director Ubaldo in response issued another letter to the Colomeda Group reiterating the conversion of the notice of strike into a case of preventive mediation and emphasizing the findings that the grounds raised center only on an intra-union conflict. causing it losses allegedly worth P29. their notice of strike is deemed not to have been filed. this petition. petitioner on June 16. Ruling: 53 . including discrimination. 1994. On November 29. Free Ingress and Egress Order and Deputization Order. coercion of employees. On the same date. IBM went on strike. calling for a lifting of the picket lines and resumption of work in exchange of “good faith talks” between the management and the labor management committees. 1995. Despite this and the pendency of the preventive mediation proceedings. 1994. To minimize further damage to itself. It therefore ordered the consolidation of the second notice with the preceding one that was earlier reduced to preventive mediation. opposed and submitted copies of flyers being circulated by IBM. 1994. The picket lines ended and work was then resumed. Issue: Whether or not it was appropriate for the NLRC to deny the petitioner company’s petition for injunction. 1994. It likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in its resolution dated February 1.The NLRC did not rule on the opposition to the TRO and allowed it to lapse. which is not strikeable. It argued that the case had become moot and academic there being no more prohibited activities to restrain. on June 4. the Galvez group filed its second notice of strike against petitioner. the group likewise notified the NCMB of its intention to hold a strike vote on May 27. without prejudice to the union’s right to peaceful picketing and continuous hearings on the injunction case. Meanwhile.

Such order is in pursuance of the NCMB’s duty to exert “all efforts at mediation and conciliation to enable the parties to settle the dispute amicably. and were dated June 19. In accordance with the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code. to be valid. In the case of San Miguel Corporation v. In the case at bar. public respondent should have granted the injunctive relief to prevent the grave damage brought about by the unlawful strike. 54 . petitioner sought recourse from the public respondent. Imposed for the purpose of encouraging the voluntary settlement of disputes. however. we find that at the time the injunction was being sought. Public respondent. where the same issue of NLRC’s duty to enjoin an unlawful strike was raised. Further. this requirement has been held to be mandatory. there existed a threat to revive the unlawful strike as evidenced by the flyers then being circulated by the IBM-NCR Council which led the union. The NLRC issued a TRO only for free ingress to and egress from petitioner’s plants. just a day after the union’s manifestation with the NLRC that there existed no threat of commission of prohibited activities. but did not enjoin the unlawful strike itself. When the NCMB ordered the preventive mediation on May 2.” The second exception. which may be prevented through an injunction in accordance with Article 254. or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which. NLRC. NCMB converted IBM’s notices into preventive mediation as it found that the real issues raised are non-strikeable.The SC held that it was incorrect for the NLRC to deny the petitioner company’s petition for injunction. These flyers were not denied by respondent. A strike is considered as the most effective weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment. may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party x x x. in IBM v. Contrary to the NLRC’s finding. we ruled that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the petition for injunction to restrain the union from declaring a strike based on nonstrikeable grounds.” and in line with the state policy of favoring voluntary modes of settling labor disputes. ruled that there was a lack of factual basis in issuing the injunction. the lack of which shall render a strike illegal. the said conversion has the effect of dismissing the notices of strike filed by respondent. and five months after came out with a decision summarily rejecting petitioner’s cited jurisprudence. 1994. respondent had thereupon lost the notices of strike it had filed. it still defiantly proceeded with the strike while mediation was ongoing. NLRC. In the present case. 1994. The NCMB having no coercive powers of injunction. on the other hand. Article 254 of the Labor Code provides that no temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or other entity except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264 of the Labor Code. it bears stressing that Article 264(a) of the Labor Code explicitly states that a declaration of strike without first having filed the required notice is a prohibited activity. One of the procedural requisites that Article 263 of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules prescribe is the filing of a valid notice of strike with the NCMB. if not restrained or performed forthwith. Moreover. Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code expressly confers upon the NLRC the power to “enjoin or restrain actual and threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts. and notwithstanding the letter-advisories of NCMB warning it of its lack of notice of strike. Clearly. It ignored the fatal lack of notice of strike. Subsequently. we held that it is the “legal duty and obligation” of the NLRC to enjoin a partial strike staged in violation of the law. petitioner sought a permanent injunction to enjoin the respondent’s strike. is when the labor organization or the employer engages in any of the “prohibited activities” enumerated in Article 264. in its decision. Under the first exception. the coercive measure of injunction may also be used to restrain an actual or threatened unlawful strike. a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. Pursuant to Article 218 (e). Failure promptly to issue an injunction by the public respondent was likewise held therein to be an abuse of discretion. However.

Meanwhile. and certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. on May 20. Trade unionism and strikes are legitimate weapons of labor granted by our statutes. did not report for work and instead gathered in front of Pier 12. petitioner filed with the NCMB a second notice of strike alleging that respondent company committed acts constituting unfair labor practice amounting to union busting.Also noteworthy is public respondent’s disregard of petitioner’s argument pointing out the union’s failure to observe the CBA provisions on grievance and arbitration. In the same Resolution. 2004 Facts: Due to a CBA deadlock. 140992. Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code. Provoked by respondent’s alleged unfair labor practice/s. 1994. Thus. Ruling: The SC held that the one-day work stoppage or petitioner’s officers and members was an illegal strike. 167 rank-and-file employees. on May 20. 1995. SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA SULPICIO LINES VS. G. on its part filed with the DOLE a petition praying that the SOLE assume jurisdiction over the controversy.” On September 29.R. Meanwhile. enjoined any strike or lockout and directed the parties to cease and desist from committing any and all acts that might exacerbate the situation. The SOLE then issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute. 1994. MARCH 25. the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The state’s commitment to enforce mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace is affirmed by no less than our Constitution. about 9:30 o’clock in the morning. petitioner union filed with the NCMB a Notice of Strike. But misuse of these instruments can be the subject of judicial intervention to forestall grave injury to a business enterprise. the NLRC issued a Resolution declaring the strike of petitioner’s officers and members illegal. officers and members of petitioner. North Harbor at Manila. Respondent company. The SOLE again issued an order directing the striking employees to return to work. petitioner union immediately conducted a strike vote. respondent company filed with the NLRC a complaint for “illegal strike/clearance for termination. the NLRC dismissed petitioner’s complaint against respondent. WHEREFORE. with notice to respondent of the option to terminate their (petitioner’s officers) employment. provide: 55 . as amended. The Sc added that it cannot sanction the respondent-union’s brazen disregard of legal requirements imposed purposely to carry out the state policy of promoting voluntary modes of settling disputes. Issue: Whether or not the one-day work stoppage or petitioner’s officers and members was an illegal strike. NO. SULPICIO LINES.

The decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken. A strike. the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of strike x x x with the Ministry (now Department) at least 30 days before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES. There is no showing that the petitioner union observed the 7-day strike ban.“ART. mass 56 . which may constitute union busting where the existence of the union is threatened. the strike mounted by petitioner union on May 20. PICKETING AND LOCKOUTS. the 15-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately. as defined in Article 212 (o) of the Labor Code. strike vote. x x x. subject to the cooling-off period herein provided.” The term “strike” shall comprise not only concerted work stoppages. ART.” In a desperate attempt to justify its position. The SC thus held that for failing to comply with the mandatory requirements of Article 263 (c) and (f) of the Labor Code. STRIKES. x x x. The Ministry (now Department) may at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party. and notice given to the Department of Labor are mandatory in nature. supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of its members. the union x x x shall furnish the Ministry (now Department) the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike or lockout. xxx (c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks.” Following are the Implementing Guidelines of the above provisions issued by the Department of Labor and Employment: 1. and that the results of the strike vote were submitted by petitioners to the Department of Labor and Employment at least seven (7) days before the strike. (a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice required in the preceding article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry (now Department). However. The rule now is that such requirements as the filing of a notice of strike. 1994 was not a strike but merely a “one-day work absence” or a “simple act of absenteeism”. x x x. However. The strike shall be supported by a majority vote of the members of the union obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for the purpose. petitioner insists that what transpired on May 20. if no notice of strike and a strike vote were conducted. 263. means “any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. A strike vote shall be reported to the Department of Labor and Employment at least seven (7) days before the intended strike. even if the union acted in good faith in the belief that the company was committing an unfair labor practice. which may constitute union busting where the existence of the union is threatened. in case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws. as amended. 1994 is illegal. the period of notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent. The SC was not convinced. A strike shall be filed with the Department of Labor and Employment at least 15 days if the issues raised are unfair labor practice or at least 30 days if the issue involved bargaining deadlock. and 3. 264. obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that purpose. but also slowdowns. Thus. xxx (f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned. In every case. the said strike is illegal. in case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and bylaws. the 15-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately. 2.

attempts to damage. The petitioner then filed an appeal of the said order but the DOLE dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. the Med-Arbiter ordered that a certification election be conducted. sitdowns. Despite the appeal of petitioner. what transpired then was a strike because the cessation of work by petitioner’s concerted action resulted from a labor dispute. however. Issue: 57 . (DOLE) a petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent or certification election among the rank and file employees of petitioner NDGM. considering that respondent’s business activities were not interrupted. petitioner pleads that its officers who participated in the one-day strike should not be dismissed from the service. they gathered in front of respondent’s office at Pier 12. The said union. Its motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. the CA held that staying the holding of the certification election was unnecessary. in the process of choosing their collective bargaining representative. North Harbor at Manila to participate in a strike voting conducted by petitioner. wherein the “Yes” vote won. petitioner NDGM filed a motion to include probationary and substitute employees in the list of qualified voters. filed a motion to certify the said union as the exclusive bargaining agent of petitioner was filed. NDGM filed an appeal from the said handwritten ‘order’ of the Med-Arbiter. in a concerted manner. Upon appeal with the CA. the Med-Arbiter issued an order which certified private respondent NDGMTEU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file employees of petitioner and accordingly dismissed petitioner’s protest. Petition is denied. a few days after. did not report for work on May 20.NO. much less paralyzed. JUNE 29. and similar activities. NOTRE DAME OF GREATER MANILA VS. During one of the pre-election conferences. The CA added that that petitioner had no standing to question the qualification of the workers who should be included in the list of voters because. 2004 Facts: Respondent union filed with the Med-Arbitration Branch.leaves. and third. National Capital Region. While we sympathize with their plight. The basic elements of a strike are present in the case at bar. the employer was definitely an intruder. 149833. it held that the Med-Arbiter’s notation on petitioner’s motion was not an order that could be the subject of an appeal to the SOLE. petitioner’s officers and members numbering 167. 1994. the results achieved are fair and in conformity with the law.R. Thereafter. This motion was denied by the Med-Arbiter by handwritten notation on the motion itself. Invoking compassion. such union activity was an aftermath of petitioner’s second notice of strike by reason of respondent’s unfair labor practice/s. Clearly. destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities. second. Petitioner NDGM filed a written notice of protest against the conduct and results of the certification of election. LAGUESMA. Thus. First. G. we must take care that in the contest between labor and capital. which was opposed by private respondent NDGMTEU. The Med-Arbiter issued an order granting the petition for certification election and to undertake a pre-election conference.

the Article pertains. Under the new rules. The Med-Arbiter. that which was issued on November 18. Procedure. shall have twenty (20) working days from submission of the case for resolution within which to dismiss or grant the petition. Petitioner is mistaken. In a petition filed by a legitimate organization involving an unorganized establishment. including orders granting motions for intervention issued after an order calling for a certification election. upon receipt of the assigned petition. but to the order granting the petition for certification election -. The filing of the appeal from the decision of the Med-Arbiter stays the holding of any certification election. Expediting such selection process advances the primacy of free collective bargaining. interlocutory orders issued by the medarbiter prior to the grant or denial of the petition.” 58 . 10. “In a petition involving an organized establishment or enterprise where the majority status of the incumbent collective bargaining union is questioned through a verified petition by a legitimate labor organization. However. Such appeal shall be decided within fifteen (15) calendar days. the Regional Director shall assign the case to a Med-Arbiter for appropriate action. in accordance with the State’s policy to “promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining”. This new rule.Whether or not the holding of the certification election was stayed by petitioner’s appeal of the medarbiter’s notation on the Motion to Include the Probationary and Substitute Employees in the List of Qualified Voters.in the present case. Not all the orders issued by a med-arbiter are appealable.” This provision is supplemented by Section 10 of Rule V of Book Five of the 1992 Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. the Med-Arbiter shall immediately order the certification election by secret ballot if the petition is filed x x x. shall not be appealable. not just to any of the med-arbiter’s orders like the subject notation. an appeal of a med-arbiter’s order to hold a certification election will not stay the holding thereof where the employer company is an unorganized establishment. and “to ensure the participation of workers in decision and policy-making processes affecting their rights. Under Article 259 of the Labor Code. Decision of the Secretary final and inappealable. duties and welfare.– Upon receipt of a petition. This intent is manifested by the issuance of Department Order No. 6. petitioner insists that its appeal of the denial should have stayed the holding of the certification election. Stating that such appeal stays the holding of a certification election. Hence. In fact. any issue arising therefrom may be raised in the appeal on the decision granting or denying the petition. This is an unmistakable inference from a reading of Sections 6 and 7 of the implementing rules: “SEC. therefore. the Med-Arbiter shall immediately order the conduct of a certification election.” Petitioner argues that the med-arbiter’s handwritten notation denying its Motion was the order referred to by Article 259. Ruling: The SC held that the holding of the certification election was not stayed by petitioner’s appeal of the medarbiter’s notation on the Motion.” Hence. 40. The intention of the law is to limit the grounds for appeal that may stay the holding of a certification election. The decision of the Secretary shall be final and inappealable. “SEC. 7 . Appeal. Article 259 clearly speaks of the “order x x x of the election. the later provision reads: “Sec. and where no union has yet been duly recognized or certified as a bargaining representative. “any party to an election may appeal the order or results of the election as determined by the Med-Arbiter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment on the grounds that the rules and regulations or parts thereof established by the Secretary of Labor and Employment for the conduct of the election have been violated.– Any aggrieved party may appeal the order of the Med-Arbiter to the Secretary on the ground that the rules and regulations or parts thereof established by the Secretary for the conduct of election have been violated. 1991.– The Secretary shall have fifteen (15) calendar days within which to decide the appeal from receipt of the records of the case. decreases or limits the appeals that may impede the selection by employees of their bargaining representative.

Thereafter. but a stranger which had no right to interfere therein. The Union moved for the reconsideration of this Order. Petitioner was not such a party to the proceedings. The NCMB summoned both parties and held a series of dialogues. The Labor Code states that any party to an election may appeal the decision of the med-arbiter. Petitioner correctly points out that labor disputes naturally 59 . 1997. Issue: Whether or not the order of the SOLE for payroll reinstatement is “called for the circumstance” of this case. The Union. A Notice of Strike was thereafter filed on September 29. The CA held that the challenged order is merely an error of judgment and not a grave abuse of discretion and that payroll reinstatement is not prohibited by law.pertaining to the incidental matter of the list of voters -. NO. but that they were merely asking for the Hotel to engage in collective bargaining negotiations with the Union for its members only and not for all the rank and file employees of the Hotel. 1997. 1997. and issued an order certifying the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. On appeal. the employer has no standing to question the election. however. G. The parties are enjoined from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation. the Union staged a strike against the Hotel. the Union announced that it was taking a strike vote. Petitioner union filed a petition for a certification election so that it may be declared the exclusive bargaining representative of the Hotel’s employees for the purpose of collective bargaining. 1997. The striking officers and members of the union were also directed to return to work and the Hotel to accept them back under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike. the SOLE directed that the strikers be reinstated only in the payroll. on August 25. the CA affirmed the order of the SOLE for payroll reinstatement. On November 29. Ruling: The SC held that there is no showing that the facts called for payroll reinstatement as an alternative remedy. On September 18. 1997. the appeal of the med-arbiter’s January 13. the first of which was on October 6. which is the sole concern of the workers. but its motion was denied. the SOLE issued another order modifying the order earlier issued. accused the Hotel of illegally dismissing the workers.should not stay the holding of the certification election. the Hotel received a letter from the Union stating that they were not giving the Hotel a notice to bargain. Numerous confrontations between the two parties followed. with the NCMB for the Hotel’s alleged “refusal to bargain” and for alleged acts of unfair labor practice. respondent hotel write to the union stating that the Hotel cannot recognize it as the employees’ bargaining agent since its petition for certification election had been earlier dismissed by the DOLE. Instead of an actual return to work. MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION VS. The union members reported for work the day after in received the order but the Hotel refused to accept the returning workers and instead filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the SOLE’s Order. 140518.Consequently. After a few months. In reply. petitioner union sent a letter to the Hotel informing it of its desire to negotiate for a collective bargaining agreement. however. Petition is denied. The Hotel claims that the strike was illegal and it had to dismiss some employees for their participation in the allegedly illegal concerted activity.R. More important. DECEMBER 16. A strained relationship between the striking employees and management is no reason for payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement. 2004 Facts: On November 11. 1992 handwritten notation -. on the other hand. The petition was dismissed by the DOLE on January 15. COURT OF APPEALS. creating an obvious strain between them. On that same day. The SOLE then assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. unless it filed a petition for a certification election pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code. 1997. but may be “called for” under certain circumstances. 1996.

the government must still perform its function and apply the law. therefore. This is in keeping with the rationale that any work stoppage or slowdown in that particular industry can be inimical to the national economy. This Court must point out that the law uses the precise phrase of “under the same terms and conditions. this Court has held that when an official by-passes the law on the asserted ground of attaining a laudable objective. As a general rule. 151379. evident from the foregoing that the Secretary’s subsequent order for mere payroll reinstatement constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. OF LABOR. paragraph (g) of the Labor Code. Under Article 263(g). Indeed. the State encourages an environment wherein employers and employees themselves must deal with their problems in a manner that mutually suits them best. Article 263. UNIVERSITY OF IMMACULATE CONCEPCION VS. all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. the same will not be maintained if the intendment or purpose of the law would be defeated. mode of dispute settlement is the general rule. especially if. which was further echoed in Article 211 of the Labor Code. Time and again. the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. this Court has always recognized the “great breadth of discretion” by the Secretary once he assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute. provides an exception: (g) When. SEC. the Secretary must always keep in mind the purpose of the law. This Court reiterates that this law was written as a means to be used by the State to protect itself from an emergency or crisis. which it normally incurs during a work stoppage or slowdown. a voluntary. which allows the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute involving an industry indispensable to the national interest. x xx x This provision is viewed as an exercise of the police power of the State. the relations between the strikers and the non-strikers will similarly be tense. there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. It is.” revealing that it contemplates only actual reinstatement. as in the UST case aforementioned. It is not for labor. Nevertheless. NO. It was an error on the part of the Court of Appeals to view the assumption order of the Secretary as a measure to protect the striking workers from any retaliatory action from the Hotel. national interest is involved. A prolonged strike or lockout can be inimical to the national economy and.R. therefore. None appears to have been established in this case. However. JANUARY 14. the situation is imbued with public necessity and involves the right of the State and the public to self-protection. in his opinion. payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement is a departure from the rule in these cases and there must be showing of special circumstances rendering actual reinstatement impracticable. Petition is granted. Hence. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. 2005 Facts: 60 . as in this case. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification. However. and that in most strikes. instead of compulsory. all workers must immediately return to work and all employers must readmit all of them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.involve strained relations between labor and management. It is clear that Article 263(g) was not written to protect labor from the excesses of management. or otherwise not conducive to attaining the purpose of the law in providing for assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in a labor dispute that affects the national interest. This is the basic policy embodied in Article XIII. Even in the exercise of his discretion under Article 236(g). G. Section 3 of the Constitution. nor is it for management. nor was it written to ease management from expenses. Bitter labor disputes always leave an aftermath of strong emotions and unpleasant situations.

the petitioner school sent notices of termination to the individual respondents. the school was directed to reinstate the individual respondents under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the labor dispute. On appeal. Anent the motion for reconsideration filed by the union. Consequently.During the negotiations for the CBA between petitioner school and its union. the school’s motion was denied by the SOLE. The SOLE also stated therein that the effects of the termination from employment of these individual respondents be suspended pending the determination of the legality thereof. the SOLE issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute. the individual respondents remained steadfast in their claim that they could still retain their confidential positions while being members or officers of the Union. The union alleged that the school’s act of terminating the individual respondents is in violation of the Order of the SOLE. The 3 rd order of the SOLE directed the school to place the 12 terminated employees under payroll reinstatement until the validity of their termination is finally resolved. It argued that the SOLE’s Order directing the reinstatement of the individual respondents would render nugatory the decision of the panel of voluntary arbitrators to exclude them from the collective bargaining unit. thereafter. Pending. The union then filed another notice of strike. Thereafter. and all workers were directed to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours upon receipt of this Order and for Management to accept them back under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike. The SOLE issued another Order reiterating the directives contained in the earlier Order. Accounting Personnel d. while included the accounting clerks and the accounting staff member in the bargaining unit. the union went on strike. Parties were also directed to submit their respective position papers. Hence. Petitioner school then furnished copies of the panel’s denial of the motion for reconsideration and the Decision to the individual respondents. Whether or not the order of the SOLE for payroll reinstatement is “called for the circumstance” of this case. the school filed another which made the SOLE modify the two previous orders. Hence. Guidance Counselors This matter was submitted for voluntary arbitration. Secretaries b. then they cannot be covered by the Secretary’s assumption order. the resolution of its motion. Hence. this time citing as a reason the petitioner school’s termination of the individual respondents. However. During the thirty (30) day cooling-off period. Thereafter. Parties were further directed to cease and desist from committing any or all acts that might exacerbate the situation. registrars. With its 2 nd MR denied. the CA dismissed the petition of the school for lack of merit and likewise denied its MR. however. chief of the accounting department. it filed a notice of strike with the NCMB on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice. moved to reconsider the aforesaid 2 nd order of the SOLE. The school. this petition. Registrars c. the panel of voluntary arbitrators denied the same. wherein the latter declared that the decision of the panel of voluntary arbitrators to exclude the individual respondents from the collective bargaining unit did not authorize the school to terminate their employment. one item was left unresolved and this was the inclusion or exclusion of the following positions in the scope of the bargaining unit: a. The panel of voluntary arbitrators rendered a decision excluding the above-mentioned secretaries. The union moved for the reconsideration of the above decision. Whether or not the SOLE can take cognizance of an issue involving employees who are not part of the bargaining unit. The school contends that the Secretary cannot take cognizance of an issue involving employees who are not part of the bargaining unit. Issues: 1. The petitioner school relayed to these employees that they could not remain as confidential employees and at the same time as members or officers of the Union. the petitioner school gave the abovementioned individual respondents two choices: to resign from the union and remain employed as confidential employees or resign from their confidential positions and remain members of the union. 61 . However. two union members were dismissed by petitioner. 2. It insists that since the individual respondents had already been excluded from the bargaining unit by a final and executory order by the panel of voluntary arbitrators. cashiers and guidance counselors from the coverage of the bargaining unit.

The payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement ordered in these cases. are part of the bargaining unit. The SC held that the order of the SOLE for payroll reinstatement is “called for the circumstance” of this case. these acts will not in any way help in the early resolution of the labor dispute. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. This is consistent with the idea that any work stoppage or slowdown in that particular industry can be detrimental to the national interest. payroll reinstatement must rest on special circumstances that render actual reinstatement impracticable or otherwise not conducive to attaining the purposes of the law. This Court sees no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the SOLE in ordering the same. in his opinion. CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER VS. G. NLRC. It is clear that the actions of both parties merely served to complicate and aggravate the aready strained labormanagement relations. APRIL 26. the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. NO.R. the Secretary did not exceed her jurisdiction. It must be pointed out that one of the substantive evils which Article 263(g) of the Labor Code seeks to curb is the exacerbation of a labor dispute to the further detriment of the national interest. The decision of the CA is affirmed. 2. Although the SC it recognizes the exercise of management prerogatives and it often declines to interfere with the legitimate business decisions of the employer. which states: (g) When. It is not a question anymore of whether or not the terminated employees. thereby rendering their actual and physical reinstatement impracticable and more likely to exacerbate the situation. The phrase “under the same terms and conditions” makes it clear that the norm is actual reinstatement. this privilege is not absolute. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification. Indeed. nor did the Secretary gravely abuse the same. therefore. said union requested for a meeting 62 . but subject to exceptions. appears justified as an exception to the rule until the validity of their termination is finally resolved. the individual respondents herein. all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. As an exception to the rule. there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. The University’s act of suspending and terminating union members and the Union’s act of filing another Notice of Strike after this Office has assumed jurisdiction are certainly in conflict with the status quo ante. Article 263(g) of the Labor Code states that all workers must immediately return to work and all employers must readmit all of them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. x x x When the Secretary of Labor ordered the school to suspend the effect of the termination of the individual respondents. The SC held that the contention of the school is incorrect. it is clear that the act of the school of dismissing the individual respondents from their employment became the impetus for the union to declare a second notice of strike. 147080. 2005 Facts: After the respondent union was able to get a Supreme Court decision dismissing its rival union’s petition for certification election was dismissed and ordering petitioner company to negotiate a CBA with respondent union as the certified bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees.Ruling: 1. By any standards. Any act committed during the pendency of the dispute that tends to give rise to further contentious issues or increase the tensions between the parties should be considered an act of exacerbation and should not be allowed. One of these exceptions is when the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over labor disputes involving industries indispensable to the national interest under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. The “superseding circumstances” mentioned by the SOLE no doubt refer to the final decision of the panel of arbitrators as to the confidential nature of the positions of the twelve private respondents.

Hence. the Union filed an ex parte motion with the DOLE. The use of the word “shall” in the rules. 1997. Quezon City on November 10. praying for its assumption of jurisdiction over the dispute. The petitioner asserts that the NLRC and the CA erred in holding that the submission of a notice of a strike vote to the Regional Branch of the NCMB as required by Section 7. Petitioner elevated its cause to the CA which in turn dismissed the petition and affirmed the ruling of the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter ruled that no voting had taken place on November 10. against the hospital director/president and other responsible corporate officers for their continuous refusal. petitioner company rejected the proposed meeting. coercion on employees and interference/restraint to self-organization. on December 1. the Labor Arbiter ruled in the affirmative and held that the strike staged by respondent union was illegal and subsequently. the Regional Director of the DOLE denied the petition of petitioner for the cancellation of the respondent Union’s certificate of registration. Further. 1997. equitable and expeditious reliefs in the premises. the officers and members of the Union stopped their strike and returned to work. the union officers lost their employment status with petitioner. On November 28. is merely directory and not mandatory. In their position paper. and attested that no secret balloting took place in the said premises. the NLRC reversed the ruling of the LA and petitioner’s MR was likewise denied. the officers and members of the Union staged a strike. As to the petition of petitioner to declare the union’s striker illegal. and the results were as follows: 156 members voted to strike. The SOLE then assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and directed all striking workers to return to work within 24 hours and the management to resume normal operations and accept back all striking workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike.with the petitioner company to discuss matters pertaining to a negotiation for a CBA. and the union was engaged in a strike which has been declared illegal by the NLRC. not limited to contempt and other penalties. moreover. indubitably indicates the mandatory nature of the respondent Union’s duty to submit the said notice of strike vote. on the claim that it was a violation of Republic Act No. Issue: Whether or not the strike staged by the union was legal. the respondents appended the joint affidavit of the Union president and those members who alleged that they had cast their votes during the strike vote held on November 10. Ruling: The SC held that the strike staged by the union was illegal. Another also attested that his signature was forged while others declared that they were not union members yet their signatures were included in the strike vote attendance. and eight votes were spoiled. Instead of filing a motion with the SOLE for the enforcement of the SC decision. The Union likewise prayed for the imposition of appropriate legal sanctions. in bad faith. 1997 at the parking lot in front of the petitioner’s premises. Petitioner company also filed a Petition for the Cancellation of the Union’s Certificate of Registration with the DOLE on the ground that the union failed for several years to submit financial statements as required by law. to bargain collectively with the Union. the union filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB on the grounds of refusal to bargain. Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules of the NLRC which reads: 63 . 14 members cast negative votes. the petitioner filed a petition to declare the strike illegal with the NLRC where it appended affidavits of a number of persons who where in at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue. In obedience to the order of the SOLE. the Union submitted to the NCMB the minutes of the alleged strike vote purportedly held on November 10. to adjudge the same hospital director/president and other corporate officers guilty of unfair labor practices. at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue. For its part. no notice of such voting was furnished to the NCMB at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to the intended holding of the strike vote. After a series of fruitless conferences before the NCMB. Thereafter. On appeal. conformably with the decision of the Court. Quezon City. 1997. Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. Subsequently. and for both parties to submit their respective proposals for the CBA. petitioner company filed a letter with the NCMB requesting that the Notice of Strike be dismissed because the union failed to furnish the agency with a copy of a notice of meeting where the strike vote was conducted. 1997. 6713 and that the Union was not a legitimate one. It appears that 178 out of the 300 union members participated therein. Apparently unaware of the petition. The respondent Union failed to comply with the second paragraph of Section 10. this petition. the petitioner avers. 1997. In the meantime. and for other just. However. the Union reiterated its proposal for CBA negotiations but to no avail. parties are directed to cease and desist from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation.

the parties shall be encouraged to submit their dispute for voluntary arbitration. the NCMB would be unable to supervise the holding of the same. The failure of a union to comply with the requirement of the giving of notice to the NCMB at least 64 . – A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for the purpose. at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party. shall call the parties to a conference at the soonest possible time in order to actively assist them in exploring all possibilities for amicable settlement. and if the requisite number of votes is obtained. the Court enumerated the notices required by Article 263 of the Labor Code and the Implementing Rules. and at the same time. at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to such meeting. to give it ample time to prepare for the deployment of the requisite personnel. 5) The result of the strike vote should be reported to the NCMB at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout. specifically the Regional Branch of the NCMB. while the seven-day strike ban is intended to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members. the NCMB cannot determine for itself whether to supervise a strike vote meeting or not and insure its peaceful and regular conduct. and (c) should the NCMB decide on its own initiative or upon the request of an interested party including the employer. In the event that the report is false. with the required contents. indeed. in the case of union busting where the union’s existence is threatened. A union is mandated to notify the NCMB of an impending dispute in a particular bargaining unit via a notice of strike.Strike or lockout vote. subject to the cooling-off period. the union or the employer shall furnish the regional branch of the Board and notice of meetings referred to in the preceding paragraph at least twentyfour (24) hours before such meetings as well as the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout. However. the NCMB. including peace officers if need be. The decision to declare a strike requires the secret-ballot approval of majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned. if and when it decides to exercise its power of supervision. nevertheless. which include the 24-hour prior notice to the NCMB: 1) A notice of strike. However. NLRC. place and time of the meeting of the union members for the conduct of a strike vote. Thereafter. Although the second paragraph of Section 10 of the said Rule is not provided in the Labor Code of the Philippines. Unless the NCMB is notified of the date. should be filed with the DOLE. with a 24hour prior notice to NCMB. paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code. a union intending to stage a strike is mandated to notify the NCMB of the meeting for the conduct of strike vote. copy furnished the employer of the union. 2) A cooling-off period must be observed between the filing of notice and the actual execution of the strike thirty (30) days in case of bargaining deadlock and fifteen (15) days in case of unfair labor practice. discourage wildcat strikes. if the parties refuse. a strike may ensue. place. supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. the seven-day period affords the members an opportunity to take the appropriate remedy before it is too late. The purpose of the strike vote is to ensure that the decision to strike broadly rests with the majority of the union members in general and not with a mere minority. a strike vote should be taken by secret balloting. … 4) Before a strike is actually commenced. and time thereof. through its conciliator-mediators. (b) give the NCMB ample time to decide on whether or not there is a need to supervise the conduct of the strike vote to prevent any acts of violence and/or irregularities attendant thereto. A strike vote report submitted to the NCMB at least seven days prior to the intended date of strike ensures that a strike vote was.Section 10. corporation or association or the partners obtained by a secret ballot in a meeting called for the purpose. taken. the cooling-off period need not be observed. to supervise the strike vote. Unless and until the NCMB is notified at least 24 hours of the union’s decision to conduct a strike vote. In National Federation of Labor v. Aside from the mandatory notices embedded in Article 263. The requirement of giving notice of the conduct of a strike vote to the NCMB at least 24 hours before the meeting for the said purpose is designed to (a) inform the NCMB of the intent of the union to conduct a strike vote. The 15 to 30 day cooling-off period is designed to afford the parties the opportunity to amicably resolve the dispute with the assistance of the NCMB conciliator/mediator. the same was incorporated in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code and has the force and effect of law. union bossism and even corruption. In the event of the failure in the conciliation/mediation proceedings. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the Board of Directors of the employer. In every case. the union may hold a strike vote. The regional branch of the Board may. subject to the cooling-off period provided in this Rule. and the date.

The Court of Appeals granted the petition and the order of the Secretary was set aside. according to the principles of justice and one’s ideas of what is right and proper under the circumstances. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. G. Discretion is defined as the act or the liberty to decide. On 31 December 2002. Thereupon it filed a Notice of Strike with the NCM. it is quite apparent that no 65 . Thus. these efforts proved futile. JULY 14. were held between the parties. and according to law. Where anything is left to any person to be done according to his discretion. Work stoppage at PLDT will also adversely effect the ordinary dayto-day life of the public in areas of its franchise. However. 162783. From the foregoing. Petition is granted. Communication is also a component of state security. The members of respondent union learned that a redundancy program would be implemented by the petitioner. it filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals. conducted by the NCMB. PLDT VS.R. However. Private respondent Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (MKP) is a labor union of rank and file employees in PLDT. A number of conciliation meetings.24 hours prior to the holding of a strike vote meeting will render the subsequent strike staged by the union illegal. MANGGAGAW NG KOMUNIKASYON SA PILIPINAS. 263(g) of the Labor Code and ordered all striking workers to return to work within twenty four (24) hours from receipt of the order. lest the Secretary would be above the law. without wilfullness or favor. On 23 December 2002. commerce. The employer is hereby enjoined to accept the striking workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike and the parties are likewise directed to cease and desist from committing any act that might worsen the situation. the application of this power is not without limitation. the private respondent staged a strike. When the Secretary exercises the powers granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. 2005 Facts: Petitioner PLDT is a domestic corporation engaged in the telecommunications business. Issue: Whether the order of the Secretary of DOLE excluding from the return-to-work order the workers dismissed due to the redundancy program of petitioner. indeed. and industry specially at this time of globalized economy where information is vital to economic survival. three hundred eighty three (383) union members were terminated from service pursuant to PLDT’s redundancy program. are valid or not? Ruling: The SC held that the order of the SOLE is invalid. the SOLE certified the labor dispute at the PLDT to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Art. except those who were terminated due to redundancy. he is. NO. On 02 January 2003. the law intends it must be done with a sound discretion. granted great breadth of discretion. Hence this petition. As the private respondent had no other plain. a portion of the which reads: That PLDT’s operations is impressed with public and national interest as communication plays a vital role in furtherance of trade. the SOLE issued an Order.

the wide latitude of discretion given the Secretary under Art. This is the status quo that must be maintained. the same will not be maintained if the intendment or purpose of the law would be defeated. VENUS. The Board of Directors of petitioner LRTA decided not to renew the contract with petitioner METRO and directed the LRTA management instead to 66 . JR. MARCH 24. and subsequently on a monthly basis. The sheriffs thus posted the Order in the different stations/terminals of the light rail transit system.” The SOLE’s order of assumption of jurisdiction was personally served on the Union through its members and officers. NO. As Article 263(g) is clear and unequivocal in stating that ALL striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit ALL workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. On the same day. Assumption of jurisdiction over a labor dispute. The power supply switches in the different light rail transit substations were turned off. 163782. initially on a yearly basis. G. LTRA and METRO continued with their distinct and separate juridical personalities.R. the Union struck. the union filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB against METRO on account of a deadlock in the CBA. Hence. the Order of assumption of jurisdiction was published in newspapers. 2006 Facts: Petitioner LTRA. on 22 December 2002. The members of the Union picketed the various substations. but the latter refused to receive the same. failed to return to work. 263(g) shall and must be within the sphere of law.. METRO then hired its own employees including herein private respondents. the SOLE issued on that same day an assumption of jurisdiction order directing all the striking employees “to return to work immediately upon receipt of this Order and for the Company to accept them back under the same terms and conditions of employment prevailing prior to the strike. – NFL – KMU (Union). Thus. or as in this case the certification of the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. Time and again. – National Federation of Labor. LTRA then. As the strike adversely affected the mobility of the commuting public. constructed a light rail transit system from Monumento in Kalookan City to Baclaran in Parañaque. then the unmistakable mandate must be followed by the Secretary. The decision of the CA is affirmed. LTRA purchased the shares of stocks in petitioner METRO. Petitioner METRO thereafter entered into a 10-year CBA with Pinag-isang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa METRO. then the condition prevailing before it. Since the strike was held on the aforementioned date. Despite the issuance. when the CBA expired. the members of the private respondent who were dismissed due to alleged redundancy were still employed by the petitioner and holding their respective positions. they renewed the same. in 1989. the same must be within the confines of law. contracted petitioner METRO to operate and manage the Metro manila Light Rail Transit System. including herein private respondent workers. must be maintained. posting.matter how broad the exercise of discretion is. the certified exclusive collective bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of petitioner METRO. otherwise known as PIGLAS-METRO. Thus. the Union officers and members. INC. and publication of the assumption of jurisdiction and return to work order. However. Further. LIGHT RAILWAY TRANSIT VS. The Records would show that the strike occurred on 23 December 2002. Metro Manila. Article 263(g) directs that the employer must readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. always co-exists with an order for workers to return to work immediately and for employers to readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. They completely paralyzed the operations of the entire light rail transit system. which was the condition present on 22 December 2002. Inc. In the meantime. Undoubtedly. In July 2000. the Agreement for the Management and Operation of the Metro Manila Light Rail Transit System between petitioners LRTA and METRO expired. private respondents were considered dismissed from employment. a government corporation. this Court has held that when an official bypasses the law on the asserted ground of attaining a laudable objective.

The suit against LRTA was dismissed since “LRTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation created by virtue of Executive Order No. Petitioner METRO maintains that private respondent workers were not illegally dismissed but should be deemed to have abandoned their jobs after defying the assumption of jurisdiction and return-to-work order issued by the Labor Secretary. 2000. Neither could they be considered as having abandoned their work. 169632. private respondent workers could not have defied the return-to-work order of the SOLE simply because they were dismissed immediately. For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment. Hence. On the same day also. which was only five days.R. Ruling: The SC held that private respondents were not illegally dismissed. 2000. private respondent workers were dismissed. this petition. COURT OF APPEALS. unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. 603 with an original charter”10 and “it had no participation whatsoever with the termination of complainants’ employment. no lockout” clause and a grievance machinery procedure to resolve management-labor disputes. Thus petitioner METRO is guilty of illegal dismissal. there must be a deliberate. In Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. Complementary to said provisions is Section 3 of Article VIII of the CBA providing for salary increases for School Years (SY) 20002003. which. it was further held – The contention of the petitioner that the private respondents abandoned their position is also not acceptable. The CA. In the instant case. such increase to take the form of either a lump sum or a percentage of the tuition incremental proceeds (TIP). the NLRC found that the striking workers failed to heed the return to work order and reversed and set aside the decision of the labor arbiter. the parties entered into a 5-year CBA. If petitioner METRO did not dismiss the strikers right away.” In Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. MARCH 28. in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. the said order of assumption of jurisdiction was duly published on July 27. 2000. 2000. Issue: Whether or not private respondents were illegally dismissed. among other things. NO.. on July 26. provided that the economic provisions thereof shall have a period of three (3) years or up to 2003. it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. An employee who forthwith takes steps to protest his lay-off cannot by any logic be said to have abandoned his work. The LA ruled in favor of the private respondents and held that they were illegally dismissed. This refusal must be clearly established. G. however. The private respondents’ MR was also denied by the NLRC. including a voluntary arbitration mechanism should the grievance 67 . mere absence is not sufficient. reversed the ruling of the NLRC and declared the workers’ dismissal as illegal. 2000.immediately take over the management and operation of the light rail transit system to avert the mass transportation crisis. Private respondents then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before NLRC and impleaded both petitioners LRTA and METRO. and instead accepted them back to work. The CBA contained a “no strike. on July 27. On appeal. Further. pierced the veil of separate corporate personality and held the LRTA and METRO as jointly liable for back wages. NLRC. UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW VS. 2006 Facts: On July 27. The said order was served and posted by the sheriffs of the Department of Labor and Employment the following day. The records show that the assumption of jurisdiction and return-to-work order was issued by the SOLE on July 25. Decision of the CA is affirmed. the management agreement between petitioners LRTA and METRO could still have been extended and the workers would still have had work to return to. v. on the other hand. even before they could obey the said order. As we stressed in a recent case. submit that they could not immediately return to work as the light rail transit system had ceased its operations. Private respondent workers. The SC said that the five-day period for the strikers to obey the Order of the Secretary of Justice and return to work was not sufficient as “some of them may have left Metro Manila and did not have enough time to return during the period given by petitioner.

main entrance. the University filed a Petition to Declare Illegal Strike and Loss of Employment Status at the NLRC. Reyes and Rocky M. the parties again took initial steps to negotiate the new CBA but said attempts proved futile. rendered a decision directed to conclude a memorandum of agreement embodying the foregoing dispositions to be appended to the current CBA. particularly the Sheriff’s Report. Issue: Whether or not the strike staged by the union was illegal.m. the Union staged a strike. on April 25. On the same day – April 7. and at the union’s office. Thereafter. the University notified the Union that it was pulling out of the negotiations because of the strike. however. When the sheriffs tried to serve the order to the union’s vice president. no lockout” clause of the parties’ CBA. 2003 strike and consequently. The NCMB. in this case. While the CA affirmed the rest of the SOLE’s decision on the economic issues. To controvert the presumption arising therefrom. On April 22. In the absence of contrary evidence. In reaction. The CA. Hence. Despite preventive mediation proceedings. In the meantime. the Union filed a Notice of Strike before the NCMB which was expectedly opposed by the University in a Motion to Strike Out Notice of Strike and to Refer the Dispute to Voluntary Arbitration. It bears stressing that said report is an official statement by the sheriff of his acts under the writs and processes issued by the court. the issue was not resolved. a presumption exists that a sheriff has regularly performed his official duty. The university requested that this case be consolidated with the earlier case pending before the SOLE. the university served notices of termination to the union officers who were declared by the CA as deemed to have lost their employment status. Consequently. invoking the “No strike. 2005. in obedience to its directive and in conformity with law. this time on ground of alleged union busting. it would be considered received by the Union. the parties commenced negotiations for the economic provisions for the remaining two years. 68 . Sheriffs Francisco L. it. there must be clear and convincing evidence. The sheriffs explained to the VP that even if she refused to acknowledge receipt of the order. The parties were also directed to submit their respective position papers. however. Pursuant to the CBA. thus the need to undergo preventive mediation proceedings before the NCMB. the Union went on strike. the SOLE. which granted its appeal.committee fail to satisfactorily settle such disputes. on the ground that only the union president us authorized to receive such order. They also served the order to the university. Hence. The LA.. the parties could not agree on the manner of computing the TIP. Sheriff Reyes further informed the Union that once the sheriffs post the order. 2003. which prompted the union to declare a bargaining deadlock grounded on the parties’ failure to arrive at a mutually acceptable position on the manner of computing the 70% of the net TIP to be allotted for salary and other benefits for SY2003-2004 and SY2004-2005. 2003. 2005. The university then elevated the issue to the CA. the same refused. the CA directed the parties to refer the economic issues of the CBA to voluntary arbitration. the SOLE was remiss in disregarding the sheriff’s report. and dismissing the university’s petition to declare the strike illegal. failed to resolve the University’s motion. On September 19. Francisco had arrived at San Agustin University to serve the SOLE’s order on the Union. As we see it. SY2003-2004 and SY2004-2005. this petition. thereafter. stood firm in its finding that the strike conducted by the petitioner Union was illegal and its officers were deemed to have lost their employment status. the same would be considered served. i. which the LA granted. Ruling: The SC held that the strike was illegal. the Union went ahead with the strike. The SC found the CA’s conclusions to be well supported by evidence.e. however. the union officers are deemed to have lost their employment status. On September 24. The University moved for a reconsideration of the said decision but its motion was denied by the SOLE. particularly the formula to be used in computing the share of the employees in the tuition fee increase for Academic Year 2003-2004. At 6:45 a. Thereafter. While both parties sought reconsideration of the CA’s decision. 2005 – in response to the University’s action. At around 5:25 p. the CA found merit on the university’s MR and thereby resolved that the economic issues on the ground that said issues were proper subject of the grievance machinery as embodied in the parties’ CBA. acting on the parties’ MRs. The parties then made a joint request for the SOLE to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. the sheriffs posted copies of the order at the main gate of the university. Notwithstanding the sheriffs’ advice as to the legal implication of the Union’s refusal to be served with the order. The SOLE then assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and strictly enjoined and the parties are directed to cease and desist from committing any act that might exacerbate the situation.. reversed the SOLE’s ruling as to the legality of the September 19. of the same day. During the negotiations.m. the Union president arrived at the respondent University’s premises and received the order from the sheriffs. the Union filed with the NCMB a second notice of strike.

Conclusively. fault-finding. On March 24. in his opinion. On January 21. private respondent Union filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal. a union member. the representatives of the petitioner agreed and guaranteed that there will be no termination of the services of private respondents during the pendency of the case. Strikes. 1999. which reads: Art. and lockouts. 1998. Petition is denied. . such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout. private respondent union filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB on the ground of unfair labor practice. Moreover. and particularly. there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. Assumption of jurisdiction over a labor dispute. a Strike Vote was conducted and supervised by NCMB personnel. private respondent Jose Lanorias. all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. On December 10. Hence. by their act of disregarding said AJO made said strike illegal. 150437. or the certification of the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. When the Secretary exercises these powers. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. 1998. 1998. was 69 . with the reservation of the management prerogative to issue memos to erring employees for the infraction. or violation of company policies. the petitioner. Ernesto Garcia. the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. picketing. COURT OF APPEALS. in a conciliation conference. Thus. 1999. Consequently. 1998. 2006 Facts: Sometime in March 1998. and union busting through coercion and interference with union affairs. when the SOLE assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to national interest or certifies the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. and was designated as PLAC Local 460 Sukhothai Restaurant Chapter (Union).R. In view of this termination. through its president. 1999. thereby agreeing to submit the issue of unfair labor practice – the subject matter of the foregoing Notice of Strike and the Strike Vote – for voluntary arbitration with a view to prevent the strike. he is granted great breadth of discretion in order to find a solution to a labor dispute. SUKHOTAI CUISINE & RESTAURANT VS. due to an alleged petty quarrel with a co-employee in February 1999. a union member. On the following day. 2003 was illegal. the Union was not able to sufficiently dispute the truth of the narration of facts contained in the sheriff’s report. In the morning of June 24. or on December 11. all striking workers shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. it was not unreasonable for the CA to conclude that there was a deliberate intent by the Union and its officers to disregard the AJO and proceed with their strike. during the pendency of the voluntary arbitration proceedings. the Union officers were deemed to have lost their employment status for having knowingly participated in said illegal act. NO. the SC saw no reversible error in the CA’s finding that the strike of September 19. G. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification.To be sure. dismissed Eugene Lucente. the majority of the employees of the petitioner company organized themselves into a union which affiliated with the Philippine Labor Alliance Council (PLAC). and the results of the vote were submitted to the NCMB on December 21. On December 3. if one had already taken place. which. always co-exists with an order for workers to return to work immediately and for employers to readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The AJO was issued by the SOLE pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. JULY 17. 263. acts of harassment. the petitioner and the Union entered into a Submission Agreement.… (g) When. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. The most obvious of these powers is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or the lifting thereof if one has already taken place.

1998 in that no termination shall be effected during the voluntary arbitration proceedings and. was converted into a “sit-down strike. the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision declaring the strike illegal. seeking to declare the strike illegal. 1999 since the same issues of unfair labor practice were involved and that unfair labor practices are continuing offenses. thus. that the petitioner violated the Submission Agreement dated December 10. which in turn. respondent Billy Bacus. the petitioner filed a complaint for illegal strike with the NLRC against private respondents.” On the next day.” On June 25. and that the re-filing of a Notice of Strike on June 25. Respondents insist that the filing of the Notice of Strike on December 3. 25. and. the Union can take action immediately. conferred with Ernesto Garcia and protested Lanorias’s dismissal. this petition. according to the respondents. 1998. including the obstruction of free ingress and egress of the premises. instead of resorting to a strike. On appeal by the union. 1999. the NLRC reversed the decision of the LA and dismissed the complaint of illegal strike. in compliance with the orders of the Labor Arbiter. The SC held that the strike staged by the private respondents is illegal. 1998 and December 11. the union vice-president. who participated in the commission of illegal acts. Whether or not private respondents were deemed to have lost their employment status by participating in the commission of illegal acts during the strike. 1999. the same was transformed into an “actual strike. and threat inflicted upon non-striking employees. petitioner company appealed to the CA. 1999 Submission Agreement. 1999 cured the defect of non-compliance with the mandatory requirements. the strike is still illegal due to the commission of prohibited acts. respondents invoke Article 263(f) in that the decision to strike is valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike vote was taken. to have lost their employment status. private respondents should have availed of the proper legal remedies such as the filing of complaints for illegal suspension or illegal dismissal with the NLRC. and that even if private respondents complied with all the requisites of a valid strike. Furthermore. such as acts of harassment. even assuming for the sake of argument that the Notice of Strike and Strike Vote in December 1998 cannot be made to apply to the concerted actions in June 1999. these requirements may nonetheless be dispensed with since the petitioner is guilty of union busting and. and union busting through coercion and interference with union affairs. and their observation of the 15-day cooling-off period in case of unfair labor practice as well as the seven-day reporting period of the results of the strike vote. a Notice of Strike was re-filed by the private respondents and the protest. Subsequently. intimidation. the root causes of the controversy are the petition for certification election and petition for cancellation of union registration which were then pending before the Department of Labor as well as the issue on unfair labor practice then pending before the voluntary arbitrator. 1999. the NLRC held that the petitioner is guilty of union busting. that the issuance of memos by the petitioner to instill discipline on erring employees is a lawful exercise of management prerogative and do not amount to acts of unfair labor practice. or on June 26. Ruling 1. and 26. and the employment of union officers and all individual respondents are deemed validly terminated in accordance with law. 70 .relieved from his post. affidavits of witnesses. that the Notice of Strike and Strike Vote dated December 3. 1998: the commission of unfair labor practices. After its MR was denied by the NLRC. In overruling the Labor Arbiter. respectively. The issue to be resolved under those proceedings pertained to the very same issues stated in the Notice of Strike of December 3. 1998. according to the respondents. In support of this theory. The LA held that the Union failed to comply with the mandatory requisites for a lawful strike. are applicable to the strike of June 24. and photographs. terminated. hence. and his employment as cook. together with supporting documents. all satisfy the mandatory requirements under Article 263[9] of the Labor Code and are applicable to the June 1999 strike. the parties should have awaited the resolution of the cases in the proper fora. that even if the foregoing Notice of Strike and Strike Vote were not applicable. that. Issues: Whether or not the strike staged by the private respondents is illegal. the submission of the results of the vote to the NCMB on December 21. and to declare respondents.” On June 29. respondents staged a “wildcat strike. the strike was justified. hence. voluntary arbitration between the parties was ongoing by virtue of the January 21. 1999. the Strike Vote of December 11. Shortly thereafter. there is no need to repeat the process. the parties submitted their position papers. The undisputed fact is that at the time the strike was staged in June 1999. Hence. hence. the Union may take action immediately since the petitioner is guilty of union busting. Having arrived at no amicable settlement. fault-finding. 1998. was denied. 1998. that. On October 12.

But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. the holding a wildcat strike. when he commits an illegal act during a strike.” This Court has held that strikes staged in violation of agreements providing for arbitration are illegal. good faith cannot be invoked as a defense. are connected to the alleged breach of the “guarantee” by the petitioner not to dismiss its employees during the pendency of the arbitration case. the submission of the cases to the grievance machinery of the CBA. The SC held that private respondents were validly terminated. Private respondents should have availed themselves of any of these alternative remedies instead of resorting to a drastic and unlawful measure. in view of the proscription under Article 264 of the Labor Code. The rationale of the prohibition under Article 264 is that once jurisdiction over the labor dispute has been properly acquired by competent authority. the very questions which they also link to the other incidents of unfair labor practices allegedly committed by the petitioner—these matters should have been raised and resolved in the voluntary arbitration proceedings that were commenced precisely to address them. On the other hand. or simply seek to terminate the pending voluntary arbitration case and complete the mandatory procedure for a lawful strike. if private respondents believed that the disciplinary measures had nothing to do with the issues under arbitration. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. specifically. and like other workers. or industrial disputes.Article 264 of the Labor Code provides that “no strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. and the prevailing state policy as well as its underlying rationale. The questions that surround their dismissal. the striker must be identified. as modes of settling labor. outlined in Article 264. even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. And because of the fact that the Union was fully aware that the arbitration proceedings were pending. In all cases. The alleged dismissals of Lucente and respondent Lanorias. subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation. Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. There must be proof that he or she committed illegal acts during a strike. A union officer. and conciliation. the applicable provision is Article 264(a) of the Labor Code: Art. That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment. are not sufficient grounds to justify the radical recourse on the part of the private respondents. Indeed it is among the chief policies of the State to promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations. both union members. since these agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends are to be achieved. 264. including voluntary arbitration. so that they may be subjected to separate voluntary arbitration proceedings. In the determination of the liabilities of the individual respondents. mediation. then they should have availed of the appropriate remedies under the Labor Code. which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal. The effects of such illegal strikes. Prohibited Activities – (a) x x x xxxx x x x x Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided. if one is available. 2. which allegedly triggered the wildcat strike. may suffice. For failing to exhaust all steps in the arbitration proceedings by virtue of the Submission Agreement. this Court declares that the strike staged by the private respondents is illegal. may be terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike. by agreement of the parties. Liability 71 . Substantial evidence available under the attendant circumstances. that jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike. on the other hand. such as the institution of cases of illegal dismissal or. make a distinction between workers and union officers who participate therein: an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. as private respondents so affirm.

PHIL. the parties submitted their respective position papers. as well as accept the workers back under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike. on the other hand. Thereafter. the appellate court denied the union’s petition and affirmed the ruling of the SOLE. G. the company suspended negotiations on the CBA which moved the union to file another Notice of Strike. Ruling: The SC held that the SOLE properly took cognizance of the issue on the legality of the strike. Thus. among others. the SOLE issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the dispute. the SOLE held that the union’s allegation of unfair labor practices were not within the legal connotation of Article 248 of the Labor Code. Issue: Whether or not the SOLE can take cognizance of the issue of the legality of a strike notwithstanding the absence of any proper petition to declare the strike illegal. while the union and the company officers and representatives were meeting. raised in its position paper the sole issue of the illegality of the strike staged by the union. The union filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing. JULY 17. the union filed with the NCMB a Notice of Strike due to perceived unfair labor practice committed by the company. 144315. the authority of the SOLE to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute. In view of the filing of the Notice of Strike. However. non-implementation of employees’ benefits. barricading the entrances and egresses thereof and setting up a stationary picket at the main entrance of the building. NO. whether threatened or actual. The SOLE further ruled that the strike conducted by the union was illegal. As directed. the company immediately filed a petition for the Secretary of Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute in accordance with Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. directing the striking workers to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the Secretary’s Order and for management to resume normal operations. The following day. the parties agreed to consolidate the two (2) Notices of Strike filed by the union and to maintain the status quo during the pendency of the proceedings. but were actually mere grievances which should have been processed through the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration outlined under the CBA.R. on the ground of bargaining deadlock. but is essentially involved in. the remaining union officers and members staged a strike at the company premises. The parties were likewise required to submit their respective position papers and evidence within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. the labor dispute itself. Since the very reason of the Secretary’s assumption of jurisdiction was PEU’s declaration of the strike. such as contractualization. Upon appeal to the CA.for prohibited acts is to be determined on an individual basis as was clearly provided by the evidence submitted by the company. disallowance of union leave. directing the parties to cease and desist from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation. The company. enjoining any strike or lockout. In its position paper. 2006 Facts: During the course of the negotiations for the renewal of its CBA. GLOBAL COMMUNICATION. the union raised the issue of the alleged unfair labor practice of the company. At a conciliation conference held at the NCMB. Article 263(g) of the Labor Code provides: 72 . Based on the position papers. the Labor Arbiter is correct in ruling that the employment of all individual private respondents are deemed validly terminated. any issue regarding the strike is not merely incidental to. A second order was issued reiterating the previous directive to all striking employees to return to work immediately. etc. PHILCOM EMPLOYEES UNION VS. Said motion was denied.

The authority of the Secretary to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising from such labor dispute. but nevertheless gave an assurance that it will seriously consider their proposal on salary increase. It is also immaterial that this issue. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order.When. Petition is dismissed. For its part. The most obvious of these powers is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or its lifting if one has already taken place. on 21 March 1996. all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. subsequent conciliation proceedings were conducted before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board . PEU cannot prevent resolution of the legality of the strike by merely refusing to submit the issue for resolution. NICANOR REYES MEDICAL FOUNDATION VS. petitioner FEU-NRMF. On 6 September 1996. 2006 Facts: In view of the forthcoming expiry of its CBA with the petitioner company. the negotiation failed. petitioner FEU-NRMF failed or refused to accept the offer. with the aim of promoting public good. Petitioner FEU-NRMF reasoned that due to financial constraints. In an effort to arrive at a compromise. thereby prohibiting any strike or lockout whether actual or impending. however. For reasons unknown to respondent union. as PEU asserts. respondent union. G. The SOLE then granted the petition and thus issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute. the union. was not properly submitted for resolution of the Secretary. in his opinion.. the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. sent a letter-proposal to petitioner company stating therein their economic and non-economic proposals for the negotiation of the new CBA. Consequently. Before the strike was conducted. longetivity pay. it cannot afford to accede to a number of their demands for educational and death benefits. FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY-DR.R. petitioner FEU-NRMF sent a letter-reply flatly rejecting respondent union’s demands and proposed to maintain the same provisions of the old CBA. underscoring the fact that it is a medical institution engaged in the business of providing health care for its patients. respondent union offered a skeletal force of nursing and health personnel who will man the hospital’s operation for the duration of the strike. staged a strike. A strike vote was conducted and after the 30-day cooling off period and the 7-day strike ban. meal allowance and special pay. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification. on 29 August 1996. The powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise of the police power of the State. It is of no moment that PEU never acquiesced to the submission for resolution of the issue on the legality of the strike. there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. respondent union filed a Notice of Strike before the NCMB on the ground of bargaining deadlock. The power is plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the dispute. the NLRC process server. he is granted “great breadth of discretion” in order to find a solution to a labor dispute. 168362. filed a Petition for the Assumption of Jurisdiction or for Certification of Labor Dispute with the NLRC. On 8 May 1996. 73 . uniforms.[16] When the Secretary exercises these powers. NO. x x x x. on 6 September 1996. and enjoining the parties from committing any acts which may exacerbate the situation.National Capital Region (NCMB-NCR) but because of the unyielding stance of both parties. FEU-NRMF EMPLOYEES ASSO. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure the compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. OCTOBER 12.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the strike illegal and dismissing the union officers for conducting the strike in defiance of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order. Further. Hence. The NLRC found that during the conciliation proceedings before the NCMB-NCR. The union officers’ dismissal is thus warranted. On the same day. petitioner FEU-NRMF filed a case before the NLRC. this petition. respondent union avers that petitioner FEU-NRMF refused to bargain collectively despite hefty financial gains and. therefore.certified that. the union officers admitted that they were aware that the Secretary of Labor issued an Assumption of Jurisdiction Order which enjoined the strike they were conducting. contending that respondent union staged the strike in defiance of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order. the striking employees returned to their respective stations. There was. on 5 September 1996 at around 4:00 P. The petitioner’s MR was also denied by the CA. endangering the lives of the patients confined at the hospital. Issue: Whether the service of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order was validly effected by the process server so as to bind the respondent union and hold them liable for the acts committed subsequent to the issuance of the said Order. was merely concocted. Petitioner FEU-NRMF’s allegation of sabotage. the said strike was conducted in a deleterious and prejudicial manner. therefore. the NLRC affirmed in toto the decision of the LA and. for the dismissal of the striking employees and decertification of the respondent union. which reversed the ruling of the NLRC. thus. upheld the illegality of the strike and loss of employment status of the union officers. The thirtyday cooling off period and the seven-day strike ban was also fully observed. he just posted copies of the said Order at several conspicuous places within the premises of the hospital. The strike was conducted in a peaceful and orderly manner where striking employees merely sat down outside the hospital’s premises with their placards airing their grievances. making the strike illegal. thus. whereby striking employees agreed to return to their work and the petitioner FEU-NRMF undertook to accept them under status pro ante. respondent maintained that they did not defy any order of the Secretary of Labor because neither its officers nor its members were able to receive a copy of the same. plus damages. The appellate court found that no personal service was validly effected by the process server that could bind the striking employees. Accordingly. respondent union complied with the procedural requirements by filing a notice of strike and strike vote with the NCMB-NCR. it was illegal. Subsequently. Respondent union also offered a skeletal work force but it was refused by petitioner FEU-NRMF. on 13 September 1996. Claiming that they had no knowledge that the Secretary of Labor already assumed jurisdiction over the pending labor dispute as they were not able to receive a copy of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order. striking employees continued holding a strike until 12 September 1996. resultantly. In contrast. In order to redress the wrongful and illegal acts of the respondent union. he attempted to serve a copy of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order to the union officers but since no one was around at the strike area.M.. On 12 September 1996. The union’s MR was likewise denied. an utter defiance of the said Order. hence. Ruling: 74 . a Return to Work Agreement was executed by the disputing parties. petitioner FEU-NRMF prayed for the declaration that the strike is illegal and. the Secretary of Labor issued another Order directing all the striking employees to return to work and the petitioner FEU-NRMF to accept them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. guilty of surface bargaining. Before staging a strike. The union brought its petition to the CA. On appeal. Finally.

The SC held that the service of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order was not validly effected by the process
server.

It can be inferred from the certification/proof of service that the process server resorted to posting the
Order when personal service was rendered impossible since the striking employees were not present at the
strike area. This mode of service, however, is not sanctioned by either the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure
or the Revised Rules of Court. The pertinent provisions of the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure read:

Section 6.Service of Notices and Resolutions.
(a) Notices or summons and copies of orders, shall be served on the parties to the case personally by the
Bailiff or duly authorized public officer within three (3) days from receipt thereof or by registered mail;
Provided that in special circumstances, service of summons may be effected in accordance with the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court; Provided further, that in cases of decisions and final awards,
copies thereof shall be served on both parties and their counsel or representative by registered mail;
Provided further, that in cases where a party to a case or his counsel on record personally seeks service of
the decision upon inquiry thereon, service to said party shall be deemed effected upon actual receipt
thereof; Provided finally, that where parties are so numerous, service shall be made on counsel and upon
such number of complainants, as may be practicable, which shall be considered substantial compliance
with Article 224(a) of the Labor Code, as amended.

An Order issued by the SOLE assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute is not a final judgment for it does
not dispose of the labor dispute with finality. Consequently, the rule on service of summons and orders,
and not the proviso on service of decisions and final awards, governs the service of the Assumption of
Jurisdiction Order.

Under the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure, service of copies of orders should be made by the process
server either personally or through registered mail. However, due to the urgent nature of the Assumption
of Jurisdiction Order and the public policy underlying the injunction carried by the issuance of the said
Order, service of copies of the same should be made in the most expeditious and effective manner, without
any delay, ensuring its immediate receipt by the intended parties as may be warranted under the
circumstances. Accordingly, in this case, personal service is the proper mode of serving the Assumption of
Jurisdiction Order.

It is also provided under the same rules that in special circumstances, service of summons may be effected
in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court. Parenthetically, the manner upon which
personal service may be made is prescribed by the following provisions of the Revised Rules of Court:

Rule 13. Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments And Other Papers.

Section 6.Personal service. – Service of the papers may be made by delivering personally a copy to the
party or his counsel, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. if no
person is found in his office, or his office is not known, or he has no office, then by leaving a copy, between
the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the party’s or counsel’s residence, if known,
with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing therein.

Let it be recalled that the process server merely posted copies of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order in
conspicuous places in the hospital. Such posting is not prescribed by the rules, nor is it even referred to
when the said rules enumerated the different modes of effecting substituted service, in case personal
service is impossible by the absence of the party concerned.

Clearly, personal service effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional requirement of
due process is accomplished. If, however, efforts to find the party concerned personally would make
prompt service impossible, service may be completed by substituted service, that is, by leaving a copy,

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between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the party’s or counsel’s residence, if
known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing therein.

Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is therefore required that statutory
restrictions for effecting substituted service must be strictly, faithfully and fully observed. Failure to comply
with this rule renders absolutely void the substituted service along with the proceedings taken thereafter.
The underlying principle of this rigid requirement is that the person, to whom the orders, notices or
summons are addressed, is made to answer for the consequences of the suit even though notice of such
action is made, not upon the party concerned, but upon another whom the law could only presume would
notify such party of the pending proceedings.

Applying this principle in the case at bar, presumption of receipt of the copies of the Assumption of
Jurisdiction Order could not be lightly inferred from the circumstances considering the adverse effect in
case the parties failed to heed to the injunction directed by such Order. Worthy to note that in a number of
cases, we have ruled that defiance of the assumption and return-to-work orders of the Secretary of Labor
after he has assumed jurisdiction is a valid ground for the loss of employment status of any striking union
officer or member.[26] Employment is a property right of which one cannot be deprived of without due
process. Due process here would demand that the respondent union be properly notified of the Assumption
of Jurisdiction Order of the Secretary of Labor enjoining the strike and requiring its members to return to
work. Thus, there must be a clear and unmistakable proof that the requirements prescribed by the Rules in
the manner of effecting personal or substituted service had been faithfully complied with. Merely posting
copies of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order does not satisfy the rigid requirement for proper service
outlined by the above stated rules. Needless to say, the manner of service made by the process server was
invalid and irregular. Respondent union could not therefore be adjudged to have defied the said Order
since it was not properly apprised thereof. Accordingly, the strike conducted by the respondent union was
valid under the circumstances.

Petition is denied.

GSIS VS. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS, G.R. NO. 170132, DECEMBER 6, 2006
Facts:

This case has its genesis when the manager of GSIS issued a memorandum directing a number of its
employees who are union embers to show cause why they should not be charged administratively for their
participation in the October 4 to October 7, 2004 mass action. The union’s counsel sought reconsideration
of said directive on the ground, among others, that the subject employees resumed work in obedience to
the return-to-work order thus issued. The plea for reconsideration was, however, effectively denied by the
filing, of administrative charges against some 110 union members for grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The union then filed with the CA a petition for prohibition against the GSIS on the ground that its members
should not be made to explain why they supported their union’s cause since the Civil Service Resolution No.
021316, otherwise known as the Guidelines for Prohibited Mass Action, Section 10 of which exhorts
government agencies to “harness all means within their capacity to accord due regard and attention to
employees’ grievances and facilitate their speedy and amicable disposition through the use of grievance
machinery or any other modes of settlement sanctioned by law and existing civil service rules.” It argued
that the organized demonstrating employees did nothing more than air their grievances in the exercise of
their “broader rights of free expression” and are, therefore, not amenable to administrative sanctions.
On the other hand, petitioners assert that the filing of the formal charges are but a natural consequence of
the service-disrupting rallies and demonstrations staged during office hours by the absenting GSIS
employees, there being appropriate issuances outlawing such kinds of mass action.

The CA ruled in favor of the union and held that the filing of administrative charges against the union
members is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion which may be the proper subject of the writ of
prohibition.

76

Issue:
Whether or not the mass action staged by or participated in by said GSIS employees partook of a strike or
prohibited concerted mass action.
Ruling:
The SC held that the mass action staged by or participated in by said GSIS employees partook of a strike or
prohibited concerted mass action. It may be that the freedom of expression and assembly and the right to
petition the government for a redress of grievances stand on a level higher than economic and other
liberties. Any suggestion, however, about these rights as including the right on the part of government
personnel to strike ought to be, as it has been, trashed.

The Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the provision “in accordance with law.” This is a clear
manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors such
right. Executive Order 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of government workers to
organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which “enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations,
mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption
of public service” by stating that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in
government service shall be observed.

The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes, mass
leaves, walkouts, and other forms of mass action that will lead in the temporary stoppage or disruption of
public service. The right of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or
associations only, without including the right to strike, adding that public employees going on disruptive
unauthorized absences to join concerted mass actions may be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.

With the view we take of the events that transpired on October 4-7, 2004, what respondent’s members
launched or participated in during that time partook of a strike or, what contextually amounts to the same
thing, a prohibited concerted activity.
The phrase “prohibited concerted activity” refers to any
collective activity undertaken by government employees, by themselves or through their employees’
organization, with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their
demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise; it includes mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts
of similar nature. Indeed, for four straight days, participating KMG members and other GSIS employees
staged a walk out and waged or participated in a mass protest or demonstration right at the very doorstep
of the GSIS main office building. The record of attendance for the period material shows that, on the first
day of the protest, 851 employees, or forty eight per cent (48%) of the total number of employees in the
main office (1,756) took to the streets during office hours, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m., leaving the other
employees to fend for themselves in an office where a host of transactions take place every business day.
On the second day, 707 employees left their respective work stations, while 538 participated in the mass
action on the third day. A smaller number, i.e., 306 employees, but by no means an insignificant few, joined
the fourth day activity.

To say that there was no work disruption or that the delivery of services remained at the usual level of
efficiency at the GSIS main office during those four (4) days of massive walkouts and wholesale absences
would be to understate things. And to place the erring employees beyond the reach of administrative
accountability would be to trivialize the civil service rules, not to mention the compelling spirit of
professionalism exacted of civil servants by the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees.

Ruling of the CA is reversed.

77

BIFLEX PHILS., INC., LABOR UNION VS. FILFLEX INDUSTRIAL & MFG., CORP., G.R. NO. 155679,
DECEMBER 19, 2006
Facts:

Petitioners Patricia Villanueva, Emilia Bandola, Raquel Cruz, Delia Relato, Regina Castillo, Lolita delos
Angeles, Marissa Villoria, Marita Antonio, Lolita Lindio, Eliza Caraulia, and Liza Sua were officers of Biflex
(Phils.) Inc. Labor Union. On the other hand, petitioners Myrna dela Torre, Avelina Añonuevo, Bernice
Borcelo, Narlie Yagin, Evelyn Santillan, Leony Serdoncilo, Trinidad Cuya, Andrea Lumibao, Gynie Arneo,
Elizabeth Capellan, Josephine Detosil, Zenaida Francisco, and Florencia Anago were officers of Filflex
Industrial and Manufacturing Labor Union. The two petitioner-unions, which are affiliated with National
Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), are the respective collective bargaining agents of the employees of
corporations.

Respondents Biflex (Phils.) Inc. and Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Corporation (respondents) are sister
companies engaged in the garment business. Situated in one big compound along with another sister
company, General Garments Corporation (GGC), they have a common entrance.

On October 24, 1990, the labor sector staged a welga ng bayan to protest the accelerating prices of oil. On
even date, petitioner-unions, led by their officers, herein petitioners, staged a work stoppage which lasted
for several days, prompting respondents to file on October 31, 1990 a petition to declare the work stoppage
illegal for failure to comply with procedural requirements. On November 13, 1990, respondents resumed
their operations. Petitioners, claiming that they were illegally locked out by respondents, assert that aside
from the fact that the welga ng bayan rendered it difficult to get a ride and the apprehension that violence
would erupt between those participating in the welga and the authorities, respondents’ workers were
prevented from reporting for work. Petitioners further assert that respondents were “slighted” by the
workers’ no-show, and as a punishment, the workers as well as petitioners were barred from entering the
company premises.
On their putting up of tents, tables and chairs in front of the main gate of respondents’ premises,
petitioners, who claim that they filed a notice of strike on October 31, 1990, explain that those were for the
convenience of union members who reported every morning to check if the management would allow them
to report for work.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the work stoppage was illegal since the following
requirements for the staging of a valid strike were not complied with: (1) filing of notice of strike; (2)
securing a strike vote, and (3) submission of a report of the strike vote to the Department of Labor and
Employment.
The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of the respondents and held that the strike was illegal. Consequently,
their following officers are declared to have lost their employment status. Respondents thereupon
terminated the employment of petitioners.

On appeal, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, it holding that there was no strike to speak
of as no labor or industrial dispute existed between the parties. It accordingly ordered respondents to
reinstate petitioners to their former positions, without loss of seniority rights, and with full backwages from
the date of their termination. On respondents’ petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed that of
the NLRC and reinstated that of the Labor Arbiter.

Issue:
Whether or not the strike staged by the union was illegal.
Ruling:

The SC held that the strike was illegal.

78

or obstruct public thoroughfares. for by blocking the free ingress to and egress from the company premises. . Even assuming arguendo that in staging the strike. . held that “the law . otherwise. conformably with the third paragraph of Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code which provides: . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided. . 153665. freedom of assembly or freedom to petition the government for redress of grievances. should thus bear the consequences of their acts of knowingly participating in an illegal strike. the legality of a strike is determined not only by compliance with its legal formalities but also by the means by which it is carried out. petitioners had complied with legal formalities. G. their work stoppage is beyond legal protection.” In fine. Petition is denied. 1990. That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment. . despite his participation in an illegal strike. NO. CITING GRAND BOULEVARD HOTEL VS. Even if petitioners’ joining the welga ng bayan were considered merely as an exercise of their freedom of expression. to join the welga ng bayan on October 24. Employees who have no labor dispute with their employer but who. MANILA HOTEL CORP.. There being no showing that petitioners notified respondents of their intention. For the protection of other significant state interests such as the “right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments. MANILA HOTEL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS.That petitioners staged a work stoppage on October 24. JULY 18. an extended sympathy strike. and to expansion and growth” enshrined in the 1987 Constitution must also be considered. being union officers. even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. DACANAY. MARCH 5. is a management prerogative which this Court may not supplant. refuse to work and instead join a welga ng bayan commit an illegal work stoppage. it is not disputed. NO. the strike would just the same be illegal. on a day they are scheduled to work. 154591. 2003 Facts: 79 .R. And it would give imprimatur to workers’ joining demonstrations/rallies even before affording the employer an opportunity to make the necessary arrangements to counteract the implications of the work stoppage on the business. G. and ignore the novel “principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers” aimed at fostering industrial peace. 1990 in conjunction with the welga ng bayan organized by the labor sector to protest the accelerating prices of oil. Stoppage of work due to welga ng bayan is in the nature of a general strike. The SC. Petitioners. the exercise of such rights is not absolute. passing on the use of the word “may” in the immediately quoted provision. they violated Article 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides that “no person engaged in picketing shall … obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes. oppression or self-destruction of capital in order to promote the interests of labor would be sanctioned. grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. or that they were allowed by respondents.” Reinstatement of a striker or retention of his employment. 2007. It affects numerous employers including those who do not have a dispute with their employees regarding their terms and conditions of employment.R.

The NLRC issued an Order directing the striking workers to return to work immediately and the hotel to accept them back under the same terms and conditions of employment. The NLRC ruled that the strike held by the union was illegal for its defiance of the return-to-work order. the NLRC awarded a severance pay equivalent to one-month salary to the returning union members for every year of service. 80 . 263. On 10 February 2000. In addition. customers and suppliers. The NLRC received a copy of the Compliance filed by Manila Hotel on 14 February 2000. Worse still. ART. and therefore. the union filed a motion alleging that the NLRC had not acquired jurisdiction over the labor dispute pending the resolution of the MR filed questioning the order of the SOLE. . the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. However. Issue: Whether or not the strike held by petitioner was illegal. Manila Hotel then filed a complaint with prayer for injunction and or TRO. During the conferences at the NLRC. that is. such employees have not forfeited their employment. alleging that MHEA conducted an illegal strike. in his opinion there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. the Order enjoined any strike or lockout and the parties were ordered to cease and desist from committing any acts that may exacerbate the situation. Specifically. which prohibited them from taking any action that would exacerbate the situation. a strike that was conducted after receiving an Order of assumptionby the SOLE certifying the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. PICKETING. non-striking employees. MHEA members seek their reinstatement after participating in an illegal strike. it determined that only the union officers were deemed to have lost their employment. It ruled that there was no evidence showing who among the striking employees were actually notified of the returnto-work order. the SOLE certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. instead of ordering Manila Hotel to reinstate them. the MHEA filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB Manila Hotel on the grounds of unfair labor practices. The law explicitly prohibits such acts. the striking employees lost their employment. issued by the NLRC. the MHEA conducted a strike despite the clear terms of the Order issued by the SOLE.On 11 November 1999. The NLRC further instructed the parties to submit proof of compliance with the instant order immediately after the lapse of twenty-four hours. STRIKES. In response to the NLRC’s return-to-work order. it sought a declaration that the strike was illegal and that. But in view of the antagonism on both sides. MHEA filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 29 November 1999 assailing the validity of said Order. despite receipt thereof. blocked all ingress and egress of the hotel premises. Ruling: The SC held that it was illegal. the parties were advised of the certification order. harassed and intimidated company officers. manifesting that only six striking employees complied with the return-to-work Order and were reinstated. The other striking employees had openly defied the said Order. Upon the petition of Manila Hotel. AND LOCKOUTS xxxx (g) When. the strikers failed to comply with the 11 February 2000 return-to-work Order. and despite the repeated reminders thereof. consequently. The union claimed that said motion had prevented the said Order of the SOLE from becoming final and executory.

PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES (a) xxxx No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. in the ordinary course. JUNE 15. cannot be sustained.R. the striking workers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that tend to. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. 2007 Facts: Mapua Institute Technology (MIT) presented a new faculty ranking and compensation system with the Faculty Association of Mapua Institute of Technology (FAMIT). all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. to justify their action. or undermine this authority of the Secretary of Labor. They cannot. More to the point. It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of any petition questioning its validity. Defiance of the assumption order or a return-to work order by a striking employee. without jeopardizing national interests. Petition is denied. a valid ground for loss of employment status. 264. ART. 164060. NO. for by then the deadline fixed for the return to work would. the Court has consistently ruled in a long line of cases spanning several decades that once the SOLE assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute. entitled them to participate in a strike. Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. have already passed and hence can no longer be affirmed insofar as the time element it concerned. to which the latter agreed for adoption and implementation in the CBA on the condition that there should be no diminution in rank and pay of the faculty member. Regardless therefore of their motives. citing unfair labor practices on the part of the company. affecting as it does an industry indispensable to the national interest. This extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes. The allegation[ that the strikers relied on their honest belief that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order. FACULTY ASSOCIATION OF MAPUA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY VS. 81 . COURT OF APPEALS. once an assumption and/or certification order is issued. is an illegal act and. ignore return-to-work orders. To say that its [return-to-work order] effectivity must await affirmance on a motion for reconsideration is not only to emasculate it but indeed to defeat its import. issued by the SOLE on 24 November 1999. and therefore must be obeyed until set aside. The parties then entered a new CBA which incorporated the new ranking for the college faculty. A return-to-work order is immediately executory notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration. The assumption of jurisdiction by the SOLE over labor disputes causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest is in the nature of a police power measure. The certification attests to the urgency of the matter. or the validity of their claims. If one has already taken place at the time of the assumption or certification. such jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike or lockout. for instance. The worker must return to his job together with his co-workers so the operations of the company can be resumed and it can continue serving the public and promoting its interest. whether a union officer or a member. The order is issued in the exercise of the court’s compulsory power of arbitration. therefore. G. The very nature of a return-to-work order issued in a certified case lends itself to no other construction.Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order.

The Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators ruled in favor of the petitioner. It is made up of a faculty classification that is substantially different from the one originally incorporated in the current CBA between the parties. lawful and consistent with the ratified CBA? (2) Is MIT’s development of a new pay formula for the high school department. to wit: · 25% increase in per rate/load for all high school faculty members effective November 2000. lawful and consistent with the ratified CBA? Ruling: NO. Considering the submissions of the parties.When the CBA took effect.8 (Emphasis supplied. together with the issue pertaining to the ranking of the college faculty. · 10% increase in per rate/load for all permanent high school faculty members effective June 2001. it must be understood as encompassing all the terms and conditions in the said agreement. (6) award winning works. Issues: (1) Is MIT’s new proposal. (1) educational attainment. (2) professional honors received. Therefore. (7) officership in relevant technical & professional organizations. (4) relevant professional experience. MIT adopted a new formula for determining the pay rates of the high school faculty: Rate/Load x Total Teaching Load = Salary where total teaching load equals number of classes multiplied by hours of service per week divided by 3 hours (as practiced. the proposed system contravenes the existing provisions of the CBA. The following factors were considered and given points. the VP for Academic Affairs issued a memo to all deans and subject chairs to evaluate the faculty using the new ranking system to evaluate and re-rank the faculty. xxx…xxx…xxx… xxx…xxx…xxx… Until a new CBA is executed by and between the parties. The INSTITUTE shall pay the following rate per load for high school faculty according to corresponding faculty rank.13 82 . regarding faculty ranking and evaluation. FAMIT brought the matter to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board for mediation. in the light of the existing CBA. hence. Meanwhile. (5) scholarly work & creative efforts. Thus. FAMIT opposed the formula and averred that MIT did not implement Section 2 of Article VI. violative of the law between the parties. One month after. is not lawful and not consistent with the CBA. Proceedings culminated in the submission of the case to the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators for resolution. The law does not provide for any exception nor qualification on which economic provisions of the existing agreement are to retain its force and effect. we find that the new point range system proposed by MIT is an unauthorized modification of Annex "C" of the 2001 CBA. one unit subject is equal to 3 hours service). Hence. (8) administrative positions held. MIT called FAMIT’s attention to certain omissions in the CBA and requested for an amendment but the latter rejected the proposal. It further argued that the proposed amendment revised the point ranges earlier agreed upon by the parties and expands the 19 faculty ranks to 23. without the knowledge of FAMIT. (3) relevant training.) MIT maintained that it was within its right to change the pay formula used. they are duty-bound to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement. According to FAMIT. which states: ARTICLE VI General Wage Clause xxxx Section 2. regarding faculty ranking and evaluation. MIT’s new proposal. changes proposed would constitute a violation of the ratified CBA and would result in diminution of rank and benefits of the FAMIT college faculty.

allegedly aimed at excluding them from the bargaining unit during the CBA negotiation. MIT cannot unilaterally adopt a new formula. should be filed with the DOLE. such should be interpreted in favor of labor. in the case of union busting where the union's existence is threatened.14 The CBA is the norm of conduct between petitioner and private respondent and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.. xxx xxx xxx 83 . the aggrieved party has the right to go to court and ask redress. of Labor directed the union to return to work. Needless to stress. Later on.15 NO. Thus. Union officers filed a petition for certiorari . The provisions of the CBA must be respected since its terms and conditions "constitute the law between the parties. the Union filed a second notice of strike on the ground of (a) union busting for alleged refusal of the company to turn over union funds and (b) the mass promotion of union members during the CBA negotiation. 6715. 2007 Facts: As the CCB between the Union and Pilipino Telephone Corp. if any. JUNE 22. In our view. Thereafter. 2) A cooling-off period must be observed between the filing of notice and the actual execution of the strike thirty (30) days in case of bargaining deadlock and fifteen (15) days in case of unfair labor practice. there is no room for unilateral change of the formula by MIT. On the same day. NO. the Union filed a notice of strike with NCMB for unfair labor practice due to the alleged acts of "restraint and coercion of union members and interference with their right to self-organization".22 and Rule XXII.160058. G. the decision was affirmed. Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code outline the following procedural requirements for a valid strike: 1) A notice of strike.. with the required contents. However. As there was a standstill on several issues." Those who are entitled to its benefits can invoke its provisions. Ruling: On Legality of Strike: SC SAID IT WAS ILLEGAL FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS Article 263 of the Labor Code. as amended by Republic Act (R. CA modified the ruling of NLRC by suspending UNION OFFICERS instead of dismissing them. Then.A. the Union submitted to the company its proposals for renegotiation of the non-representation aspectsof their CBA. On appeal to NLRC. the parties submitted their dispute to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for preventive mediation but it failed. PILIPINO TELEPHONE EMPLOYEES ASSO. the Union went on strike.) No. specifically the Regional Branch of the NCMB. copy furnished the employer of the union.The CBA during its lifetime binds all the parties. of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. The Sec. the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor. the Comapny filed with the NLRC a petition to declare the said union strike illegal where decision was rendered declaring said strike illegal and some members to have lost their employment status and others suspended.R. VS. Both parties appealed Issues: a) the legality of the Union's strike and b) the penalty to be imposed on the Union officers. the cooling-off period need not be observed. In the event that an obligation therein imposed is not fulfilled. Sec. Xxx…xxx…xxx… PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORP.

the second notice of strike filed by the Union merely assailed the "mass promotion" of its officers and members during the CBA negotiations. rank-and-file union members who participated in such a strike from losing their jobs provided that they did not commit illegal acts during the strike. This requirement should be observed to give the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the approval of the majority of the union members. subject to the cooling-off period. NLRC29 and PNOC Dockyard and Engineering Corporation v. 264. held that "a strike staged by the workers inspired by good faith does not automatically make the same illegal. In the case at bar. a strike vote should be taken by secret balloting.23 It is settled that these requirements are mandatory in nature and failure to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. as the most preeminent economic weapon of the workers to force management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and capital. Mere participation in an illegal strike is not a sufficient ground for termination of the services of the union members.28 Panay Electric Company v. The Labor Code protects ordinary. the Union staged the strike on the same day that it filed its second notice of strike." but said case was decided before the effectivity of R. promotion is different from dismissal The Union's reliance on Bacus v. 6715. In both cases. The Union violated the seven-day strike ban.A. No. In the case at bar. we agree with the CA that there was no union busting which would warrant the non-observance of the cooling-off period.4) Before a strike is actually commenced. Ople. even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. No. with a 24-hour prior notice to NCMB. there must be: 1) a dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws. and 2) the existence of the union must be threatened by such dismissal. x x x We have explained the meaning of this provision as follows: The effects of illegal strikes. 1989. as outlined in Article 264 of the Labor Code. 5) The result of the strike vote should be reported to the NCMB at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout. strike vote. To constitute union busting under Article 263 of the Labor Code. It is correct that this Court. It cannot be overemphasized that strike. We have ruled that with the enactment of R.— x x x Any workers whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. Prohibited activities. make a distinction between ordinary workers and union officers who participate therein. that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment. Moreover. and notice given to the DOLE are mandatory in nature. Surely. the striking union members complied with the procedural requirements for a valid strike. Under established jurisprudence. a union officer may be terminated from employment for knowingly participating in an illegal strike. the requirements as to the filing of a notice of strike. NLRC30 is likewise unavailing. Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided.A. but also on the general 84 . exert some disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor and management. The decision to declare a strike requires the secret-ballot approval of majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned. The fate of union members is different. in Bacus. Nowhere in Panay Electric Company and PNOC Dockyard and Engineering Corporation did the Court rule that the procedural requirements for a valid strike may be dispensed with if the striking workers believed in good faith that the company was committing acts of unfair labor practice. 6715 on March 21. ON PENALTY OF DISMISSAL: SC SAID CA ERRED IN LOWERING THE PENALTY Article 264 of the Labor Code further provides: Art.

Ayson denied the allegations. as main players in an illegal strike. The policy of the state is not to tolerate actions directed at the destabilization of the social order. filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter. however. Landtex reaffirmed its decision terminating Ayson in the meetings with the union. The appellate court sustained the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter.peace and progress of society and economic well-being of the State. The union president requested Landtex for a formal dialogue regarding Ayson’s case. where the relationship between labor and management has been endangered by abuse of one party's bargaining prerogative.R. considering the interest of public welfare. It further stated that the records are bereft of any showing that grievance mediation had been undertaken so as to thresh out any disciplinary measure against Ayson. Salvador Ayson worked in Landtex as knitting operator and was an officer of Landtex Industries Workers Union Federation of Free Workers which had an existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Landtex. Landtex expected that the issue be referred to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for the selection of voluntary arbitrator. This weapon is so critical that the law imposes the supreme penalty of dismissal on union officers who irresponsibly participate in an illegal strike and union members who commit unlawful acts during a strike. 150278. to the extent of disregarding not only the direct order of the government to maintain the status quo. The labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Ayson. (2) Whether or not the meeting between Landtex and the Union constitute grievance machinery as mandated by the CBA. Despite such notice. and for having an altercation with one of the company’s owners when he was asked to submit an ID picture. Landtex decided to conduct an investigation in view of Ayson’s denials. The labor arbiter declared that despite union manifestation of its desire to refer Ayson’s case to a third party in accordance with law and CBA. Ayson received from Landtex a letter which stated that he committed acts contrary to company policies. (3) Whether or not Ayson was validly dismissed. as provided in Article 261 of the Labor Code. His termination thus properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. is greater than that of the members as the union officers have the duty to guide their members to respect the law. this manifestation did not affect Landtex’s termination of Ayson’s employment. is a business enterprise engaged in the manufacture of garments. Ruling: (1) Article 261 of the Labor Code provides that voluntary arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation 85 . Landetx and the union agreed to refer the matter to a third party in accordance with the provisions of law and CBA. CA. NO. a sole proprietorship owned by Alex and managed by William Go. Ayson received a notice stating his termination due to his lack of cooperation during the investigations. G. but the welfare of the entire workforce though they may not be involved in the dispute. and wanton and reckless exercise of management prerogative. The appellate court found that Ayson was illegally dismissed because his termination was characterized by bad faith. AUGUST 9. he still reported to work. Ayson and the Union. Issues: (1) Whether or not the Labor arbiter has jurisdiction over the case. Thus. 2007 Facts: Landtex. The letter required him to explain why no disciplinary actions should be taken against him for spreading damaging rumors about the personal life of an unspecified person (William Go). Landtex and William Go filed a petition to the Supreme Court. The responsibility of the union officers. The NLRC agreed with Landtex and Wiliam Go’s argument that Ayson’s case falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrators. The grave penalty of dismissal imposed on the guilty parties is a natural consequence. LANDTEX INDUSTRIES VS. Ayson had a meeting with the counsel of Landtex and the second meeting was rescheduled for Ayson’s failure to attend.

Had Landtex immediately filed a motion to dismiss. SAN MIGUEL FOODS INC.[37] In the present case. Landtex scheduled meetings with Ayson but these meetings were not free from arbitrariness. Existing law is an intrinsic part of a valid contract without need for the parties to expressly refer to it. More importantly. G. the labor arbiter would have determined the issue outright before proceeding with hearing the case. 2007 Facts: 86 . there was nothing in the minutes that shows that the attendees constituted a Management-Employee Committee. Finally. Ayson could not adequately defend himself from Landtex’s and William Go’s accusations. the CBA between Landtex and the union does not clearly state that termination disputes. No witness was ever presented against Ayson. hence. the two-notice rule should be followed. The validity of the charge must be established in a manner consistent with due process. In the present case. Landtex raised the issue of jurisdiction only after the labor arbiter required the parties to submit their position papers. Unsubstantiated suspicions. the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter over unfair labor practices. while the second notice informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him.R. and not necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted. The meetings happened only after the effectivity of Ayson’s termination. In the present case. (3) The requisites for a valid dismissal are (1) the dismissal must be for any of the causes expressed in Article 282 of the Labor Code. Such agreement should be clear and unequivocal. on the other hand. NLRC. Landtex and William Go assert that Ayson’s termination was for a just cause as defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code. then Landtex should have filed a motion to dismiss in accordance with Section 15. are covered by the CBA. and (2) the opportunity to be heard and to defend oneself. The meetings did not comply with the requisite number of participants. including disciplinary action imposed on any covered employee. 168569. (2) We find nothing in the records which shows that the meetings between the union and Landtex already constitute the grievance machinery as mandated by the CBA. Thus. The CBA defined a grievance as “one that arises from the interpretation or implementation of this Agreement. Procedural due process in the dismissal of employees requires notice and hearing. SAN MIGUEL CORP EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO . The requirement of a hearing.of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. OCTOBER 5. as opposed to mere disciplinary actions.” The CBA did not explicitly state that termination disputes should be submitted to the grievance machinery. A suspicion or belief no matter how sincerely felt cannot substitute for factual findings carefully established through an orderly procedure. It is not enough for an employer who wishes to dismiss an employee to charge him with wrongdoing. On the other hand. Landtex failed to understand the law’s purpose in requiring the opportunity to be heard. Landtex scheduled three meetings before terminating Ayson. termination disputes. the appellate court is correct in stating that if Landtex really believed that the labor arbiter did not have jurisdiction over the present case. is complied with as long as there was an opportunity to be heard. In the present case.[26] Instead of filing a motion to dismiss. Rule V of The New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. NO. The CBA mandated that there should be three representatives each from the union and Landtex but there were seven union members and two Landtex representatives who attended the meetings. Landtex more than complied with the two-notice rule.[40] we ruled that the mere conduct of an investigation and the statements of the company’s security guard are not enough to establish the validity of the charge of wrongdoing against the dismissed employees. and claims for damages cannot be arrogated into the powers of voluntary arbitrators in the absence of an express agreement between the union and the company. The first notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought. VS. accusations. The employer must furnish the employee two written notices before termination may be effected. In Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation (PASAR) v.Landtex participated in the proceedings before the labor arbiter. hence Ayson could not test the veracity of their claims. and conclusions of the employer are not sufficient to justify an employee’s dismissal. The employer must prove by substantial evidence the facts and incidents upon which the accusations are made. a reading of Article 217 in conjunction with Article 262 shows that termination disputes fall under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter unless the union and the company agree that termination disputes should be submitted to voluntary arbitration. However..

review. to the NLRC by "Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal". unfair labor practices. 1993. allegations made in the complaint. " It prayed that SMFI et al. allegations made in the complaint." SMFI informed the Union that it planned to address the grievance through a "work management review" to be completed by March 1993. 87 . Veloso. SMFI argues that the allegations in the Union’s complaint filed before the Labor Arbiter do not establish a cause of action for ULP. its President Amadeo P. therefore. SMFI concludes that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over its complaint. neither were the ultimate facts in support thereof. In determining jurisdiction over a case. evaluat[ion] & upgrad[ing of] all Finance staff and 2. Almost 9 months after the grievance meeting was held or on October 6. through the Union represented by Edgar Moraleda. elevate the grievance to Step 2. Ruling: Section 1 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court should thus not be strictly applied to a case filed before a Labor Arbiter. be ordered to promote the therein named employees "with the corresponding pay increases. [and] unjust discrimination in matters of promotion . The Union sought the "1.” SMFI et al. . In determining jurisdiction over a case. Section 1 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court should thus not be strictly applied to a case filed before a Labor Arbiter. includes complaints for ULP. The Union filed a complaint on October 20. The Labor Arbiter granted SMFI et al. "should be resolved in the grievance machinery. . The Labor Arbiter may avail himself of all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the controversy speedily. brought a grievance against Finance Manager Gideon Montesa (Montesa). may thus be considered. the particular acts of ULP alleged to have been committed by SMFI were not specified." hence. enumerated in Article 217 of the Labor Code. Montesa to other SMC affiliate[s] & subsidiaries. the Union detailed the particular acts of ULP attributed to SMFI and the ultimate facts in support thereof. Arbitration Branch. Section 7. However. the Union’s requests could not be granted. favoritism.On November 9. prompting the Union to.8contending that the issues raised in the complaint were grievance issues and. 1992. etc. such was granted and accordingly ordered the Labor Arbiter to continue the proceedings on the Union’s complaint. Hence. they having violated the seniority rule under the CBA by appointing and promoting certain employees which amounted to a ULP.Q. The technicalities of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in the courts of law shall not strictly apply thereto. The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters. 1993 before the NLRC. etc. against SMFI. some employees of San Miguel Foods. promot[ion of] G. it was not completed by March 1993. may thus be considered. SMFI rendered a "Decision on Step 1 Grievance" stating that it was still in the process of completing the "work management review. Issues: Whether or not the labor arbiter has jurisdiction over the case. In its Position Paper. the Union having merely contended that SMFI was guilty thereof without specifying the ultimate facts upon which it was based. It cites Section 1 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court as applying suppletorily to the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. including ocular inspection and examination of well-informed persons. SMFI filed a petition for certiorari with SC which they referred the case to the CA pursuant to St. Indeed. Court of Appeals denied SMFI et al. NLRC. Inc’s Finance Department. SMFI guilty of ULP but only on the ground of violation of the CBA Agreement. and its Finance Manager Montesa for "unfair labor practice.’s motion to dismiss and ordered the remand of the case to the grievance machinery for completion of the proceedings. before SMFI Plant Operations Manager George Nava in accordance with Step 1 of the grievance machinery. however. promoting divisiveness. filed a motion to dismiss. it holding that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the complaint of the Union. Whether or not SMFI is guilty of unfair labor practice. Martin Funeral Homes v. Thus. for "discrimination. as well as those in the position paper. as well as those in the position paper. On appeal. Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides: The proceedings before the Labor Arbiter shall be non-litigious in nature.’s petition for certiorari.

hours of work. It may not be seriously disputed that this charge is a gross or flagrant violation of the seniority rule under the CBA. specifically the seniority rule. The Court of Appeals having affirmed the NLRC decision finding that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the Union’s complaint and thus remanding it to the Labor Arbiter for continuation of proceedings thereon. As for the alleged ULP committed under Article 248(i). In Silva v. Based on Art. in that SMFI "appointed less senior employees to positions at its Finance Department. Thegrievance machinery provision in the CBA is not an economic provision. NO. NLRC. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. For purposes of this article. the Union did not allege that they were done to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization. AND (2) the violation pertains to the economic provisions of the CBA. TOYOTA MOTOR PHILS WORKERS ASSO. the appellate court’s said finding may be taken to have been made only for the purpose of determining jurisdiction. WHEREFORE. NLRC. for violation of a CBA. the allegations in the complaint should show prima facie the concurrence of two things. the second requirement for a Labor Arbiter to exercise jurisdiction of a ULP is not present. namely: (1) gross violation of the CBA.VS. shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. this Article is qualified by Article 261 of the Labor Code. In fact. however. AND (2) the violation pertains to the economic provisions of the CBA. following a liberal construction (following the rule on construction in favor of labor) of Article 261 of the Labor Code. OCTOBER 19. the Union alleges that violated the Job Security provision in the CBA. 158786. and the NLRC to exercise its appellate jurisdiction. The Union applied and was granted the immediate holding of a certification election ( the most democratic and expeditious method by which the laborers can freely determine the union that shall act as their representative in their dealings with the establishment where they are working.ULP on the ground of discrimination which must allege that that they were done to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization. Second.R. be considered an "economic provision" of the CBA. ULP on the ground of violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement – (1) gross violation of the CBA. gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement. thus bypassing others who were more senior and equally or more qualified. the Union charges SMFI to have promoted less senior employees. the Petition is DENIED. – It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practices: (e) To discriminate in regard to wages. It is the appropriate means whereby controversies and disputes on representation may be laid to rest. those promoted were members of the complaining Union.Workers Assoc. On the questioned promotions. consequently intentionally by-passing more senior employees who are deserving of said appointment. for a ULP case to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter. the pertinent portion of which latter Article reads: xxx violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement. (Union) is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota rank and file employees. except those which are gross in character. a ULP over which the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction. First. G. by the unequivocal vote of the employees themselves) and was later 88 . it may." Since the seniority rule in the promotion of employees has a bearing on salary and benefits. hence. 2007 Facts: Toyota Motor Phils. The promotions do not thus amount to ULP under Article 248(e) of the Labor Code.

such as inducing the employer to commit an unfair labor practice against non-union employees. 263 of the Labor Code]. 2001. On the other hand. the DOLE Secretary directed all striking workers to return to work at their regular shifts by April 16. or (6) [when it] is contrary to an existing agreement. such as strike by employees performing governmental functions. regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of the employer and the employee. or sabotage plant equipment and facilities. more than 200 employees staged mass actions on in front of the BLR and the DOLE offices. 89 . The strikers prevented workers who reported for work from entering the plants. fixing. Subsequently. lists six (6) categories of an illegal strike. 2001. at around 12:00 noon. destroy. on May 23. 2001. 2001 to April 12. 2001. such as a no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause. some twenty-nine (29) payroll-reinstated employees picketed in front of the Santa Rosa Plant’s main entrance. On April 10. sit-downs. but also slowdowns. 2001. Toyota terminated the employment of 227 employees. maintaining. changing. on May 28. such as a widespread terrorism of non-strikers [for example. Pending Toyota’s appeal. includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating. or (4) [when it] employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective. prohibition. (2) Extent of the liabilities of union members participating in the strike (3) Whether separation pay should be awarded to the Union members who participated in the illegal strikes. or (5) [when it] is declared in violation of an existing injunction. 2001. the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued an Order certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC. Toyota challenged said Order via an appeal to the DOLE Secretary. prohibited acts under Art. despite the issuance of the DOLE Secretary’s certification Order. At the same time. or order issued by the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. or (2) [when it] violates a specific requirement of law. 2001 Order. only Toyota heeded the order and the NLRC declared the strikes illegal. 2001. On February 22 & 23. [such as injunction. Meanwhile. from March 28. around forty-four (44) Union members staged another protest action in front of the Bicutan Plant. Despite denial of the Union’s request. [such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the requisites of a valid strike]. viz: (1) [when it] is contrary to a specific prohibition of law.recognized by the NCMB as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the Toyota rank and file employees. Rosa plants. the Union submitted its CBA proposals to Toyota which the latter denied. several payroll-reinstated members of the Union staged a protest rally in front of Toyota’s Bicutan Plant bearing placards and streamers in defiance of the April 10. A strike means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. or (3) [when it] is declared for an unlawful purpose. the Union intensified its strike by barricading the gates of Toyota’s Bicutan and Sta. attempts to damage. 264(e) of the Labor Code]. to protest the partisan and anti-union stance of Toyota which resulted to substantial company losses. On March 16. mass leaves. Ludwig Teller. In reaction to the dismissal of its union members and officers. put them under payroll reinstatement. The term “strike” has been elucidated to encompass not only concerted work stoppages. Ruling: On the 1st issue: Noted authority on labor law. In said Order. and similar activities. Issues: (1) Whether the mass actions committed by the Union on different occasions are illegal strikes. Then. or arranging the terms and conditions of employment. in turn. When the parties were asked to submit their position papers. 2001. it ordered Toyota to accept the returning employees under the same terms and conditions obtaining prior to the strike or at its option. A labor dispute. the Union went on strike on March 17. and were later joined by other Union members.

which is essential to the attainment of legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law With respect to the strikes committed from March 17 to April 12. those were initially legal as the legal requirements were met. which proscribes acts of violence. In Esso Philippines. The leaders are expected to recommend actions that are arrived at with circumspection and contemplation. and the Union failed to comply with the following requirements: (1) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date of strike. in a legal or illegal strike. Member’s liability depends on participation in illegal acts Art. Malayang 90 . They are tasked with the duty to lead and guide the membership in decision making on union activities in accordance with the law. Union officers are liable for unlawful strikes or illegal acts during a strike Under Art. 263 of the Labor Code. and established labor practices. This was an affirmation of the rulings in Bacus v. rules and regulations. This is a patent violation of the assumption of jurisdiction and certification Order of the DOLE Secretary. or which obstruct the free ingress to and egress from the company premises. are they liable? This was squarely answered in Gold City Integrated Port Service. where it was held that though the strike is illegal. There are prerequisites for a valid strike under Art. Inc. where it was held that an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. 264(e). NLRC. As long as the members commit illegal acts. coercion. The evident intention of the law in requiring the strike notice and the strike-vote report is to reasonably regulate the right to strike. the exercise of such right is governed by existing laws. and (3) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike. Inc.While we recognize the right of every person or a group to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. 264 (a) of the Labor Code. and always keep paramount the best interests of the members and union within the bounds of law. v. government rules and regulations. Aguas. If the strike is legal at the beginning and the officials commit illegal acts during the duration of the strike. on March 28 to April 12.” While the provision is silent on whether the strike is legal or illegal. However. 264(a) of the Labor Code provides that a member is liable when he knowingly participates in an illegal act “during a strike. or intimidation. These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply with them renders the strike illegal.” While there are no work stoppages. 2001. the ordinary member who merely participates in the strike should not be meted loss of employment on the considerations of compassion and good faith and in view of the security of tenure provisions under the Constitution. v. This is a palpable violation of Art. the Union barricaded the gates of the Bicutan and Sta. While it may be conceded that there was no work disruption in the two Toyota plants. then they can be terminated However. when union members merely participate in an illegal strike without committing any illegal act. the fact still remains that the Union and its members picketed and performed concerted actions in front of the Company premises. which ordered the parties “to cease and desist from committing any act that might lead to the worsening of an already deteriorated situation. or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice. we find that the same is irrelevant. the pickets and concerted actions outside the plants have a demoralizing and even chilling effect on the workers inside the plants and can be considered as veiled threats of possible trouble to the workers when they go out of the company premises after work and of impending disruption of operations to company officials and even to customers in the days to come. (2) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. Rosa plants and blocked the free ingress to and egress from the company premises. then they cannot evade personal and individual liability for said acts. Ople and Progressive Workers Union v. 2001. It is clear that the responsibility of union officials is greater than that of the members.

The dismissed employee. traced the history relating to the liability of a union member in an illegal strike. But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. The union member is made liable on the theory that all the members are engaged in a general conspiracy. done on behalf of the union. and the unlawful acts of the particular members are viewed as necessary incidents of the conspiracy. The new Constitution contains a separate article devoted to the promotion of social justice and human rights with a separate sub-topic for labor. what are considered “illegal acts” under Art. One exception where separation pay is given even though an employee is validly dismissed is when the court finds justification in applying the principle of social justice well entrenched in the 1987 Constitution. Professor Cesario A. or for a labor activity. however. In the landmark case of Ang Tibay vs. Noted labor law expert. and (3) Violation of any order. prohibition. Association of Independent Unions in the Philippines v. NLRC lays down the rule on the liability of the union members: An ordinary striking employee cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. and 23. starting with the “rule of vicarious liability. 2001 in front of the Toyota Bicutan and Sta. Thus. 263(g) of the Labor Code. In the cases at bench.’ Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. Now. the employee is not entitled to separation pay. like accrued service incentive leaves. Jr. The apparent reason behind the forfeiture of the right to termination pay is that lawbreakers should not benefit from their illegal acts. this enumeration is not exclusive and it may cover other breaches of existing laws. It means such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. (2) The strikes held on March 17 to April 12. CIR.” It may encompass a number of acts that violate existing labor or criminal laws. the court ruled “Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion. Article XIII expressly recognizes the vital role of labor. but the evidence must be ‘substantial. 2nd issue: The general rule is that when just causes for terminating the services of an employee under Art. Azucena. the entitlement of the dismissed employees to the benefits depends on the stipulations of the CBA or the company rules and policies. benefits and privileges [s/he] may have under the applicable individual or collective bargaining agreement with the employer or voluntary employer policy or practice” or under the Labor Code and other existing laws. (2) Commission of crimes and other unlawful acts in carrying out the strike. 22. the rule on vicarious liability of a union member was abandoned and it is only when a striking worker “knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike” that he will be penalized with dismissal. the individual respondents participated in several mass actions.. 282 of the Labor Code exist. viz: (1) The rallies held at the DOLE and BLR offices on February 21. or injunction issued by the DOLE Secretary or NLRC in connection with the assumption of jurisdiction/certification Order under Art. or obstruct public thoroughfares”. such as the following: (1) Violation of Art. which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal. it was explained that a member is not responsible for the union’s illegal strike even if he voted for the holding of a strike which became illegal. despite the dismissal for a valid cause. As earlier explained.Manggagawa sa Esso (MME). As in any rule. mere membership in a labor union serves as basis of liability for acts of individuals. there are exceptions. may suffice. retains the right to receive from the employer benefits provided by law. 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides that “[n]o person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence. in the advancement of the national 91 . 2001.” thus: Under [the rule of vicarious liability]. With respect to benefits granted by the CBA provisions and voluntary management policy or practice. 2001. This means that the employee. hand in hand with management. is entitled to “whatever rights. Substantial evidence available under the circumstances. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the strike and the striker who participated in the commission of illegal act[s] must be identified. Rosa plants.264(a)? No precise meaning was given to the phrase “illegal acts. and (3) The rallies and picketing on May 23 and 28. coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes.

282 of the Labor Code other than serious misconduct. habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude. thus endangering the business that they both want to succeed. as the petitioner correctly argues. of rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense. 159553. or whatever other name it is called. In this case. Again. We therefore find that in addition to serious misconduct. 282 like willful disobedience.economy and the welfare of the people in general. have the effect. the Union challenged 68 votes cast by newly regularized rank-and-file employees and another five (5) votes by alleged supervisor-trainees. the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay. fraud or willful breach of trust.2. The categorical mandates in the Constitution for the improvement of the lot of the workers are more than sufficient basis to justify the award of separation pay in proper cases even if the dismissal be for cause. In analogous causes for termination like inefficiency. 2007 Facts: On October 7. SPOILED . Yokohama formalized its protest and raised as an issue the eligibility to vote of the 78 dismissed employees. Lastly. In all of the foregoing situations. it is an antiquated notion that they are truly beneficial. whether the act is the first offense. Upon appeal from the Med-Arbiter’s order dismissing the petition. 282 of the Labor Code were serious or grave in nature and attended by willful or wrongful intent or they reflected adversely on the moral character of the employees. PETITION DISMISSED. for example. Even though strikes and lockouts have been recognized as effective bargaining tools. The election held on November 23. respondent Yokohama Employees Union (Union) filed a petition for certification election among the rank-and-file employees of Yokohama. Yokohama challenged 78 votes cast by dismissed employees. in dismissals based on other grounds under Art. and others. What is unclear is whether the ruling likewise precludes the grant of separation pay when the employee is validly terminated from work on grounds laid down in Art. 282). G. Issue: 92 . as they only provide short-term solutions by forcing concessions from one party. there was no award of separation pay nor financial assistance. on the ground of social justice. or Acts that reflect on the moral character of the employee. NO. NO UNION . We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. while the Union submitted only a handwritten manifestation during the election. separation pay should not be conceded to the dismissed employee. drug use.R. or financial assistance. the Court declined to grant termination pay because the causes for dismissal recognized under Art. like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker. the performance of the employee and the like. gross and habitual neglect of duty. DECEMBER 10. The union officers who participated in and the union members who committed illegal acts during the illegal strike have lost their employment status.117. using the guideposts enunciated in PLDT (see full text for case reference) on the propriety of the award of separation pay. the NLRC or the courts may opt to grant separation pay anchored on social justice in consideration of the length of service of the employee. YOKOHAMA EMPLOYEES UNION. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is. YOKOHAMA TIRE PHILS VS. but staging such strikes would damage the working relationship between employers and employees. Total votes cast = 250. 1999. 2001 yielded the following result: YOKOHAMA EMPLOYEES UNION – 131. There are two exceptions when the NLRC or the courts should not grant separation pay based on social justice: Serious misconduct (which is the first ground for dismissal under Art. On the other hand. the strike was held illegal because it violated agreements providing for arbitration. and commission of a crime against the employer or his family. A contrary rule would. the amount involved. the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) ordered an election with (1) “Yokohama Employees’ Union” and (2) “No Union” as choices.

Section 5. to wit: 1)Eligibility 93 . 2003 Decision was resolved by the NLRC only on August 29. equivalent to one month’s current basic pay. The 68 votes of the newly regularized rankand-file employees. Qualification of voters. Finally. Here. AIRLINES INC. On 22 April 1988. prior to the payment of the 13th month pay (mid-year bonus). MARCH 12. 142399. Section 2.” will not materially alter the result. 2008 Facts: On 6 February 1987. NO.R. 2001 certification election clearly. G. The votes of the dismissed employees shall be appreciated.Whether or not it is proper to appreciate the votes of the dismissed employees Ruling: Yes. An employee who has been dismissed from work but has contested the legality of the dismissal in a forum of appropriate jurisdiction at the time of the issuance of the order for the conduct of a certification election shall be considered a qualified voter. – . It is distinctly understood that nothing herein contained shall be construed to mean that the Company may not at its sole discretion give an additional amount or increase the Christmas bonus. There would still be 208 votes in favor of respondent and 189 votes in favor of “No Union. unequivocally and unambiguously allows dismissed employees to vote during the certification election if the case they filed contesting their dismissal is still pending at the time of the election. 2003. . dismissed employees are eligible or qualified voters. . Christmas Bonus The equivalent of one month’s current basic pay as of November 30.” We also note that the certification election is already a fait accompli. 13th Month Pay (Mid-year Bonus) A 13 th month pay. Part of said agreement required petitioner PAL to pay its rank and file employees the following bonuses: Section 4. petitioner PAL released a guideline implementing the aforequoted provision. xxxx Thus. 2001 and the appeal of the Labor Arbiter’s February 28. RULE IX CONDUCT OF CERTIFICATION ELECTION Section 5. we need not resolve the other issues for being moot. inclusion-exclusion. even if counted in favor of “No Union. 2001. PHIL. Rule XII (of the rules implementing Book V of the Labor Code). petitioner PAL and respondent PALEA entered into a CBA covering the period of 19861989. consistent with the existing practice shall be paid in advance in May. shall be paid in December as a Christmas bonus. and clearly petitioner’s rank-and-file employees had chosen respondent as their bargaining representative. Payment may be staggered in two (2) stages. the votes of employees with illegal dismissal cases were challenged by petitioner although their cases were still pending at the time of the certification election on November 23. Thus. VS. These cases were filed on June 27. unless his/her dismissal was declared valid in a final judgment at the time of the conduct of the certification election. Even the new rule has explicitly stated that without a final judgment declaring the legality of dismissal. we find no reversible error on the part of the DOLE Acting Secretary and the Court of Appeals in ordering the appreciation of the votes of the dismissed employees. PHIL AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. the rule in force during the November 23.

and 2) it has always been the company practice not to extend the mid-year bonus to those employees who have not attained regular status prior to the month of May. when payment of the particular bonus accrues. 1988. Disagreeing with petitioner PAL. consistent with equity to the employer. 1988 for category 1 a) above. it would be a clear case of discrimination. b)Employees covered under 1 b) above shall be paid not less than 1/12 of their basic salary for every month of service within the calendar year. comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees. Hence. including the mid. Section 3. [32] Otherwise. It is a well-settled doctrine that the benefits of a CBA extend to the laborers and employees in the collective bargaining unit. It argues that 1) the CBA does not apply to non-regular employees such that any benefits arising from said agreement cannot be made to apply to them. 2) Amount a)For category a) above. It is apparent to us that petitioner PAL excludes certain employees from the benefits of the CBA only because they have not yet achieved regular status by the cut-off date. the allegation of petitioner PAL that the nonregular employees do not belong to the collective bargaining unit and are thus not covered by the CBA is unjustified and unsubstantiated. regular or non-regular. in principle. All the terms and conditions of employment of employees within the bargaining unit are embodied in this Agreement. In response thereto. 3)Payment Date: May 9. 3 of said agreement made its provision applicable to all employees in the bargaining unit. respondent PALEA filed a labor complaint [16] for unfair labor practice against petitioner PAL before the NLRC on 1 March 1989. not falling within category a) above shall receive their 13th Month Pay on or before December 24. Respondent PALEA assailed the implementation of the foregoing guideline on the ground that all employees of PAL. Issue: Whether or not employees regularized after 30 April 1988 are entitled to 13 th month pay or mid-year bonus Ruling: Be that as it may. 1988.a) Ground employees in the general payroll who are regular as of April 30. petitioner PAL countered that those rank and file employees who were not regularized by 30 April of a particular year are. that the Christmas Bonus given to all its employees is deemed a compliance with Presidential Decree No. 851. b)Other ground employees in the general payroll. xxx without distinguishing between regular and non-regular employees. must be paid their 13th month pay. which the collective interest of all the employees. including those who do not belong to the chosen bargaining labor organization. but not necessarily of the labor organization designated as the bargaining agent. the employees must be members of the bargaining unit. A “bargaining unit” has been defined as a group of employees of a given employer. The complaint interposed that “the cut-off period for regularization should not be used as the parameter for granting [the] 13 th month pay considering that the law does not distinguish the status of employment but (sic) the law covers all employees. one month basic salary as of April 30. [33] At this point. petitioner PAL informed respondent PALEA that rank and file employees who were regularized after 30 April 1988 were not entitled to the 13th month pay as they were already given their Christmas bonuses on 9 December 1988 per the Implementing Rules of Presidential Decree No. Sec. 30 April 94 . a cursory reading of the 1986-1989 CBA of the parties herein will instantly reveal that Art. to be entitled to the benefits under the CBA.year bonus. 851 and the latter’s implementing rules. I.Application. not denied their 13 th month pay considering they receive said mandatory bonus in the form of the Christmas Bonus. 1988. As succinctly put by respondent PALEA in its Memorandum: All employees in (sic) PAL are entitled to the same benefit as they are within the same collective bargaining unit and the entitlement to such benefit spills over to even non-union members. indicates to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.

” respondent and “NO UNION” as choices. terms and conditions as they may deem convenient. where the CBA is clear and unambiguous. the mother federation of respondent SCPEU. and 2) the Christmas bonus. petitioner and FUEL-GAS appealed to the CA. the certification election.R. are not actually seeking more benefits than what the other member-employees of the same bargaining unit are already enjoying. while the Christmas bonus is evidently and distinctly a separate benefit. Respondent SCP Employees Union (SCPEU) – National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) intervened. Petitioner PAL may not be allowed to brush off said distinction. They are only requesting that all members of the bargaining unit be treated equally and afforded the same privileges and benefits as agreed upon between respondent PALEA and petitioner PAL in the CBA. Unsatisfied.[40] As in all other contracts.1988. it becomes the law between the parties. as ordered by 95 . filed a petition for Certification Election for and on behalf of its affiliate. a consent election was conducted. petitioner PAL agreed to pay its employees 1) the 13 th month pay or the mid-year bonus. 851. although both types of employees are members of the same bargaining unit. SCP EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL G. Subsequent motions for reconsideration were denied. and unilaterally and arbitrarily declare that for non-regular employees.year bonus can be equated to the Christmas bonus. with “FUEL-GAS” and “NO UNION” as choices. APRIL 16. Both petitioner and FUEL-GAS appealed to the Secretary of Labor. Later on. 169829-30. Said election was however declared a failure because less than a majority of the rank-and-file employees cast their votes. [41] Thus. Xxx The non-regular rank and file employees of petitioner PAL as of 30 April 1988. and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law. The 13 th month pay. good customs. which appeals were later consolidated. Later on. seeking to participate and be voted for in such election but the same was denied for having been filed out of time. VS. A collective bargaining agreement refers to a negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages. 2008 Facts: Petitioner Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP) is engaged in manufacturing construction materials. There is no showing that the non-regular status of the concerned employees by said cut-off date sufficiently distinguishes their interests from those of the regular employees so as to exclude them from the collective bargaining unit and the benefits of the CBA. However. provided these are not contrary to law. DOLE Undersecretary rendered a consolidated decision ordering the conduct of a certification election with “SCPEU. STEEL CORP. The Med-Arbiter granted the petition for certification election filed by NAFLU and further ordered the conduct of the election with “NAFLU” and “NO UNION” as choices. morals. NAFLU. NO. hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. is explicitly covered or provided for as the mid-year bonus in the CBA. the next and crucial query to be addressed is whether the 13th month pay or mid. public order or public policy. SCP-Federated Union of the Energy Leaders – General and Allied Services (FUEL-GAS) filed a petition for Certification Election in its bid to represent the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner. Petitioner PAL is committing a patent act of inequity that is grossly prejudicial to the non-regular rank and file employees there being no rational basis for withholding from the latter the benefit of a Christmas bonus besides the 13th month pay or mid-year bonus. while the same is being granted to the other rank and file employees of petitioner PAL who have been regularized as of 30 April 1988. supplying approximately 50% of the domestic needs for roofing materials. the parties to a CBA may establish such stipulations. seeking to represent the rank-and-file employees of petitioner. Xxx It must be stressed that in the 1986-1989 CBA. guaranteed by Presidential Decree No. Having ruled that the benefits provided by the subject CBA are applicable even to non-regular employees who belong to the bargaining unit concerned. their Christmas bonus is the same as or equivalent to the 13th month pay. clauses. petitioner PAL must pay its regular and non-regular employees who are members of the bargaining unit represented by respondent PALEA their 13 th month pay or mid-year bonus separately from and in addition to their Christmas bonus. As it had willfully and intentionally agreed to under the terms of the CBA.

respondent sent to petitioner CBA proposals. hence. Petitioner. The law provides limits for its exercise. The notice was later dismissed and respondent was enjoined from holding a strike. Thus. as the employees' bargaining representative to work out a collective bargaining agreement despite the striking union's doubtful majority status to merit voluntary recognition and lack of formal certification as the exclusive representative in the bargaining unit. The right to strike as a means for the attainment of social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy the employer. petitioner’s refusal to bargain and union busting. The certification election that was conducted where respondent emerged as winner. an election protest filed by FUELGAS. the strike would be declared illegal for having been conducted in utter defiance of the Secretary's return-towork order and after the dispute had been certified for compulsory arbitration. be faulted in refusing to bargain. not having been recognized as valid. the strike undertaken by the officers of respondent union is patently illegal for the following reasons: (1) it is a union-recognition-strike which is not sanctioned by labor laws. Even if this Court were to uphold the validity of respondent's purpose or objective in staging a strike. As the issue of its identity had been the subject of a separate case which had been settled by the court with finality. As its legal designation implies. Consequently. respondent filed another Notice of Strike alleging as grounds. the only issues left for determination are: the validity of the strike participated in by the officers of the respondent union. However. Neither could this Court sustain respondent's imputation of unfair labor practice and union busting against petitioner. Thus. however. the Undersecretary rendered a Decision certifying respondent as the exclusive bargaining agent of petitioner’s employees.61 petitioner cannot. Respondent thereafter went on strike. Later. the Labor Secretary certified the dispute to the NLRC and directed the employees to return to work. respondent emerged as winner. and (3) it was in violation of the Secretary's return-to-work order. this Court cannot sustain the validity of the strike staged on such basis. As a consequence of its certification as the exclusive bargaining agent. In said election. it has no authority to represent the rank and file employees of petitioner. Later. Issue: Whether or not the strike staged by respondent union is illegal Ruling: Whether or not respondent is the recognized collective bargaining agent had been finally resolved in the negative. It is considered as the most effective weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment. proceeded. Meanwhile. respondent filed another Notice of Strike on the grounds of refusal to bargain and union busting.the Med-Arbiter. The strike is a legitimate weapon in the human struggle for a decent existence. it could not compel petitioner to bargain with it. With more reason. as correctly concluded by the CA. In the instant case. this kind of strike is calculated to compel the employer to recognize one's union and not other contending groups. still. respondent filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB. Petitioner and FUEL-GAS timely filed motions for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision. making it a unionrecognition-strike. But to be valid. Finding no justification in petitioner’s refusal to bargain with it. and the validity of their termination from employment by reason of such participation. Although ostensibly there 96 . Respondent's notices of strike were founded on petitioner's continued refusal to bargain with it. a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. It thus staged the strike to compel petitioner to recognize it as the collective bargaining agent. FUEL-GAS participated without prejudice to the decision of the CA in its pending petition. it could not ask petitioner to bargain with it. (2) it was undertaken after the dispute had been certified for compulsory arbitration. held in abeyance any action on the proposals in view of its pending motion for reconsideration. therefore.

97 . he is granted "great breadth of discretion" to find a solution to a labor dispute. they do so at the risk of severing their relationship with their employer. 264. the collective bargaining agent would have been determined and petitioner could have been compelled to bargain. in his opinion. in the instant case. Respondent. and was thus illegal. having been staged after the dispute had been certified for arbitration and contrary to the return-to-work order. after the assumption of jurisdiction and certification of the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. without jeopardizing national interests. Regardless of their motives. The most obvious of these powers is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or its lifting if one has already taken place. to justify their action. citing unfair labor practices on the part of the company. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. it filed not one but several notices of strike which resulted in two certified cases which were earlier consolidated. once an assumption and/or certification order is issued. Respondent. These disputes could have been averted had respondent respected the CA's decision. It was not even necessary for the Secretary of Labor to issue another order directing a return to work. Prohibited activities. Says the Labor Code: Art. The moment the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to national interest. When the Secretary exercises these powers. even if the directive to return to work is not expressly stated in the assumption order. The mere issuance of an assumption order by the Secretary of Labor automatically carries with it a return-to-work order. A return-to-work order imposes a duty that must be discharged more than it confers a right that may be waived. aimed at promoting the public good. They cannot. through its officers. all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. instead opted to use the weapon of strike to force petitioner to recognize it as the bargaining agent. Worse. became a prohibited activity. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure the compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. the striking workers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that undermine or tend to undermine this authority of the Secretary of Labor. This extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes. While the workers may choose not to obey. filed notices of strike and staged the strike obviously contrary to the provisions of labor laws. there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. ignore return-to-work orders. such assumption shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike. That way. The strike. or the validity of their claims. these notices were founded on substantially the same grounds – petitioner's continued refusal to recognize it as the collective bargaining representative. The powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise of the police power of the State. Article 263(g) of the Labor Code provides: When. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification. – xxx No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.were several notices of strike successively filed by respondent. the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. The worker must return to his job together with his co-workers so that the operations of the company can be resumed and it can continue serving the public and promoting its interest. for instance. x x x.

A worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from employment. Having settled that the subject strike was illegal. In every strike staged by a union. and firmly focused on the legitimate interest of the union which should not however be antithetical to the public welfare. the petition is partly GRANTED. confidential 98 . Secretary Patricia A. petitioner sought the exclusion of only the following employees from the appropriate bargaining unit – all managers who are vested with the right to hire and fire employees. Tomas of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) issued an Order for the parties to execute their CBA. petitioner filed a Notice of Strike prompting the Secretary of Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Prohibited activities. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participating in the commission of illegal acts during a strike. unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of a few. but also on the general peace and progress of society. 2008 Facts: Petitioner and the Standard Chartered Bank (Bank) began negotiating for a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) in May 2000 as their 1998-2000 CBA already expired. It possesses the right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from service. this Court shall now determine the proper penalty to be imposed on the union officers who knowingly participated in the strike. APRIL 22. the law provides that a union officer may be terminated from employment. G. Hence. that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost employment status.Strikes exert disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor and management. Otherwise. Article 264 of the Labor Code further provides: Art.— x x x Any workers whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION VS. It is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the union and members in their struggle with management for a more equitable due of their labors. WHEREFORE. NO. Sto. not to mention the economic well-being of the State. x x x. In their proposal. the workers will simply refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge and preventing management from filling up their positions. Issue: Whether the Bank's Chief Cashiers and Assistant Cashiers. free from emotionalism.R. 161933. Due to a deadlock in the negotiations. 264. such that they shall be excluded in the bargaining unit Ruling: The CBA provisions in dispute are the exclusion of certain employees from the appropriate bargaining unit and the adjustment of remuneration for employees serving in an acting capacity for one month. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK ET AL.. It bears stressing that the law makes a distinction between union members and union officers. even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. the decision to wield the weapon of strike must therefore rest on a rational basis. The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. the general peace and progress of society and public welfare are involved. On May 31. 2001. personnel of the Telex Department and HR staff are confidential employees.

employees, those with access to labor relations materials, Chief Cashiers, Assistant Cashiers, personnel of
the Telex Department and one Human Resources (HR) staff.

The Secretary's disposition of the issues raised by petitioner were affirmed by the CA. The Court sustains
the CA.
Whether or not the employees sought to be excluded from the appropriate bargaining unit are confidential
employees is a question of fact, which is not a proper issue in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. This holds more true in the present case in which petitioner failed to controvert with
evidence the findings of the Secretary and the CA.

The disqualification of managerial and confidential employees from joining a bargaining unit for rank and
file employees is already well-entrenched in jurisprudence. While Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the
ineligibility to join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial employees, jurisprudence has
extended this prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or nature of
work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and hence, are likewise
privy to sensitive and highly confidential records.

In this case, the question that needs to be answered is whether the Bank's Chief Cashiers and Assistant
Cashiers, personnel of the Telex Department and HR staff are confidential employees, such that they should
be excluded.
As regards the qualification of bank cashiers as confidential employees, National Association of Trade
Unions (NATU) – Republic Planters Bank Supervisors Chapter v. Torres declared that they are confidential
employees having control, custody and/or access to confidential matters, e.g., the branch's cash position,
statements of financial condition, vault combination, cash codes for telegraphic transfers, demand drafts
and other negotiable instruments, pursuant to Sec. 1166.4 of the Central Bank Manual regarding joint
custody, and therefore, disqualified from joining or assisting a union; or joining, assisting or forming any
other labor organization.
Golden Farms, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja meanwhile stated that “confidential employees such as accounting
personnel, radio and telegraph operators who, having access to confidential information, may become the
source of undue advantage. Said employee(s) may act as spy or spies of either party to a collective
bargaining agreement.”

Finally, in Philips Industrial Development, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court designated
personnel staff, in which human resources staff may be qualified, as confidential employees because by the
very nature of their functions, they assist and act in a confidential capacity to, or have access to
confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions in the field of labor relations.

Petitioner insists that the foregoing employees are not confidential employees; however, it failed to buttress
its claim. Aside from its generalized arguments and despite the Secretary's finding that there was no
evidence to support it, petitioner still failed to substantiate its claim. Petitioner did not even bother to state
the nature of the duties and functions of these employees, depriving the Court of any basis on which it may
be concluded that they are indeed confidential employees. As aptly stated by the CA:
While We agree that petitioner's proposed revision is in accordance with the law, this does not necessarily
mean that the list of exclusions enumerated in the 1998-2000 CBA is contrary to law. As found by public
respondent, petitioner failed to show that the employees sought to be removed from the list of
exclusions are actually rank and file employees who are not managerial or confidential in
status and should, accordingly, be included in the appropriate bargaining unit.

Absent any proof that Chief Cashiers and Assistant Cashiers, personnel of the Telex department
and one (1) HR Staff have mutuality of interest with the other rank and file employees, then
they are rightfully excluded from the appropriate bargaining unit. x x x21(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner cannot simply rely on jurisprudence without explaining how and why it should apply to this case.
Allegations must be supported by evidence. In this case, there is barely any at all.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

99

SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA SAMMA-LAKAS SA INDUSTRIYA NG KAPATIRANG HALIGI
NG ALYANSA (SAMMA-LIKHA) VS. SAMMA CORP., G.R. NO. 167141, MAR. 13, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Samma– Lakas sa Industriya ng Kapatirang Haligi ng
Alyansa (SAMMA-LIKHA) filed a petition for certification election on July 24, 2001 in the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE), Regional Office IV. It claimed that: (1) it was a local chapter of the LIKHA
Federation, a legitimate labor organization registered with the DOLE; (2) it sought to represent all the rankand-file employees of respondent Samma Corporation; (3) there was no other legitimate labor organization
representing these rank-and-file employees; (4) respondent was not a party to any collective bargaining
agreement and (5) no certification or consent election had been conducted within the employer unit for the
last 12 months prior to the filing of the petition.

Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition arguing that (1) LIKHA Federation failed to
establish its legal personality; (2) petitioner failed to prove its existence as a local chapter; (3) it failed to
attach the certificate of non-forum shopping and (4) it had a prohibited mixture of supervisory and rankand-file employees.
In an order dated November 12, 2002, med-arbiter Arturo V. Cosuco ordered the dismissal of the petition on
the following grounds: (1) lack of legal personality for failure to attach the certificate of registration
purporting to show its legal personality; (2) prohibited mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees
and (3) failure to submit a certificate of non-forum shopping.

Issues:
1. Whether a certificate for non-forum shopping is required in a petition for certification election;
2. Whether petitioner had the legal personality to file the petition for certification election.

Ruling:
No requirement of certificate of non-forum shopping.
The requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping refers to complaints, counter-claims, cross-claims,
petitions or applications where contending parties litigate their respective positions regarding the claim for
relief of the complainant, claimant, petitioner or applicant. A certification proceeding, even though initiated
by a "petition," is not a litigation but an investigation of a non-adversarial and fact-finding character.

… [The] rationale for the requirement of a certification against forum shopping is to apprise the Court of the
pendency of another action or claim involving the same issues in another court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency, and thereby precisely avoid the forum shopping situation. Filing multiple petitions or complaints
constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc
upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.
Furthermore, the rule proscribing forum shopping seeks to promote candor and transparency among
lawyers and their clients in the pursuit of their cases before the courts to promote the orderly
administration of justice, prevent undue inconvenience upon the other party, and save the precious time of
the courts. It also aims to prevent the embarrassing situation of two or more courts or agencies rendering
conflicting resolutions or decisions upon the same issue.

The same situation holds true for a petition for certification election. Under the omnibus rules implementing
the Labor Code as amended by D.O. No. 9, it is supposed to be filed in the Regional Office which has
jurisdiction over the principal office of the employer or where the bargaining unit is principally situated. The
rules further provide that where two or more petitions involving the same bargaining unit are filed in one
Regional Office, the same shall be automatically consolidated. Hence, the filing of multiple suits and the
possibility of conflicting decisions will rarely happen in this proceeding and, if it does, will be easy to
discover.

100

Notably, under the Labor Code and the rules pertaining to the form of the petition for certification election,
there is no requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping either in D.O. No. 9, series of 1997 or in D.O.
No. 40-03, series of 2003 which replaced the former.

Considering the nature of a petition for certification election and the rules governing it, we therefore hold
that the requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping is inapplicable to such a petition.
Legal Personality of Petitioner

Petitioner argues that the erroneous inclusion of one supervisory employee in the union of rank-and-file
employees was not a ground to impugn its legitimacy as a legitimate labor organization which had the right
to file a petition for certification election.

We agree.

LIKHA was granted legal personality as a federation under certificate of registration no. 92-1015-03211638-FED-LC. Subsequently, petitioner as its local chapter was issued its charter certificate no. 2-01.With
certificates of registration issued in their favor, they are clothed with legal personality as legitimate labor
organizations:
Section 5.Effect of registration. – The labor organization or workers’ association shall be deemed registered
and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration. Such legal
personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack, but may be questioned only in an independent
petition for cancellation in accordance with these Rules.

Section 3.Acquisition of legal personality by local chapter. - A local/chapter constituted in accordance with
Section 1 of this Rule shall acquire legal personality from the date of filing of the complete documents
enumerated therein. Upon compliance with all the documentary requirements, the Regional Office or
Bureau of Labor Relations shall issue in favor of the local/chapter a certificate indicating that it is included
in the roster of legitimate labor organizations.

Such legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack, but may be questioned only in an
independent petition for cancellation of certificate of registration. Unless petitioner’s union registration is
cancelled in independent proceedings, it shall continue to have all the rights of a legitimate labor
organization, including the right to petition for certification election.

Furthermore, the grounds for dismissal of a petition for certification election based on the lack of legal
personality of a labor organization are the following: (a) petitioner is not listed by the Regional Office or the
Bureau of Labor Relations in its registry of legitimate labor organizations or (b) its legal personality has
been revoked or cancelled with finality in accordance with the rules.

As mentioned, respondent filed a petition for cancellation of the registration of petitioner on December 14,
2002. In a resolution dated April 14, 2003, petitioner’s charter certificate was revoked by the DOLE. But on
May 6, 2003, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of this resolution. Neither of the parties alleged that
this resolution revoking petitioner’s charter certificate had attained finality. However, in this petition,
petitioner prayed that its charter certificate be "reinstated in the roster of active legitimate labor
[organizations]." This cannot be granted here. To repeat, the proceedings on a petition for cancellation of
registration are independent of those of a petition for certification election. This case originated from the
latter. If it is shown that petitioner’s legal personality had already been revoked or cancelled with finality in
accordance with the rules, then it is no longer a legitimate labor organization with the right to petition for a
certification election.

A Final Note

101

Respondent, as employer, had been the one opposing the holding of a certification election among its rankand-file employees. This should not be the case. We have already declared that, in certification elections,
the employer is a bystander; it has no right or material interest to assail the certification election.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILS., (HYATT REGENCY) VS. SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA
SA HYATT-(NUWHRAIN) G.R. NO. 165756, JUNE 5, 2009

Facts:
Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-National Union of Workers in the Hotel Restaurant and Allied
Industries (Union) is the certified collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Hyatt
Regency Manila, a hotel owned by petitioner Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines, Inc. (HEPI).
In 2001, HEPI’s hotel business suffered a slump due to the local and international economic slowdown.
After implementing several schemes to recover their losses, HEPI decided to implement a downsizing
scheme by removing positions identified as redundant. The effect was to be a reduction of the hotel’s rankand file employees from the agreed number of 248, from their CBA, down to just 150. The Union opposed
the downsizing plan because they did not believe the financial report stating that the hotel was incurring
heavy financial losses, and for being violative of the CBA.
Despite its opposition, a list of the positions declared redundant and to be contracted out was given by the
management to the Union. Notices of termination were, likewise, sent to 48 employees whose positions
were to be retrenched or declared as redundant.
The Union filed a notice of strike based on unfair labor practice (ULP) against HEPI. A petition was likewise
filed by HEPI to declare the strike illegal.
The NLRC decided in favor of HEPI. They gave credence to the financial report that the hotel had incurred
huge financial losses necessitating the adoption of a downsizing scheme. Thus, NLRC declared the strike
illegal, suspended all Union officers for a period of six (6) months without pay, and dismissed the ULP
charge against HEPI.

Issue:
Whether or not the Union staged a valid strike.

Ruling:
The Constitution affords full protection to labor, but the policy is not to be blindly followed at the expense of
capital. Always, the interests of both sides must be balanced in light of the evidence adduced and the
peculiar circumstances surrounding each case.

The requisites for a valid strike are: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended
date thereof or 15 days in case of ULP; (b) a strike vote approved by a majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that
purpose; and (c) a notice to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the
intended strike. The requirements are mandatory and failure of a union to comply therewith renders the
strike illegal.

In this case, respondent fully satisfied the procedural requirements prescribed by law: a strike notice filed
on April 12, 2002; a strike vote reached on April 25, 2002; notification of the strike vote filed also on April
25, 2002; conciliation proceedings conducted on May 8, 20002; and the actual strike on May 10, 2002.

Substantively, however, there appears to be a problem. A valid and legal strike must be based on
"strikeable" grounds, because if it is based on a "non-strikeable" ground, it is generally deemed an illegal
strike. Corollarily, a strike grounded on ULP is illegal if no acts constituting ULP actually exist. As an
exception, even if no such acts are committed by the employer, if the employees believe in good faith that
ULP actually exists, then the strike held pursuant to such belief may be legal. As a general rule, therefore,

102

who was then the Vice President of the union.where a union believes that an employer committed ULP and the surrounding circumstances warranted such belief in good faith.APCWU CBA. the grievance committee issued its report recommending to ATI the recall of the petitioner as Shop Steward and for his reversion to his former position of Checker I.[ On December 28. Miranda. Jr. and the union president. 103 . The union president explained that the petitioner was recalled as union Shop Steward due to loss of trust and confidence in him. 2009 Facts: Petitioner Teodorico S. Indeed. upon the recommendation of the union president. A suspension of two (2) months without pay should have been more reasonable and just. Silva. He further contends that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing his consolidated petitions which prayed for the enforcement of his reinstatement as Shop Steward for being moot and academic. Silva. On April 10. Inc. may be considered legal.) . even if technically there was no legal ground to stage a strike based on ULP (because the downzising/retrenchment scheme by the employer was declared valid).” Upon the conclusion of the investigation. JR. The Shop Steward is a field representative of both the company and the union and acts as an independent arbiter of all complaints brought to his attention. was appointed to the position of Shop Steward which is a union position under the payroll of the company. MIRANDA. by exception. The petitioner questioned his recall as union Shop Steward. wrote a letter to the petitioner regarding the recall of his designation as the union Shop Steward. Here. the resulting strike may be considered legal although. The belief was bolstered when the management hired 100 contractual workers to replace the 48 terminated regular rank-and-file employees who were all Union members. subsequently. TEODORICO S. Roger P. Thus. amending Section 2. 1992. ASIAN TERMINALS. the strike. Be it noted that the striking workers are not entitled to receive strike-duration pay. since the attendant circumstances support the belief in good faith that petitioner’s retrenchment scheme was structured to weaken the bargaining power of the Union. the petitioner. INC. The petitioner argues that he is entitled to claim reinstatement as Shop Steward as well as the payment of his backwages pending the respondent’s appeal. issued a letter which reasoned that the petitioner’s recall as Shop Steward was pursuant to Section 13 of the Agreement Amending the MPSI-APCWU CBA. the President of APCWU. 174316 JUNE 23. The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the union and ATI provided for the appointment of a Shop Steward from among the union members. He also became a member of the Associated Port Checkers and Workers Union (APCWU or the union). 1993. the ULP allegation against the employer being unfounded. in accordance with the CBA. pursuant to the “Agreement Amending the MPSI (Marina Port Services. such allegations of unfair labor practices were found to be groundless. Roger P. (ATI) AND COURT OF APPEALS GR NO. respondent Union went on strike in the honest belief that petitioner was committing ULP after the latter decided to downsize its workforce contrary to the staffing/manning standards adopted by both parties under a CBA forged only four (4) short months earlier. Because of this. VS. was employed by respondent ATI in 1991 as Checker I. those circumstances showed prima facie that the hotel committed ULP. we view the NLRC’s decision to suspend all the Union officers for six (6) months without pay to be too harsh a punishment. Article V of the MPSI-APCWU CBA which required that the term of office of the Shop Steward shall be based on trust and confidence and favorable recommendation of the duly elected president of the Union.” The letter further stated that the petitioner refused to heed the union president’s reminders concerning his “chronic absenteeism” that “is hurting the interest of the Union members as they are left with no responsible union officer when summoned for investigation concerning alleged infractions of company rules.

union president and this time including respondent company and the president of the company. The shop steward is responsible for receiving complaints and grievances of the employees and for bringing these complaints to the immediate supervisor of the employee concerned. or from any order or memorandum. An "Internal Union Dispute" or intra-union conflict refers to a conflict within or inside a labor union. If the grievance is not settled through the efforts of the shop steward. maintains that both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals relied on substantial evidence in arriving at their decision that the consolidated petitions are already moot and academic in view of the previous reinstatement of the petitioner to Checker I and his retrenchment and separation from ATI since October 31. Notwithstanding the determination of the Med-Arbiter. department. and his retrenchment was finally settled through the execution of a Quit Claim and 104 . He was already retrenched from respondent ATI since October 21. Since the Shop Steward is a union position. making the dispute an intra-union dispute. The first Complaints filed by the petitioner were against the union and the Union President for illegal recall of his designation as Shop Steward. A shop steward is appointed by the union in a shop. which is binding on this Court. But the money claims could not be brought before the union since the salaries of the petitioner were paid by the respondent company. Black's Law Dictionary defines a shop steward as a union official elected to represent members in a plant or particular department. 2001. charged with negotiating and adjustment of grievances of employees with the supervisor of the employer. In fine. It includes all disputes or grievances arising from any violation of or disagreement over any provision of the constitution and by-laws of a union.The respondent. His duties include collection of dues. and not within the company. A Complaint was then filed before the DOLE Med-Arbiter praying for reinstatement to union Shop Steward and for the award of the salary differential while he was allegedly illegally demoted. Employment with respondent ATI and membership in the union are required in order to occupy the position of Shop Steward. as affirmed by the Secretary of Labor. the controversy surrounding his recall from his position as Shop Steward becomes a dispute within the union. He is the representative of the union members in a building or other workplace. recruitment of new members and initial negotiations for the settlement of grievances. [ Article 226 of the Labor Code of the Philippines vests on the Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Division jurisdiction to act on all inter-union or intra-union conflicts. against the union. thus. it is referred to the grievance committee. the petitioner could not be reinstated to the position of Shop Steward because his eventual separation from respondent ATI made reinstatement unfeasible. circular or assignments issued by the appropriate authority in the establishment. a Complaint for illegal demotion amounting to constructive dismissal was filed before the Labor Arbiter. 2001. But the petitioner is neither a member of the union nor employed with respondent ATI. they are part and parcel of the continuous process of grievance resolution designed to preserve and maintain peace among the employees and their employer. The actions of the petitioner bolster the conclusion that his grievances were directed against the union and not the respondent company. that the petitioner should be reinstated to the position of Shop Steward. They occupy positions of trust and laden with awesome responsibilities. including any violation of the rights and conditions of union membership provided for in the Code. or plant and serves as representative of the union. It is quite clear that the jurisdiction of shop stewards and the supervisors includes the determination of the issues arising from the interpretation or even implementation of a provision of the CBA. Issues: (1) Whether or not the petitioner should be reinstated to the position of Shop Steward (2) Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the dispute Ruling: A cursory look at the responsibilities of a shop steward leads to the conclusion that it is a position within the union. on the other hand.

should not be immediately certified as the bargaining agent. The Quit Claim and Release provides that in consideration of the receipt ofP367. however. Still five other votes were segregated on the ground that they were cast by probationary employees and. pursuant to the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). NO. which garnered 151 votes. appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE). ET AL. 2009 Facts: A certification election was conducted on June 16. NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS RESTAURANTS AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES-MANILA PAVILION HOTEL CHAPTER VS. such employees cannot vote. albeit the legality of their dismissal was still pending before the Court of Appeals. Issues: 105 . they could not vote. 2006 among the rank-and-file employees of respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel (the Hotel) with the following results: In view of the significant number of segregated votes. the petitioner discharges respondent ATI and its officers from any claims arising from his retrenchment. and he released respondent ATI from any and all claims or liability with respect to his separation from employment due to retrenchment. 181531. It may seem that the outcome of this case provides no relief for the petitioner despite his invalid removal from the position of union Shop Steward. SOLE. 2007. To order the respondent company to reinstate the petitioner to his employment in ATI would render the Quit Claim and Release nugatory. which garnered 169 votes. EMPLOYEES IN VOTERS’ LIST = 353 Petitioner. G. the SOLE concluded that the certification of HIMPHLU as the exclusive bargaining agent was proper. He was already compensated for his retrenchment from ATI. 032809-02. as the opening of the 17 segregated ballots would push the number of valid votes cast to 338 (151 + 169 + 1 + 17).00. Six other votes were segregated because the employees who cast NUWHRAIN-MPHC = 151 them were already occupying supervisory positions at the time of the election. hence. and respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavillion Hotel Labor Union (HIMPHLU).500. Eleven (11) votes were initially segregated because they were cast by dismissed employees. a probationary employee. but the reinstatement of the petitioner could not be forced into the present circumstances because the petitioner is no longer employed by the respondent company. the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE). petitioner. By the assailed Resolution of January 22. And petitioner averred that respondent HIMPHLU. was counted. without prejudice to the present labor case filed by the petitioner. arguing that the votes of the probationary employees should have been opened considering that probationary employee Gatbonton’s vote was tallied. The events which have taken place during the pendency of the case have rendered the present petition moot and academic.R. It bears noting early on. the six probationary employees were not yet hired. JULY 31. It is a fact that we cannot avoid and must consider in resolving this case. In fine. NUHWHRAIN-MPHC. that the vote of one Jose Gatbonton (Gatbonton). affirmed the Med-Arbiter’s Order. through then Acting Secretary Luzviminda Padilla. the 169 votes which HIMPHLU garnered would be one vote short of the majority which would then become 169.Release which was executed before the Second Division of the NLRC in NLRC CA No. contending unions. Simonette Calabocal to decide which among those votes would be opened TOTAL VOTES CAST = 346 and tallied. The Order granting the petition for the conduct of the certification election. referred the case back to Med-Arbiter Ma. hence.

" Collective bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all employees in the bargaining unit. any employee. Who may join labor unions and workers' associations. As Airtime Specialists. which amended Rule XI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. be eligible for membership in any labor organization. Hence. as well as the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules on certification elections and jurisprudence thereon. shall have the right to self-organization and to form. as certified by the Department of Foreign Affairs. eligible for membership in a labor organization.The relevant issues for resolution then are first. The inclusion of Gatbonton’s vote was proper not because it was not questioned but because probationary employees have the right to vote in a certification election. all rank and file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. For purposes of this section. v. Alien employees with valid working permits issued by the Department may exercise the right to selforganization and join or assist labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining if they are nationals of a country which grants the same or similar rights to Filipino workers. Inc. probationary or permanent. 106 . Sec. The provision in the CBA disqualifying probationary employees from voting cannot override the Constitutionally-protected right of workers to self-organization. the Court rules in the affirmative. The law refers to "all" the employees in the bargaining unit. from the first day of their employment. Managerial employees shall not be eligible to form. All other workers. charitable. have a substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. including employees of government owned or controlled corporations without original charters established under the Corporation Code. shall beginning on the first day of his/her service. it is evident that the period of reckoning in determining who shall be included in the list of eligible voters is. intermittent and other workers. The Code makes no distinction as to their employment status as basis for eligibility in supporting the petition for certification election. 2 of Department Order No. that supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor union of the rank-and-file employees but may form. medical or educational institutions whether operating for profit or not. industrial and agricultural enterprises. becomes final and executory. and second. series of 2003. in cases where a timely appeal has been filed from the Order of the MedArbiter. join or assist labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining: provided. the date when the Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection and other legitimate purposes except collective bargaining. join or assist separate labor unions of their own. including ambulant. whether employees on probationary status at the time of the certification elections should be allowed to vote. the self-employed. The votes of the six other probationary employees should thus also have been counted. however. Ruling: On the first issue.All persons employed in commercial. join or assist any labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining. as well as employees of religious. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the "bargaining unit. whether HIMPHLU was able to obtain the required majority for it to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent." (Emphasis supplied) Rule II. all rank and file employees. whether probationary or permanent are entitled to vote. This principle is clearly stated in Art. 40-03. . Ferrer-Calleja holds: In a certification election. whether affirming or denying the appeal. provides: Rule II Section 2. Prescinding from the principle that all employees are. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the "labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for purposes of collective bargaining. whether employed for a definite period or not.

The filing of an appeal to the SOLE from the Med-Arbiter’s Order stays its execution, in
accordance with Sec. 21, and rationally, the Med-Arbiter cannot direct the employer to furnish him/her
with the list of eligible voters pending the resolution of the appeal.

During the pendency of the appeal, the employer may hire additional employees. To exclude the employees
hired after the issuance of the Med-Arbiter’s Order but before the appeal has been resolved would violate
the guarantee that every employee has the right to be part of a labor organization from the first day of
their service.
In the present case, records show that the probationary employees, including Gatbonton, were included in
the list of employees in the bargaining unit submitted by the Hotel on May 25, 2006 in compliance with the
directive of the Med-Arbiter after the appeal and subsequent motion for reconsideration have been denied
by the SOLE, rendering the Med-Arbiter’s August 22, 2005 Order final and executory 10 days after the
March 22, 2007 Resolution (denying the motion for reconsideration of the January 22 Order denying the
appeal), and rightly so.
Because, for purposes of self-organization, those employees are, in light of the discussion
above, deemed eligible to vote.
A certification election is the process of determining the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of
the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining.
Collective bargaining, refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor
organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and
conditions of employment in a bargaining unit.

The significance of an employee’s right to vote in a certification election cannot thus be overemphasized for
he has considerable interest in the determination of who shall represent him in negotiating the terms and
conditions of his employment.

Even if the Implementing Rules gives the SOLE 20 days to decide the appeal from the Order of the MedArbiter, experience shows that it sometimes takes months to be resolved. To rule then that only those
employees hired as of the date of the issuance of the Med-Arbiter’s Order are qualified to vote would
effectively disenfranchise employees hired during the pendency of the appeal. More importantly, reckoning
the date of the issuance of the Med-Arbiter’s Order as the cut-off date would render inutile the remedy of
appeal to the SOLE.
But while the Court rules that the votes of all the probationary employees should be included, under the
particular circumstances of this case and the period of time which it took for the appeal to be decided, the
votes of the six supervisory employees must be excluded because at the time the certification elections
was conducted, they had ceased to be part of the rank and file, their promotion having taken effect two
months before the election.

2nd Issue:
As to whether HIMPHLU should be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent, the Court rules in the
negative. It is well-settled that under the so-called "double majority rule," for there to be a valid
certification election, majority of the bargaining unit must have voted AND the winning union
must have garnered majority of the valid votes cast.

Prescinding from the Court’s ruling that all the probationary employees’ votes should be deemed valid
votes while that of the supervisory employees should be excluded, it follows that the number of valid votes
cast would increase – from 321 to 337. Under Art. 256 of the Labor Code, the union obtaining the majority
of the valid votes cast by the eligible voters shall be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of
all the workers in the appropriate bargaining unit. This majority is 50% + 1. Hence, 50% of 337 is 168.5 + 1
or at least 170.
HIMPHLU obtained 169 while petitioner received 151 votes. Clearly, HIMPHLU was not able to obtain a
majority vote. The position of both the SOLE and the appellate court that the opening of the 17 segregated
ballots will not materially affect the outcome of the certification election as for, so they contend, even if
such member were all in favor of petitioner, still, HIMPHLU would win, is thus untenable.

107

It bears reiteration that the true importance of ascertaining the number of valid votes cast is for it
to serve as basis for computing the required majority, and not just to determine which union
won the elections. The opening of the segregated but valid votes has thus become material. To be sure,
the conduct of a certification election has a two-fold objective: to determine the appropriate bargaining unit
and to ascertain the majority representation of the bargaining representative, if the employees desire to be
represented at all by anyone. It is not simply the determination of who between two or more contending
unions won, but whether it effectively ascertains the will of the members of the bargaining unit as to
whether they want to be represented and which union they want to represent them.
Having declared that no choice in the certification election conducted obtained the required majority, it
follows that a run-off election must be held to determine which between HIMPHLU and petitioner should
represent the rank-and-file employees.

A run-off election refers to an election between the labor unions receiving the two (2) highest number of
votes in a certification or consent election with three (3) or more choices, where such a certified or consent
election results in none of the three (3) or more choices receiving the majority of the valid votes cast;
provided that the total number of votes for all contending unions is at least fifty percent (50%) of the
number of votes cast.8 With 346 votes cast, 337 of which are now deemed valid and HIMPHLU having only
garnered 169 and petitioner having obtained 151 and the choice "NO UNION" receiving 1 vote, then the
holding of a run-off election between HIMPHLU and petitioner is in order.

A. SORIANO AVIATION VS. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION OF A. SORIANO AVIATION ET AL. G.R. NO.
166879, AUG. 14, 2009

Facts:
A. Soriano Aviation (petitioner or the company) and respondent Employees Association of A. Soriano
Aviation (the Union), the duly-certified exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of
petitioner, entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) which included a “No-Strike, No-Lock-out”
clause.
On May 1 & 12, and June 12, 1997, which were legal holidays and peak season for the company, eight
mechanics-members of respondent Union refused to render overtime work. Petitioner treated the refusal to
work as a concerted action which is a violation of the “No-Strike, No-Lockout” clause in the CBA. It thus
meted the workers a 30-day suspension. It also filed a complaint for illegal strike.

The attempted settlement between the parties having been futile, the Union filed a Notice of Strike with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board on October 3, 1997, attributing to petitioner the following acts:
(1) union busting, (2) illegal dismissal of union officer, (3) illegal suspension of eight mechanics, (4)
violation of memorandum of agreement, (5) coercion of employees and interrogation of newly-hired
mechanics with regard to union affiliation, (6) discrimination against the aircraft mechanics, (7) harassment
through systematic fault-finding, (8) contractual labor, and (9) constructive dismissal of the Union
President, Julius Vargas. As despite conciliation no amicable settlement of the dispute was arrived at, the
Union went on strike on October 22, 1997.

The Labor Arbiter declared that the newly implemented work-shift schedule was a valid exercise of
management prerogative and the refusal of herein individual respondents to work on three consecutive
holidays was a form of protest by the Union, hence, deemed a concerted action. Noting that the Union
failed to comply with the formal requirements prescribed by the Labor Code in the holding of strike, the
strike was declared illegal.
The Labor Arbiter declared the second strike illegal. The Labor Arbiter went on to hold that the Union
deliberately resorted to the use of violent and unlawful acts in the course of the “second strike,” hence, the
individual respondents were deemed to have lost their employment.

NLRC affirmed in toto the Labor Arbiter’s decision.

108

The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the NLRC ruling, holding that the acts of violence committed
by the Union members in the course of the strike were not serious or pervasive to call for loss of
employment of the striking employees. Specifically, the appellate court noted that at the time petitioner
filed its complaint in June 1998, almost eight months had already elapsed from the commencement of the
strike and, in the interim, the alleged acts of violence were committed only during nine non-consecutive
days.

Issue:
In issue then is whether the strike staged by respondents is illegal due to the alleged commission of illegal
acts and violation of the “No Strike-No Lockout” clause of the CBA and, if in the affirmative, whether
individual respondents are deemed to have lost their employment status on account thereof.

Ruling:
The Court rules in the affirmative.
The Court notes that, as found by the Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case No. 07-05409-97, the first strike or the
mechanics’ refusal to work on 3 consecutive holidays was prompted by their disagreement with the
management-imposed new work schedule. Having been grounded on a non-strikeable issue and without
complying with the procedural requirements, then the same is a violation of the “No Strike-No Lockout
Policy” in the existing CBA. Respecting the second strike, where the Union complied with procedural
requirements, the same was not a violation of the “No Strike- No Lockout” provisions, as a “No Strike-No
Lockout” provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) is a valid stipulation but may be invoked
only by employer when the strike is economic in nature or one which is conducted to force wage or other
concessions from the employer that are not mandated to be granted by the law. It would be inapplicable to
prevent a strike which is grounded on unfair labor practice. In the present case, the Union believed in good
faith that petitioner committed unfair labor practice when it went on strike on account of the 30-day
suspension meted to the striking mechanics, dismissal of a union officer and perceived union-busting,
among others.

The Court holds that the second strike became invalid due to the commission of illegal action in its course.
It is hornbook principle that the exercise of the right of private sector employees to strike is not
absolute. Thus Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 3. x x x
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be
entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in
policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by
law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, even if the purpose of a strike is valid, the strike may still be held illegal where
the means employed are illegal. Thus, the employment of violence, intimidation, restraint or coercion in
carrying out concerted activities which are injurious to the right to property renders a strike illegal. And so
is picketing or the obstruction to the free use of property or the comfortable enjoyment of life or property,
when accompanied by intimidation, threats, violence, and coercion as to constitute nuisance.

Apropos is the following ruling in Sukhothai Cuisine v. Court of Appeals:
Well-settled is the rule that even if the strike were to be declared valid because its objective or purpose is
lawful, the strike may still be declared invalid where the means employed are illegal. Among such limits are
the prohibited activities under Article 264 of the Labor Code, particularly paragraph (e), which states that
no person engaged in picketing shall:
a) commit any act of violence, coercion, or intimidation or
b) obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or
c) obstruct public thoroughfares.

109

The following acts have been held to be prohibited activities: where the strikers shouted slanderous and
scurrilous words against the owners of the vessels; where the strikers used unnecessary and obscene
language or epithets to prevent other laborers to go to work, and circulated libelous statements against the
employer which show actual malice; where the protestors used abusive and threatening language towards
the patrons of a place of business or against co-employees, going beyond the mere attempt to persuade
customers to withdraw their patronage; where the strikers formed a human cordon and blocked all the ways
and approaches to the launches and vessels of the vicinity of the workplace and perpetrated acts of
violence and coercion to prevent work from being performed; and where the strikers shook their fists and
threatened non-striking employees with bodily harm if they persisted to proceed to the
workplace. Permissible activities of the picketing workers do not include obstruction of access of
customers.

The appellate court found in the present case, as in fact it is not disputed, that the Union committed illegal
acts during the strike. The Union members’ repeated name-calling, harassment and threats of bodily harm
directed against company officers and non-striking employees and, more significantly, the putting up of
placards, banners and streamers with vulgar statements imputing criminal negligence to the company,
which put to doubt reliability of its operations, come within the purview of illegal acts under Art. 264 and
jurisprudence.
That the alleged acts of violence were committed in nine non-consecutive days during the almost eight
months that the strike was on-going does not render the violence less pervasive or widespread to be
excusable. Nowhere in Art. 264 does it requires that violence must be continuous or that it should be for
the entire duration of the strike.

The appellate court took against petitioner its filing of its complaint to have the strike declared illegal
almost eight months from the time it commenced. Art. 264 does not, however, state for purposes of having
a strike declared as illegal that the employer should immediately report the same. It only lists what acts
are prohibited. It is thus absurd to expect an employer to file a complaint at the first instance that an act of
violence is alleged to be committed, especially, as in the present case, when an earlier complaint to have
the refusal of the individual respondents to work overtime declared as an illegal strike was still pending —
an issue resolved in its favor only on September 25, 1998.

The records show that the Union went on strike on October 22, 1997, and the first reported harassment
incident occurred on October 29, 1997, while the last occurred in January, 1998. Those instances may have
been sporadic, but as found by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the display of placards, streamers and
banners even up to the time the appeal was being resolved by the NLRC works against the Union’s favor.
The acts complained of including the display of placards and banners imputing criminal negligence on the
part of the company and its officers, apparently with the end in view of intimidating the company’s
clientele, are, given the nature of its business, that serious as to make the “second strike” illegal.
Specifically with respect to the putting up of those banners and placards, coupled with the name-calling and
harassment, the same indicates that it was resorted to coerce the resolution of the dispute – the very evil
which Art. 264 seek to prevent.

2nd Issue:
As to the issue
strike, Sukhothai instructs:

of

loss

of

employment

of

those

who

participated

in

the

illegal

In the determination of the liabilities of the individual respondents, the applicable provision is Article 264(a)
of the Labor Code:
Art. 264. Prohibited Activities – (a) x x x
x x x x Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union
officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during an illegal strike may
be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker
in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even
if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.
xxxx

110

While respondent Julius Vargas was identified to be a union officer. Substantial evidence available under the attendant circumstances. After the necessary strike vote was taken under the supervision of the National Conciliation Mediation Board – National Capital Region (NCMB-NCR). Of the 11 employees sought to be retrenched. Claiming that YSS Laboratories was guilty of discrimination and union-busting in carrying out the said retrenchment program. Initially. and YSS Laboratories to accept them under the terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. these employees were given the option to avail themselves of the early retirement program of the company. It also asserted that the union officers who participated in the purported illegal 111 . Inc. In order to forge a compromise. all striking workers were thereby directed to return to work within 24 hours from their receipt of the said Order. refused to fully comply with the directive of the Secretary of Labor. A perusal of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision. Underscoring the government’s policy of preserving economic gains and employment levels. the striker must be identified. on the other hand. When no one opted to retire early. individual respondents were all deemed to have lost their employment. YSSEU is a duly registered labor organization and the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of YSS Laboratories.. but these efforts proved futile since the parties’ stance was unbending. But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. NO. make a distinction between workers and union officers who participate therein: an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal. the records do not indicate. In its Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. when he commits an illegal act during an illegal strike. The Court not being a trier of facts. YSS Laboratories. Of the participants in the illegal strike. outlined in Article 264. DECEMBER 4. the Secretary of Labor certified the labor dispute to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration. Accordingly. YSS LABORATORIES INC. if any. shows that on account of the staging of the illegal strike. 2009 Facts: YSS Laboratories is a domestic corporation engaged in the pharmaceutical business. whether they knowingly participated in the illegal strike in the case of union officers or knowingly participated in the commission of violent acts during the illegal strike in the case of union members. This prompted the Secretary of Labor to finally intervene in order to put an end to a prolonged labor dispute.R.In Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines. and like other workers. the Secretary of Labor deemed that the continuation of the labor dispute was inimical to national interest. A union officer. There must be proof that he or she committed illegal acts during a strike. The liability for prohibited acts has thus to be determined on an individual basis. YSSEU staged a strike on 20 April 2001. nine were officers and members of YSSEU. Inc. YSS Laboratories implemented a retrenchment program which affected 11 employees purportedly chosen in accordance with the reasonable standards established by the company. Thus. copies of the Notices of Termination were filed with DOLE on 19 March 2001 and were served to concerned employees on 20 March 2001. In all cases. which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal.-NAFLU v. 155125. YSS Laboratories exercised its option to terminate the services of its employees as allegedly authorized under Article 283 of the Labor Code. Sulpicio Lines. however. this Court explained that the effects of such illegal strikes. there is no indication if he knowingly participated in the illegal strike. In order to arrest escalating business losses. which was affirmed in toto by the NLRC. YSS EMPLOYEES UNION-PHIL TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION VS. a number of conciliation proceedings were conducted by the NCMB-NCR. may be terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike. G. Thus. the remand of the case to the NLRC is in order only for the purpose of determining the status in the Union of individual respondents and their respective liability. YSSEU decided to hold a strike. in an Order dated 11 May 2001. YSS Laboratories argued that nine union officers and members who were previously terminated from service pursuant to a valid retrenchment should be excluded from the operation of the return-to-work order. may suffice. without distinction as to their respective participation.

the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. if not totally averted. Ruling: The petition is impressed with merit. The grant of these plenary powers to the Secretary of Labor makes it incumbent upon him to bring about soonest. picketing. and is granted great breadth of discretion to adopt the most reasonable and expeditious way of writing finis to the labor dispute. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. 263. which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. WHETHER OR NOT THE SECRETARY OF LABOR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN CERTIFYING THE LABOR DISPUTE TO THE NLRC FOR COMPULSORY ARBITRATION. II. and enjoining YSSEU to return to work and YSS Laboratories to admit them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. After martial law was lifted and democracy was restored. when the Secretary of Labor directed YSS Laboratories to accept all the striking workers back to work. by avoiding stoppage of work or any lag in the activities of the industry or the possibility of those contingencies that might cause detriment to the national interest. if one has already taken place. there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. or gravely abuse the same. and lockouts. all striking workers shall immediately return to work. and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. Accordingly. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. an act may be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same is performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment. The Secretary of Labor is afforded plenary and broad powers. YSS Laboratories’ vigorous insistence on the exclusion of the retrenched employees from the coverage of the return-to-work order seriously impairs the authority of the Secretary of Labor to forestall a labor dispute that he deems inimical to the national economy. Strikes. the Secretary did not exceed his jurisdiction. The 112 . certifying the labor dispute involving the herein parties to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. the assumption of jurisdiction in Art. Thus. Said provision reads: Art. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification. 263(g) has now been viewed as an exercise of the police power of the State with the aim of promoting the common good. in his opinion. It is significant at this point to point out that grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment. xxxx (g) When.strike should likewise not be allowed to be back to their employment for they were deemed to have already lost their employment status. Issues: I. a fair and just solution to the differences between the employer and the employees. The Orders dated 11 May 2001 and 9 June 2001 of the Secretary of Labor. Moreover. so that the damage such labor dispute might cause upon the national interest may be minimized as much as possible. In order to effectively achieve such end. WHETHER OR NOT THE RETRENCHED EMPLOYEES SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE OPERATION OF THE RETURN TO WORK ORDER. were issued pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. the assumption or certification order shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout.

the determination of who among the strikers could be admitted back to work cannot be made to depend upon the discretion of employer. in accordance with Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Orders dated 11 May 2001 and 9 June 2001 were issued by the Secretary of Labor. Gracia. Pilar Layco. AND ANTONIO JOSE LEGARDA. WHEREFORE. his certification for compulsory arbitration is not intended to interfere with the management’s rights but to obtain a speedy settlement of the dispute. The certification attests to the urgency of the matter. 180291. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) VS. premises considered. as President and General Manager of the GSIS. This was done for the promotion of the common good. III. marched to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support for Messrs. and therefore must be obeyed until set aside. Inc. GRACIA. Rowena Therese B. The Secretary of Labor acts to maintain industrial peace. there is no showing that the assailed orders were issued in an arbitrary or despotic manner. ELIZABETH DUQUE. with the end in view of preserving the status quo ante while the main issues of the validity of the retrenchment and legality of the strike were being threshed out in the proper forum. G. NO.R. The return-to-work order does not interfere with the management’s prerogative. but of obligation mandated by law for YSS Laboratories to faithfully comply with. The order is issued in the exercise of the court’s compulsory power of arbitration. Certainly. x x x. even during the pendency of any petition questioning their validity. JULY 27. YSS Laboratories undermines the underlying principle embodied in Article 263(g) of the Labor Code on the settlement of labor disputes -. committed as follows: That on 27 May 2005. Accepting back the workers in this case is not a matter of option. Instructive is the ruling of this Court in Philippine Airlines Employees Association v. The interests of both the employers and employees are intended to be protected and not one of them is given undue preference. (20). Adronico A. PILAR LAYCO. or of the validity of its claims. f) in relation to Section 52A (3). wearing red shirt together with some employees. The rights granted by the Constitution are not absolute. not to cater to a narrow segment of society. Rodel Rubio. but merely regulates it when. or to favor labor at the expense of management. Thus. RODEL RUBIO. D. In the case at bar. filed separate formal charges against respondents Dinnah Villaviza. YSS Laboratories must readmit all striking employees and give them back their respective jobs. affecting as it does an industry indispensable to the national interest. ROWENA THERESE B. national interests will be affected. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco. as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. Philippine Airlines. 113 . ADRONICO A. Regardless therefore of its motives. of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS). 2010 Facts: Petitioner Winston Garcia (PGM Garcia). Its compulsory character is mandated.: The very nature of a return-to-work order issued in a certified case lends itself to no other construction. considering that a lingering strike could be inimical to the interest of both employer and employee. but to serve the greater interest of society by maintaining the economic equilibrium. Echavez. c.abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.that assumption and certification orders are executory in character and are to be strictly complied with by the parties. By harping on the validity of the retrenchment and on the exclusion of the retrenched employees from the coverage of the return-to-work order. They are still subject to control and limitation to ensure that they are not exercised arbitrarily. in the exercise of such right. lest we strip the certification or assumption-of-jurisdiction orders of the coercive power that is necessary for attaining their laudable objective. the latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises. respondent. the instant Petition is GRANTED. Elizabeth Duque. and Antonio Jose Legarda for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service pursuant to the Rules of Procedure in Administrative Investigation (RPAI) of GSIS Employees and Officials. DINNAH VILLAVIZA. Rule IV. ECHAVEZ. or to act at all in contemplation of law. (1.

xxx xxx xxx That some of these employees badmouthed the security guards and the GSIS management and defiantly raised clenched fists led by Atty. the concerted activity or mass action proscribed must be coupled with the "intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession. Respondents Duque. Otherwise. clenching their fists. Molina pursuant to Section 7 (b) (2) of R. the members thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty. 2005. Layco. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Velasco who was barred by Hearing Officer Marvin R. whatever their ranks. On June 29. and Legarda. 02-1316 are there to temper and focus the application of such prohibition." Wearing similarly colored shirts.5 None was filed. all dated June 4. It would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service. we would be totally depriving our brothers and sisters in the government service of their constitutional right to freedom of expression. PGM Garcia then filed the above-mentioned formal charges for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service against each of the respondents. Denying that there was a planned mass action.A. 114 . otherwise known as Omnibus Rules on Prohibited Concerted Mass Actions in the Public Sector caused alarm and heightened some employees and disrupted the work at the Investigation Unit during office hours. Barbo dated June 6. Gracia. 2005. 2005 amounted to a "prohibited concerted activity or mass action. Respondents were again directed to submit their written answers under oath within three (3) days from receipt thereof. 021316. Not all collective activity or mass undertaking of government employees is prohibited. The CSC ruled that respondents were not denied their right to due process but there was no substantial evidence to hold them guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Aside from some of them wanting to show their support. Echavez. they were interested in that hearing as it might also affect them. Gatpayat in an Order dated 24 May 2005 from appearing as counsel for Atty. together with two others. the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found the respondents guilty of the lesser offense of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations and reduced the penalty to reprimand. attending a public hearing at the GSIS-IU office. Rubio. together with other employees in utter contempt of CSC Resolution No. Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of expression. This freedom can be reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away. the limitations or qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. bringing with them recording gadgets. PGM Garcia issued separate but similarly worded decisions finding all seven (7) respondents guilty of the charges and meting out the penalty of one (1) year suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto. have as much right as any person in the land to voice out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their rights and interests. some even badmouthing the guards and PGM Garcia. 02-1316 which serves to regulate the political rights of those in the government service. On appeal. the respondents explained that their act of going to the office of the GSIS-IU was a spontaneous reaction after learning that their former union president was there. That respondent. 2005. Precisely. submitted a letter-explanation to Atty. are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work stoppage or service disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of force concession. Issue: Whether or not respondents' actions on May 27." Ruling: As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. dated 11 October 2002. Government workers.

A Notice was also served on the DOLE. One such case is that of Scott v. Atty. 160828. issued a rule prohibiting employees from wearing badges or buttons on their uniforms. while recognizing the government's right as an employer to lay down certain standards of conduct. In the recent case of GSIS v. which is the collective bargaining agent for the rank-andfile employees of petitioner PRI. respondents' actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass action. 115 . NO. respondents Tañeca and 14 others filed a Complaint for unfair labor practice. PRI has a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with NAMAPRI-SPFL for a period of five (5) years from May 22. 2000. and CSC's Resolution No. 2000. To equate their wearing of red shirts and going to the GSIS-IU office for just over an hour with that four-day mass action in Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS case and to punish them in the same manner would most certainly be unfair and unjust. Respondents alleged that none of them ever withdrew their membership or submitted to PRI any union dues and check-off disauthorizations against NAMAPRI-SPFL. 09 AUGUST 2010 Facts: On February 13. Proculo P. the New York Transit Authority (NYTA). 1995 until May 22. and the terms and conditions of the CBA.. We cannot say the same for the 20 or so employees in this case. They claimed that they continue to remain on record as bona fide members. Respondents were regular rank-and-file employees of PRI and bona fide members of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa PRI Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (NAMAPRI-SPFL). (PRI). respondents' freedom of speech and of expression remains intact. A number of union members wore union buttons promoting their opposition to a collective bargaining agreement. Recent analogous decisions in the United States. VS.A review of PGM Garcia's formal charges against the respondents reveals that he himself was not even certain whether the respondents and the rest of the twenty or so GSIS employees who were at the GSIS-IU office that fateful day marched there or just simply appeared there simultaneously. Measured against that definition. staged a walkout and participated in a mass protest or demonstration outside the GSIS for four straight days. G. On May 16. AL. Inc. responsible for operation of New York City's mass transit service. the petitioners were not even sure if the spontaneous act of each of the twenty or so GSIS employees on May 27. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS. supported and signed the Petition for Certification Election of the Federation of Free Workers Union (FFW) during the effectivity of the CBA. tend to lean towards a broad definition of "public concern speech" which is protected by their First Amendment. TANECA ET. illegal dismissal and money claims against petitioner PICOP Resources . 2005 was a concerted one. The report of Manager Nagtalon of the GSIS-SD which was the basis for PGM Garcia's formal charges reflected such uncertainty. Meters.17 In said case. They insisted that mere affixation of signature on such authorization was not per se an act of disloyalty. held that the NYTA's rule was "unconstitutionally overboard. Caraga Region.14 Thus. The court. numbering between 300 and 800 each day. Consequently. though recognizing the government's right to impose reasonable restrictions. 02-1316 defining what a prohibited concerted activity or mass action has only tempered or regulated these rights. The CSC and the CA were both correct in arriving at said conclusion. NAMAPRI-SPFL considered said act of campaigning for and signing the petition for certification election of FFW as an act of disloyalty and a valid basis for termination for a cause in accordance with its Constitution and By-Laws. PICOP RESOURCES INC. VP of PRI sent a letter to the management of PRI demanding the termination of employees who allegedly campaigned for.R. the petition of FFW was only filed with the DOLE on May 18. 2000. or 58 days after the start of the freedom period. On October 16. the NYTA tried to enforce its rule and threatened to subject these union members to discipline.16 the Court upheld the position of petitioner GSIS because its employees." Thus. 2001. Fuentes. PRI served notices of termination for causes to the 31 out of the 46 employees whom NAMAPRIL-SPFL sought to be terminated on the ground of "acts of disloyalty" committed against it. 2000. They claimed that while it may be true that they signed the said authorization before the start of the freedom period.

its error. The power of the CA to review NLRC decisions via Rule 65 or Petition for Certiorari has been settled as early as in our decision in St. there is no sufficient evidence to support the decision of PRI to terminate the employment of the respondents." or any other form of agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting employment. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA." "union shop. Martin Funeral Home v.cra1aw Issue 2: PRI argued that the dismissal of the respondents was valid and legal. there is no question that the CBA between PRI and respondents included a union security clause. declaring the dismissal of respondents from employment as legal. because the CBA had already expired on May 22. in their letters. The CA reversed and set aside the assailed Resolutions of the NLRC and reinstated the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. as to the third requisite. restraint or coercion of respondents' exercise of their right to self-organization. in two (2) occasions demanded from PRI. upon written request from the Union. and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union to expel the employee from the union. there could be no justification in PRI's act of dismissing respondents due to acts of disloyalty. Whether or not a CBA can be given its effectivity in all its Terms and Conditions. Secondly. Hence. The Labor Arbiter declared the respondents' dismissal to be illegal and ordered PRI to reinstate respondents to their former or equivalent positions without loss of seniority rights and to jointly and solidarily pay their backwages. However. it is likewise undisputed that NAMAPRI-SPFL.cThis Court held that the proper vehicle for such review was a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. However. 2000. Issues: Whether or not an error in the interpretation of law fall within the ambit of Extraordinary Remedy of Certiorari under Rule 65. likewise. thus. but it was denied for lack of merit. if any. PRI. 116 . Following the same provision. it was no longer the bargaining representative of the rank-and-file workers of PRI. PRI and NAMAPRI-SPFL appealed to the NLRC which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. even beyond the 5-year period when no CBA has yet been entered into. the employer needs to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is applicable. they are enjoined to keep the status quo and continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing CBA during the 60-day period until a new agreement is reached by the parties. which is applied to and comprehends "closed shop. It claimed that assuming that the NLRC erred in its judgment on the legal issues." "maintenance of membership. to terminate the employment of respondents due to their acts of disloyalty to the Union.Respondents. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. The act indirectly required petitioners to support and maintain their membership with NAMAPRI-SPFL as a condition for their continued employment. argued that at the time NAMAPRI-SPFL demanded their termination. possessing just cause to terminate on the grounds herein. is not tantamount to abuse of discretion falling within the ambit of Rule 65. and that this action should be filed in the CA in strict observance of the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts. (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA. in terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union security clause. PRI contends that as parties to the CBA. can indeed terminate the employment of the employee who failed to maintain its good standing as a union member. NLRC. As to the first requisite. Ruling: Issue 1: PRI perceived an error in the mode of appeal by respondents in assailing the decision of the NLRC. WRONG. UNTENABLE. Respondents asserted that the act of PRI in giving in to the wishes of the Union in discharging them on the ground of disloyalty to the Union amounted to interference with. It claimed to have acted in good faith at the instance of the incumbent union pursuant to the Union Security Clause of the CBA. These requisites constitute just cause for terminating an employee based on the union security provision of the CBA. "Union security" is a generic term. Citing Article 253 of the Labor Code.

because it affects not only his position but also his means of livelihood. Due process must be observed in dismissing an employee. After series of negotiations. In said notice. Domy R.UNCONVINCED.PRI alleged that respondents were terminated based on the alleged acts of disloyalty. It contends that their acts are a violation of the Union Security Clause. among others. respondent Hotel and DIHFEU-NFL signed a Memorandum of Agreement wherein Hotel agreed to re-open subject to certain concessions. Respondents did not resign or withdraw their membership from the Union to which they belong. Hotel downsized its manpower structure to 100 rank-and-file employees and a new pay scale was also prepared. It can be said that while it is incumbent for the employer to continue to recognize the majority status of the bargaining agent even after the expiration of the freedom period. among others. reduce leave benefits. as per records. no lock-out shall be enforced). emergency leave and birthday leave be waived.R. The letters signified. but with limitations. Time and again. notifying the same that it will suspend its operations for a period of six months due to severe and serious business losses. as provided in their CBA. Rojas. payment of benefits be on a staggered basis or as available. The retained employees 117 . the recognized labor organization in Waterfront Davao. During the period of the suspension. President of Davao Insular Hotel Free Employees Union (DIHFEU-NFL). We will emphasize anew that the power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the employer. which include the right to labor. respondent assured the DOLE that if the company could not resume its operations within the six-month period. sent respondent a number of letters asking management to reconsider its decision. G. INSULAR HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL VS." is not sufficient ground to terminate the employment. which included. The mere signing of the authorization in support of the Petition before the "freedom period. and multi-tasking of employees." Likewise. we have ruled that we adhere to the policy of enhancing the welfare of the workers. the petition is DENIED. Dismissals must not be arbitrary and capricious. respondent sent the DOLE Region XI. the gesture of support of the union for the economic solutions of the company. WHEREFORE. it was clear that the actual Petition for Certification Election of FFW was filed within the ambit of the freedom period. WATERFRONT INSULAR HOTEL-DAVAO. a Notice of Suspension of Operations. any such agreement entered into by management with a labor organization is fraught with the risk that such a labor union may not be chosen thereafter as the collective bargaining representative. The provision for statusquo is conditioned on the fact that no certification election was filed during the freedom period. therefore. 2000. with a pending petition for certification. Nothing in the records would show that respondents failed to maintain their membership in good standing in the Union. An "authorization letter to file a petition for certification election" is different from an actual "Petition for Certification Election. overtime hours rendered shall be off-set as practiced. suspension of the CBA for ten years (no strike. Respondents continued to pay their union dues and never joined the FFW. The employer is bound to exercise caution in terminating the services of his employees especially so when it is made upon the request of a labor union pursuant to the CBA. NO. Strictly speaking. 2010 Facts: On November 6. 174040-41. what is prohibited is the filing of a petition for certification election outside the 60-day freedom period. Accordingly. The reason is. the company would pay the affected employees all the benefits legally due to them. Their freedom to choose who should be their bargaining representative is of paramount importance. they could only do so when no petition for certification election was filed. respect and protect the rights of their employees. SEPTEMBER 22. Employers should.

the officers. the NCMB approved ex parte the selection of AVA Montejo as the new voluntary arbitrator. When asked to present his authority from NFL. 2003. 2002. filed by individual employees named in the SPAs. AL. However. On March 18. in fact. Hotel filed with the NCMB a Manifestation with Motion for a Second Preliminary Conference. Respondent filed its Motion to Withdraw. raising the following grounds: (1) The persons who filed the instant complaint in the name of the Insular Hotel Employees Union-NFL have no authority to represent the Union. On September 16. AVA Olvida voluntarily inhibited himself out of “delicadeza” and ordered the remand of the case to the NCMB. which embodied the new terms and conditions of their continued employment. at the instance of Cullo. undated and unnotarized.individually signed a “Reconfirmation of Employment”. however. in all stages of proceedings in courts or administrative bodies provided that the issue of the case will involve labor-management relationship like in the case at bar. The proper party-complainant is INSULAR HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL. 2002. as the case may be. Joves. Danilo Cullo (Cullo). respondent resumed its business operations. the recognized and incumbent bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the respondent hotel. In said Opposition. maintained its stand that the NCMB had no jurisdiction over the case. claiming to be local officers of the National Federation of Labor (NFL). presented several Special Powers of Attorney (SPA) which were. The hearing officer directed both parties to elevate the aforementioned issues to AVA Olvida. and signatory to the existing CBA. AVA Olvida ruled that respondent was correct when it raised its objection to NFL as proper party-complainant. 2001. and (3) The existence of an intra-union dispute renders the filing of the instant case premature. filed a Notice of Mediation before the NCMB-Regional Office stating that the Union involved was “DARIUS JOVES/DEBBIE PLANAS ET. Cullo then filed an Opposition. 118 . Olvida to act as voluntary arbitrator. however. certain Darius Joves and Debbie Planas. confirmed that the case was filed not by the IHEU-NFL but by the NFL.” The NCMB called Joves and Hotel to a conference to a possibility of settling the conflict. The NCMB then required the parties to appear before the conciliator for the selection of a new voluntary arbitrator. AVA Olvida directed respondent to file a formal motion to withdraw its submission to voluntary arbitration.” The issue raised in said Notice was the “Diminution of wages and other benefits through unlawful Memorandum of Agreement. respondent filed a Motion for Inhibition alleging AVA Olvida's bias and prejudice towards the cause of the employees. 2002. Later. On August 22. the party complainant written is INSULAR HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL and not the NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR and 79 other members. a second preliminary conference was conducted in the NCMB. Cullo. represented by Joves. Consequently. Respondent again raised its objections. the members or union and officers or members. Respondent. since the NFL is the mother federation of the local union. The case was docketed and referred to Olvida. National Federation of Labor. (2) The individuals who executed the special powers of attorney in favor of the person who filed the instant complaint have no standing to cause the filing of the instant complaint. Hotel and petitioner IHEU-NFL. In the said conference. however. where Cullo denied any existence of an intra-union dispute among the members of the union. assisted by Atty. In support of his authority to file the complaint. it can represent the union. Cullo admitted that the case was. arguing that the persons who signed the complaint were not the authorized representatives of the Union nor were they parties to the MOA. signed a Submission Agreement wherein they chose Alfredo C. On June 15. Cullo reiterated that the complainants were not representing the union but filing the complaint through their appointed attorneys-in-fact to assert their individual rights as workers who are entitled to the benefits granted by law and stipulated in the collective bargaining agreement. In the submission agreement of the parties dated August 29. Submitted for the resolution of Olvida was the determination of WON there was a diminution of wages and other benefits through an unlawful MOA.

declaring the Memorandum of Agreement in question as invalid as it is contrary to law and public policy. including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement. Cullo only assailed the Decision in so far as it did not categorically order respondent to pay the covered workers their differentials in wages reckoned from the effectivity of the MOA up to the actual reinstatement of the reduced wages and benefits. Cullo filed a Motion for Reconsideration. CA rendered a ruling in favor of respondent Hotel. We hold that the voluntary arbitrator had no jurisdiction over the case. Hence. 2004.” represented by Joves and Cullo. there are two circumstances which affect its validity: first. While it is undisputed that a submission agreement was signed by respondent and “IHEU-NFL. WON the diminution of the benefits enjoyed by the employees is allowable. simply because the Notice of Mediation does not mention the name of the local union but only the affiliate federation. however. Article 100 does not. Who may file a notice or declare a strike or lockout or request preventive mediation. hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment. A CBA is “a contract executed upon request of either the employer or the exclusive bargaining representative incorporating the agreement reached after negotiations with respect to wages. Clearly. in other words. the NCMB had no jurisdiction to entertain the notice filed before it. which was. Anent the second issue. Both cases were consolidated by the CA. purport to apply to situations arising after the promulgation date of the Labor Code. It is a separate and distinct voluntary association owing its creation to the will of its members. therefore. for its part. Issues: WON the Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator has no jurisdiction over the case.” The primary purpose of a CBA is the stabilization of labormanagement relations in order to create a climate of a sound and stable industrial peace. Respondent maintained that the MOA it had entered into with the officers of the Union was valid. It only gives rise to a contract of agency. the same is again without merit. It is curious that even Cullo himself admitted. While we commend NFL's zealousness in protecting the rights of lowly workers. Clearly. among others. allow it to go beyond what it is empowered to do. questioned among others the jurisdiction of the NCMB. declaring that there is a diminution of the wages and other benefits of the Union members and officers under the said invalid MOA. denied. however. the prohibition against elimination or diminution of benefits set out in Article 100 of the Labor Code is specifically concerned with benefits already enjoyed at the time of the promulgation of the Labor Code. the courts must be practical and realistic and give due consideration to the context in which it is 119 . A local union does not owe its existence to the federation with which it is affiliated. AVA Montejo rendered a Decision ruling in favor of Cullo. Ruling: Cullo contends that the CA committed error when it ruled that the voluntary arbitrator had no jurisdiction over the case simply because the Notice of Mediation did not state the name of the local union thereby disregarding the Submission Agreement which states the names of local union as IHEU-NFL. that the case was filed not by the Union but by individual members thereof. neither does it give the mother federation the license to act independently of the local union. that respondent had persistently objected questioning the authority of Joves. It is clear that only a certified or duly recognized bargaining agent may file a notice or request for preventive mediation. where the former acts in representation of the latter. local unions are considered principals while the federation is deemed to be merely their agent.On April 5. Mere affiliation does not divest the local union of its own personality. Aggrieved. Cullo and the individual members of the Union to file the complaint before the NCMB. Respondent. We cannot. the Notice of Mediation was filed by a party who had no authority to do so. second. in a number of pleadings. In construing a CBA. Any certified or duly recognized bargaining representativemay file a notice or declare a strike or request for preventive mediation in cases of bargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practices. Both parties appealed the Decision of AVA Montejo to the CA.

the peculiar circumstances herein prevent this Court from applying the same in the instant petition. 190515. Respondent. In the meantime. Stipulated in each Reconfirmation of Employment were the new salary and benefits scheme. filed a Notice of Lockout on June 16. Inc. Petitioner submitted the MOA via Motion and Manifestation to the Secretary of Labor. prompting petitioner to file another Notice of Strike which was. Each contract was freely entered into and there is no indication that the same was attended by fraud. While the terms of the MOA undoubtedly reduced the salaries and certain benefits previously enjoyed by the members of the Union. 2005. upon the other hand. the execution of the MOA allowed respondents to keep their jobs. alleging that the remaining officers signed the MOA under respondent’s assurance that should the Secretary order a higher award of wage increase. after conciliation meetings. The officers were eventually dismissed from employment. premises considered. By Order dated June 23. The law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play. Withal. misrepresentation or duress. 2004. be deemed an implied ratification by the Union members of the MOA. a Vice President. petitioner went on strike on June 20. therefore. 120 . the Secretary and the Chairman of the Board of Directors under preventive suspension for allegedly spearheading a boycott of overtime work. it cannot escape this Court's attention that it was the execution of the MOA which paved the way for the re-opening of the hotel. 2004. respondent would comply. converted to a voluntary arbitration case. includes the right to suspend it. WHEREFORE. that signing should. Even if our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and on the protection of labor. 2005. G. NO. while the scales of justice usually tilt in favor of labor. Before the SOLE could rule on the controversy. 2005. respondent placed seven union officers including the President.00 per day effective January 1. as amicable settlement of the CBA was deadlocked. it bears to stress that specific provisions of the new contract also made reference to the MOA. 2004 and P9. the parties renegotiated its economic provisions but failed to reach a settlement. 2005. after all. had an existing CBA with Cirtek Employees Labor Union-Federation of Free Workers (petitioner) for the period January 1. The right to free collective bargaining. respondent created a Labor Management Council (LMC) through which it concluded with the remaining officers of petitioner a Memorandum of Agreement providing for daily wage increases of P6. The dismissal of the officers was later found to be legal.R. CITREK EMPLOYEES LABOY UNION-FFW VS. the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the controversy and issued a Return to Work Order which was complied with. 15 NOVEMBER 2010 Facts: Cirtek Electronics. More importantly. particularly on the issue of wage increases. Thus. the petition is DENIED. notwithstanding its financial distress. petitioner appealed. an electronics and semi-conductor firm situated inside the Laguna Technopark. Prior to the 3rd year of the CBA. It is iniquitous to receive benefits from a CBA and later on disclaim its validity. While the conciliation proceedings were ongoing.negotiated and the purpose which it is intended to serve. Petitioner thereupon declared a bargaining deadlock and filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMBRegional Office on April 26. (respondent). the individual members of the union cannot feign knowledge of the execution of the MOA. To this Court's mind. 2001 up to December 31. In addition. hence. CITREK ELECTRONICS INC.00 per day effective January 1. it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers.

the arbitral award can be considered an approximation of a collective bargaining agreement which would otherwise have been entered into by the parties. Whether or not the MOA was entered into and ratified by the remaining officers of petitioner under the condition. and adopting all other benefits as embodied in the MOA. AL. and the courts must place a practical and realistic construction upon it. giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and purpose which it is intended to serve. thus. VS. which was not incorporated in the MOA.00 to P15. The SC denied said motion. is not merely contractual in nature but impressed with public interest. The petition is GRANTED. respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. But even assuming arguendo that the MOA is treated as a new CBA.00 per day effective January 1. 2006.R. While an arbitral award cannot per se be categorized as an agreement voluntarily entered into by the parties because it requires the intervention and imposing power of the State thru the Secretary of Labor when he assumes jurisdiction. it must be construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically.00 to P10. A CBA. No. As such. 2005. as he did. Reconsideration of the Decision was denied by Resolution of August 12. 2006 and Resolution dated August 12. the Secretary of Labor resolved the CBA deadlock by awarding a wage increase of from P6. GRAMIER. in resolving the CBA deadlock. hence. may resolve all issues involved in the controversy including the award of wage increases and benefits. 190515. That the arbitral award was higher than that which was purportedly agreed upon in the MOA is of no moment. in the exercise of his power to assume jurisdiction under Art. He could. G. While a contract constitutes the law between the parties. The Decisions of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Order dated March 16. 2004 and from P9. that respondent would honor the SOLE’s award in the event that it is higher. 2008. this is so in the present case with respect to the CBA. A resolution to that effect was issued on June 06. consider the financial documents submitted by respondent as well as the parties’ bargaining history and respondent’s financial outlook and improvements as stated in its website. For the SOLE. ET. NOTE: A motion for reconsideration was filed by respondent. not to the MOA in which even the union’s signatories had expressed reservations thereto. as a labor contract within the contemplation of Article 1700 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which governs the relations between labor and capital. hence.By Orderdated March 16. 2008 of the Secretary of Labor are REINSTATED. however.00 per day effective January 1. it has the force and effect of a valid contract obligation. It is well-settled that the SOLE. Ruling: The Court resolves both issues in the affirmative. 2010 FACTS: 121 .R. it is not. it must yield to the common good. is not limited to considering the MOA as basis in computing the wage increases. NO. Issues: Whether or not the SOLE is authorized to give an award higher than that agreed upon in the MOA. 2011 (G. it must be construed liberally and yield to the common good. . SOLIDBANK CORP. While the terms and conditions of a CBA constitute the law between the parties. NOVEMBER 15. since it is imbued with public interest. The CA favored respondent. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the Decision. 263 (g)of the Labor Code. 06 June 2011). an ordinary contract to which is applied the principles of law governing ordinary contracts. 159460-61.

simultaneous to their filing of MR of the March 24. De Guzman. maintaining. from April 3 until April 5. 1999. joined the “mass leave” and “protest action”. 2000.43 After a thorough review of the records. Condevillamar. 2000. Article 212 of the Labor Code. as amended. Bacolod and Naga followed suit and "boycotted regular work. and not its appearance." As a result of the employees’ concerted actions. The assumption order dated January 18. On April 5. Respondents Gamier. Thus. The bank’s provincial branches in Cebu. a total of 513 returned to work and were accepted by the bank. (2) whether the respondents were validly terminated. 2000 directed the parties "to cease and desist from committing any and all acts that might exacerbate the situation. 2000 "provided these employees were/are not part of those who led or instigated or coerced their co-employees into participating in this illegal act. will be deemed to be controlling. the Union declared a deadlock on December 22. petitioner Solidbank and respondent Solidbank Employees’ Union (Union) were set to renegotiate the economic provisions of their 1997-2001 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) to cover the remaining two years thereof. The protest action lasted for three days. regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees. 2000. HELD: I. the union officers and members decided to protest the same by holding a rally in front of the SOLE office and the bank’s head offices. 1999 but seeing that an agreement was unlikely. Negotiations commenced on November 17. Gamier. In his Order4 dated March 24. Iloilo. Secretary Laguesma resolved all economic and non-economic issues submitted by the parties. pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code. 2000 order. this time declaring that the bank is prepared to take back employees who will report for work starting April 6. mass leaves. 2000 of the Secretary of Labor. The president of Solidbank issued a memorandum addressed to all employees to show cause why they should not be dismissed for participating in an illegal strike. which included herein respondents Ernesto U. 2000. destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities and similar activities. Elena R. attempts to damage. Janice L. on April 3. sitdowns. Sensing the impending strike. moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. 1999 and filed a Notice of Strike on December 29.Sometime in October 1999. Arriola and Ophelia C. changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment. ISSUE/s: The fundamental issues to be resolved in this controversy are: (1) whether the protest rally and concerted work abandonment/boycott staged by the respondents violated the Order dated January 18. including the respondents. An overwhelming majority of the employees. The remaining 199 employees insisted on defying Vistan’s directive. Respondent Union joined by the 129 dismissed employees filed a separate suit against petitioners for illegal dismissal. we hold that the CA patently erred in concluding that the concerted mass actions staged by respondents cannot be considered a strike but a legitimate exercise of the 122 .41 The term "strike" shall comprise not only concerted work stoppages. Condevillamar. the fact that the conventional term "strike" was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential. as amended. A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating. unfair labor practice and damages. Not satisfied with the Secretary’s ruling. Vistan (president of Solidbank) issued another memorandum. Solidbank’s business operations were paralyzed. the Secretary of Labor and Employment “assumed jurisdiction” over the labor dispute." Out of the 712 employees who took part in the three-day work boycott. defines strike as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. but also slowdowns. fixing. since the substance of the situation.42 Thus. and (3) whether the respondents are entitled to separation pay or financial assistance. Arriola and De Guzman filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal. they were dismissed.

It possesses the right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from service.52Hence. xxxx The foregoing shows that the law makes a distinction between union officers and members.46 Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code. The court also ruled that notwithstanding the illegality of the strike. is greater than that of the members and. while constitutionally recognized. a worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from employment. they cannot sanction petitioner’s act of indiscriminately terminating the services of individual respondents who admitted joining the mass actions and who have refused to comply with the offer of the management to report back to work. The Court has consistently ruled that once the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided. It must be stressed that the concerted action of the respondents was not limited to the protest rally infront of the DOLE Office on April 3. thus: Art. The right to strike. 264. II. also considers it a prohibited activity to declare a strike "during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the same strike. The court reiterates the distinction between the liabilities of a union officer and a union member when they participate in an illegal strike. the proceedings before the Secretary of Labor were still pending as both parties filed motions for reconsideration of the March 24. as amended. provides: Art. 264. with respect to respondents who are union officers. Respondent Union had also picketed the Head Office and Paseo de Roxas Branch.47 A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption order and/or certification is a prohibited activity and thus illegal. 2000. Clearly. as main players in an illegal strike. Being fully aware that the proceedings 123 . even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike."49 There is no dispute that when respondents conducted their mass actions on April 3 to 6. Prohibited activities. – (a) x x x No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. is not without legal constrictions. respondents knowingly violated the aforesaid provision by holding a strike in the guise of mass demonstration simultaneous with concerted work abandonment/boycott. such jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike or lockout. including those in the provincial branches. That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participating in the commission of illegal acts during a strike. therefore. Considering that these mass actions stemmed from a bargaining deadlock and an order of assumption of jurisdiction had already been issued by the Secretary of Labor to avert an impending strike.51 We have held that the responsibility of union officers. 2000 Order.respondents’ right to express their dissatisfaction with the Secretary’s resolution of the economic issues in the deadlocked CBA negotiations with petitioners. as amended.48 Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code. the law provides that a union officer may be terminated from employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost employment status.50 However. boycotted and absented themselves from work in a concerted fashion for three continuous days that virtually paralyzed the employer’s banking operations. there is no doubt that the concerted work abandonment/boycott was the result of a labor dispute.— x x x xxxx Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. limiting the penalty of dismissal only for the former for participation in an illegal strike is in order. About 712 employees. The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. Prohibited activities. 2000. the validity of their termination by petitioners cannot be questioned.

The burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the employee’s dismissal was for just cause. and 2. Second. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during its conduct. They need only to stop work or reduce the rate of their work while generally remaining in their assigned post. 178409.before the Secretary of Labor were still pending as in fact they filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 24. between the ordinary workers’ liability for illegal strike and that of the union officers who participated in it. 189314.R. JUNE 15. as Chief Mate of the vessel Maritina. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that slowdowns actually transpired at the company’s farms. INC. PENA PETITIONER. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that union officers committed illegal acts that warranted their dismissal from work. why did they not hold their meetings after work. In an Order dated May 12. for a contract period of six months. 2002 the three-year collective bargaining agreement or CBA between the union Bukluran ng Manggagawa sa Monterey-Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (the union) and Monterey Foods Corporation (the company) expired. 2003 after the negotiation for a new CBA reached a deadlock. 2011 Facts: Miguel Barairo (petitioner) was hired by respondent MST Marine Services (Phils. To head off the strike. VS. 2011 Facts: On April 30. the employees involved in a slowdown do not walk out of their jobs to hurt the company. It also directed the union and the company to desist from taking any action that may aggravate the situation. G.. Six days later or on June 16 the company sent new notices to the union officers.) Inc. 2000 Order. 2003 the union filed a second notice of strike before the NCMB on the alleged ground that the company committed unfair labor practices. on April 30. On March 28. the union filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). JUNE 08. FADRIQUELAN ET AL VS MONTEREY FOOD CORP. informing them of their termination from work for defying the DOLE Secretary’s assumption order. On the other hand. what is involved is a slowdown strike. 2003. charging them with intentional acts of slowdown. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND MST MARINE SERVICES (PHILS. if the meetings had really been for the stated reason. the company failed to show that all 17 union officers deserved to be dismissed. But as the CA correctly observed. why did the union officers and members from separate company farms choose to start and end their meetings at the same time and on the same day? And if they did not intend a slowdown. 2003 the company filed with the DOLE a petition for assumption of jurisdiction over the dispute in view of its dire effects on the meat industry. A distinction exists. RESPONDENT. G. Here. (MST) for its principal. Held: First.. however. The union of course argues that it merely held assemblies to inform members of the developments in the CBA negotiation. In termination cases. Ltd.. A strike conducted after such assumption is illegal and any union officer who knowingly participates in the same may be declared as having lost his employment.). Here. On June 10. they cannot invoke good faith as a defense. 2003 the company sent notices to the union officers. the dismissed employee is not required to prove his innocence of the charges against him. TSM International. He boarded 124 . Unlike other forms of strike. NO. The employer’s failure to do so means that the dismissal was not justified. Issues: 1. The ordinary worker cannot be terminated for merely participating in the strike.R. The law is explicit: no strike shall be declared after the Secretary of Labor has assumed jurisdiction over a labor dispute. the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and enjoined the union from holding any strike. a union officer can be terminated upon mere proof that he knowingly participated in the illegal strike. MIGUEL DELA BARAIRO. On May 21. not protest demonstrations over it.

"if petitioner's rights have been violated as he claims. MST soon informed petitioner that he would be redeployed to the M/T Haruna on November 30. 2004. which declaration petitioner has not refuted. He was paid a 1-month “stand-by fee” in connection with the Maritina contract. Petitioner was later to claim that he was not paid the promised "stand-by fee" in lieu of salary that he was to receive while awaiting transfer to another vessel as in fact the transfer never materialized. Petitioner claimed. 2002. However. 125 . petitioner signed a new Contract of Employment for a six-month deployment as Chief Mate of M/T Haruna vessel. KILUSANG MANGGAGAWA NG LGS ET AL. the petitioner was found guilty of the said subject matter of the complaint thus was penalized by the POEA Administrator with one year suspension from overseas deployment. Parenthetically. 2004 then he disembarked a week later as MST claimed that his boarding of M/T Haruna was a "sea trial" which. The rationale behind this development is grounded on the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency. the Undersecretary of Labor declared that the real reason petitioner refused to rejoin Haruna is that he left the Philippines on to join MT Adriatiki. Issue: Whether or not the OP’s dismissal of the case was proper. 2004 ostensibly for transfer to another vessel. 2004 but was relieved on August 28. but petitioner refused. Ruling: It was proper because for this case the appropriate remedy to question the decisions or orders of the Secretary of Labor is via Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 not via an appeal to the OP. a vessel of another maiming agency. 2011 Facts: KMLMS filed a notice of strike on March 5. Also.the vessel and discharged his duties on July 23.R. 2004. prompting MST to file a complaint for breach of contract against him before the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). was priorly made known to him on a "stand-by fee”. 2002 and conducted its strike-vote on April 8. modified the POEA Order by shortening the period of suspension from one year to six months. However. hence. 2002 by the Department of Labor and Employment. 2004. however. the Petitioner's appeal of the Secretary of Labor's Decision to the Office of the President did not toll the running of the period. For. as noted in the assailed DOLE Order. The Court concurred with the POEA Administrator and the Secretary of Labor that petitioner's refusal to board the M/T Haruna constituted unjustified breach of his contract of employment. he has various remedies under the contract which he did not avail of. Solar. who in turn dismissed the case for on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. and that not wanting to experience a repetition of the previous "termination" of his employment aboard the Maritina. MAGDALA MULTIPURPOSE & LIVELIHOOD COOPERATIVE VS. For appeals to the OP in labor cases have indeed been eliminated. OCTOBER 19. On October 20. except those involving national interest over which the President may assume jurisdiction. 191138-39. who noting that it was petitioner's first offense. Petitioner boarded the M/T Haruna on October 31. That petitioner believed that respondent company violated his rights when the period of his earlier Maritina contract was not followed and his "stand-by fees" were not fully paid did not justify his refusal to abide by the valid and existing Haruna contract requiring him to serve aboard M/T Haruna. MST maintains. NOS. Petitioner appealed said order of the POEA to the Secretary of Labor. that he was placed on "forced vacation” when he was made to disembark from the M/T Haruna. Petitioner then appealed the order to the Office of the President (OP). the assailed Decisions of the Secretary of Labor are deemed to have attained finality. he refused to be redeployed to the M/T Haruna. G. Petitioner thus disembarked in Manila on August 29. KMLMS only acquired legal personality when its registration as an independent labor organization was granted on April 9.

2002 strike was illegal. 2002 strike is illegal and 41 workers are declared to have lost their employment. first. could not legally represent the eventual union and its members. KMLMS — now a legitimate labor organization (LLO) — staged a strike where several prohibited and illegal acts were committed by its participating members. IV in Quezon City. on May 6. because when KMLMS filed the notice of strike on March 5 or 14. Issues: (1) WON the strike was illegal (2) WON the union members are validly terminated from their employment. Ruling of Labor Arbiter The May 6. 2002 or the day after it conducted the strike-vote. Art. 263 (c). 2002. Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. These factual findings are undisputed and borne out by the records. thus. 263(c): Controversy What to File Who may File Where File Bargaining Deadlock Notice of Strike Duly Certified or Recognized Bargaining Agent Ministry 30 days before the intended date of strike Employer Ministry 30 days before the intended lockout Duly Certified or Recognized Bargaining Agent Ministry 15 days before the intended date of strike Notice Lockout Unfair Practice Labor Notice of Strike of In absence of the above: Any Legitimate Labor behalf of its members to Period of Notice in 126 . And second. there was still no union to speak of. it became officially affiliated as a local chapter of the Pambansang Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino when its application was granted by the Bureau of Labor Relations. violating Art. 2002. On the ground of lack of valid notice of strike. Ruling: (1) There is no question that the May 6. it had not yet acquired legal personality and. 2002.On April 19. Consequently. similarly when KMLMS conducted the strikevote on April 8. since KMLMS only acquired legal personality as an independent LLO only on April 9. Thereafter. ineffective conduct of a strike-vote and commission of prohibited and illegal acts. (d) and (f) of the Labor Code and Rule XXII. Ruling of the NLRC Affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision but declared additional seven workers to have lost their employment Ruling of the CA Affirmed the decision of the NLRC. 2002. the mandatory notice of strike and the conduct of the strike-vote report were ineffective for having been filed and conducted before KMLMS acquired legal personality as an LLO. petitioners filed their Petition to Declare the Strike of May 6. 2002 Illegal before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Board (RAB) No.

2002 strike is illegal. (b) No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence. There was patent misappreciation of evidence both by the LA and the NLRC. even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. clear that the filing of the notice of strike and the conduct of the strike-vote by KMLMS did not comply with the aforequoted mandatory requirements of law and its implementing rules. coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes. Art. Prohibited Acts: (a) Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided. — Any certified or duly recognized bargaining representative may declare a strike in cases of bargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practices. thus. 6. any legitimate labor organization in the establishment may declare a strike but only on grounds of unfair labor practice. Art.On the other hand. the May 6.Who may declare a strike or lockout. 27 of which are those from the judgment of the Labor Arbiter. Rule XXII. or obstruct public thoroughfares. Consequently. The employer may declare a lockout in the same cases. the members of respondent KMLMS committed prohibited and illegal acts which doubly constituted the strike illegal. It is. 2002 illegal strike was conducted. 264 of the Code present a substantial distinction of the consequences of an illegal strike between union officers and mere members of the union: Persons Involved Ground for Termination Union Officers Knowingly participating in an illegal strike Union Members Committed prohibited and illegal acts during the strike and there is substantial evidence or proof of their participation (mere participation is not a ground) A total of 34 union members have been declared to have lost their employment due to their commission of prohibited and illegal acts during the illegal strike of May 6. In the absence of a certified or duly recognized bargaining representative. 72 additional union members are however found by the court to have committed illegal acts to which petitioners have substantially proven their identity. 2002. Here. the striking workers committed acts of (1) interference by obstructing the free ingress to or egress from petitioners' compound and (2) coercion and intimidation. and was not corrected by the CA. STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS xxx xxx xxx SEC. That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment. in having a view that there is no substantial proof of the identity of the other 72 striking union members who committed prohibited and illegal activities. 264. 127 . (2) There is likewise no dispute that when the May 6. Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code likewise pertinently provides: RULE XXII CONCILIATION.

President of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa MCCH (NAMA-MCCH-NFL) signed the Proof of Posting. and that said union submitted only a copy of its Charter Certificate. Rev. Gregorio P. (MCCHI). Buot as Board of Trustees Chairman. 154113.. AND 196156 DECEMBER 7. MCCHI attempted to take over the room being used as union office but was prevented to do so by Nava and her group who protested these actions and insisted that management directly negotiate with them for a new CBA. 7 issued certifications stating that there is nothing in their records which shows that NAMA-MCCH-NFL is a registered labor organization. posters and streamers. Sr. several complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice were filed by the terminated employees against MCCHI. Iyoy. Armando M. Iyoy as MCCH Administrator and Atty. threatening other workers and forcing them to join the strike. NFL’s Regional Director. the signatories were Ciriaco B. MCCHI referred the matter to Atty. the signatories were Sheila E.ABERIA ET AL. marching around the hospital premises and putting up placards. Iyoy is the Hospital Administrator. VS. Meanwhile. Thereafter. Lumapguid as President of NFL-MCCH Chapter. [G. Nava wrote Rev. Cebu City. However.R. Alforque immediately disowned the concerted activities being carried out by union members which are not sanctioned by NFL. Alforque (NFL Legal Counsel) and Paterno A. invoked the grievance procedure provided in the CBA to settle the dispute between management and the union. Under the previous Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs). 1995. non-profit corporation organized under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Alforque informed MCCHI that the proposed CBA submitted by Nava was never referred to NFL and that NFL has not authorized any other legal counsel or any person for collective bargaining negotiations. Fernando Yu as Legal Counsel of NFL. Nava subsequently requested that the following employees be allowed to avail of one-day union leave with pay. The next day. Pongasi. having been informed that Nava and her group have also been suspended by NFL. however. Inc. Responding to this directive. The collection of union fees (check-off) was temporarily suspended by MCCHI in view of the existing conflict between the federation and its local affiliate. MCCHI returned the CBA proposal for Nava to secure first the endorsement of the legal counsel of NFL as the official bargaining representative of MCCHI employees. Alforque. In the CBA effective from January 1994 until December 31.. several union members led by Nava and her group launched a series of mass actions such as wearing black and red armbands/headbands. Thereafter. Nava and her group denied there was a temporary stoppage of work. directed said officers to appear before his office for investigation in connection with the illegal strike wherein they reportedly uttered slanderous and scurrilous words against the officers of the hospital. UCCP and members of the Board of Trustees of MCCHI. Rev. Iyoy expressing the union’s desire to renew the CBA. 128 . MCCHI directed the union officers led by Nava to submit within 48 hours a written explanation why they should not be terminated for having engaged in illegal concerted activities amounting to strike. 187778. and advised Nava that their group is not recognized by NFL. and placed them under immediate preventive suspension. It operates the Metro Cebu Community Hospital (MCCH). for MCCHI. MCCHI then sent individual notices to all union members asking them to submit within 72 hours a written explanation why they should not be terminated for having supported the illegal concerted activities of NAMA-MCCH-NFL which has no legal personality as per DOLE records. Rev. explaining that employees wore their armbands only as a sign of protest and reiterating their demand for MCCHI to comply with its duty to bargain collectively. Atty. and Atty.The National Federation of Labor (NFL) is the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of MCCHI. NATIONAL LABOR RELATION COMMISSION ET. 187861. a tertiary medical institution located at Osmeña Boulevard. while Perla Nava. Atty. attaching to her letter a statement of proposals signed/endorsed by 153 union members. 2011] Facts: The consolidated cases involve the legality of mass termination of hospital employees who participated in strike and picketing activities. is a non-stock. The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office No. MCCH is owned by the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) and Rev. Metro Cebu Community Hospital. Said union officers. Iyoy. NOS. presently known as the Visayas Community Medical Center (VCMC).

no labor union may strike and no employer may declare a lockout on grounds involving interunion and intra-union disputes. . as amended. This was followed by an injunction from the NCMB enjoining the union leaders from further blocking the free ingress to and egress from the hospital. – x x x (b) Workers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection. NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not entitled to those rights granted to a legitimate labor organization under Art. Whether or not the union officers and members were guilty of illegal strike and picketing activities. Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining agreement. having submitted only its charter certificate as an affiliate or local chapter of NFL. INCORPORATED VS DEQUILLA. ET. specifically: (a) To act as the representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining. 263 (b) of the Labor Code. 242. It could not then legally represent the union members. makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "[t]o violate the duty to bargain collectively" as prescribed by the Code. provides: ART. or at least give a counter-proposal to the proposed CBA the union had submitted and which was ratified by a majority of the union membership. on its part. MCCHI. 2. However. (d) and (f) of the Labor Code and Rule XXII. disturbance and obstruction that the local government authorities eventually ordered their removal for being a public nuisance. Records of the NCMB and DOLE Region 7 confirmed that NAMAMCCH-NFL had not registered as a labor organization. the mandatory notice of strike and the conduct of the strike vote report were ineffective for having been filed and conducted by NAMA-MCCH-NFL which has no legal personality as a legitimate labor organization. – When there is a collective bargaining agreement. By then. as sustained by the appellate court. NAMA-MCCH-NFL was not a duly registered or an independently registered union at the time it filed the notice of strike and when it conducted the strike. GR NO 172666.Issues: 1. PICOP RESOURCES. 2011 129 . It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. shall continue to be recognized and respected. The right of legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employers to lockout. 253 which provides: ART. (b) To be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining. NAMA-MCCH-NFL and its union officers and members are guilty of illegal strike and picketing. consistent with the national interest. The applicable provision in this case is Art. AL. The findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter and NLRC. either party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date. the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its lifetime. the illegal strike had lasted for almost five months. As borne by the records. Not being a legitimate labor organization. Held: 1. Whether or not declaring private respondents MCCHI guilty of unfair labor practice and union busting. clearly established that the striking union members created so much noise. Consequently. DECEMBER 7. deferred any negotiations until the local union’s dispute with the national union federation (NFL) is resolved considering that the latter is the exclusive bargaining agent which represented the rank-and-file hospital employees in CBA negotiations since 1987. and from committing threats. 248 (g) of the Labor Code. 253. picketing and lockouts. Art. as amended. 263 (c). 2. NAMA-MCCH-NFL charged MCCHI with refusal to bargain collectively when the latter refused to meet and convene for purposes of collective bargaining. The Supreme Court rule for MCCHI. MCCHI not guilty of unfair labor practice Art. 263. coercion and intimidation against non-striking employees and patients/vehicles desiring to enter for the purpose of seeking medical treatment/confinement. Strikes. in violation of Art. However.

supporting and signing a petition for the certification of FFW. It is far from being within the definition of "acts of disloyalty. (PICOP) and members of the NAMAPRI-SPFL. PICOP and NAMAPRI-SPFL had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which would expire on May 22. for allegedly campaigning. 130 . PICOP failed to show in detail how private respondents campaigned and supported FFW. a duly registered labor organization and existing bargaining agent of the PICOP rank-and-file employees. supporting and signing a petition for the certification of a rival union. On May 16. a rival union. damages and attorney’s fees. the freedom period would start on March 22. 2000. 2000. they filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice and Illegal Dismissal with money claims. When an employer exercises its power to terminate an employee by enforcing the union security clause. (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA. RULING The petition merits a denial. it needs to determine and prove the following: (1) the union security clause is applicable. It is basic in labor jurisprudence that the burden of proof rests upon management to show that the dismissal of its worker was based on a just cause. then National President of the Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL). the Federation of Free Workers Union (FFW) before the 60-day "freedom period" and during the effectivity of the CBA. The Court finds Itself unable to agree. and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union to expel the employee from the union. as correctly ruled by the CA. Fuentes. (Atty. There is no dispute that private respondents were members of NAMAPRI-SPFL who were terminated by PICOP due to alleged acts of disloyalty. Thus. Proculo P. Fuentes). ISSUE Whether an existing CBA can be given full force and effect in its terms and conditions. 2000. 2000. advised the PICOP management to terminate about 800 employees due to acts of disloyalty. The clause imposes upon the workers the obligation to join and maintain membership in the company’s recognized union as a condition for employment. even beyond the five year period when no new CBA has been entered into. PICOP served a notice of termination due to acts of disloyalty to 31 employees including herein private respondents. Moreover. the records are bereft of proof of any contemporaneous acts of resignation or withdrawal of union membership or non-payment of union dues. specifically. the resolution thereof hinges on whether PICOP was able to show sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union to expel private respondents from it.” The act of "signing an authorization for a petition for certification election" is not disloyalty to the union per se considering that the petition for certification election itself was filed during the freedom period which started on March 22. The employees were given an opportunity to be heard and subsequently on October 16. including its union security clause. Inc. In this case. There is no question that in the CBA entered into by the parties.FACTS Ricardo Dequilla. Cesar Atienza and Aniceto Orbeta (private respondents) were regular rank-and-file employees of Picop Resources. Based on the CBA. Jr. Such acts of disloyalty were construed to be a valid cause for termination under the terms and conditions of the CBA. PICOP basically contends that private respondents were justly terminated from employment for campaigning. Their acts constitute an act of disloyalty against the union which is valid cause for termination pursuant to the Union Security Clause in the CBA. before the 60-day "freedom period" and during the effectivity of the CBA. Their mere act of signing an authorization for a petition for certification election before the freedom period does not necessarily demonstrate union disloyalty. the late Atty. 2000. there is a union security clause.

or an exercise of respondents’ right to selforganization. Moreover. INC. PRI's obligation to recognize NAMAPRI-SPFL as the incumbent bargaining agent does not hold true when petitions for certification election were filed. Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Alsons-SPFL (the Union) is the exclusive bargaining agent of the Company’s rank and file employees.ALCANTARA & SONS. the need to terminate the employment of respondents. The holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented. prompting the Union to file a notice of strike. Inc. as in this case. the last sentence of Article 253 which provides for automatic renewal pertains only to the economic provisions of the CBA. If at all. Petitioner's reliance on Article 253 is misplaced. PETITIONERS. 2000. When there is a representational issue. NAGKAHIUSANG MAMUMUO SA ALSONS-SPFL (NAMAAL-SPFL). went on strike. NO. (the Company) is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and processing of plywood. Alcantara & Sons. G. or compromised.. hence. Moreover. 2000. After efforts at conciliation by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) failed. INC. 2000 until May 21. 131 . ALCANTARA & SONS.R. Thus. after the observance of the mandatory cooling-off period. private respondents remained in good standing with their union. the signing of the authorization to file a certification election was merely preparatory to the filing of the petition for certification election.2 The Company and the Union entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) that bound them to hold no strike and no lockout in the course of its life. thereafter. G. VS. PETITIONER. SEPTEMBER 29. it was within the ambit of the freedom period which commenced from March 21. We are constrained to believe that an "authorization letter to file a petition for certification election" is different from an actual "Petition for Certification Election.. it was clear that the actual Petition for Certification Election of FFW was filed only on May 18. If we apply it. 2010. 179220 This case is about a) the consequences of an illegally staged strike upon the employment status of the union officers and its ordinary members and b) the right of reinstated union members to go back to work pending the company’s appeal from the order reinstating them.Neither is there proof that private respondents joined FFW." It claimed that they are still bound by the Union Security Clause of the CBA even after the expiration of the CBA. C. COURT OF APPEALS. C. it will create an absurd situation where the union members will be forced to maintain membership by virtue of the union security clause existing under the CBA and. 155109. The Union reported the strike vote to the DOLE and. Otherwise." Likewise. Following Article 256. AND ITS MEMBERS WHOSE NAMES ARE LISTED BELOW. NAMAPRI-SPFL. VS. as per records. The fact is. and does not include representational aspect of the CBA. there will always be an issue of disloyalty whenever the employees exercise their right to self-organization. the Union conducted a strike vote that resulted in an overwhelming majority of its members favoring it.. Facts: C. at the expiration of the freedom period.R. the status quo provision in so far as the need to await the creation of a new agreement will not apply. At some point the parties began negotiating the economic provisions of their CBA but this ended in a deadlock. what is prohibited is the filing of a petition for certification election outside the 60-day freedom period. NO. RESPONDENT. PRI anchored their decision to terminate respondents’ employment on Article 253 of the Labor Code which states that "it shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. The other parties to these cases are the Union officers 1 and their striking members. This is not the situation in this case. support another union when filing a petition for certification election. Strictly speaking. An existing CBA cannot constitute a bar to a filing of a petition for certification election.

Meantime. Thus – The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes. the Union filed a petition4 with the Court of Appeals (CA). questioning the NLRC decision. and directed them to pay damages to the Company. As a consequence. The NLRC ruled. The NLRC first issued a 20-day TRO and.R. On November 8.825. 10 annulling the NLRC decision and reinstating that of the Labor Arbiter. 1999 the NLRC rendered a decision. The Union filed a petition for certiorari 9 with the CA. 2002. questioning the NLRC decision. the CBA between the parties contained a "no strike. ordered the Union officers terminated. and directed them to pay damages to the Company. the Labor Arbiter held that the Union officers should be deemed to have forfeited their employment with the Company and that they should pay actual damages of P3. 2002. Only the intervention of law enforcement units made such implementation possible. should also be terminated for having committed prohibited and illegal acts. The Labor Arbiter denied the Union’s counterclaim for lack of merit. 10 annulling the NLRC decision and reinstating that of the Labor Arbiter.000. a writ of preliminary injunction. 1999 the latter court dismissed the petition. The Union did not appeal from such dismissal. threatening. Finding merit in the petition. 155109 and 155135. enjoining the Union and its officers and members from performing the acts complained of. On November 8. 6 declaring the Union’s strike illegal for violating the CBA’s no strike. the CA rendered a decision on March 20. On February 8. that the Union members involved. The Union filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. 8 affirming that of the Labor Arbiter insofar as the latter declared the strike illegal. 132 . With respect to the striking Union members. the Labor Arbiter ordered their reinstatement without backwages. that the Union members involved. 1999 the NLRC rendered a decision. Indeed. The NLRC ruled. no lockout" provision that enjoined both the Union and the Company from resorting to the use of economic weapons available to them under the law and to instead take recourse to voluntary arbitration in settling their disputes. Ruling: A strike may be regarded as invalid although the labor union has complied with the strict requirements for staging one as provided in Article 263 of the Labor Code when the same is held contrary to an existing agreement. and impeding by barricade the entry of non-striking employees at the Company’s premises. No law or public policy prohibits the Union and the Company from mutually waiving the strike and lockout maces available to them to give way to voluntary arbitration. provision. who were identified in the proceedings held in the case. 8 affirming that of the Labor Arbiter insofar as the latter declared the strike illegal.00 plus 10% interest and attorney’s fees. should also be terminated for having committed prohibited and illegal acts. after hearing. no less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes in Section 3. The Company and the Union with its officers and members filed separate petitions for review of the CA decision. 1999 the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision. the Company filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) Ex Parte3 with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to enjoin the strikers from intimidating. molesting. Issue: Whether or not the Union staged an illegal strike. questioning the preliminary injunction order. the CA rendered a decision on March 20. finding no proof that they actually committed illegal acts during the strike.During the strike. The Company and the Union with its officers and members filed separate petitions for review of the CA decision in G. including conciliation. Article XIII. But several attempts to implement the writ failed. respectively. preferential use of voluntary means to settle disputes. such as a no strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause. however. however. On June 29. who were identified in the proceedings held in the case. and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace. no lockout. 19 Here. ordered the Union officers terminated. Finding merit in the petition.

preferential use of voluntary means to settle disputes. Indeed. Regino T. Article 264 of the Labor Code provides that termination from employment is not warranted by the mere fact that a union member has taken part in an illegal strike. CBA proposals and ground rules. but then Acting Labor Secretary Bienvenido E. Peralta (PRO). However.The Court finds no compelling reason to depart from the findings of the Labor Arbiter. It cannot be used as a badge for not complying with a lawful agreement. Jr. no lockout" provision that enjoined both the Union and the Company from resorting to the use of economic weapons available to them under the law and to instead take recourse to voluntary arbitration in settling their disputes. As regards the rank and file Union members. Social justice is not one-sided. Esplana (Esplana). at Arms). 2012] Facts: By virtue of a certification election. Esplana and his group filed a case for Preventive Mediation before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board based on Digitel's violation of the duty to bargain. Digitel Employees Union (Union) became the exclusive bargaining agent of all rank and file employees of Digitel in 1994. and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace. DIGITEL EMPLOYEES UNION ET AL. On 25 November 2004. the NLRC. Tomas issued an Order 4 assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Some Union members abandoned their employment with Digitel. Article XIII. at Arms). Digitel was reluctant to negotiate with the Union and demanded that the latter show compliance with the provisions of the Union's Constitution and By-laws on union membership and election of officers. On 4 November 2004. Garcia (Auditor). Licando (Vice-President). Romero. Unidad (Sgt. Thus – The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes. On 10 March 2005. Laguesma assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and eventually directed the parties to execute a CBA. Javier (Sgt. in accordance with law be terminated from employment for their actions. October 10. 133 . Felicito C. and the CA regarding the illegality of the strike. 184903-04. They cannot be shielded from the coverage of Article 264 of the Labor Code since the Union appointed them as such and placed them in positions of leadership and power over the men in their respective work units. clearly identified. no less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes in Section 3. No law or public policy prohibits the Union and the Company from mutually waiving the strike and lockout maces available to them to give way to voluntary arbitration. Alan D. It cannot be used as a badge for not complying with a lawful agreement. 3 The officers were respondents Esplana. the NLRC. The Court finds no compelling reason to depart from the findings of the Labor Arbiter. Social justice is not one-sided. Zosimo B. the CBA between the parties contained a "no strike. 19 Here. Sto. who identified himself as President of the Union. No. and the CA regarding the illegality of the strike. the Union officers can. A strike may be regarded as invalid although the labor union has complied with the strict requirements for staging one as provided in Article 263 of the Labor Code when the same is held contrary to an existing agreement. (Secretary). Digitel received from Arceo Rafael A. no CBA was forged between Digitel and the Union. Esplana filed a notice of strike. Ten (10) years thereafter or on 28 September 2004. DIGITAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILS INC. Gonzales (Treasurer).R. This includes the shop stewards. including conciliation. vs. [G. such as a no strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause. and Jim L. then Labor Secretary Patricia A. performed an illegal act or acts during the strike. Since the Union’s strike has been declared illegal. The Union later became dormant. Reynel Francisco B. The Union threatened to go on strike. Arnold D. The Union and Digitel then commenced collective bargaining negotiations which resulted in a bargaining deadlock. a letter containing the list of officers. It must be shown that such a union member.

Petitioner refused to bargain and instead filed a petition for cancellation of the union's certificate of registration. The closure affected at least 100 employees. duty bound to collectively bargain with the Union. Digitel Service. 134 . Citing the cases of Association of Court of Appeals Employees v. The respondent union therein sent a letter to petitioner requesting a negotiation of their CBA. Alleging that the affected employees are its members and in reaction to Digiserv's action. Inc. The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and ordered all striking workers to return to work. (Digiserv). 2) misrepresentation of its alleged officers. Ferrer-Calleja 16 and Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic v. Petitioner challenged said order by contending that its petition for cancellation of union's certificate of registration involves a prejudicial question that should first be settled before the Secretary of Labor could order the parties to bargain collectively. Laguesma. the Secretary of Labor ordered the second notice of strike subsumed by the previous Assumption Order. a non-profit enterprise engaged in call center servicing. the Hospital is.During the pendency of the controversy. we agreed with the Secretary of Labor that the pendency of a petition for cancellation of union registration does not preclude collective bargaining. On 23 May 2005. illegal lock-out. 14 Trajano was reiterated in Legend International Resorts Limited v. When the case eventually reached this Court. more so should the collective bargaining process continue despite its pendency. 17 it was pointed out at the time of the filing of the petition for certification election — or a CBA process as in the instant case — the union still had the personality to file a petition for certification — or to ask for a CBA negotiation — as in the present case. v. by express provision of the law. Kilusang Manggagawa ng Legenda (KMLIndependent). They eventually staged a strike. 110 SCRA 274). Trajano 13 is apropos. thus: SDaHEc That there is a pending cancellation proceeding against the respondent Union is not a bar to set in motion the mechanics of collective bargaining. If a certification election may still be ordered despite the pendency of a petition to cancel the union's registration certificate (National Union of Bank Employees vs. Inc. 3) membership of the Union is composed of rank and file. Digitel filed a petition with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) seeking cancellation of the Union's registration on the following grounds: 1) failure to file the required reports from 1994-2004. Ruling: The pendency of a petition for cancellation of union registration does not preclude collective bargaining. filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) an Establishment Termination Report stating that it will cease its business operation. Hon. and violation of the assumption order. Esplana and his group filed another Notice of Strike for union busting. and 4) substantial number of union members are not Digitel employees. Petitioner's refusal to bargain forced the union to file a notice of strike. Issue: Whether the Secretary of Labor erred in issuing the assumption order despite the pendency of the petition for cancellation of union registration. Hon. Meanwhile. The 2005 case of Capitol Medical Center. 15 Legend International Resorts reiterated the rationale for allowing the continuation of either a CBA process or a certification election even during the pendency of proceedings for the cancellation of the union's certificate of registration. 42 of whom are members of the herein respondent Union. Minister of Labor. on 14 March 2005. Unless its certificate of registration and its status as the certified bargaining agent are revoked. supervisory and managerial employees. We must emphasize that the majority status of the respondent Union is not affected by the pendency of the Petition for Cancellation pending against it.

Those who refused were threatened with dismissal. acting collectively and in concert. They threatened and forced the company guards and some company officers and personnel to open the gate of the AER-PSC compound." The issues at bar arise. the results of the drug test came out and some employees were found positive for illegal drugs and was suspended for coming to work under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or drinking any alcoholic beverages on the premises on company time. AER forced all of its employees to submit their urine samples for drug testing. barricaded company premises. the affected workers were denied entry into the AER premises by order of management. Unyon filed a petition for certification election before the Department of Labor and Employment(DOLE) after organizing their employees union within AER. PROGRESIBONG UNYON NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA AER [G. When their picket proved futile. and that the unqualified acceptance of the offer of the 150 striking employees by petitioner likewise constitutes condonation of the illegal strike insofar as the reinstated employees are concerned. suddenly and without reason staged a walkout and assembled illegally in the company premises. and (2) the said 114 employees are entitled to reinstatement with three months' backwages. where the Court held: The Solicitor General has correctly stated in his comment that "from these facts are derived the following conclusions which are likewise undisputed: that petitioner engaged in an illegal lockout while the NAFLU engaged in an illegal strike. the affected workers staged a picket in front of company premises hoping that management would accept them back to work. It has been applied in the case of Philippines Inter-Fashion. and prevented the free ingress and egress of the other employees. the concerned employees refused and. walked out of the company premises and proceeded to the office of the AER Performance and Service Center (AER-PSC) located on another street. On January 8. Inc. officers. instead. 2011 Main Decision] Facts: On December 22. v NLRC. Issue: WON the CA erred in ruling for the reinstatement of the complaining employees but without grant of backwages. Ruling: The in pari delicto doctrine in labor cases is not novel to us. that the unconditional offer of the 150 striking employees to return to work and to withdraw their complaint of illegal lockout against petitioner constitutes condonation of the illegal lock-out. illegal suspension and illegal dismissal. On February 22. 1999. 1999. Resenting what they did. 1999. They also tried to use force and inflict violence against the other employees. they filed a complaint for unfair labor practice. the concerned employees started a wildcat strike. No. eighteen (18) employees of AER. 2013 & July 13. Their wildcat strike stopped after the NLRC issued and served a temporary restraining order (TRO). 1998. On February 2. and visitors and the transportation of company equipments. Despite management’s plea for them to go back to work. On January 28.AUTOMOTIVE ENGINE REBUILDERS vs. 160138. January 16. however. 135 . from respondent commission's approval of its commissioner's conclusions that (1) petitioner must be deemed to have waived its right to pursue the case of illegal strike against the 114 employees who were not reinstated and who pursued their illegal lockout claim against petitioner. Because of this. They also urged the AER-PSC employees to likewise stop working. 1999.R. clients.

there were only two strikers involved who were both reinstated by their employer upon their request to return to work. the in pari delicto doctrine was applied in the case of First City Interlink Transportation Co. 438) is inapplicable to the present case. the ruling cited in the Bisaya case that the employer waives his defense of illegality of the strike upon reinstatement of strikers is applicable only to strikers who signified their intention to return to work and were accepted back . but nevertheless in view of the undisputed findings of illegal strike on the part of the 114 employees and illegal lockout on petitioner's part. if petitioner really had any intention to pardon the 114 strikers. and therefore the latter could not be deemed to have condoned petitioner's lockout. Insurefco. On the other hard. Insurefco Employees Union v. is the principle of "no work. as likewise submitted by the Solicitor General. The findings show that both petitioner and the 114 strikers are in pari delicto. With such restoration of the status quo ante it necessarily follows. This means that the contending parties must be brought back to their respective positions before the controversy. Truly. the 114 strikers employees who participated therein are liable for termination (Liberal Labor Union v. 95 Phil. Inc. 72. in view of the undisputed finding of illegality of the strike.. The reason is obvious. as regards the strikers who decided to pursue with the case. of which 150 who desired to return to work were reinstated. the finding of illegal lockout was likewise not disputed. before the strike. there were more than 200 strikers involved.The Court approves the stand taken by the Solicitor General that there was no clear and unequivocal waiver on the part of petitioner and on the contrary the record shows that it tenaciously pursued its application for their dismissal.. 761). it is more logical and reasonable for condonation to apply only to strikers who signified their intention to return and did return to work. however. Phil. However. Can Co. Police and Barangay Clearances as well as the driver's and conductor's/conductress licenses and photographs required 136 . Therefore. as in the case of the 114 strikers herein. the employer could not be deemed to have condoned their strike. it would have included them in its motion to withdraw on November 17. contends that the application for readmission to work by the 150 strikers constitutes condonation of the lockout which should likewise bind the 114 remaining strikers. the 114 employees affected by the lockout are also subject to reinstatement. xxx xxx xxx The finding of illegal strike was not disputed. The fact that it did not. such as where the employer is guilty of oppression and union-busting activities and strikers ordered reinstated are denied such reinstatement and therefore are declared entitled to backwages from the date of such denial). Petitioner. no pay" applicable to the case at bar. These strikers took the initiative in normalizing relations with their employer and thus helped promote industrial peace. 91 Phil. Thus. The medical examination. that is. simply means that it did not pardon the 114 strikers. as follows: The Bisaya case (102 Phil. So. Suffice it to say that the 150 strikers acted for themselves.. v The Honorable Secretary. NBI. a situation which warrants the maintenance of the status quo. More so. Therefore. but instead continued to pursue the case to the end. that the petition must be granted insofar as it seeks the setting aside of the award of three months' backwages to the 114 employees ordered reinstated on the basis of the general rule that strikers are not entitled to backwages (with some exceptions not herein applicable. The rest were not reinstated because they did not signify their intention to return to work. However. both parties are in pari delicto and such situation warrants the restoration of the status quo ante and bringing the parties back to the respective positions before the illegal strike and illegal lockout through the reinstatement of the said 114 employees. Likewise. 1980. in the present case. not on behalf of the 114 remaining strikers. thus: 3) Petitioner substantially complied with the Return to Work Order. because they had not shown any willingness to normalize relations with it. the order reinstating the 114 employees is proper. Therefore. because in the former.

However. HON. July 23. [Emphases and underscoring supplied] In the case at bar. Because of their failure to affix their names and signatures in the Membership Resolution they cannot be granted the relief that Unyon wanted for them in its Motion for Partial Reconsideration.as conditions for reinstatement were reasonable management prerogatives. HCCS is unorganized. should be considered entitled to reinstatement. As both the employer and the employees were. at fault or in pari delicto. as no charges for illegal strike were filed against these 14 employees. provided they did not participate in illegal acts. These excluded nine (9) workers. who signed their names in their petition before the CA. Records disclose that thirty-two (32) employees filed a complaint for illegal suspension and unfair labor practice against AER. there is no collective bargaining agreement or a duly certified bargaining agent or a labor organization certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the proposed bargaining unit within one year prior to the filing of the petition. they cannot be among those found guilty of illegal strike. STO TOMAS ET AL. They cannot be considered in pari delicto. it is the employees' refusal to return to work that may be deemed a refusal to comply with the Return to Work Order resulting in loss of their employment status. they should be given separation pay computed up to March 8. Resolution: January 16. five (5) failed to write their names and affix their signatures in the Membership Resolution attached to the petition filed before the CA. Nonetheless. HCCS is a private educational institution duly registered and operating under Philippine laws. 137 . only eighteen (18) of them were charged by AER with illegal strike leaving fourteen (14) of them excluded from its complaint. Out of these 14 employees. 2013] Facts: A petition for certification election was filed by private respondent Pinag-Isang Tinig at Lakas ng Anakpawis — Holy Child Catholic School Teachers and Employees Labor Union (HCCS-TELU-PIGLAS). 179146. It is basic in jurisprudence that illegally dismissed workers are entitled to reinstatement with backwages plus interest at the legal rate. Out of these 32 workers. if reinstatement is no longer feasible. No. authorizing the Union President to represent them. the other requirements imposed as condition for reinstatement were unreasonable considering that the employees were not being hired for the first time. alleging that: PIGLAS is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) representing HCCS-TELU-PIGLAS. They should be reinstated and given their backwages. [G. the nonreturning employees. the concerned employees should be given separation pay up to the date set for the return of the complaining employees in lieu of reinstatement. since both AER and the union are at fault or in pari delicto. Unyon filed the subject Motion for Partial Reconsideration questioning the Court's July 13. the Court holds that only nine (9) of the fourteen (14) excluded employees deserve to be reinstated immediately with backwages. But since reinstatement is no longer feasible. although the imposition of such requirements did not amount to refusal on the part of the employer to comply with the Return to Work Order or constitute illegal lockout so as to warrant payment of backwages to the strikers. in a sense. however. If at all. Technically. HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL vs. 2013 After going over the records again. they should be restored to their respective positions prior to the illegal strike and illegal lockout. 2011 Decision insofar as it failed to award backwages to fourteen (14) of its members. deserve to be reinstated immediately and granted backwages. 1988 (the date set for the return of the employees) in lieu of reinstatement.R.

Petitioner raised that members of private respondent do not belong to the same class. It should be emphasized that the petitions for certification election involved in Toyota and Dunlop were filed on November 26. series of 1997 (1997 Amended Omnibus Rules).Petitioner averred that of the employees who signed to support the petition. Whether or not a petition for certification election is dismissible on the ground that the labor organization’s membership allegedly consists of supervisory and rank-and-file employees. The SOLE ruled that the private respondent could continue to exist as a legitimate labor organization with combined teaching and nonteaching personnel in its membership and representing both classes of employees in separate bargaining negotiations and agreements. 2. Private respondent then appealed before the SOLE. and rank-and-file employees — as three (3) are vice-principals.). supervisory. one (1) is a department head/supervisor. respectively. it is not only a mixture of managerial. Secretary of Labor and Employment and De La Salle University Medical Center and College of Medicine v. The med-arbiter denied the petition for certification election on the ground that the unit which private respondent sought to represent was inappropriate. as held in Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation v. on June 21. department head. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union. but in which the membership included rank-and-file employees. Specifically. and coordinators are neither supervisory nor managerial employees. v. the 1989 Rules was applied in both cases. in which the labor organization that filed a petition for certification election was one for supervisory employees. stating that there was no “community or mutuality of interest” since there is a mixture of teaching and non-teaching staff. the Court reiterated that such labor organization had no legal right to file a certification election to represent a bargaining unit composed of supervisors for as long as it counted rank-and-file employees among its members. which does not require that. and an inappropriate bargaining unit for want of community or mutuality of interest. hence. as ruled in Dunlop Slazenger (Phils. 1992 and September 15. Instead. No it does not. 9. Whether or not the petition for certification election should be dismissed on the ground that respondent is not qualified for its failure to qualify as a legitimate labor organization due to the improper mixture of teaching and non-teaching personnel (absence of mutuality of interest among its members) Ruling: 1. 138 . In Dunlop. for not being in accord with Article 245 of the Labor Code. It insisted that. But then. 1997. Issues: 1. 1995. Inc. for its creation and registration. who ruled against the dismissal of the petition and directed the conduct of two separate certification elections for the teaching and the non-teaching personnel. and eleven (11) are coordinators — but also a combination of teaching and non-teaching personnel — as twenty-seven (27) are non-teaching personnel. the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules was further amended by Department Order No. the requirement under Sec. fourteen (14) already resigned and six (6) signed twice. 2(c) of the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules — that the petition for certification election indicate that the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees has not been mingled with supervisory employees — was removed. private respondent is an illegitimate labor organization lacking in personality to file a petition for certification election. Laguesma. When the case was brought before the Court of Appeals. the CA affirmed the decision of the SOLE and also ruled on the issue regarding the alleged mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees stating that the Toyota case is inapplicable because the vice-principals. a local or chapter submit a list of its members. what the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules requires is a plain description of the bargaining unit.

As the SOLE correctly observed. the concept of a bargaining unit. It suffices to quote with approval the apt disposition of the SOLE when she denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration: [Petitioner] appears to have confused the concepts of membership in a bargaining unit and membership in a union. No.All said. in the seminal case of Democratic Labor Association v. The choice of their representative is the exclusive concern of the employees.. an employer is a mere bystander to any petition for certification election. In case of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a union. the Court. Toyota and Dunlop no longer hold true under the law and rules governing the instant case. because "the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights. San Miguel and Air Philippines. No. having been validly issued a certificate of registration. Toyota and Dunlop no longer hold sway in the present altered state of the law and the rules. hence. or similarity of compensation and working conditions. to wit: (1) will of employees (Globe Doctrine). v. [petitioner] believed that the petitioning union could not admit academic employees of the university to its membership.O. however. private respondent. petitioner failed to comprehend the full import of Our ruling in U. To reiterate. it cannot interfere with. Following the doctrine laid down in Kawashima and SMCC-Super. such as substantial similarity of work and duties. but related to. while the latest issuance is R.A. it must be stressed that petitioner cannot collaterally attack the legitimacy of private respondent by praying for the dismissal of the petition for certification election: Except when it is requested to bargain collectively. The Court disagrees with Petitioner. had already set the tone for it. 9481. We stressed. 2. that the test of the grouping is community or mutuality of interest. (3) prior collective bargaining history. as interpreted by the Court in Tagaytay Highlands. D. (2) affinity and unity of employees' interest. the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules. respectively. The concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization are different from. Ferrer-Calleja. such proceeding is non-adversarial and merely investigative. In determining the proper collective bargaining unit and what unit would be appropriate to be the collective bargaining agency.A. In contrast. But such was not the intention of the Supreme Court. No. and (4) employment status. the employer cannot have any partisan interest therein. 2002. In unequivocal terms.P. The petitions for certification election involved in Toyota and Dunlop were filed on November 26. 9 is applicable in the petition for certification election of private respondent as it was filed on May 31. much less oppose. The employer's only right in the proceeding is to be notified or informed thereof. the process by filing a motion to dismiss or an appeal from it. Cebu Stevedoring Company. as amended. 6715 (1989 Amended Omnibus Rules) was applied. should be considered as having acquired juridical personality which may not be attacked collaterally. seasonal and probationary employees. 139 . the 1989 Rules and Regulations Implementing R. we reiterated that the alleged inclusion of supervisory employees in a labor organization seeking to represent the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees does not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor organization. for the purpose thereof is to determine which organization will represent the employees in their collective bargaining with the employer.P. not even a mere allegation that some employees participating in a petition for certification election are actually managerial employees will lend an employer legal personality to block the certification election. such as temporary. mentioned several factors that should be considered. 1992 and September 15. 1995. In emphasizing the phrase "to the exclusion of academic employees" stated in U. Inc. false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code. Indeed. the proper procedure for an employer like petitioner is to directly file a petition for cancellation of the union's certificate of registration due to misrepresentation.

NFL’S Regional Director. the order for the conduct of two separate certification elections. then Metro Cebu Community Hospital Inc. 1996. involving both academic and non-academic personnel. Thus the need for separate bargaining units. Since the decision of the Supreme Court in the U. No. On March 14. who then advised Nava that their group was no longer recognized by NFL.P. Such employees need not be members of a union seeking the conduct of a certification election. case prohibits us from commingling teaching and non-teaching personnel in one bargaining unit. VISAYAS COMMUNITY MEDICAL CENTER vs. Alforque. academic and non-academic personnel. Worker's Union composed of both U. Iyoy expressing the union’s desire to renew the CBA. to constitute a bargaining unit to the exclusion of the academic employees of the institution". MCCHI sent termination letters to union members and other members who participated in the strike and picketing activities. the signatories include Rev. On March 30 of the same year.P. 1996.P. MCCHI referred the matter to Atty. NAMA-MCCG-NFL filed a Notice of Strike but was deemed not filed for want of personality on their part.P. namely[. Nava insisted that the management should directly negotiate with them. On March 13 and 19. In summary. However. He sent a letter addressed to Nava that their union membership is suspended for serious violation of the Constitution and By-Laws. one involving teaching personnel and the other involving non-teaching personnel. and the need for separate certification elections. In the CBA effective January 1994 until December 31. rank-and-file employees. Workers Union intended to cover all U. Iyoy as MCCH administrator and Perla Nava as president of the Nagkahiusang Mamumuno sa MCCH. without prejudice to the right of the academic personnel to constitute a separate bargaining unit for themselves and for the All U.P.. In the same manner. the Supreme Court did not dismiss the petition and affirmed the order for the conduct of a certification election among the non-academic personnel of U.P. but did not order them to organize a separate labor organization. case. In the U. DOLE Regional Office issued certifications stating that there is nothing in their records which show that NAMA-MCCH-NFL is a registered labor organization.A bargaining unit is a group of employees sought to be represented by a petitioning union. the teaching and non-teaching personnel of [petitioner] school must form separate bargaining units. The violations occurred on February 27. Nava wrote Rev. 2014] Facts: Respondents Yballe. Workers Union to institute a petition for certification election.P. 140 . ONAPUP sought the conduct of a certification election among the rank-and-file non-academic personnel only. case.R. The Supreme Court ordered the "non-academic rank-and-file employees of U. National Federation of Labor was the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of MCCHI. a NFL chartered union. there were two contending unions in the U. one for the teaching personnel and another for the non-teaching personnel. It should be stressed that in the subject petition. 1996 when Nava and her group launched a series of mass actions such as wearing of black and red armbands and headbands. Cortez and Ong were hired as employees of Visayas Community Medical Center. Thus. 196156. As pointed out in our assailed Decision.P.P.] the Organization of Non-Academic Personnel of U. A union certified as an exclusive bargaining agent represents not only its members but also other employees who are not union members. [private respondent] union sought the conduct of a certification election among all the rank-andfile personnel of [petitioner] school. while the All U. (ONAPUP) and the All U.P. YBALLE. 1995. marching around the hospital premises and putting up placards. Angel. teaching and non-teaching personnel may be commingled in one union but have to be separated for collective bargaining purposes. [G. the proposal was returned requiring Nava to secure the endorsement of the legal counsel of NFL as the official bargaining representative of MCCHI employees. they have to be separated into two separate bargaining units with two separate certification elections to determine whether the employees in the respective bargaining units desired to be represented by [private respondent].P. On December 6. 1995. ET AL. January 15.

The alternative relief for union members who were dismissed for having participated in an illegal strike is the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement under the following circumstances: (a) when reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the passage of a long period of time or because of the realities of the situation. (c) reinstatement is no longer feasible. the mass termination of complainants was illegal. Therefore. (e) the employer is prejudiced by the workers’ continued employment. respondents were illegally dismissed. Issue: Whether or not the union members were illegally dismissed based on their participation in the alleged illegal strike. MCCHI suffered heavy losses due to low patient admission rates. The Labor Code provides that "any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status". (b) reinstatement is inimical to the employer’s interest. It possesses the right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from service. (f) facts that make execution unjust or inequitable have supervened. willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out. However. 2011. Placards were place at the hospital’s entrance. the NLRC affirmed the finding of the Labor Arbiter that respondents supported and took part in the illegal strike and further declared that they were guilty of insubordination. and with many of the petitioners either employed elsewhere. On the other hand. and in view of strained relations that ensued. They are however only entitled to separation pay and not to full back wages. in addition to the reality of replacements already hired by the hospital which had apparently recovered from its huge losses. However. Since there was no showing that the complainants committed any illegal act during the strike. a union officer may be terminated from employment for knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike. A worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from employment. notwithstanding the illegality of the strike in which they participated. In this case. The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. Ruling: Yes. If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay unless. 141 . they may not be deemed to have lost their employment status by their mere participation in the illegal strike. suspended or dismissed or otherwise illegally prevented from working. The means to and egress from the hospital were blocked so that the vehicles carrying patients and employees were barred from entering the premises. With respect to backwages. It is only when he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost employment status. In the Decision dated December 7. the CA erred in awarding respondents full back wages and ordering their reinstatement despite the prevailing circumstances. the laborer was able. An ordinary striking worker cannot be dismissed for such mere participation in the illegal strike. or (g) strained relations between the employer and employee. we declared as invalid the dismissal of MCCH employees who participated in the illegal strike conducted by NAMA-MCCHNFL which is not a legitimate labor organization. (d) reinstatement does not serve the best interests of the parties involved. Considering that 15 years had lapsed from the onset of this labor dispute. already old and sickly. or otherwise incapacitated. With the intensified violence. In contrast.Unfazed. of course. the union members held more mass actions. the union leaders (Nava group) who conducted the illegal strike despite knowledge that NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not a duly registered labor union were declared to have been validly terminated by petitioner. separation pay without back wages is the appropriate relief. the principle of "fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor" remains as the basic factor in determining the award thereof.

filed a Notice of Strike with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). PHILTRANCO WORKERS UNION-ASSOCIATION OF GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS [G. 6 Respondent Wesleyan University-Philippines Faculty and 142 . The very nature of certiorari – which is an extraordinary remedy resorted to only in the absence of plain. then such petition was timely filed. and then seasonably file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY-PHILS. WON the said remedy was timely filed Ruling: 1. Petitioner filed for a Motion for Reconsideration on June 25 (Monday) or the first working day following last day which was Sunday. before a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be availed of. non-profit educational institution duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. 2007. WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY-PHILS. 180962. Issues: 1. speedy and adequate remedies in the course of law – requires that the office issuing the decision or order be given the opportunity to correct itself. the petition shall be filed not later than 60 days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.R. the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to afford an opportunity for the correction of the error or mistake complained of. this opportunity for rectification does not arise if no motion for reconsideration has been filed. vs. No.PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES INC. 2. vs. Hence. 2007 which was exactly within the 60-day period within which to file. The order was received on June 14. Inc. The fact is undeniable that by referring the case to the Secretary of Labor. Conciliator-Mediator Aglibut conceded that the case fell within the coverage of Article 263 of the Labor Code. 2014] Facts: Petitioner Wesleyan University-Philippines is a non-stock. 181806. Since Petitioner filed the Petition for Certiorari on August 29. The Motion was denied by SOLE on August 15. March 12. available. WON the remedy of Petition for Certiorari was the appropriate remedy 2. the case was referred to the SOLE which ordered the reinstatement of the Union Officers without loss of seniority rights. February 26.. Quite evidently. 2007 which was received by Petitioner on Aug 17. Rule 65 states that where a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed. whether such motion is required or not. claiming that petitioner engaged in unfair labor practices. It has long been settled that the remedy of an aggrieved party in a decision or resolution of the Secretary of Labor is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy. 2014] Facts: Petitioner Philtranco Service Enterprises. No. retrenched 21 of its employees on the ground that it was suffering business losses.R. Yes. Clearly. the provisions of Article 263 became applicable. By assuming jurisdiction over the case. Thus the company union. Yes. Philtranco Workers Union-Association of Genuine Labor Organizations (PWU-AGLU). a local land transportation company. It then filed the Petition for Certiorari on August 29. 2007. FACULTY & STAFF ASSOCIATION [G. The NCMB conducted the preliminary conference but no settlement was arrived at..

the parties signed a 5-year CBA effective June 1. petitioner announced its plan of implementing a one-retirement policy. Cynthia L. On 2005. Ruling: No. In the same meeting. petitioner. 2005 contrary to law. the rule on Non-Diminution of Benefits would still apply. 143 . issued a Memorandum providing guidelines on the implementation of vacation and sick leave credits as well as vacation leave commutation. Based on the affidavits. 2008. the CA rendered a Decision finding the rulings of the Voluntary Arbitrator supported by substantial evidence. through its President. their affidavits. only vacation leave is commuted or monetized to cash. It also affirmed the nullification of the one-retirement policy and the Memorandum dated August 16. however. the parties referred the matter to a Voluntary Arbitrator.Staff Association. On November 2. As we see it then. however. 2006. De Lara (De Lara) informed the petitioner through a letter that respondent is not amenable to the unilateral changes made by petitioner. on the other hand. the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a Decision declaring the one-retirement policy and the Memorandum dated August 16. In December 2003." The error. The practice of giving two retirement benefits to petitioner’s employees is supported by substantial evidence. On September2007. a written contract. otherwise. are more than sufficient to show that the granting of two retirement benefits to retiring employees had already ripened into a consistent and deliberate practice. A Labor Management Committee (LMC) Meeting was held during which petitioner advised respondent to file a grievance complaint on the implementation of the vacation and sick leave policy. 2005 on the ground that these unilaterally amended the CBA without the consent of respondent Issue: Whether the [CA] committed grave and palpable error in sustaining the Voluntary Arbitrator’s ruling that a university practice of granting its employees two (2) sets of Retirement Benefits had already been established as defined by the law and jurisprudence. it must be consistently and deliberately made by the employer over a long period of time. respondent was able to present substantial evidence in the form of affidavits to support its claim that there are two retirement plans. 2003 until May 31. applies only if the benefit is based on an express policy. This rule. they have to be earned. Respondent questioned the guidelines for being violative of existing practices and the CBA. or has ripened into a practice. The Non-Diminution Rule found in Article 100 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits employers from eliminating or reducing the benefits received by their employees. Aggrieved. on the other hand. Petitioner. To be considered a practice. Respondent’s President. petitioner has been giving two retirement benefits as early as 1997. petitioner appealed the case to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. is a duly registered labor organization 7 acting as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file faculty and staff employees of petitioner. failed to present any evidence to refute the veracity of these affidavits. In this case. An exception to the rule is when "the practice is due to error in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of law. Some of its provisions are: vacation and sick leave credits are not automatic. corroborated by the affidavits of incumbent employees. must be corrected immediately after its discovery. Unable to settle their differences at the grievance level. which was unacceptable to respondent.

petitioner’s assertion that there is only one retirement plan as the CBA Retirement Plan and the PERAA Plan are one and the same is not supported by any evidence. 2 Unilateral changes or suspensions in the implementation of the provisions of the CBA. the energy sector. unanimously voted for the holding of a strike. 170007. Thus. Sections 1 and 2 of Article XII of the CBA provide that all covered employees are entitled to 15-day sick leave and 15-day vacation leave with pay every year and that after the second year of service. thus. including the matter of compensation. 2005 is contrary to the existing CBA. TABANGAO SHELL REFINERY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. the Union filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB. Region IV based in Calamba. Thus. 2005. 1 Like any other contract. Besides. This. The Secretary of Labor and Employment found that the intended strike would likely affect the company’s capacity to provide petroleum products to the company’s various clientele. the Company and the Union already met to discuss the ground rules that would govern their upcoming negotiations. No.Moreover. The union alleged in its petition that the Secretary of Labor and Employment acted with grave abuse of discretion in grossly 144 . On 2 September 2004. While a total of 41 meetings were held between the parties. cannot be allowed without the consent of both parties. expressed its disagreement with the union’s manifestation. several items. should be complied with in good faith. 2005 is contrary to the existing CBA. On September 16. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP. not later than August 30 of each year. the Secretary of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction over the dispute of the parties. as early as 13 April 2004. April 7. who participated in the voting.R. the union manifested that the company was bargaining in bad faith. Laguna anchored on a perceived unfair labor practice consisting of alleged bad faith bargaining on the part of the Company. it has the force of law between the parties and. Alleging failure on the part of the company to justify its offer. 2014] Facts: The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) of the Company and the Union expired on 30 April 2004. Upon being aware of this development. [G. during the cooling off period. the union conducted the necessary strike vote. Convinced that such a strike would have adverse consequences on the national economy. The union proposed an annual across-the-board basic salary increase for the next three years that would be covered by the new CBA. The Memorandum dated August 16. therefore. limits the available leave credits of an employee at the start of the school year. on 15 April 2004. however. The members of the union. The company. all unused vacation leave shall be converted to cash and paid to the employee at the end of each school year. A Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) is a contract entered into by an employer and a legitimate labor organization concerning the terms and conditions of employment. the company filed a Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction with the Secretary of Labor and Employment. the Union submitted its proposals for the renewal of their CBA. any doubt in the interpretation of the provisions of the CBA should be resolved in favor of respondent. The Memorandum dated August 16. remained unresolved. Neither do we find any reason to disturb the findings of the CA that the Memorandum dated August 16. The company made a counter-proposal to grant all covered employees a lump sum amount of yearly for the three-year period of the new CBA. 2004. There is nothing in Article XVI of the CBA to indicate or even suggest that the "Plan" referred to in the CBA is the PERAA Plan. states that vacation and sick leave credits are not automatic as leave credits would be earned on a month-to-month basis. including the transportation sector. The union thereafter filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. Then. in effect. and the manufacturing and industrial sectors. in turn. the Secretary of Labor and Employment ruled that the labor dispute between the parties would cause or likely to cause a strike in an industry indispensable to the national interest.

The contention of the labor union is untenable. Furthermore. and decide the same accordingly. issues that are necessarily involved in the dispute itself. and annual lump sum payment by the company. Neither the union nor the company appealed the Decision dated June 8. 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. 145 . there was actually a complete stoppage of the ongoing negotiations between the parties and the union filed a Notice of Strike. Thus. but not limited to the union’s allegation of bad faith bargaining. The labor dispute between the union and the company concerned the unresolved matters between the parties in relation to their negotiations for a new CBA. the said Decision attained finality. as the Decision dated June 8. 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment already settled the said issues with finality.misappreciating the facts and issue of the case. as a matter of necessity. it includes questions incidental to the labor dispute. the absence of the parties’ mutual declaration of deadlock does not mean that there was no deadlock. and that there was no bad faith on the part of the company when it was bargaining with the union are both supported by substantial evidence. The union’s contended that the Secretary of Labor and Employment cannot resolve the economic issues because the union had not given its consent to the declaration of a deadlock. In the case at bar. particularly the matter of annual wage increase or yearly lump sum payment in lieu of such wage increase. on the one hand. The fact is that the negotiations between the union and the company were stalled by the opposing offers of yearly wage increase by the union. A mutual declaration would neither add to nor subtract from the reality of the deadlock then existing between the parties. Thus. there was already an existing deadlock between the parties. Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion when is assumed jurisdiction over the dispute between the union and the company Ruling: Findings of fact of the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the Decision dated June 8. The power of the Secretary of Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over this dispute includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising from the said dispute. The Secretary of the DOLE has been explicitly granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. whether or not there was deadlock in the negotiations. It also includes and extends to the various unresolved provisions of the new CBA such as compensation. on the other hand. The Court of Appeals found the position of the union untenable. Each party was adamant in its position. and not just to that ascribed in the Notice of Strike or otherwise submitted to him for resolution. the union cannot once again raise those issues in this Court through this petition without violating the principle of res judicata. particularly in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment. 2005 that there already existed a bargaining deadlock when she assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute between the union and the company. And. such as. The Secretary of Labor has jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Thus. that is. because of the unresolved issue on wage increase.

1991. a duly certified bargaining agent. The complaint alleged unfair labor practice on the part of GMC for: (1) refusal to bargain collectively. a day before the expiration of the CBA. GMC dismissed Marcia Tumbiga. states: ART. Article 253-A of the Labor Code. on grounds of religious affiliation and personal differences. on the ground of incompetence. 1988. be for a term of five (5) years.TOPIC 14: UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE GENERAL MILLING CORP. as amended by Rep. The union protested and requested GMC to submit the matter to the grievance procedure provided in the CBA. (2) interference with the right to self-organization. GMC. On the first issue. GMC did not send any counter-proposal. 253-A. GMC wrote a letter to the union’s officers stating that it felt there was no basis to negotiate with a union which no longer existed. GMC and the union concluded a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which included the issue of representation effective for a term of three years. On April 28. with a request that a counter-proposal be submitted within ten (10) days. 1991. and (3) discrimination." Thus. for brevity). a union member. Cebu City. insofar as the representation aspect is concerned. Ruling: GMC is guilty of unfair labor practice. advised the union to "refer to our letter dated December 16. the union filed. February 11. the union sent GMC a proposed CBA. Arbitration Division. however. GMC violated its duty to bargain collectively. – Any Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter into shall. Act No. On December 16. 6715.R. 1992. On November 29. 1991. Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct when it imposed upon the GMC the draft CBA proposes by the union for two years to begin from expiration of the original CBA. Hence. GMC received letters from workers who stated that they had withdrawn from their union membership. 1992. COURT OF APPEALS [G. Believing that the union no longer had standing to negotiate a CBA. 2004] Facts: In its plants located at Cebu City and Lapu-Lapu City. 146728. 2. The CBA was effective for three years retroactive to December 1. Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. vs. it would expire on November 30. 1989. As early as October 1991. No. a complaint against GMC with the NLRC. 146 . No petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside of the sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry of such five year term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. who were all members of respondent General Milling Corporation Independent Labor Union (union. on July 2. Whether or not GMC is guilty of unfair labor practice. All other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution. making it liable for unfair labor practice. On January 13. 1991. Issues: 1. General Milling Corporation (GMC) employed 190 workers. Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to the union’s proposals.

when the union requested for a renegotiation on November 29. the company committed an unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code. The union lived up to this obligation when it presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC within three (3) years from the effectivity of the original CBA.The law mandates that the representation provision of a CBA should last for five years. – It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice: (g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code.The effect of an employer’s or a union’s actions individually is not the test of good-faith bargaining. GMC’s failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the union is indicative of its utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union. The fact that the resignations of the union members occurred during the pendency of the case before the labor arbiter shows GMC’s desperate attempts to cast doubt on the legitimate status of the union. We hold that GMC’s refusal to make a counter-proposal to the union’s proposal for CBA negotiation is an indication of its bad faith. What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse. Article 252 of the Labor Code elucidates the meaning of the phrase "duty to bargain collectively. by questioning the existence of the union and the status of its membership to prevent any negotiation... considered as a whole. The ill- 147 . GMC violated its duty to bargain collectively.." thus: ART. was mainly dilatory as it turned out to be utterly baseless. 248. Good faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts. Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to the union’s proposals. Procedure in Collective Bargaining It bears stressing that the procedure in collective bargaining prescribed by the Code is mandatory because of the basic interest of the state in ensuring lasting industrial peace. Where the employer did not even bother to submit an answer to the bargaining proposals of the union. – The following procedures shall be observed in collective bargaining: xxxx The other party shall make a reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice. Under Article 252. Hence. because it was seeking said renegotiation within 5 years from the date of effectivity of the CBA on December 1. But GMC failed in its duty under Article 252. 1988. it was still the certified collective bargaining agent of the workers. ART. For refusing to send a counter-proposal to the union and to bargain anew on the economic terms of the CBA. Procedure in collective bargaining. both parties are required to perform their mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. just before the last day of said period. We have held that there is no per se test of good faith in bargaining.but the impact of all such occasions or actions. – The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. Its excuse that it felt the union no longer represented the workers. 250. It was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the union. 1991. making it liable for unfair labor practice. The relation between labor and management should be undisturbed until the last 60 days of the fifth year. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. there is a clear evasion of the duty to bargain collectively. Unfair labor practices of employers. 252. which provides that: ART. The union’s proposal was also submitted within the prescribed 3-year period from the date of effectivity of the CBA.

who refused to submit any counter proposal proposed by its employees’ certified bargaining agent. the interests of equity and fair play were properly served and both parties regained equal footing. June 16. that neither party is guilty of bad faith. That is. 1993. CA was correct in imposing the draft proposed by the Union on GMC following the doctrines on Kiok Loy vs. Thus. Nonetheless. That Sweden’s approach and attitude – stalling the negotiation lead to a conclusion that it is unwilling to negotiate and reach an agreement with the Union. Secretary of Labor and Employment. which was lost when GMC thwarted the negotiations for new economic terms of the CBA. had lost its right to bargain the terms and conditions of the CBA. refused to perform its duty to bargain collectively. We are not inclined to gratify GMC with an extended term of the old CBA after it resorted to delaying tactics to prevent negotiations. evinced good faith. Divinagracia. Included therein was a list of the names of the members of the Union’s negotiating panel. ART. Divine Word University of Tacloban. the Union. but within the 60-day freedom period. sent a letter containing its proposals covering political provisions and 34 economic provisions.Sweden Ice Cream Plant. 253 on the duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining agreement. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION vs. when one of the parties abuses this grace period by purposely delaying the bargaining process. Petitioner has not at any instance. 114974. until a new one is agreed upon. we upheld the unilateral imposition on the university of the CBA proposed by the Divine Word University Employees Union. by imposing on GMC the provisions of the draft CBA proposed by the union. based on Kiok Loy and Divine Word University of Tacloban. Since it was GMC which violated the duty to bargain collectively. To rule otherwise would be to allow GMC to have its cake and eat it too. that as strictly distinguished from the facts of this case. its provision shall continue to govern the relationship between the parties. Applying the principle in the foregoing cases to the instant case. NLRC and Divine Word University of Tacloban vs. However. for brevity).R. mandates the parties to keep the status quo while they are still in the process of working out their respective proposal and counter proposal. NLRC. Secretary of Labor and Employment. a departure from the general rule is warranted. 148 . the Union initiated the negotiations.timed letters of resignation from the union members indicate that GMC had interfered with the right of its employees to self-organization. No. The general rule is that when a CBA already exists. The rule necessarily presupposes that all other things are equal. 2004] Facts: The exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the Standard Chartered Bank is the Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union (the Union. it would be unfair to the union and its members if the terms and conditions contained in the old CBA would continue to be imposed on GMC’s employees for the remaining two (2) years of the CBA’s duration. there was no pre-existing CBA between the parties in Kiok Loy and Divine Word University of Tacloban. through its President. Prior to the expiration of the 3-year period of their CBA. Thus. it had lost its statutory right to negotiate or renegotiate the terms and conditions of the draft CBA proposed by the union. CONFESOR [G. In Kiok Loy vs. However. we deem it proper to apply in this case the rationale of the doctrine in the said two cases. In Divine Word University of Tacloban vs. in our view. On February 18. Eddie L.

Issues: 1. An order was issued that the parties execute a collective bargaining agreement. However. On March 12. there were still provisions on which the Union and the Bank could not agree. In the succeeding meetings. the Bank’s Human Resource Manager. the Union’s charge for unfair labor practice is similarly dismissed. Diokno suggested to Divinagracia that Jose P.Meanwhile. the parties met and set the ground rules for the negotiation. the Union suggested that if the Bank would not make the necessary revisions on its counter-proposal.. Jr. as it did not bargain in good faith. 1993. 1993. Jr. suggested to the Union’s President Eddie L. Umali requested the Bank to validate the Union’s "guestimates. The Bank acceded. 1993. i." especially the figures for the rank and file staff. In support of its claim. the President of the National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE). Umali was retained as a member thereof. Even during the final reading of the non-economic provisions on May 4. issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute at the Bank. then SOLE Nieves R. In the morning of the June 15. The petitioner asserts that respondent committed ULP. Whether or not the company is guilty of unfair labor practice 2. stating that prior to the 149 . Umali chided the Bank for the insufficiency of its counterproposal on the provisions on salary increase. Cielito Diokno.. pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. Umali. the negotiation for economic provisions commenced. Thus. the federation to which the Union was affiliated. On July 21. 1993. It contended that the Union demanded "sky high economic demands." The proposed non-economic provisions of the CBA were discussed first. Confesor. be excluded from the Union’s negotiating panel. group hospitalization. Umali. Divinagracia executed an affidavit.e. death assistance and dental benefits. Divinagracia that Jose P. be excluded from the Union’s negotiating panel. President of the NUBE. 1993. After the break. docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-06-380-93. the Bank’s charge for unfair labor practice which it originally filed with the NLRC but which is deemed consolidated herein. wherein. The Bank alleged that the Union violated its duty to bargain." indicative of blue-sky bargaining. "Interference" under Article248 (a) of the Labor Code to amount to ULP.. the Union and the Bank failed to agree on the remaining economic provisions of the CBA. Towards the end of the Bank’s presentation. 1993 meeting.The Union suggested to the Bank’s head of the negotiating panel. Whether or not the Union is engaged in Blue-Sky Bargaining Ruling: The bank is not guilty of ULP. the Bank presented its revised counter-proposal.26. interference in the selection of the Union’s negotiating panel. The Union declared a deadlock and filed a Notice of Strike before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on June 21. is dismissed for lack of merit. Whether or not the Union is estopped after it executed with the company the CBA 3. On May 18. On the other hand. Diokno suggested that the negotiation be kept a "family affair. that the bank lawyers should be excluded from the negotiating team. The Union filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Procedure. The parties then executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement wherein the wage increase was effected and the signing bonuses based on the increased wage were distributed to the employees covered by the CBA. 1993. when Cielito Diokno. the Bank filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) and Damages before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Manila against the Union on June 28. except for the provisions on signing bonus and uniforms. On the other hand. it would be best to seek a 3rd party assistance.

industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious. to job organizations of their own choosing without previous authorization. Ltd.S. or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining. Inc. emphasizing its mandate to afford protection to labor. particularly in Article 243 thereof.. and highlights "the principle of shared responsibility" between workers and employers to promote industrial peace. subject only to the rules of the organization concerned. The right to self-organization necessarily includes the right to collective bargaining. considers it an unfair labor practice when an employer interferes. 243. which provides: ART. Under the International Labor Organization Convention (ILO) No. self-employed people. and that during the first meeting. restrains or coerces employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization or the right to form association. Insular Life Assurance Co. Ambulant. Article 2 of ILO Convention No. shall have the right to establish and. 2. In particular. – All persons employed in commercial. or one who is a member or an official of other labor organizations. Ltd. the test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees in the exercise of their right to selforganization within the meaning of subsection (a)(1) is whether the employer has engaged in conduct which it may reasonably be said. 98 pertaining to the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining." devotes an entire section.. Diokno stated that the negotiation be kept a "family affair. shall have the right to self-organization and to form. Employees Association – NATU vs. aside from making it a policy to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare. Postal Service and Harley Davidson Motor Co. with the object of placing such organizations under the control of employers or employers’ organizations within the meaning of this Article. rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection.commencement of the negotiation.." In U. to elect their representatives in full freedom to organize their administration and activities and to formulate their programs. and Articles 248 and 249 respecting ULP of employers and labor organizations. the National Labor Relations Board held that upon the employer’s refusal to engage in negotiations with the Union for collective-bargaining contract when the Union includes a person who is not an employee..” Workers’ and employers’ organizations shall have the right to draw up their constitutions and rules. acts which are designed to promote the establishment of workers’ organizations under the domination of employers or employers’ organizations or to support workers’ organizations by financial or other means. it is not necessary that there be direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that antiunion conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on self-organization and collective bargaining. The aforecited ILO Conventions are incorporated in our Labor Code. intermittent and itinerant workers. "workers and employers. AMF. 87 FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 248(a) of the Labor Code. charitable. The 1987 Constitution. such employer is engaged in unfair labor practice under Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA. In. join. Diokno approached him and suggested the exclusion of Umali from the Union’s negotiating panel. provides: Article 2 1. COVERAGE AND EMPLOYEES’ RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION. functioning or administration. Workers’ and employers’ organizations shall enjoy adequate protection against any acts or interference by each other or each other’s agents or members in their establishment. medical or educational institutions whether operating for profit or not. 150 .Further. without distinction whatsoever. Insular Life Assurance Co. tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees’ rights under Section 3 of the Act.

49 Such is what appears to have happened in this case. The Union alleges that the Bank violated its duty to bargain. both at and away from the bargaining table. Substantial Evidence required to support the claim of ULP under the Labor Code. The complaint was made only on August 16. The circumstances that occurred during the negotiation do not show that the suggestion made by Diokno to Divinagracia is an anti-union conduct from which it can be inferred that the Bank consciously adopted such act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise of the right to self-organization and collective bargaining of the employees. Admittedly. The accusation occurred after the arguments and differences over the economic provisions became heated and the parties had become frustrated. which are all part of the friendly relations between the Union and Bank. 1993 after a deadlock was declared by the Union on June 15. substantial evidence is required to support the claim. In the case at bar. In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code.51 It involves the question of whether an employer’s conduct demonstrates an unwillingness to bargain in good faith or is merely hard bargaining. As the public respondent noted. Surface Bargaining Surface bargaining is defined as "going through the motions of negotiating" without any legal intent to reach an agreement. and as a result. ULP under Article 248(a) in connection with Article 243 of the Labor Code is committed. The records show that after the initiation of the collective bargaining process. the parties were not able to agree and reached a deadlock. 151 . the Bank only made 6 economic counterproposals. the negotiations pushed through. the suggestion made by Diokno to Divinagracia should be construed as part of the normal relations and innocent communications. It happened after the parties started to involve personalities. it is herein emphasized that the duty to bargain "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. The Duty to Bargain Collectively If at all. the accusation that the Bank made bad-faith provisions has no leg to stand on. with the inclusion of Umali in the Union’s negotiating panel. the parties’ failure to agree did not amount to ULP under Article 248(g) for violation of the duty to bargain. In view of the finding of lack of ULP based on Article 248(g).52 The Union has not been able to show that the Bank had done acts. committed ULP under Article 248(g) when it engaged in surface bargaining. The resolution of surface bargaining allegations never presents an easy issue. It alleged that the Bank just went through the motions of bargaining without any intent of reaching an agreement. especially considering that such was undertaken previous to the commencement of the negotiation and simultaneously with Divinagracia’s suggestion that the bank lawyers be excluded from its negotiating panel. which tend to show that it did not want to reach an agreement with the Union or to settle the differences between it and the Union. However. suggestions given under less adversarial situations may be colored with unintended meanings. and if it can be inferred that the employer adopted the said act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise to right to self-organization or on the right to collective bargaining of the employees. The determination of whether a party has engaged in unlawful surface bargaining is usually a difficult one because it involves. It is clear that such ULP charge was merely an afterthought.If an employer interferes in the selection of its negotiators or coerces the Union to exclude from its panel of negotiators a representative of the Union." 53 Hence. passions may rise. hence. and usually such intent can only be inferred from the totality of the challenged party’s conduct both at and away from the bargaining table. It explained that of the 34 economic provisions it made. a question of the intent of the party in question. as evident in the Bank’s counter-proposals. at bottom. 1993. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. the Union bases its claim of interference on the alleged suggestions of Diokno to exclude Umali from the Union’s negotiating panel.

2006] Facts: Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation is engaged in the business of manufacturing wool and yarn carpets and rugs. Moreover. (Robert’s Dictionary of Industrial Relations (Revised Edition. did not. find that the Union failed to substantiate its claim that the Bank refused to furnish the information it needed. Inc.R. No. while the signing bonus was included in the CBA itself. Umali. The minutes of the meeting show that the Union based its economic proposals on data of rank and file employees and the prevailing economic benefits received by bank employees from other foreign banks doing business in the Philippines and other branches of the Bank in the Asian region. in a meeting dated May 18. February 22. The Corporation also owned 17. requested the Bank to validate its guestimates on the data of the rank and file. PHILIPPINE CARPET EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. as alleged by the Union. Inc. and the Philippine Woolen Spinning Corporation (PWSC) which manufactured wool yarn. The Bank failed to show that the economic demands made by the Union were exaggerated or unreasonable. p. We. 51). The Union. however." It actually is not collective bargaining at all. as the Labor Code requires. Estoppel not ApplicableIn the Case at Bar The respondent Bank argues that the petitioner is estopped from raising the issue of ULP when it signed the new CBA. amounts to a validation of the data it had used in its presentation. hold that the Union is not guilty of ULP. HON. 152 . 168719. the Philippine Carpet Employees Association (Union for brevity). The Union Did Not EngageIn Blue-Sky Bargaining Blue-Sky Bargaining is defined as "unrealistic and unreasonable demands in negotiations by either or both labor and management. TOMAS [G.While the refusal to furnish requested information is in itself an unfair labor practice. and 2. the approval of the CBA and the release of signing bonus do not necessarily mean that the Union waived its ULP claim against the Bank during the past negotiations. likewise. the conclusion of the CBA was included in the order of the SOLE. The Corporation also had 100% equity investments in the following corporations: Pacific Carpet Mills Corporation (PCMC-USA) which sold carpets and mats on wholesale basis. we find the latter did not engage in ULP.95% of the shares of stocks in DI Security and General Services. The Corporation employed 473 employees. After all. While the approval of the CBA and the release of the signing bonus did not estop the Union from pursuing its claims of ULP against the Bank. STO. likewise. send a written request for the issuance of a copy of the data about the Bank’s rank and file employees. the fact that the Bank made use of the aforesaid guestimates. the Union twice filed a motion for reconsideration respecting its ULP charges against the Bank before the SOLE. Umali failed to put his request in writing as provided for in Article 242(c) of the Labor Code. 355 of whom were members of the sole bargaining unit of the employees therein. where neither concedes anything and demands the impossible. We do not agree that the Union is guilty of ULP for engaging in blue-sky bargaining or making exaggerated or unreasonable proposals. Pacific Carpet Manufacturing Corporation (PCMC-Clark) which manufactured hand-tufted and machine-tufted carpets and rugs. In the case.. 1971. However. and also supports the inference of surface bargaining.20% of such shares in the Manila Peninsula Hotel. We. Moreover. 1993.

00 in 2001 dropped to P23. "on account of depressed business conditions brought about by the currency crisis in Southeast Asia. The appellate court affirmed the finding of the SOLE that there was a slump in the demand of the Corporation’s products.855. rice subsidy. 77 were Union members. it suffered a sharp decline in business in terms of volume and income derived since 2001.000. and. 2004 (Monday). holding that while low volume of work was not listed as a valid ground for dismissal under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. including Edgardo Villanueva. and that a "slump" in demand of the Corporation’s products was not a valid ground to dismiss employees. The SOLE likewise affirmed the termination of the 88 employees on the ground that.796.330. PCMC-Clark. Appended to the letter were proposals on revisions of the previous CBA. caused by the Asian financial crisis and later aggravated by the 9/11 incident in the U. The Corporation did not respond to the letter. 2004.00 in 2003. Corporation alleged that based on the documents submitted to the SOLE. to commence negotiations.039. However.927. to take effect the following working day. Christmas package. 2004.In a letter dated February 10. The Union insisted that the Corporation was guilty of unfair labor practice. this was also to justify the dismissal of the 77 Union members and bust the Union in the process. and early retirement plan/separation pay. According to the Union. the Corporation violated the mandatory 30-day notice rule because such employees received the notice of termination on March 13. 2004. the Union proposed the holding of a conference between representatives of the Union and the Corporation on February 24. the Union filed a notice of strike with the DOLE. Frustrated at the Corporation’s reason for retrenchment. to P5. The Union also charged the Corporation of resorting to a sinister scheme of re-channeling its carpet business to its wholly owned subsidiary. Relative to increased benefits for uniform. if not for the personnel reduction program.00 in 2002. who was elected Union officer after the personnel reduction program commenced. its income of P28.00 to the employees for the three years of the CBA. Issue: 153 .000. and the ongoing war in the Middle East. Of the 88 employees who were terminated from employment. The Union claimed that there was no valid economic reason to retrench employees. Diaz issued a Memorandum informing all employees that a comprehensive cost reduction program would be implemented by the Corporation on April 15. The Union rejected this and accused the Corporation of union busting. the SOLE ordered the retention of the status quo. Negotiations before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board ensued. thereafter.S. 2004 (Saturday). the SOLE denied the demand of the Union as to the scope of the bargaining unit. 2004 addressed to the Corporation’s Assistant Vice President for Administration. as 77 of its members were dismissed. On June 23. March 15. Manuel Ike Diaz.000. It stressed that the 30-day mandatory notice could not be substituted by paying the affected employees their respective one month salaries. The Union filed a petition with the DOLE for the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute involving economic issues on wage increases and certain benefits and non-economic issues such as scope of bargaining unit and on the issue of unfair labor practice. The Corporation went on to explain that its income from the domestic market and export operations declined sharply: from its export operations. the Middle East war and the 9/11 incident in the United States of America. it nevertheless justified the dismissal on the ground of redundancy. the SOLE rendered a Decision granting wage increases totaling P8. but the Corporation stood pat on its stance for a moratorium on increases in wages and benefits. The Union maintained that in dismissing its employees. while negotiations for a new CBA were ongoing. The Union thereafter filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which rendered judgment dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The appellate court ruled that the Corporation failed to prove that the SOLE committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the decision.

the phrase "to prevent losses" was defined to mean that retrenchment or termination of the services of some employees is authorized to be undertaken by the employer sometime before the losses anticipated are actually sustained or realized. whether they are temporary. said ground for termination would be susceptible to abuse by scheming employers who might be merely feigning losses or reverses in their business ventures in order to ease out employees. that law may well be vulnerable to constitutional attack as taking property from one man to give to another. much less serious business losses within the meaning of the law. and (5) that the employer used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be dismissed and who would be retained among the employees. 1. nor on expected losses that would have been incurred had operations been continued. a measure utilized by an employer to minimize business losses incurred in the operation of its business. Retrenchment Retrenchment is an authorized cause for the termination of employment under Article 283 of the Labor Code. physical fitness. regular or managerial employees). absent any other evidence on its impact on the business. The bare fact that an employer may have sustained a net loss. are reasonably imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer. Federation of Free Workers. It is a reduction in manpower. 48 Moreover. if already incurred. the intention of the lawmaker to compel the employer to stay his hand and keep all his employees until sometime after losses shall have.. whichever is higher. (3) that the employer pays the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to one month pay or at least ½ month pay for every year of service.Whether or not respondent corporation is guilty of unfair labor practice because of dismissing the 77 union members and bust the union in the process. the employer must prove the requirements for a valid retrenchment by clear and convincing evidence. Retrenchment is defined as the termination of employment initiated by the employer through no fault of the employee and without prejudice to the latter. The prerogative of an employer to retrench its employees must be exercised only as a last resort. per se. Ruling: The petition is meritorious. age. such loss. resorted by management during periods of business recession. industrial depression or seasonal fluctuations or during lulls over shortage of materials. What the law speaks of is serious business losses or financial reverses. in other words. Redundancy 154 . serious. (4) that the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench employees in good faith for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees’ right to security of tenure. but substantial. This is simple enough. if such an intent were expressly written into the law. It is justified only when all other less drastic means have been tried and found insufficient or inadequate.e. actual and real. may not amount to serious business losses mentioned in the law. and financial hardship for certain workers. materialized. 2. 50 The employer must also show that its losses increased through a period of time and that the condition of the company will not likely improve in the near future. considering that it will lead to the loss of the employees’ livelihood. In Lopez Sugar Corporation v. are not merely de minimis. or if only expected. efficiency. casual. (2) that the employer served written notice both to the employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment. seniority. such as status (i. otherwise. Sliding incomes or decreasing gross revenues are not necessarily losses. The requirements are: (1) that the retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses which. in fact. It is not.

Under these conditions.917. whichever is higher. 2004. Admittedly. Corporation. Moreover.00 in 2001 decreased to P37. such decrease ensued because respondent Corporation declared cash dividends for its shareholders amounting to P28.776.259. There was thus no reason for respondent Corporation to implement its "retrenchment program" and terminate the 88 employees. or phasing out of a service activity previously undertaken by the business. such as utilizing the latter’s respective forced vacation leaves. (3) good faith in abolishing the redundant positions. the employer has no legal obligation to keep in its payroll more employees than are necessary for the operation of its business.000. The net income of the respondent Corporation of P39.764. We believe that respondents acted in bad faith in terminating the employment of the members of petitioner Union.Redundancy.00.00 to increase production capacity. It also appears that respondent Corporation’s personnel costs decreased to P97. (2) payment of separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay for every year of service. and (4) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant and accordingly abolished. decreased volume of business. 2004 was made barely five months after the 77 Union members were dismissed on the ground that respondent Corporation was suffering from "chronic depression.00. However.00. in fact.00 in 2002 decreased to P12.00 in 2003. respondent Corporation failed to exhaust all other means to avoid further losses without retrenching its employees. after receipt of the February 10." There is likewise no justification for the hiring of more than 100 new employees.473.000. Respondent corporation failed to produce clear evidence for valid retrenchment.00 by the respondent Corporation on September 16.000. Respondents also failed to use fair and reasonable criteria in implementing the retrenchment program. All these are inconsistent with the intransigent claim that respondent Corporation was impelled to retrench its employees precisely because of low demand for its products and other external causes. when it appropriated P60. as well as the order authorizing full blast overtime work for six hours daily.303.000." 155 . That respondents acted in bad faith in retrenching the 77 members of petitioner is buttressed by the fact that Diaz issued his Memorandum announcing the cost-reduction program on March 9. 2004. such as overhiring of workers.559. Respondents failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence to prove the confluence of the essential requisites for a valid retrenchment of its employees. It found no need to appropriate its retained earnings except on March 23.971. respondent Corporation hired new employees and even rehired the others who had been "retrenched. exists when the service capability of the work force is in excess of what is reasonably needed to meet the demands of the enterprise. on the other hand.729. that the stockholders received cash dividends in the total amount of P12. For the implementation of a redundancy program to be valid. the employer must comply with the following requisites: (1) written notice served on both the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment. Worse.000. more than the number of those who were retrenched. dropping of a particular product line previously manufactured by the company.It bears stressing.00 in 2002.000. 2004 letter of the Union president which included the proposal for additional benefits and wage increases to be incorporated in the CBA for the ensuing year.028.479. however. 3. A redundant position is one rendered superfluous by any number of factors. and instead chose to retrench 77 of the members of petitioner out of the dismissed 88 employees.553." Cash dividends were likewise declared on March 29. barely two weeks after it implemented its "retrenchment program. the net income of respondent Corporation of P46. 2001. The appropriation of P20. amassed substantial earnings from 1999 to 2003.

then employed about 80 teaching and non-teaching personnel who were members of the St. No. the strike ended and classes resumed. noncompliance with the substantial requirements to effect a valid retrenchment. 4. The retrenchment effected by respondent Corporation is invalid due to a substantive defect. Where reinstatement is no longer feasible because the positions they previously held no longer exist. in lieu of reinstatement. 156 . respondent Corporation shall pay the employees-members of petitioner Union backwages plus. 1998. illegal dismissal and non-payment of monetary benefits against SJCI before the NLRC which was docketed as RAB-IV-5-10039-98L. in the case of those employees-members of petitioner Union who had received their respective separation pay.Respondents failed to prove that there was a drastic or severe decrease in the product sales or that it suffered severe business losses within an interval of three (3) months from January 2004 to March 9. they (petitioner Union’s members) are entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. 51 employees had received their separation compensation package while 25 employees refused to accept the same. the 25 employees filed a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP). The Union members alleged that the closure of the high school was done in bad faith in order to get rid of the Union and render useless any decision of the SOLE on the CBA deadlocked issues. or one-half month pay for every year of service. 1998. 1998. In order to end the strike. On May 21. Labor Arbiter Antonio dismissed the Union’s complaint for ULP and illegal dismissal while granting SJCI’s petition to declare the strike illegal coupled with a declaration of loss of employment status of the 25 Union members involved in the strike. through the efforts of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). it necessarily follows that the termination of the employment of petitioner Union’s members on such ground is. 1997. SJCI rejected all the proposals of the Union for an increase in worker’s benefits. 1997. the amounts of such payments shall be deducted from the backwages due them. whichever is higher. Since termination illegal. which it employed. the 25 employees conducted a protest action within the perimeter of the high school. The Union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB only on May 7. agreed to refer the labor dispute to the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) for assumption of jurisdiction. ST. 2004 when Diaz issued said Memorandum. The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between SJCI and the Union was set to expire on May 31. On May 4. October 27. petitioner offered a secondary course only. SJCI informed the DOLE that as of March 31. SJCI and the Union. During the ensuing collective bargaining negotiations. on November 27. Subsequently. 167892. On April 2. members are entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. The high school. vs. 1998.R. the Board of Directors of SJCI approved on February 22. illegal. ST. As such. John Academy Faculty & Employees Union (Union). some teaching and non-teaching personnel of the high school agreed to the closure. 1997. INC. 2006] Facts: Prior to 1998. After which. likewise. Pending resolution of the labor dispute before the SOLE. JOHN COLLEGES. 1998 a resolution recommending the closure of the high school which was approved by the stockholders on even date because of the irreconcilable differences between the school management and the Academy’s Union particularly the safety of our students and the financial aspect of the ongoing CBA negotiations. 1998. However. This resulted to a bargaining deadlock which led to the holding of a valid strike by the Union on November 10. JOHN ACADEMY FACULTY EMPLOYEES UNION [G. separation pay equivalent to one month pay.

thus. it claims that it was forced to close down the high school due to alleged difficult labor problems that it encountered while dealing with the Union since 1995. thus. that SJCI closed the high school in bad faith is supported by substantial evidence and is. This is precisely what the Labor Code abhors and punishes as unfair labor practice since the net effect is to defeat the Union’s right to collective bargaining. John Colleges is guilty of unfair labor practice through its act of closing the academy. an inference which must be drawn from the peculiar circumstances of a case. (3) payment of separation pay equivalent to one (1) month or at least one half (1/2) month pay for every year of service. the reopening of the high school department by SJCI after only one year from its closure. affirmed with modification the decision of the NLRC wherein the two month unworked summer vacation should excluded. 6728. 6728 or the "Government Assistance to Students and Teachers in Private Education Act. the finding of the NLRC. SJCI is liable for ULP and illegal dismissal. to unilaterally end the bargaining deadlock. It found SJCI guilty of ULP and illegal dismissal and ordered it to reinstate the 25 employees to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and other benefits. which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. after all. Under Article 283 of the Labor Code. The third requisite would have been satisfied were it not for the refusal of the herein private respondents to accept the separation compensation package. 1. whichever is higher.. In fine.A. Rather. Whether or not the closure of the high school was done in good faith is a question of fact and is not reviewable by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari save for exceptional circumstances. with a fraction of at least six (6) months to be considered as a whole year. revolves around the fourth requisite. the income from tuition fee increase is to be used as follows: (a) 70% of the tuition fee shall go to the 157 . SJCI contends that these circumstances do not establish its bad faith in closing down the high school. (2) serving a notice with the DOLE one month before the taking effect of the closure. and reasons for the closure of the high school. The closure was done to defeat the parties’ agreement to refer the labor dispute to the SOLE.On June 28. to render nugatory any decision of the SOLE. and with full backwages. Ruling: The petition lacks merit. and to circumvent the Union’s right to collective bargaining and its members’ right to security of tenure. Consequently. and the reasons for the subsequent opening of a college and elementary department. the financial aspect of the ongoing CBA negotiations. SJCI in effect admitted that it wanted to end the bargaining deadlock and eliminate the problem of dealing with the demands of the Union. binding on this Court. and. to render nugatory any decision of the SOLE. the Union’s illegal demands in violation of R. and to circumvent the Union’s right to collective bargaining and its members’ right to security of tenure. specifically. ultimately. whether SJCI closed the high school in good faith. The two decisive factors in determining whether SJCI acted in bad faith are (1) the timing of. It is not disputed that the first two requisites were satisfied. Under these circumstances. and (4) cessation of the operation must be bona fide. On appeal. Whether SJCI acted in bad faith depends on the particular facts as established by the evidence on record. the Court of Appeals. i. Closure. The instant case. Issue: Whether or not St. it is not difficult to discern that the closure was done to defeat the parties’ agreement to refer the labor dispute to the SOLE. to unilaterally end the bargaining deadlock. By admitting that the closure was due to irreconcilable differences between the Union and school management. Bad faith is. 2002.e. and (2) the timing of. the following requisites must concur for a valid closure of the business: (1) serving a written notice on the workers at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof.A." Under R. specifically. the NLRC rendered judgment reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

however. The reason for this is that the employer carries the burden of proof to establish that the closure of the business was done in good faith. allowances. Even on the assumption that the Union’s demands were illegal or excessive. the parties themselves acknowledged that there is a sufficient mechanism to resolve the said dispute. its remedy under the law is to refer the matter for voluntary or compulsory dispute resolution. equipment. wages. even assuming that the Union’s demands were illegal or excessive. If SJCI found the Union’s demands excessive. Besides. Circumstances lead to the inescapable conclusion that SJCI merely used the alleged safety and wellbeing of the students as a subterfuge to justify its actions. neither party is obliged to give-in to the other’s excessive or unreasonable demands during collective bargaining. which could hardly establish the good faith of SJCI or justify the closure in 1998. However. SJCI had the burden of proving that. by referring the labor dispute to the Voluntary Arbitrator. The closure was done in bad faith for the purpose of defeating the Union’s right to collective bargaining. thus it closed down the high school on March 31. Given this denial by the Union. suffice it to say that it is erroneous to rule on said issue since the same was submitted before the Voluntary Arbitrator and is not on appeal before this Court. SJCI’s remedy was to await the resolution by the SOLE and to file a ULP case against the Union. SJCI next argues that the Union unduly endangered the safety and well-being of the students who joined the valid strike held on November 10. we fail to see how this alleged labor problem in 1996 shows the good faith of SJCI in closing the high school in 1998. indeed. This was what SJCI and the Union did when they referred the 1997 CBA bargaining deadlock to the SOLE. aside from the remedy of submitting the dispute for voluntary or compulsory arbitration. the employer may file a complaint for ULP against the Union for bargaining in bad faith. The Labor Code does not authorize the employer to close down the establishment on the ground of illegal or excessive demands of the Union. the alleged illegality and excessiveness of the Union’s demands were not sufficiently proved by SJCI. 1997. Anent the Union’s claim for the unimplemented 20% tuition fee increase in 1996. and the remedy in such case is to refer the dispute to the proper tribunal for resolution. Instead. These alleged difficult labor problems merely show that SJCI and the Union had disagreements regarding workers’ benefits which are normal in any business establishment. Again. this gives rise to civil and criminal liabilities and allows the employer to implement a lock out.payment of salaries. As already discussed. 1998. and other benefits of teaching and non-teaching personnel. the closure of the school was necessary to uphold the safety and well-being of the students. it was incumbent upon SJCI to prove that the students were actually harmed or put in harm’s way and that the Union coerced them to join the protest actions. 158 . Besides. Besides. At any rate. in any way. as found by the NLRC. the important and crucial point is that these alleged illegal or excessive demands did not justify the closure of the high school and do not. and (b) 20% of the tuition fee increase shall go to the improvement or modernization of the buildings. 2. In the instant case. SJCI did not have the power to take matters into its own hands by closing down the school in order to get rid of the Union. We are not persuaded. In fine. SJCI preempted the resolution of the dispute by closing the high school. and other facilities as well as payment of the cost of operations. The Union categorically denied that it put the students in harm’s way or pressured them to join the protest actions. The employer cannot unilaterally close its establishment on the pretext that the demands of its employees are excessive. this incident complained of occurred in 1995. If found guilty. but not the closure of the establishment resulting to the permanent loss of employment of the whole workforce. establish SJCI’s good faith. It claims that the Union coerced the students to join the protest actions to pressure SJCI to give-in to the demands of the Union. SJCI disregarded the whole dispute resolution mechanism and undermined the Union’s right to collective bargaining when it closed down the high school while the dispute was still pending with the SOLE. SJCI undermined the Labor Code’s system of dispute resolution by closing down the high school while the 1997 CBA negotiations deadlock issues were pending resolution before the SOLE.

when SJCI reopened its high school. Promotion of G. through the Union represented by Edgar Moraleda.R. prompting the Union to. No. evaluation & upgrading of all Finance staff and 2. 3. 168569." SMFI informed the Union that it planned to address the grievance through a "work management review" to be completed by March 1993. there is evidence on record contesting the alleged reason of SJCI for reopening the Finally. First. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO [G. the parents were vehemently opposed to the closure of the school because there was no basis to claim that the students’ safety was at risk. protest actions of the Union cannot be considered a strike because. However. the closure had achieved its purpose. Even assuming arguendo that the students’ safety and well-being were jeopardized by the said protest actions. etc. SAN MIGUEL FOODS. Pieces of evidence regarding the subsequent reopening of the high school after only one year from its closure further show that the high school’s closure was done in bad faith. SJCI asserts that the strike conducted by the 25 employees on May 4. 1992. by then. promoting divisiveness. for "discrimination. that is. it did not rehire the Union members. In sum. The contention is untenable. Inc’s Finance Department. unfair labor practices. before SMFI Plant Operations Manager George Nava in accordance with Step 1 of the grievance machinery. these circumstances lead to the inescapable conclusion that SJCI merely used the alleged safety and well-being of the students as a subterfuge to justify its actions. and that the Union was responsible therefor. the alleged threat to the students’ safety and well-being had long ceased by the time the high school was closed. the employer-employee relationship has long ceased to exist because of the previous closure of the high school on March 31. 1998. the timing of.Q. favoritism. However. and the reasons for the closure of the high school and its reopening after only one year from the time it was closed down. Moreover. Consequently. SJCI next contends that the subsequent reopening of the high school after only one year from its closure did not show that the previous decision to close the high school was tainted with bad faith because the reopening was done due to the clamor of the high school’s former students and their parents. some employees of San Miguel Foods. SJCI is liable for ULP and illegal dismissal. the fact that after one year from the time it closed its high school. Second. SJCI opened a college and elementary department. 2007] Facts: On November 9. 1998 was illegal for failure to take the necessary strike vote and give a notice of strike. it was not completed by March 1993. October 5. and reopened its high school department showed that it never intended to cease operating as an educational institution. elevate the grievance to Step 2. review. Lastly. show that the closure was done in bad faith for the purpose of circumventing the Union’s right to collective bargaining and its members’ right to security of tenure. Taken together. It claims that its former students complained about the cramped classrooms in the schools where they transferred. to get rid of the Union members. brought a grievance against Finance Manager Gideon Montesa (Montesa). Montesa to other SMC affiliate[s] & subsidiaries. vs. Evidently. 159 . Clearly. The Union sought the "1. INC. these pieces of evidence regarding the subsequent reopening of the high school after only one year from its closure further show that the high school’s closure was done in bad faith.There is insufficient evidence to hold that the safety and well-being of the students were endangered and/or compromised.

SMFI guilty of ULP but only on the ground of violation of the CBA Agreement. 1993 before the NLRC. the Union’s requests could not be granted. therefore.” SMFI et al. SMFI concludes that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over its complaint. Section 7. may thus be considered. it holding that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the complaint of the Union. SMFI filed a petition for certiorari with SC which they referred the case to the CA pursuant to St. The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters. The Union filed a complaint on October 20. includes complaints for ULP. Issues: Whether or not the labor arbiter has jurisdiction over the case. NLRC. 8contending that the issues raised in the complaint were grievance issues and. SMFI argues that the allegations in the Union’s complaint filed before the Labor Arbiter do not establish a cause of action for ULP. Section 1 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court should thus not be strictly applied to a case filed before a Labor Arbiter. SMFI rendered a "Decision on Step 1 Grievance" stating that it was still in the process of completing the "work management review. Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides: The proceedings before the Labor Arbiter shall be non-litigious in nature. Thus.Almost 9 months after the grievance meeting was held or on October 6. Arbitration Branch." hence. be ordered to promote the therein named employees "with the corresponding pay increases. the Union having merely contended that SMFI was guilty thereof without specifying the ultimate facts upon which it was based. neither were the ultimate facts in support thereof. Hence. its President Amadeo P. as well as those in the position paper. the particular acts of ULP alleged to have been committed by SMFI were not specified. however. On appeal. such was granted and accordingly ordered the Labor Arbiter to continue the proceedings on the Union’s complaint. The Labor Arbiter may avail himself of all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the controversy speedily. The technicalities of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in the courts of law shall not strictly apply thereto. It cites Section 1 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court as applying suppletorily to the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. the Union detailed the particular acts of ULP attributed to SMFI and the ultimate facts in support thereof. " It prayed that SMFI et al.’s motion to dismiss and ordered the remand of the case to the grievance machinery for completion of the proceedings. The Labor Arbiter granted SMFI et al. . In determining jurisdiction over a case. etc. In determining jurisdiction over a case. . [and] unjust discrimination in matters of promotion . filed a motion to dismiss.’s petition for certiorari. against SMFI. they having violated the seniority rule under the CBA by appointing and promoting certain employees which amounted to a ULP. Veloso. enumerated in Article 217 of the Labor Code. and its Finance Manager Montesa for "unfair labor practice. allegations made in the complaint. as well as those in the position paper. In its Position Paper. 1993. allegations made in the complaint. to the NLRC by "Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal". including ocular inspection and examination of well-informed persons. "should be resolved in the grievance machinery. 160 . Whether or not SMFI is guilty of unfair labor practice. Martin Funeral Homes v. Indeed. Court of Appeals denied SMFI et al. Ruling: Section 1 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court should thus not be strictly applied to a case filed before a Labor Arbiter. may thus be considered.

the Union did not allege that they were done to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization. hence. 161 . Second. and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. namely: (1) gross violation of the CBA. for a ULP case to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter. following a liberal construction (following the rule on construction in favor of labor) of Article 261 of the Labor Code. a ULP over which the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction. the Union alleges that violated the Job Security provision in the CBA. – It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practices: (e) To discriminate in regard to wages. gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement. The Court of Appeals having affirmed the NLRC decision finding that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the Union’s complaint and thus remanding it to the Labor Arbiter for continuation of proceedings thereon. for violation of a CBA. consequently intentionally by-passing more senior employees who are deserving of said appointment. In Silva v. the pertinent portion of which latter Article reads: x x x violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement. this Article is qualified by Article 261 of the Labor Code. in that SMFI "appointed less senior employees to positions at its Finance Department. On the questioned promotions. ULP on the ground of violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement – (1) gross violation of the CBA. AND (2) the violation pertains to the economic provisions of the CBA. hours of work. specifically the seniority rule. those promoted were members of the complaining Union. however. except those which are gross in character. be considered an "economic provision" of the CBA. thus bypassing others who were more senior and equally or more qualified. Based on Art. Unfair labor practices of employers. As for the alleged ULP committed under Article 248(i). In fact. It may not be seriously disputed that this charge is a gross or flagrant violation of the seniority rule under the CBA. First. and the NLRC to exercise its appellate jurisdiction. the allegations in the complaint should show prima facie theconcurrence of two things. The grievance machinery provision in the CBA is not an economic provision.ULP on the ground of discrimination which must allege that that they were done to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization. it may. NLRC. the appellate court’s said finding may be taken to have been made only for the purpose of determining jurisdiction. the Union charges SMFI to have promoted less senior employees. shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. 248." Since the seniority rule in the promotion of employees has a bearing on salary and benefits. the second requirement for a Labor Arbiter to exercise jurisdiction of a ULP is not present. The promotions do not thus amount to ULP under Article 248(e) of the Labor Code. AND (2) the violation pertains to the economic provisions of the CBA. For purposes of this article.

Tomas. as only the union members were locked out. however. LA rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint. The petitioner corporation filed a Rule 65 petition before the CA who dismissed the petition outright for no proof of authority to act for and on behalf of the corporation was submitted by the corporation's senior vicepresident who signed the non-forum shopping. 1995. supervisors and electrical workers of the Sto. Aggrieved by these developments.000 chickens from the poultry farm in Sto. August 28. Ruling: 162 . the regular rank-and-file workers in the Sto. STFWU. vs. Batangas. Tomas. No. who were members of another union. 5 days thereafter. in the farm in Sto. and PGFWU submitted their respective proposals for CBA renewal. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of ULP. STFWU. and the company subsequently resumed operations of the closed farm under a new contract with the landowner. Purefoods refused to negotiate with the unions should a PULO representative be in the panel. The next day. 4 company employees facilitated the transfer of around 23. and on July 31. saying that the company's refusal to recognize the labor organizations' affiliation with PULO was unjustified considering that the latter had been granted the status of a federation by the Bureau of Labor Relations. In the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. Purefoods interposed. docketed with the Labor Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. Purefoods Unified Labor Organization (PULO). The real motive of the company in the sudden closure and the mass dismissal was union busting. Batangas. the petitioner company concluded a new CBA with another union in its farm in Malvar. were nevertheless retained by the company in its employ. The parties then agreed to postpone the negotiations indefinitely.R. NAGSAMA-Purefoods. lost its status as bargaining representative when the Sto. 1995. the respondent labor organizations jointly instituted a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP).PUREFOODS CORP. 150896. at around 8:00pm. 2008] Facts: The respondents in this case. affirmed the organizations' affiliation with PULO. These organizations were affiliates of the federation. 3 labor organizations and a federation: NAGSAMA-Purefoods). Tomas farm was closed. illegal lockout/dismissal and damages. Rosa. Laguna. the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file workers of Purefoods' meat division throughout Luzon. and their general membership resolutions which. The farm manager. that the closure of the Sto. Tomas farm was not arbitrary but was the result of the financial non-viability of the operations. STFWU. Tomas farm. 22 STFWU members were terminated from employment. NAGKAKAISANG SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG PUREFOODS RANK AND FILE [G. Batangas (where STFWU was the exclusive bargaining agent) to that in Malvar. the defenses that PULO was not a legitimate labor organization or federation for it did not have the required minimum number of member unions. NLRC reversed the ruling of the LA. and restraint on the exercise of the employees' right to self-organization and free collective bargaining. PGFWU. Tomas farm were refused entry in the company premises. Whether or not the NLRC gravely abused its discretion. among others. Petitioner instituted before us the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. and that this refusal constituted undue interference in. On July 24. of those in the poultry farm in Sta.

applying settled jurisprudence. it surreptitiously transferred and continued its business in a less hostile environment. While technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. When the petitioner is a corporation. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court mandates that the petition for certiorari shall be accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. the certification shall be executed by a natural person authorized by the corporation's board of directors. Petitioner presented no evidence to support the contention that it was incurring losses or that the subject farm's lease agreement was pre-terminated. and proof of such authority must be attached to the petition. or that it exercised its power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. that this Court now refuses to condone petitioner's procedural transgression. In the instant case. because it did not attach to its motion for reconsideration any proof of the authority of its signatory. restrain or coerce 163 . attached to the petition. Tomas farm was made in bad faith.The petition is denied. therefore. We must reiterate that the rules of procedure are mandatory. 3. and when there is sufficient explanation that the non-compliance is for a justifiable cause. Ineluctably. When the petitioner is a corporation. Need to prove grave abuse of discretion of the NLRC. the petitioner corporation did not present a reasonable explanation for its non-compliance with the rules. and that its abuse of discretion is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. We deem as proper the award of moral and exemplary damages. It is crystal clear that the closure of the Sto. No proof of his authority to sign the said certificate was. We hold that the sudden termination of the STFWU members is tainted with ULP because it was done to interfere with. Further. Here. Tomas farm circumvented the labor organization's right to collective bargaining and violated the members' right to security of tenure. no such proof was adduced by petitioner. they are provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. it cannot be said that petitioner substantially complied therewith. for the most persuasive of reasons. 2. Failure to attach to the certification any proof of the signatory's authority is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. we find that the CA committed no error when it dismissed the petition. Section 1. It stands to reason. thus. however. Badges of bad faith are evident from the following acts of the petitioner: it unjustifiably refused to recognize the STFWU's and the other unions' affiliation with PULO. 3. Thus. such that the outright dismissal of the case will defeat the administration of justice. It was incumbent for petitioner to prove before the appellate court that the labor commission capriciously and whimsically exercised its judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. except only when. as aforesaid. but retained and brought the non-members to the Malvar farm. they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice. the certification shall be executed by a natural person authorized by the corporation's board of directors. Award of moral and exemplary damages due to existence of ULP. We. declare that the NLRC ruling is not characterized by grave abuse of discretion. While technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. and it suddenly terminated the STFWU members. they are provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Petitioner guilty of ULP. the senior vice-president of the petitioner corporation signed the certificate of nonforum shopping. Here. The Court cannot even be liberal in the application of the rules because liberality is warranted only in instances when there is substantial compliance with the technical requirements in pleading and practice. the closure of the Sto. it concluded a new CBA with another union in another farm during the agreed indefinite suspension of the collective bargaining negotiations.

It implemented 3 waves of an Early Retirement Program. CCBPI(GEN. The NLRC anchored its ruling on the validity of the “Going-to-the-Market” (GTM) system implemented by the company. CCBPI filed a Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction with the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment.000.00 as moral and exemplary damages should be made to the illegally dismissed STFWU members. payment of P500. or one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service. the company is ordered to pay the illegally dismissed STFWU members separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay. It found that JLBP was an independent contractor and that the decision to contract out jobs was a valid exercise of management prerogative to meet exigent circumstances. including the production department of CCBPI Gen San. signed by the employees. 178647. whichever is higher. and tougher competition. No. Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit. Issue: Whether or not CCBPI was guilty of unfair labor practice for contracting out jobs. The CA upheld the NLRC’s finding that CCBPI was not guilty of unfair labor practice. The Union petitioner filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). are declared invalid and ineffective. and office workers. Hence. NLRC ruled that CCBPI was not guilty of unfair labor practice for contracting out jobs to JLBP. GENERAL SANTOS COCA-COLA PLANT FREE WORKERS UNION-TUPAS vs. which called for restructuring its selling and distribution system. the petitioner company is liable for the payment of the aforesaid damages. The parties failed to come to an amicable settlement. The NLRC held that petitioner failed to prove by substantial evidence that the system was meant to curtail the right to self-organization of petitioner’s members.R. messengers.” Because several employees availed of the early retirement program. As to the order of reinstatement. Faced with the “freeze hiring” directive. Feb. there was an inter-office memorandum mandating officers to put on hold “all requests for hiring to fill in vacancies in both regular and temporary positions in the Head Office and in the Plants. The Secretary of Labor issued an Order enjoining the threatened strike and certifying the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. including janitorial services. 164 . CCBPI engaged the services of JLBP Services Corporation (JLBP). a company in the business of providing labor and manpower services. leading to the closure of certain sales offices and the elimination of conventional sales routes. since it is no longer feasible considering the length of time that the employees have been out of petitioner's employ. vacancies were created in some departments. Meanwhile. 2009] Facts: CCBPI experienced a decline in profitability due to the Asian economic crisis. [G. The releases and quitclaims. decrease in sales. we deny the Petition.employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization. who were then necessitous men at the time of execution of the documents. Correcting the dispositive portion of the NLRC ruling. Thus. where members of petitioner Union worked. as well as the affidavits of desistance. SANTOS CITY) ET AL. 13. a Notice of Strike on the ground of alleged unfair labor practice for contracting-out services regularly performed by union members (“union busting”).

Disputing the Aliazas group’s allegation.Dismissed for issues raised which are questions of facts. even if unfair. DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY ET AL. a group of respondents led by one Belen Aliazas (Aliazas group) filed a petition for conduct of elections with the DOLE. 2000.” The prohibited acts are related to the workers’ right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. The issues raised.R. Moreover. No. are not unfair labor practices. whether JLBP is an independent contractor. respondent claimed that an election was conducted in 1987 but by virtue of the enactment of Republic Act 6715. the term of office of its officers was extended to 5 years or until 1992 during which a general assembly was held affirming their hold-over tenure until the termination of collective bargaining negotiations. 2001. It was the Union that had the burden of adducing substantial evidence to support its allegations of unfair labor practice. Notwithstanding the conduct of election imposed. The 165 . x x x Unfair labor practice refers to “acts that violate the workers’ right to organize. vs. which amended the Labor Code. the acts. are generally accorded not only respect but finality especially when such factual findings are affirmed by the CA. restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization. and whether such action was a valid exercise of management prerogative. whether CCBPI’s contracting-out of jobs to JLBP amounted to unfair labor practice. alleging that the then incumbent officers of respondent had failed to call for a regular election since 1985. April 7. which burden it failed to discharge. call for a re-examination of evidence. DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION [G. respondent called for a regular election on July 9.. i. an examination of the issues raised by petitioner reveals that they are questions of fact. factual findings of the NLRC. First.e. Without that element. Article 248 of the Labor Code provides: It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practices: x x x (c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with. Both the NLRC and the CA found that petitioner was unable to prove its charge of unfair labor practice. an administrative agency deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within its jurisdiction. It accordingly ordered the conduct of elections to be placed under the control and supervision of its Labor Relations Division and subject to pre-election conferences. 177283. which is not within the ambit of this Court’s jurisdiction. Second. The DOLE-NCR held that the holdover authority of respondent’s incumbent set of officers had been extinguished by virtue of the execution of the CBA. the NLRC found – and the same was sustained by the CA – that the company’s action to contractout the services and functions performed by Union members did not constitute unfair labor practice as this was not directed at the members’ right to self-organization. 2009] Facts: In 2001. prompting the Aliazas group to file an Urgent Motion for Intervention with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) of the DOLE. without prior notice to the DOLE and without the conduct of pre-election conference. The company’s action to contract did not constitute unfair labor practice as this was not directed at the members’ right to self-organization. and that a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) was executed only on March 30.

via letter of August 7. The NLRC Third Division granted respondent’s motion. 2002. on behalf of some of its members. Thus. 1.BLR granted the Aliaza’s group’s motion for intervention directing to cease and desist from holding the general election of DLSUEA officers. It decided the following saying that it does not want itself to be unnecessarily involved in your intra-union dispute. During the pendency of its ULP complaint. respondent. In the meantime. “already disposed of” (dismissed) by the Arbiter and was in fact pending appeal before the NLRC Second Division. the hold-over authority of your incumbent set of officers has been considered extinguished and an election of new union officers. filed four other cases against petitioners which were lodged at the NLRC Second Division. Labor Arbiter Felipe Pati. petitioner’s petition for review on certiorari at bar. in the meantime. Respondent appealed to the NLRC. to be conducted and supervised by the DOLE has been directed to be held. at the time the NLRC Third Division Order was issued. the ULP complaint having been. Hence. Respondent thereafter filed in the certified case which was lodged at the NLRC Third Division a motion to have its four other cases and its ULP complaint then pending appeal before the NLRC Second Division to have these cases “subsumed” in the certified case. The certified case. While the dismissal of its ULP complaint was pending appeal before the NLRC Second Division. Issues: Whether or not the CA’s tenth division’s decision was correct in declaring the act of subsuming wrong. Whether or not petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice. was raffled to the NLRC Third Division. The Court of Appeals First Division SET ASIDE the NLRC Second Division Order affirming the dismissal of respondent’s ULP complaint and ordered NLRC Second Division to transmit the entire records of the ULP complaint to the NLRC Third Division where the ULP complaint had been ordered consolidated. The Aliazas group thereupon. claiming that petitioners unduly interfered with its internal affairs and discriminated against its members. REVERSED the said Order of the NLRC Third Divisiom with respect to the “subsuming” of respondent’s ULP complaint. DLSU decided that. by Decision of July 12. and 2. and was lodged at the NLRC Second Division. This is the only way that the University can maintain neutrality on this matter of grave concern. Discontinue normal relations with any group within the Union including the incumbent set of officers. FSC. The NLRC Second Division. 2001 to Brother Rolando Dizon. respondent to file a complaint against petitioners for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP complaint). Establish a savings account for the Union where all collected union dues and agency fees will be deposited and held in trust. respondent filed its First Notice of Strike with the Office of the Secretary of Labor (OSL). docketed as NLRC-NCR CC000222-02. Consequently. President of petitioner DLSU. The Court of Appeals Tenth Division. Ruling: 166 . charging petitioners for 1) gross violation of the CBA and 2) bargaining in bad faith which was certified for compulsory arbitration to the NLRC (certified case). dismissed respondent’s ULP complaint. affirmed the dismissal by the Arbiter of respondent’s ULP complaint. requested the University “to please put on escrow all union dues/agency fees and whatever money considerations deducted from salaries of concerned co-academic personnel until such time that an election of union officials has been scheduled and subsequent elections has been held.

the CA’s Tenth Division ruling having become final. (ABI) is engaged in the manufacture. become final. 162025.000. Aug. respondent must show proof of entitlement to moral. the appellate court’s Tenth Division ruling having. their leadership is not deemed terminated by the expiration of their terms of office. respondent’s officers remained duly authorized to conduct union affairs. the same can no longer be effected. until their successors shall have been elected and qualified. No such damages were prayed for. shandy. 2004. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good in addition to the moral. The grant of nominal damages and attorney’s fees is in order. It thus behooved petitioners to observe the terms and conditions thereof bearing on union dues and representation. 1.R. Inc. ASIA BREWERY. INC. 3. It bears noting that at the time petitioners’ questioned moves were adopted. the same can no longer be effected.000 and attorney’s fees in the amount ofP50. Pending the final resolution of the intra-union dispute. While the amount of exemplary damages need not be proved. for they shall continue their functions and enjoy the rights and privileges pertaining to their respective positions in a hold-over capacity. the Court finds no basis to grant the prayer for exemplary damages. It is axiomatic in labor relations that a CBA entered into by a legitimate labor organization and an employer becomes the law between the parties. On the other matter raised by petitioners – that their acts of withholding union and agency dues and suspension of normal relations with respondent’s incumbent set of officers pending the intra-union dispute did not constitute interference. compliance with which is mandated by express policy of the law. The clarification letter by BLR Director Hans Leo J. ABI entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with Bisig at Lakas ng mga 167 . The appellate court’s Tenth Division Decision had become final and executory on July 11. To transmit the records of respondent’s ULP complaint to the NLRC Third Division. temperate. hence. The grant of nominal damages in order. liquidated or compensatory damages. 3.The petition is partly meritorious. The Decision of DOLE-NCR Regional Director should not be construed as an automatic termination of the incumbent officers’ tenure of office. however. a valid and existing CBA had been entered between the parties. [G. No. temperate or compensatory damages before the Court may consider awarding exemplary damages. No basis for exemplary damages. As duly-elected officers of the DLSUEA. sale and distribution of beer. TUNAY NA PAGKAKAISA NG MANGGAGAWA SA ASIA BREWERY vs. and to pay respondent nominal damages in the amount of P250. Therefore. 2. the Court finds for respondent. respondent’s officers remained duly authorized to conduct union affairs. it bears repeating. Cacdac enlightens: We take this opportunity to clarify that there is no void in the DLSUEA leadership. 2010] Facts: Asia Brewery. Pending the final resolution of the intra-union dispute. with respect to the herein challenged Decision of the appellate court’s First Division ordering the NLRC Second Division to transmit the records of respondent’s ULP complaint to the NLRC Third Division. In so far as the the NLRC Second Division Decision is REVERSED finding petitioners liable for Unfair Labor Practice. bottled water and glass products.

a dispute arose when ABI’s management stopped deducting union dues from eighty-one (81) employees.Manggagawa sa Asia-Independent (BLMA-INDEPENDENT). The rest are secretaries/clerks directly under their respective division managers. Section 2. Probationary Employees 10. hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment. BLMA-INDEPENDENT claimed that ABI’s actions restrained the employees’ right to self-organization and brought the matter to the grievance machinery. as follows: Section 1. Full Goods Department of the Brewery Division and Packaging Division. Article I of the CBA defined the scope of the bargaining unit. a certification election was held on August 10. Purchasing and Quality Control Staff Subsequently. the following jobs/positions as herein defined shall be excluded from the bargaining unit. In the meantime. The COMPANY recognizes the UNION as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the regular rank-and-file daily paid employees within the scope of the appropriate bargaining unit with respect to rates of pay." Voluntary Arbitrator sustained the BLMA-INDEPENDENT after finding that the positions of the subject employees qualify under the rank-and-file category because their functions are merely routinary and clerical. Managers 2. Confidential and Executive Secretaries 7. As the parties failed to amicably settle the controversy. However. the exclusive bargaining representative of ABI’s rank-and-file employees. On appeal. Communications Personnel 9. Supervisors 5. The parties eventually agreed to submit the case for arbitration to resolve the issue of "whether or not there is restraint to employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization. to wit: 1. The UNION shall not represent or accept for membership employees outside the scope of the bargaining unit herein defined. Superintendents 6. Personnel. Security and Fire Brigade Personnel 11. 2002 wherein petitioner Tunay na Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa sa Asia (TPMA) won.Bargaining Unit. BLMA-INDEPENDENT lodged a complaint before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). Accounting and Marketing Staff 8. Assistant Managers 3. Eighteen (18) of these affected employees are QA Sampling Inspectors/Inspectresses and Machine Gauge Technician who formed part of the Quality Control Staff. Twenty (20) checkers are assigned at the Materials Department of the Administration Division. Monthly Employees 12. the CA reversed the Voluntary Arbitrator. Section Heads 4. The bargaining unit shall be comprised of all regular rank-and-file daily-paid employees of the COMPANY.Recognition. As the incumbent bargaining representative of ABI’s rank-and-file employees claiming interest in the outcome of 168 . BLMA-INDEPENDENT filed a motion for reconsideration. believing that their membership in BLMA-INDEPENDENT violated the CBA.

and other paper works for their respective departments while secretarial tasks such as receiving telephone calls and filing of office correspondence appear to have been commonly imposed as additional duties. petitioner filed with the CA an omnibus motion for reconsideration of the decision and intervention. ABI failed to indicate who among these numerous secretaries/clerks have access to confidential data relating to management policies that could give rise to potential conflict of interest with their Union membership. for which reason ABI seeks their disaffiliation from the union. NLRC. Whether or not the ABI committed an act in restraining the employees in the exercise of their right to selforganization. the giving of and receiving notices.12 Issues: Whether or not the 81 employees are excluded from and are not eligible for inclusion in the bargaining unit as defined in the CBA. Materials Manager and Production Manager. maintains that except for Daisy Laloon. all Staff of General Management. Ruling: 1. the court declared that legal secretaries who are tasked with. with attached petition signed by the union officers. memoranda and correspondence. the rationale under our previous rulings for the exclusion of executive secretaries or division secretaries would have little or no significance considering the lack of or very limited access to confidential information of these secretaries/clerks. Petitioner. Finance Director. several secretaries/clerks are deemed included among the rank-and-file employees of ABI. Evelyn Mabilangan and Lennie Saguan who had been promoted to monthly paid positions. Management System Manager. perusal of the job descriptions of these secretaries/clerks reveals that their assigned duties and responsibilities involve routine activities of recording and monitoring. v. Human Resources Manager. jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and hence. Said employees may act as a spy or spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement. Confidential employees are thus excluded from the rank-and-file bargaining unit. Personnel and Industrial Relations Department. this Court held that petitioner’s "division secretaries. Inc. Engineering Manager.the case. fall under the category of confidential employees and hence excluded from the bargaining unit composed of rank-and-file employees. the typing of legal documents. the keeping of records and files. In Philips Industrial Development. Product Development Manager. The rationale for their separate category and disqualification to join any labor organization is similar to the inhibition for managerial employees because if allowed to be affiliated with a Union. 169 . However. confidential employees may also become the source of undue advantage. among others. form and assist any labor organization to managerial employees. EDP and Financial Systems" are confidential employees not included within the rank-and-file bargaining unit. the latter might not be assured of their loyalty in view of evident conflict of interests and the Union can also become company-denominated with the presence of managerial employees in the Union membership. the CBA expressly excluded "Confidential and Executive Secretaries" from the rankand-file bargaining unit. In the present case. Clearly. Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join. in Pier 8 Arrastre & Stevedoring Services. Having access to confidential information. Also considered having access to "vital labor information" are the executive secretaries of the General Manager and the executive secretaries of the Quality Assurance Manager.11 Both motions were denied by the CA. It is rather curious that there would be several secretaries/clerks for just one (1) department/division performing tasks which are mostly routine and clerical. Marketing Director. Inc. Secretaries of Audit. however. and such other duties as required by the legal personnel of the corporation. are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential records. Earlier. Roldan-Confesor. ABI insisted they fall under the "Confidential and Executive Secretaries" expressly excluded by the CBA from the rank-and-file bargaining unit. v.

nor have thereby demonstrated an antiunion stance. Unfair labor practice refers to "acts that violate the workers’ right to organize. and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee – that is. But we disagree with ABI’s contention that the twenty (20) checkers are similarly confidential employees being "quality control staff" entrusted with the handling and custody of company properties and sensitive information.We thus hold that the secretaries/clerks. that social humiliation. the secretaries/clerks and checkers are not disqualified from membership in the Union of respondent’s rank-and-file employees. "bad faith. respondent cannot be said to have committed unfair labor practice that restrained its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization. fall under a distinct category. finishing section of the Packaging Department. are rank-and-file employees and not confidential employees. and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations. Consequently. Confidential employees are defined as those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity. MANILA MINING CORP. or public policy. For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper. the confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor.R. under the express terms of the CBA. the job descriptions of these checkers assigned in the storeroom section of the Materials Department. Again. or done in a manner contrary to morals. Not being confidential employees. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-FFW vs. or was oppressive to labor. through its Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) in Butuan City. we hold that the twenty (20) checkers may not be considered confidential employees under the category of Quality Control Staff who were expressly excluded from the CBA of the rank-and-file bargaining unit. Consequently. in the normal course of their duties. and the supervisor must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations. 170 . There is no showing in this case that the secretaries/clerks and checkers assisted or acted in a confidential capacity to managerial employees and obtained confidential information relating to labor relations policies." The prohibited acts are related to the workers’ right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. determine. 2010] Facts: Respondent Manila Mining Corporation (MMC) is a publicly-listed corporation engaged in large-scale mining for gold and copper ore. 29. or fraud. of course. No. With respect to the Sampling Inspectors/Inspectresses and the Gauge Machine Technician. and the decorating and glass sections of the Production Department plainly showed that they perform routine and mechanical tasks preparatory to the delivery of the finished products. MMC is required by law to maintain a tailings containment facility to store the waste material generated by its mining operations. (2) to persons who formulate. The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who. 178222-23. [G. Sept. it must be shown that ABI was motivated by ill will. good customs. and. Considering that the herein dispute arose from a simple disagreement in the interpretation of the CBA provision on excluded employees from the bargaining unit. wounded feelings or grave anxiety resulted from ABI’s act in discontinuing the union dues deduction from those employees it believed were excluded by the CBA. Agusan del Norte. One of these dams it constructed in 1993 and was operated under a permit issued by the DENR. become aware of management policies relating to labor relations is a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the "confidential employee rule. there seems no dispute that they form part of the Quality Control Staff who. The two (2) criteria are cumulative. MMC constructed several tailings dams to treat and store its waste materials. 2. MANILA MINING CORP. numbering about forty (40).

one of the conditions imposed by DENR-EMB in granting its application for a permanent permit. together with the Union filed a complaint before the labor arbiter praying for reinstatement. resulting in the temporary lay-off of more than 400 employees in the mine site. MMC was compelled to temporarily shut down its mining operations. MMC called for the suspension of negotiations on the CBA with the Union until resumption of mining operations. The NLRC modified the judgment of the labor arbiter and ordered the payment of separation pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of service." to wit: 171 .21 [Emphasis supplied. it is once apparent that the suspension of MMC’s mining operations was not due to its fault nor was it necessitated by financial reasons. and payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. acquired its legitimate registration status and subsequently.] Unfair labor practice cannot be imputed to MMC since. submitted letters to MMC relating its intention to bargain collectively. 7 under a valid permit from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) through its Environmental Management Bureau (EMB). The Union filed with the DOLE all the requirements for its registration. The NLRC did not dispute MMC’s claim that it had timely filed an application for renewal of its permit to operate TP No. is valid. The Court of Appeals maintained the order to pay separation pay but set aside the MMC liability to pay the Union attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the award. As aptly put by the Court of Appeals: The evidence on record indeed clearly shows that MMC’s suspension of its mining operations was bonafide and the reason for such suspension was supported by substantial evidence. Issue: Whether or not MMC is guilty of unfair labor practice Ruling: The lay-off is neither illegal nor can it be considered as unfair labor practice. 2001. which exceeded more than six (6) months. Among the employees laid-off. as well as the temporary lay-off of the employees. MMC operates TP No. MMC cannot conduct mining operations without a tailings disposal system. who later became complainants before the labor arbiter. it did not succeed in obtaining the consent of the residents of the community where the tailings pond would operate. attended the organizational meeting of MMC-Makati Employees Association-Federation of Free Workers Chapter (Union). It is precisely MMC’s faultless failure to secure a permit which caused the temporary shutdown of its mining operations. 7 without which MMC cannot resume its milling and mining operations. MMC was compelled to temporarily shut down its milling and mining operations. the 11 complainants. Upon expiration of the tailings permit. For this purpose." Article 252 of the Labor Code defines the phrase "duty to bargain collectively. Such suspension was brought about by the non-issuance of a permit for the continued operation of TP No. The Union submitted its Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) proposal to MMC. recognition of the Union as the sole and exclusive representative of its rank-and-file employees. 2001 in favor of MMC valid for a period of six (6) months or until July 25. hence. x x x. had the effect of severance of the employer-employee relationship. In fact. Here. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of MMC and held that the temporary shutdown of the mining operation. a "Temporary Authority to Construct and Operate" was issued on January 25. 7 but that the renewal permit was not immediately released by the DENR-EMB. DENR-EMB did not issue a permanent permit due to the inability of MMC to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC).Eleven (11) rank-and-file employees of MMC. the call of MMC for a suspension of the CBA negotiations cannot be equated to "refusal to bargain. It ratiocinated that the temporary lay-off. Despite all efforts exerted by MMC. as ruled by the Court of Appeals.

since they all transferred to Lubas at their own request. despite such transfer. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively.ARTICLE 252.R. PTI caused the transfer of all union members and sympathizers to one of its sub-companies. Lubas Transport (Lubas). as well as their company identification cards. tickets and reports of the respondents were also filed at the PTI office. of the employees. PTI employees requested for a cash advance. The Union failed to prove bad faith in MMC’s actuations. petitioners have nothing to do with the management and operations of Lubas as well as the control and supervision of the latter's employees. Verily. that before the union was registered on April 15. For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper. these meetings led Renato Claros. [G. wounded feelings or grave anxiety. It merely sought a suspension and in fact. it cannot be said that MMC deliberately avoided the negotiation. While the law makes it an obligation for the employer and the employees to bargain collectively with each other. . bad faith or fraud. (PTI) is a company engaged in the business of transporting passengers by land. in order to block the continued formation of the union. 1998. The Union based its contention on the letter request by MMC for the suspension of the collective bargaining negotiations until it resumes operations. they also received commissions equivalent to 8 to 10% of their wages. who is the president of PTI. hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreements [and executing a contract incorporating such agreements] if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession. even expressed its willingness to negotiate once the mining operations resume. or public policy causing social humiliation. who was assigned as Operations Manager. sometime in October 1997. 2011] Facts: Prince Transport.. The employer must have acted in a manner contrary to morals. such compulsion does not include the commitment to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. which resulted in the virtual stoppage of its operations and respondents' loss of employment. were issued by PTI. except for respondent Diosdado Garcia. and. later. January 12. Petitioners.The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages. later. conductors. PTI acceded to the request of some. but not all. on the other hand. GARCIA ET AL. the business of Lubas deteriorated because of the refusal of PTI to maintain and repair the units being used therein. mechanics or inspectors. this led respondents and other employees of PTI to hold a series of meetings to discuss the protection of their interests as employees. Respondents alleged in their complaints that: that they were hired by petitioner either as drivers. that the real motive in the filing of the 172 . No. vs. There was valid reliance on the suspension of mining operations for the suspension. of the CBA negotiation. the said commissions were reduced to 7 to 9%. petitioners were not aware of the existence of any union in their company and came to know of the same only in June 1998 when they were served a copy of the summons in the petition for certification election filed by the union. denied the material allegations of the complaints contending that herein respondents were no longer their employees. Inc. in turn. to suspect that respondents are about to form a union. it must be shown that the employer was motivated by illwill. the schedule of drivers and conductors.. he made known to Garcia his objection to the formation of a union. All it contemplates is that both parties should approach the negotiation with an open mind and make reasonable effort to reach a common ground of agreement. in December 1997. or was oppressive to labor. PRINCE TRANSPORT ET AL. the foregoing circumstances led respondents to form a union for their mutual aid and protection. 167291. in addition to their regular monthly income. the complaint subject of the present petition was already filed. but the same was denied by management which resulted in demoralization on the employees' ranks. all claims for salaries were transacted at the same office. good customs. the daily time records.

Prince Transport never regarded Lubas Transport as a separate entity. The Labor Arbiter also held that Lubas is the respondents' employer and that it is an entity which is separate. petitioners failed to refute the contention of respondents that despite the latter's transfer to Lubas of their daily time records. it may be true that Lubas is a single proprietorship and not a corporation. daily income remittances of conductors. disregard the legal fiction that these two entities are distinct and treat them as identical or as one and the same. Petitioners likewise aver that the CA erred and committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered petitioners to reinstate respondents to their former positions. schedule of drivers and conductors were all made. and that petitioners' act of transferring respondents' employment to Lubas is indicative of their intent to frustrate the efforts of respondents to organize themselves into a union. both law and equity will. However. conducted and controlled by the same parties. making them solidarily liable for the payment of backwages and other money claims awarded to the complainants therein." Moreover. how come that it was Prince Transport who made the decision to transfer its employees to the former? Besides. respondents' identification cards bear the name of PTI. Lastly." The Court also agrees with respondents that if Lubas is indeed an entity separate and independent from PTI why is it that the latter decides which employees shall work in the former? Moreover. that Lubas is a mere instrumentality.complaints was because PTI asked respondents to vacate the bunkhouse where they (respondents) and their respective families were staying because PTI wanted to renovate the same. performed. agent conduit or adjunct of PTI. distinct and independent from PTI. to wit: As correctly pointed out by petitioners. The CA granted respondents' petition. in said letter. In the present case. ruling that petitioners are guilty of unfair labor practice. filed and kept at the office of PTI. The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioners are not guilty of unfair labor practice in the absence of evidence to show that they violated respondents' right to self-organization. It may not be amiss to point out at this juncture that in two separate illegal dismissal cases involving different groups of employees transferred by PTI to other companies. thus. Nonetheless. if Lubas were truly a separate entity. reports. it did not transfer the employees. the Labor Arbiter found that Lubas is guilty of illegally dismissing respondents from their employment. when necessary to protect the rights of third parties. the Court agrees with the observations of the CA. conduit or adjunct of PTI. The NLRC partly sustained the Labor Arbiter’s ruling. it "assigned" them. petitioners' attempt to isolate themselves from and hide behind the supposed separate and distinct personality of Lubas so as to evade their liabilities is precisely what the classical doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity seeks to prevent and remedy. In fact. Issues: (1) Whether or not Lubas is a separate and independent entity from PTI (2) Whether or not PTI is guilty of unfair labor practice Held: (1) The Court agrees with the CA that Lubas is a mere agent. the existing funds and 201 file of the employees were turned over not to a new company but a "new management. 173 . A settled formulation of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is that when two business enterprises are owned. Thus. the Labor Arbiter handling the cases found that these companies and PTI are one and the same entity. In the aforesaid letter. considering that the issue of reinstatement was never brought up before it and respondents never questioned the award of separation pay to them. it referred to said entity as "Lubas operations.

evidence of petitioners' unfair labor practice is shown by the established fact that. are not their personal liability but the direct accountability of the corporation they represent. vs. an employer is guilty of unfair labor practice if it interferes with. INC.R. GOYA. being a juridical entity. respondents filed complaints for illegal dismissal. [G. vs.R. Percy. Obligations incurred by them. before the Labor Arbiter (LA). INC. corporate officers may be deemed solidarily liable with the corporation for the termination of employees if they acted with malice or bad faith. Roberto Enriquez are also the officers and stockholders of Burgos Corporation. As a result. The Court finds no error in the findings and conclusion of the CA that petitioners "withheld the necessary financial and logistic support such as spare parts. and repair and maintenance of the transferred buses until only two units remained in running condition. hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. respectively. Gonzales and Badilla were employees of Burgos Corporation. Gonzales and Badilla were dismissed from work for allegedly stealing company properties. after respondents' transfer to Lubas. In their complaints. PARK HOTEL ET AL. September 10. Section 31 of the Corporation Code makes a director personally liable for corporate debts if he willfully and knowingly votes for or assents to patently unlawful acts of the corporation. 17118. 2012] Facts: Soriano was initially hired by Park Hotel but was transferred to Burgos Corporation. GOYA. SORIANO ET AL. No. Thus. In the present case. Issue: Whether or not corporate officers are solidarily and personally liable in a case for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice Ruling: A corporation. However. of Park Hotel. 170054. Harbutt and Percy are the General Manager and owner. Indeed. while acting as corporate agents." This left respondents virtually jobless. No. officers and employees. Under Article 248 (a) and (e) of the Labor Code. restrains or coerces its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization or if it discriminates in regard to wages. Soriano.(2) As to whether petitioners are guilty of unfair labor practice. acted maliciously in terminating the services of respondents without any valid ground and in order to suppress their right to self-organization. January 21. petitioners left them high and dry insofar as the operations of Lubas was concerned. EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW [G. are jointly and severally liable with the latter for respondents' dismissal. unfair labor practice. in their capacity as corporate officers of Burgos. respondents alleged that the real reason for their dismissal was that they were organizing a union for the company's employees. Percy and Harbutt. Harbutt and Atty. It also makes a director personally liable if he is guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation. may act only through its directors. having acted in bad faith in directing the affairs of Burgos. Burgos is a sister company of Park Hotel. 2013] Facts: 174 . the lower tribunals unanimously found that Percy and Harbutt. the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the CA that respondents' transfer of work assignments to Lubas was designed by petitioners as a subterfuge to foil the former's right to organize themselves into a union.

During the hearing on July 1. When the matter remained unresolved. With the hiring of contractual employees. may be shortened if the employee has already acquired the knowledge or skills required of the job. they agreed to submit for resolution the solitary issue of "[w]hether or not [the Company] is guilty of unfair labor acts in engaging the services of PESO.Condition of Employment.] and jurisprudence. the grievance was referred to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for voluntary arbitration. the probationary period shall be three (3) months. — The parties agree on the following categories of employees: (a)Probationary Employee. — One hired by the Company to perform occasional or seasonal work directly connected with the regular operations of the Company." Both parties thereafter filed their respective pleadings. (b)Regular Employee. rendering inutile Section 1. all regular rank-and-file employees shall remain members of the Union in good standing and that new employees covered by the appropriate bargaining unit shall automatically become regular employees of the Company and shall remain members of the Union in good standing as a condition of continued employment. and that a possible 175 . The Union asserted that the hiring of contractual employees from PESO is not a management prerogative and in gross violation of the CBA tantamount to unfair labor practice (ULP). hence. Inc. employee). importation.Sometime in January 2004. This prompted respondent Goya. the Company sometimes hired probationary employees who also later became regular workers after passing the probationary period. the Company and the Union manifested before Voluntary Arbitrator (VA) Bienvenido E. — An employee who has satisfactorily completed his probationary period and automatically granted regular employment status in the Company. Article I of the CBA. laws[. he shall be required to undergo a probationary period of six (6) months. Inc. which provides for three categories of employees in the Company. (Company). 2004. The Union moreover advanced that sustaining the Company's position would easily weaken and ultimately destroy the former with the latter's resort to retrenchment and/or retirement of employees and not filling up the vacant regular positions through the hiring of contractual workers from PESO. It was averred that the categories of employees had been a part of the CBA since the 1970s and that due to this provision.] under the existing CBA. Article III (Union Security) of the CBA. Employees Union-FFW (Union) to request for a grievance conference on the ground that the contractual workers do not belong to the categories of employees stipulated in the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). (c)Casual Employee. If the probationary employee is hired or comes from outside the Company (non-Goya. thus. Marikina City. a pool of casual employees had been maintained by the Company from which it hired workers who then became regular workers when urgently necessary to employ them for more than a year. a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture. a third party service provider[. If the employee is hired from the casual pool and has worked in the same position at any time during the past two (2) years. in effect violating Section 4. and wholesale of top quality food products. petitioner Goya. to wit: Section 4. Likewise. the Union contended that it would no longer have probationary and casual employees from which it could obtain additional Union members. Laguesma that amicable settlement was no longer possible. which period. Inc.Categories of Employees. — As a condition of continued employment in the Company. or one hired for specific projects of limited duration not connected directly with the regular operations of the Company. in the sole judgment of management. hired contractual employees from PESO Resources Development Corporation (PESO) to perform temporary and occasional services in its factory in Parang. — One hired to occupy a regular rank-and-file position in the Company and is serving a probationary period. It noted that the contractual workers engaged have been assigned to work in positions previously handled by regular workers and Union members. which states: Section 1.

" while the CA held that "[t]his management prerogative of contracting out services. is not without limitation. prejudice the Union. said employees joined LEU. Issue: Whether or not the voluntary artbitrator committed an error in declaring that the engagement of PESO is not keeping with the intent and spirit of the CBA . that such act is a valid exercise thereof. . To emphasize. the Company kept on harping that both the VA and the CA conceded that its engagement of contractual workers from PESO was a valid exercise of management prerogative.scenario could also be created by the Company wherein it could "import" workers from PESO during an actual strike. v. In countering the Union's allegations. Lastly. in any way. the Company's invocation of Sections 4 and 5. since not a single employee was terminated and neither did it result in a reduction of working hours nor a reduction or splitting of the bargaining unit. When LEU entered into a CBA with Ludo. In the course of its business operations. Resultantly. in the words of the CA. Indeed. declaring that a particular act falls within the concept of management prerogative is significantly different from acknowledging that such act is a valid exercise thereof. Both did not say. It is confused. . We said so in Honda Phils. the opinion of the VA is germane to." A collective bargaining agreement is the law between the parties: It is familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between the parties and they are obliged to comply with its provisions. Saornido. on different dates. Inc. Rule IV 20 and Section 5. 18-02. Article I of the CBA merely provides for the definition of the categories of employees and does not put a limitation on the Company's right to engage the services of job contractors or its management prerogative to address temporary/occasional needs in its operation. the company was engaged in the manufacture of coconut oil. the CA did not commit serious error when it sustained the ruling that the hiring of contractual employees from PESO was not in keeping with the intent and spirit of the CBA. however. Indeed. The arrastre workers deployed by CLAS to perform the services needed were subsequently hired. "interrelated and intertwined with. This being said.. and (c) Section 4. Rule VI 21 of the Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings dated October 15. (b) the engagement of contractual employees did not. corn starch. 22 In Ludo." the sole issue submitted for resolution by the parties. [These] categories of employees particularly with respect to casual employees [serve] as limitation to [the Company's] prerogative to outsource parts of its operations especially when hiring contractual employees. Obviously. 2004 issued by the NCMB is plainly out of order. providing for certain benefits to the employees (the amount of which vary according to the length of service rendered). however. Samahan ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Honda: 176 . . glucose and related products. the Company argued that: (a) the law expressly allows contracting and subcontracting arrangements through Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Order No. it engaged the arrastre services of CLAS for the loading and unloading of its finished products at the wharf. Ruling: We confirm that the VA ruled on a matter that is covered by the sole issue submitted for voluntary arbitration. this is due to the recognition that the CBA provisions agreed upon by the Company and the Union delimit the free exercise of management prerogative pertaining to the hiring of contractual employees. as Ludo's regular rank-and-file employees. the VA opined that "the right of the management to outsource parts of its operations is not totally eliminated but is merely limited by the CBA. What the VA and the CA correctly ruled was that the Company's act of contracting out/outsourcing is within the purview of management prerogative. Thereafter. which acted as the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees. it requested to include in its members' period of service the time during which they rendered arrastre services so that they could get higher benefits. or. the Company cannot find solace in its cited case of Ludo & Luym Corporation v. Likewise.

They likewise filed various petitions for audit covering the period from 2000 to 2004. which were later consolidated. disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations. petitioners filed three (3) separate complaints for ULP against the respondents. petitioners were. On February 17. terms and conditions as they may deem convenient provided these are not contrary to law. questioning legality of their expulsion from the union and their subsequent termination from employment. As in all contracts. including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect. RPNEU’s officers informed their company of the expulsion of petitioners and the 12 others from the union and requested the management to serve them notices of termination from employment in compliance with their CBA’s union security clause. the parties in a CBA may establish such stipulations. a legitimate labor organization and the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of Radio Philippines Network (RPN). BAPTISTA ET AL.––Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization. Issue: Whether or not respondents committed unfair labor practices Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit. while the respondents were the union’s elected officers and members.A collective bargaining agreement or CBA refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages. Moreover. informed petitioners and the 12 others of the termination of their employment effective March 20. enforcing Article II. 2006. it becomes the law between the parties and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law. [G. The primary concept of ULP is embodied in Article 247 of the Labor Code. which provides: Article 247. vs. through a memorandum. if the terms of a contract. 194709. morals. cases were filed against the petitioners and several others for alleged violation of the union’s constitution and by-laws. petitioners. Section 21 also known as the union security clause of their current CBA. the literal meaning of their stipulations shall control. Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure for prosecution thereof. RPN HRD Manager. together with some other union members. 177 . public order or public policy. are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties. filed a complaint for impeachment of their union president. On April 26. a government-sequestered corporation involved in commercial radio and television broadcasting affairs. No. where the CBA is clear and unambiguous. Aggrieved. this time. against all the union officers and members of RPNEU before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). on suspicion of union mismanagement. VILLANUEVA ET AL. 2005.R. served an expulsion notice from the union. good customs. 2013] Facts: Petitioners were former union members of Radio Philippines Network Employees Union (RPNEU). Reynato Siozon. Lourdes Angeles. Thus. After an exchange of communications between the grievance committee and the petitioners. before the executive board of RPN. Thereafter. which was eventually abandoned. July 31. are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management. as in a CBA. clauses. 2006. hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. They later re-lodged the impeachment complaint.

In this case. Aside from their self-serving allegations. Due process. For a charge of ULP against a labor organization to prosper. would not constitute ULP Based on RPNEU’s Constitution and By-Laws. Petitioners were found to have violated the provisions of the union’s Constitution and By-Laws when they filed petitions for impeachment against their union officers and for audit before the DOLE without first exhausting all internal remedies available within their organization. The records likewise failed to sufficiently show that the respondents unduly persuaded management into discriminating against petitioners. and Illegal Lockout. the T&H Shopfitters Corporation/ Gin Queen Corporation workers union (THS-GQ Union). seventeen (17) employees were barred from entering petitioners’ factory premises located in Castillejos. before the Labor Arbiter (LA). petitioners were not able to establish how they were restrained or coerced by their union in a way that curtailed their right to self-organization. 191714. it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the internal remedies within the organization. the acts complained. the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. In administrative proceedings. This act is a ground for expulsion from union membership. petitioners failed to discharge the burden required to prove the charge of ULP against the respondents. Moreover. The following day or on November 24. as in other administrative proceedings. as a constitutional precept. In their desire to improve their working conditions. February 26. it is indubitable that all the prohibited acts constituting unfair labor practice should materially relate to the workers' right to self-organization. In labor cases.R. Respondents treated T&H Shopfitters and Gin Queen as a single entity and their sole employer. the charges against petitioners were not mere internal squabbles. 2003 to discuss the formation of a union. Besides. which in turn. T&H SHOPFITTERS CORP. petitioners’ expulsion from the union was not a deliberate attempt to curtail or restrict their right to organize.5 of Article IX of the union’s Constitution and By-Laws. 2014] Facts: On September 7. to organize their administration and activities and to formulate their programs. Zambales. TH SHOPFITTERS CORP. against T&H Shopfitters Corporation (T&H Shopfitters) and Gin Queen Corporation (Gin Queen) (collectively referred to as "petitioners"). expressly sanctioned by Section 2. would constitute grounds for their expulsion from the union. ET AL. other than to bring to its attention their expulsion from the union. the onus probandi rests upon the party alleging it to prove or substantiate such claims by the requisite quantum of evidence. It is well-settled that workers’ and employers’ organizations shall have the right to draw up their constitutions and rules to elect their representatives in full freedom. ULP relates to the commission of acts that transgress the workers’ right to organize. As specified in Articles 248 and 249 of the Labor Code. 2004. Unfortunately. No. vs. and ordered to transfer to T&H Shopfitters’ warehouse at Subic Bay 178 . any supposed procedural flaw in the proceedings before the Committee was deemed cured when petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard. resulted in the implementation of their CBA' s union security clause. but violations that demand proper investigation because.In essence. UNION [G. RPNEU’s Constitution and By-Laws expressly mandate that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court. is satisfied when a person was notified of the charge against him and was given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. respondents and other employees of petitioners held their first formal meeting on November 23. with moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. the prohibited acts must necessarily relate to the workers' right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. filed their Complaint 7 for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) by way of union busting. substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion is required. Absent the said vital elements. but was triggered by the commission of an act. if proven. Thus. although seemingly unjust. its officers and/or members of THS-GQ union. 2003.

The officers and members of the THS-GQ Union were purportedly excluded from the field trip. Later. On October 10. dated August 17. 2004. petitioner Ben Huang (Huang). who visited the site in Cabangan. Zambales and announced the relocation of its office and workers to Cabangan. 2003. for its employees. hours of work. On March 24. and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. the THS-GQ Union president was made to explain why he should not be terminated for insubordination. Due to the heavy pressure exerted by petitioners. Issue: Whether or not acts of unfair labor practices were committed by petitioners against respondents Ruling: As to the issue of ULP. the THS-GQ Union filed its protest with respect to the certification election proceedings. THS-GQ Union filed a petition for certification election. the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). 2004. As a consequence. the remaining employees situated at the SBFZ plant cast their votes as well. On December 18. a sales officer of petitioners. informed its employees of the expiration of the lease contract between Gin Queen and its lessor in Castillejos. Regional Office No. Some of the respondents. the employees were escorted from the field trip to the polling center in Zambales to cast their votes. xxxx (c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with. or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to selforganization. The other employees who likewise failed to report in Cabangan were meted out with suspension. Unfair labor practices of employers. the certification election was scheduled on October 11. Eventually. under the supervision of a certain Barangay Captain Greg Pangan. Director for Gin Queen. a certain Angel Madriaga. Meanwhile. Zambales. On October 14. the votes for "no union" prevailed. Afterwards. The following day or on October 11. On the evening of the field trip. 2004. In the case at bench. Due to these circumstances. an order was issued to hold the certification election in both T&H Shopfitters and Gin Queen. petitioners are being accused of violations of paragraphs (a). 2004. to wit: Article 257. petitioners sponsored a field trip to Iba. 2004. campaigned against the union in the forthcoming certification election. through a memorandum. the employees assigned in Cabangan did not report for work. restrain. III issued a certificate of registration in favor of THS-GQ Union.Freeport Zone (SBFZ) purportedly because of its expansion. discovered that it was a "talahiban" or grassland. Zambales. On July 12. 2004. restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to selforganization. (c). the said union officers and members were made to work as grass cutters in Cabangan. 2004. 179 . and (e) of Article 257 (formerly Article 248) of the Labor Code. petitioners’ argument is utterly without merit. 2004. the said seventeen (17) employees were repeatedly ordered to go on forced leave due to the unavailability of work.––It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practices: (a) To interfere with. On October 13. xxxx (e) To discriminate in regard to wages.

3) escorting its employees after the field trip to the polling center. indeed. 5) assigning union members to the Cabangan site to work as grass cutters. unduly meddled in the affairs of its employees in selecting their exclusive bargaining representative. to the exclusion of union members. 180 . taken together. and 6) the enforcement of work on a rotational basis for union members. reasonably support an inference that. Indubitably. all reek of interference on the part of petitioners. such were all orchestrated to restrict respondents’ free exercise of their right to self-organization. 4) the continuous hiring of subcontractors performing respondents’ functions. before the scheduled certification election. The Court is of the considered view that petitioners’ undisputed actions prior and immediately before the scheduled certification election.xxx The questioned acts of petitioners. 2) the active campaign by the sales officer of petitioners against the union prevailing as a bargaining agent during the field trip. namely: 1) sponsoring a field trip to Zambales for its employees. the various acts of petitioners. while seemingly innocuous.

organized. On May 20.D. wrote another letter to Sanyo recommending the dismissal of the following non-union workers: Bernardo Yap. supported another labor organization xxx PSSLU through its national and local presidents. PSSLU. The union shall have the right to demand from the company the dismissal of the members of the union by reason of xxx their having formed. relying on Article 217 (c) of P. No. 1992] Facts: PSSLU had an existing CBA with Sanyo Philippines Inc. PSSLU filed this petition alleging that public respondent Labor Arbiter cannot assume jurisdiction over the complaint of public respondents because it had no jurisdiction over the dispute subject of said complaint. On September 4. Reynaldo Ricohermoso. The jurisdiction of the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration shall cover other controversies. 6715 which provides that cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of the collective bargaining agreements shall be disposed of by the labor arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration. Alexander Atanacio. 6 of the Secretary of Labor. effective immediately. The function of the Labor Arbiter under the same law and rule is to refer this case to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration. PSSLU filed another motion to resolve motion to dismiss complaint with a prayer that the Labor Arbiter resolve the issue of jurisdiction. On August 7. The same CBA contained a union security clause which provided: xxx members must retain their membership in good standing in the union as condition of his/her continued employment with the company. Named respondent were PSSLU and Sanyo. PSSLU filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that the Labor Arbiter was without jurisdiction over the case. supported and sympathized with a minority union. respondent Arbiter has no jurisdiction and authority to take cognizance of the complaint brought by private respondents which involves the implementation of the union security clause of the CBA. 1991. as amended by Section 9 of Republic Act No. joined. However. Benito Valencia. holding that it had jurisdiction over the case. and 3) they threatened and were still threatening with bodily harm and even death the officers of the union. On June 20. affiliated. allegedly because: 1) they were engaged and were still engaging in anti-union activities. it considered them dismissed as of March 23. 181 . 1991. requesting management to put the respondent employees on preventive suspension. the respondent Labor Arbiter issued the second questioned order which held that it was assuming jurisdiction over the complaint of private respondents. KAMAO: Gerardo Lasala. It is their submission that under Article 217 (c) of the Labor Code. effective July 1. the respondent Labor Arbiter issued the first questioned order. As per the attached letter from the local union President SPWU and the federation President.TOPIC 15: REVISED GUIDELINES OF THE NCMB FOR THE CONDUCT OF VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS SANYO PHILIPPINE WORKERS UNION-PPSLU vs. 101619. Salvador Solibel. CANIZARES [G. July 8. in effect. 1991. 1989 to June 30. 1994. Also recommended for dismissal were the following union members who allegedly joined. 2) they willfully violated the pledge of cooperation with PSSLU which they signed and executed on February 14. Arnel Salvo. and termination dispute being clearly spelled as falling under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. Legardo Tangkay. 1991. It held that: xxx xxx xxx While there are seemingly contradictory provisions in the aforecited article of the Labor Code. the same shall be respected. and the company having received no information on whether said employees appealed to PSSLU. 1991.R. the resolution of the instant issue shall be suspended until both parties have fully presented their respective positions. the dismissed employees filed a complaint with the NLRC for illegal dismissal. Renato Baybon. and Leonardo Dionisio. 1990. 442. the better interpretation will be to give effect to both. in relation to Article 261 thereof. and Allan Misterio. as well as Policy Instruction No.

In its comment. it is expressly provided that "cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation and enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements. Inc. the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide . . a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code.R. The failure of the parties to the CBA to establish the grievance machinery and its unavailability is not an excuse for the Labor Arbiter to assume jurisdiction over disputes arising from the implementation and enforcement of a provision in the CBA. . thus the phrase "Except as otherwise provided under this Code . 1990). exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations. . . Ruling: 1. the procedure and mechanics of its establishment had been clearly laid out. Labor Code). 154 SCRA 368) and always with due process (Tropical Hut Employees Union v. private respondents argue that Article 217(a) 2 and 4 of the Labor Code is explicit. . It is clear from Article 217 that termination cases fall under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. All that needs to be done to set the machinery into motion is to call for the convening thereof. Only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators. 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission. moral. they should be ordered to do so. : xxx xxx xxx 2) Termination disputes. to a panel of voluntary arbitrators outlined in CBA's does not only include grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA but applies as well to those arising from the implementation of 182 . to wit: Art. 76989. In the existing CBA between PSSLU and Sanyo. If the parties to the CBA had not designated their representatives yet. joining. The demand for the dismissal and the actual dismissal by the company on any of these grounds is an enforcement of the union security clause in the CBA. 1987. the following cases involving all workers. It was provided in the CBA executed between PSSLU and Sanyo that a member's voluntary resignation from membership. organizing. NLRC. 20.The procedure introduced in RA 6715 of referring certain grievances originally and exclusively to the grievance machinery and when not settled at this level. No. 29 Sept. xxx xxx xxx 4) Claims for actual. It should be noted however that said article at the outset excepted from the said provision cases otherwise provided for in other provisions of the same Code. .. 261. Issue: Whether or not the resolution between an employee versus the union and the employer need to be referred to the labor arbiter. ." Under paragraph (c) of the same article. This act is authorized by law provided that enforcement should not be characterized by arbitrariness (Manila Mandarin Employee Union v. Tropical Food Market. G. L-43495-99. The reference to a Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitrators for the adjustment or resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of their CBA and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies is mandatory. willful refusal to pay union dues and his/her forming. The law grants to voluntary arbitrators original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies (Art. supporting. affiliating or aiding directly or indirectly another labor union shall be a cause for it to demand his/her dismissal from the company. Jan. .

The force caused her to fall on the floor. a co-employee. No grievance between them exists which could be brought to a grievance machinery. followed her. July 14. Upon seeing petitioner. When he peeped behind the divider. In the instant case. So she went outside and asked Basa. the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. While it appears that the dismissal of the private respondents was made upon the recommendation of PSSLU pursuant to the union security clause provided in the CBA. on the other hand . told petitioner that Baylas was not at the dormitory and advised him to stop courting her because she had no feelings towards him. grievances or matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. the two left leaving petitioner alone in the room.R. In the instant case. it shall automatically be referred to voluntary arbitrators (or panel of voluntary arbitrators) designated in advance by the parties. She resisted and futilely struggled to free herself from his grasp. Since there has already been an actual termination. Afterwards. co-boarders of Baylas. responded to Baylas' shouts for help. Petitioner went to visit Mercy Baylas. and saw petitioner embracing and kissing Baylas. The dispute has to be settled before an impartial body." the jurisdiction of which pertains to the Grievance Machinery or thereafter. only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators. Baylas hid behind the divider at the reception room. its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes. Beleno and Subong to help Baylas. He then placed himself on top of her. She tried to separate petitioner from Baylas but to no avail. They shall establish a machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. he saw Baylas. 183 . No. Hence. 101875. Due process demands that the dismissed workers grievances be ventilated before an impartial body. We are of the opinion that THESE FACTS DO NOT COME WITH IN THE PHRASE "grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of (their) Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. The dormitory housekeeper. both the union and the company are united or have come to an agreement regarding the dismissal of private respondents. DAMASCO [G. The grievance machinery with members designated by the union and the company cannot be expected to be impartial against the dismissed employees. We hold that the Labor Arbiter and not the Grievance Machinery provided for in the CBA has the jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaints of the private respondents. Rosemarie Basa and Isabel Beleno. No other body shall take cognizance of these cases. 1995] Facts: Petitioner Navarro was employed as typist of private respondent at its plant in Bukidnon. pulled her towards him. to a voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. The last paragraph of Article 261 enjoins other bodies from assuming jurisdiction thereof: The commission. at the ladies' dormitory inside the compound of private respondent. Article 260 of the Labor Code on grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrator states that "(t)he parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall include therein provisions that will ensure the mutual observance of its terms and conditions." It is further provided in said article that the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is not settled in that level. It need not be mentioned that the parties to a CBA are the union and the company. however. and after taking hold of her left hand.company personnel policies. The problem or dispute in the present case is between the union and the company on the one hand and some union and non-union members who were dismissed. NAVARRO III vs.

filed his position paper with the Voluntary Arbitrator and even submitted additional documentary evidence. Whether or not the quarrel between Baylas and him was a purely private affair. through its personnel officer. The instant case is not a grievance that must be submitted to the grievance machinery.According to the medical report issued by Dr. 3. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. the ladies' dormitory which was located inside the plant site. Petitioner was then dismissed from the service for having violated paragraph 3. Whether or not petitioner Navarro was denied due process of law because no hearing was held and he 3. but both of them are employees of private respondent. The case of petitioner was submitted to voluntary arbitration by agreement of the president of the labor union to which petitioner belongs. Concerning the allegation that petitioner was not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses. It is the policy of the State to promote voluntary arbitration as a mode of settling labor. The incident happened within the company premises. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard.e. Whether or not the Voluntary Arbitrator exceeded in his authority in taking cognizance of the labor case? 2. In the report of Densing who was the one who investigated the incident. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice and hearing. Maraat. particularly the provision penalizing the immoral conduct of employees. No. Letecia P. 2. he was not denied of due process. The acts of petitioner involved a violation of the Code of Employee Discipline. and his employer. was not given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. i. the parties manifested that they were not questioning the authority of the Voluntary Arbitrator. Ruling: 1. Petitioner himself voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator when he.B (Conduct and Behavior) of the Code of Employee Discipline. A decision was rendered by the Voluntary Arbitrator dismissing petitioner from his employment and holding that private respondent did not violate the provisions of the grievance procedure under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. the quarrel was not a private affair. 1991. Issues: 1. during the initial conference on March 27. the Voluntary Arbitrator did not exceed in his authority. petitioner filed the instant petition. there was no justification for petitioner to invoke the grievance machinery provisions of the CBA. What are subject of the grievance procedure for adjustment and resolution are grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the collective bargaining agreement. Management would then be at the mercy of its employees if it cannot enforce discipline within company premises solely because the quarrel is purely 184 . NO. In addition thereto. or as applied to administrative proceedings. he recommended that the maximum penalty be meted out against petitioner. Consequently. Baylas complained of pains on her shoulder and left foot. through his counsel. Not satisfied with the decision. an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. the record shows that the parties had agreed not to cross-examine their witnesses anymore. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. NO. Petitioner was informed of the complaint against him and was placed under preventive suspension.

that “wages. The CBA between the petitioners and respondent union provides. The pretext of petitioner that he was merely helping Baylas is belied by the eyewitnesses. Whether or not the strong state policy on the promotion of voluntary modes of settlement of labor disputes crafted in the Constitution and the Labor Code dictates the submission of the CBA dispute to grievance and arbitration. in behalf of private respondents. bona fide officers and members of private respondent Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa. to the effect that they had to be seperated from the service effective October 31. Article V entitled ARBITRATION. WHEREFORE. under Section 1. The petitioners appealed the denial to respondent Commission and were unimpressed by the grounds therefor. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION vs. conditions of employment and/or employer-employee relations shall be settled by arbitration. Petitioner admitted that it took Subong to pull him away from Baylas. 2. the Decision of the respondent Voluntary Arbitrator is AFFIRMED. NLRC [G. No. Hence. Respondent Labor Arbiter denied this motion. His alleged act of chivalry is nothing more than a chance to gratify his amorous feelings. Issues: 1. The complaint was assigned to Labor Arbiter Eduardo F. the instant petition for certiorari. petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.” Respondent union. private respondents were served a Memorandum from petitioner Angel G. Whether or not the labor arbiter can exercise jurisdiction over the alleged illegal termination and ULP cases without prior resort to the grievance and arbitration provided under the CBA. were and still are. opposed the intended dismissal and asked for a dialogue with management. On or about July 31. Ruling: FIRST ISSUE: LABOR ARBITER has original and exclusive jurisdiction over termination disputes and unfair labor practices and the exceptions not present in the case at bar. On February 25. Roa. with a prayer for damages and attorney’s fees. 1996] Facts: Private respondents. 1990.” Petitioners’ thesis is that the dispute as to the termination of the union 185 . The harassment of an employee by a co-employee within the company premises even after office hours is a work-related matter considering that the peace of the company is thereby affected. alleging that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint.personal matter. On April 15. 1990 on the ground of “redundancy or excesss personnel. The Code of Employee Discipline is very clear that immoral conduct "within the company premises regardless of whether or not [it is] committed during working time" is punishable. March 15. dismissed the appeal. respondents filed a complaint against petitioners for Illegal Dismissal and Unfair Labor Practices. and that respondent Labor Arbiter must defer consideration of the unfair labor practice complaint until after the parties have gone through the grievance procedure provided for in the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). with the Arbitration Branch of respondent National Labor Relations Commission. Carpio for hearing and proper disposition. 1991.R. machinists. hours of work. Vice-President and Manager of SMC’s Business Logistics Division (BLD). 108001. thus. employed by petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) as mechanics. 1991. and carpenters.

shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks. The sole EXCEPTION to the above rule can be found under Article 262 of the same Code. to show that the dispute is a proper subject of the grievance procedure. Article V of the CBA does not provide that petitioners and the respondent union conform to the submission of termination disputes and unfair labor practices to voluntary arbitration. Petitioners insist that involved in the controversy is the interpretation and implementation of the CBA which is grievable and arbitrable by law under Article 217(c) of the Labor Code which xxx shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements. said provision does not come into play considering that the union never exercised its right to seek reconsideration of the discharges effected by the company. There is no connection whatsoever between SMC’s management prerogative to effect the discharges and the interpretation or implementation of Articles III and IV of the CBA. the Labor Arbiter properly has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the respondent union on February 25. Hence. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes . The law in point is Article 217 (a) of the Labor Code. was absent in the case at bench. and not directly by the labor arbiter. following their CBA. 6715) Based on the CBA. In fact. Such recourse under Section 2 would have been treated as a grievance under Article IV (Grievance Machinery) of the CBA. which is the condition sine qua non to categorize the termination dispute and the ULP complaint as a grievable dispute. Article III of the CBA. together with unfair labor practices. The only relevant provision under Article III that may need interpretation or implementation is Section 2 which was cited herein. 186 . indeed. which ought to be treated as the law between the parties thereto. which provides: “Aricle 262. the law speaks in plain and unambiguous terms that termination disputes. Second.” (As amended by R. and such requests for reconsideration shall be considered a dispute or grievance to be dealt with in accordance with the procedure outlined in Article IV hereof [on Grievance Machinery] x x x” Petitioners fail miserably to prove that. viz: “x x x The UNION. 6715). This was not the case however.” (As added by R. The filing of a request for reconsideration by the respondent union. thus calling for the possible interpretation or implementation of the entire provision on Grievance Machinery as agreed upon by the parties. However. Hence. however.A. upon agreement of the parties. lay-off or disciplinary action. consistent with the general rule under Article 217 (a) of the Labor Code.The voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. Petitioners questions whether SMC had the management right or prerogative to effect the discharges on the ground of redundancy. the respondent union acted well within their rights in filing their complaint for illegal dismissal and ULP directly with the Labor Arbiter under Article 217 (a) of the Labor Code. as patiently pointed out by this court. shall have the right to seek reconsideration of any discharge. A. It would have been different had the union sought reconsideration. the respondent union requested for a reconsideration or review of the management decision to dismiss the private respondents. Petitioners point however to Section 2. Section 1. The union brought the termination dispute directly to the Labor Arbiter rendering Articles III and IV of the CBA inapplicable for the resolution of this case.A. and this necessarily calls for the interpretation or implementation of Article III (Job Security) in relation to Article IV Grievance Machinery)of the CBA. It is elementary that this law is deemed written into the CBA. are matters falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. 1991 for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice.members and the unfair labor practice should first be settled by arbitration. under the heading Job Security. The argument is unmeritorious.

restraint. Third. The acts of the respondent company in economically coercing employees to accept payment of separation and/or retirement benefits. Petitioners would like to persuade us that respondents’ ULP claims are merely conclusory and cannot serve to vest jurisdiction to the Labor Arbiters. they may be considered grievable and arbitrable by virtue of Article 2 17(c). The dismissal or lock-out from work of the individual complainants clearly constitutes an act of unfair labor practices in the light of the fact that the work being performed by the individual complainants are being contracted out by the respondent company. and cognizable by the Labor Arbiter. transfer and other personnel movements which are usually not spelled out in the collective agreement. They deal with matters affecting efficiency and well-being of employees and include. Judging therefrom. among others. CIR. the complaint filed by the private respondents on alleges facts sufficient to constitute a bona fide case of ULP.Petitioner’s theory does not hold water. particularly SMC’s personnel policies on lay-offs arising from redundacy. xxx xxx xxx 23. benefits. The questioned discharges due to alleged redundancy can hardly be considered company personnel policies and therefore need not directly be subject to the grievance machinery nor to voluntary arbitration. The complaint alleges that: “5. the questioned discharges due to alleged redundancy can hardly be considered company personnel policies and therefore need not directly be subject to the grievance machinery nor to voluntary arbitration. This is consistent with the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint.” Short of pre-empting the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. is the rules and regulations governing disciplinary actions. 187 . promotions. Not necessarily so. petitioners also contend. The Court is not convinced. C. however. makes Out a genuine case for ULP. except the one stated above if a reconsideration was filed. unfair labor practices were committed in the form of discriminatory dismissal where only unionists were permanently dismissed. B. v. call for the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. and so. and coercion of employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization and collective bargaining. Petitioners maintain that respondents’ complaint does not allege a genuine case for ULP. the above complaint. xxx xxx xxx 25. long-range terms that express the philosophy or beliefs of an organization’s top authority regarding personnel matters. This was despite the valid excuse given by the Manila Pencil Company that the dismissal of the employees was due to the reduction of the company’s dollar allocations for importation and that both union members and non-union members were laid-off. We find that based on the circumstances surrounding this case. the procedure in the administration of wages. Company personnel policies are guiding principles stated in broad. pending final resolution of the labor xxxx there is undue interference. The discharges. In Manila Pencil Co. The usual source of grievances. There is no connection whatsoever between SMC’s management prerogative to effect the discharges and the interpretation or implementation of Articles III and IV of the CBA. Individual complainants are bona fide officers and members of complainant Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM). where business conditions justified a lay-off of employees.

all of the dismissed employees were officers and members of their respective unions. SECOND ISSUE: Finally. the action taken by the firm becomes highly suspect. It leads us to conclude that the firm had been discriminating against membership in the NAFLU. On the other hand. v. He continued in petitioner's employ until he retired at the age of fifty-two (52) after 188 . If that is true. As such. It matters not that the cause of termination in the above cited cases was retrenchment while that in the instant case was redundancy. It is for the above reason that we cannot hold the petitioners guilty of the ULP charge. This will be the task of the Labor Arbiter. This is consistent with the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. In any case. Employees Union involving the lay-off by a bank of 65 employees who were active union members allegedly by reason of retrenchment.R. It may be the case that employees other than union members may have been terminated also by petitioner SMC on account of its redundancy program. it is also possible that such may only be a clever scheme of the petitioner company to camouflage its real intention of discriminating against union members particularly the private respondents. VS. Inc. In the absence of an express legal conferment thereof. including the one at bar. 1991 alleges facts sufficient to constitute a bona fide case of ULP.: Under the circumstances.. NLRC [G. 95940. This Court was more emphatic however in Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co. No. such interference is considered an act of unfair labor practice on the part of the Company x x x. jurisdiction cannot be appropriated by an official or tribunal no matter how well-intentioned it is. termination disputes. The important fact is that in all of these cases. 1996] Facts: Private respondent Suñiga was hired by petitioner as a bus conductor.A similar ruling was made by this Court in People’s Bank and Trust Co. PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS INC. even in the pursuit of the clearest substantial right. an act which amounts to interference in the employees’ exercise of their right of self-organization. petitioners cannot arrogate into the powers of voluntary arbitrators the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters over unfair labor practices. Under Art. et al. All of the retrenched employees are officers and members of the NAFLU. 249 (now Art. in the absence of an express agreement between the parties in order for Article 262 of the Labor Law to apply in the case at bar. NLRC. and their employers failed to give a satisfactory explanation as to why this group of employees was singled out. In the same manner. and joined the Pantranco Employees Association-PTGWO. these matters will be best ventilated in a hearing before the Labor Arbiter. v. We however find that based on the circumstances surrounding this case. petitioners try to impress on this Court the strong State policy on the promotion of voluntary modes of settlement of labor disputes crafted in the Constitution and the Labor Code which dictate the submission of the CBA dispute to grievance and arbitration. the discharges may really be for a bona fide authorized cause under Article 283 of the Labor Code. and claims for damages. The Court likewise found the employer in that case to have committed ULP in effecting the discharges. we are inclined to believe that the company had indeed been discriminatory in selecting the employees who were to be retrenched. the complaint filed by the private respondents on February 25. July 24. 248) of the Labor Code of the Philippines. People’s Bank and Trust Co. and therefore properly cognizable by the Labor Arbiter under Article 2 17(a) of the Labor Code.

300.00 as retirement pay. The interpretation of the CBA or enforcement of the company policy is only corollary to the complaint of illegal dismissal. It adduced arguments to the legality of its act. Petitioner appealed to public respondent. In the instant case. Private respondent received P49. No grievance between them exists which could be brought to a grievance machinery. The dispute has to be settled before an impartial body. Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction 2. the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. an employee who was on AWOL. it cannot be said that the "dispute" is between the union and petitioner company because both have previously agreed upon the provision on "compulsory 189 . Otherwise.having rendered twenty five years' service." Applying the same rationale to the case at bar. x x x. First. only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators. A litigant cannot pray for reliefs on the merits and at the same time attacks (sic) the jurisdiction of the tribunal. Issues: 1. Whether or not the CBA stipulation on compulsory retirement after twenty-five years of service is legal and enforceable. The problem or dispute in the present case is between the union and the company on the one hand and some union and non-union members who were dismissed. The basis of his retirement was the compulsory retirement provision of the CBA between the petitioner and the union. The Labor Arbiter believed otherwise. whether such act may be retirement and/or dismissal. A person cannot have one's cake and eat it too. It claims that the case falls under the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators under Article 261 of the Labor Code. and prayed for reliefs on the merits of the case. Suñiga filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner with the Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch of the respondent Commission. LA found that the three complainants are illegally and unjustly dismissed and ordered the respondent to reinstate them to their former or substantially equivalent positions without loss of seniority rights with full backwages and other benefits. The order of reinstatement was immediately executory even pending appeal. The grievance machinery with members designated by the union and the company cannot be expected to be impartial against the dismissed employees. this is a complaint of illegal dismissal of which original and exclusive jurisdiction under Article 217 has been conferred to the Labor Arbiters. which issued the questioned Resolution affirming the labor arbiter's decision in toto. Second. on the other hand. both the union and the company are united or have come to an agreement regarding the dismissal of private respondents. Respondent voluntarily submitted the case to the jurisdiction of this labor tribunal. Since there has already been an actual termination." The Court agrees with the public respondent's affirmance of the arbiter's decision in respect of the question of jurisdiction. or who committed offenses contrary to the personnel polices (sic) can no longer file a case of illegal dismissal because the discharge is premised on the interpretation or enforcement of the company polices. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter Pantranco contends that the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction because the dispute concerns a provision of the CBA and its interpretation. Cañizares “x x x Hence. Due process demands that the dismissed workers’ grievances be ventilated before an impartial body. The amounts already received by complainants shall be considered as advanced payment of their retirement pay which shall be deducted when they shall actually retire or (be) separated from the service. Ruling: I. In Sanyo Philippines Workers Union — PSSLU vs.

Although passed many years after the compulsory retirement of herein private respondent. including herein private respondent. As such. Incidentally. thus it must yield to the common good. the CBA between the petitioner and the union intended the provision on compulsory retirement to be beneficial to the employees-union members. xxx xxx xxx In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment. — Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age establish in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract. the CBA stipulation on compulsory retirement after twenty-five years of service is legal and enforceable. Retirement. to make it read as follows: "ART. nevertheless. the said statute sheds light on the present discussion when it amended Art. who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment may retire x x x. Thus.” Being a product of negotiation. Also. 7641. public respondent did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in upholding the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter over this case. 1993." The aforequoted provision makes clear the intention and spirit of the law to give employers and employees a free hand to determine and agree upon the terms and conditions of retirement. "(A)s a labor contract within the contemplation of Article 1700 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which governs the relations between labor and capital. Legality and enforceability of CBA stipulation YES. we call attention to Republic Act No.retirement" as embodied in the CBA. giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and purpose which it is intended to serve. II. the case is properly denominated as a "termination dispute" which comes under the jurisdiction of labor arbiters. it was only private respondent on his own who questioned the compulsory retirement. The law presumes that employees know what they want 190 . 287 of the Labor Code. and the courts must place a practical and realistic construction upon it. it cannot be said that he was illegally dismissed when the CBA provision on compulsory retirement was applied to his case. an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more. he not only agreed to the CBA but also agreed to conform to and abide by its provisions. Providing in a CBA for compulsory retirement of employees after twenty-five (25) years of service is legal and enforceable so long as the parties agree to be governed by such CBA. known as "The Retirement Pay Law. (it) is not merely contractual in nature but impressed with public interest. A CBA is not an ordinary contract. 7. xxx xxx The COMPANY shall formulate a retirement plan with the following main features: xxx (e) The COMPANY agrees to grant the retirement benefits herein provided to regular employees who may be separated from the COMPANY for any of the following reasons: xxx xxx xxx A CBA incorporates the agreement reached after negotiations between employer and bargaining agent with respect to terms and conditions of employment. Article XI." which went into effect on January 7. When private respondent ratified the CBA with the union. but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age. it must be construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically. Section 1 (e) (5) of the CBA states: "Section 1. Therefore. Thus.

acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. the retrenchment program instituted by Philtread with the understanding that they would have priority in re-employment in the event that the company recovers from its financial crisis. Petitioners duly appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. ruling that even before the amendatory law took effect. Even the request of the incumbent union for Philtread to stop hiring new personnel until petitioners were first hired failed to elicit any favorable response. was erroneously served on him by the process server of the NLRC. NLRC revered the decision of the LA. Upon discovery of this development. NLRC [G. subject only to existing vacancies and a finding of good physical condition. public respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the labor arbiter. NLRC affirmed its earlier resolution. pursuant to Article 261 of the Labor Code. 1992. since the primary issue was the implementation and interpretation of the CBA. expanded its operations and hired new personnel. 191 . as well as those former employees similarly situated for available positions provided they meet the necessary current qualifications. which however. Atty. YES. 2. petitioners filed their respective applications for employment with Philtread. the voluntary arbitrator or LA and NLRC? Can RA 6715 be applied retroactively? Ruling: 1. 1992. then rank-and-file employees and members of Philtread Workers Union (PWU). NLRC. despite that the latter became final and executory when Philtread failed to seasonably file a motion for reconsideration within the ten-day reglementary period required by Article 223 of the Labor Code. It ruled that while petitioners had standing to sue. Issues: 1. 110226. which. No. Philtread. merely agreed to consider them for future vacancies. petitioners lodged a complaint with the NCR Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for unfair labor practice. Hence. regardless of age qualifications and other pre-employment conditions. the complaint should have been filed with the voluntary arbitrator. Thus. It directed Philtread to re-employ petitioners and other employees similarly situated. NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion. Who has jurisdiction. Gutierrez.R. damages and attorney’s fees against Philtread.and what is good for them absent any showing that fraud or intimidation was employed to secure their consent thereto. Whether or not NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion for issuing 2 resolutions which reconsidered a resolution it rendered on April 15. June 19. The compulsory retirement of private respondent effected in accordance with the CBA is legal and binding. Subsequent demands for re-employment made by petitioners were ignored. in accordance with their CBA. SILVA ET AL vs. promulgated one of its challenged resolutions dismissing the complaint of petitioners. Philtread opted not to interpose an appeal despite the Labor Arbiter’s failure to rule squarely on the question of jurisdiction. Borreta filed with the NLRCVan ex parte manifestation explaining that he was returning the copy of the resolution rendered on April 15. 1997] Facts: Petitioners. and availed of. according to him. matters involving bargaining agreements were already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator. Petitioners moved for reconsideration. this petition. LA dismissed the complaint but directing Philtread to give petitioners priority in hiring. apparently having recovered from its financial reverses. as set forth in Article 262 of the Labor Code. On this point then. volunteered for.

” In the case at bar. lies. Hence. therefore. While we agree with the dictum that a void judgment cannot attain finality. the case at bar presents no peculiar circumstances warranting a departure therefrom. Article 260 of the Labor Code on grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrator states that ‘(t)he parties to a CBA shall include therein provisions that will ensure the mutual observance of its terms and conditions. it is not the voluntary arbitrator who can take cognizance of the complaint. one cannot immediately jump to the conclusion that jurisdiction is with the voluntary arbitrator. said rule. the filing of a motion for reconsideration and filing it ON TIME are not mere technicalities of procedure. notwithstanding Philtread’s claim that the real issue is the interpretation of the CBA provision on reemployment. The argument is not tenable. There is an equally important need to inquire further if the disputants involved are the union and the employer. In this case. It was thus incumbent upon the NLRC to have dismissed outright Philtread’s late motion for reconsideration. They shall establish a machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of their CBA and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. the rule adverted to is misapplied for it is actually the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC which possess jurisdiction over petitioners’ complaint and NOT the voluntary arbitrator. When the issue concerns an interpretation or implementation of the CBA. NLRC. is a mandatory requirement to forestall the finality of such order. as erroneously contended by Philtread. Canizares. It need not be mentioned that the parties to a CBA are the union and the company.PSSLU v. as an administrative and quasi-judicial body. then pursuant to the Sanyo doctrine. Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators. since the contending parties in the instant case are not the union and Philtread. is not bound by the rigid application of technical rules of procedure in the conduct of its proceedings. resolution or decision of the NLRC. its motion could not be considered late. We are of the opinion that these facts do not come within the phrase ’grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of (their) CBA and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. According to PhilTread. There is confusion in the minds of both Philtread and the NLRC with respect to the proper jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator. their decisions thereon were null and void and. it shall automatically be referred to voluntary arbitrators (or panel of voluntary arbitrators) designated in advance by the parties. The statutory bases for this are found in Article 223 of the Labor Code and Section 14. 192 . therefore. jurisdiction lies instead with the voluntary arbitrator so that when the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC took cognizance of the case. incapable of attaining finality. otherwise. While it appears that the dismissal of the private respondents was made upon the recommendation of PSSLU pursuant to the union security clause provided in the CBA. the voluntary arbitrator cannot assume jurisdiction. is only relevant if the tribunal or body which takes cognizance of a particular subject matter indeed lacks jurisdiction over the same. to a voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. resolution or decision. Philtread’s counsel filed a motion for reconsideration 31 days after receipt of said resolution. However. we clarified the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator: We hold that the Labor Arbiter and not the Grievance Machinery provided for in the CBA has the jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaints of the private respondents. In short. Philtread maintains that the ten-day reglementary period could not have started running and. its actuation was not only whimsical and capricious but also a demonstration of its utter disregard for its very own rules. By doing exactly the opposite. In Sanyo Philippines Workers Union . however.’ the jurisdiction of which pertains to the Grievance Machinery or thereafter.The seasonable filing of a motion for reconsideration within the 10-day reglementary period following the receipt by a party of any order. These are jurisdictional and mandatory requirements which must be strictly complied with. Although there are exceptions to said rule. Certiorari. therefore.’ The parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is not settled in that level.

To their mind. any violation of the CBA was unqualifiedly treated as ULP of the employer falling within the competence of the Labor Arbiter to hear and decide. the employer and the bargaining representative shall meet to adjust the grievance. conciliation or arbitration as provided elsewhere in this Code. except claims for employees’ compensation.It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice: xxx xxx (i) To violate a collective bargaining agreement. Unfair labor practices of employers. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission.(a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide. separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement. overtime compensation. 261. whether agricultural or non-agricultural: 1. 4. 3. the NLRC and the voluntary arbitrator. the governing provision of the Labor Code with respect to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC was Article 217: “ART. Philtread’s refusal to re-employ them was tantamount to a violation of the re-employment clause in the 1983 CBA which was also substantially reproduced in the 1986 CBA. 1989. however. amending several provisions of the Labor Code.” Articles 261 and 262. . as amended. ART. and 5.Whenever a grievance arises from the interpretation or implementation of a collective agreement.” On March 21. Grievance machinery. viz. one can understand why petitioners lodged their complaint for ULP with the Labor Arbiter. Unfair labor practice cases. . defined the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator.” took effect. did the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC validly acquire jurisdiction when both of them entertained the complaint? At the time petitioners filed their complaint for unfair labor practice.: “ART.” Under the above provisions then prevailing. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. unless the parties agree to submit them to voluntary arbitration. 262. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) working days after submission of the case by the parties for decision. All money claims of workers. Republic Act 6715. . including those based on non-payment or underpayment of wages. 217. on the other hand. or the so-called “Herrera-Veloso Amendments. Cases involving household services. . 2. Where there is no collective agreement and in cases where the grievance procedure as provided herein does not apply. medicare and maternity benefits.All grievances referred to in the immediately preceding Article which are not settled through the grievance procedure provided in the collective agreement shall be referred to voluntary arbitration prescribed in said agreement: Provided. including disciplinary actions imposed on members of the bargaining unit. “ART. the following cases involving all workers. within thirty (30) 193 . social security. 217. 248. including the respective jurisdictions of the Labor Arbiter. hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment. That termination disputes shall be governed by Article 278 of this Code. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this Code. “ART. Voluntary arbitration. including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts. (b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters. damages and attorney’s fees. At the time.If the voluntary arbitrator could not have assumed jurisdiction over the case. Those that workers may file involving wages. grievances shall be subject to negotiation.

The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.” “ART. the following cases involving all workers.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.” With the amendments introduced by RA 6715.” (Underscoring supplied) “ART. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement. . including those of persons in domestic or household service. and 6. rates of pay. x x x. namely: (1) gross violation of the CBA. For purposes of this article. exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations. whether agricultural or nonagricultural: 1. Medicare and maternity benefits. it can be gleaned that the Labor Arbiter still retains jurisdiction over ULP cases. 4. including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts. all other claims. 3. except those which are gross in character. 2. Except claims for Employees Compensation. even in the absence of stenographic notes. Accordingly.000. a significant change: The unqualified jurisdiction conferred upon the Labor Arbiter prior to the amendment by RA 6715 has been narrowed down so that “violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement. arising from employer-employee relations. Termination disputes. moral. the allegations in the complaint should show prima facie the concurrence of two things. and the NLRC to exercise its appellate jurisdiction. Social Security. There is. hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment. (b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding article. Claims for actual. involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5. except those which are gross in character. shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. those cases that workers may file involving wages. 262. It is further stated that “gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement. 194 .calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension. upon agreement of the parties.” For a ULP case to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter. however. 261. shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks. AND (2) the violation pertains to the economic provisions of the CBA. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. 5. (c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements. Unfair labor practice cases. shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice but as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code. .

including money claims.Republic Act No. E. As in the instant case. Inc. 6715. is not a curative statute. involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment. instruments or acts of public authorities which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain existing legal requirements. like Civil Case No. 797 an intention to give it retroactive effect. 6715 has retroactive application. This amendment. With the Briad ruling in place. the Labor Arbiter’s assumption of jurisdiction therein was likewise questioned in view of the subsequent enactment of E. however. 1982.A. 6. at the time private respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner. Under said law. given the foregoing considerations.000.A.000. 797. We adopt instead the more recent case of Erectors. no longer being employed. Dela Cerna . when this new law divested Regional Directors of the power to hear money claims. the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over the same. 9657. x x x. Martinez . E. the implication is that the qualified jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC should have been applied when the ULP complaint was still pending. No. National Labor Relations Commission. Thus.O. 797 did not divest the Labor Arbiter’s authority to hear and decide the case filed by private respondent prior to its effectivity.A. or househelper under the Code.The lack of jurisdiction was cured by the issuance of the amendatory decree which is in the nature of a curative statute with retrospective application to a pending proceeding. (Note that under par. E. where we refused to give retroactive application to Executive Order No. 6715 are therefore curative statutes. The law at bar.O.’ At the time of the filing of the complaint. A curative statute is enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings.” which jurisdiction was originally conferred upon the Labor Arbiter. regional directors have jurisdiction) Garcia v. E. On March 31. 797 which created the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). No. created a situation where the jurisdiction of the Regional Directors and the Labor Arbiters overlapped. R. as well as the economic provision violated. This means that petitioners should have been required to show in their complaint the gross nature of the CBA violation. the Regional Director has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving money claims provided: (1) the claim is presented by an employer or person employed in domestic or household service.00.RA 6715 is in the nature of a curative statute. the divestment affected pending litigations. RA 6715 cannot be applied retroactively. No. 797. amended Article 217 of the Labor Code to widen the worker’s access to the government for redress of grievances by giving the Regional Directors and Labor Arbiters concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving money claims.O. Laws should only be applied prospectively unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. where the claim does not exceed P5. Briad Agro Development Corporation v. Thus. 1691 and Presidential Decree No. Under R. it can be applied retroactively to pending cases. 195 . POEA was vested with “original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases. 111. may the Briad doctrine be applied to the instant case and cause its dismissal for want of jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC? NO. Thus.O. (2) the claimant. v. 111 and R. the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No. 1391 which vested the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with ‘original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims arising out of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment.O. without which the complaint would be dismissible. “The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. No. All other cases within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. 6715 further amended Article 217 by delineating their respective jurisdictions. does not seek reinstatement. As a remedy.” Hence.00. No. We fail to perceive in the language of E. and (3) the aggregate money claim of the employee or househelper does not exceed P5.O. it cannot be applied.

the Court deemed it a rectification of such defect. the instant case presents no defect in the law requiring a remedy insofar as the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the Voluntary Arbitrator is concerned. therefore. Nestle filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case as it involves a labor dispute or enforcement of a company personnel policy cognizable by the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. Hence. 1999. as amended by then E. The Court view it as merely a matter of change in policy of the lawmakers. we uphold the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter which attached to this case at the time of its filing on December 5. only 141 or 28. This situation was viewed as a defect in the law so that when RA No. 1999. Petitioners filed their opposition.43% submitted themselves to drug testing. the conclusion that it was curative in nature and. explaining that the company has the right: (a) to ensure that its employees are of sound physical and mental health and (b) to terminate the services of an employee who refuses to undergo the drug test. 2002] Facts: On August 1. This. there was resistance to the policy in the Nestle Cagayan de Oro factory. petitioners. 148303. as well as interpretation and enforcement of company personnel policies. Cagayan de Oro City. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction since the constitutional issue is closely related or intertwined with the labor issue. the underlying reason for applying RA 6715 retroactively was the fact that prior to its amendment. NESTLE PHILIPPINES INC.In Briad. the RTC issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents. the management shall conduct simultaneous drug tests on all employees from different factories and plants. Similarly. must be the rationale that prompted the amendment. adopted Policy No. On August 24. HRM 1. Petitioners filed with this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure but was referred to the Court of Appeals. must be applied retroactively. otherwise known as the "Drug Abuse Policy. However. especially since the 1987 Constitution adheres to the preferential use of voluntary modes of dispute settlement. 6715 was passed and delineated the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and Regional Directors.R. On August 20. all ULP cases were exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. Like in Erectors. WHEREFORE.8. created a scenario where the Labor Arbiters and the Regional Directors of the (DOLE) had overlapping jurisdiction over money claims. 1999. Nestle Philippines. wrote Nestle challenging the implementation of the policy and branding it as a mere subterfuge to defeat the employees’ constitutional rights. What RA 6715 merely did was to reapportion the jurisdiction over ULP cases by conferring exclusive jurisdiction over such ULP cases that do not involve gross violation of a CBA’s economic provision upon the voluntary arbitrator. contending that the RTC has jurisdiction since the complaint raises purely constitutional and legal issues. Article 217 of the Labor Code. instead of the inherent defect in the law. 1999. The same thing cannot be said of the case at bar. the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. There is here no overlapping of jurisdiction to speak of because matters involving interpretation and implementation of CBA provisions. Inc. have always been determined by the Voluntary Arbitrator even prior to RA 6715. 196 . UNION OF NESTLE WORKERS CAGAYAN DE ORO FACTORY vs.O. so much so that this Court is inclined to believe that it has no jurisdiction but the NLRC. Out of 496 employees. a complaint for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order against Nestle. No. On August 23. hence. October 17. 111." Pursuant to this policy. We do not see anything in the act of re-apportioning jurisdiction curative of any defect in the law as it stood prior to the enactment of RA 6715. the Union of Nestle Workers Cagayan de Oro Factory and its officers. Nestle claimed that the policy is in keeping with the government’s thrust to eradicate the proliferation of drug abuse. petitioners filed with the RTC. [G. 1988.

which exercises jurisdiction over this case. long-range terms that express the philosophy or beliefs of an organization’s top authority regarding personnel matters. To our minds. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint. NLRC. For certiorari to prosper. it is "arbitrary in character" because: (1) the employees were not consulted prior to its implementation. Hence this petition for review on certiorari. 261. In San Miguel Corp. They deal with matter affecting efficiency and well-being of employees and include. What should have interposed is an appeal to the Court of Appeals. it is not enough that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. They are assailing the manner by which respondents are implementing the policy. it is the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. which exercises jurisdiction over this case. not the RTC. not the RTC. vs. According to them. Whether or not petitioners’ resort to certiorari under Rule 65 is in order. Considering that the Drug Abuse Policy is a company personnel policy. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. Certiorari is not a substitute for an appeal. Certiorari is not a substitute for an appeal." II. promotions. as alleged by petitioners. on the basis of its allegations. In view thereof. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over petitioners’ suit for injunction 2. On the first issue. and (3) such implementation is subject to limitations provided by law which were disregarded by the management. The fact that the complaint was denominated as one for injunction does not necessarily mean that the RTC has jurisdiction. nor any plain. (2) the policy is punitive inasmuch as an employee who refuses to abide with the policy may be dismissed from the service. pertinently provides: Art. which prays for an injunction had become moot and academic. not a petition for certiorari which they initially filed with this Court. the instant petition. speedy and adequate remedy in the 197 .The Appellate Court rendered its Decision dismissing the petition for petitioners xxx submitted themselves to the drug test required by management and was confirmed free from illegal drug abuse. as amended. we hold that petitioners’ insistence that the RTC has jurisdiction over their complaint since it raises constitutional and legal issues is sorely misplaced. Is the complaint. among others. it is the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. Issues: 1. The requirement that there is no appeal. It is indubitable from the allegations in the complaint that petitioners are not per se questioning "whether or not the person will undergo the drug test" or the constitutionality or legality of the Drug Abuse Policy. since the assailed RTC order is final. cognizable by the RTC? Respondent Nestle’s Drug Abuse Policy is a guiding principle adopted by Nestle to safeguard its employees’ welfare and ensure their efficiency and well-being. this Court held: "Company personnel policies are guiding principles stated in broad. With respect to the second issue raised by petitioners. – The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies x x x. benefits. not a petition for certiorari since the assailed RTC order is final. Article 261 of the Labor Code. The remedy of injunction could no longer be entertained because the act sought to be prevented had been consummated. this is a company personnel policy." Considering that the Drug Abuse Policy is a company personnel policy. Ruling: I. the procedure in the administration of wages. what they should have interposed is an appeal to the Court of Appeals. transfer and other personnel movements which are usually not spelled out in the collective agreement.

The parties having failed to arrive at a settlement.” Respondent thus moved to dismiss petitioners’ complaint for lack of jurisdiction. filed a Notice of Preventive Mediation with the Department of Labor and Employment – National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). it would be absurd to bring the case to voluntary arbitration. the union is an indispensable party to a voluntary arbitration but that since Tan informed respondent that the union had not authorized petitioners to represent it. labor disputes. but they did not resort to it. it dismissed said petition. The NCMB thus set a date for the parties to agree on a Voluntary Arbitrator. Whether or not the NCMB. respondent presented before the NCMB a letter stating that petitioners “are not duly authorized by [the] board or the officers to represent the union.” He thus advised petitioners to avail of the compulsory arbitration process to enforce their rights. On petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. 10 We must stress that the remedy of appeal was then available to petitioners. its decisions or that of its authorized officer cannot be appealed either through a petition for review under Rule 43 or under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. [hence] .” Via Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals. when exercising adjudicative powers acts as a quasi-judicial agency. representations or agreements made by these people with the management will not be honored or recognized by the union. by letter of April 11. . all actions.the NCMB Director. . 2. Whether or not final judgments of RTCs and quasi-judicial bodies like the NCMB are appealable by petition for review to the CA. to voluntary arbitration CAN NOT BE GRANTED.R. TABIGUE ET AL.ordinary course of law must likewise be satisfied. INTERNATIONAL COPRA EXPORT CORPORATION [G. 183335. As the parties failed to reach a settlement before the NCMB. No. and that under the CBA forged by the parties. . . 198 . December 23. . Ruling: The petition fails. employees of International Copra Export Corp-oration (INTERCO). which willingness is a pre-requisite to submit the case thereto. The NCMB Director thus concluded that “the demand of [petitioners] to submit the issues . x x x x Considering that NCMB is not a quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions but merely a conciliatory body for the purpose of facilitating settlement of disputes between parties. petitioners requested to elevate the case to voluntary arbitration. Issues: 1. for violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and failure to sit on the grievance conference/meeting. 2009] Facts: Juanito Tabigue and his 19 co-petitioners. XI. Before the parties could finally meet. Petitioners filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. vs. NCMB Director Teodorico O. . Yosores wrote petitioner Alex Bibat and respondent’s plant manager Tangente of the lack of willingness of both parties to submit to voluntary arbitration. And while this Court in exceptional instances allowed a party’s availment of certiorari instead of appeal. stated that the NCMB “has no rule-making power to decide on issues [as it] only facilitates settlement among the parties to . Regional Branch No. we find that no such exception exists here. Davao City against respondent. 2007 to petitioners’ counsel.

(underscoring supplied) Given NCMB’s following functions. proof of service of the petition. the deposit for costs. It cannot be considered a quasi-judicial agency. procedures. judgments. manuals of operation and guidelines pertaining to effective mediation and conciliation of labor disputes. and other government authorities concerned with matters relative to the prevention and settlement of labor disputes. boards or commissions. the dismissal by the appellate court of petitioners’ petition is in order. Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action. petitioners have not proffered any reason to call for a relaxation of the above-quoted rule. in the interest of justice. been duly authorized to represent the union. given due course to appeals despite the belated payment of those fees. of public administrative officers or bodies. A[n agency] is said to be exercising judicial function where [it] has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are. viz: x x x Pursuant to Article 260 of the Labor Code. resolutions. decisions. etc. Under Section 9 (3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. (b) Perform preventive mediation and conciliation functions. standards. Apropos is this Court’s pronouncement in Atlas Farms. and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. While the Court has. instrumentalities. programs. who are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts. orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies. viz: (a) Formulate policies. On this score alone. and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. (g) Monitor and exercise technical supervision over the Board programs being implemented in the regional offices. (d) Formulate policies. and (h) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law or assigned by the Minister. standards. final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. 126 (the Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Labor and Employment). manuals of operation and guidelines pertaining to the promotion of cooperative and non-adversarial schemes. (underscoring and emphasis supplied) Petitioners claim that they had completed the payment of the appellate docket fee and other legal fees when they filed their motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals. maintain/update a list of voluntary arbitrations. (e) Administer the voluntary arbitration program. (c) Coordinate and maintain linkages with other sectors or institutions. discretion. the appellate court’s dismissal would just the same be sustained. (f) Provide counseling and preventive mediation assistance particularly in the administration of collective agreements. Inc. plans.the Court of Appeals exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments. Petitioners have not. procedures. grievance handling. and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. v. the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is unsettled in that level. it shall automatically be referred to the voluntary 199 . Rule 43 of the Rules of Court under applies to awards. programs.Section 7 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that: The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees. But even if the above-quoted rule were relaxed. voluntary arbitration and other voluntary modes of dispute settlement. hold hearings. National Labor Relations Commission. as enumerated in Section 22 of Executive Order No. compile arbitration awards and decisions.

arbitrators designated in advance by parties to a CBA. the immediately quoted provision “is meant to be an exception to the exclusiveness of the representative role of the labor organization/union. When circulation and mediation again failed. Louis University. Consequently only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators. 2010] Facts: Evangeline C. The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. Despite the conferences held. prompting Cobarrubias to file a case for illegal forced leave or illegal suspension with the NCMB. an individual employee or group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer.7(a) of the 2006-2011 CBA means within the five-year effectivity of the CBA. the parties submitted the issues between them for voluntary arbitration before Voluntary Arbitrator (VA) Daniel T. when she was placed on forced leave. However. SLU placed Cobarrubias on forced leave for the first semester of School Year (SY) 2007-2008 when she failed the evaluation for SY 2002-2003. Cobarrubias filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. 187104. The CA brushed aside SLU’s insistence on the finality of the VA decision and annulled it. and 72. without a distinction on whether the three years fall within one or two CBA periods. Issue: 200 . SY 2005-2006. declaring that the "three (3) cumulative years in five (5) years" phrase in Section 7. For teaching employees in college who fail the yearly evaluation.” SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY vs. He noted that the CBA clearly authorized SLU to place its teaching employees on forced leave when they fail in the evaluation for three (3) years within a five-year period. Thus. below the required rating of 87 points. Clutching at straws. She is an active member of the Union of Faculty and Employees of Saint Louis University (UFESLU). 255. the CA ordered SLU to pay all the benefits due Cobarrubias for the first semester of SY 2007-2008.7. the following provisions shall apply: (a) Teaching employees who are retained for three (3) cumulative years in five (5) years shall be on forced leave for one (1) regular semester during which period all benefits due them shall be suspended. and SY 2006-2007. To petitioners. The 2001-2006 and 2006-2011 Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) between SLU and UFESLU contain the following common provision on forced leave: Section 7. 77. To reverse the imposed forced leave. Cobarrubias is an associate professor of ST. but failed to pay the required filing fees and to attach to the petition copies of the material portions of the record. COBARRUBIAS [G.14 SLU insisted that the VA decision had already attained finality for Cobarrubias’ failure to pay the docket fees on time.R. respectively. College of Human Sciences. with the rating of 85. The voluntary arbitrator dismissed the case. Cobarrubias sought recourse from the CBA’s grievance machinery. Fariñas. No. the parties still failed to settle their dispute. petitioners invoke the first paragraph of Article 255 of the Labor Code which states: Art.9 points. August 3.

like all rules. and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. (5) the merits of the case. no such explanation has been advanced. thus. 201 . we reiterated that the appeal is not perfected if only a part of the docket fee is deposited within the reglementary period and the remainder is tendered after the expiration of the period. (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory. such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons. Cobarrubias’ appeal was not perfected within the reglementary period. guided by all the attendant circumstances. the appeal fee is a threshold issue that renders all other issues unnecessary if SLU’s position on this issue is correct. (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play. legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case. but also jurisdictional. procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their nonobservance may have prejudiced a party's substantive rights. It is an essential requirement. 2007. no appeal was deemed perfected where the other half was tendered after the period within which payment should have been made. Republic. (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. when she filed her motion for reconsideration on February 15. (9) fraud. Endencia and Andres we stressed that the payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. appeal must be made strictly in accordance with the provision set by law. the petitioner shall pay to the CA clerk of court the docketing and other lawful fees non-compliance with the procedural requirements shall be a sufficient ground for the petition’s dismissal. However. (12) importance of the issues involved. there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance. 2008 and attached the postal money orders for P4. (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances. by filing a petition for review within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice of judgment. we decided that even though half of the appellate court docket fee was deposited. Undeniably. and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge. and in reversing the VA decision. Cobarrubias filed her petition for review on December 5. the docket fees were paid late. mistake or excusable negligence without the appellant's fault. (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. In Aranas v.26 Furthermore. the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal has been filed. without which. upon the filing of the petition. on the part of the party invoking liberality. the rules were established primarily to provide order to and enhance the efficiency of our judicial system. accident. there should be an effort. Cobarrubias offered no excuse for her failure to pay the docket fees in full when she filed her petition for review.52 Thus. Endona. they are required to be followed. Ruling: Payment of Appellate Court Docket Fees Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege. While procedural rules are liberally construed. (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default. As early as the 1932 case of Lazaro v.Whether the CA erred in reinstating Cobarrubias’ petition despite her failure to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period.25 Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals from the judgment of the VA shall be taken to the CA. indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays. to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules. 2007. In the present case. but paid her docket fees in full only after seventy-two (72) days. Thus.00. payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is not only mandatory. Cobarrubias’ omission is fatal to her cause. Other than insisting that the ends of justice and fair play are better served if the case is decided on its merits. To us. (10) peculiar. Viewed in this light. Exceptions to the Rule on Payment of Appellate Court Docket Fees not applicable Procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the litigants. In Cobarrubias' case. and without payment of the full docket fees. (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules. To state the obvious. fifteen (15) days from receipt of the VA decision on November 20. the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied. In Lee v.230.

He argues that when the respondent workers received the VA’s decision on June 12. which. The respondent workers received the VA’s decision on June 12. but the CA denied the motion in its resolution of September 1. 2003. owns boats (basnig). Issue: Whether or not the VA’s decision is subject to a motion for reconsideration. PAHAGAC ET AL. [G. They filed a motion for reconsideration. As the respondent workers opted instead to move for reconsideration. 2003. the VA’s decision becomes final and executory unless an appeal is taken. 202 . the respondent workers filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Albert Teng Fish Trading.R. does not provide the remedy of a motion for reconsideration. On February 20. 2003. and other fishing paraphernalia. they take charge of the management of each fishing venture. equipment. Teng moved to reconsider the CA’s decision. to file an appeal. thus. filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. they had 10 days. Ruling: Article 262-A of the Labor Code does not prohibit the filing of a motion for reconsideration. or until June 22. for this purpose. 2003. Teng claims that he customarily enters into joint venture agreements with master fishermen (maestros) who are skilled and are experts in deep sea fishing. thereafter. Zamboanga City. The VA rendered a decision in Teng’s favor and declared that no employer-employee relationship existed between Teng and the respondent workers. as the VA declared. Teng contends that the VA’s decision is not subject to a motion for reconsideration in the absence of any specific provision allowing this recourse under Article 262-A of the Labor Code. No. He avers that the maestros hired the respondent workers as checkers to determine the volume of the fish caught in every fishing voyage. including the hiring of the members of its complement. Respondent-workers elevated the case to the CA. 2010] Facts: Albert Teng Fish Trading is engaged in deep sea fishing and. IX. the 10-day period to appeal continued to run. He claims that after the lapse of 10 days from its receipt. thus. the VA’s decision is not subject to a motion for reconsideration. claiming that: a. which was denied in an order dated June 27. The VA decision had lapsed to finality when the docket fees were paid. which reversed the decision of the VA. He cites the 1989 Procedural Guidelines. the CA had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal except to order its dismissal. Teng. Region Branch No. 2005. 169704. 2003 and which they received on July 8. and b. the VA’s decision had already become final and executory by the time they assailed it before the CA on July 21. He. no employer-employee relationship existed between Teng and the respondent workers. 2003. and Chua before the NCMB. As owner of the business. TENG vs.We. The VA reasoned out that Section 6. 2003. find that the CA erred in reinstating Cobarrubias’ petition for review despite the nonpayment of the requisite docket fees within the reglementary period. Rule VII of the 1989 Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings (1989 Procedural Guidelines) does not provide the remedy of a motion for reconsideration to the party adversely affected by the VA’s order or decision. November 17. hence.

a motion for reconsideration is the more appropriate remedy in line with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion. By allowing a 10-day period. No. or resorting to. For this reason. 179428. Whether or not the respondents were illegally dismissed. Alexander J.[42] we ruled that relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. v. every opportunity must be given to the agency to resolve the matter and to exhaust all opportunities for a resolution under the given remedy before bringing an action in. The requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted is based on the doctrine that in providing for a remedy before an administrative agency. Petitioners appealed to the NLRC which agreed with the decision of the LA and dismissed the appeal. vs. BEGUALOS [G. Indeed. and the VA erred in denying the motion because no motion for reconsideration is allowed. January 26. Rule XIX of DO 40-03 and Section 7 of the 2005 Procedural Guidelines went directly against the legislative intent behind Article 262-A of the Labor Code. an appeal from administrative agencies to the CA via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court requires exhaustion of available remedies as a condition precedent to a petition under that Rule. is indispensable. (Caong). Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.[38] guided by congressional intent. sound judicial discretion governs.[41] In Industrial Enterprises. Teng’s allegation that the VA’s decision had become final and executory by the time the respondent workers filed an appeal with the CA thus fails. Court of Appeals. 203 .These rulings fully establish that the absence of a categorical language in Article 262-A does not preclude the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the VA’s decision within the 10-day period. and Loriano D. Labor Arbiter decided in favor of respondent. By disallowing reconsideration of the VA’s decision. experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or intricate questions of facts. They filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. We consequently rule that the respondent workers seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the VA’s judgment. Petitioners thus elevated the case to the Supreme Court arguing that they were illegally dismissed and were not afforded due process of law. Caong. The CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. Jr. Tresquio (Tresquio). Issues: 1. Daluyon (Daluyon) were employed by respondent Avelino Regualos under a boundary agreement. 2011] Facts: Petitioners Primo E. Inc. subject to judicial review. The petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was also denied. In this era of clogged court dockets. In November 2001. as drivers of his jeepneys. the obvious intent of Congress in amending Article 263 to Article 262-A is to provide an opportunity for the party adversely affected by the VA’s decision to seek recourse via a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court filed with the CA. they filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal against respondent who barred them from driving the vehicles due to deficiencies in their boundary payments.R. the need for specialized administrative agencies with the special knowledge. JR. These rules deny the VA the chance to correct himself[40] and compel the courts of justice to prematurely intervene with the action of an administrative agency entrusted with the adjudication of controversies coming under its special knowledge. CAONG. training and specific field of expertise. Section 7. the courts of justice.

From September 3. On August 13. then its noncompliance must be excused. since 1986. Respondent’s policy of suspending drivers who fail to remit the full amount of the boundary was fair and reasonable under the circumstances. Instead of paying. Nelson died due to acute renal failure secondary to septicemia. 2001. on January 29. Ruling: We have no reason to deviate from such findings. Merridy Jane. On March 5. 2000. 2012] Facts: Nelson R. (GCI). and regulations on work-related activities of the employees must always be fair and reasonable. 2001. including the prerogative to instill discipline on his employees and to impose penalties. 204 . It is acknowledged that an employer has free rein and enjoys a wide latitude of discretion to regulate all aspects of employment. petitioners even filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent. June 13. He initially worked as an ordinary seaman and later as bosun on a contractual basis. ABOITIZ JEBSEN MARITIME INC.2. if warranted. [G. incurred deficiencies in their boundary remittances. or 25 days after the completion of his employment contract. This is a management prerogative. rules. commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the infraction A company policy must be implemented in such manner as will accord social justice and compassion to the employee. Respondent explained that he noticed that his drivers were getting lax in remitting their boundary payments and. At the time of his death. Demonstrating their obstinacy. But such was not the case. the employer must consider the surrounding circumstances and the reasons why the employee failed to comply. Then there would have been a clear act of dismissal. As it was. on the days immediately following the implementation of the policy. the manner in which management conducts its own affairs to achieve its purpose is within the management’s discretion. Nelson's widow. the grievance procedure was "declared deadlocked" as petitioners refused to grant the benefits sought by the widow. Dulay (Nelson. the suspension dragged on for years because of petitioners’ stubborn refusal to pay. He had to put a stop to it as he also relied on these boundary payments to raise the full amount of his monthly amortizations on the jeepneys. Inc. Nelson was a bona fide member of the Associated Marine Officers and Seaman's Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP). Nelson was detailed in petitioners' vessel. petitioners. ESTATE OF DULAY vs. considering that there was no intent on the part of respondent to sever the employer-employee relationship between him and petitioners. 1999 up to July 19. However. Indeed. Whether or not the policy of suspending drivers pending payment of arrears in their boundary obligations reasonable. herein petitioners had already incurred a considerable amount of arrears. upon erring employees. petitioners’ suspension cannot be categorized as dismissal.R. including dismissal. a subsidiary of co-petitioner [herein co-respondent] Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime. GCI's collective bargaining agent. In case of noncompliance with the company policy. Merridy Jane filed a complaint with the NLRC Sub-Regional Arbitration Board in General Santos City against GCI for death and medical benefits and damages. Indeed. In fact. the MV Kickapoo Belle. It would have been different if petitioners complied with the condition and respondent still refused to readmit them to work. Inc. it was made clear that petitioners could put an end to the suspension if they only pay their recent arrears. The only limitation on the exercise of management prerogative is that the policies. and the corresponding penalties. 172642. thereafter claimed for death benefits through the grievance procedure of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between AMOSUP and GCI. No. in fact. for brevity) was employed by [herein respondent] General Charterers. 2000. when prescribed. ET AL. When the circumstances merit the relaxation of the application of the policy.

on the other hand.On March 8.000. the claims arising out of an employeremployee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual.00. It ordered the petitioner to pay P4.000. paragraph 6 of the Labor Code and the existence of a reasonable causal connection between the employer-employee relationship and the claim asserted. 10.00 less P20. otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. Nelson also had no claims against petitioners for sick leave allowance/medical benefit by reason of the completion of his contract with GCI. Merridy Jane averred that the P20. . [the NLRC] affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision as to the grant of death benefits under the CBA but reversed the latter's ruling as to the proximate cause of Nelson's death. The pertinent provisions of Section 10 of R. Issue: Whether or not the CA committed error in ruling that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case.) 8042. vests jurisdiction on the appropriate branches of the NLRC to entertain disputes regarding the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement involving migrant or overseas Filipino workers.A. Petitioner argues that the abovementioned Section amended Article 217 (c) of the Labor Code which. states that: xxx xxx xxx (c)Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements. 2001. the equivalent of US$90. Merridy Jane contended that she is entitled to the aggregate sum of Ninety Thousand Dollars ($90. Nelson's brother. on the other hand. . in turn. Petitioners admitted liability only with respect to article 20(A)2 [of the CBA].300. within ninety (90) calendar days after filing of the complaint. moral. On appeal.00. at the time of judgment . Joven Mar. . the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide. the same was already discharged.[00]. exemplary and other forms of damages.000.000.00) pursuant to [A]rticle 20 (A)1 of the CBA . received P20.A. .00 already received by Joven Mar should be considered advance payment of the total claim of US$90. It took cognizance of the case by virtue of Article 217 (a).Money Claims. .000. 8042 provide as follows: SEC. confers jurisdiction upon voluntary arbitrators over interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. . — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.621.00 from [respondents] pursuant to article 20(A)2 of the CBA and signed a "Certification" acknowledging receipt of the amount and releasing AMOSUP from further liability. asserted that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the action on account of the absence of employer-employee relationship between GCI and Nelson at the time of the latter's death. The Labor Arbiter also ruled that the proximate cause of Nelson's death was not work-related. as petitioners stressed. . Article 217 (c) of the Labor Code. However. They further alleged that private respondent is not entitled to death benefits because petitioners are only liable for such "in case of death of the seafarer during the term of his contract pursuant to the POEA contract" and the cause of his death is not workrelated.000. cCSHET 205 . Ruling: Petitioner contends that Section 10 of Republic Act (R. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of private respondent. [Herein respondents].

8042. resolved and settled amicably by the parties hereof within ninety (90) days from the date of filing of the dispute or conflict and in case of failure to settle thereof any of the parties retain their freedom to take appropriate action. It is true that R. which is cited by petitioner. It is settled that when the parties have validly agreed on a procedure for resolving grievances and to submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration then that procedure should be strictly observed. its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes. grievances or matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to the Grievance Machinery or Voluntary Arbitration provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. simply speaks. which states that "[f]or OFWs with 206 .1 of the CBA entered into by and between respondent GCI and AMOSUP. exemplary and other forms of damages. However. really intended to bring to conciliation or voluntary arbitration any dispute or conflict in the interpretation or application of the provisions of their CBA. a careful reading of this special law would readily show that there is no specific provision thereunder which provides for jurisdiction over disputes or unresolved grievances regarding the interpretation or implementation of a CBA. the same shall be settled through negotiation. conciliation or voluntary arbitration. it is clear that the parties. From the foregoing. moral. as amended by Republic Act No. The petition is without merit.Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. The Court agrees with the CA in holding that this issue clearly involves the interpretation or implementation of the said CBA. The Company and the Union further agree that they will use their best endeavor to ensure that any dispute will be discussed. 10022. of "claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual. Thus. Section 7 of the present Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. — The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding article.A. the specific or special provisions of the Labor Code govern. The Commission.On their part. Accordingly. Article 217. Section 10 of R. 8042) refers to a subject in general. except those which are gross in character. in the first place. In any case. in general. thus: ARTICLE 261. 8042 is a special law governing overseas Filipino workers. shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. the basic issue raised by Merridy Jane in her complaint filed with the NLRC is: which provision of the subject CBA applies insofar as death benefits due to the heirs of Nelson are concerned.A. the Court agrees with petitioner's contention that the CBA is the law or contract between the parties. violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement. respondents insist that in the present case. paragraph (c) as well as Article 261 of the Labor Code remain to be the governing provisions of law with respect to unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation and implementation of collective bargaining agreements. gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement. Article 13. which the general statute (Labor Code) treats in particular. provides as follows: The Company and the Union agree that in case of dispute or conflict in the interpretation or application of any of the provisions of this Agreement. jurisdiction remains with voluntary arbitrators. Under these provisions of law. Article 261 of the Labor Code reads. For purposes of this article. Stated differently.A. It may not be amiss to point out that the abovequoted provisions of the CBA are in consonance with Rule VII." On the other hand. 5 In the present case. the union to which petitioner belongs. or enforcement of Company policies. the instant case involves a situation where the special statute (R. Articles 217 (c) and 261 of the Labor Code are very specific in stating that voluntary arbitrators have jurisdiction over cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements.

It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce.Dispute Settlement Procedures. the Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that the voluntary arbitrator has jurisdiction over the instant case. and are entitled to great respect. 9 In the instant case. (Emphasis supplied) It is clear from the above that the interpretation of the DOLE. promulgated by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). including conciliation. 157086. Section 3. No. the same shall be appointed from the accredited voluntary arbitrators of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the Department of Labor and Employment. principals. the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from this rule. pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 8042. otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 or to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. provides as follows: Section 29. In the same manner. as modes of settling labor or industrial disputes. rules and regulations involving employers. If there is no provision as to the voluntary arbitrators to be appointed by the parties. Section 29 of the prevailing Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels. which are administrative in character.collective bargaining agreements. involving or arising out of violations of recruitment laws. February 18. the parties covered by a collective bargaining agreement shall submit the claim or dispute to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. 8 Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. The above interpretation of the DOLE." Consistent with this constitutional provision. contracting partners and Filipino seafarers. Article XIII. the parties may at their option submit the claim or dispute to either the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). under the third paragraph. and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace." The Court notes that the said Omnibus Rules and Regulations were promulgated by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and that these departments were mandated to consult with the Senate Committee on Labor and Employment and the House of Representatives Committee on Overseas Workers Affairs. — In cases of claims and disputes arising from this employment. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY vs. DFA and POEA is also in consonance with the policy of the state to promote voluntary arbitration as a mode of settling labor disputes. thereof that "[t]he State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes. have the force of law. including voluntary arbitration.R. in consultation with their counterparts in the respective committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives. mediation and conciliation. If the parties are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement. No less than the Philippine Constitution provides. DHSEcI The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) shall exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide disciplinary action on cases. the case shall be submitted for voluntary arbitration in accordance with Articles 261 and 262 of the Labor Code. 2013] Facts: 207 . the dispute or claim should be submitted to the jurisdiction of a voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. as well as the DFA and the POEA is that with respect to disputes involving claims of Filipino seafarers wherein the parties are covered by a collective bargaining agreement." On the basis of the foregoing. It is only in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement that parties may opt to submit the dispute to either the NLRC or to voluntary arbitration. THE LEPANTO CAPATAZ UNION [G. Article 211 of the Labor Code provides the declared policy of the State "[t]o promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations.

Lontoc of DOLE-CAR issued a ruling to the effect that the capatazes could form a separate bargaining unit due to their not being rank-and-file employees. 2001. respondent Lepanto Capataz Union (Union). the other parties cannot discuss the issues they did not raise in the same position papers and have to await receipt of the others' position paper for their appropriate reply. Further. on February 8. Gacad-Ulep of DOLE-CAR rendered a decision certifying the Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all capatazes of Lepanto. a hearing was held on Lepanto's opposition/protest. By her Resolution dated September 17. holding and disposing thus: Appellant accused Med-Arbiter Ulep of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction based on her failure to resolve appellant's motion to modify order to submit position papers and on rendering judgment on the basis only of appellee's position paper. states that "in all proceedings at all levels. to simultaneously submit their respective position papers within a nonextendible period of ten days". but shall remain as part of the records for whatever they may be worth when the case is decided on the merits". Lepanto later opted not to submit its position paper. 2001. the exclusive representative of all rank-and-file employees of its Mine Division. including appellant company were apprised of these issues and they agreed thereto. 9. Med-Arbiter Florence Marie A. Lepanto operated several mining claims in Mankayan. On May 18. On May 2. incidental motions shall not be given due course. We deny. a labor organization duly registered with DOLE. 1998. the second issue was for the LEU and the third issue for appellant company to explain in their respective position paper. Hence. According to appellant. 2000. Section 5. Sto. (2) failure (especially of LEU) to participate actively in the proceedings before the decision calling for the conduct of certification election. otherwise known as the New Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code. the first issue was for appellee LCU to reply to in its position paper. Rule XXV of Department Order No. The parties. Appellant claimed that the issues over which Med-Arbiter Ulep directed the submission of position papers were: (1) failure to challenge properly. whether LEU failed to participate in the proceedings. Lepanto opposed the petition. filed a petition for consent election with the Industrial Relations Division of the Cordillera Regional Office (CAR) of DOLE. however. if so. Med-Arbiter Michaela A. Tomas affirmed the decision dated April 26. and contended that the issues identified during the hearing did not pose any legal issue to be addressed in a position paper. states that "the Med-Arbiter shall in the same hearing direct all concerned parties. and (3) validity of earlier arguments. including appellant company were required to submit their respective positions on whether there was proper challenge of the voters. which is applied with equal force in the disposition of protests on the conduct of election. Although the parties were required in that hearing to submit their respective position papers. The minutes of the hearing even 208 . The parties.As a domestic corporation authorized to engage in large-scale mining. 9. Lepanto pointed out that the capatazes were already members of LEU. whether it should be allowed to participate at this belated stage and whether the arguments raised during the pre-election conferences and in the protests are valid. On April 26. On May 27. Lepanto presented an opposition/protest. 15 DOLE Secretary Patricia A. On the day of the certification election. and would be thereby competing with the Lepanto Employees Union (LEU). Rule XI of Department Order No. Benguet. not a consent election. thereby proposing to represent 139 capatazes of Lepanto. In due course. It was the position of appellant company that unless the parties filed their position paper on each of their respective issues. 2002. the current collective bargaining agent. contending that the Union was in reality seeking a certification election. The issues as recorded in the minutes of 28 February 2001 hearing before the Med-Arbiter are clear. Section 9. including the employer. the motion to modify order to submit position papers filed by appellant is without merit. Lepanto appealed the decision of Med-Arbiter Gacad-Ulep to the DOLE Secretary. 2001. 2001.

Martin's Funeral Home v. because: 209 . acting by authority of the DOLE Secretary. resolution or ruling of the DOLE Secretary from which the Labor Code affords no remedy to the aggrieved party may be reviewed through a petition for certiorari initiated only in the CA in deference to the principle of the hierarchy of courts. her subordinates in the DOLE fairly and objectively resolved whether the Union could lawfully seek to be the exclusive representative of the bargaining unit of capatazes in the company. the ruling in National Federation of Labor v. It appears that appellant did not do so and acquiesced to the filing of its position paper within fifteen days from the date of said hearing. are hereby accorded great respect and finality. appellant should have clarified the same during the said hearing and refused to file its position paper simultaneously with LCU and LEU. We cannot undo the affirmance by the DOLE Secretary of the correct findings of her subordinates in the DOLE. where the Court has pronounced that the special civil action of certiorari is the appropriate remedy from the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in view of the lack of any appellate remedy provided by the Labor Code to a party aggrieved by the decision of the NLRC. 9 which provides that "in a petition filed by a legitimate labor organization involving an unorganized establishment. and (2) the ruling in National Federation of Labor v. Accordingly. an office that was undeniably possessed of the requisite expertise on the matter in issue. If there is any matter that had to be clarified. Laguesma reiterates St. There is no other labor organization of capatazes within the employer unit except herein appellant. To start with. In accordance with the last paragraph of Section 11. Thus. [o]r with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the decision dated september 17. despite her own finding that there had been a premature canvass of votes. thus: The bargaining unit sought to be represented by the appellee are the capataz employees of the appellant. Department Order No. We hold to be untenable and not well taken Lepanto's submissions that: (1) a motion for reconsideration was not an available remedy from the decision of the DOLE Secretary because of Section 15. when she deliberately ignored the facts and ruled in favor of the respondent union. 2002. Rule XI. appellant is an unorganized establishment in so far as the bargaining unit of capatazes is concerned. Issue: Whether or not the secretary of labor acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. the Med-Arbiter shall. Laguesma 21 (recognizing the remedy of certiorari against the decision of the DOLE Secretary to be filed initially in the CA) actually affirms its position that an immediate recourse to the CA on certiorari is proper even without the prior filing of a motion for reconsideration. automatically order the conduct of certification election after determining that the petition has complied with all requirements under Sections 1. In dealing with the matter. 22 SIEHcA And. Their factual findings. pursuant to Article 257 of the Code. as amended. secondly. the requirement of the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration as a precondition to the filing of a petition for certiorari accords with the principle of exhausting administrative remedies as a means to afford every opportunity to the respondent agency to resolve the matter and correct itself if need be. Such findings cannot be made the subject of our judicial review by petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. the order for the conduct of a certification election is proper.contained the statement that "no order will issue" and that "the parties are informed accordingly". observed in the resolution dated July 12. then DOLE Undersecretary Baldoz. Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. 2000. being supported by substantial evidence. Rule XI. Agreeing with Med-Arbiter Lontoc's findings. any decision. 2 and 4 of the same rules and that none of the grounds for dismissal thereof exists". National Labor Relations Commission. Ruling: The filing of the motion for reconsideration is a pre-requisite to the filing of a petition for certiorari to assail the decision of the DOLE Secretary.

R.. contrary to the assertion of petitioner that they may not. Here. and as such they may influence the rank-and-file workers under them to engage in slowdowns or similar activities detrimental to the policies. Respondent submitted his money claims against petitioner for arbitration before the NCMB. While the NCMB arbitration case was pending. absent any showing of whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment. Voluntary arbitrators may. The Rule limits that function of the Court to review or revision of errors of law and not to a second analysis of the evidence. June 26. particularly where the findings of both the trial court (here. such as redundancy. Ruling: The voluntary arbitrator rightly assumed jurisdiction to decide the said issue. ALBARICO [G. Judicial review of labor cases does not go far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence on which the labor official's findings rest. jurisprudence holds that separation pay may also be awarded for considerations of social justice. The factual findings by quasi-judicial agencies. No. contrary to the provisions of Rule 45. Albarico filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against petitioner before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. the DOLE Secretary) and the appellate court on the matter coincide. testimonial and documentary. The Court has also ruled that separation pay may be awarded if it has become an established practice of the company to pay the said benefit to voluntarily resigning employees or to those validly dismissed for non-membership in a union as required in a closed-shop agreement. 7K CORP. adduced by the parties to an appeal. assume jurisdiction over a termination dispute such asthe present case. It claimed that Albarico was guilty of abandonment of employment. The NCMB voluntary arbitrator rendered a decision finding petitioner corporation liable for illegal dismissal. however. [T]he office of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court requires that it shall raise only questions of law. It is not our function to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence. Thus. it is also given to employees who are terminated for authorized causes. as in this case at bar. In fact. petitioners would have us re-calibrate all over again the factual basis and the probative value of the pieces of evidence submitted by the Company to the DOLE. retrenchment or installation of labor-saving devices under Article 283 of the Labor Code. . such as the Department of Labor and Employment. Petitioner filed its position paper in the NCMB arbitration case denying that respondent was terminated from work. the voluntary arbitrator ordered the corporation to pay Albarico his separation pay. In lieu of reinstatement. 182295. . Having established that the issue of the legality of dismissal of Albarico was in fact necessarily albeit not explicitly included in the Submission Agreement signed by the parties. are entitled to great respect in view of their expertise in their respective field. interests or business objectives of the employers. separation pay may be given not only when there is illegal dismissal. and unless lack of any basis for the conclusions made by the appellate court may be amply demonstrated. we may not disturb such factual findings. even if an employee has been terminated for a just cause other than serious misconduct or an act reflecting on moral character. Additionally. backwages. In any event. we affirm that capatazes or foremen are not rank-and-file employees because they are an extension of the management. 2013] Facts: Petitioner 7K Corporation terminated Albarico’s employment allegedly for his poor sales performance. much less illegally dismissed. vs. this Court rules that the voluntary arbitrator rightly assumed jurisdiction to decide the said 210 . when supported by substantial evidence. Issue: Whether the voluntary arbitrator properly assumed jurisdiction to decide the issue of the legality of the dismissal of respondent even if the same was not expressly claimed in the Submission Agreement of the parties. Under the Labor Code. and attorney’s fee. by agreement of the parties.

211 . Backwages. Consequently. we also rule that the voluntary arbitrator may award backwages upon a finding of illegal dismissal. are awarded on the ground of equity as a form of relief that restores the income lost by the terminated employee by reason of his illegal dismissal. even though the issue of entitlement thereto is not explicitly claimed in the Submission Agreement.issue. in general.