ANTONIO

BENGSON
III,
petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO
C. CRUZ, respondents.
Facts:
Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of
Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in
the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United
States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. He was
naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired
his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act
No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the
Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over
petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.

Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the

Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall
be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a naturalborn
citizen.

Held:
Yes. There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by
naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two
kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A
person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular
country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."On the other hand,

naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens

through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473,
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the
former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. To be
naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen.
The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after
two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that
during the intervening period, the applicant has (1)not left the Philippines;
(2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been
convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or
(4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to
any Government announced policies.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the
same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No.
63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2)by repatriation,
and (3) by direct act of Congress. Naturalization is a mode for both
acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially
acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by
Commonwealth
Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode
for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act
No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to
reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications
and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those
who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; (2)
service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in
the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time; (4) marriage of a
Filipino woman to analien; and (5) political and economic necessity. As
distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization,
repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath inthe Local
Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or
last resided. As a rule, repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized

Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a naturalborn citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. The rule
applies to Cruzs case. Being a natural-born citizen, Cruz reacquired
this status upon his repatriation.

G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996]

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and
RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996]
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G.
FRIVALDO, respondents.
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in
the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee,

another candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec praying

that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any
public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of
the Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. On
May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution
granting the petition.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until
after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was
voted for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the
Comelec en banc affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second
Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election
returns and a Certificate of Votes was issued showing the following

votes obtained by the candidates for the position of Governor of

Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
RaulR.Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed a (supplemental) petition praying for his
proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an order dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition
"only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en bane directed "the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of
proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial
candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29,1995 x x x."
Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,1995, Lee was proclaimed
governor of Sorsogon.
Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition praying for the annulment of
the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation.
He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took
his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his
petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the
Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been
granted." As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the
Comelec) x x x was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at
5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the
proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor x x x." In the alternative, he
averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec, the
Vice-Governor not Lee should occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein
assailed Resolution holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest
number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected
governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of
votes, and having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation
on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
725 is qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon".

Frivaldo v. Comelec
G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996
Facts:
Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but was
disqualified by the Court twice due to his alien citizenship. He claims to have reassumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation. Respondent Lee was the
second placer in the canvass and claimed that the votes cast in favor of petitioner
should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have intentionally
thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number of valid
votes; or the incumbent Vice-Governor should take over the said post due to permanent
vacancy due to Frivaldos ineligibility.
Issues:
1) Was the repatriation valid and legal and reasonably cure his lack of
citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office?
2) Is disqualification for lack of citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to
run for or be elected to or hold public office?
3) Did Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition considering that
said petition is not a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo
warranto case?
4) Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in
light of existing jurisprudence?
Ruling:
1) Yes. According to law, citizenship may be reacquired by 1) direct act of
Congress, 2) by naturalization or 3) by repatriation under P.D 725. The law
does not specifically state a particular date or time when the
candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (at
least 1 year residency immediately preceding the day of election)
and age (at least 35 years old on election day). Philippine citizenship is
an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office to ensure
that no alien, or person owing allegiance to another nation, shall
govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. An
official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his
proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to
begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on the very day the
term of his office began, he was therefore already qualified to be
proclaimed, to hold office and to discharge the functions and
responsibilities thereof as of said date. The law intended CITIZENSHIP to

be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter

presumes being a citizen first. The Local Government Code requires an
elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to
vote actually. In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is
to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he
seeks to govern and not anywhere else. In fact, petitioner voted in all the
previous elections. The prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned
from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election
or date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repatriation of
the petitioner retroacted upon the date of filing of his application.
2) No. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship
cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is because
a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter, lose his
citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the
purpose.
3) No. The Constitution has given the Comelec ample power to "exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of all elective provincial officials. Such power to
annul a proclamation must be done within ten (10) days following
the proclamation. Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days after
Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly
acquired jurisdiction over the same.
4) No. The fact remains that Lee was not the choice of the sovereign will. Lee
is just a second placer. The rule is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving
majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated
candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
The petition was DISMISSED for being moot and academic and has no merit.

G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner,vs.EDUARDO

BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondents.

FACTS:
Manzano and Mercado are vice-mayoral candidates Makati City in the May
11, 1998 elections. Manzano got the highest number votes while Mercado
bagged the second place. However, Manzanos proclamation was
suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification on the
ground
that
he
is
an
American
citizen.
In
his
answer, Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with
the Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen
because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino
mother. He was born in the United States (San Francisco, CA) on
Sept. 14, 1955 and is considered an American citizen under US laws
(jus soli). But notwithstanding his registration as an American
citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and
cancelled Manzanos certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is a dual
citizen. Under the Local Government Code (sec. 40), dual citizens are
disqualified from running for any position.The COMELEC en banc
reversed the divisions ruling. In its resolution, it said that Manzano was
both a US citizen and a Filipino citizen. It further ruled that although
he was registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of
Immigration and was using an American passport, this did not result
in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce
Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the
US. Moreover, the COMELEC found that when respondent attained the age of
majority, he registered himself as a Philippine voter and voted as such,
which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law.
Under Philippine law, he no longer had US citizenship. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Manzano was no longer a US citizen- YES
Whether or not Manzano is qualified to run for and hold elective office
HELD:
DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

Dual Citizenship vs. Dual Allegiance

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different
laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when
a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a
person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently
considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art.
IV)of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the
Philippines to possess dual citizenship: Those born of Filipino fathers and/or
mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the
laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country; Those
who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship. There may be other situations in which
a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also
a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible
given the constitutional provisions on citizenship. Dual allegiance,
on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by dome positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individuals volition. LGC prohibits Dual Allegiance not Dual
Citizenship
The phrase dual citizenship in the LGC must be understood as referring to
dual allegiance.
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under
this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must,
therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to
the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship,
it would suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy,
they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons
with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. By
Electing Philippine Citizenship, the Candidate forswear Allegiance to the
Other Country By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same

time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens
and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the
point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not
effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

PETITIONERS ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The COMELEC en bancs ruling was that Manzanos act of
registering himself as a voter was an effective renunciation of his
American citizenship. This ruling is in line with the US Immigration
and Nationality Act wherein it is provided that a person who is a national
of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his
nationality by: (e) Voting in a political election in a foreignstate or
participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the
sovereignty over foreign territory.
But this provision was declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, our SC held that by filing a certificate of candidacy when he
ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and
in effect renounced his American citizenship. To recapitulate, by declaring in
his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and
support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance
thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent
has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated
his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a
dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the
Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his
youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
professionals an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. His
declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking
made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for
declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial
of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his

oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his

Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed
abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken
against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.

G.R. No. L-52365 January 22, 1980

AMADO
F.
GADOR, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AS REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN,
HON. LEONARDO PEREZ, respondent.

FERNANDEZ, J.:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectably prayed that the respondent be
immediately ordered to include the name of the herein petitioner in the list of
candidates for Mayor of the City of Ozamiz which shall be printed and
distributed soon to all voting centers in the City of Ozamis.
The petition alleges that the petitioner is a candidate for the Office of
Mayor of the City of Ozamiz as Independent this coming January 30,
1980 local election; that he filed his certificate of candidacy with the
Election Registrar of Ozamis City on January 7, 1980; that the petitioner filed
his certificate of candidacy for Mayor on January 7, 1980 on the basis of a
news item in the Bulletin Today, January 6, issue; that on January 8, 1980,
the petitioner wired the Chairman of the Commission on Elections informing
him of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and at the time requesting
him to release the approval of the said certificate; that on January 11, 1980,
the petitioner caused the Election Registrar of Ozamiz City to wire
the Chairman, Commission on Elections, reiterating the information

that the petitioner had filed a certificate of candidacy on January 7;

that he was already in the thick of campaigns and was asking about
the status of his candidacy; that in view of the President's
announcement that the resolution of the respondent, Commission
on Elections, for the extension of time for filing certificates of
candidacy from January 4 to January 10 had been denied, there is a
strong probability that the petitioner's name as candidate for Mayor
may not be included in the list of candidates to be voted which is to
be printed soon and distributed in Ozamiz City; and that on grounds of
fairness, principles of equity and for the best interest of the people of Ozamiz
City, judgment should be rendered commanding the respondent, Commission
on Elections, to immediately include the petitioner in the list of candidates
for Mayor.
ISSUE: is whether or not the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner which
was filed on January 7, 1980 is valid.
Section 7, Batasang Pambansa Bilang 52, provides that "The sworn
certificate of candidacy shall be filed in triplicate not later than January 4,
1980." It is a fact admitted by the petitioner that the President had not
extended the period within which to file the certificate of candidacy.
This Court is powerless to grant the remedy prayed for in the
petition. Having been filed beyond January 4, 1980, the certificate
of candidacy of the petitioner is void.
In as much as the election is only eight (8) days away, it is to the interest of
all concerned, specially the petitioner himself, that this matter be resolved
immediately.
WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-54718 May 3l, 1983

CRISOLOGO
vs.

VILLANUEVA

PAREDES, petitioner,

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF

DOLORES QUEZON, AND VIVENCIO G. LIRIO, respondents.
Crisologo P. Villanueva in his own behalf.
The Solicitor General for respondents. Danosos, Lirio, Bautista &
Asso. for private respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
It appears that on January 4, 1980, which is the last day for the filing
of certificates of candidacy in the January 30, 1980 elections, one
Narciso Mendoza, Jr. filed with the Election Registrar of Dolores,
Quezon, his sworn certificate of candidacy for the office of vicemayor of said municipality. Subsequently, however, but on the same day,
Mendoza filed an unsworn letter withdrawing his said certificate of candidacy.
On January 25, 1980, herein petitioner filed with the Election
Registrar of Dolores, Quezon, his sworn "Certificate of Candidacy in
Substitution" of the aforementioned Narciso Mendoza, Jr. for the
office of vice-mayor of said municipality.
On January 31, 1980, the respondent Municipal Board of Canvassers
proclaimed, on the basis of the results of its canvass, respondent
Vivencio Lirio as the duly elected vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon.
Respondent Board considered all the votes cast in favor of petitioner as stray
votes on the ground that his certificate of candidacy was not given due
course by the Commission on Elections, Manila, and his name was
not included in the certified list of official candidates.
On February 6, 1980, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a petition to
annul the proclamation of respondent. He likewise prayed that
COMELEC should order the official counting of the votes that may
have been cast in his favor and thereafter, to proclaim him as the
duly elected vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon.

WITHDRAWAL NOT MADE UNDER OATH NOT EFFECTIVE

On February 21, 1980, COMELEC issued the herein questioned resolution

denying the said petition, upon the reasoning that petitioner could not
have filed his candidacy in substitution of Mendoza's because the
withdrawal of the latter had produced no legal effect, the same not
having been made under oath as required by Section 27 of the
Election Code, and even assuming the efficacy of said withdrawal, the
same was made not after the last day for filing of certificates of
candidacy as provided under Section 28 of said Code, but on the
very same last day. COMELEC reaffirmed its stand upon petitioner's filing
of a motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the present recourse.

ISSUE: WON THERES VALID SUBSTITUTION?

HELD:
The law on the matter of withdrawal or cancellation of certificates of
candidacy is Section 27 of the 1978 Election Code, which provides:
Sec. 27. Withdrawal or cancellation of certificates of candidacy. - No
certification of candidacy duly filed shall be considered withdrawn or
cancelled unless the candidate files with the office which received the
certificate of candidacy or with the Commission, a sworn statement of
withdrawal or cancellation at any time before the day of election. (Emphasis
supplied)
There is absolutely no vagueness or ambiguity of the above provision, as to
the need of a sworn statement of withdrawal or cancellation of a duly filed
certificate of candidacy. That the withdrawal of Mendoza's certificate of
candidacy was not made under oath is not disputed. As such, the
withdrawal produces no legal effect for failure to comply with the
clear and unequivocal mandate of the law. Mendoza, therefore, for all
legal intents and purposes, remained to be a candidate for vice Mayor of
Dolores, Quezon, up to January 30, 1980, the date of the elections, as
correctly ruled by the COMELEC.
Even assuming that the questioned withdrawal is effective, under a liberal
construction of the law as invoked by petitioner, which should not be the
case when the terms of the statute are clear and unmistakable, still
petitioner may not derive comfort therefrom for Mendoza's
withdrawal was made on January 4, 1980, on the very last day for

filing certificates of candidacy. Substitution of a candidate by

reason of withdrawal is proper only when such withdrawal is
made after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy. This is
as, likewise, clearly provided by Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code.
Sec. 28. Candidates in case of death, withdrawal or disqualification of
another. If, after the last day for filing certificates of candidacy, a
candidate with a certificate of candidacy duly filed should die, withdraw or be
disqualified for any cause, any voter qualified for the office may file his
certificate of candidacy for the office for which the deceased, the candidate
who has withdrawn, or disqualified person was a candidate in accordance
with the preceding sections on or before mid-day of the day of the election,
and if the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day
before the election and the mid-day of election day, said certificate may filed
with any election committee in the political subdivision where he is a
candidate: Provided, however, That if the candidate who died, withdrew or
was disqualified is the official candidate of a political party, group or
aggrupation, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political
party, group or aggrupation may file a certificate of candidacy for the same
office.
While it may be true as persistently pointed out by the petitioner that a
certificate of candidacy duly filed may be withdrawn or cancelled at any time
before the day of election, it does not necessarily follow that such withdrawn
or cancelled certificate of candidacy may be the subject of substitution by
another's certificate of candidacy. For substitution to take place, the
withdrawal must be effected after the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy. If the withdrawal was made prior to or on
the said last day, as what happened in the instant case, substitution
is not allowed. Hence, the person filing a certificate of candidacy is
filing said certificate in his own right, not as substitute candidate,
and the filing to make the certificate of candidacy valid must not be
after the last day for filing ordinary certificates of candidacy, which
is January 4, 1980.
By and large, petitioner was, therefore, not a candidate, either in
substitution of Mendoza or in his own right, as he filed his
certificate of candidacy on January 25, 1980, long after the last day
for filing certificates of candidacy. Whatever votes may have been
cast in his favor are necessarily considered stray votes. [Section 155

(15), Election Code] There is thus no legal basis for the annulment of
respondent Lirio's proclamation as vice-mayor.

Crisologo Villanueva Y Paredes v. COMELECPonente:

Teehankee, J. (December 4, 1985)
FACTS:
Narciso Mendoza, Jr. had filed on January 4, 1980, the last day for filing
of certificates of candidacy in the January 30, 1980 local elections, his sworn
certificate of candidacy as independent for the office of vice-mayor of the
municipality of Dolores, Quezon. But later on the very same day , Mendoza
filed an unsworn letter in his own handwriting withdrawing his said
certificate of candidacy "for personal reasons." Later on January 25, 1980,
petitioner Crisologo Villanueva, upon learning of his companion Mendoza's
withdrawal, filed his own sworn "Certificate of Candidacy in substitution" of
Mendoza's for the said office of vice mayor as a one-man independent ticket.
... The results showed petitioner to be the clear winner over
respondent with a margin of 452 votes. But the Municipal Board of
Canvassers disregarded all votes cast in favor of petitioner as stray votes on
the basis of the Provincial Election Officer's erroneous opinion that since
petitioner's name does not appear in the Comelec's certified list of
candidates for that municipality, it could be presumed that his candidacy
was not duly approved by the Comelec so tha this votes could not
be "legally counted. " ... The canvassers accordingly proclaimed respondent
Vivencio G. Lirio as the only unopposed candidate and as the duly elected
vice mayor of the municipality of Dolores. The COMELEC denied his petition
because Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate is not under oath, as
requiredunder Section 27 of the Code; hence it produces no legal effect.
For another, said withdrawal was made not after the last day(January 4,
1980) for filing certificates of candidacy, as contemplated underSec. 28 of
the Code, but on that very same day.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was able to file his certificate of candidacy on time
and with the forms prescribed by law and thus, making him the winner of the
said elections.
RULING:

The
fact
that Mendoza's
withdrawal was
not sworn
is but
a technicality which should not be used to frustrate the people's will
in
favor
of
petitioner
as
the
substitute candidate. In
Guzman us, Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211,clearly
applicable,
mutatis
mutandis this Court held that "(T)he will of the people cannot be
frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of candidacy had not
been properly sworn to, This legal provision is mandatory and noncompliance therewith before the election would be fatal to the status of the
candidate before the electorate, but after the people have expressed
their
will, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that th
e candidate has not sworn to his certificate or candidacy."
The Comelec's post-election act of denying petitioner's substitute ca
ndidacy certainly does not seem to be in consonance with the
substance and spirit of the law. Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code
provides for such substitute candidates in case of death, withdrawal or
disqualification up to mid-day of the very day of the elections. Mendoza's
withdrawal was filed on the last hour of the last day for regular
filing of candidacies on January 4, 1980, which he had filed earlier
that same day. For all intents and purposes, such withdrawal should
therefore be considered as having been made substantially and in
truth after the last day, even going by the literal reading of the provision
by the Comelec.

Miranda v Abaya
G.R. No. 136351 July 28, 1999
Facts
Jose Pempe Miranda then incumbent mayor of Santiago City,
Isabela, filed his certificate of candidacy for the same mayoralty
post for the synchronized May 11, 1998 elections. Three days after, a
complaint to cancel certificate of candidacy was filed against him by
Antonio Abaya which was granted. Shortly after the deadline for filing for
candidacy, Joel Miranda filed his certificate of candidacy as a
substitute
for Pempe
Miranda.
Of course, Abaya
filed

a disqualification case against Joel Miranda for void substitution.

After a motion for reconsideration, COMELEC granted Abayas complaint.
Hence, this petition.
Issue
1. Whether the annulment of petitioners substitution and proclamation was
issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction; and
2. Whether the order of the Comelec directing the proclamation of the
private respondent was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
Held
A disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a
valid certificate of candidacy in the first place because, if the
disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed
certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a
person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section
77 of the Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so- called substitute to
file a new and original certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the
filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection f the law,
an act abhorred by our Constitution.

G.R. no. 150605, Dec. 10, 2002

EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official
capacities as Speaker and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively, and MA. VICTORIA L.
LOCSIN, respondents.

If
the
validity
of
the proclamation is
the
core
issue
of
the disqualification case, the proclamation of the candidate cannot divest
Comelec en banc of its jurisdiction to review its validity. Ministerial duty
of the House to administer oath of office to the winning candidate

FACTS:
Codilla, then sitting as Mayor of Ormoc City, and Locsin, the
incumbent Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, were
candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte. A petition fordisqualification was filed against Codilla for violating Sec.
68(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, alleging that he used the equipment
and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and
distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte,
for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.
At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the disqualification case was
still pending so Codillas name remained in the list of candidates and was
voted for. In fact, he garnered the highest number of votes. However,
his proclamation as winner was suspended by order of the Comelec. After
hearing of his disqualification case, he was found guilty and ordered
disqualified.
Codillas votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus proclaimed as the
duly elected Representative and subsequently took her oath of office. Codilla
then filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec and also
sought
the
annulment
of
Locsins proclamation.
ISSUES:
Whether or not
a Representative

Comelec

has jurisdiction to

annul

the proclamation of

Whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the House to recognize Codilla as

the legally electedRepresentative
RULING:
First. The validity of the respondents proclamation was a core issue in the
Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner.
xxx
Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order
of
the Second
Division suspending
hisproclamation and

disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of

its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division.
The said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has not
attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends
its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in
office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the
4th legislative
district
of
Leyte.
Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which
has
no jurisdiction in
the
instant
case.
xxx
(a)The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division has not yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the
validity of the Resolution of the COMELECSecond Division was seasonably
challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was
still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve.
Hence,
the
HRET
cannot
assume jurisdiction over
the
matter.
In Puzon vs. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the doctrinal ruling that once
a proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it
is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving
members of the House of Representatives, could not have been immediately
applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC
pronouncements
themselves.
This
is
because
the
HRET
has
no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether
issued
by
a
division
or
en
banc.
(b)The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of
respondent
Locsin.
xxx
A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility
and disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. In the case at bar, neither
the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and
if
she
won,
to
assume
office.

A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been
duly elected and proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes
but whose eligibility is in question at the time of such proclamation. It is
evident that respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto
proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide
margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her premature assumption to
office as Representativeof the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void from
the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to
tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto
proceeding.
Ministerial duty of the House to administer the oath of office of a winning but
nevertheless
unproclaimed
candidate
Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person
may file a verified petition for mandamus when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For a petition for
mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition for
mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the
part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a welldefined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated.
A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in
a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate
of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty
upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is
ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise
of
official
discretion
or
judgment.
In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the
petitioner
in
the
Roll
of
Members
of
the House
of
Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer

a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts are
settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against
respondent Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections.
The
COMELEC Second
Division initially
ordered
theproclamation of
respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set
aside the order of itsSecond Division and ordered the proclamation of the
petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged
before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final
and
executory.
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative
district of Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the
constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands
that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative
to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.

Aquino v COMELEC (1995)

Aquino
vs.
Comelec
Agapito A. Aquino, petitioner vs. Commission on Election, Move Makati,
Mateo
Bedon,
and
Juanito
Icaro,
respondents
Sept,
18,
1995
Special
Civil
Action
in
the
Supreme
Court.
Certiorari.
Relevant
Provisions:
Section
6,
Article
VI
of
the
1987
Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at
least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the partylist representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately
preceding
the
day
of
the
election.
Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new (remember: newly

created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of

candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned
district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of
LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to
disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the
residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which under Section
6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than one
year
preceding
the
(May
8,
1995)
day
of
the
election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his
residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The
Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition on
May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with
38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on
May 15, the latter acted with an order suspending the proclamation of
Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission
on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for
lack
of
constitutional qualification of
residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2
orders.
Issue:
1. Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes
domicile to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the
electoral
district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not
just residence (not in the sense of the COC)in the district he was running in.
Held:
1. Yes, The term residence has always been understood as synonymous
with domicile not only under the previous constitutions but also under the
1987 Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission
wherein
this
principle
was
applied.
Mr.
Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt
to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately
preceding
the
day
of
elections.

What is the Committees concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual

residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?

Mr.
Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day
of election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 constituition, the
interpretation
given
to
it
was
domicile.
Mrs.
Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has
been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual
residence.

Mr.
De
los
Reyes
So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and
not
physical
and
actual
residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word residence to have the same
meaning
of
domicile.
The
place
where
a
party
actually
or
constructively
has
his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that
to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes
of
election
law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the
conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable
circumstances existing in
that
community
for
electoral
gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a
given area for meeting election law requirements, this defeats the essence of
representation, which is to place through assent of voters those
most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a
candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to
qualify.
Which
brings
us
to
the
second
issue.
2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was
running
in.
The SC agreed with the Comelecs contention that Aquino should prove that
he established a domicile of choice and not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of
residency prior to the elections in the district in which he seeks election to .
Aquinos certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election
indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth

certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also
showed him to be a registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicile of
origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in
Conception,
Tarlac.
Aquinos connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an
alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention
not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a
condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims
to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and
his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose
in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or
domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second
District
of
Makati
City.
Aquinos assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati
is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at
bench. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and
definite
acts
which
correspond
with
the
purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to
his
lack
of
one
year
residence
in
the
district.
Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from
proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in
the congressional
elections of
Second
district
of
Makati
City
made permanent.
Dicta:
I.
Aquinos
petition
of
certiorari
contents
were:
A. The Comelecs lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue
involving congressional candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such
determination reserved with the house of representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant
case after the elections and the remedy to the adverse parties lies in
another forum which is the HR Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17,
Article
VI
of
the
1987
Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to
promulagate its questioned decision despite its own recognition that a
threshold issue of jurisdiction has to be judiciously reviewed again, assuming
arguendo
that
the
Comelec
has
jurisdiction
D. The Comelecs finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement

of one year against the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable

laws
and
jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of
enforcing the one year residency requirement of Congressional candidates in
newly created political districts which were only existing for less than a year
at the time of the election and barely four months in the case of petitioners
district
in
Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it ordered the board of canvassers to determine and proclaim the
winner out of the remaining qualified candidates after the erroneous
disqualification of the petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a second
place candidate or a person who was repudiated by the electorate is a loser
and
cannot
be
proclaimed
as
substitute
winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers cant be allowed to take advantage of the
creation of new political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in
such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of
taking
advantage
of
existing
conditions
in
these
areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to
support the one year residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate
of the HR, by establishing a commencement date of his residence. If a
oerfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself establish a domicile of
choice, this particular lease agreement cannot be better.

Bagatsing v. COMELEC

There is a difference between a disqualification case filed before and after an

election. Why there is a difference between a petition for disqualification filed before
and after the election proceeds from the fact that before the election, the question
of disqualification is raised as an issue before the electorate and those who vote for
the candidate assume the risk that should said candidate be disqualified after the
election, their votes would be declared stray or invalid votes. Such would not be
true in the case of one filed after the electorate has already voted. The mere filing
of a petition for disqualification is not a ground to suspend the proclamation of the
winning candidate. In the absence of an order suspending the proclamation, the
winning candidat