April23,2015

AllisonM.Macfarlane,Chairman
U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission
Washington,DC205550001

DearMs.Macfarlane,

Asapersonresidinginsidethe50mileradiusaroundtheTurkeyPointnuclearplantandalready
subjectedtoitsdangers,Idistressinglyfindmyselfapartytotheongoinglicensingprocessfor
twounsafe,untestedAP1000reactorswhichFPLwantstoaddtothesite.

Lastnight,IattendedtheNRCspublicmeetingonthedraftEnvironmentalImpactStatementfor
TurkeyPointunits6and7.Imustsaythelackofpreparednessandpooraccesstoinformation
demonstratedbytheNRCstaffatthismeetingweremostdistressing.NRCstaffwere
essentiallyunabletoansweranypublicquestionsofsignificance.Theagencysalternative
energyexpertsaidthatsolarwasntviablebecausethesunwentawayatnight,anappalling
revelationoftheagencysignoranceofmodernsaltstorageandbatterytechnologiesforsolar.
TheNRCstaffmemberwasunawareofthe24/7baseloadsolarpowerplantinSpainandwas
totallyignorantofFloridaeffortsatrooftopsolar,offthegridlocalpowergeneration,andhome
batterystorage.TheextentofhisunderstandingofcurrentUSprogressinsolarenergywas
revealedwhenhesaidthathethoughttheremightbesomeresearch[aboutsolar]inCalifornia.

Whenaskedtojustifytheelectricaldemandforanewplant,anotherstaffmembersimply
reportedthatthestatePublicUtilitiesCommissionhaddeemeditnecessary.TheseniorNRC
staffmemberpresidingovertheeventdemonstratedatotalignoranceofhydrologicalconditions
inSouthFloridaandaroundtheTurkeyPointsitewhensheannouncedthatstaffhaddetermined
theimpacttolocalwatersupplieswouldbesmall.Theassembledpublicspenttherestofthe
eveninglearningjusthowmanycriticalenvironmentalfactsdraftEIShadfailedtouncover.

ItisclearfromtheactionsoftheNRCspoorlyinformedstaffthatduediligencewasnot
performedinresearchingandwritingthedraftEISforTurkeyPoint6and7.TheNRChasfailed
tomeetitsobligationtoprotectingpeopleandtheenvironmentbyignoringorfailingtodiscover
crucialinformationabouttheenvironmentalandhealthimpactsofsitingtwonewnuclearplants
alongsidetwoexistingplantsandneartosuchalarge,waterstarvedpopulation.Inadditionto
thecommentsIpresentedorallylastnight,Iaddmyvoicetothemanyothersatthemeetingwho
demandarevisedandcompleteEnvironmentalImpactStatementwhichaddresstheissues
outlinedinthisletter.

Itistellingthatnofewerthanfourlocalmayorsandastaterepresentativewereinattendanceto
speakoutagainstthedraftEISonbehalfoftheirconstituents.Themeetingfacilitatormadea
grievouserrorintryingtohurrythemayorofMiamioffthepodiumashecontinuedtopointout
theappallingenvironmentalimpactsoftheproposedplants,particularlyonourdrinkingwater

supply.ThefactthatourelectedrepresentativeshavenopowerovertheNRCslicensing
processotherthantostandatthepodiumliketheirfellowcitizensshowsthatthelicensing
processfornuclearpowerplantsinthiscountryisanythingbutdemocratic.

ThemostseriousshortcomingsinthedraftEISrelatetoradiationreleasesandaccident
mitigation.Althoughthestaffpresentatlastnightsmeetingtriedtoshiftquestionsaboutradiation
offtoacloseddoorsafetyreviewwhichdoesnotallowpublicparticipation,thetruthofthe
matteristhatsafetyandenvironmentalimpactcannotbeseparatedwhenitcomestothe
manufactureandreleaseoffissionproducts,whetherintentionalorunintended.Every
radioactiveisotopecreatedattheproposedplantsisbothasafetyhazardandanenvironmental
hazard.

Evenprecludingtheirrelease,themerecreationofradioactiveisotopessuchasplutoniumwith
its24,000yearhalflifeposesunavoidableriskstohealthandtheenvironment.Storingthese
elementsinspentfuelpoolssuchasFPLproposesforTurkeyPoint6and7createsaserious
environmentalthreattothepeople,land,air,andwaterofthiscommunity.TheNRCcannot
persistinashellgamethatpretendsradiationisntbothasafetyandenvironmentalconcern.

Toputitsuccinctly,thereisnowaythattheNRCcanclaimtomeetitslegalobligationstopublic
healthandenvironmentalsafetyinlicensingtheconstructionoftheseplantsinSouthFlorida.
ThecombinationoftheAP1000snewanduntestedpassivesafetyfeaturesandtheparticular
meteorological,hydrological,andpopulationdensitycharacteristicsoftheareaprecludethelegal
licensingofTurkeyPoint6and7.Itisquitepossiblethattheplantswillneverbebuilt,ifFPL
decides,forexamplethattheirusewouldbeuneconomical.

Anotherwaytheseplantscouldbeabandonedisbytheadvanceofsolarandbattery
technology.TheGemasolsolarplantinSpainalreadyoperates24hoursadaythankstomolten
saltenergystorageandhasdonesosince2013.Justthisweek,theNewYorkTimescarrieda
storyaboutTeslasdeploymentof400homesolarstoragebatterieswhichallowtheirownersto
runsolarelectricityatnight,includinginstallationsatWalMartstores.Thecompanyannounced
thatitsnextsolarstorageproductwillbeautilitygradebattery.With24/7solargenerationand
homesolarenergystoragebybatteriesalreadyareality,itisinconceivablethatFloridawould
needbaseloadnuclearenergyatthetimeoftheplantsprojectedopening15yearsfromthestart
ofconstruction.Infact,itsmorelikelythatFloridawouldsufferfromaglutofelectricityproduced
offthegrid,causingFPLtomoveawayfromtheircostlyinvestmentsinnuclearandfossilfuel
plants.

ThankstoFloridalaw,FPLisalreadychargingratepayersforplanningandlicensingTurkey
Point6and7andthecompanywillcontinuetodosoupuntilthemomentconstructionis
abandoned,atwhichpointFPLkeepsanyremainingfundstheyvecollectedandpassesthemto
theirshareholders.FortheUnitedStatesNuclearRegulatoryCommissiontoparticipateinsuch
aconjob,oreven
appeartobeassociatedwithit,
isunconscionable.

Inlieuofthetraditionaldefenseindepthsafetyfeaturesfoundinconventionalnuclearpower
plants,theAP1000designproposesasetofunprovenpassivesafetyfeatureswhichare
assumedtopreventorcontainameltdownaccidentwithouthumanintervention.Theproposed
plantsshareanumberofdesignproblemswiththereactorsandfuelpoolsatFukushimaDaiichi,
problemscompoundedbytheremovaloftraditionalsafetyfeaturesasacostsavingmeasure.

SeverelyCompromisedEmergencyCooling
Themostimportantsafetyfunctionofanynuclearpowerplant,emergencycooling,isthemost
severelycompromisedintheAP1000design.Itspredominantfeatureisawatersupplytank
locatedontopofthereactorbuildingwhichoffersonlya3daysupplyofcoolingwater.Ifaplant
emergencylastsmorethan3days,humansareexpectedtocomerefillthetank.Inameltdown
situation,radiationatthesitewouldseverelylimithumanaccess,makingfurthercoolingdifficult
orimpossible.Withlifethreateningradiationlevelssurroundingthefuelpoolsthere,workersat
Fukushimawerenotabletophysicallyapproachtheplanttoassistincoolingandtheywouldnot
beabletoapproachTurkeyPoint6or7,either.StormsurgelevelsattheTurkeyPointsitecan
alsoprecludeaccessbypersonnel.ThedraftEISfailstoconsidertheenvironmentalimpactsof
theanticipatedfissionproductreleasesfromastationblackoutconditionlastingmorethan3
daysandcompletelytheevidenceofhistoricalandpredictedstormsurgeheightatthesite.

ItcannotbereasonablyassumedthattheAP1000designwilldoabetterjobofpreventinga
meltdownbyhavingonlyasinglelargecoolingtankontopinsteadofaseriesofbackuppumps
andwatersupplies.Thecoolingdesignitselfisdubious,involvingdrippingwateraroundthe
outsideofthecontainmentbuildingratherthanoverthefuelrodsthemselves.Placedindirect
sunlightontheroofasitis,thecoolingtankswaterissubjectedtosolarheating,whichfurther
reducesitspotentialcoolingeffect.Thetopheavynatureofthetankslocationmakesthe
reactorbuildingparticularlysusceptibletohurricanedamageandthereforeespeciallyunsuited
forSouthFlorida.

Initsmissiontoprotectpublicsafetyandhealth,theNRCmusterronthesideofcautionand
presumethatabeyonddesignbasisaccidentwillresemblewhattookplaceatFukushimaand,
giventheparticularconditionsattheTurkeyPointsite,alsoinvolveanextendedstationblackout
lastinglongerthan3dayscombinedwithsiteinaccessibilityduetostormsurgeorflooding.
Giventhehardevidencethatanaccidentinvolvingasimilararrangementofmultipleunits,the
lossofonsitepower,andhighradioactivityduetomeltdownhasalreadyoccurred,thedraftEIS
forTurkeyPoint6and7issubstantiallyincompleteasitassumesonhumanaccesstoprevent
catastrophicenvironmentalreleaseswhenitmaynotbepossibleforhumanstoreachTurkey
Pointduringorfollowingahurricane.ThedraftEISomitsanydiscussionoftheenvironmental
impactofastationblackoutlastinglongerthan3daysoroneinvolvinglongtermsite
inaccessibilityduetostormsurge,eventhoughbothofthoseeventsareanticipatedtooccurat
thesite.

SingleContainmentinProblematicBuilding
Unliketraditionalreactorswithtwocontainmentstructures,theAP1000designoffersonlyone.
InasetupWestinghousecallspassivecooling,thiscontainmentbuildingwouldbedirectly
exposedtothemoist,salty,andcorrosiveairfoundattheTurkeyPointsite.Thechimneystyle
designtakesinthewarm,wetairoutsidethebuilding,heatsitfurther,andsendsitoutthetop.
Nearlytheentireoutersurfaceofthecontainmentvesselisexposedtothemoist,corrosivesea
airattheproposedsite.Incidentsofseverecorrosion,includingcompleteholesthrough
containmentvessels,havebeendiscoveredatothernuclearplantsintheUnitedStateslocated
infarlessharshenvironments.

ThedraftEISforTurkeyPoint6and7failstoconsiderthatthecontainmentvesselcouldbe
compromisedbythehighlycorrosiveenvironmentatthesiteortocomparethecorrosionrates
ofsuchavesselinSouthFloridasclimatewiththoseofthelocationswherereactorcontainment
perforationshavealreadyoccurred.Aleakinthecontainmentvesselofanysizeisanevent
whichpresentsasubstantialrisktohumanhealthandtheenvironment.Itisariskwhichcan
onlyincreaseovertheproposedplantlifetimeof60yearsasthevesselcontinuestobeattacked
bymoistureandmineralsfromtheoutsideandradiationfromtheinside.ThedraftEISomitsany
studyofthelongtermeffectsofcorrosionfromtheoutsideofthecontainmentvesselunderthe
lifetimeagingconditionsoftheplant,includingagingofmaterialsduetonuclearstresses.

Theouterbuilding,whichoffersnocontainmentfunction,ismadeofanewsteelandconcrete
compositedeemedproprietarybyWestinghouse.Nobuildingshaveeverbeenbuiltofthis
materialintheUnitedStatesandWestinghouserefusestodiscloseitscomposition,preventing
independenttesting.TheNRCsownleadstructuralengineerfamouslydescribedthebrittle
natureofthiscompositewhenhesaidthatitcouldshatterlikeaglasscupuponimpact.After
pointingouttoWestinghousethattheproposedmaterialwouldntmeetstandardnuclearbuilding
codesforreinforcedstructures,theNRCacceptedthecompanysreplythatcomputermodels
wereequivalent.Whentheprimarypartofthereactorbuilding,calledModule#2,failedina
Westinghousetest,thecompanyclaimedthetestresultswereproprietaryandcouldntbe
releasedtothepublic.

Theirregularphysicaldesignoftheproposedreactorbuildingsandsupportstructures,
combinedwiththeuseofanew,unprovenmaterial,makeitimpossibletomodeltheplants
structuralbehaviorusinganyexistingcomputercode.Inahurricane,thereactorbuilding,rooftop
coolingpool,orfuelstoragepoolcouldbedamagedinunpredictableways,posingan
exceptionalandunjustifiablerisktopublicsafetyandtheenvironment.Thenearbylocationof
MiamiInternationalAirportandtheevencloserHomesteadAirReserveBaseaddanotherlevel
ofdangerasanyaccidentorterroristincidentinvolvingtheconsiderablelowaltitudeairtrafficin
thevicinitycoulddamagethereactorbuildings.Theprimaryemergencycoolingtank,thehighest
pointabovegroundlevel,presentsaparticularrisk,asdoesthespentfuelstoragepoolits
poorlyprotectedlocation.

ThedraftEISforTurkeyPoint6and7failstoexaminehowthebuildingdesignandmaterials
wouldaffecttheplantsstructuralintegrityduringhurricanewindsorimpactfroma
hurricanelaunchedobject.Shouldthereactorbuildingorfuelprocessingbuildingbedamagedin
astorm,theresultingreleaseoffissionproductswouldpresentaseriousenvironmentaland
healthimpactwhichremainsunexamined.Theemergencycoolingsupportstructure,beingthe
reactorbuildingitself,presentsanewandunjustifiablyriskydesign,whiletheopenfuelpoolin
anunreinforcedbuildingatgroundlevelsimplyrepeatstheproblemsfoundatFukushima.The
draftEISisincompletebecauseitlacksamodelforhurricanedamagetocrucialplantstructures
aroundthereactorandfuelpoolandthepotentialforensuingfissionproductrelease.

UntestedInCoreCondensationCooling
Inlieuofredundantcoolingsystemsandwatersuppliesinthereactorcore,theAP1000design
reliesonacompletelynewanduntestedmethodofincoreemergencycooling.Itpurportsto
circulatewaterfromasinglepoolwithoutpumpsusingonlyconvectionandcondensation.The
NRChasquestionedthelegitimacyofsuchacoolingmethod,whichislikelytobejustas
impossibleasitsounds.Inanemergency,thecontentsofasinglepoolofwaterwillbedumped
intothebottomofthereactorcontainmentvessel.Thewaterisexpectedtoevaporateorboil,
risingtothetopofthevesselwhereitiscollectedassteam,condensed,andreturnedtothe
bottom.Theactualemergencyremovalofheatfromthesystemisexpectedtobeaccomplished
notwithmultiplesourcesofwaterasinatraditionalPWRreactor,bymerelybythecontainment
vesselsairinterfaceasdescribedpreviously.Westinghousereferstothisstrategyasthe
atmosphereistheultimateheatsink.Abetterdescriptionmightbethatitstheonlyheatsink.It
isasinglepointoffailureinallcorecoolingscenariosintheAP1000design.

Withoutpumps,thisincorecoolingsystemisclaimedtobeabletoremoveenoughheatto
preventcoremeltdownbutonlyfor72hours.After3days,humaninterventionisagain
required,andtheentiresystemwillonlyfunctionifthereisnodamagetoanyofitsmanyparts,
especiallythescreensdesignedtokeepoutdebriswhichwouldclogthecondensationreturn
path.Whenchallengedonhowthesystemcouldpreventthescreensthemselvesfrom
becomingclogged,Westinghouseagainretreatedtoaproprietaryclaimandrefusedtodisclose
thescreensmakeup.

ThedraftEISforTurkeyPoint6and7failstoexaminetheenvironmentalimpactsofameltdown
eventresultingfromtheafailureoftheincorecoolingsystemoritsatmosphericheatsink,
especiallyduringahurricanewhenstationblackoutmaylastlongerthan3daysandstormsurge
maypreventworkeraccesstothefacility.Theincorecoolingsystemreliesonthecirculationof
condensationandoutdooraircoolingandtheefficacyoftheseapproacheshasnotbeentested
underSouthFloridaweatherconditions.

Lackingthemultiplebackupsoftraditionalemergencycorecoolingsystems,theAP1000design
reliesontheenvironmenttoprovideitscoolingfunctions.Thereisnoproofthatthisemergency
corecoolingfunctionwillworkintheyearroundwarmtemperaturesatTurkeyPointand,ifit
fails,theensuingcoremeltdownwouldpresentacatastrophicandunacceptablerisktothe

peopleandtheenvironmentofMiamiDade,Broward,andMonroecounties,aswellastothe
surroundingwaterwaysoftheUnitedStates.ThedraftEISoffersnoevidencethattheproposed
incorecoolingsystem,whichreliesstrictlyonaircirculationaroundtheoutsideofthe
containmentvesselforheatremoval,willworkasdesignedinthemeteorologicalenvironment
foundatthesite.

OpenChimneyDesign
AnessentialpartoftheAP1000semergencycoolingisthechimneydesigninwhichthe
containmentvesselsits.Thechimneydrawsinairfromthesideandspewsitoutthetop,
unfiltered.Shouldanyleakorbreachofthecontainmentvesseleveroccur,theensuingfission
productswouldbeimmediatelycarriedupthechimneyandoutintotheenvironment.Thedesign
isreminiscentoftheWindscalereactorinEnglandwhichsprayeditsradioactiveleaksintothe
atmosphere,resultinginwidespreadexposuretofalloutandcontaminationofland,water,farm
animals,andcrops.Thenarrowgapinbetweenthecontainmentvesselandthecompositeshell
preventssimpleinspections,makingiteasyforcontainmentleakstogounnoticedwhilethey
pourfissionproductsintothesky.Thedesignisfullofsmall,moistspacesthatwillmakeiteasy
forcorrosion,andthereforeleaks,todeveloparoundthecontainmentvessel,andthesewillbe
immediatelysweptupandoutside.

Iftheairinletsatthesidesofthereactorbuildingareblockedforanyreasonthecrucialair
circulationfunctionwillbelost.Lackingthetraditionalarrayofredundantcorecoolingmethods,
thischimneydesignrepresentsasinglepointoffailurefortheAP1000semergencycooling.
Boththewatertankmountedontopandthepooltobedumpedinsiderelyonthechimneyair
interfacetoactuallyremoveheat.AtFukushima,wesawhowahydrogenexplosionatanolder
reactorcouldlaunchdebristhatdamagedaspentfuelpoolatadifferentreactor.TheTurkey
PointsitingoftwoAP1000snexttotwoolderreactorswouldpresentanearlyidenticalsituation.

NotonlywouldTurkeyPoint6and7sfuelpoolbuildingsbesusceptibletodamagefroman
accidentattheolderTurkeyPoint3and4,sowouldtheAP1000schimneyswhichareessential
foreveryemergencycorecoolingscenario.Debrisfromanykindofaccidentorhurricanecould
blockpartofthisaircirculationsystem,suchasthefiltersattheairintakeorthenarrowannulus
thatseparatesthecontainmentvesselfromtheshellbuilding,threateningtheentiresetupand
potentiallyleadingtomeltdownandmassivereleaseoffissionproducts.Ahydrogenexplosion
orturbineaccidentatoneofTurkeyPointsothertwo,oldernuclearplantscouldclogthese
crucialairpathsandpreventemergencycoolingofoneorbothoftheAP1000.ThedraftEISfor
TurkeyPoint6and7failstotakeintoaccounthowthesinglepointoffailurerepresentedbythe
theAP1000satmosphericcoolingdesigncouldbefurthercompromisedbytheolderreactorsat
thesiteorbyhurricanedamage.

ThedraftEISforTurkeyPoint6and7alsofailsconsiderhowthecorrosiveseaairatthesite
willaffectitscontainmentintegrity,ignoringtheNRCsowndocumentationofcontainmentleaks
atotherUSnuclearfacilities.Thecombinationofthecontainmentvesselandchimneydesign
addanewandunnecessaryrisktopeopleandtotheenvironment,especiallygiventhelarge

populationintheaffectedareaandthemassivefissionproductreleasethatcouldresultfroma
prolongedlossofcooling.ThedraftEISalsocompletelyignorestheveryseriousissueofsiting
theplantnexttotwoexisting,agingnuclearreactors.TheNRCsowntaskforceonFukushima
foundthatsiteswithmultiplenuclearplantspresentspecialconcernsinthefaceofextended
stationblackouts.Theyalsoincreasethedifficultiesofemergencypreparednessand
evacuations.ThedraftEISforTurkeyPoint6and7ignoresthetheNRCsown
recommendationsfromitsFukushimataskforcebylookingatthetwonewreactorsinisolation
andfailingtotakeintoaccountthatplacingatotaloffourreactorsatthesamesite,differingin
ageanddesign,willaffecttheplantsenvironmentalimpactduringanaccident.

FukushimaStyleSpentFuelPool
TheAP1000designstoresspentfuelinawhatisessentiallyanindoorswimmingpoolinsidea
simplebuildingconstructedofthesamebrittle,untestedmaterialasthereactorhousing.Ifthe
waterinthispoolweretodraintoalevelwherethefuelrodswereexposed,radiationfromthe
fuelrodswouldbesointensethatthespentfuelbuildingwouldnolongerbeaccessibleby
humanbeings.Westinghousedesigndocumentsshowthat,dependingonwaterlevelandthe
amountandageofthefuelrodsinthepool,spentfuelcanmeltdowninaperiodofhoursto
days.AlthoughWestinghouseclaimsthatthefuelpoolcanbekeptcoolfor7daysinan
emergency,somebatterybackedpartsofthesystemwillonlyfunctionfor24hours.Itisnot
onlyconceivable,itishighlylikelythatahurricaneaffectingTurkeyPointwouldpreventhuman
accesstothesiteformorethan24hoursoreven72hours.Theproposedonsitebatteries,
themselvesoflittleduration,couldbeeasilywipedoutbystormsurgeastheywereat
Fukushima.Beingatsealevel,theentireareacanbecomeinaccessibleduringseverestorm
surgeflooding.TheNRCsownassessmentoftheeventsofHurricaneAndrewreportedthat
workerswerenotabletoreachtheTurkeyPointsitefor5daysafterthestormduetoflooding.If
humanscannotreachandattendtothefuelpoolandreactorcoolingfunctions,ameltdownis
assured.

Afuelpoolmeltdownisparticularlydangeroussincethespentfuelrodssitinanopenpoolof
water,ratherthaninsideashieldedreactor.TheAP1000fuelpelletsarecoatedinazincalloy,
likethoseatFukushima,whichreactswithwaterandsteamduringanaccidenttoproduce
explosivehydrogen.AhydrogenexplosionintheAP1000fuelhandlingbuildingwouldresultina
massiveandcatastrophicreleaseoffissionproducts,contaminatingalloftheMiamiareaaswell
asthesurroundingwaterwaysandmakingtheareaunlivableforthousandsofyears.Less
severeaccidentshavealsotakenplaceinfuelpoolsofthisdesign,eachrequiringahugeand
expensivecleanup.Inmanyways,anopenspentfuelpoolisanuclearweaponwhichisalready
deployedbutiswaitingtobeactivated.Aterroristattackonthepoorlyprotectedfuelhandling
building,especiallybyair,isanotablerisk.Hurricanedamagetothefuelpoolbuildingorits
coolingwatersupplyequipmentisofparticularconcernatTurkeyPoint,aswithoutaconstant
supplyofwater,ameltdownofthefuelrodsisassured.

OperatorsofPWRreactorsliketheAP1000oftenstorethefullcoreinventoryinthespentfuel
poolduringmaintenanceoperations,alongsidetheolderfuelkeptinlongtermstoragethere.The

largerthenumberofrodsinthefuelpoolatonetime,thegreatertheriskofcriticalityaccidents,
meltdown,hydrogenexplosion,andthereleaseoffissionproducts.Anextendedstation
blackout,terroristattack,oraircraftaccidenttakingplacewhenthefuelpoolwasfullornearly
fullpresentsarisktohumanhealthandtheenvironmentofunprecedentedproportions.Fission
releasesfromfuelpoolmeltdownsatFukushimawereoneoftheprincipalsourcesoflandand
watercontaminationandhumanexposuretoradiation.SpentfuelpoolsatJapanesereactors
typicallyhavefarfewerfuelrodsthantheirUScounterpartsowingtothatcountrysuseofspent
fuelreprocessing.

InthefouryearssincetheeventsatFukushima,theNRChasallowedthestartofconstruction
ofAP1000plantsinGeorgiaandSouthCarolinawithspentfuelpoolsthatarenodifferentfrom
preFukushimadesigns.Thoseplantsaresituatedatinland,rurallocations.TurkeyPointis
locatedontheAtlanticOceannearamajormetropolitanarea.Afuelpoolaccidentorhydrogen
explosionatTurkeyPoint6or7presentsanunjustifiablerisktothelargehumanpopulation,
FloridaEvergladesNationalPark,andtothemarineenvironmentalongthecoastincluding
BiscayneBayNationalPark.Fuelpoolmeltdownswereandcontinuetobethecauseofthe
largestreleasesofradioactivityfromFukushima,wherethesurroundinglandhasbecome
uninhabitableandtheplantcontinuestopourdangerouslyradioactivewaterintotheseaevery
dayastheutilitycompanyattemptstopreventfurthercriticalities.

AcatastrophicreleaseofradiationintothewatersaroundTurkeyPointwouldhavedevastating
consequencesfortourismandshippingindustriesastheplantsitsalongsideoneofthemost
heavilytraffickedwaterwaysoftheUnitedStatesandjustsouthofimportantseaportsatMiami
andFortLauderdale.Thepotentialeconomicimpactsofradioactivelycontaminatingtheseports
andwaterwaysisstaggering.ThedraftEISforTurkeyPoint6and7isincompletebecauseit
failstotakeintoaccountthesiteslocationalongsideeconomicallyandbiologicallycritical
waterwaysoftheUnitedStates.Theproposedplantsfuelpooldesignisdangerousinits
similaritiestoFukushima,adangercompoundedbytheuseofnewandunprovenbuilding
materials.ThedraftEIScompletelyomitstheseimportantconsiderationsoftheproposedsiting
andtheresultinghazardstheypresenttotheenvironmentandpublichealth.

HydrogenExplosions
HydrogenexplosionsintwospentfuelpoolsatFukushimaallowedthefissionproductsfrom
selfsustainingfuelrodfirestobereleasedintotheenvironmentwithcatastrophicresults.The
hydrogenresultsfromthezincalloycoatingonthefuelpelletsreactingwiththewaterandsteam
insideameltingpileoffuelrods.AlthoughtheAP1000scontainmentvesselcontainshydrogen
igniterswhichclaimtobeabletoexplodethehydrogenbeforethehydrogenexplodesthe
building,theseareunprovensystemswhichonlyworkincomputermodels.Themostvulnerable
partoftheplant,thespentfuelpool,hasnohydrogenignitersatall.

WhenhydrogenignitedabovethespentfuelpoolsatFukushimaitblewoffpartoftheroofofthe
building.Thiswasnthardtodo,asthefuelpoolswerelocatedoutsideofthecontainment
structure.DespitewhattranspiredatFukushima,theproposedreactorsatTurkeyPoint6and7

presentanidenticalrisktopeopleandtheenvironmentbyvirtueofusingzincalloycoatedfuel
pelletsandrackingtheminthesametypeofunprotectedpool.

ThedraftEISforTurkeyPoint6and7failstodemonstratehowhydrogenexplosionswillbe
avoidedduringacoreorfuelpoolmeltdownscenario,despitetheagencysownFukushimatask
forcerecommendationsonthissubject.ThemostdangerousscenarioforTurkeyPointisalso
themostlikelytooccur,anextendedstationblackoutcombinedwithextensivesitefloodingdue
toahurricane.Althoughextendedstationblackoutandstormsurgefloodinghavetakenplaceat
TurkeyPointalreadyandareexpectedtocontinueorevenincreaseinthefutureasaresultof
climatechange,thedraftEISfailstoexamineanyaspectofthissitespecificscenario.A
hydrogenexplosionwhichopenedthereactorcoreorthetopofthefuelprocessingbuilding
wouldresultinawidespreadreleaseoffissionproducts,potentiallymakingtheentireMiami
metropolitanareauninhabitableforthousandsofyears.

CoolingwithRadioactiveWasteWater
TheprimarysourceofcoolingwaterfortheproposedTurkeyPoint6and7reactorsiswaste
waterfromMiami.Someofthiswaterwillbeturnedintosteamandreleasedintothesurrounding
environment,alongwithitsconstituentpesticides,inorganicsolvents,industrialwastes,
householdchemicals,anddissolvedpharmaceuticals.Thiswastewaterturnedintosteamwill
spreadoutintocloudsovertheentirepopulationofMiamiDadeandBrowardcountiesandrain
downonthepopulationwithitschemical,waste,andpharmaceuticalcomponents,creating
pollutedairvaporsandpollutedrainfall.

Theradioactiveportionofthewastewaterisproposedtobedivertedtoundergroundwells
locatednearimportantaquifersandfreshwatersupplies,exposingtheresidents,animals,and
plantsinthesurroundingareastowaterlacedwithtritiumandotherdangerousradioactive
isotopes.TwonearbymunicipalwatersupplieshavealreadyfiledcommentswiththeNRC
objectingtotheproposedinjectionofchemicallyandradioactivecontaminatedwastewaterso
neartotheircommunitiesdrinkingwatersupplies.Inadditiontotheirwastewateruse,Turkey
Point6and7wouldusevastquantitiesofdrinkingwater,makingitunavailableforpeopleand
agriculturaluses.Floridaalreadysuffersfromalackoffreshwaterandthefurtherencroachment
uponoursupplynecessitatedbytheproposedplantswouldcreateasubstantialandunjustifiable
impingementupontheenvironmentresultinginahazardtohumanhealth.

ProblemswithcoolingpondsattheexistingTurkeyPoint3and4reactorshavealreadyledto
unprecedenteduseoffreshwaterbythoseplantsastheyattempttoreversethetoxicsalinitythe
plantsalreadyintroduceintoBiscayneBay.ThewatercycleinSouthFloridasimplycannot
affordthedemandsoffournuclearplantsandtheNRCcannotpermittheirradioactiveeffluents
tobereleasedinsuchcloseproximitytolocaldrinkingwatersuppliesastheTurkeyPointsiting
wouldrequire.

ThedraftEISisincompletebecauseitfailstoexaminethemigrationpathsofeffluentwaterfrom
theproposedplantsdeepinjectionwellsandtheresultingthreattothewatersupplyof4million

people.ThedraftEISalsoomitsanyanalysisofthechemicalconstituentsoftheaerosolized
effluentsaswellasanymodelingofthesynergisticeffectsofaddingtwonewplantsasitewhich
hasalreadyreachedunacceptablelevelsoffreshwateruse.Furthermore,thedraftEISneglects
anystudyoftheimpactoftheradialcollectorwellsonthesalinityofthewatersofBiscayneBay
NationalPark,anirreplaceableenvironmentalresource.WaterisFloridasmostimportant
environmentalasset.Infailingtofullyexaminetheimpactofbothitsproposeduseoffreshwater
andtheplantseffluentinjectionandwastewateraerosols,thedraftEISprovestobefatally
incomplete.

NoViableEvacuationOption
AnyaccidentatTurkeyPointseriousenoughtocreatewidespreadenvironmentalcontamination
byfalloutwillalsonecessitateevacuationoflargenumbersoftheresidentpopulation,making
evacuationafactorinenvironmentalimpactplanning.Allowingatotaloffournuclearreactorsto
TurkeyPointwouldmeanparadoxicallysitingofoneofthecountryslargestnuclearreactor
installationsalongsideanurbanpopulationof4millionpeople.Sitingatthislocationpresentsan
extremehazardtopublichealthandsafetyintheeventofanevacuationduetocatastrophic
environmentalreleaseofradiation.SouthFloridaislaidoutalongthecoastoftheAtlanticOcean
andlacksevacuationroutestothewest.

TrafficflowtoandfromtheFloridaKeysisentirelyconstrainedbyasingleroadand,inessence,
mostSouthFloridatrafficisconstrainedtothreeroads:US1,Highway95,andtheFlorida
Turnpike.BoundedbytheEvergladestothewest,Floridasimplydoesnothavetheeastwest
transportationinfrastructuretomakeevacuationfromTurkeyPointviable.Intheeventofan
emergency,alltrafficflowwouldbeconstrainedtothesamenorthsouthevacuationroutesalong
thecoast.ByvirtueoftheroadsystemendingintheFloridaKeys,evacuationsouthwardisalso
animpossibility,leavingnorthwardtravelbythreeroadwaysastheonlyevacuationoptionin
caseofanuclearaccidentatanyofthefourreactorswhichwouldconstitutetheTurkeyPoint
siteifunits6and7werecompletedandfueled.

Onatypicalweekday,MiamiandFortLauderdaleexperienceconsiderabledelaysintryingto
usethesenorthsouthroadways.Duringholidays,thecorridorbetweenHomesteadandKey
Westisknowntobeparticularlyimpassible.HurricaneevacuationsfromtheKeystake34
timesaslongasatripduringanyothertime,andnoneoftheseisamasscatastropheonthe
orderofasevereaccidentatTurkeyPoint.SouthFloridasimplydoesnotthegeographyorthe
roadsystemtohandleamassevacuationsuchaswouldbenecessitatedbyaseriousnuclear
accidentatTurkeyPointtodayandaddingtwomorereactorstothesitewouldonlycompound
theproblem.

ThedraftEISforTurkeyPoint6and7isincompletebecauseitfailstotakeintoaccountthe
problemsofevacuatingthelargepopulationsurroundingtheplantwhenonlyafewnorthbound
traveloptionsexistandthesearealreadyconstrained.Lackingaclearandworkableevacuation
plan,anysignificantradiationrelease(notjustameltdown)wouldpresentaconsiderableand
unjustifiablehazardtohumanhealthandtheenvironment.Theresultingattemptbythepublicto

evacuateanuclearaccidentdespitethelackofviableroadwayscouldleadtoviolence,car
crashes,andotherhazardstopeople.ThedraftEISisincompletebecauseitdidnotcompare
evacuationproblemsandoptionswithotherproposedsites.

Conclusion
Atthetimeofitscreation,theNRCwaschargedwithservingasthepublicsguardianoverthe
activitiesofciviliannuclearpowerplantssuchasthoseatTurkeyPoint.Thelawwhichformed
theNRCdidsowiththepurposeofseparatingthefunctionof
protecting
thepublicfromthe
taskof
promoting
nuclearenergy.TheNRCistohavenoroleinaidingthenuclearindustryor
inpromotingthedevelopmentofitsproductsoragenda.Itisnottheagencysjobtojustify,
rationalize,orencouragetheindustrysattemptstospreadnuclearpower.Yetfacedwith
overwhelmingpublicsupportfortruecleanenergyoptions,particularlythesolaroptioninSouth
Florida,theNRCfindsitselfcontinuallydefendingthenuclearindustryssalespitch.The
lighthearted,promotionaltoneofthesummaryEISmaterialspresentedattheApril22ndpublic
meetingwasshockingandreprehensible.Asaninformedandconcernedcitizen,Iurgethe
agencytocleanupitsact.IfthepeopleoftheUnitedStatesdecidethatthereisnofuturein
nuclearpower,asthepeopleofAustralia,Belgium,Germany,Italy,Japan,thePhilippines,
Sweden,andSwitzerlandhavealreadydecided,thentheNRCwillsimplyhavetoacceptthat
factandgooutofbusiness,asonecommenteronregulations.govrecommended.

TheNRCssloganpointsoutthatthesolepurposeoftheNuclearRegulatoryCommissionis
protectingpeopleandtheenvironment.LicensingoftheAP1000designatTurkeyPointwould
representacatastrophicfailingontheagencyspartonbothcounts.Itwouldshatterwhatlittle
publicconfidenceintheagencymightexistand,shouldanaccidentensue,wouldmeantheend
ofnuclearpowerintheUnitedStatesforever.Astheagencychargedwithprotectingthepeople
ofthiscommunity,youmustrejecttheseunsafereactorsasifyouandyourlovedoneslived
nearby,forIand5millionotherpeopledojustthat.

GivennowtheincontrovertibleevidencethattheapplicantsCOLforTurkeyPoint6and7
presentsunacceptableriskstohumanhealthandtheenvironment,IdemandthattheNRC
swiftlyandconclusivelyterminatetheselicensingproceedings.

Thankyouforyourattention,

DavidBethune
david@bethunecompany.com

1628ArthurSt.
Hollywood,FL33020