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PHIL 14-14

Philosophical Perspectives, 14, Action and Freedom, 2000

THE EPISTEMIC REQUIREMENTS FOR MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

Carl Ginet
Cornell University

In this paper I will use the term action to mean a persons (voluntarily
and intentionally) moving their body in a certain way and thereby bringing about
a certain consequence. For example, Herman moves his arm and hand and
thereby causes a car door to close on Sammys fingers. And I will use the term
omission to mean a persons failing to prevent some event because they did
not move their body in a certain way at a certain time, that is, had they moved
in that way at that time, their movement would have prevented the event; let us
call this event the consequence of the omission. For example, Herman fails to
push a certain button on the dashboard before exiting his car, and, if he had
pushed that button then, his doing so would have closed the sunroof and thereby
prevented the rain from soaking the interior of his car. (These are, I realize,
somewhat artificial meanings for the terms action and omission, not in complete conformity with their ordinary use.)
What is required for a person to be morally responsible for such an action
or omission (or for the consequence involved in the action or omission)? Let us
restrict our attention to actions or omissions in which the consequence is undeserved harm to someone, to their person or to their interests, and ask a more
restricted question: What is required for a person to be morally blameworthy
for a harmful action or omission?
I will assume here that one thing required is that the agent could have
avoided the action or omission. I will call this the could-have-done-otherwise
condition, or CDO condition for short. This assumption is controversial.
(Harry Frankfurt has put forward a type of example which, as he and many
others see it, shows that being able to avoid a harmful action or omission is not
required for being morally responsible for it. Some who are persuaded by
Frankfurt-type examples suggest that, instead of the CDO condition, some
would-have-done-otherwise-if condition is what is necessary.1 ) Ill not defend
my assumption here. The question I want to pursue in this paper is this: assuming that the CDO condition is necessary for being blameworthy for a harmful
action, what else is necessary?2 (My answer to this question, or some adapta-

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tion of it, might well prove to be equally satisfactory if we were to replace the
CDO condition with some would-have-done-otherwise-if condition, but Ill not
explore that possibility.)
I
We need to state the CDO condition more exactly. We are considering actions where at a certain time t1 a person S moves their body in a certain way M
and thereby causes a harmful consequence of a certain sort H, and omissions
where at a certain time t1 S does not move in a certain way M and thereby fails
to prevent a certain sort of harmful consequence H. The specification of the
CDO condition that may first come to mind is something like the following.
(A) For actions: until t1 it was open to S not to make movement M then or
any other movement that would bring about H;
for omissions: until t1 it was open to S to make movement M then or
some other movement that would prevent H.
But this is, unfortunately, too simple. It fails to cover cases where, although at t1 it was no longer open to S to make (or not to make) M at t1, at
some earlier time it was open to S to act (or not to act) in some way such that,
had S so acted (or not so acted) at that earlier time, it would have been open to
S until t1 to make (or not to make) M at t1. For example, Frank sets off on a
walk at 7:00pm and is a mile from home at 7:30pm when he suddenly remembers that he promised his family to record a certain TV program that begins at
7:30. Despite his being unable at 7:30 to turn on the TV and VCR, Frank can
properly be held accountable for failing to do so and, if he had no outweighing
good reason for bringing it about that he was unable to do so, he can be held
blameworthy for this failure.
In order to cover cases of this sort we must state the CDO condition necessary for Ss being blameworthy for an action or omission in the following,
more complex way:
For actions: At some time t0 not later than t1, either (i) S acted in a certain
way W such that it was open to S at t0 not to act in way W then and, had S
not acted in way W then, it would have been open to S at t1 not to make M
or any other movement then that would bring about H, or (ii) S did not at
t0 act in a certain way W such that it was open to S to act in way W then
and, had S acted in way W then, it would have been open to S at t1 not to
make M or any other movement then that would bring about H.
For omissions: At some time t0, not later than t1, either (i) S acted in a
certain way W such that it was open to S at t0 not to act in way W then
and, had S not acted in way W then, it would have been open to S at t1 to
make M or some other movement then that would have prevented H, or

Moral Responsibility / 269

(ii) S did not at t0 act in a certain way W such that it was open to her to act
in way W then and, had S acted in way W then, it would have been open to
S at t1 to make M or some other movement then that would have prevented H.
II
Let us first consider the restricted class of cases that satisfy condition (A)
abovethat is, actions where S had it open to her at t1 not to make M or any
other movement that would cause H, and omissions where S had it open to her
at t1 to make movement M or some other movement that would prevent H. In
such cases I will say that the CDO condition is satisfied at t1. 3
Ss harmful action may satisfy the CDO condition at t1 but still not be one
for which S deserves blame, if at t1 S did not know that then making movement M would bring about H and Ss failure to know this was not itself blameworthy. For example, Simon enters the hotel room he has just checked into and
flips what appears to be, and what he takes to be, an ordinary light switch, but,
to his surprise and consternation, the flipping of the switch sets off a loud fire
alarm. It seems that, because he did not know that his flipping the switch would
have this unfortunate consequence, it would be wrong to feel indignant with
him for bringing about that consequence.
Similarly, Ss harmful omission may satisfy the CDO condition at t1 but
still not be one for which S deserves blame, if at t1 S did not know that then
making movement M would prevent H and Ss failure to know this was not
itself blameworthy. Herb did not unlock the back door before leaving for work,
and therefore later that day the plumber was unable to get in to repair the furnace and left a note saying that he would not be able to come again until next
week. But Herb did not know that the plumber was scheduled to come that
dayhis wife made the appointment and forgot to tell himso Herb cannot be
justly reproached for not making the movements that would have prevented the
postponement of the furnace repairs.
Should we say, then, that, when an action (or omission) satisfies the CDO
condition at t1, S is blameworthy for bringing about harm H by making movement M at t1 (or for failing to prevent harm H by making movement M at t1)
only if it is also the case that at t1 S knew that making movement M would
bring about H (or knew that making M would prevent H)? No, this would be to
require S to know too much. Even though Herman, when he pushed the car
door, did not know that he would thereby close the door on Sammys fingers,
we are right to feel some indignation towards Herman for causing Sammys
pain and injury, if Herman knew that Sammy was still emerging from the car
and that there was a possibility that Sammy would put his fingers where the
door could close on them. George tossed a rock over the edge of a cliff, which
struck and injured someone on the trail below. Even though he did not know
that it would hit someone, we are surely right to reproach George for a reckless

270 / Carl Ginet

act, if he knew that there were or might well be people on the trail below and
therefore knew that his tossed rock might hit someone. Such examples suggest
that we should not require for blameworthiness more than that at t1 S knew
that making movement M would or might cause H.
It will be convenient to use the verb know and cognate terms in a special
restricted sense. Ill mark such uses with an asterisk (*). Let us stipulate that
at t1 S knew* that... implies that at t1 S actively believed (the truth) that... To
say that George knew* that there might be people on the trail below when he
tossed his rock is to imply, not only that he then believed this truth, but also
that this consideration had not then slipped his mind: he was then sufficiently
aware of this possibility that it would not be correct to say that he threw the
rock only because he failed to recall (to think of ) the possibility of people below. He threw the rock while aware that it might hit someone below. This does
not entail that he intended that it hit someone; he may not have cared whether
it did or even have hoped that it would not.
S must, of course, (and usually will) have had justification for believing
that causing H (or harm of that sort) by moving in way M was a non-negligible
possibility. (In the case of Georges throwing the rock over the cliff, his beliefs
would give him such justification if they merely lacked any basis for thinking
that the area below was very unlikely to have any people in it.) It is not quite
enough, however, to require only that S have some justification or other for
believing this: S must have a justification for believing it that is not also a
reason for believing a false proposition as to how her making movement M
would or might cause H. Melanie shoots her gun and thereby causes the death
of her enemy, fully intending to do so. Her belief as she pulled the trigger that
by firing the gun she would cause her enemys death was correct and justified,
for she is an expert marksman and just an hour ago she checked the operation
of her gun and loaded it. But what happened was this: the bullet she fired was
deflected by a flying bird; nevertheless the firing of the gun caused the death
of her enemy because the sound of the shot startled a passing driver and caused
him to lose control of his car which struck and killed her enemy. Here I am
disinclined to regard Melanie as blameworthy for the death of her enemy (though
she is, of course, to be blamed for acting with the intent of killing him). She
seems no more culpable for that consequence than she would have been had
she aimed her shot harmlessly into the sky and unintentionally caused her enemys death in a similar way. What negates blameworthiness for the harmful
consequence in both cases is that the justification Melanie has for her true belief that her firing the gun will cause the death of her enemy is also a justification for a false belief as to how it will bring about that consequence.
Let us say of justification that has this unfortunate property that it is not
proper justification. And let us stipulate further that at t1 S knew* that moving in way M then would or might cause a consequence of sort H implies, not
only that at t1 S actively believed this truth, but also that S had proper justification for this belief.

Moral Responsibility / 271

Should we say, then, with respect to a harmful action, that what is additionally necessary when the CDO condition is satisfied at t1, is this: at t1 S
knew* that moving in way M then would or might cause a consequence of sort
H? No. This is still to require more than is necessary.
A person may be blameworthy for a harmful action, even if they fail to
realize that their movement will bring about a harm, if the failure to realize this
is itself something for which the person is blameworthy. Consider a revised
version of our example of Simon and the switch that set off a fire alarm. Suppose that the switch did not look at all like an ordinary light switchthe whole
thing was red, much larger than a typical light switch, and located fairly high
up on the wall. Moreover, immediately below it in large white letters on a red
background were the words FIRE ALARM. Simon is a normal adult whose
native language is English and he has been about in the world enough to know
about the typical appearance of light switches and about fire alarms. But so
intent was he on finding a light switch that he somehow failed to notice the
words FIRE ALARM, or to take in the significance of the conspicuous differences between the switch he pulled and a typical light switch, and thought
that the switch he flipped would just turn on a light. As Simon himself later
confessed in making profuse apologies, his failure to notice or heed those things
was inexcusable. A certain amount of indignation towards him, for his causing
the alarm to go off, would be deserved (though, of course, not as much as if he
had intentionally set it off ).
Similar observations hold for cases of harmful omissions. Consider a revised version of the case of Herbs not unlocking the back door. When Herb
comes down to make his breakfast, there is a note by the coffeemaker from his
wife. Herb puts the note aside without reading it, telling himself that he will
read it as soon as hes poured his juice and coffee. But he starts thinking about
something else and forgets the note. The note reads, Herb, Before you leave
please unlock the back door so that the plumber can get in to fix the furnace.
Herb goes off to work without unlocking the back door. Even though Herb
didnt know* as he was leaving for work that, if he then unlocked the back
door, he would prevent the plumbers being locked out, his wife would be justified in reproaching him for failing to prevent this, given that his failure to
read her note before leaving was blameworthy.
It is clear that failure to realize that ones action or omission would or might
have the harmful consequence can itself be culpable: the belief one lacked is a
belief one should have had. And that being so, even if it is only because of that
failure that one commits the harmful action or omission (i.e., one would not
have done so had one known* at the time that it might have the harmful consequence), one is blameworthy for the harmful consequence.
So we can say that, when the CDO condition is satisfied at t1 (the time of
making, or omitting to make, the relevant bodily movement), what is further
required in order for S to be blameworthy for the harmful action or omission is
the following disjunctive condition: at t1, either S knew* that moving in way

272 / Carl Ginet

M would or might bring about the harm H (or, in the case of an omission, S
knew* that moving in way M would or might prevent H) or S should have
known* this.
III
Let me here digress briefly to note an interesting question that arises about
cases, like that of Georges throwing a rock over the cliff, where the agent knew*
or should have known* that his act (or omission) might have a certain sort of
harmful consequence. Imagine two such cases which differ only in that in one
the agents act (or omission) does have the sort of harmful consequence he
knew* or should have known* it might have, but in the other it does not. With
respect to all other relevant circumstances, particularly with respect to the agents
mental state at the time of his potentially harmful act (or omission), the cases
are exactly alike. The interesting question is this: Does the unlucky agent (the
one whose action (or omission) does have the harmful consequence) deserve
more blame for his action (or omission) than the lucky agent deserves for his?
Thomas Nagel (1979) and Bernard Williams (1981) have argued that our
actual practice of moral assessment implies an affirmative answer to this question; our moral reactions in such cases show that we do take the degree of
blame an agent deserves to depend on sheer luck. Against this view, Brian Rosebury (1995) has made a convincing case that examples that may seem to support it do not actually do so. (Roseburys discussion covers cases where the
agent neither knew* nor should have known* that her action (or omission) might
have a harmful consequence, as well as the cases we are concerned with here,
where the agent knew* or should have known* this.)
In some such examples, Rosebury argues, what is being described as observers expressing or feeling a greater degree of moral condemnation toward
the unlucky action (or its agents feeling a greater degree of self-reproach) is
being misdescribed, that it is actually some other feeling or attitude, such as
dismay or regret or sadness. This may be the appropriate thing to say, for instance, about Hermans feelings after closing the car door on Sammys fingers
as compared with Hermiones feelings after narrowly missing closing the door
on Sammys fingers: Herman of course feels a great deal worse than Hermione
did, but the additional negative feeling, insofar as it is rational and appropriate,
is keen regret and dismay at having caused an injury rather than more severe
self-reproach or heavier guilt.
But there are cases where our greater negative feeling towards the unlucky
agent really is moral blame. About these Rosebury argues that our attitude does
not reflect what would be our considered judgment were we to take adequate
account of the agents epistemic responsibilities and limitations at the time of
his action. So, for example, Sammys mother may initially be inclined to condemn Herman a good deal more strongly for his carelessness when he slams
the car door on Sammys fingers than the mild reproach she felt towards Her-

Moral Responsibility / 273

mione for her earlier car-door slamming that luckily missed Sammys fingers.
But when she reflects that Hermione was as heedless as Herman and that Herman had as much excuse for being heedless as Hermione hadboth were preoccupied with what they were about to do after getting out of the carthe
mothers feelings of indignation towards the two of them should tend to equalize. Or I might be initially inclined to feel greater outrage at a midnight bombing of a shop that killed people than at one that did not kill or injure anyone.
But after realizing that in neither case did the bomber intend to kill people (in
both they hoped that no one would be around when the bomb exploded) and
that in both cases the bomber knew* there was a non-negligible chance that the
bomb would kill people, I become as outraged at the action of the lucky
bomber as I am at the action of the unlucky bomber.
IV
Returning now to our investigation of the epistemic requirements for blameworthiness, can we find something general and informative to say about what
sort of circumstance will make true the judgment that at t1 S should have known*
that his action (or omission) would or might have a harmful consequence of
sort H (in a case where at t1 S did not know* this)? We can, I think, say this:
Ss failure to know* must have been a consequence of some earlier action or
omission concerning which S then knew* or should have known* that it would
or might lead to such an unfortunate failure of knowledge* as S in fact suffered at t1 (Holly Smith calls this the benighting action or omission). That is:
at some time t0 earlier than t1, either S acted in a certain way W that brought
about his failure to know* at t1, which was responsible for his harmful act (or
omission) then, and at t0 S knew* or should have known* that his so acting
then would or might lead (risked leading) to that sort of failure to know*, or S
omitted to act in a certain way W such that Ss acting in way W at t0 would
have prevented his failure to know* at t1 and at t0 S knew* or should have
known* that his so acting then would or might prevent that sort of failure to
know*. Lets call the harmful act (or omission) at t1, which occurred because
of Ss knowledge* failure at t1, the benighted act (or omission).
For example, Simons failure to realize that the switch he was flipping was
an alarm switch was (in one version of the example) culpable because, in the
period between the time when the switch first caught his eye and the time he
flipped it, he could and should have stopped to think what its unusual location
and appearance might mean and to attend more closely to the letters on the
plaque below it, actions which would have made him realize what the switch
was and prevented his flipping it. Herbs failure to realize that by omitting to
unlock the back door before he left he was preventing the plumber from fixing
the furnace that day was blameworthy (in one version of the example) because
he could and should have avoided this failure by reading the note by the coffeepot before laying it aside (or by putting it somewhere he could not avoid

274 / Carl Ginet

seeing it later). Or consider another, rather different example, where S knows*


that there is a sort of action he could take that would prevent a certain harm
but S fails to know* which specific sort of action it is (and is blameworthy for
this failure): Herb neglected to memorize the combination to the lock on his
locker at the fitness center (or to take a copy of it with him), and so when he
and his partner return to the locker after their squash game, he does not know*
what manipulations of the lock would open the locker, manipulations which he
could then carry out if only he knew* what they were (and, of course, if he had
opened the locker then, he would have prevented much inconvenience for himself and his squash partner).
Those were examples, of a benighted act and benighted omissions, where
what did the benighting was a prior omission. One would expect that blameworthy failure to know* would typically come about through a prior omission.
It is hard to think of realistic examples where what brings it about is a prior
action. Here are some unrealistic examples, which are variations on the example of Herbs failure to leave the back door unlocked. Suppose that Herbs wife
told him before she left the house that he should unlock the back door before
he leaves so that the plumber can get in. Right after his wife leaves, Herb takes
a certain drug in order to enjoy the hours worth of euphoria it induces on his
train ride to work, but he knows that this drug also induces memory lapses;
and, sure enough, because of the drug he forgets to unlock the back door. He is
blameworthy for this forgetting because he could and should have avoided the
drug-taking that induced it. Or suppose that normally Herb and his wife keep
both back and front doors unlocked while they are home, and so what Herbs
wife tells him is to not lock the back door before he leaves. Again, Herb takes
the drug with the result that, while locking the back door, he fails to recall that
by doing this he will be preventing the furnace from being fixed that day.
Suppose that at t0 S did not know* but should have known* that his act
then would or might bring about the relevant sort of subsequent failure to know*
that occurred at t1 (or that the act he omitted at t0 would or might prevent the
relevant sort of subsequent failure to know* that occurred at t1). Then the blameworthiness of this knowledge* failure at t0 must be owing to a fact of just the
same form as was required to make the knowledge* failure at t1 blameworthy
that is, a prior blameworthy act (or omission), at t-minus-1 earlier than t0, that
is benighting with respect to the benighted act (or omission) at t0. For example, before Horace leaves for work his wife tells him to telephone her before he
comes home from work in order to find out whether he needs to do a certain
errand on the way home; before leaving for work (t-minus-1) Horace neglects
to write a reminder to do call his wife in his daily diary, so that as he leaves
work for home (t0) he fails to recall that he should do this, and so on the way
home (t1) he fails to know* that he should do the errand.
There is thus the possibility of a prior sequence of blameworthy benighting acts (or omissions), each member of which leads to a subsequent blameworthy benighted act (or omission), that eventually comes to the benighted act

Moral Responsibility / 275

(or omission) at t1. Such a prior sequence cannot, however, go back forever,
given that Ss life does not go back forever. The sequence cannot be such that
it has no beginning, such that each member is an act (or omission) that is benighted by a preceding benighting act (or omission). It must begin with a blameworthy act (or omission) that is not benighted, where S knowingly* brings about
(or omits to prevent) the harm that consists of a subsequent benighted act (or
omission). As Michael Zimmerman (1997, p. 417) says, culpability for ignorant behavior must be rooted in culpability that involves no ignorance.
V
Lets now take stock. Weve established that, given that the CDO condition is satisfied at t1, what more is necessary for S to be blameworthy for his
harmful act (or omission) at t1 is the following:
(K) either (i) S knew* at t1 that his moving in way M then would or might
bring about (or, in the case of omission, prevent) a harm of sort H, or
(ii) S did not then know* this but there is a sequence of one or more
prior acts (or omissions) that ends with the act (or omission) at t1 and
is such that (a) each member before this last member benights the
subsequent member, (b) the first (earliest) member of the sequence
was not a benighted act (or omission)at the time S knew* that her
act (or omission) would or might lead to the sort of harm it in fact led
to, namely, the benighted act (or omission) that is the next member of
the sequenceand (c) at the time of each benighted act (or omission)
in the sequence S should have known* (was blameworthy for not
knowing*) that it would or might lead to the sort of benighted act (or
omission) that it in fact led to in the next member of the sequence.
Its time now to consider the case where the CDO condition is not satisfied
at t1 but only at some earlier time t0. That is, at t1 it was not open to S not to
make movement M then (or, in the case of omission, to make M then), but at t0
earlier than t1 either (i) S acted in a certain way W such that it was open to S at
t0 not to act in way W then and, had S not acted in way W then, it would have
been open to S at t1 not to make M or any other movement then that would
bring about H (or, in the case of omission, it would have been open to S at t1 to
make M or some other movement that would prevent H), or (ii) S did not at t0
act in a certain way W such that it was open to S to act in way W then and, had
S acted in way W then, it would have been open to S at t1 not to make M or
any other movement then that would bring about H (or, in the case of omission,
it would have been open to S at t1 to make M or some other movement that
would prevent H).
In such cases, which satisfy the CDO condition only earlier than t1, what
more is necessary for S to be blameworthy for her harmful act (or omission) at

276 / Carl Ginet

t1? To answer this we need only apply the K condition formulated above, but
take t0 in such a case to be the time referred to in the K condition as t1, the
acting (or omitting to act) in way W at t0 in such a case to be what is designated in the K condition as the harmful act at t1, and the benighted harmful act
(or omission) at t1 in such a case to be what is designated in the K condition as
the harmful consequence H of the harmful act (or omission) at t1.
So, for example, Sheldon and his children arrived at the amusement park
at t1; Sheldon was unable at t1 to pay the fee necessary to gain admittance,
because at an earlier time t0 he had omitted to put money in his wallet, something he could have done then. Sheldon may still be blameworthy for his omitting to pay the admission fee at t1, even though he could not then have done
so. Whether he is, I suggest, depends on whether his omitting to put money in
his wallet satisfies the K condition, with t1 in it taken to be the time of that
omission, moving in way M taken to be whatever movements would have put
the money in his wallet, and the harm H that would have been prevented taken
to be the subsequent unavoidable failure to pay the entrance fees. And an analogous point holds when a prior avoidable omission renders unavoidable a later
action (rather than omission) and when a prior avoidable action (rather than
omission) renders unavoidable a later omission or action. We simply take t1
to be the time of the prior action or omission and that action or omission to
be what satisfies the CDO condition at its time, take its harmful consequence
to be the subsequent unavoidable harmful action or omission, and then apply
the K condition to determine whether S is blameworthy for that harmful
consequence.
We are now in a position to formulate a general statement of a necessary
condition for blameworthiness, which includes the CDO condition and the further, epistemic requirements that we have been investigating in this paper.
S is blameworthy for bringing about (or failing to prevent) harm H by
moving (or omitting to move) in way M at t1 only if: [the CDO condition] at some time t0, not later than t1, either (i) S acted in a certain way
W such that it was open to S at t0 not to act in way W then and, had S
not acted in way W then, it would have been open to S at t1 not to make
(or to make) M or any (some) other movement then that would bring about
(prevent) H, or (ii) S did not at t0 act in a certain way W such that it was
open to S at t0 to act in way W then and, had S acted in way W then, S
would have had it open to her at t1 not to make (or to make) M or any
(some) other movement then that would bring about (prevent) H; and [the
epistemic condition] either (i) S knew* at t0 that her acting (or omitting
to act) in way W would or might bring about (or, in the case of omission,
prevent) a harmful act (or omission) of the sort S subsequently committed at t1, or (ii) S did not at t0 know* this but there is a sequence of one
or more acts (or omissions) that ends with the act (or omission) at t0 and
is such that (a) each member before this last member benights the sub-

Moral Responsibility / 277

sequent member, (b) the first (earliest) member of the sequence was not a
benighted act (or omission)at the time of it S knew* that it would or
might lead to the sort of harm it in fact led to, namely, the benighted act
(or omission) that is the next member of the sequence, and (c) at the time
of each benighted act (or omission) in the sequence S should have known*
(was blameworthy for not knowing*) that it would or might lead to the
sort of benighted act (or omission) that it in fact led to in the next member of the sequence.
I venture to suggest that this two-part necessary condition is also sufficient for
Ss being blameworthy for her harmful act (or omission).
Notes
1. The most well worked out suggestion of this sort that I know of is in Fischer and
Ravizza 1998.
2. Ive gained much insight on this topic from Holly Smith 1983.
3. Actions in this restricted class satisfy part (i) of the more general condition for actions when t0 5 t1 and acting-in-way-W 5 making-movement-M; and omissions in
this restricted class satisfy part (ii) of the more general condition for omissions when
t0 5 t1 and acting-in-way-W 5 making-movement-M.

References
Fischer, John and Ravizza, Mark, 1998, Responsibility and Control, Cambridge University Press.
Smith, Holly, 1983, Culpable Ignorance, The Philosophical Review 97, p. 543571.
Nagel, Thomas, 1976, Moral Luck, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supp. Vol. 50; reprinted in revised form in Nagel 1979.
Nagel, Thomas, 1979, Moral Luck, in Mortal Questions, Cambridge University Press.
Rosebury, Brian, 1995, Moral Responsibility and Moral Luck, The Philosophical Review 104,
pp. 499524.
Williams, Bernard, 1976, Moral Luck, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supp. Vol. 50;
reprinted in revised form in Williams 1981.
Williams, Bernard, 1981, Moral Luck, in Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press.
Zimmerman, Michael J., 1997, Moral Responsibility and Ignorance, Ethics 107, pp. 410 426.