213 views

Uploaded by StanfordEcon

Scott Corwon, the founder of IMPACTS, explores equilibrium refinements in computational game theory.
The purpose of the IMPACTS presentation series is to effectuate knowledge transfer concerning topical mathematical and scientific issues. Significant published works form the basis for much of the presentation series, and these works are interpreted and presented by recognized leaders in the topic area. The presentation series is made possible through the generous support of IMPACTS.

- The Laws of EuchreAs adopted by the Somerset Club of Boston, March 1, 1888 by Dwight, James
- 6 Max NLHE Strategy Guide
- johanson pokerbot
- PokerStrategies
- Rory Monahan - Texas Hold'Em Secrets
- Profitable Poker
- Systematic Poker - No Limit Sit-N-Go Texas Holdem System
- Monetary policy and monetary policy instruments
- Rummy - a tactical version
- Online No Limit Texas Hold em Poker for Beginners English
- The Pot-Limit Omaha Book by Tri Slow Habit) Nguyen
- Games of Skill and Games of Chance: Poker as a Game of Skill - PPA (2009)
- Advanced Concepts Of Poker-Complete 352Pg Book
- how-to-win-at-online-poker
- Texas Hold 'em Excellence
- Dusty Schmidt -Don't Listen to Phil Hellmuth
- Card Games Properly Explained - Arnold Marks
- leenelsonebook_letsplay
- Easy Game Volume I by Andrew Balugawhale Seidman
- [Cigital] 100M Hand Analysis Report

You are on page 1of 115

Miltersen, et al. in exploring equilibrium refinements in

computational game theory.

knowledge transfer concerning topical mathematical and scientific

issues. Significant published works form the basis for much of the

presentation series, and these works are interpreted and presented

by recognized leaders in the topic area. The presentation series is

made possible through the generous support of IMPACTS.

2

Game theory in Computational game theory in

(most of) Economics: (most of) CAV and (some of) AI:

p

What is the outcome when 2-player What should we do

rational agents interact? 0-sum to win?

games

Stability concept: Guarantee concept:

Nash equilibrium = Maximin/Minimax

Refined stability notions:

Sequential equilibrium

Trembling hand perfection Stronger

St o ge gua

guarantees?

a tees

Quasiperfect equilibrium

Proper equilibrium Most of

this

morning

3

Computational game theory in

CAV vs. Computational game

theory in AI

Main challenge in CAV: Infinite duration

Plan

sum games and computing minimax strategies.

g

resolve the issues

issues, and how to modify the algorithms to compute

refinements.

two-player,

player zero-sum

zero sum case

case.

How to make a (2-player) poker

bot?

How to represent and solve two-player

two player, zero

zero-

sum games?

Perfect information games

Matrix games

Perfect Information Game (Game tree)

5

Backwards induction (Minimax

evaluation)

5

Backwards induction (Minimax

evaluation)

6

6

5

Backwards induction (minimax

evaluation)

5

5

2

6

6

5

The stated strategies are minimax: They assure the best possible

payoff

p y against

g a worst case opponent.

pp Also they

y are Nash: They

y are

best responses against each other.

Matrix games

Matching Pennies:

Hide heads up -1 0

Hide tails up 0 -1

1

Solving matrix games

Matching Pennies:

Hide tails up 0 -1

1 1/2

1/2 1/2

Mixed strategies

The stated strategies are minimax: They assure the best possible

payoff

p y against

g a worst case opponent.

pp Also they

y are Nash: They

y are

best responses against each other.

Solving matrix games

are found using linear programming.

minimax strategies are exactly the Nash

equililbria of a matrix games.

How to make a (2-player) poker

bot?

Unlike chess, poker is a game of imperfect

information.

sequential) game.

algorithms (backwards induction and linear

programming) to solve such games?

Matching pennies in extensive form

Player 1 hides a penny either heads

1 up or tails up

up.

Information set

Player 2 does not know if the penny

2 2 is heads of or tails up, but guesses

which is the case.

0 If he guesses correctly

correctly, he gets the

0 -1

-1 penny.

action for each node in the information set.

Extensive form games

A deck of card is shuffled

Guess the Ace: R

Information set

Player

y 1 does not know if A♠ is the

1 1 top card or not.

He can choose to end the game.

0 0 If he

h does,

d no money is

i exchanged.

h d

the top

p card or not ((he cannot see it).

)

-1000 0 0 -1000 him $1000.

How to solve?

Stop 0 0

Play

ay 19.23

-19 23 -980

980.77

77

17

The rows and columns

matrix) is a vector consisting of one

designated

g action to make in each

information set belonging to him.

strategies.

strategies

Done?

Stop 0 0

Play

ay 19.23

-19 23 -980

980.77

77

19

20

LL

21

LL LR

22

LL LR RL

23

LL LR RL RR

24

Behavior strategies (Kuhn, 1952)

probability distributions, one for each

information set, the distribution being over the

actions

i one can make k there.

h

Behavior strategies

Guess the Ace: R

1/52 51/52

1 1

0 0

2 2

0 1 0 1

-1000 0 0 -1000

Behavior strategies

g , behavior strategies

g are

compact objects.

F ll behavior

f t recall, b h i strategies

t t i

and mixed strategies are equivalent (Kuhn, 1952).

described by a linear program!

Realization plans (sequence form)

(K ll M idd

(Koller-Megiddo-von SStengel,

l 1994))

g of a sequence

realization weight q of moves

is the product of probabilities assigned by

the strategy to the moves in the sequence.

sequences (a( realization

li ti l ) we can

plan),

deduce the corresponding behavior strategy

(and vice versa)

versa).

Behavior strategies

Realization plans

2/3

0

1

1

1/6

1/3

0

1/6

(2/3 1/3,

(2/3, 1/3 1/6, 1/6, …)) is a realization plan for Player II

1/6 1/6

Crucial observation

(Koller-Megiddo-von Stengel 1994)

The set of valid realization plans for each of the two

players (for games of perfect recall) is definable by a set

of linear equations

q and p positivity.

y

using realization plan x and Player 2 is playing using

realization plan y is given by a bilinear form xTAy.

efficiently using linear programming!

Optimal response to fixed x.

is given by:

(Fx = f, y ¸ 0 expressing that y is a realization plan.)

Maximize fT q so that FT q · xT A.

What should MAX do?

that he obtains the value given by

Maximize fT q so that FT q · xT A.

strategy

t t y is

i given

i b

by

Maximize fTq so that FT q · xT A, Ex = e, x ¸ 0.

(Ex = ee, x ¸ 0 expressing that x is a realization plan)

KMvS linear program

action (sequence)

of player 2

x is valid

realization plan

34

Up

p or down? Max q

q=1, xu = 1, xd = 0 q·5

q · 6 xu + 5 xd

5

q xu + xd = 1

xu, xd ¸ 0

2

xu 6

xd

5

achieve right hand side is what he actually achieves by this action

achieve, action.

35

Guess-the-Ace, Nash equilibrium

found by Gambit by KMvS algorithm

Complaints!

[..] the strategies are not guaranteed to take advantage of mistakes when they

become apparent.

apparent This can lead to very counterintuitive behavior

behavior. For example

example,

assume that player 1 is guaranteed to win $1 against an optimal player 2. But

now, player 2 makes a mistake which allows player 1 to immediately win

$10000. It is perfectly consistent for the ‘optimal’ (maximin) strategy to continue

playing so as to win the $1 that was the original goal

goal.

Koller and Pfeffer, 1997.

If you run an=1 bl=1 it tells you that you should fold some hands (e.g. 42s) when

the small blind has only called, so the big blind could have checked it out for a

free showdown but decides to muck his hand. Why is this not necessarily a

bug? (This had me worried before I realized what was happening).

Selby, 1999.

Plan

sum games and computing minimax strategies.

g

resolve the issues

issues, and how to modify the algorithms to compute

refinements.

two-player,

player zero-sum

zero sum case

case.

Equilibrium Refinements

Nash Eq.

(Nash 1951)

(Normal form)

Subgame Perfect Eq

Trembling hand perfect Eq.

(Selten 1965)

(Selten 1975)

Sequential Eq.

((Kreps-Wilson 1982))

Trembling hand perfect eq.

eq (van Damme 1991)

(Selten 1975)

Proper eq.

eq

(Myerson 1978)

39

Equilibrium Refinements

Nash Eq.

(Nash 1951)

Nobel prize winners

(Normal form)

Subgame Perfect Eq

Trembling hand perfect Eq.

(Selten 1965)

(Selten 1975)

Sequential Eq.

((Kreps-Wilson 1982))

Trembling hand perfect eq.

eq (van Damme 1991)

(Selten 1975)

Proper eq.

eq

(Myerson 1978)

40

Equilibrium Refinements

Nash Eq.

(Nash 1951)

(Normal form)

Subgame Perfect Eq

Trembling hand perfect Eq.

(Selten 1965)

(Selten 1975)

Sequential Eq.

((Kreps-Wilson 1982))

Trembling hand perfect eq.

eq (van Damme 1991)

(Selten 1975) For some games,

impossible to achieve

both! (Mertens 1995)

Proper eq.

eq

(Myerson 1978)

41

Subgame perfection (Selten ’1965)

rationality.

induces an equilibrium in all subgames

subgames.

A subgame

b i a subtree

is bt off th

the extensive

t i form

f

that does not break any information sets.

Doomsday Game

(0,0)

Peaceful

2 co-existence

surrender

d

(-100,-100)

43

Doomsday Game

(0,0)

(-1,1)

44

Doomsday Game

(0,0)

(-1,1)

45

Doomsday Game

(-1,1)

46

Doomsday Game

(0,0)

(-1,1)

1 Non-credible threat

is not subgame perfect.

47

Nash eq. found by backwards induction

5

5

2

6

6

5

Another Nash equilibrium!

Not subgame perfect!

In zero-sum

zero sum games,

games sequential

5 rationality is not so much

about making credible threats as

about not returning gifts

2

49

How to compute a subgame perfect

equilibrium in a zero-sum game

with

ith itits computed

t d value.

l

Guess-the-Ace, bad Nash equilibrium

found by Gambit by KMvS algorithm

(Extensive form) trembling hand

perfection (Selten’75)

Perturbed game: For each information set, associate a

parameter ² > 0 (a tremble). Disallow behavior

probabilities smaller than this parameter

parameter.

an equilibrium of the original game and called trembling

hand perfect.

paper by Joe Halpern).

Doomsday Game

(0,0)

1-²

²

(-1,1)

1 Non-credible threat

is not trembling hand perfect: If Player 1 worries just a

little bit that Player 2 will attack, he will not commit

himself to triggering the doomsday device

53

Guess-the-Ace, Nash equilibrium

found by Gambit by KMvS algorithm

Computational aspects

trembling hand

perfect equilibrium be computed for a given

zero-sum extensive form g game ((two p

player,

y ,

perfect recall) in polynomial time?

interesting as

interesting, as…

Equilibrium Refinements

Nash Eq.

(Nash 1951)

(Normal form)

Subgame Perfect Eq

Trembling hand perfect Eq.

(Selten 1965)

(Selten 1975)

Sequential Eq.

((Kreps-Wilson 1982))

Trembling hand perfect eq.

eq (van Damme 1991)

(Selten 1975) For some games,

impossible to achieve

both! (Mertens 1995)

Proper eq.

eq

(Myerson 1978)

56

(Normal form) trembling hand

perfect equilibria

Transform the g

game from extensive form to normal form.

with just one information set for each player and apply

the definition of extensive form trembling hand perfect

equilibria.

form perfect if and only if it consists of two undominated

strategies.

Mertens’ voting game

The task may be performed either correctly or incorrectly.

If it is performed correctly, both players receive a payoff of 1,

otherwise both players receive a payoff of 0.

The election is by a secret vote.

If both players vote for the same player, that player gets to

p

If each player votes for himself, the player to perform the task is

chosen at random but is not told that he was elected this way.

If each player votes for the other

other, the task is performed by

somebody else, with no possibility of it being performed

incorrectly.

59

Normal form vs. Extensive form

trembling hand perfection

The normal form and the extensive form trembling hand

perfect equilibria of Mertens’ voting game are disjoint:

Any extensive form perfect equilibrium has to use a

dominated strategy.

One of the two players has to vote for the other guy.

What’s wrong with the definition of

trembling hand perfection?

equilibria are limit points of equilibria of

perturbed games.

the relative magnitude of the trembles

trembles.

Thi d

This does nott seem warranted!

t d!

Open problem

Is there a zero

zero-sum

sum game for which the

extensive form and the normal form trembling

hand pperfect equilibria

q are disjoint?

j

Equilibrium Refinements

Nash Eq.

(Nash 1951)

(Normal form)

Subgame Perfect Eq

Trembling hand perfect Eq.

(Selten 1965)

(Selten 1975)

Sequential Eq.

((Kreps-Wilson 1982))

Trembling hand perfect eq.

eq (van Damme 1991)

(Selten 1975) For some games,

impossible to achieve

both! (Mertens 1995)

Proper eq.

eq

(Myerson 1978)

63

Equilibrium Refinements

Nash Eq.

(Nash 1951)

(Normal form)

Subgame Perfect Eq

Trembling hand perfect Eq.

(Selten 1965)

(Selten 1975)

Sequential Eq.

((Kreps-Wilson 1982))

Trembling hand perfect eq.

eq (van Damme 1991)

(Selten 1975)

Proper eq.

eq

(Myerson 1978)

64

Computing a normal form perfect

equilibrium of a zero-sum game,

easy hack!

Compute

p the value of the g

game using

g KMvS algorithm.

g

that maximizes payoff against some fixed fully mixed

strategy of the opponent.

to be sequentially rational (keep gifts).

Example of ”bad”(?) behavior in a

normal form perfect equilibrium

Rules of the game:

Player 2 can either stop the game or give Player 1

a dollar.

If Player 1 gets the dollar, he can either stop the

game or give Player 2 the dollar back.

If Player 2 gets the dollar, he can either stop the

game or give Player 1 two dollars.

It is part of a normal form perfect equilibrium for

Player 1 to give the dollar back if he gets it.

Equilibrium Refinements

Nash Eq.

(Nash 1951)

(Normal form)

Subgame Perfect Eq

Trembling hand perfect Eq.

(Selten 1965)

(Selten 1975)

Sequential Eq.

((Kreps-Wilson 1982))

Trembling hand perfect eq.

eq (van Damme 1991)

(Selten 1975)

Proper eq.

eq

(Myerson 1978)

67

Sequential Equilibria

(

(Kreps and

d Wilson,

il 1982))

In addition to p

prescribing

g two strategies,

g , the

equilibrium prescribes to every information set a

belief: A probability distribution on nodes in the

information set

set.

At each information set, the strategies should be

“sensible”, given the beliefs.

At each information set, the beliefs should be

“sensible”, given the strategies.

dominated strategies.

g

Sequential equilibrium using a

dominated strategy

Rules of the game:

g

Player 1 either stops the game or asks Player 2 for a

dollar.

Player 2 can either refuse or give Player 1 a dollar

the game and not ask Player 2 for a dollar

dollar.

Intuition: A sequential equilibrium reacts correctly to

mistakes done in the past but does not anticipate

mistakes that may be made in the future.

Equilibrium Refinements

Nash Eq.

(Nash 1951)

(Normal form)

Subgame Perfect Eq

Trembling hand perfect Eq.

(Selten 1965)

(Selten 1975)

Sequential Eq.

((Kreps-Wilson 1982))

Trembling hand perfect eq.

eq (van Damme 1991)

(Selten 1975)

Proper eq.

eq

(Myerson 1978)

70

Quasi-perfect equilibrum

(van Damme, 1991)

A quasi-perfect equilibrium is a limit point of ²-quasiperfect behavior

strategy profile as ² > 0.

An ²-quasi perfect strategy profile satisfies that if some action is not a local

b t response, it iis ttaken

best k with

ith probability

b bilit att mostt ².

²

for completing play after taking a

a, so that best possible payoff is achieved

among all strategies agreeing with ¼ except possibly at t h and afterwards.

Intuition: A player trusts himself over his opponent to make the right

decisions in the future – this avoids the anomaly pointed out by Mertens.

Byy so

somee irony

o yo of te

terminology,

o ogy, tthe

e ”quasi”-concept

quas co cept see

seems

s in fact

act far

a supe

superior

o

to the original unqualified perfection. Mertens, 1995.

Computing quasi-perfect

equilibrium M. and Sørensen, SODA’06 and

Economic Theory,

y 2010.

Shows how to modify the linear programs of Koller, Megiddo and von

Stengel using symbolic perturbations ensuring that a quasi-perfect

equilibrium is computed.

programs.

community: How to compute a sequential equilibrium using realization

plan representation (McKelvey and McLennan) and gives an

alternative to an algorithm of von Stengel, van den Elzen and Talman

for computing an nromal form perfect equilibrium.

72

Perturbed game G(ε)

constraint on the mixed strategies allowed:

d moves must have realization weight at least

εd.

Facts

0.

found in practice using the simplex algorithm,

p g ε a symbolic

keeping y p

parameter representing

p g

sufficiently small value.

polynomial time by the ellipsoid algorithm.

Theorem

gy

equilibrium found for G(ε), we get a behavior

strategy profile for the original game G. This can

y

be done symbolically y

equilibrium

ilib i ffor G

G.

could have feared that an extensive form perfect

equilibrium was computed.

Questions about quasi-perfect equilibria

quasi-perfect

perfect equilibria of a zero-

zero

sum game 2-player game a Cartesian product

(as the sets of Nash and normal-form proper

equilibria are)?

polyhedrally characterized/computed (as the

sets off Nash

N h andd normal-form

lf proper equilibria

ilib i

can)?

All complaints taken care of?

[..] the strategies are not guaranteed to take advantage of mistakes when they

become apparent.

apparent This can lead to very counterintuitive behavior

behavior. For example

example,

assume that player 1 is guaranteed to win $1 against an optimal player 2. But

now, player 2 makes a mistake which allows player 1 to immediately win

$10000. It is perfectly consistent for the ‘optimal’ (maximin) strategy to continue

playing so as to win the $1 that was the original goal

goal.

Koller and Pfeffer, 1997.

If you run an=1 bl=1 it tells you that you should fold some hands (e.g. 42s) when

the small blind has only called, so the big blind could have checked it out for a

free showdown but decides to muck his hand. Why is this not necessarily a

bug? (This had me worried before I realized what was happening).

Selby, 1999.

Matching Pennies on Christmas

Morning

Player 1 hides a penny.

penny.

Player I has the option of giving Player 2 another penny, no

strings

g attached ((after all, it’s Christmas).

)

Matching Pennies on Christmas

Morning, bad Nash equilibrium

Matching Pennies on Christmas

Morning, good equilibrium

How to celebrate Christmas

without losing your

Nash Eq.

(Nash 1951)

mind

(Normal form)

Subgame Perfect Eq

Trembling hand perfect Eq.

(Selten 1965)

(Selten 1975)

Sequential Eq.

((Kreps-Wilson 1982))

Trembling hand perfect eq.

eq (van Damme 1991)

(Selten 1975)

Proper eq.

eq

(Myerson 1978)

81

Normal form proper equilibrium

(Myerson ’78)

A limit point as ε ! 0 of εε-proper

proper strategy

profiles.

mixed strategies,

strategies so that for any two pure

strategies i,j belonging to the same player, if j

is a worse response than i to the mixed

strategy of the other player, then p(j) · ε p(i).

Normal form proper equilibrium

(Myerson ’78)

Intuition:

make mistakes.

other

th player

l are made

d iin a rational

ti l manner.

83

Normal-form properness

The good equilibrium of Penny-Matching-on-

Christmas-Morning is the unique normal-form

proper one.

mistakes are made in a “rational fashion”. In

particular, after observing that the opponent

gave a gift,

ift we assume that

th t apartt from

f thi

this

he plays sensibly.

Properties of Proper equilibria of zero

sum games (van Damme, 1991)

product D1 £ D2 (as for Nash equlibria)

equlibria).

Strategies

St t i off Di are payoff i l t The

ff equivalent: Th

choice between them is arbitrary against any

strategy of the other player

player.

85

Miltersen and Sørensen, SODA

2008

For imperfect information games, a normal form

proper equilibrium can be found by solving a

sequence of linear programs, based on the KMvS

programs.

KMvS “balancing”

balancing the slack obtained in the

inequalitites.

Up

p or down? Max q

q·5

q · 6 xu + 5 xd

5

q xu + xd = 1

xu, xd ¸ 0

2

xu 6

xd

5

87

“Bad” optimal

p solution Max q

q=1, xu = 0, xd = 1 q·5 No slack

q · 6 xu + 5 xd

5

q xu + xd = 1

xu, xd ¸ 0

2

xu 6

xd

5

88

Good optimal

p solution Max q

q=1, xu = 1, xd = 0 q·5 Slack!

q · 6 xu + 5 xd

5

q xu + xd = 1

xu, xd ¸ 0

2

xu 6

xd

5

could achieve,

achieve right hand side is what he actually achieves by taking the

action, so slack is good!

89

The algorithm

Solve original KMvS program.

some optimal solution. Intuition: These are the inequalities

indexed by action sequences containing mistakes.

mistakes

containing

g mistakes but having g no p

prefix containing

g mistakes.

those inequalities.

inequalities)

90

Proof of correctness

Dresher s

procedure” – characterizing the proper

equilibria of a matrix game.

“survives” the iteration.

are “payoff”-equivalent.

91

Left or right?

1

Unique proper eq.: 2/3 1/3

2 2

1 0 2 0

92

Interpretation

If Player 2 never makes mistakes the choice is arbitrary.

We should imagine that Player 2 makes mistakes with

some small probability but can train to avoid mistakes in

either the left or the right node.

In equilibrium, Player 2 trains to avoid mistakes in the

“

“expensive” node with probability 2/3.

/

Similar to “meta-strategies” for selecting chess openings.

The perfect information case is easier and can be solved

in linear time by “a backward induction procedure”

without linear programming.

This procedure assigns three values to each node in the

tree, the “real” value, an “optimistic” value and a

“pessimistic” value.

93

The unique proper way to play tic-

tac-toe

Questions about computing proper

equilibria

Can a proper equilibrium of a general-sum

bimatrix game be found by a “pivoting algorithm”? Is it in

the complexity class PPAD? Can one convincingly argue

that this is not the case?

polynomials

l i l iin ²) for

f a matrix

t i game be

b ffoundd iin

polynomial time). Motivation: This captures a

“lexicographic belief structure” supporting the

corresponding proper equilibrium.

equilibrium

95

Plan

sum games and computing minimax strategies.

g

resolve the issues

issues, and how to modify the algorithms to compute

refinements.

two-player,

player zero-sum

zero sum case

case.

Finding Nash equilibria of general

sum games in normal form

Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou, 2005. Finding an approximate

Nash equilibrium in a 4-player game is PPAD-complete.

a 2-player

2 l game iis PPAD-complete.

PPAD l t

… this means that these tasks are polynomial time equivalent to each other

and to finding an approximate Brower fixed point of a given continuous map

map.

case polynomial time

time.

.. On the other hand, the tasks are not likely to be NP-hard.: If they are NP-

a d, tthen

hard, e NP=coNP.

co

Motivation and Interpretation

”If

If your laptop can’t

can t find it neither can the

market” (Kamal Jain)

What is the situation for

equilibrium refinements?

Finding a refined equilibrium is at least as

hard as finding a Nash equilibrium.

3-player game in normal form is trembling

hand perfect is NP-hard.

Two-player zero-sum games

Player 1: Player 2 :

Gus,, the Howard,, the

Maximizer Minimizer

v = max x∈Δ ( S1 ) min y∈Δ ( S 2 ) u1 ( x, y )

Minmax value (upper value, threat value):

v = min y∈Δ ( S 2 ) max x∈Δ ( S1 ) u1 ( x, y )

von Neuman’s minmax theorem

(LP duality): v=v

100

Three-player zero-sum games

Player 1: Players 2 and 3:

Gus,, the Alice and Bob,, the

Maximizer Minimizers

“honest-but-married”

Maxmin value (lower value, security value):

v = max x∈Δ ( S1 ) min ( y , z )∈Δ ( S 2 )×Δ ( S3 ) u1 ( x, y, z )

v = min ( y , z )∈Δ ( S 2 )×Δ ( S3 ) max x∈Δ ( S1 ) u1 ( x, y, z )

Uncorrelated mixed

strategies.

strategies

101

Three-player zero-sum games

Player 1: Players 2 and 3:

Gus,, the Alice and Bob,, the

Maximizer Minimizers

“honest-but-married”

Maxmin value (lower value, security value):

v = max x∈Δ ( S1 ) min ( y , z )∈Δ ( S 2 )×Δ ( S3 ) u1 ( x, y, z )

v = min ( y , z )∈Δ ( S 2 )×Δ ( S3 ) max x∈Δ ( S1 ) u1 ( x, y, z )

Bad news:

• Lower value · upper value but in general not =

• Maxmin/Minmax not necessarily Nash

• Minmax value may be irrational

102

Why not equality?

Computable in

P given table

P,

of u1

v = max x∈Δ ( S1 ) min ( y , z )∈Δ ( S 2 )×Δ ( S3 ) u1 ( x, y, z )

= max x∈Δ ( S1 ) min ( y , z )∈S 2 ×S3 u1 ( x, y, z )

= min ( y , z )∈Δ ( S 2 ×S3 ) max x∈Δ ( S1 ) u1 ( x, y, z )

Correlated mixed

strategy (married-and-dishonest!)

value threat value):

Borgs et al., STOC 2008:

NP-hard to approximate, given table of u1!

103

Borgs et al., STOC 2008

NP-hard minmax

value of a 3-player n x n x n game with

payoffs

p y 0,1

, ((win,lose)

, ) within additive error

3/n2.

Proof – Hide and seek game

undirected graph.

Proof – Hide and seek game

undirected graph.

Gus, blindfolded, has to call

the location of one of them.

Alice is at

…. 8

Analysis

Call arbitrary player at random vertex.

Hide at random vertex

1/n.

Hide and seek game with colors

Alice and Bob hide in an

undirected graph.

.. and declare a color in

the location of one of them.

Alice is at

…. 8

Hide and seek game with colors

Additional way in which

Gus may win: Alice and

Bob makes a declaration

inconsistent with 3-coloring.

Oh no

you don’t!

Hide and seek game with colors

Additional way in which

Gus may win: Alice and

Bob makes a declaration

inconsistent with 3-coloring.

Oh no

you don’t!

Analysis

If graph is 3-colorable

3 colorable, minmax value is 1/n:

Alice and Bob can play as before.

least 1/n + 1/(3n2).

)

Reduction to deciding trembling

hand perfection

Given a 3-player game G, consider the task of determining if the

min-max of Player 1 value is bigger than ®+² or smaller than ®-².

Define G* by

y augmenting

g g the strategy

gy space

p of each p

player

y with a

new strategy *.

0, no matter what is played

played.

he gets in G

G.

minmax

i value

l off G iis smaller

ll th

than ® - ².

²

Intuition

equilibrium (*,*,*) Players 2 and 3 may tremble and play the exactly

the minmax strategy. Hence the equilibrium is trembling hand

perfect.

about how Players 2 and 3 may tremble that Player 1 could not react

to and achieve something better than ® by not playing *. This makes

(*,*,*) imperfect,

happen to have a fixed belief about what will happen if Players 2

and 3 tremble(?)…..

Questions about NP-hardness of

the general-sum case

Is deciding trembling hand perfection of a

3-player game in NP?

NP-hard (same reduction). Can properness of an

equilibrium of a 2-player game be decided in P? In NP?

114

115

- The Laws of EuchreAs adopted by the Somerset Club of Boston, March 1, 1888 by Dwight, JamesUploaded byGutenberg.org
- 6 Max NLHE Strategy GuideUploaded byJose Guerra
- johanson pokerbotUploaded byJohannes Eath Edamovic
- PokerStrategiesUploaded byantohif
- Rory Monahan - Texas Hold'Em SecretsUploaded byPop George
- Profitable PokerUploaded byTony
- Systematic Poker - No Limit Sit-N-Go Texas Holdem SystemUploaded byPop George
- Monetary policy and monetary policy instrumentsUploaded byjhsobrun
- Rummy - a tactical versionUploaded byProsthetic Head
- Online No Limit Texas Hold em Poker for Beginners EnglishUploaded byIg21
- The Pot-Limit Omaha Book by Tri Slow Habit) NguyenUploaded byBilly Saucer
- Games of Skill and Games of Chance: Poker as a Game of Skill - PPA (2009)Uploaded bypokerplayersalliance
- Advanced Concepts Of Poker-Complete 352Pg BookUploaded byMateus Pinheiro da Silva
- how-to-win-at-online-pokerUploaded bysio2008
- Texas Hold 'em ExcellenceUploaded bycghub
- Dusty Schmidt -Don't Listen to Phil HellmuthUploaded byCeno Nedkov
- Card Games Properly Explained - Arnold MarksUploaded byConstable & Robinson
- leenelsonebook_letsplayUploaded byAurelien Djekhiane
- Easy Game Volume I by Andrew Balugawhale SeidmanUploaded byArjun Prakash
- [Cigital] 100M Hand Analysis ReportUploaded bypokerplayersalliance
- Hoyle Card Games HelpUploaded byChristiaan de Klerk
- Economic PsychologyUploaded byΦαίδων Μαρμαρίδης
- Systematic Poker - No Limit Texas Holdem SystemUploaded byPop George
- 2011 Card Games ManualUploaded bylrc24332725
- PPA Players' Funds Legal GuideUploaded bypokerplayersalliance
- Micro Stakes GuideUploaded byhexilumhexus
- Free Steps to Winning Texas Hold EmUploaded byjamsams
- Jason Pohl - Short Handed and SNGUploaded byPop George
- Jonathan Schaeffer - Learning to Play Strong PokerUploaded byPop George
- Winning Consistently at Online PokerUploaded byEstela Silva

- Chapter 1 Part 7Uploaded byJohn Good
- Joint regression models for sales analysis using SASUploaded bydmitry8071
- ms 2016Uploaded bySitangshu Pal
- Myths and Counterexamples in Mathematical Programming.pdfUploaded byPedro Díaz
- Robust StatisticsUploaded bysantoso22
- Flexible Flow Shop Sheduling Problem With Machine EligibilityUploaded byRajesh Ravindran
- MixedModels-RandSAScomparisonUploaded bywoelfert
- Hetero StataUploaded byGucci Zamora Diamante
- 01cLPGraphical(XNET)Uploaded byVivan Sharma
- w2 l2 Measuringthecostofliving HandoutUploaded byImran Khan
- Math lesson 5_7Uploaded bycermatika
- Lecture 8 and 9 Regression Correlation and IndexUploaded byআসিফ বিন মনজুর
- 173232298 a Guide to Modern Econometrics by Verbeek 321 330Uploaded byAnonymous T2LhplU
- stats ii - height vs shoe size finishedUploaded byapi-286571309
- Cost of CapitalUploaded byRosanwo Kehinde O
- 13. Simple Linear RegressionUploaded byNurgazy Nazhimidinov
- week 7 Revised Application.docUploaded byPandurang Thatkar
- Excel Sales Forecasting For Dummies Cheat Sheet - For Dummies.pdfUploaded byromwama
- diagnostics.pdfUploaded bypaula_mon89
- Linear ProgramingUploaded byLuis Ivan
- A General Approach to Causal Mediation AnalysisUploaded bymarianscribd
- Time+Series+Econometrics+for+MicroeconometriciansUploaded byZhang Hanghui
- M1L4_LNUploaded bysantosprsd
- Review_5AUploaded byAsaf Abramovich
- Computational Approach to Generalized Ratio Type Estimator of Population Mean Under Two Phase SamplingUploaded byEditor IJRITCC
- Econometrics With RUploaded byKrishnan Chari
- YMS Ch4: More on Two-Variable Data AP Statistics at LSHS Mr. MoleskyUploaded byInTerp0ol
- Math562_ContinuousOptimizationUploaded byDSP111
- Lauer 1982Uploaded byAlluri Appa Rao
- CorrelationUploaded byRizzah Mae Soriano Raguine