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Topic: Arias Doctrine

Ponente: JOSE MENDOZA


ALEJANDRO C. RIVERA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 156577, December 03, 2014
ALFREDO Y. PEREZ, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 156587
LUIS D. MONTERO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 156749
FACTS:
Several Department of Health (DOH) officials of Region VIII were charged with
violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act after they
entered into a negotiated contract with PAL Boat Industry owned by Palanas
regarding the construction of riverine boats to be used as floating clinics. All three
appellants were convicted by the Sandiganbayan.
Perez was held liable because as the Chairman of the RIBAC, he pre-qualified
Palanas. He knew that Palanas had more liabilities than capital and yet he still prequalified him based on an ocular inspection. He cited the ruling in Arias v
Sandiganbayan which states that heads of offices could rely to a reasonable extent
on their subordinates on good faith. Since he merely relied on the vouchers and
reports of his subordinates, he should be acquitted.
ISSUE:
Can Perez invoke the Arias doctrine?
SC:
No. The Arias doctrine is not an absolute rule. It is not a magic cloak that can be
used as a cover by a public officer to conceal himself in the shadows of his
subordinates and necessarily escape liability. Thus, this ruling cannot be applied to
exculpate the petitioners in view of the peculiar circumstances in this case which
should have prompted them, as heads of offices, to exercise a higher degree of
circumspection and, necessarily, go beyond what their subordinates had prepared.
In the case at bench, Perez should have placed himself on guard when the
documents and vouchers given to him by his subordinates did not indicate the
retention money required by P.D. No. 1594. Moreover, when he personally inspected
the construction site of PAL Boat, he should have noticed the financial weakness of

the contractor and the defective works. Deplorably, Perez kept mum and chose to
continue causing undue injury to the government. No other conclusion can be
inferred other than his manifest partiality towards PAL Boat.
Topic: Due Process
Ponente: PRESBITERO VELASCO JR
EDELBERT C. UYBOCO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 211703, December 10, 2014
FACTS:
Uyboco was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. Then he filed a motion praying for the
reopening of the proceedings on the ground that his constitutional rights to due
process and to competent counsel were violated when his former counsel did not
present any evidence in his defense. His counsel then merely relied on the defences
presented by the lawyers of his two other co-accused. The Sandiganbayan
dismissed his petition.
ISSUE:
Is his constitutional right to due process violated?
SC:
No. It has already been ruled that a client is bound by his counsels conduct,
negligence and mistake in handling a case, and to allow a client to disown his
counsels conduct would render proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to
reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. The basis is the tenet that
an act performed by counsel within the scope of a general or implied authority is
regarded as an act of the client. While the application of this general rule certainly
depends upon the surrounding circumstances of a given case, there are exceptions
recognized:
(1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process
of law;
(2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or
property; or
(3) where the interests of justice so require.
The present case does not fall under the said exceptions.
Furthermore, Uyboco cannot attribute any serious misjudgment or fault or gross
incompetence on his counsel alone as the decision not to present further evidence

in his defense bears his conformity as shown by his signature in the manifestation
he submitted.

Topic: Power of LGU to tax


Ponente: TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF
MANILA, AND ANTHONY Y. ACEVEDO, CITY TREASURER v. HON. ANGEL
VALERA COLET, AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA
(BR. 43), AND MALAYSIAN AIRLINE SYSTEM
G.R. No. 120051, December 10, 2014
FACTS:
Due to the implementation of Ordinance No. 7794 or the Manila Revenue Code,
several corporations engaged in transportation of passengers or freight by hire and
common carriers by air, land or water were taxed pursuant to Section 21 (b) thereof.
This then led to the filing of complaints against the city and its officials claiming that
the provision is void for being unconstitutional since it has no power to impose said
taxes because no law grants such.
ISSUE:
Is Section 21 (b) of the Manila Revenue Code constitutional?
SC:
No. It was null and void for being beyond the power of the City of Manila and its
public officials to enact, approve, and implement under the LGC. Although the
power to tax is inherent in the State, the same is not true for the LGUs to whom the
power must be delegated by Congress and must be exercised within the guidelines
and limitations that Congress may provide. This is because the LGUs are mere
territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines
Also, Section 133(j) of the LGC clearly and unambiguously proscribes LGUs from
imposing any tax on the gross receipts of transportation contractors, persons
engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by hire, and common carriers
by air, land, or water. Even if under Section 143(h) of the LGC, the LGUs may
impose tax on any business subject to the excise, value-added or percentage tax
under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended , the former section must
prevail.
First, Section 133(j) of the LGC is a specific provision while Section 143 of the LGC
defines a general power. This is in accord with the rule on statutory construction
that specific provisions must prevail over general ones irrespective of their relative
positions in the statute.

Second, the construction adopted by the Court gives effect to both Sections 133(j)
and 143(h) of the LGC. In construing a law, care should be taken that every part
thereof be given effect and a construction that could render a provision inoperative
should be avoided, and inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever
possible as parts of a harmonious whole.
Third, pursuant to Section 5(b) of the LGC itself, Section 21(B) of the Manila Revenue
Code, as amended, should be strictly construed against the City of Manila and its
public officials and liberally in favor of the transportation contractors, persons
engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by hire, and common carriers
by air, land, or water. And fourth, the construction adopted by the Court is in
accordance with the consistent intention of the law.