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Chapter IX

and training for mass casualty events, dedica-

T he tragic scenes that occurred at Virginia

Tech are the worst that most emergency
medical service (EMS) providers will ever see.
tion, and ability to perform at a high level in the
face of the disaster that struck so many people.

Images of so many students and faculty mur- The Virginia Tech Rescue Squad and Blacksburg
dered or seriously injured in such a violent man- Volunteer Rescue Squad were the primary agen-
ner and the subsequent rescue efforts can only be cies responsible for incident command, triage,
described by those who were there. This chapter treatment, and transportation. Many other
discusses the emergency medical response on regional agencies responded and functioned
April 16 to victims including their pre-hospital under the Incident Command System (ICS). The
treatment, transport, and care in hospitals. Blacksburg Volunteer Rescue Squad (BVRS) per-
sonnel and equipment response was timely and
Interviews were conducted with first responders, strong. Virginia Tech Rescue Squad (VTRS), the
emergency managers, and hospital personnel lead EMS agency in this incident, is located on
(physicians, nurses, and administrators) to
the Virginia Tech campus and is the oldest colle-
determine: giate rescue squad of its kind nationwide. It is a
• The on-scene EMS response. volunteer, student-run organization with 38
members. Their actions on April 16 were heroic
• Implementation of hospital multi-
and demonstrated courage and fortitude.
casualty plans and incident command
• Pre-hospital and in-hospital initial RESPONSE
patient stabilization.
• Compliance with the National Incident
Management System (NIMS).
T he first EMS response was to the West
Ambler Johnston (WAJ) residence hall inci-
dent. At 7:21 a.m., VTRS was dispatched to 4040
• Communications systems used. WAJ for the report of a patient who had fallen
• Coordination of the emergency medical from a loft. In 3 minutes, at 7:24 a.m., VT Rescue
care with police and EMS providers. 3 was en route. While en route, dispatch advised
that a resident assistant reported a victim lying
Evaluating patient care subsequent to the initial against a dormitory room door and that bloody
pre-hospital and hospital interventions was footprints and a pool of blood were seen on the
beyond the scope of this investigation. Fire floor. VT Rescue 3 arrived on scene at 7:26 a.m.,
department personnel were not interviewed 5 minutes from the time of dispatch. This
because there were no reports of their involve- response time falls within the nationally ac-
ment in patient care activities cepted range.

Although there is always opportunity for

improvement, the overall EMS response was
excellent and the lives of many were saved. The 1
VTRS. (2007). April 16, 2007: EMS Response. Presentation
challenges of systematic response, scene and to the Virginia Tech Review Panel. May 21, 2007, The Inn at
Virginia Tech.
provider safety, and on-scene and hospital 2
NFPA (2004). NFPA 1710: Standard for the Organization
patient care were effectively met. Responders are and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency
to be commended. The results in terms of patient Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by
Career Fire Departments. National Fire Protection Associa-
care are a testimony to their medical education tion: Battery March Park, MA.


At 7:29 a.m., Rescue 3 accessed the dorm room to Following CPR that occurred en route she was
find two victims with gunshot wounds, both pronounced dead at CRMH.
obviously in critical condition. At 7:31 a.m., it
requested a second advanced life support (ALS) Based on the facts known, the triage, treatment,
and transportation of both WAJ victims
unit and ordered activation of the all-call tone
requesting all available Virginia Tech rescue per- appeared appropriate. The availability of heli-
sonnel to respond to the scene. The “all-call” copter transport likely would not have affected
patient outcomes. Their injuries were incompati-
request is a normal procedure for VTRS to
respond to an incident with multiple patients. ble with survival.
Personnel from BVRS responded to WAJ as well.
At 7:48 a.m., VT Rescue 3 requested that
Carilion Life-Guard helicopter be dispatched and
was informed that its estimated time of arrival
A t 9:02 a.m., VT Rescue 3 returned to service
following the WAJ incident. VT Rescue 2
continued equipment cleanup at MRH when the
was 40 minutes. It was decided to dispatch the
call for the Norris Hall shootings came in. At
helicopter to Montgomery Regional Hospital
approximately 9:42 a.m., VTRS personnel at
(MRH). Carilion Life-Guard then advised that
their station overheard a call on the police radio
they were grounded due to weather and never
advising of an active shooter at Norris Hall.
began the mission.
Many EMS providers were about to respond to
One of the victims in 4040 WAJ was a 22-year- the worst mass shooting event on a United
old male with a gunshot wound to the head. He States college campus.
was in cardiopulmonary arrest. CPR was initi-
Upon hearing the police dispatch of a shooting at
ated, and he was immobilized using an extrica-
Norris Hall, the VTRS officer serving as EMS
tion collar and a long spine board. VT Rescue 3
commander immediately activated the VTRS
transported him to MRH. During communica-
Incident Action Plan and established an incident
tions with the MRH online physician, CPR was
command post at the VTRS building. VT Rescue
ordered to be discontinued. He arrived at the
3 3, staffed with an ALS crew, stood by at their
hospital DOA.
station. At about 9:42 a.m., VTRS requested the
The second victim was an 18-year-old female Montgomery County emergency services coordi-
with a gunshot wound to the head. She was nator to place all county EMS units on standby
treated with high-flow oxygen via mask, two IVs and for him to respond to the VTRS Command
were established, and cardiac monitoring was Post. “Standby” means that all agency units
initiated. She was immobilized with an extrica- should be staffed and ready to respond. Each
tion collar and placed on a long spine board. At agency officer in charge is supposed to notify the
7:44 a.m., she was transported by VT Rescue 2 to appropriate dispatcher when the units are
MRH. During transport, her level of conscious- staffed.
ness began to deteriorate and her radial pulse
4 The Montgomery County Communications Cen-
was no longer palpable. Upon arrival at MRH,
ter immediately paged out an “all call” alert (9:42
endotracheal intubation was performed. At 8:30
a.m.) advising all units to respond to the scene at
a.m., she was transferred by ground ALS unit to
Norris Hall.
Carilion Roanoke Memorial Hospital (CRMH), a
Level I trauma center in Roanoke, Virginia. The EMS responses to West Ambler Johnston
and Norris halls occurred in a timely manner.
EMS Patient Care Report Q0669603. However, for the shootings at Norris Hall, all
EMS Patient Care Report Q0669604. EMS units were dispatched to respond to the
Turner, K. N., and Davis, J. (2007). Public Safety Timeline
for April 16, 2007. Unpublished Report. Montgomery County 6
Department of Emergency Services, p. 4. EMS Patient Care Report Q0019057.


scene at once contrary to the request. Sub- Overall, the structure of the EMS ICS was effec-
sequently, the Montgomery County emergency tive. The ICS as implemented during the inci-
services coordinator requested dispatch to correct dent is compared in Figure 13 and Figure 14 to
the message in time to allow for most of the in- NIMS ICS guidelines. Figure 13 shows the
coming squads to proceed to the secondary stag- Virginia Tech EMS ICS structure as imple-
ing area at the BVRS station. mented in the incident. Although it did not
strictly follow NIMS guidelines, it included most
At 9:46 a.m., VTRS was dispatched by police to
of the necessary organization. Figure 14 shows
Norris Hall for multiple shootings—4 minutes the Model ICS structure based on the NIMS
after VTRS monitored the incident (9:42 a.m.) on
the police radio. The VTRS EMS commander
advised VT dispatch that the VTRS units would EMS Command – An EMS command post was
stand by at the primary staging site until police established at VTRS. The BVRS officer-in-charge
secured the shooting area. At 9:48 a.m., the EMS who arrived at Norris Hall reportedly was
commander also requested the VT police dis- unable to determine if an EMS ICS was in place.
patcher to notify all responding EMS units from Since each agency has its own radio frequency,
outside Virginia Tech to proceed to the secondary the potential for miscommunication of critical
staging area at BVRS instead of responding information regarding incident command is pos-
directly to Norris Hall. sible. To enhance communications, EMS com-
mand reportedly switched from the VTRS to the
The VTPD and the Montgomery County Com- BVRS radio frequency. In addition, to shift rou-
munications Center issued separate dispatches
tine communications from the main VT fre-
for EMS units, which led to some confusion in quency, EMS command requested units to switch
the EMS response. to alternate frequency, VTAC 1. Some units were
confused by the term VTAC 1. Eventually, all
EMS INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM units switched to the Montgomery County

A t the national level, Homeland Security Mutual Aid frequency.

Presidential Directives (HSPDs) 5 and 8
The fact that BVRS was initially unaware that
require all federal, state, regional, local, and
VTRS had already established an EMS command
tribal governments, including EMS agencies, to
7 post could have caused a duplication of efforts
adopt the NIMS, including a uniform ICS. The
and further organizational challenges. Partici-
Incident Management System is defined by
pants interviewed stated that once a BVRS offi-
Western Virginia EMS Council in their Mass
cer reported to the EMS command post, commu-
Casualty Incident (MCI) Plan as:
nications between EMS providers on the scene
A written plan, adopted and utilized by all improved. The Montgomery County emergency
participating emergency response agencies, management coordinator was on the scene and
that helps control, direct and coordinate served as a liaison between the police tactical
emergency personnel, equipment and other
command post and the EMS incident command
resources from the scene of an MCI or
evacuation, to the transportation of patients post, which also helped with communications.
to definitive care, to the conclusion of the
8 Because BVRS and VTRS are on separate pri-
mary radio frequencies, BVRS reportedly did not
know where to stage their units. In addition,
BVRS units reportedly did not know when the
7 police cleared the building for entry.
Bush, G. W. (2003). December 17, 2003 Homeland Security
Presidential Directive/HSPD–8.
8 9
WVEMS. (2006). Mass Casualty Incident Plan: EMS VTRS. (2007). April 16, 2007: EMS Response. Presentation
Mutual Aid Response Guide: Western Virginia EMS Council, to the Virginia Tech Review Panel. May 21, 2007, The Inn at
Section 2.1.7, p. 2. Virginia Tech.


Virginia Tech Rescue

Squad EMS

Montgomery County
Virginia Tech Rescue
Squad EMS
Command Post
Operations Chief

Triage Officer Staging Officer Treatment Officer

Primary Staging
Triage Teams Tertiary Triage
(on campus)

Primary Secondary
Triage Staging
(Station 1)


Figure 13. Virginia Tech EMS ICS as Implemented in the Incident

Another issue concerned the staging of units ing them out of the building. As victims exited
and personnel. EMS command correctly advised the building, some walked and some were car-
dispatch that assignments and staging would be ried out and transported by police SUV’s and
handled by EMS command. other mobile units to the safer EMS treatment
Triage – The VTPD arrived at Norris Hall at
9:45 a.m. At 9:50 a.m., the VTPD and Blacks- The triage by ERT medics inside the Norris Hall
burg police emergency response teams (ERTs) classrooms had two specific goals: first, to iden-
arrived at Norris Hall, each with a tactical tify the total number of victims who were alive
medic. At 9:50 a.m., two ERT medics entered or dead; and second, to move ambulatory vic-
Norris Hall where they were held for about 2 tims to a safe area where further triage and
minutes inside the stairwell before being al- treatment could begin. The tactical medics em-
lowed to proceed. At 9:52 a.m., the two medics, ployed the START triage system (Simple Triage
one from VTRS and one from BVRS, began tri- and Rapid Treatment) to quickly assess a victim
age. Medics initially triaged those victims and determine the overall incident status. The
brought to the stairwells while police were mov- START triage is a “method whereby patients in
an MCI are assessed and evaluated on the basis
Turner, K.N., & Davis, J. (2007). Public Safety Timeline
for April 16, 2007. Unpublished Report. Montgomery County
Department of Emergency Services, p. 6.


EMS Command
VT Rescue
VT Lieutenant
Liaison Officer
Safety Officer
Norris Hall
Norris Hall
Montgomery Co.
Blacksburg Lt.


Operations Chief Logistics Chief

Planning Chief Finance/Admin
VT Rescue VT Rescue
VT EMS Command VT University Staff
VT Lieutenant VT Lieutenant

Staging Manager Base

VT Rescue Blacksburg

Triage Group Treatment Group Transportation

Norris Hall Norris Hall Group
VT Captain VT Lieutenant VT Rescue

Major Treatment
Morgue Unit
Unit Medical
Norris Hall
Norris Hall Communicator
Blacksburg Lt.

Initial Triage Unit Delayed

Norris Hall Treatment Unit
Tactical Medics Barger Street

Minor Treatment
VT Rescue

Patient Dispatch
VT Rescue

Figure 14. Model ICS Based on the NIMS Guidelines

of the severity of injuries and assigned to treat-

11 Immediate
ment priorities.” Patients are classified in one
of four categories (Figure 15). Colored tags are Delayed
affixed to patients corresponding to these catego- Minor
ries. 12
In an incident of this nature, the triage team
Figure 15. START Triage Patient Classifications
must concentrate on the overall situation instead

11 12
WVEMS. (2006). Mass Casualty Incident Plan: EMS Critical Illness and Trauma Foundation, Inc. (2001).
Mutual Aid Response Guide: Western Virginia EMS Council, START—Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment.
Section 2.1.8, p. 2.


of focusing on individual patient care. Patient A decision was quickly made to treat a 22-year-
care is limited to quick interventions that will old male victim who exhibited a profuse femoral
make the difference between life and death. The artery bleed by applying a commercial-brand
medics systematically approached the initial tri- tourniquet (Figure 17) to control the bleeding.
age, with one assessing victims in the odd- The patient was transported to MRH, where sur-
numbered rooms on the second floor of Norris gical repair was performed and he survived. The
Hall while the other assessed victims in the application of a tourniquet was likely a lifesaving
even-numbered rooms. The medics were able to event.
quickly identify those victims who were without
vital signs and would likely not benefit from
medical care. This initial triage by the two tacti-
cal medics accompanying the police was appro-
priate in identifying patient viability. The medics
reported “a tough time with radio communica-
tions traffic” while triaging in Norris Hall.

The triage medics identified several patients who

required immediate interventions to save their
lives. Some victims with chest wounds were
treated with an Asherman Chest Seal (Figure
16). It functions with a flutter valve to prevent
air from entering the chest cavity during inhala- Figure 17 Tourniquet
tion and permits air to leave the chest cavity
during exhalation. This is a noninvasive tech- At approximately 10:09 a.m., VTPD dispatch
nique that can be applied quickly with low risk. notified EMS command that the “shooter was
It was reported that a female victim with chest down” and that EMS crews could enter Norris
wounds benefited by the immediate application Hall. EMS command assigned a lieutenant from
of the seal. Since the scene was not yet secured VTRS to become the triage unit leader. Triage
at this point to allow other EMS providers to continued inside and in front of Norris Hall.
enter, the tactical medics quickly instructed Some critical patients at the Drillfield side and
some police officers how to use the seal. others at the secondary triage (critical treatment
unit) Old Turner Street side of Norris Hall were
placed in ambulances and transported directly to
hospitals. Noncritical patients were moved to a
treatment area at Stanger and Barger Streets.

A BVRS officer and crew arrived at Norris Hall

and began to retriage victims. Their reassess-
ment confirmed that 31 persons were dead.
Based on the evidence available, the decision not
to attempt resuscitation on those originally tri-
aged as dead was appropriate. No one appeared
to have been mistriaged. A medical director
(emergency physician) for a Virginia State Police
Figure 16. Asherman Chest Seal Division SWAT team responded with his team to
the scene. He was primarily staged at Burress
Hall and was available to care for wounded
ACS (2007). Asherman Chest Seal. 14 Medgadget (2007).


officers if needed. There were no reports of inju-

ries to police officers.

Interviews of prehospital and hospital personnel

revealed that triage ribbons or tags were not
consistently used on victims. The standard triage
tags were used on some patients but not on all.
These triage tags, shown in Figure 18, are part of
the Western Virginia EMS Trauma Triage
Protocol and can assist with record keeping and
patient follow-up. Not using the tags may have
led to some confusion regarding patient
identification and classification upon arrival at

Treatment – Patients were moved to the treat-

ment units based on START guidelines. The
treatment group was divided into three units: a
critical treatment unit, a delayed treatment unit
and a minor treatment unit. The critical treat-
ment unit was located at the Old Turner Street
Side of Norris Hall where patients with immedi-
ate medical care needs (red tag) received care.
Patients who were classified as less critical (yel-
low tag) were moved to the delayed treatment
unit at Stanger and Barger Streets. Patients
with minor injuries, including walking wounded/
worried well (green tag) were moved to a minor
treatment unit at VTRS (Figure 19). “Worried
well” are those who may not present with inju-
ries but with psychological or safety issues.

Patients were moved to the treatment units in

various ways. Some critical patients were carried
out of Norris Hall by police and EMS personnel.
Others were moved via vehicles, while those less
critical walked to the delayed treatment or minor
treatment units. EMS command assigned leaders
to each of the units.
Figure 18. Virginia Triage Tag
The weather was a significant factor with wind
set up or maintained. Large vehicles such as
gusts of up to 60 mph grounding all aeromedical
trailers and mobile homes, often used for tempo-
services and hampering the use of EMS equip-
rary shelter, had difficulty responding as high
ment. This included tents, shelters, and treat-
winds made interstate driving increasingly haz-
ment area identification flags that could not be
ardous. The incident site was close to ongoing
construction. High winds blew debris, increasing
danger to patients and providers and impeding
WVEMS. (2006). Mass Casualty Incident Plan: EMS patient care. To protect the walking wounded/
Mutual Aid Response Guide: Western Virginia EMS Council., worried well from the environment, patients
Section 22.3, p. 13.


A/B: Staging Areas

B C: Command Post
D D: Treatment Area
(Delayed and Minor
A Treatment Units)

E: Secondary Triage
(Critical Treatment

Figure 19. Initial Location of Treatment Units

were moved to the minor treatment unit at the was among the first in line at Norris Hall. CRS,
VTRS building. BVRS, CPTS, and Longshop–McCoy Rescue
Squad transported critical patients to area hos-
Twelve EMS patient care reports (PCRs) were pitals. CPTS ambulances from Giles, Radford,
available for review. In some cases PCRs were and Blacksburg as well as some of their
not completed, and in other cases not provided
Roanoke-based units, including Life-Guard
upon request. In multiple casualty incident flight and ground critical care crews, responded
situations, EMS providers can use standard tri- in mass to the incident either at Norris Hall or
age tags in place of the traditional PCR; how-
by interfacility transport of critical victims. By
ever, no triage tag records were provided, as 10:51 a.m., all patients from Norris Hall were
noted earlier. either transported to a hospital, or moved to the
Based on the PCRs available and the interviews delayed or minor treatment units. In addition to
of EMS and hospital personnel, it appears that VTRS, 14 agencies responded to the incident
the patient care rendered to Norris Hall victims with 27 ALS ambulances and more than 120
was appropriate. EMS personnel (Table 4). Some agencies
delayed routine interfacility patient transports
Transportation – EMS command appointed a or “back filled” covering neighboring communi-
transportation group leader who assigned ties through preset mutual aid agreements.
patients to ambulances and specific hospital Agency supervisors and administrators were
destinations. Christiansburg Rescue Squad working effectively behind the scenes procuring
(CRS) responded with BLS and ALS units and


Table 4. EMS Response EMS units from several companies would trans-
14 Assisting Agencies port the deceased to Roanoke. In general, front-
line EMS units are not used to transport the
Montgomery County Emergency Services
deceased. In this instance, however, the use of
EMS units was acceptable because emergency
Blacksburg Volunteer Rescue Squad
coverage was not neglected and the rescuers felt
Christiansburg Rescue Squad
that the sight of a refrigeration truck and
Shawsville Rescue Squad
funeral coaches on campus would be undesir-
Longshop-McCoy Rescue Squad
Carilion Patient Transportation Services
Salem Rescue Squad The decedents were placed two to a unit for
Giles Rescue Squad transport. A serious concern raised by EMS pro-
Newport Rescue Squad viders was an order given by an unidentified
Lifeline Ambulance Service police official that the decedents be transported
Roanoke City Fire and Rescue to Roanoke under emergency conditions (lights
Vinton First Aid Crew and sirens). Due to safety considerations, EMS
Radford University EMS command modified this order.
City of Radford EMS
The police order to transport the deceased under
the necessary resources and supporting the emergency conditions from Norris Hall to the
response of their EMS crews. These agencies medical examiners office in Roanoke was in-
demonstrated an exceptional working relation- appropriate for several reasons:
ship, likely an outcome of interagency training
• It is not within law enforcement’s scope
and drills.
of practice to order emergency transport
False Alarm Responses – At 10:58 a.m., EMS (red lights and siren) of the deceased.
command was notified of a reported third shoot- • There was no benefit to anyone by
ing incident at the tennis court area on Wash- transporting under emergency condi-
ington Street that proved to be a false alarm. At tions.
11:18 a.m., EMS command was notified of a
• A 30-minute or longer drive to Roanoke,
bomb threat at Norris and Holden Halls that
during bad weather, with winds gusting
also proved to be false. Due to safety concerns,
above 60 mph, exposes EMS personnel
EMS command ordered the staging area moved
to unnecessary risks.
from Barger St. to Perry St.
• Transporting under emergency condi-
Post-Incident Transport of the Deceased – tions increases the possibility of vehicle
At 4:03 p.m., the medical examiner authorized crashes with risk to civilians.
removal of the deceased from Norris Hall to the
medical examiner’s office in Roanoke. Due to Critical Incident Stress Management –
another rescue incident in the Blacksburg area, Although no physical injuries were reported,
units were not available until 5:15 p.m. to begin psychological and stress- related issues can sub-
transport of the deceased. Several options were sequently manifest in EMS providers. Local and
considered including use of a refrigeration regional EMS providers participated in critical
truck, funeral coaches, or EMS units. EMS incident stress management activities such as
command, in consultation with the medical defusings and debriefings immediately post-
examiner’s representative, determined that incident.

VTRS. (2007). April 16, 2007: EMS Response. Presenta-
tion to the Virginia Tech Review Panel. May 21, 2007, The
Inn at Virginia Tech.


HOSPITAL RESPONSE Montgomery Regional Hospital – The MRH

emergency department, a Level III trauma cen-

P atients from Virginia Tech were treated at

five area hospitals:
ter, received 17 patients from the Virginia Tech
incident; two from West Ambler Johnston and
• Montgomery Regional Hospital 15 from Norris Hall. The patients from WAJ
arrived at 7:51 and 7:55 a.m. The first patient
• Carilion New River Valley Hospital
from WAJ was the 22-year-old male with a gun-
• Lewis–Gale Medical Center shot wound to the head who was DOA. No fur-
• Carilion Roanoke Memorial Hospital ther attempts at resuscitation were made in the
emergency department.
• Carilion Roanoke Community Hospital
The second patient from WAJ was the 18-year-
Twenty-seven patients are known to have been
old female who arrived in critical condition with
treated by local emergency departments. Some
a gunshot wound to the head. Upon arrival to
others who were in Norris Hall may have been
the emergency department, she was unable to
treated at other hospitals, medical clinics, or
speak and her level of consciousness was dete-
doctor’s offices including their own primary care
riorating. Airway control via endotracheal intu-
providers; but there are no known accounts.
bation was achieved using rapid sequence in-
Overall, the local and regional hospitals quickly duction. At 8:30 a.m., she was transported by
implemented their hospital ICS and mobilized ALS ambulance to Carilion Roanoke Memorial
resources. Aggressive measures were taken to Hospital, the Level I trauma center for the
postpone noncritical procedures, shift essential region. She died shortly after arrival at CRMH.
personnel to critical areas, reinforce physician
staffing, and prepare for patient surge. Three
notified of shots fired somewhere on the
hospitals initiated their hospital-wide emer-
Virginia Tech campus. Because they were un-
gency plans. One hospital, a designated Level I
sure of the number of shooters or whether the
trauma center, did not feel that a full-scale,
incident was confined to campus, MRH initiated
hospital-wide implementation of their emer-
a lockdown procedure. Since the killing of a hos-
gency plan was necessary.
pital guard at MRH in August 2006 (the Morva
The most significant challenge early on was the incident mentioned in Chapter VII), there has
lack of credible information about the number of been heightened awareness at MRH regarding
patients each expected to receive. The emer- security procedures. At 10:00 a.m., information
gency departments did not have a single official became available confirming multiple gunshot
information source about patient flow. Likely victims. A “code green” (disaster code) was initi-
explanations for this were (1) an emergency ated and the following actions were taken:
operations center (EOC) was not opened at the
• The hospital incident command center
university, and (2) the Regional Hospital Coor-
was opened and preassigned personnel
dinating Center did not receive complete infor-
reported to command.
mation that it should have under the MCI
17 • The hospital facility was placed on a
controlled access plan (strict lockdown).
Preparedness, patient care/patient flow, and Only personnel with appropriate identi-
patient outcomes were reviewed for each of the fication (other than patients) could enter
receiving hospitals. the hospital and then only through one
• All elective surgical procedures were
Personal communications, Morris Reece, Near Southwest postponed.
Preparedness Alliance, June 15, 2007.


• Day surgery patients with early surgery At 10:30 a.m. as the above actions were being
times were sent home as soon as possi- taken, four more gunshot victims arrived via
ble. EMS transport from Norris Hall. Between 10:45
• The emergency department was placed and 10:55 a.m., five additional patients arrived
on divert for all EMS units except those via EMS. Command designated a public infor-
arriving from the Norris Hall incident. mation officer and, by 11:00 a.m., a base had
The emergency department was staffed been established where staff and counselors
at full capacity. A rapid emergency could assist family and friends of patients.
department discharge plan was insti- By 11:15 a.m., MRH was still unclear about how
tuted. Stable patients were transferred many additional patients to expect. (They had a
from the emergency department to the total of 12 by this time.) The operations chief
outpatient surgery suite. instructed an emergency administrator to
At 10:05 a.m., the first patient from Norris Hall respond to the Virginia Tech incident as an on-
arrived via self-transport. This patient was scene liaison to determine how many more
injured escaping from Norris Hall. MRH was patients would be transported to MRH. At 11:20
unable to determine the extent of the Norris a.m., the emergency department administrator
Hall incident based on the history and minor reported to the Virginia Tech command center.
injuries of this patient. The Regional Hospital MRH said that the face-to-face communications
Coordinating Center (RHCC) was notified of the were helpful in determining how many addi-
incident and asked to open. Although the RHCC tional patients to expect.
had early notification of the incident, they too At 11:40 a.m., MRH received its last gunshot
were not able to ascertain the extent of the cri- victim from the incident. By 11:51 a.m., its on-
sis initially. scene liaison confirmed that all patients had
At 10:14 and 10:15 a.m., two EMS-transported been transported. At 12:12 p.m., the EMS divert
patients from Norris Hall arrived. It was evi- was lifted. At 13:04 and 13:10 p.m., however,
dent that MRH might continue to receive two additional patients from the incident
expected and unexpected patients. In prepara- arrived by private vehicle. At 13:35 p.m., the
tion for the surge, MRH took the following addi- code green was lifted.
• The Red Cross was alerted and the blood all, 15 patients arrived at MRH from the Norris
supply reevaluated. Hall incident (Table 5) and were managed well.

• Additional pharmaceutical supplies and An emergency department (ED) nurse/EMT-C

a pharmacist were sent to the emer- was assigned to online medical direction and
gency department. assisted with directing patients to other hospi-
• A runner was assigned to assist with tals. EMS was instructed to transport four
bringing additional materials to and patients to Carilion New River Valley Hospital
from the emergency department and the and five patients to Lewis–Gale Medical Center.
pharmacy. One patient from the Norris Hall incident was
transferred from MRH to CRMH in Roanoke.
• Disaster supply carts were moved to the
hallways between the emergency The hospital representatives reported that there
department and outpatient surgery. were problems with patient identification and
tracking. As noted earlier:
Montgomery Regional Hospital. (2007). Montgomery
Regional Hospital VT Incident Debriefing. April 23, 2007,
p. 1.


Table 5. Norris Hall Victims Treated by friends to gather. Since Virginia Tech had not
Montgomery Regional Hospital yet opened an EOC or family assistance center,
some victims’ family and friends chose to pro-
Injuries Disposition
ceed to the closest hospital. Several family
GSW left hand – fractured OR and admission
members and friends of victims came to MRH
4th finger
even though their loved ones were never trans-
GSW to right chest – Chest tube in OR and
hemothorax admission ported there.
GSW to right flank OR and admission to A psychological crisis counseling team was
assembled at MRH to provide services to vic-
GSW left elbow, right thigh Admitted
tims, their families and loved ones, and hospital
GSW x 2 to left leg OR and admission staff. Virginia State Police troopers were
assigned to the hospital and were helpful in
GSW right bicep Treated and discharged
maintaining security.
GSW right arm, grazed chest Admitted
wall; abrasion to left hand
At 11:30 a.m., a surgeon arrived from Lewis–
GSW right lower extremity; OR and ICU Gale Hospital and was emergently credentialed
laceration to femoral artery
by the medical staff office. This is notable as
GSW right side abdomen OR and ICU
and buttock
Lewis–Gale and MRH are not affiliated.
GSW right bicep Treated and discharged Police departments often rely on hospitals to
GSW to face/head Intubated and trans- help preserve evidence and maintain a chain of
ferred to CRMH custody. MRH was able to gather evidence in
Asthma attack precipitated Treated and discharged the emergency department and operating
by running from building
rooms, including bullets, clothing, and patient
Tib/fib fracture due to jump- OR and admission
identification. At 1:45 p.m., the Virginia State
ing from a 2nd-story window
Police notified the hospital that all bullets and
First-degree burns to chest Treated and discharged
wall fragments were to be considered evidence.
Back pain due to jumping Treated and discharged Internal communications issues included:
from a 2nd-story window
• The Nextel system was overwhelmed.
• An EOC was not activated at Virginia Clinical directors were too busy to
Tech. Establishing an EOC can enhance retrieve and respond to messages.
communications and information flow to
• Monitoring EMS radio communications
was difficult due to noise and chatter.
• Triage tags were not used for all
• There was deficient communications
patients. This would have provided a
between the university and MRH.
discrete number for identifying and
tracking each patient. • An EOC could have been helpful with
MRH activated its ICS as shown in Figure 20.


FRIENDS: MRH accommodated families and
friends of patients they treated in their emer-
gency department. MRH was challenged by the
need to provide assistance to those who were
unsure of the status or location of persons they
were trying to find (possibly victims). An open 19
Heil, J. et al. (2007). Psychological Intervention with the
space on the first floor was used for family and Virginia Tech Mass Casualty: Lessons Learned in the Hospi-
tal Setting. Report to the Virginia Tech Review Panel.


Incident Commander

Safety Officer
PIO Marketing
Director Safety/Security

Biological/Infectious Disease Legal Affairs

Chemical Risk Management
Liaison Officer Medical/Technical
Radiological Medical Staff
Dir. Emergency Mgmt. Specialist(s) Clinic Administration Pediatric Care
Hospital Administration Medical Ethicist

Operations Chief Planning Chief Logistics Chief Finance Section Chief

CNO CEO/Director Emergency Mgmt. CEO CFO

Resources Leader Services Branch

Staging Manager Time Unit Leader
Director Material Mg. Director
Personnel Staging Team Personnel Tracking Communications Unit
Vehicle Staging Team Material Tracking IT/IS Unit
Equipment/Supply Staging Team Staff Food & Water Unit Procurement Unit
Medication Staging Team Leader
Situation Unit Leader
Medical Care Director Support Branch
ED Director Patient Tracking Director Compensation/Claims
Bed Tracking Unit Leader
Triage Unit Leader Employee Health & Well-Being Unit
(ED RN/Surgeon) Family Care Unit
Immediate Care Unit Leader Supply Unit
(ED Charge Nurse) Documentation Unit Facilities Unit
Delayed/Minor Unit Leader Leader Transportation Unit Cost Unit Leader
(ED RN/NP) Labor Pool & Credentialing Unit

Infrastructure Branch Demobilization Unit

Director Leader
Power/Lighting Unit
Water/Sewer Unit
Building/Grounds Damage Unit
Medical Gases Unit
Medical Devices Unit
Environmental Services Unit
Food Services Unit

Hazmat Branch Director

Detection and Monitoring Unit

Spill Response Unit
Victim Decontamination Unit
Decontamination Unit

Security Branch
Access Control Unit
Crowd Control Unit
Traffic Control Unit
Search Unit
Law Enforcement Interface Unit

Business Continuity
Branch Director
Information Technology Unit
Service Continuity Unit
Records Preservation Unit
Business Function Relocation Unit

Figure 20. Montgomery Regional Hospital ICS


Carilion New River Valley Hospital – friends and assisting others who were looking
CNRVH is a Level III trauma center that for their loved ones.
received four patients with moderate to severe
Table 6. Norris Hall Victims Treated by Carilion New
River Valley Hospital
Injuries Disposition
unofficial reports of the WAJ shootings. They
GSW to face, pre-auricular Surgical cricothyro-
heard nothing further for over 2 hours until
area, bleeding from external tomy
they received a call from MRH and also from an auditory canal, GCS of 7, poor Transferred to CRMH
RN/medic who was on scene. They were called airway, anesthesiologist rec- by critical care ALS
again later by MRH and advised that they ommended surgical airway ambulance
would be receiving patients with “extremity GSW to flank and right arm, Immediately taken to
injuries.” They were also notified that MRH was hypotensive OR; small bowel
on EMS divert. injury/resection
GSW to posterior thorax (exit To OR for surgical
While waiting for patients to arrive, the emer- right medial upper arm), addi- repair of left femur
gency department (ED) physician medical direc- tional GSWs to right buttock, fracture
and left lateral thigh
tor assumed responsibility for the “regular” ED
GSW to right lateral thigh, exit Admitted in stable
patients while the on-duty physicians were pre-
thru right medial thigh, lodged condition and
paring to treat patients from Norris Hall. The in left medial thigh observed; no vascular
on-duty hospitalist (a physician who is hired by injuries
the hospital to manage in-patient care needs)
Lewis–Gale Medical Center – LGMC, a com-
reported to the ED to make rapid decisions on
munity hospital, received five patients from the
whether current patients would be admitted or
Norris Hall shootings. The ICS structure used
and their emergency response to the incident
The hospital declared a “code green” and their were appropriate. Multiple casualty incidents
EOC was opened at 11:50 a.m. The incident and use of the ICS were not new to LGMC.
commander was a social worker who had special Their ICS had been recently tested after an out-
training in hospital ICS. Security surveyed all break of food poisoning at a local college.
patients with a metal detection wand because
they were unsure who may be victims or perpe-
aware of the Norris Hall incident when a call
trators. A SWAT team from Pulaski County
was received requesting a medical examiner.
responded to assist with security.
They were unable to fulfill the request. At 11:10
PATIENT CARE/PATIENT FLOW/PATIENT OUTCOMES: a.m., they received a call from Montgomery
Four patients were transported by EMS to Regional Hospital advising them of the incident.
CNRVH, each having significant injuries. The LGMC immediately declared a “code aster,”
hospital managed the patients well and could which is their disaster plan.
have handled more. Table 6 lists the patient
The code aster was announced throughout the
injuries and dispositions.
hospital, the EOC was opened, and the ICS was
ACCOMMODATIONS FOR PATIENTS’ FAMILIES AND initiated. At 11:16 a.m., they were notified that
FRIENDS: The hospital received many phone calls MRH was on EMS diversion. At 11:32 a.m., they
concerning the whereabouts of Virginia Tech were notified that they were receiving their first
shooting victims. Communications issues, par- patient suffering from a gunshot wound. In
ticularly the lack of accurate information, were addition to preparing for the patients to arrive
a big concern for the hospital; while providing at their own hospital, LGMC sent a surgeon to
accommodations for patients’ families and MRH to assist with the surge of surgical
patients there.


PATIENT CARE/PATIENT FLOW/PATIENT OUTCOMES: trauma fellow physician, one radiologist, one
EMS transported five patients from the Norris anesthesiologist, and a lab technician.
Hall shootings to LGMC. Table 7 lists the
patient injuries and dispositions. These patients In addition to the patient transfers, CRMH
received a trauma patient from another inci-
were well managed.
dent. The ED had three other emergency physi-
Table 7. Norris Hall Victims Treated by cians physically present with others on standby.
Lewis–Gale Medical Center A neurosurgeon was also in the ED awaiting the
arrival of transfer patients.
Injuries Disposition
GSW grazed shoulder and Patient taken to sur- CRMH’s concerns echoed those of the other hos-
lodged in occipital area, did gery by ENT for pitals who received patients from the Virginia
not enter the brain debridement
Tech incident, including lack of clarity as to
GSW in back of right arm, Patient admitted for expected patient surge and the need for better
bullet not removed observation
regional coordination. It was suggested that the
GSW to face, bullet fragment Treated in ED and
in hair, likely secondary to released RHCC Mobile Communications Unit could have
shrapnel spray been dispatched to the scene.
Jumped from Norris Hall, 2nd Admitted, taken to sur-
floor, shattered tib/fib gery the next day
CRMH appropriately triaged and managed well
Jumped from Norris Hall, 2nd Treated in ED and
floor, soft tissue injuries, released the patients they received. Adequate staffing
neck and back sprain, re- and operating rooms were immediately avail-
portedly was holding hands able. Table 8 lists WAJ and Norris Hall victims
with another jumper
treated at CRMH.
No specific information was obtained from Carilion Roanoke Memorial Hospital
LGMC about accommodations for patients’ fami-
lies and friends. However, the hospital’s needs Injuries Disposition
for accurate information while accommodating Transfer from MRH, se- Pronounced dead in ED
patient families’ and friends and assisting vere head injury
others in attempting to locate loved ones are Transfer from MRH, head Patient taken to OR for
similar for all emergency departments in times and significant facial/jaw surgery, subsequently
injuries, subsequent oro- transferred to a facility
of mass casualty incidents. tracheal intubation closer to home
Carilion Roanoke Memorial Hospital – This Transfer from CNRVH, Patient taken to OR for
GSW to face, subsequent surgery
Level I trauma facility located in Roanoke cricothyrotomy
received three critical patients transferred from
local hospitals. Two patients were transported Carilion Roanoke Community Hospital –
from MRH (one from the WAJ incident and one CRCH is a community hospital located near and
from the Norris Hall incident). The third patient associated with CRMH. CRCH treated a self-
was transferred from CNRVH (from the Norris transported student who was injured by jump-
Hall incident). ing from Norris Hall. Table 9 lists the injuries
and disposition of this patient.
its hospital-wide disaster plan since standard Table 9. Norris Hall Victim Treated by Carilion
procedures allowed for effective incident man- Roanoke Community Hospital
agement with the relatively small number of
Injuries Disposition
patients received. They did initiate a “gold
Ankle contusion and sprain Treated and released
trauma alert” that brings to the ED three secondary to jumping
nurses, one trauma attending physician, one


EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT The Virginia Department of Health regional

planning approach aligns hospitals with health

M ulticasualty incidents often require coor-

dination among state, regional, and local
authorities. This section reviews the inter-
department planning regions. In collaboration
with the 88 acute care hospitals in the Com-
monwealth, six hospital and healthcare plan-
relationships of these authorities. ning regions were established, closely corre-
Virginia Department of Health – In 2002, sponding with five health department planning
the Virginia Department of Health (VDH) was regions. Each of the six hospital planning
awarded funding from the Health Resources and regions has a designated Regional Hospital
Services Administration (HRSA) National Coordinating Center (RHCC) located at or near
Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program the Level I trauma facility in the region as well
(NBHPP) for enhancement of the health and as a regional hospital coordinator funded
medical response to bioterrorism and other through the HRSA cooperative agreement.
emergency events. As part of this process, VDH Near Southwest Preparedness Alliance –
developed a contract with the Virginia Hospital The Near Southwest Preparedness Alliance
and Healthcare Association (VHHA) to manage (NSPA), which covers the Virginia Tech area,
the distribution of funds from the HRSA grant was developed under the auspices of the West-
to state acute care hospitals and other medical ern Virginia EMS Council pursuant to a memo-
facilities and to monitor compliance. A small randum of understanding between the Virginia
percentage of the HRSA funds were used within Department of Health, the Virginia Hospital
VDH to fund a hospital coordinator position, as and Healthcare Association, and the NSPA.
well as to partially fund a deputy commissioner NSPA is organized to facilitate the development
and other administrative positions. Substan- of a regional healthcare emergency response
tially more than 85 percent of this HRSA grant system and to support the development of a
funding was distributed to hospitals or used for statewide healthcare emergency response sys-
program enhancement, including development tem. Regional hospital preparedness and coor-
of a web-based hospital status monitoring sys- dination will foster collaborative planning
tem, multidisciplinary training activities, efforts between the several medical care facili-
behavioral health services, and poison control ties and local emergency response agencies in
centers. the established geographically and demographi-
At the same time, VDH received separate fund- cally diverse region.21
ing from the Centers for Disease Control and The “Near Southwest” region is defined as:
Prevention (CDC) for the enhancement of public
health response to bioterrorism and other emer- • 4th Planning District (New River area),
gency events. The position of VDH Deputy which includes Floyd, Giles, Montgom-
Commissioner for Emergency Preparedness and ery, and Pulaski counties and the City of
Response was created, with responsibility for Radford.
both CDC and HRSA emergency preparedness • 5th Planning District (Roanoke and
funds. The physician in this position reports Alleghany area), which includes
directly to the state health commissioner, who Alleghany, Botetourt, Craig, and Roa-
serves as the state health officer for Virginia. noke counties as well as the cities of
Covington, Roanoke, and Salem.
• 11th Planning District, which includes
Kaplowitz, L, Gilbert, C. M., Hershey, J. H., and Reece, Amherst, Appomattox, Bedford, and
M. D. (2007). Health and Medical Response to Shooting
Episode at Virginia Tech, April, 2007: A Successful
Approach. Unpublished Manuscript. Virginia Department of 21
Health, p. 2. Ibid.


Campbell counties; the cities of • Establish and manage WebEOC and
Lynchburg and Bedford; and the towns communications systems for the dura-
of Altavista, Amherst, Appomattox, and tion of the incident.
Brookneal. • Serve as the single point of contact and
• 12th Planning District (Piedmont area), collaboration point for Virginia fire/EMS
which includes Franklin, Henry, Patrick agencies for the purposes of hospital di-
and Pittsylvania counties and the cities version management, movement of
of Danville and Martinsville patients from an incident scene to
receiving hospitals, and input/guidance
The region covers 7,798 square miles and with respect to hospital capabilities,
houses a population of 910,900. It has 24 local available services, and medical trans-
governments and 16 hospitals. port decisions.
Regional Hospital Coordinating Center – • Coordinate interhospital patient move-
At the regional level, hospital emergency ment, transfers, and tracking
response coordination during exercises and • Provide primary resource management
actual events is provided by RHCCs that have to hospitals for:
been established to facilitate emergency
response, communication, and resource alloca- Equipment
tion within and among each of the six hospital Supplies
regions. These centers serve as the contact
among healthcare facilities within the region
and with RHCCs in other state regions. RHCCs • Coordinate regional expenditures for
are also linked to the statewide response system reimbursement.
through the hospital representative seat at the • Coordinate regional medical treatment
VDH Emergency Coordinating Center (ECC) in and infection control protocols during
Richmond, Virginia. The hospital seat at the the incident as needed.
ECC serves as the contact between the health- • Coordinate Virginia hospital requests
care provider system and the statewide emer- for the Strategic National Stockpile
gency response system. It provides a communi- through the local jurisdiction EOC.
cation link to the Virginia Emergency Opera-
tions Center (VEOC). The RHCC complements but does not replace
the relationships and coordinating channels
The primary responsibilities of the RHCC established between individual healthcare
include: facilities and their local emergency operations
• Provide a single point of contact between centers and health department officials. The
hospitals in the region and the VDH regional structure is intended to enhance the
ECC. communication and coordination of specific
issues related to the healthcare component of
• Collect and disseminate initial event no- the emergency response system at both regional
tification to hospitals and public safety
and state levels.
• Collect and disseminate ongoing situ- At 10:05 a.m. on April 16, MRH requested that
ational awareness updates and warn- the RHCC be activated. At 10:19 a.m., it was
ings, including the management of the activated under a standby status and signed on
current bed availability in hospitals.
WebEOC is a web-based information management system
22 that provides a single access point for the collection and
Ibid. dissemination of emergency or event-related information


to WebEOC. By 10:25 a.m., the Virginia De- those in Patrick, Floyd, and Giles counties. The
partment of Health also had signed on to region’s total population (based on 1998 esti-
WebEOC and monitored the event. At 10:40 mates) is 661,200. The region encompasses
a.m., the RHCC requested that all hospitals 9,643 square miles.
provide an update of bed status and diversion
status for their facility. By 10:49 a.m., LGMC The region encompasses the counties of
was the only hospital that signed on to WebEOC Alleghany, Botetourt, Craig, Floyd, Franklin,
Giles, Henry, Montgomery, Patrick, Pittsylva-
of the hospitals that had received patients from 26
the Norris Hall incident. Pulaski County Hospi- nia, Pulaski, and Roanoke (Figure 21).
tal also signed on and provided their status. At
11:49 a.m. (1 hour later), MRH signed on fol-
lowed by CNRVH at 12:33 p.m.

The WebEOC boards (the RHCC Events Board

and the Near Southwest Region Events Board)
were used for a variety of communications
between the RHCC, hospitals, and other state
agencies. Some hospitals spent considerable
time attempting to post information on the
WebEOC boards. None of the EMS jurisdictions
signed on to either of the boards. Not all hospi-
tals or EMS agencies are confident in using
WebEOC and require regular training drills for Figure 21. Map Showing Counties in the
familiarity. Western Virginia EMS Region

The hospitals and public safety agencies should Multicasualty Incidents – The Western
have used the RHCC and WebEOC expedi- Virginia EMS Mass Casualty Incident Plan
tiously to gain better control of the situation. (WVEMS MCI) plan defines a multiple casualty
Considering the many rumors and unconfirmed incident as “an event resulting from man-made
reports concerning patient surge, the incident or natural causes which results in illness and/or
could have been better coordinated. If the RHCC injuries that exceed the emergency medical ser-
was kept informed as per the MCI plan, it could vices capabilities of a hospital, locality, jurisdic-
have acted as the one official voice for informa- tion and/or region.” Online medical direction is
tion concerning patient status and hospital the responsibility of the MCI Medical Control,
availability. defined as:
That medical facility, designated by the
Western Virginia EMS Mass Casualty Inci-
hospital community, which provides remote
dent Plan – The Western Virginia EMS region overall medical direction of the MCI or
encompasses the 7 cities and 12 counties of evacuation scene according to predeter-
Virginia Planning Districts 4, 5, and 12. The mined guidelines for the distribution of
region extends from the West Virginia border to patients throughout the community.
the north and to the North Carolina border to
the south. The region encompasses the urban
and suburban areas of Roanoke and Danville, as 26
WVEMS. (2006). Trauma Triage Plan. Western Virginia
well as many rural and remote areas such as EMS Council, Appendix E.
24 28
Baker, B. (2007). VA Tech 4-16-2007: RHCC Events WVEMS. (2006). Mass Casualty Incident Plan: EMS
Board, p. 1. Mutual Aid Response Guide: Western Virginia EMS Council,
25 Section 2.1.1, p. 1.
Baker, B. (2007). April 16, 2007: Near Southwest Region 29
Events Board, p. 1. Ibid., Section 2.1.4, p. 1.


Access to online physician medical direction were unable to determine the appropri-
should be available. In MCI situations, modern ate level of preparation.
EMS systems rely more on standing orders and • In several instances, on-scene providers
protocols and less on online medical direction. called hospitals or other resources
Therefore, it may be more logical to have the directly instead of through the ICS. This
RHCC coordinate these efforts, including patch- included relaying incorrect information
ing in providers to online physician medical to hospitals.
direction as needed.
• Cell phones and blackberries worked
The MCI plan identifies three levels of incidents intermittently and could not be relied
based on the initial EMS assessment using the upon. Officials did not have time to
Virginia START Triage System: return or retrieve messages left on cell
phones. A mobile cell phone emergency
• Level 1 – Multiple-casualty situation operating system was not immediately
resulting in less than 10 surviving vic- available to EMS providers.
• Level 2 – Multiple casualty situation Interviews with EMS and hospital personnel
resulting in 10 to 25 surviving victims. reiterated a well-known fact: face-to-face com-
munications, when practical, is the preferred
• Level 3 – Mass casualty situation result-
30 method.
ing in more than 25 surviving victims.
From a technological standpoint, the NIMS
The Virginia Tech incident clearly fits into the requirement for interoperability is critical. Local
definition of a Level 3 MCI, since at least 27 communities must settle historical issues and
patients were treated in local emergency move forward toward an efficient communica-
tions system.
Frustrating communications issues and barriers
Lack of a common communications system
occurred during the incident. Every service between on-scene agencies creates confusion
operated on different radio frequencies making and could have caused major safety issues for
dispatch, interagency, and medical communica-
responders. Each jurisdiction having its own
tions difficult. These issues included both on- frequencies, radio types, dispatch centers, and
scene and in-hospital situations that could be procedures is a sobering example of the lack of
avoided. Specific communications challenges
economies of scale for emergency services. Local
included the following: political entities must get past their inability to
• The radios used by responding agencies reach consensus and assure interoperability of
consisted of VHF, UHF, and HEAR fre- their communications systems. In this case, the
quencies. This led to on-scene communi- most reasonable and prudent action probably
cations difficulties and the inability for would be to expand the Montgomery County
EMS command or Virginia Tech dis- Communications System to handle all public
patch to assure that all units were safety communications within the county. Coop-
aware of important information. eration, consensus building, and the provision of
adequate finances are required by emergency
• Communications between the scene and
service leaders and governmental entities. Fail-
the hospitals were too infrequent. Hos-
ure to accomplish this goal will leave the region
pitals were unable to understand exactly
vulnerable to a similar situation in the future
what was going on at the scene. They
with potentially tragic results.

Unified Command – There is little evidence

Ibid., Section 7, p. 4. that there was a unified command structure at


the Virginia Tech incident. Command posts the BPD, a university official, a VT EMS officer,
were established for EMS and law enforcement a BVRS EMS officer, the FBI special agent-in-
at the Norris Hall scene and for law enforce- charge, the state police superintendent, and the
ment at another location. Separate command ranking elected official for the City of Blacks-
structures are traditional for public safety agen- burg. The operations section chief would have
cies. The 9/11 attack in New York City exempli- received operational guidelines from the unified
fied the need for public safety agencies to step command post and assured their implementa-
back and reconsider these traditions. At Norris tion.
Hall, a unified command structure could have
led to less confusion, better use of resources, The unified command team would be in direct
communications with the EOC and policymak-
better direction of personnel, and a safer work-
ing environment. Figure 22 depicts a proposed ing group. Command and general staff members
model unified command structure that could would have communicated with their counter-
parts in the EOC. The policymaking group
have been utilized.
would have transmitted their requests to the
The unified command post would be staffed by EOC and the unified command post.
those having statutory authority. During the
Virginia Tech incident, those personnel would
likely have been the police chiefs for VTPD and


Liaison Officer
Safety Officer
Montgomery County
EMS or Fire
Emergency Coord.

Joint Information

Planning Logistics Finance/
Section Chief
Section Chief Section Chief Administration
Virginia Tech or
VT Police or VTRS Virginia Tech EMS Virginia Tech Univ.
Blacksburg Police

Law Deputy Planning

EMS Section Chief
Branch FBI or ATF Assistant
Special Agent In
Charge (ASAIC)
*For this incident, law enforcement would have been the lead agency. The unified command post would be staffed by
those having statutory authority. During the Virginia Tech Incident, those personnel would likely have been the police
chiefs for the VTPD and BPD, a university official, a VT EMS officer, the FBI special agent-in-charge, the Virginia State
Police superintendent, and the ranking elected official for the City of Blacksburg.

Figure 22. Proposed Model Unified Command Structure for an April 16-Like Incident


Emergency Operations Center – The lack of The application of a tourniquet to control a

an EOC activated quickly as the incident un- severe femoral artery bleed was likely a life-
folded led to much of the confusion experienced saving event.
by hospitals and other resources within the
Patients were correctly triaged and transported
community. An EOC should have been activated
at Virginia Tech. The EOC is usually located at to appropriate medical facilities.
a pre-designated site that can be quickly acti- The incident was managed in a safe manner,
vated. Its main goals are to support emergency with no rescuer injuries reported.
responders and ensure the continuation of
operations within the community. The EOC Local hospitals were ready for the patient surge
does not become the incident commander but and employed their NIMS ICS plans and man-
instead concentrates on assuring that necessary aged patients well.
resources are available.
All of the patients who were alive after the
A policy-making group would function within Norris Hall shooting survived through discharge
the EOC. Virginia Tech had assembled a policy from the hospitals.
making group that functioned during the inci-
Quick assessment by a hospitalist of emergency
department patients waiting for disposition
Another responsibility of the EOC is the estab- helped with preparedness and patient flow at
lishment of a joint information center (JIC) that one hospital.
acts as the official voice for the situation at
The overall EMS response was excellent, and
hand. The JIC would coordinate the release of
the lives of many were saved.
all public information and the flow of informa-
tion concerning the deceased, the survivors, EMS agencies demonstrated an exceptional
locations of the sick and injured, and informa- working relationship, likely an outcome of
tion for families of those displaced. By not im- interagency training and drills.
mediately activating an EOC, hospitals or the
RHCC did not receive appropriate or timely Areas for Improvement
information and intelligence. There was also a All EMS units were initially dispatched by the
delay in coordinating services for families and Montgomery County Communications Center to
friends of victims who needed to be identified or respond to the scene; this was contrary to the
located. Although Virginia Tech eventually set request.
up a family assistance center, it was not done
immediately. There was a 4-minute delay between VTRS
monitoring the incident (9:42 a.m.) on the police
KEY FINDINGS radio and its being dispatched by police (9:46
Positive Lessons
Virginia Tech police and the Montgomery
The EMS responses to the West Ambler Johns- County Communications Center issued separate
ton residence hall and Norris Hall occurred in a dispatches. This can lead to confusion in an
timely manner. EMS response.
Initial triage by the two tactical medics accom- BVRS was initially unaware that VTRS had
panying the police was appropriate in identify- already set up an EMS command post. This
ing patient viability. could have caused a duplication of efforts and
further organizational challenges. Participants
interviewed noted that once a BVRS officer
reported to the EMS command post, communi-


cations between EMS providers on the scene National Incident Management System
improved. Incident Command System model. For this
incident, law enforcement would have been the
Because BVRS and VTRS are on separate pri-
lead agency.
mary radio frequencies, BVRS reportedly did
not know where to stage their units. In addition, IX-3 Emergency personnel should use the
BVRS units were reportedly unaware of when National Incident Management System
the police cleared the building for entry. procedures for nomenclature, resource typ-
ing and utilization, communications,
Standard triage tags were used on some
interoperability, and unified command.
patients but not on all. The tags are part of the
Western Virginia EMS Trauma Triage Protocol. IX-4 An emergency operations center must
Their use could have assisted the hospitals with be activated early during a mass casualty
patient tracking and record management. Some incident.
patients were identified by room number in the
emergency department and their records IX-5 Regional disaster drills should be
held on an annual basis. The drills should
became difficult to track.
include hospitals, the Regional Hospital Coordi-
The police order to transport the deceased under nating Center, all appropriate public safety and
emergency conditions from Norris Hall to the state agencies, and the medical examiner’s
medical examiners office in Roanoke was office. They should be followed by a formal post-
inappropriate. incident evaluation.

The lack of a local EOC and fully functioning IX-6 To improve multi-casualty incident
RHCC may lead to communications and opera- management, the Western Virginia Emer-
tional issues such as hospital liaisons being sent gency Medical Services Council should
to the scene. If each hospital sent a liaison to review/revise the Multi-Casualty Incident
the scene, the command post would have been Medical Control and the Regional Hospital
overcrowded. Coordinating Center functions.

A unified command post should have been IX-7 Triage tags, patient care reports, or
established and operated based on the NIMS standardized Incident Command System
ICS model. forms must be completed accurately and
retained after a multi-casualty incident.
Failure to open an EOC immediately led to They are instrumental in evaluating each com-
communications and coordination issues during
ponent of a multi-casualty incident.
the incident.
IX-8 Hospitalists, when available, should
Communications issues and barriers appeared assist with emergency department patient
to be frustrating during the incident. dispositions in preparing for a multi-
casualty incident patient surge.
IX-9 Under no circumstances should the
IX-1 Montgomery County, VA should
deceased be transported under emergency
develop a countywide emergency medical
conditions. It benefits no one and increases the
services, fire, and law enforcement commu-
likelihood of hurting others.
nications center to address the issues of
interoperability and economies of scale. IX-10 Critical incident stress management
and psychological services should continue
IX-2 A unified command post should be
to be available to EMS providers as needed.
established and operated based on the