Egypts Sisi Is Getting Pretty Good at

Being a Dictator
But will the army continue to back the president if the
economy starts to tank?

BY THANASSIS CAMBANIS-MAY 22, 2015

The outrageous death sentences in Egypt over the weekend, and the muted reaction
from Western governments, suggest that President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has cemented
a ruling coalition that will propel him out of a transitional phase into a long-term project
of power consolidation.
Lost amid the court ruling against more than 100 defendants which include
academics and senior members of the Muslim Brotherhood, even Egypts sole elected
civilian president, Mohamed Morsi is the mounting evidence that Sisi has cobbled
together a workable formula for ruling Egypt. This formula might be doomed in the long
run, but the long run can be very far off indeed.
Todays governing agenda in Egypt centers around three things: a crackdown on
terror and dissent, maintaining a steady flow of cash from the Sunni monarchies of
the Gulf, and modest economic reforms that at a minimum give the impression of

vision and positive momentum.

The governments war on terror will resonate with Egyptians for quite some time.
Jihadi attacks have proliferated since Morsi was deposed in July 2013; one fact
sheet released by the government last year documented more than 700 people killed
in the attacks. There have been dozens since, mostly targeting security forces and
government facilities.
The public is repulsed by the bomb attacks on the police, army, and other government
branches. Even most of the Muslim Brotherhood supporters of the deposed Morsi also
condemn the insurgency and its terrorist tactics. As a unifying ideology for the
Egyptian state, a war on terror might not suffice but it will go a long way to mobilize
what might be otherwise tepid support for Sisi and the military.
In prosecuting its war on terror, Egypt has lumped the Muslim Brotherhood together
with the jihadi Ansar Beit al-Maqdis equating dissent in the vernacular of political
Islam with bombings and assassinations. The Muslim Brotherhood is the parent
organization of extreme ideology, Sisi told theWashington Post in March. They are
the godfather of all terrorist organizations. They spread it all over the world.
Perhaps Sisi is motivated by a sincere belief that the entire Islamist current is
collectively responsible for the recent attacks, or perhaps hes made a cynical
calculation that the spate of violence offers an opportunity to eliminate the mainstream
Islamist opposition under the cover of fighting an insurgency.
The battle against Islamists has given Sisi some legitimacy but it isnt what brought
him to power. For that he counted on Gulf money, an initial precondition of the coup
that toppled Morsi. As weve heard in great detail on leaked recordings from the office
of Sisis chief of staff, the president made clear that he expected the billions to flow
unabated from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies: Man, they have money like
rice, a man who sounds like Sisi famously says in one of the leaks.
This might sound like thuggish extortion, but its also shrewd politics. Sisi recognizes
that the Gulf can afford to underwrite Egypt, and that its willing to indefinitely pay $10
billion or more a year for a dependable ally in Cairo. Egypt struggles to import enough
fuel and food staples to keep the country functioning and the poor quiescent; without
Gulf money, the summertime power outages would likely turn into long-term blackouts
and electricity rationing.Egypts rulers have historically feared a revolution of the
hungry if the circumstances decline for the nations many poor.
Economic reform, the last piece of the formula, is trickier. Its become clear that Sisis
autocratic ways and narrow, nepotistic circle of military advisors will preclude creative
governance. But while significant reform is off the table, piecemeal improvements to
the subsidy system could serve Sisi adequately for the medium-term. Meanwhile,
theatrical flourishes like the $45-billion new capital planned for the desert outside of
Cairo a boondoggle for Emirati construction conglomerates which will probably
never be built and massive proposed public housing, irrigation, and road works
projects give the impression of a nation on the move.

If even a small fraction of these projects materialize, Sisi will cement deep support in
some quarters. Wealthy business owners and the small but politically influential middle
class have both reliably remained in Sisis corner, and could benefit from infrastructure
development. The military will also play a major role in any large-scale construction
projects and, if shrewdly distributed, new housing or other perks could neutralize some
of the few potential oases of organized political opposition, such as factory workers in
the cities of the Suez Canal zone and the Nile Delta.
The medium-term stability of Sisis regime, however, may lead to more trouble for
Egypt down the road. His repressive policies will not cure the countrys many ills, and
are guaranteed to drive Egypt into even worse shape that it was when it rose up
against Hosni Mubarak in January 2011. Recent events underscore Sisis paranoid
style, punctuated over the weekend by banning soccer fan clubs known as Ultras and
sentencing exiled political science professor Emad Shahin to death. As Shahin put it in
a statement, the show trials are a centerpiece of Sisis effort to reconstitute the
security state and intimidate all opponents.
The pattern of prosecutions fits that argument. If the government casts its net wide
enough, it wont have to worry about student union protests or critical university
professors, because the majority of Egyptians will be frightened into silence.
Sisis paranoid style appears to be the product of a coherent view among Egypts
fractious security services, which are showing a unity of purpose in carrying out the
campaign against all political dissent. The military, police, intelligence agencies, and
courts are pulling together to carry out the governments political vision an
impressive bureaucratic achievement, but one that bodes poorly for democratic
reform.
The downsides of the new dictatorships governing approach will be toxic for Egypt
over the long haul. Securing the cooperation of a balkanized bureaucracy is not the
same as controlling it: Sisi has the courts in lockstep on his side, but at the expense of
their reputation. The courts have clearly abetted military rule, disbanding the elected
parliament on flimsy pretexts, barring popular presidential candidates, and certifying
election laws that served the militarys aims.
As a result of these machinations, no one will be able to take the judiciary seriously as
a branch of government and a future ruler, even an unelected autocrat, who wants
to restore some semblance of the rule of law will face a daunting rebuilding job. The
situation only deteriorated further today, with the appointment of Ahmed el-Zend as
justice minister: The head of the influential Judges Club famously told a television
show that judges are masters in our homeland. Everyone else are slaves.
The army, which paved Sisis path to power, remains the presidents only native
constituency. But theres no evidence to suggest that in a crisis say, an economic
collapse or a widespread popular uprising Egypts generals would sacrifice their
own institutional privileges to protect Sisi.
Even authoritarian rulers must play politics to retain power, pacifying the key

organizations and constituencies that support them. Under the former dictator Hosni
Mubarak, the military had to compete against the police, the intelligence services, and
the circle of business moguls around the ruling family for its perks. Today, the military
possesses unchecked power, which is likely to lead to greater corruption,
unaccountability, and serial failures to accomplish the basic bread-and-butter business
of the state.
This incompetence will negatively affect the very war on terror upon which Sisi is
building his legitimacy. Jihadis are openly operating out of the Sinai, but according to
the few independent reports that come out of the peninsula, poorly trained soldiers
have employed scorched-earth tactics in retaliation, bombing towns and arresting
random men while actual jihadis escape. Convicting and trying men for crimes
they probably didnt commit as appeared to occur over the weekend in a ballyhooed
terror trial wont end the destabilizing domestic insurgency either.
Sisi also faces other long-term threats that are not solely of his making. These include
an untenable national balance sheet, subsidies too expensive to maintain and too
crucial to eliminate without massive social dislocation, growing unemployment, and
inadequate water for agriculture under current usage practices.
Ultimately, any economic reform will depend on foreign pressure a formula that
didnt work when the United States was the primary donor. Perhaps financial advisers
from the United Arab Emirates will have better luck as they try to implement better
practices in the ministries and government offices that will absorbed upward of $32
billion from the Gulf monarchies ever since Sisis coup. If those massive sums cant
buy meaningful political influence or instill sound economic practices, no amount of
foreign money will.
The new regime is clearly unable to resolve these challenges, but history suggests
that mismanagement can continue for a long time. Indeed, perhaps the greatest threat
to Egypt is that Sisi simply muddles through. There are surely fissures within the
regime, but he doesnt need a monolithic ruling elite: He needs just enough power to
stay in charge, and enough international support to ignore the outrage of Egyptians
who want civil rights, political freedom, and genuine economic development.
Photo credit: MOHAMED EL-SHAHED/AFP/Getty Images
Posted by Thavam