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SpectrumReview

March2015

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Commonwealth of Australia 2015
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Contents

Background...................................................................................................................4
ExecutiveSummary......................................................................................................5
Recommendations........................................................................................................7

1. Introduction.....................................................................................................10
1.1. Increasingimportanceofspectrum....................................................................10
1.2. Currentspectrummanagementframework.......................................................10
1.3. Whatdoesreformlooklike?...............................................................................13

2. Proposalsforreform........................................................................................15
2.1. Recommendation1Legislation........................................................................15
2.2. Recommendation1(a)Singlelicensingsystem................................................17
2.3. Recommendation1(b)Integratingmanagementofbroadcastingspectrum..20
2.4. Recommendation1(c)Clarifiedrolesandresponsibilities..............................22
2.5. Recommendation1(d)Transparentandtimelyallocationprocesses.............25
2.6. Recommendation1(e)Userinvolvementinspectrummanagement.............27
2.7. Recommendation1(f)Streamlineddevicesupplyschemes............................29
2.8. Recommendation1(g)Improvedcomplianceandenforcement.....................31
2.9. Recommendation1(h)Transitionalarrangements..........................................33
2.10. Recommendation2Governmentspectrumuse..........................................35
2.11. Recommendation3Spectrumpricing..........................................................36

3. Financialimplications.......................................................................................37
3.1. Singlelicensingsystemimplicationsforchargingandrevenues.....................37
3.2. Compensation.....................................................................................................37
3.3. Costsofimplementation.....................................................................................37

4. Implementation...............................................................................................38

AttachmentA.............................................................................................................40
Spectrumreviewprocess...............................................................................................40
AttachmentB..............................................................................................................43
Currentspectrummanagementframework.................................................................43
AttachmentC..............................................................................................................45
Currentspectrumreallocationprocess.........................................................................45

Background
InMay2014theMinisterforCommunications,theHonMalcolmTurnbullMP(the
Minister),announcedareviewofAustraliasspectrumpolicyandmanagement
framework.TheDepartmentofCommunications(theDepartment),inconjunctionwith
theAustralianCommunicationsandMediaAuthority(theACMA),wastaskedwith
undertakingthereview.Adescriptionoftheprocessthatwasundertaken,including
stakeholderconsultation,isatAttachmentA.
UndertheTermsofReference,thereviewwastoconsiderwaysto:
1.

simplifytheframeworktoreduceitscomplexityandimpactonspectrumusersand
administrators,andeliminateunnecessaryandexcessiveregulatoryprovisions

2.

improvetheflexibilityoftheframeworkanditsabilitytofacilitatenewand
emergingservicesincludingadvancementsthatoffergreaterpotentialforefficient
spectrumuse,whilecontinuingtomanageinterferenceandprovidingcertaintyfor
incumbents

3.

ensureefficientallocation,ongoinguseandmanagementofspectrum,and
incentiviseitsefficientusebyallcommercial,publicandcommunityspectrum
users

4.

considerinstitutionalarrangementsandensureanappropriatelevelofMinisterial
oversightofspectrumpolicyandmanagement,byidentifyingappropriaterolesfor
theMinister,theAustralianCommunicationsandMediaAuthority,the
DepartmentofCommunicationsandothersinvolvedinspectrummanagement

5.

promoteconsistencyacrosslegislationandsectors,includinginrelationto
compliancemechanisms,technicalregulationandtheplanningandlicensingof
spectrum

6.

developanappropriateframeworktoconsiderpublicinterestspectrumissues

7.

developawholeofgovernmentapproachtospectrumpolicy

8.

developawholeofeconomyapproachtovaluationofspectrumthatincludes
considerationofthebroadereconomicandsocialbenefits.

ExecutiveSummary
Spectrumisacriticalinputtoanetworkedanddigitaleconomyandsociety.Itsupportsa
widerangeofservicesthatpromoteeconomicgrowthandenhancesocialwellbeing.Its
roleasaneconomicdriver,andthevalueitreturnstosociety,isincreasing.Abroad
projectionoftheeconomicvalueofspectruminAustraliaundertakenbytheCentrefor
InternationalEconomics(CIE)suggestsnationalbenefitscouldbeashighas$177billion
overa15yearperiod.1
Thecurrentlegislativeframeworkforthemanagementofspectrumisover20yearsold.
Whenitwasintroduced,theframeworkwasprogressivebyinternationalstandardsinits
useofmarketmechanisms,administrativeandcommonsapproaches.However,sinceits
introductiontherehasbeenaproliferationofnewdigitaltechnologiesand
communicationsservicesresultinginsignificantchangesinmarketstructures.
WiththebenefitofastrongstakeholdercontributiontheDepartmenthasidentified
substantialdeficiencieswiththecurrentlegislativeframework.Thereviewhasfound
thatcurrentspectrummanagementarrangementsareslow,rigidandadministratively
cumbersome.Forexample,reallocatingthedigitaldividend(694820MHz)took
approximatelythreeyearswith16legislativeinstrumentsbeingissuedbytheMinisteror
theACMA.Spectrumnotbeingallocatedquicklyandeasilyimposesunnecessarycosts
onbothindustryandgovernment.
Thereviewmakesthreerecommendations,thecoreelementsofthese
recommendationsare:
1. replacethecurrentlegislativeframeworkwithoutcomesfocussedlegislation,
thatfacilitatestimelyallocations,greaterflexibilityofuse,includingthrough
sharingandtradingofspectrum,anddeliversimprovedcertaintyformarket
participants
2. improvetheintegrityandconsistencyoftheframeworkbyincorporatingthe
managementofbroadcastingspectrumandbetterintegratingpublicsector
agenciesthroughthereportingoftheirspectrumholdingsandallowingthose
agenciestolease,sellorsharethatspectrumfortheirownbenefit
3. reviewspectrumpricingarrangementstomaketheseconsistentandtransparent
inordertosupportefficientuseandtofacilitatesecondarymarkets.
Therecommendedlegislationwouldsimplifyregulatorystructures,streamline
regulatoryprocessesandclarifytheroleforGovernmentandtheACMA.Itwouldalso
provideforgreateruseofmarketmechanismsand,consistentwiththeGovernments
deregulationagenda,rationalisethenumberoflicencecategories,reformcurrenthighly
prescriptive/lengthyallocationprocessesanddevicesupplyregulations.

The economic value of spectrum Research report prepared for the Department of Communications by the Centre for
International Economics, January 2015.

TherecommendednewframeworkwouldmaintaintheGovernmentsroleinensuring
theadequateprovisionofspectrumforkeypublicandcommunityservices.The
GovernmentwouldprovidepolicydirectionandguidancetotheACMAasregulatorand
continuetomanageAustraliasparticipationininternationalforums.
IfthereviewrecommendationsareagreedbytheGovernmentthenthenextstageof
thereformprocessisthedevelopmentofdetailedlegislativeandregulatorymeasures,
whichwouldbeundertakenincloseconsultationwithstakeholders.
Thelegislativereformswould:
> establishasinglelicensingsystembasedontheparametersofthelicence,including
durationandrenewalrights
> clarifytherolesandresponsibilitiesoftheMinisterandtheACMA
> providefortransparentandtimelyspectrumallocationandreallocationprocesses
andmethods,andallowforallocationandreallocationofencumberedspectrum
> providemoreopportunitiesforspectrumuserstoparticipateinspectrum
management,throughdelegationoffunctionsanduserdrivendisputeresolution
> managebroadcastingspectruminthesamewayasotherspectrumwhilerecognising
thattheholdersofbroadcastinglicencesandthenationalbroadcasterswouldbe
providedwithcertaintyofaccesstospectrumtodeliverbroadcastingservices
> streamlinedevicesupplyschemes
> improvecomplianceandenforcementbyintroducingproportionateandgraduated
enforcementmechanismsforbreachesofeitherthelaworlicenceconditions
> ensurethattherightsofexistinglicenceholdersarenotdiminishedinthetransition
tothenewframework.
Implementationstageswouldcommencefollowingthepassageoflegislation.Thiswould
againincludeongoingconsultationwithstakeholdersandprogressoveraperiodof
someyears.

Recommendations
1. Giventechnologicalchangeandincreasingdemandsforspectrumthecurrent
legislativeframework(theRadiocommunicationsAct1992)shouldbereplacedby
arrangementsthat:
> provideforgreatermarketbasedactivity,includingbyincreasingtheopportunityfor
spectrumholderstoshareandtradespectrum
> simplifyregulatorystructures,streamlineregulatoryprocessesandclarifytheroleof
Government.
Thenewlegislativeframework(includingamendmentstorelatedlegislation),which
wouldbedevelopedincloseconsultationwithstakeholders,shouldachievethisby:
a) Establishingasinglelicensingsystembasedaroundalimitednumberofparameters
ofthelicence(forexamplefrequencyband,geographicarea,licencedurationand
renewalrightsofthelicence).
b) Integratingthemanagementofbroadcastingspectrum,includingplanning,licensing
andpricingintothegeneralspectrummanagementframework,recognisingthatthe
currentholdersofbroadcastinglicencesandthenationalbroadcasterswouldbe
providedwithcertaintyofaccesstospectrumtodeliverbroadcastingservices.
c) ClarifyingtherolesandresponsibilitiesoftheMinisterandtheACMAunderthe
frameworkby:
i.

ii.

iii.

iv.
v.

havingtheMinisterissuepolicystatementsontheGovernmentsstrategyand
prioritiesforspectrumwithwhichtheACMAwouldberequiredtoact
consistently
providingtheMinisterwithpowerstodirecttheACMAonspecificmatters
(suchasplanning,allocationandreallocation,licensingandpricing),aswellasa
generaldirectionspower
requiringtheACMAtoprovidetotheMinisteranannualworkprogram,
preparedinconsultationwithstakeholders,includingkeyprioritiesoverathree
tofiveyeartimeframe
requiringtheACMAtonotifytheMinisterofintendeddecisionsonspecified
issues
requiringtheACMAtoimproveandmaintaintherange,availabilityandquality
ofinformationavailabletothemarket,supportedbyappropriatepowersto
collectinformationfromindustry.

d) Providingfortransparentandtimelyspectrumallocationandreallocationprocesses
andmethodsby:
i.
ii.
iii.

removingtheMinisterfrommandatedandroutineinvolvementinallocation
andreallocationprocesses
authorisingtheACMAtoallocateandreallocatespectrumconsistentwithpolicy
statementsorasoutlinedinitspublishedworkprogram
authorisingtheACMAtoallocateandreallocateencumberedspectrum.

e) Providingmoreopportunitiesforspectrumuserstoparticipateinspectrum
managementby:
i.
ii.

enablingtheACMAtodelegatespectrummanagementfunctionstoother
entitieswhereappropriate
allowinglicenseestoresolveinterferenceanddisputes,including:

encouraginglicenseestoaccessalternativedisputeresolution
requiringtheACMAtodevelopandpublishguidelinesonitsdispute
managementprocesses
expandingrightsoflicenseestotakecivilproceedings.

f) Streamliningdevicesupplyschemesby:
i.
ii.

authorisingtheACMAtodeveloptargeteddevicesupplyschemes
commensuratewithrisk
allowingusersofdevicesthatarenotsubjecttoaspecificschemetomanage
theircomplianceobligationsconsistentwithgeneralinterferencemanagement
principles.

g) Improvingcomplianceandenforcementbyintroducingproportionateandgraduated
enforcementmechanismsforbreachesofthelegislativeframework,including:
i.
ii.

enablingtheACMAtoimposecivilpenalties,issuerecallsorinterimbansand
issueremedialdirectionsandformalwarnings
applyingstrictliabilityprovisionsandinfringementnoticestoabroaderrangeof
offences.

h) Ensuringthattherightsofexistinglicenceholdersarenotdiminishedinthe
transitiontothenewframeworkby:
i.
ii.

iii.

providingthatallocationandreallocationprocessesunderwayatthetimethe
newActcomesintoeffectwouldcontinueundertheexistingarrangements
allowingexistinglicencestocontinueundertheoldlicensingarrangementsuntil
expiry,whilealsoallowingtheselicencestotransitionearlieratthelicensees
discretion
providingcertaintyforcurrentholdersofbroadcastinglicencesandnational
broadcastersthattheywouldhavecontinuedaccesstospectrumtodeliver
broadcastingservices.

2. Recognisingthathowpublicsectoragenciesaccountforanddealwithassetsisa
separatepolicymatterforGovernment,thefollowingapproachescouldbe
considered:
i.
ii.

requiringpublicsectoragenciesthatholdspectrumtoregularlyreportthe
valueoftheirholdings
permittingagenciestoeitherleaseorsellthespectrumandretainthebenefitof
doingso.

3. ThattheDepartmentreviewthearrangementsforpricingofspectrum(including
exemptions,concessions,administrativechargesandtaxes)sothattheseare
consistent,transparentandsupportefficientuseinsecondarymarkets.

i.

ThisreviewwilltakeintoaccountanyrelevantoutcomesoftheReviewof
AustralianGovernmentCharging.

1. Introduction
Theobjectiveofthisreviewistomaximisethepublicbenefitderivedfromspectrum.
Thiswouldbeachievedbyimprovingthespectrummanagementframeworksothatnew
andexistingusersofspectrumbenefitfrommorecertainandefficientallocationand
reallocationofspectrumandhavegreateropportunitiesfortechnologicalandservice
innovation.

1.1.

Increasingimportanceofspectrum

Spectrumisacriticalinputtoanetworkedanddigitaleconomyandsociety.Itsupportsa
widerangeofservicesthatwealluseandbenefitfromeveryday,andthatpromote
economicgrowthandenhancesocialwellbeing.Itsroleasaneconomicdriver,andthe
valueitreturnstosociety,isincreasing.Abroadprojectionoftheeconomicvalueof
spectruminAustralia,undertakenbytheCIEonbehalfoftheDepartment,suggests
nationalbenefitscouldbeashighas$177billionovera15yearperiod,dependingon
thefactorsincluded.2
Wirelessservicessupportmoreefficientprocessesanddeliveryofexistingservices,
enablingimprovementsinproductivity.TheACMAhasestimatedthatmobilebroadband
increasedAustraliaseconomicgrowthrateby0.28percenteachyearfrom20072013.
Thisequatestoaneconomiccontributionof$33.8billionbymobilebroadbandalone
overthisperiod,primarilythroughproductivityimprovements.3
In2014,anAustralianRadioCommunicationsIndustryAssociationcommissionedstudy
showedthatthespectrumusedforlandmobileradio(alsoknownastwowayradio)
generateseconomicbenefitsofbetween$1.99billionand$3.72billionperannum.Land
mobileradioplaysacentralroleinthedeliveryofservicessuchasmining,transport,
utilitiesandpublicsafetyservicessuchaspolice,fireandambulance.
Thecontributionofotherspectrumusingsectorstoeconomicgrowthandproductivityis
alsosubstantial.ArecentUSstudyofthevalueofcommonsspectrumfoundthatthe
applicationofradiofrequencyidentificationtechnologiesinareassuchasretailingand
healthcarealoneprovidedanestimatedeconomicvalueofUS$130billion.4
Theimpactofthesebenefitsaresubstantial.Equally,thepotentialcostsofspectrumnot
beingfullyandefficientlyutilisedaresignificant.

1.2.

Currentspectrummanagementframework

ThespectrummanagementframeworkissetoutintheRadiocommunicationsAct1992
(theRadiocommunicationsAct),relatedlegislationandsubordinateregulation.

2 The economic value of spectrum Research report prepared for the Department of Communications by the Centre for
International Economics, January 2015.
3 The economic impacts of mobile broadband on the Australian economy from 2006 to 2013 Research report prepared
for the ACMA by the Centre for International Economics, April 2014. http://engage.acma.gov.au/wpcontent/uploads/2014/04/Economic-impacts-of-mobile-broadband_Final2.pdf
4 Assessment of the economic value of unlicensed spectrum in the United States, authored by Raul Katz for Telecom
Advisory Services, February 2014. http://www.wififorward.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Value-of-Unlicensed-Spectrumto-the-US-Economy-Full-Report.pdf

10

Theexistinglegislativeframework,summarisedatAttachmentB,isover20yearsold.
Whenintroduced,theframeworkwasprogressivebyinternationalstandardsinitsuseof
marketmechanismsanditsmixedapproachtospectrummanagement(useofmarket,
administrative,commonsapproaches).Thelicensingsystemhasaccommodatedarange
ofnewtechnologiesandservices,andarrangementshaveallowedspectrumtobe
allocatedandreallocatedtonewuses.
Thereareanumberofareaswherethecurrentarrangementscouldbesignificantly
improvedtothebenefitofexistingandnewusersofspectrum.Feedbackfrom
stakeholders,supportedbytheDepartmentsassessment,hasidentifiedthat:
> licensingofspectrumistoocomplexandrigidtoefficientlyaccommodatenew
technologiesandstakeholdersevolvingandincreasingspectrumneeds
> allocationandreallocationofspectrumtakestoolonganddecisionslack
transparencyandconsistencyespeciallywhenweighingupcommercialandnon
commercialusesforexamplereallocatingthedigitaldividend(694820MHz)took
approximatelythreeyearswith16legislativeinstrumentsbeingissuedbythe
MinisterortheACMA
> thereistoomuchuncertaintyaroundspectrumaccessandrenewal,impactingon
investoranduserconfidence.Forexampleittooknearlytwoyearsforgovernment
toassessthatreissuingthe15yearspectrumlicenceswouldbeinthepublicinterest.
FollowingthisdecisiontheACMAthenhadtoassesswhetherthelicenceshadbeen
usedoverthelicenceperiodbeforetheycouldreissuethelicences
> stakeholdersarenotclearonthedifferent(andappropriate)responsibilitiesofthe
Minister,theDepartmentandtheACMA
> pricingofspectrumdoesnotalwaysreflectitsvalue,changesinvalueovertimeor
thebenefitspectrumprovidestosociety;andtherationaleforpricingdiscountslack
clarity
> marketbasedactivityspecificallytradingorleasingspectrumwhileavailable,is
notbeingmadeuseofextensively
> technicalregulationistoodetailedandadministrativelyburdensome
> complianceandenforcementarrangementsdonotprovideusersandtheregulator
withtherightsetoftools.
Muchoftheadministrativecomplexityistheresultofchecksandbalancesincludedin
theframeworkwhenitwasfirstestablished,whichcanbesignificantlystreamlined.
Otherimpedimentsarisebecausetechnologyhassubstantiallychangedandasa
consequencespectrumcanbeputtofargreateruseanddeliverawidervarietyof
servicesthanwhatwascontemplatedwhentheframeworkwasdevelopedin1992.
Thechallengeofincreasingdemandforspectrum
Ascommunicationsserviceprovidersandothersectorsoftheeconomyintegrateand
betterexploitdigitaltechnologiesintotheiroperationsthevalueofspectrumandits
futurepotentialisbecomingmoreevidenttoagreaterrangeofstakeholders.

11

Consumersareseekingondemandaccesstoanincreasingrangeofcommunications,
informationandentertainmentservices.Governmentuserssuchasdefenceandfirst
responders(police,fireandambulance)wanttoimprovetheirexistingcapabilitiesby
takingadvantageofnewtechnologiessuchasmobilebroadband.
Newspectrumbasedtechnologiesandservicesareemerging,includingmachineto
machinecommunicationsandservicesbasedoncognitiveradiotechnologies.Thereis
significantdemandforawiderangeofcurrentusesofspectrumsuchasmaritimeand
aviationsafetyandcommunications,scientificresearchandmonitoring,satellite
communicationsandradioandtelevisionbroadcastingwhichneedtocontinuetobe
accommodated.
Mobilebroadbandinparticularisdrivingincreasingspectrumdemand.In2014,the
InternationalTelecommunicationUnion(RadiocommunicationSector)estimatedthatan
additional1,340to1,960MHzofspectrumwouldberequiredformobilebroadbandby
2020.5InAustralia,theACMAestimatesmobiledatausagetogrowby265percentover
afouryearperiodto2017,increasingfromanestimated22.2petabytesin2013to
81.1petabytesin2017.6
Vacantspectrumtomeetthisdemandisbecominghardertofind.Internationally,there
isafocusonenablinggreaterspectrumsharingbytakingadvantageofsmart
technologiesthatcanlookupdatabasestofindunusedspectrumandswitchtothe
unusedfrequenciesinrealtime(thesearevariouslycalleddynamicspectrumaccess,
cognitiveorwhitespacetechnologies).Whileinitiallybeingimplementedintheunused
spectruminthebroadcastingbands,theycanpotentiallybeusedthroughoutthe
spectrumbands.
Australiasexperienceaccordswithwhatishappeningoverseas,whereincreasing
demandformobilebroadbandisdrawingresponsesfromgovernments.Identificationof
spectrumtosupportfuturemobiletelecommunicationsisexpectedakeyfocusofthe
November2015WorldRadiocommunicationConference(WRC).Inthelastfiveyearsthe
UnitedKingdom(UK)7,UnitedStates(US)8andCanada9havecommittedtomaking
additionalspectrumavailableformobilebroadband,throughdirectallocationsand
spectrumsharing.
AccordingtotheUSDefenseSpectrumOrganization,theUSDefenseDepartmentis
lookingatsharingspectrumwithcommercialuserswiththehelpofnewtechnologies

5 Future spectrum requirements estimate for terrestrial IMT M Series Mobile, radiodetermination, amateur and related
satellite services, ITU-R, 2014, http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-r/opb/rep/R-REP-M.2290-2014-PDF-E.pdf
6 The economic impacts of mobile broadband on the Australian economy from 2006 to 2013 Research report prepared
for the ACMA by the Centre for International Economics, April 2014.
http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/Library/researchacma/Research-reports/economic-impacts-of-mobile-broadband-1
7 In 2011 the UK announced its intention to release 500 MHz of government spectrum below 5 GHz for commercial mobile
services by 2020.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/77429/Spectrum_Release.pdf
8 In 2010, the US announced it would make 500 MHz of federal and non-federal spectrum available for wireless
broadband use within 10 years. http://www.broadband.gov/plan/5-spectrum/
9 In late 2014, Canada announced measures to release 60 percent more spectrum (above that available at the beginning
of 2014) for mobile broadband by May 2015. http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ic-gc.nsf/eng/07389.html

12

thatenablenearrealtimefrequencymanagement.Thegoalistoenabletheoperational
needsofbothcommercialandGovernmentuserstobemet.10
Thereviewassessmentisthataspectsofthecurrentframeworkaretooslow,rigidand
administrativelycumbersometoenablespectrumtobeallocatedandusedquicklyand
easily.Currentarrangementscanbesimplifiedandmademoreflexibletoefficiently
accommodatenewtechnologiesandstakeholdersevolvingandincreasingspectrum
needs.

1.3.

Whatdoesreformlooklike?

Thedevelopmentofthereformswasguidedbytheprinciplesof:
> transparencyprovidingaclearandtransparentpolicyframeworkanddirection,
withintheboundsofwhichtheACMAshouldhavebroaddiscretionovertheoptions
availabletoittomanagethespectrumandenableagreaterroleforusers
> efficiencypromotingefficientallocationanduseofspectrumbymakinguseof
marketprinciplesandmechanismsasthepreferredapproachandprovidinglicensees
withthefreedomandincentivestomakeoptimalchoicesabouttheirspectrumuse
> flexibilityensuringarrangementsareasflexibleaspossibletopromotechoiceand
innovation
> certaintyprovidingconfidenceaboutregulatoryarrangementsandspectrum
accesstermsandconditionsandpromoteinternationalharmonisationinAustralias
interests
> simplicitycreatingaframeworkthatissimpler,easiertounderstandandusesthe
leastcostregulationrequiredtoachievetheobjective.
Theproposedreformapproachistorestructureandrationalisethelegislative
frameworkto:
> provideforgreatermarketbasedactivity
> simplifyregulatorystructures,streamlineregulatoryprocessesandclarifytherolefor
Government.
ConsistentwiththeGovernmentsderegulationagenda,afocusoftheproposedreforms
istorationalisethenumberoflicencecategoriesandassociatedsubordinateregulation
andtoremoveunnecessaryregulationparticularlyrelatingtohighlyprescriptiveand
lengthyallocationandreallocationprocesses.
Areaswhereadditionalregulationisproposed,suchasthetargeteddirectionspowers
fortheMinisterandanexpandedcomplianceandenforcementtoolkit,wouldbenefit
spectrumusersthroughimprovingcertaintyandtimelinessofdecisionmaking
processes,anddelivermoreeffectivecomplianceactivities.
ThereremainsanimportantroleforGovernmentinspectrummanagement.Thereforms
maintainGovernmentsroleinestablishingthespectrummanagementframework,
includingsettingthegroundrulesformarkettransactions,enforcecompliance,ensuring

10

http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120052 & http://fedscoop.com/disa-spectrum-forecast-to-industry/

13

thereremainsadequateprovisionofspectrumforpublicandcommunityservicesandin
managingAustraliasparticipationininternationalforumsandarrangements.
Giventheinherentcostsandinefficienciesinbothgovernmentsandmarketstryingto
jointlycoordinateeconomicactivity,thereformsprovideagreateropportunityfor
Governmenttoestablishandpromotethenecessaryconditionsformarketbased
activityupfrontwithaviewtolimitingtheextenttowhichfurtherdirectinterventions
arenecessary.NotingthatGovernmentwouldretaintherighttointerveneinspecific
spectrummanagementmatterstoachievepolicypriorities.
Marketmechanismsplayavaluableroleinallocatingspectrumefficiently,placinga
disciplineonmarketparticipantsandprovidingopportunitiestotradeorleasespectrum.
Thisencouragesefficientuseandoffersusersgreaterflexibilityinthewaytheyacquire
andmanagetheirspectrum,andmaximisesitsvalue.
However,theuniquefeaturesofspectrumsuchasitspropagationcharacteristics,the
constraintsimposedbytechnologyandtheinternationalplanningframework,limitthe
extenttowhichspectrumcanbefullycommoditised.Agoodexampleisaeronautical
spectrumwhich,throughinternationalagreements,meansthespectrumisnoteasily
substitutableforotheruses.
TheDepartmentcommissionedworkfromtheCIEtodevelopatheoreticalmarketbased
modelforspectrummanagement,totesthowsuchaframeworkwouldoperate.11
Themodeloutlinesamarketsystembasedonthepropertyrightsofspectrum,whereall
spectrumiscompetitivelyallocatedandheldaslongterm(possiblyperpetual)licences
withparameterssettingconditionsofuse.Userswouldhavethefreedomtotradeor
leasespectrum.Therewouldbecarveoutsfromthisframeworkforpubliccommonsuse
andservicessubjecttointernationalagreements(suchasaeronautical,maritimeand
satellites).TheroleoftheGovernmentwouldbetoestablishmarketrules,upholdthe
rightsandresponsibilitiesofusers,andprovidemediationininterferencedisputes
shouldnegotiationsnotbesuccessful.
TheCIEapproachwaspresentedtoastakeholderworkshopinJanuary2015.Whilst
therewasinterestintheissuesraisedtherewasnotgeneralsupportexpressedforits
adoption.ThisreviewdoesnotrecommendcompleteadoptionoftheCIEproposed
model,althoughanumberofthespecificmeasures,particularlyinrelationtoa
simplifiedlicensingsystem,theprovisionofhigherqualityinformationandmeasuresto
improvesecondarytradingtomarketparticipantsaligncloselywiththeproposed
reforms.

11

Maximising market involvement in spectrum management Research conducted for the Department of
Communications by the Centre for International Economics, February 2015.

14

2. Proposalsforreform
2.1.

Recommendation1Legislation

Giventechnologicalchangeandincreasingdemandsforspectrumthecurrentlegislative
framework(theRadiocommunicationsAct1992)shouldbereplacedbyarrangements
that:
> provideforgreatermarketbasedactivity,includingbyincreasingtheopportunityfor
spectrumholderstoshareandtradespectrum
> simplifyregulatorystructures,streamlineregulatoryprocessesandclarifytheroleof
Government.
Rationaleforreform
Theincreasingvalueofspectrumtotheeconomyandsociety,rapidtechnological
changeandincreasingdemandforspectrumareimpactingontheeffectivenessofthe
existingregulatoryframework.WhiletheRadiocommunicationsActhasbeenableto
accommodatethesedevelopmentstodate,asimplerandmoreflexibleframeworkis
desirable.Inparticularthecurrentframeworkishighlyprescriptiveaboutprocessrather
thanfocussedonoutcomes.
Proposal
ThecentralrecommendationofthisreviewistoreplacetheRadiocommunicationsAct
withanewActthatisstreamlined,consistentandoutcomesfocussed.Reformingthe
currenttripartitelicensingframework,intoasinglelicensingsystemwouldsupportthese
objectives.
Whilethecurrentframeworkisprescriptiveaboutprocesses,thenewActwouldfocus
ontheoutcomesthatshouldbeachievedthroughspectrummanagement.Thiswould
giveusersandtheACMAgreaterflexibilityindecidinghowtomeettheoutcomesand
rulessetoutinlegislation.ThenewActwouldsetoutahighlevelframeworkwith
operationaldetailcontainedinsubordinateregulation.SpectrumusersandtheACMA
wouldhaveincreaseddiscretionwhenoperationalisingtheframeworktobettermeet
changingmarketcircumstances,withinaframeworkoflegislativeobjectivesand
principlesandMinisterialpolicyoversight.TheexpectationisthattheACMAwould,in
closeconsultationwithstakeholders,developsubordinateregulationinawaythat
appropriatelylimitsitsproliferationandminimisestheregulatoryburden.
TheobjectsoftheActwouldbereviewedduringthedevelopmentofthedetailed
legislativearrangementstomakesuretheyareappropriateforthenewframework,
includingencouragingefficiency,innovationandcertaintyofinvestmentandensuring
regulationdoesnotoverlyconstrainspectrumuseandreuse.Theobjectiveofproviding
adequateprovisionforpublicandcommunityserviceswouldberetained.
ThenewActwouldalsobereorderedtoprovideaclearandlogicalstructurethatis
easierforspectrumuserstonavigate.

15

Detailaroundhowthisframeworkwouldworkissetoutinthediscussionof
recommendations1(a)(h)below.

16

2.2.

Recommendation1(a)Singlelicensingsystem

Establishingasinglelicensingsystembasedaroundalimitednumberofparametersof
thelicence(forexamplefrequencyband,geographicarea,licencedurationandrenewal
rightsofthelicence).
Rationaleforreform
Thelicensingsystemneedstobemadesimplerandmoreflexible.Therigidboundaries
betweenthethreelicencetypesandtheprescriptiverightsthatapplyinthe
RadiocommunicationsActhavelimitedtheACMAsabilitytodesignlicencesthatmeet
usersneeds.Someelementsofcurrentlicencedesign,forexamplethelackofcertainty
aroundlicencetenureandthelimitedhomogeneityoflicences,mayactasabarrierto
secondarytrading.TheRadiocommunicationsActcontainsover180pagesofrules
relatingtothethreelicencetypes.Conversionand/orreallocationfromapparatusto
spectrumlicencesarecomplicatedandlengthyprocesses.Therightsgrantedunder
licensesvaryconsiderablydependingonwhetheranapparatusorspectrumlicencehas
beenissued,yetoftentheuseandgeographicalareasthatapplytothelicencearethe
same.
Areformedlicensingsystemwouldbetterpositionuserstointeractearlyand
constructivelywiththeACMAtoconfigurelicencesthatcanaccommodatechangesin
technologyandimprovetheircapacitytoengageinsecondarytrading.Itwouldalso
providelicenseeswithgreaterclarityaslicenceparametersandrightswould
predominantlybeprovidedforwithinalicence,ratherthanmostlyresidingindifferent
partsoftheRadiocommunicationsAct.
Thisisoneofthekeyderegulatoryreformproposals.Itwouldsimplifythelicensing
system,reducingthenumberoflicencetypesandassociatedsubordinateinstruments.
Proposal
Thisreformwouldbethecentrepieceofanewspectrummanagementframework.The
intentionistoestablishasinglelicensingsystemtoreplacethecurrenttripartite
licensingsystem.Theprimarylegislationwouldprescribecoreparameterswhichmust
beincludedinalicencebutenablethedetailregardingtheseparameterstobe
developedbytheACMAinconsultationwithusers,andsetoutinsubordinate
instruments.
TheMinisterwouldhaveadirectionandoversightrole,implementedthroughpolicy
statementsanddirectionspowersassetoutinrecommendation1(c).Theexpectationis
thattheMinisterwouldissueapolicystatementtoguidedevelopmentofthenew
licensingsystem,includingprinciplesfortheACMAtofollowinsettingupthelicensing
systemandtheapproachtorenewaloflicences.
Likelycoreparameterswouldinclude:
> frequency
> geographiclocation

17

> duration
> whetherthelicenceissubjecttorenewal,andconditionswhentheACMAwouldnot
renew
> termsforvaryingand/orrevokinglicences
> paymentmechanismandamount.
TheDepartmentspreferredapproachistominimisethelistofcoreelementsandnot
undulyrestrictthecapacityoftheACMAtotailorarrangementstobestsuitdifferent
users.Aswiththecurrentarrangements,theACMAwouldretaintheabilitytoinclude
otherparametersandconditionsconsistentwiththeMinistersoverarchingpolicy
direction,forexample,thoserelatingtosharing/exclusiveuseoflicences,thirdpartyuse
andregistrationofdevices.
ItisanticipatedthattheACMAwoulddevelopanumberofstandardlicenceoptionswith
standardparameters.Thesewouldlikelyincludeoptionsbroadlyequivalenttothe
licencetypesinthecurrentlegislation.
Stakeholderswantamoreflexiblesystembutalsowantcertaintyinrelationtosome
rights,particularlyrenewalrights.Tobalancetheseneeds,theDepartmentspreferred
approachisfortheMinistertoissueapolicystatementprovidingguidanceonrenewal.
TheACMAwouldthendevelopanumberofrenewaloptions,includingrenewal
processesandmethodsfordeterminingprice,andincorporateintotherelevantlicence
therenewaltermsmostsuitableforthatlicence.
Thereformdirectionspaperproposedprescribinginthelegislationamaximumlicence
duration,andthatitbefor15years.Somestakeholdershaveadvocatedforalonger
durationorfortheretobenocapinthelegislation.Thisisadifficultissuebecausewhilst
therearebenefitstoextendingthemaximumterm(providingusersofspectrumwith
greatercertaintytoinnovateandinvestwhilstsupportingthedevelopmentofsecondary
markets),therearealsorisksintermsofreducinggovernmentflexibilityas
circumstanceschange.Onbalance,theDepartmentsuggeststhattheprimarylegislation
shouldcontinuetospecifyamaximumdurationforlicenses,butthatthedurationbe
extendedto20years.
Accommodatingclasslicensinginthesinglelicensingsystem
Therehasbeensomesupportfromstakeholdersforkeepingclasslicencesseparatefrom
thesinglelicensingsystem,particularlygiventhelimitednatureofclasslicenseerightsas
comparedtothosethatapplytoapparatusorspectrumlicences.
Thefollowingoptionshavebeenconsideredinprovidingforcommonsuseofspectrum
underthereformedframework:
> mergingapparatusandspectrumlicencesbutretainingclasslicencesasaseparate
licencecategory
> excludingclasslicencesfromthesinglelicensingsystembutprovidingforunlicensed
spectrumusethiswouldbeusedtoaccommodatelowpowerorlocalised
applicationsthatrequirelessprotectionoroversight

18

> incorporatingclasslicencesfullyintothesinglelicensingsystem.
Acommonsformofregulateduseofspectrumexistsinmostinternationalspectrum
managementframeworksandshouldcontinuetobeprovidedinAustralia.Thisallows
operationofcertainservicesanddevicesusingcommonfrequenciesonasharedbasis
withnorighttointerferenceprotection.Rulesfortheuseofcommonsspectrumare
requiredtomanagetheriskofinterference(andsonotdiminishtherightsofother
users)andaddresshealthrelatedconcernsarisingfromelectromagneticemissions.
Unlicensedorlicenceexemptspectrumusedoesnotequatetoitbeingunregulated.
Consistentwithcurrentclasslicensingarrangementsandotherinternational
frameworks,theDepartmentproposesthattherulesregardingcommonsuseof
spectrumbespecifiedinsubordinatelegislationratherthanthroughprimarylegislation.
ThequestiontobeexaminedduringthecourseofdevelopingthenewActiswhetherit
isbesttoincorporatecommonsregulationthroughlicensingorbyseparate
authorisation.Bothoftheseapproachescanbeaccommodatedundertheumbrellaofa
singlelicensingsystem.
Consolidatepricingandtaxationarrangements
Thepricingandtaxationarrangementsforlicenceswouldneedtobeconsolidatedas
partofthemovetoasinglelicensingsystem.
Thepaymentstructuresandtaxationarrangementsbetweenthelicensingtypes
currentlydiffer.Spectrumlicencesaresubjecttocostrecoverycharges,spectrumaccess
chargesandaspectrumlicencetax.Apparatuslicenceshaveacostrecoverychargeplus
alicencetaxwhichdiffersdependingonwhetheritisareceiverortransmitterlicence.
ThesefeearrangementsaresourcedfromfivedifferentActsaswellassubordinate
regulation.Classlicenceshavenofees.
ItisproposedtoretainthecurrentflexibilityfortheACMAtosetprices,andthetiming
andstructureofpayments,withtheMinistersimilarlyretainingthepowertodirectthe
ACMAonthesematters.
Iftherecommendationsofthisreviewareacceptedthentheintentionwouldbeto
undertakefurtherworktoreviewpricingarrangementsforspectrumtoensuretheseare
suitableforthenewlicensingsystem(seerecommendation3).

19

2.3. Recommendation1(b)Integratingmanagementofbroadcasting
spectrum
Integratingthemanagementofbroadcastingspectrum,includingplanning,licensingand
pricingintothegeneralspectrummanagementframework,recognisingthatthecurrent
holdersofbroadcastinglicencesandthenationalbroadcasterswouldbeprovidedwith
certaintyofaccesstospectrumtodeliverbroadcastingservices.
Rationaleforreform
Theobjectiveistoprovidegreaterflexibilityforbroadcasterstomanagetheirservices
withintheirspectrumholdings,improvethetradabilityofspectrumandtopromote
efficiencyandconsistencyinspectrummanagementacrossdifferentplatforms.
Historically,theplanning,allocation,licensingandpricingofbroadcastingservicesband
spectrumhasbeenconducteddifferentlyfromspectrumforotheruses.Thiswasputin
placetoaccommodatetheuniquerequirementsofbroadcastingservices,including
contentandrelatedpublicinterestobligations,tomanagecoverageandreceptionof
services,andtoallowaregulatedprocesstodeterminethenumberandcharacteristics
oftelevisionandradioservicesgiventheiruniqueroleinsociety.
AsidentifiedintheDepartmentsDigitalTelevisionRegulationConsultationPaper
(January2015)technologicaldevelopmentsandincreasingcompetitionforcontent
serviceswillrequirebroadcasterstocontinuetoinnovate.Inthisenvironmentitis
importantthatbroadcastersabilitytooffernewservicesandmanagetheircosts,
throughtheuseofmorespectrallyefficienttechnologiesand/orsharedinfrastructure
arenotconstrained.
Proposal
Itisproposedthatovertimebroadcasterswouldtransitiontothenewarrangementson
thesamebasisasotherapparatuslicenseessothatthesamebroadandflexible
spectrumprocesseswouldbeappliedtouseofbroadcastingservicesbands.Undera
newframeworkbroadcasterswouldhavegreateropportunitytomanagetheirown
servicearrangementswithintheircurrentchannels,orincollaborationwithother
broadcastersorprovidersofcontent.Subjecttothetermsofthelicencetherewould
alsobescopeforbroadcasterstradingspectrumforalternateuses.Arangeof
regulatoryandotherissuesassociatedwiththeseproposalsarecanvassedintheDigital
TelevisionRegulationConsultationPaper.
Thetransitiontoanynewarrangementwouldrequireconsiderationofarangeofpolicy,
regulatoryandtechnicalissues,includingspectrumpricingandlicencetenure,andthe
linkbetweenspectrumallocationandpublicinterestobligationsonbroadcasters.The
allocationofbroadcastingandapparatuslicencestofreetoairbroadcastersiscurrently
linked,andtechnicalandinterferenceconsiderationsarelikelytomeanthatuseofany
sparespectrumfornonbroadcastingpurposeswouldrequiresubstantialreplanning.
TheGovernmentwouldneedtoworkcloselywiththebroadcasterstomanageany
transitioninawaywhichisconsistentwithcommitmentstoensurethattelevisionand

20

radiooperatorscontinuetohaveaccesstoadequatespectrumfortheirservices,and
whichiscognisantoftheneedtomanageimpactsonthepublicwhousebroadcasting
services.
Thepricingarrangementsforbroadcastersspectrumlicenceswouldbeconsideredby
theGovernmentthroughtheproposedreviewatrecommendation3andwouldalso
takeintoaccountthepricingarrangementsthatapplytobroadcastersseparate
broadcastingservicelicences.

21

2.4.

Recommendation1(c)Clarifiedrolesandresponsibilities

ClarifyingtherolesandresponsibilitiesoftheMinisterandtheACMAunderthe
frameworkby:
i.

havingtheMinisterissuepolicystatementsontheGovernmentsstrategyand
prioritiesforspectrumwithwhichtheACMAwouldberequiredtoact
consistently
providingtheMinisterwithpowerstodirecttheACMAonspecificmatters(such
asplanning,allocationandreallocation,licensingandpricing),aswellasa
generaldirectionspower
requiringtheACMAtoprovidetotheMinisteranannualworkprogram,
preparedinconsultationwithstakeholders,includingkeyprioritiesoverathree
tofiveyeartimeframe
requiringtheACMAtonotifytheMinisterofintendeddecisionsonspecified
issues
requiringtheACMAtoimproveandmaintaintherange,availabilityandquality
ofinformationavailabletothemarket,supportedbyappropriatepowersto
collectinformationfromindustry.

ii.

iii.

iv.
v.

Rationaleforreform
Thepolicyframework
ThekeymethodofMinisterialinterventioninthecurrentframeworkisthegeneral
directionspowerintheAustralianCommunicationsandMediaAuthorityAct2005
(ACMAAct).ThepowersofMinisterialinterventionundertheRadiocommunicationsAct
areforthemostpartprocessdriven,ratherthanleversforstrategicpolicyintervention.
Forclarityandtransparency,policyareaswheretheMinisterwouldwanttodirectly
interveneinspectrummanagementshouldbeidentified.
Stakeholderswantgreatertransparencyandaccountabilityindecisionmaking,anda
cleardistinctiontobemadebetweentheresponsibilitiesoftheMinister/Governmentto
setpolicyandtheACMAtoimplementpolicy.Thisincludestransparentdisclosureof
decisionsandthereasoningbehinddecisions,regularupdatesonprocessesand
explanationswhenthingschange.Stakeholdersarealsoseekingclearguidanceonfuture
spectrumpolicyandmanagementpriorities.
Theproposedreformstothepolicyframeworkwouldsignificantlyimprovedecision
makingandmakethismoretransparentandaccountable.Theproposedreformswould
allowtheMinistertointerveneinastrategicwayandtoprovidepolicyguidance;and
providegreaterclarityforusersonroles,spectrummanagementprioritiesandthe
ACMAsactivities.Essentiallytheapproachrecommendedinthisreviewaimstoimprove
thearrangementsfortransparentgovernmentpolicysetting,whilstreducingMinisterial
involvementinACMAprocesssteps.
Makinginformationavailabletosupportthespectrummarket
Efficientspectrummanagementandmarkettransactionsrelyoninformationonwhat
spectrumisavailable,where,underwhatconditions,andthepricespaid.This

22

informationisnotalwaysaccessibletousersandinsomecasestheACMAmaynothave
thepowertocollectrelevantinformation.
Morereadilyavailableinformationwouldreducetransactioncosts,aidpricedisclosure
andsupportspectrumsharing,secondarytradingandnewmarketentry.
Proposal
Thepolicyframework
Theseproposedreformsareintendedtoprovidethekeymechanismforguidingthe
ACMAsdiscretion,makingmajorallocationandreallocationdecisionsthatinvolve
competingusesandundertakingexceptionbasedinterventionsonbehalfofnon
commercialusers.Decisionsneedtobebasedongoodinformation,includingonthe
economicimplicationsofchoices.TheMinistersdecisionmakingwouldbeguidedby
theObjectsofthenewActandanyotherprinciplessetoutintheprimarylegislation.
TheMinisterwouldissuepolicystatementssettingoutthegovernmentspolicygoalsfor
spectrummanagement,orfocussingonaparticularissueorpolicyinitiative.TheACMA
wouldberequiredtoactconsistentlywithpolicystatements.Policystatementswould
beoflimitedornosetdurationandcouldbeupdatedorwithdrawnasneeded.
Statementswouldinitiallyguideimplementationofkeyelementsofthenewframework,
forexample,thesinglelicensingsystem.
TheMinisterwouldalsobeprovidedwithanexpandedrangeofspecificdirections
powers,allowinginterventioninmostaspectsofthespectrummanagementframework.
Examplesofnewdirectionspowersincludetoreservespectrumforparticularpurposes,
allocatespectrum,overrideastandardlicensingoptionestablishedbytheACMA,and(as
iscurrentlythecase)tosetcompetitionlimitsandspectrumprices.
Daytodaymanagementofspectrum,consistentwithgovernmentpolicy,wouldbethe
responsibilityoftheACMA.Itisanticipatedthat,havingsetthepolicydirection,
Ministerialinterventionusingspecificdirectionspowerswouldbeonanexceptionbasis.
IftheMinisterweretointervene,policystatementsanddirectionswouldbemade
public,consistentwithcurrentpractice.TheACMAActgeneraldirectionspowerwould
continuetobeavailabletotheMinistertodirecttheACMAontheexerciseofits
spectrummanagementpowersandfunctions.
TheACMAannualworkprogramwouldclearlysetouttheACMAsprioritiesspecificto
spectrum,howthesewouldbeimplementedandtiming.TheACMAwouldusethework
programtoreportimplementationprogressandchangestopriorities.Whenpreparing
itsannualworkprogramtheACMAwouldconsultwithstakeholdersonitscontents
beforeprovidingittotheMinister.TheMinisterwouldhavetheabilitytorequire
amendmentstotheworkprogram,requestadditionalinformationandindicateissuesof
interestorwhereMinisterialinterventionmayberequired.Theannualworkprogram
wouldbeapublicdocument.
TheACMAwouldberequiredtonotifytheMinisterofupcomingmajoractivitiesand
decisions,toprovidetheMinisterwithsufficientopportunitytoassesspolicy

23

implicationsandintervenewherenecessary.Thesenotificationswoulddiscusspotential
impacts,sensitivitiesandrisksandwouldnotberequiredtobemadepublic.
Makinginformationavailabletosupportthespectrummarket
Aspartofitsannualworkprogram,theACMAwouldberequiredtoidentifythe
informationneededtosupportspectrummanagementandthespectrummarketunder
thenewframework,followingopendataprinciples.Thiswouldincludemaking
informationthatitroutinelycollectsasaccessible,uptodateandinteractiveaspossible;
andassessingtheabilityoftheACMAscurrentlicensingdatabasetomeetuserneeds.
TheACMAwouldmakerecommendations,provideanimplementationplanandreport
onprogress.
Inmakinginformationavailable,theACMAwoulddosoinawaythatenablesthird
partiestobecomeinvolvedininformationprovisionandinprovidingservicestothe
marketbasedontheACMAinformation,forexample,databasestosupportdynamic
spectrumaccessorspectrumtradingintermediaries.
ThereformdirectionspaperproposedthattheACMAbegivenageneralinformation
gatheringpowerundertheActsimilartothatcurrentlyprovidedunderthe
TelecommunicationsAct1997.Whilestakeholderssupporthighqualityinformation
beingmadeavailable,theydonotsupportabroadinformationgatheringpowerforthe
ACMAduetothepotentialadministrativeburdenofinformationrequests.Instead,itis
proposedtoprovidetheACMAwithaninformationgatheringpowerbutlimitthepower
toonlytargettheinformationgapsnecessarytosupportACMAsspectrummanagement
functions.

24

2.5.

Recommendation1(d)Transparentandtimelyallocationprocesses

Providingfortransparentandtimelyspectrumallocationandreallocationprocessesand
methodsby:
i.

removingtheMinisterfrommandatedandroutineinvolvementinallocationand
reallocationprocesses
authorisingtheACMAtoallocateandreallocatespectrumconsistentwithpolicy
statementsorasoutlinedinitspublishedworkprogram
authorisingtheACMAtoallocateandreallocateencumberedspectrum.

ii.
iii.

Rationaleforreform
Allocationandreallocationprocessesneedtobemadeconsistent,lessprescriptiveand
complex,whilecontinuingtomeettheobjectivesof:
> maximisingthepublicbenefitthroughefficientallocationanduse
> providingareturnfortheuseofapublicresource.
Thecurrentconversionandreallocationprocessesarehighlyprescriptive,inefficientand
requireinterventionbytheMinisterinroutineprocesseswhichreducestheefficiency
andflexibilityoftheframework.Forexample,reallocatingthedigitaldividend(694
820MHz)tookapproximatelythreeyearswith16legislativeinstrumentsbeingissuedby
theMinisterortheACMA.AttachmentCillustratesthestepsandinstrumentsrequired
toreallocatespectrumunderthecurrentframework.
Stakeholdershavehighlightedtheneedforfaster,simplerandlesscostlyallocationand
reallocationprocesses.
Proposal
Underasinglelicensingsystem,allocationandreallocationprocesseswouldbe
streamlinedandmadeconsistent,reducingtheregulatoryburden.Arrangementswould
balancestakeholdersneedfortransparencyandcertaintywiththeflexibilitytochange
spectrumusewhenitisinthepublicinteresttodoso.
Planningallocationandreallocationprocesses
TheACMAwouldberequiredtoidentifyplannedallocationandreallocationprocesses
throughitsannualworkprogram.Thiswouldfacilitateearlyengagementwith
stakeholders.WhiletheMinisterwouldhavepowerstodirecttheACMAinrelationto
thehighleveloutcomesoftheseprocesses,therewouldnolongerbemandated
Ministerialinvolvementintheroutineprocessesassociatedwithallocationand
reallocation.TheACMAwouldbeabletoundertakeallocationandreallocationactivities
wheretheseareconsistentwiththeMinisterialpolicystatementoroutlinedinitswork
program.
Intheinterestsofprovidinglicenseeswithassuranceabouttenure,theACMAwould
specifytheprocessesgoverningvariationorrevocationoflicencesasalicence
parameteratthetimeofissue.Additionally,theACMAwouldbeexpectedtomanage

25

futurevariationorreallocationprocessesbyissuinglicencesofappropriatedurationsto
accommodateplannedreallocationsofparticularbands.
Allocationandreallocationprocesses
TheACMAwouldberequiredtodetermineallocationandreallocationproceduresin
writing,includingtimingoftheseprocesses.TheACMAwouldhavethediscretionto
determinetheappropriateallocationorreallocationmechanismsuchasauctions,
tendersoradministrativemechanisms.
TheACMAwouldhavetheauthoritytoallocateorreallocatespectrumthatis
encumbered,toprovidegreaterflexibilityforbothexistingandfuturespectrumusers,
facilitateprivatebandmanagementandencouragemoreefficientandintensive
spectrumuse.Allocatingandreallocatingencumberedspectrumwouldneedtotakeinto
accountincumbentsexistingrightsandlicencedurations.

26

2.6.

Recommendation1(e)Userinvolvementinspectrummanagement

Providingmoreopportunitiesforspectrumuserstoparticipateinspectrummanagement
by:
i.

enablingtheACMAtodelegatespectrummanagementfunctionstoother
entitieswhereappropriate
allowinglicenseestoresolveinterferenceanddisputes,including:

ii.

encouraginglicenseestoaccessalternativedisputeresolution
requiringtheACMAtodevelopandpublishguidelinesonitsdispute
managementprocesses
expandingrightsoflicenseestotakecivilproceedings.

Rationaleforreform
Delegatingspectrummanagementfunctions
TheACMAiscurrentlylimitedinthefunctionsitcandevolvetoindustryundertheAct.
Otherentitiesmaybeabletoperformthesefunctionsmoreefficientlyandeffectively.
Thisproposalcouldprovidegreaterflexibilityandfitforpurposeaccessarrangements
forspectrumusersbybringingspectrummanagementclosertotheuserwhere
appropriate.Itwouldalsoallowinnovativemanagementarrangementstodevelop,and
potentiallyresultingreaterefficiencyofspectrumuse.
Allowinglicenseestoresolveinterferencedisputes
Thecurrentarrangementsdonotencourageorincentivisespectrumuserstoresolve
interferenceproblemsthemselves,insteadtheyrelyontheACMAtoaddressthese
issues.ThisplacesanincreasedadministrativeburdenontheACMAwhereusershave
thecapacitytoresolveinterferencedisputesbutdonotdoso.
Stakeholdershaverequestedtherighttoundertakecivilactiontoenforcetheirrightsof
access.
Proposal
Delegatingspectrummanagementfunctions
ItisproposedthattheACMAbeabletodelegateitsspectrummanagementfunctions
withtheintentionofenablinggreaterinvolvementofspectrumusersandotherentities
inspectrummanagementandsoimproveflexibilityandefficiency.Thismayinclude
privatebandmanagementorinvolvementofotherentitiesinspecificpartsofthe
framework.
TheACMAwoulddesignatewhatrolesorfunctionsweretobedelegatedandany
requirementsthatwouldapply.Thiscouldincludeplanning,licensing,pricing,fee
collection,interferencemanagementanddisputeresolution.Intheinterestsof
flexibility,thelegislationwouldnotmandateparticularfunctions.
TheACMAwouldberesponsibleformonitoringandoverseeingthesearrangementsto
ensurethedelegatedfunctionsareperformedeffectivelyandremainconsistentwith

27

policyguidanceandspectrummanagementarrangements.TheACMAwouldbeableto
withdrawdelegationsforcertainreasons,forexample,breachesofrequirements.
Somestakeholdershaveindicatedconcernaboutthedelegationofparticularfunctions,
suchasinterferencemanagementandcomplianceandenforcement.TheDepartments
preferredapproachistonotlimitthekindsoffunctionsthatcanbedelegated,withthe
appropriatenessofdoingsotobeconsideredatthetimeaproposalisputforward.Itis
expectedthattheACMAwouldretainoversightofanyfunctionsdelegated,having
regardtoanyMinisterialpolicystatements.
Somestakeholderssuggestedinsubmissionsthatindustrycodesmaybeausefultoolfor
usersinvolvementinspectrummanagement.Industrycodesaremostlikelytobe
successfulwheretheydealwithtechnicalissuesandtheindustryisclearlydefinedwitha
smallnumberofparticipants.Thespectrumsectorismorefragmented,withalarge
numberofdiverseusers,andlesssuitedtoacoregulatoryapproachwherecodesare
requiredtobeagreedbyallorasubstantialsectoroftheaffectedparties.Whilethenew
Actwouldprovideforindustrycodes,theDepartmentspreferredapproachisforuser
involvementinspectrummanagementtooccurthroughselfregulationorthedelegation
ofspectrummanagementfunctionsbytheACMA.
Allowinglicenseestoresolveinterferencedisputes
Theintentionistoallowspectrumusersindisputeoverinterferencetovoluntarily
attemptresolutiondirectlythemselvesorthroughalternativedisputeresolution
mechanisms,priortoapproachingtheACMA.Incaseswherethisoptionistakenup,the
ACMAwouldonlybecomeinvolvedwhereareportfromaconciliatorormediator
indicatesthatnoresolutionispossible.
Toencouragethisoptiontobeused,theACMAwouldberequiredtopublishguidelines
settingoutitsdisputehandlingprocess,includingtheexpectationthatusersgenerally
attempttoresolveanissuethemselvesbeforecomingtotheACMA.Thesewouldbe
developedinconsultationwiththeMinisterandstakeholders.TheACMAsguidelines
wouldincludetheprocessstepsandoutlinetherolesandresponsibilitiesofallinvolved
inadispute.Theseguidelineswouldformthebasisofastandardapproachtodispute
resolutionandguidetheconductofanyindependentdisputeresolutionprocesses.
Interferenceprotectionisaprimaryconcernofstakeholders.Itwillnotalwaysbe
appropriateforuserstoresolveinterferenceissuesthemselves.Insomecasesthe
interferingpartymaynotbereadilyidentifiableandinterferencemayhaveserious
consequences.Underausermanagedarrangement,therewouldbeaprocessto
escalateinterferencedisputesforresolutionbytheACMA.Whereinterferenceis
particularlyserious,forexamplewhereitthreatenssafetyoflifeand/orproperty,and
forinterferenceofunknownorigin,theACMAwouldremainthemostappropriatebody
toinvestigateandinitiateaction.
SpectrumlicenseesarecurrentlyabletoundertakeFederalCourtcivilproceedings
againstapersoncausingtheminterference.Theproposalwouldexpandeligibilityto
undertakecivilproceedingstoawiderrangeoflicensees.

28

2.7.

Recommendation1(f)Streamlineddevicesupplyschemes

Streamliningdevicesupplyschemesby:
i.

authorisingtheACMAtodeveloptargeteddevicesupplyschemes
commensuratewithrisk
allowingusersofdevicesthatarenotsubjecttoaspecificschemetomanage
theircomplianceobligationsconsistentwithgeneralinterferencemanagement
principles.

ii.

Rationaleforreform
Supplyregulationneedstobesimplifiedandmadelessduplicative.Supplyregulationis
necessarytolimitthelikelihoodofnoncompliantdevicesenteringthemarketand
creatinginterferencetoradiocommunications.Currentlyanexanteapproachisusedas
itistoodifficultandcostlytoregulateuseafterthefact.Thescopeofregulationis
broad.Itincludesallelectricalandelectronicequipmenttoensuretheirelectromagnetic
compatibility,aswellasmandatesspecificperformancecharacteristicsforradio
communicationstransmitters.
ThecurrentActisverydetailedandallowsfortheACMAtomakestandards,labelling
andrecordkeepingrequirementsthatareburdensomeforbusinessandtheACMA.It
alsoimposesanAustraliaspecificcomplianceburdenonsuppliersthatcanactasa
barriertomarketentryandinternationaltrade.Theglobalisationoftradehasalso
meantthatthecurrentframeworkfailstocaptureallrelevantpartiesinthesupplychain
suchassomeparallelimportsanddropshipments.12
SimplifyingcomplianceispartoftheAustralianGovernmentsIndustryInnovationand
CompetitivenessAgenda13toassistsmallandlargebusinesses.Reducingthehighly
detailedrequirementswhereappropriatewouldreducecostsanddelaysforbusinesses,
increasethesupplyofproductsintotheAustralianmarketandallowregulatory
authoritiestofocusonhigherpriorities.
Proposal
ItisproposedthatthedetailintheRadiocommunicationsActaroundlabellingand
recordkeepingrequirementsberemovedandtheACMAauthorisedtodevelopdevice
supplyschemesinsubordinateregulationthatarecommensuratewithrisk.
TheprimarylegislationwouldspecifytheobjectivestobeconsideredbytheACMAin
developingandapplyingsupplyschemes,andamendthedefinitionofsupplierto
captureallpartiesinthesupplychain.Generalinterferencemanagement
principles/requirementscouldbespecifiedintheprimarylegislationorinagenerally
applicabledevicesupplyscheme.Apreferredapproachwouldbedevelopedthroughthe

12 Drop shipping is the supply of items where local traders act as an intermediary between an overseas supplier and the
consumer.
13 Industry Innovation and Competitiveness Agenda: A lower cost, business friendly environment - Reducing the
regulatory burden, October 2014. www.dpmc.gov.au/pmc/publication/lower-cost-business-friendly-environment-reducingregulatory-burden

29

draftingprocessinconsultationwithstakeholders.Consistencywithotherlegislation
wouldalsobeconsideredwhendraftingthenewarrangements.
TheACMAwouldberequiredtodevelopdevicesupplyschemesthat:
> areappropriatetothelevelofriskposedbytheequipmentintermsofriskof
interferenceand/orriskstohealthandsafety
> aretargetedtoensurecomplianceobligationsaremetbythemostappropriateparty
inmodern,complexandglobalisedsupplychains
> definethepartybearingthecomplianceburdenforaparticularsupplychainto
mitigateindustryconcernthatambiguityofresponsibilitycreatesregulatoryburden.
DevicesupplyschemesdevelopedbytheACMAmayincludeelementsofcurrent
requirementswheretheACMAconsidersthisisnecessarybasedontheriskposed.
Supplierswouldbefreetochoosehowtheycomplywithgeneralinterference
managementprinciples/requirementsunlesstheACMAhassetoutspecificobligations
inadevicesupplyscheme.Forexample,ifasystem,serviceorproducthasbeen
approvedunderatrustedinternationalstandardorriskassessment,thentheACMA
shouldnotimposeanyadditionalrequirementsforapprovalinAustralia,exceptincases
wheretheneedforuniqueAustralianregulationscanbedemonstrated.

30

2.8.

Recommendation1(g)Improvedcomplianceandenforcement

Improvingcomplianceandenforcementbyintroducingproportionateandgraduated
enforcementmechanismsforbreachesofthelegislativeframework,including:
i.

enablingtheACMAtoimposecivilpenalties,issuerecallsorinterimbansand
issueremedialdirectionsandformalwarnings
applyingstrictliabilityprovisionsandinfringementnoticestoabroaderrangeof
offences.

ii.

Rationaleforreform
TheACMAneedsabetterrangeofcomplianceandenforcementtools.
TheRadiocommunicationsActisreliantoncriminalsanctionswhichappliesahigher
standardofproofthanforcivilactions.ItistheACMAsresponsibilitytocollectevidence
thatmeetsthestandardofproofrequiredtoprosecuteanoffence.Therearestrict
liabilityprovisionsbuttheseapplytoalimitednumberofoffences.Intheeventofa
breachofaspectrumlicencecondition,theACMAislimitedtosuspendingorcancelling
thelicence,ratherthanusingmoregraduatedtoolssuchasremedialdirectionsand
formalwarnings.
TheACMAalsohaslimitedflexibilityintermsofitstechnicalregulation.Incontrast,
electromagneticcompatibilitynoncomplianceiscommonlymanagedthroughrecallsin
NorwayandSwedenandbansintheUnitedKingdom.
Stakeholdersareseekingamoreeffectiveapproachtocomplianceandenforcement.
Proposal
Theproposalistointroducegraduatedcomplianceandenforcementarrangements.This
wouldenablemoretargetedresponsestobreachesoftheframeworkandapathwayof
escalation,enablingtheACMAtotakeactionwhichismorecommensuratewiththe
seriousnessoftheconduct.Additionalenforcementpowersandanexpandedrangeof
penaltieswouldbetteraligntheACMAsenforcementcapabilitieswiththoseofother
Australianregulators.
Criminaloffenceswouldbereviewedtotakeaccountofdevelopmentsinpolicyand
contemporarypracticeontheframingandoperationofCommonwealthoffences.
Specificproposalsinclude:
> reviewing(inconsultationwiththeAttorneyGeneralsDepartment)whatcriminal
and/orcivilpenaltiesshouldapplyunderthereformedframeworkcivilpenalties
areavailabletootherregulatorsinAustraliaandoverseas,includingmeasures
availabletotheACMAundertheTelecommunicationsAct1997andtheBroadcasting
ServicesAct1992
> applyingstrictliabilityprovisionsandinfringementnoticestoabroaderrangeof
offencesthiswouldreducetheevidentiaryburdenandenableminoroffencestobe
respondedtoandresolvedmorequicklyandefficiently

31

> enablingtheACMAtoissueremedialdirectionsandformalwarningstheseare
usefulintermediarystepsandwouldenhancetheACMAscapacitytopreventor
remediateinterferenceandothernoncompliancematters
> enablingtheACMAtoseekcourtorderssuchasinjunctionstorestrainexistingor
futureconduct,orrequiringrespondentstoundertakecertainactionincluding
publishingnoticesabouttheirconduct
> empoweringtheACMAtoissuerecalls,interimbans,formalandpublicwarnings
and/orrequireconsumerwarninglabelsthiswouldgreatlyassisttheACMAinits
managementofthesupplyofnoncompliantdevices,forexample,whenaproduct
posesaninterferenceriskandthesupplierisnotpreparedtorecallthegoods
voluntarilyorasuppliercannotbefound.
ConsultationwiththeAustralianCompetitionandConsumerCommissionandStateand
Territoryfairtradingagencieswouldbeundertakeninrespecttothefinalproposalto
ensurethereisnooverlapwithexistinglegislativeframeworksregardingconsumer
productsafety.

32

2.9.

Recommendation1(h)Transitionalarrangements

Ensuringthattherightsofexistinglicenceholdersarenotdiminishedinthetransitionto
thenewframeworkby:
i.

providingthatallocationandreallocationprocessesunderwayatthetimethe
newActcomesintoeffectwouldcontinueunderthecurrentarrangements
allowingexistinglicencestocontinueundertheoldlicensingarrangementsuntil
expiry,whilealsoallowingtheselicencestotransitionearlieratthelicensees
discretion
providingcertaintyforcurrentholdersofbroadcastinglicencesandnational
broadcastersthattheywouldhavecontinuedaccesstospectrumforthedelivery
ofbroadcastingservices.

ii.

iii.

Rationaleforreform
Transitionalarrangementswouldneedtobeworkedthroughcarefullywithstakeholders
andthefulltransitiontothenewframeworkwouldtakeplaceoveranumberofyears.In
additiontothenewlegislationcomingintoeffect,significantworkwouldberequiredto
prepareforimplementationofthenewframework,includingthedevelopmentofnew
standardlicenceoptions.Indevelopingthesearrangements,ongoingassurancefor
existinglicenseesandcloseengagementwithstakeholderswouldbeparamount.
Proposal
Replanningandallocationactivities
Asageneralprinciple,anyprocesses,includingallocationandreallocationactivities,
underwayatthetimethenewActcommenceswouldcontinueundertheold
framework.Anyallocationorreallocationactivitiesthatbeginaftertherelevantpartof
thenewActcommenceswouldbeconductedunderthenewframework.
PriortothenewActcommencingtheACMAwouldbeexpectedtohaveregardtothe
outcomesofthisreviewwhenconsideringimplementationofanyreplanningorreviews
ofbandsthatareunderway.
Existinglicences
Allexistinglicenceswouldcontinueunderthecurrentframeworkwiththeircurrent
licenceconditionsuntilexpiry(orrevocationinthecaseofclasslicences).However,once
thenewframeworkcommencesnonewlicenceswouldbeissuedundertheoldlicensing
system(otherthandesignatedprocessesunderwayatthetimeofcommencement).The
consequencesforexistinglicenseeswouldbe:
> Apparatuslicencestransitiontothenewarrangementsasexistinglicencesexpire,
however,alllicenseeswouldbegivenatleast12monthsnoticeofthetransition.
> Spectrumlicencesthesewouldbegrandfatheredandcontinueuntilexpiryunless
usersvoluntarilytransitiontothenewframework.

33

> ClasslicencesthesewouldcontinueuntilrevokedbytheACMA.Ingeneral,
revocationwouldoccurwhenanappropriatereplacementlicenceorregulationis
availableunderthenewarrangements.
Thegrandfatheringofspectrumlicenceswouldresultinaprotractedtransitionperiod
(upto15years)duringwhichbothframeworkswouldoperateinparallel.Therefore
considerationwouldbegiventoappropriatearrangementstoencourageexisting
licenseestomovetothenewsystempriortoexpiryoftheirlicence.Anyearlymigration
wouldbeatthelicenseesdiscretion.
Licencesforbroadcastingserviceproviders
Broadcasterswouldtransitiontothenewarrangementsonthesamebasisasother
apparatuslicensees,thatis,theywouldcontinuetooperateundercurrentarrangements
untiltheirlicencesexpire.Theywouldthenbeissuedlicencesunderthenew
arrangementswiththetechnicalfeaturessimilartotheircurrentlicences.
Thepricingarrangementsforbroadcastersspectrumlicenceswouldbeconsideredby
theGovernmentthroughtheproposedreviewoutlinedatrecommendation3andwould
alsotakeintoaccountthepricingarrangementsthatapplytobroadcastersseparate
broadcastingservicelicences.

34

2.10. Recommendation2Governmentspectrumuse
Recognisingthathowpublicsectoragenciesaccountforanddealwithassetsisa
separatepolicymatterforGovernment,thefollowingapproachescouldbeconsidered:
i.
ii.

requiringpublicsectoragenciesthatholdspectrumtoregularlyreportthe
valueoftheirholdings
permittingagenciestoeitherleaseorsellthespectrumandretainthebenefit
ofdoingso.

Rationaleforreform
Governmentusersofspectrumprovideservicesthatoffersignificantbenefitstosociety
beyondapurecommercialreturn.Theseuserscurrentlyreceivemostoftheirspectrum
administratively,andshouldtheyachieveefficienciesinitsusearegenerallyunableto
fullyrealisethesebenefits.
TreatmentofGovernmentassetsisamatterofGovernmentpolicy.However,fromthe
perspectiveofanewframework,thepolicyobjectiveofimprovingefficiencyand
treatingspectrumusersconsistentlywouldbesignificantlyenhancedifGovernment
usersareabletobenefitfromtradingandleasingofspectrum.
Proposal
ItisproposedthattheGovernmentconsideritspoliciesregardinghowpublicsector
agenciesaccountforandarepermittedtodealwithassets,suchthatagenciescan
benefitfromboththeadditionalflexibilityprovidedinthenewframeworkandmore
efficientuseoftheirspectrumholdings.Thiswouldincludeconsidering:
> requiringpublicsectoragenciesthatholdspectrumtoregularlyreportthevalueof
theirholdings,and
> permittingagenciestoeitherleaseorsellthespectrumandretainthebenefitof
doingso.

35

2.11. Recommendation3Spectrumpricing
ThattheDepartmentreviewthearrangementsforpricingofspectrum(including
exemptions,concessions,administrativechargesandtaxes)sothattheseareconsistent,
transparentandsupportefficientuseinsecondarymarkets.
i.

ThisreviewwilltakeintoaccountanyrelevantoutcomesoftheReviewof
AustralianGovernmentCharging.

Rationaleforreform
Iftheproposedchangestothelegislationandlicensingareagreed(recommendations1
and1(a)),thenpriceschargedforspectrumwouldneedtobereviewedtoensurethey
areappropriatetothenewarrangements.Forexample,changestolicenceconfiguration
andaccessrightsmayrequireadjustmentstopricing.
Currentpricingarrangementsarecomplexandmaynotalwaysprovideanincentivefor
efficientuse.Theapproachtoprovidingpricingdiscountsisunclearandneedstobe
examined.
Proposal
Itisproposedthatthisreviewwouldconsiderthepricingoptionsandvaluation
approaches(forexample,opportunitycostpricingorotherformsofadministered
incentivepricing)whichshouldbeappliedtospectrumunderanynewarrangements.It
wouldalsoconsiderrelatedpricingissuessuchastaxescharged,theapplicationof
concessionalratesandrecoveryofadministrativecosts.
ThereviewwouldcommencefollowingGovernmentsapprovalofanewlegislative
frameworkandwouldreporttotheMinisterinattheendof2015.Theoutcomesofthe
reviewwouldinformthechargesforlicencesallocatedunderthenewframework.

36

3. Financialimplications
3.1.

Singlelicensingsystemimplicationsforchargingandrevenues

Thecurrentlicencetypeshavedifferentpaymentstructures.Amovetoasinglelicensing
systemthatprovidesforgreaterpaymentflexibility,whilenotaffectingcurrentlyissued
licencesandtheirassociatedpaymentarrangements,hasthepotentialtoprovide
greatercertaintyaroundrevenueforecasts.
Asnotedinrecommendation3,movingtoasinglelicensingsystemwouldalso
necessitateareviewofspectrumpricingarrangements.Charges,pricingandimplications
forGovernmentrevenuewouldbereportedtotheMinisteraspartofthatreview.

3.2.

Compensation

CompensationiscurrentlypayableundertheRadiocommunicationsActtospectrum
licenseesiftheACMAresumespartorallofalicence(section93).TheACMAmustnot
compulsorilyresumealicencewithouttheMinistersapproval.Statutorycompensation
isnotavailabletoapparatusorclasslicensees.
Itisproposedthattherighttocompensationwouldcontinuetobealastresortin
limitedcircumstancesandsimilarlyrequireMinisterialapproval.
Stakeholdershaveaskedforcompensationand/orfinancialassistancetocoverthecosts
ofrelocationwhenbandsarereplanned.TheDepartmentproposesthatfinancial
assistanceforrelocationnotbeprovided.Replanningwouldcontinuetobemanaged
throughnoticeperiodsandtheprovisionofinformationtoassistaffectedstakeholders.
AnyassistancewouldbeconsideredonacasebycasebasisbytheGovernmentas
occurredwiththerecentdigitaltelevisionswitchoverandrestackprocess.

3.3.

Costsofimplementation

Theintentionoftheproposedchangesistosimplify/streamlineadministrationof
spectrumregulatoryarrangements.Costofregulationisthereforeexpectedtodecline
overtimealthoughtimingofthis,includingprovisionforanytransitionalcosts,would
needtobeassessed.ItisproposedthatthisoccurthroughnormalGovernment
budgetaryprocesses.
TheACMAhasindicatedaneedfortransitionalfundingtoundertakeworksuchas
reviewingadministrativeinstruments,implementingenhancedcomplianceand
enforcementrequirements,stakeholderengagementanddevelopingsystemsand
supportforthesinglelicensingarrangementsandchangesinchargingandpricing.

37

4. Implementation
WereGovernmentpolicyapprovaltoimplementtheproposedreformstobeannounced
bymid2015,thenthebroadactivitiesandindicativetimingforthemajorworkstreams
tobecompletedbylate2016are:
1.Newlegislationandrelatedlegislativechanges.
>

Detailedstakeholderconsultationanddevelopmentofdraftlegislative
proposalsannouncementtoSeptember2015.

>

ReleaseofconsolidatedlegislativereformpackageSeptember2015.

>

Passageoflegislativepackagebyearlytomid2016.

2.Initialpolicystatementsandsubordinateregulation.
a) PolicyprioritiesandthedevelopmentoftheACMAannualworkprogram.
-

Consultationonscopeanddetailofpolicystatementmidtolate2015.

Releaseofpolicystatementfollowingpassageoflegislativepackage.

ACMAcommencesformalconsultationondraftannualworkprogram,
includingtransitionarrangementsmid2016.

Firstannualworkprogramfinalisedmid2016.

Singlelicensingsystem:

Initialexamplesofmodellicencespreparedforreleasewithexposure
draftoflegislationfrommid2015.

Consultationonthedetailofthesinglelicensingsystemmid2015to
early2016.

Releaseofpolicystatementfollowingpassageoflegislativepackage.

ACMAcommencesformalconsultationondraftlicensingoptionsmid
2016.

ACMAcommenceprogressiveimplementationofnewlicensingsystem
late2016.

b) Furthermeasurestofullyoperationalisethenewframeworkincludingallocation
andreallocationprocesses,technicalregulationandcomplianceand
enforcementmeasurestotakeplaceduringthecourseof2016and2017.
3.Reviewofpricingarrangements.
> Consultationandpreparationofreportonrevisedarrangementsmid2015tolate
2015.
> Outcomestoinformimplementationofdraftlicensingoptionsmid2016onwards.

38

Attachments
A. Spectrumreviewprocess
B. Currentspectrummanagementframework
C. Currentspectrumreallocationprocess

39

AttachmentA
Spectrumreviewprocess
Overview
TheDepartmentundertookextensiveconsultationduringthisreview.Thisincludedthe
releaseoftwodiscussionpaperstowhichover80submissionswerereceived,over40
meetingswithindustry,Governmentandcommunitystakeholdersbothbilaterallyand
infocusgroupsandconductingastakeholderworkshopwithover100attendees.
Eachoftheseconsultationactivitiesandkeyoutcomesareoutlinedfurtherbelow.

IssuesPaper
On23May2014,theMinisterannouncedthereview.Atthesametimeanissuespaper
wasreleasedwhichoutlinedthetermsofreferenceforthereviewanddiscussedtheir
broadercontext.
TheDepartmentreceivedatotalof38submissionstotheissuespaper,ofwhich35were
publishedontheDepartmentswebsite.Theremainingthreewereconfidential.

ConsultationontheIssuesPaperindividualandgroupmeetings
TheDepartmentconsultedwithover30stakeholderseitheronanindividualbasisorin
groupmeetings.Thesediscussionsallowedthestakeholderstohighlightconcernsand
offerproposalsregardingthedirectionandscopeofthereview.
Industrygroupsandassociations
TheDepartmentheldindividualmeetingswithover15keyindustrystakeholders,
including:
> telecommunicationscompanies(Telstra,Optus,Vodafone,theCommunications
AllianceandtheAustralianMobileTelecommunicationsAssociation)
> broadcasters(FreeTVAustralia,allthreecommercialbroadcasters,theABCandSBS,
theAustralianSubscriptionTelevisionandRadioAssociationandCommercialRadio
Australia)
> specificserviceproviders(AustralianCommercialandEntertainmentTechnologies
Association,AustralianRadioCommunicationsIndustryAssociation,Broadcast
Australia,SatelliteIndustryAssociationofAustralia,andtheWirelessInstituteof
Australia).
Mostofthesestakeholderswereinvolvedinsubsequentengagementactivities(suchas
theWorkshop)andmadesubmissionstothereview.

40

InterdepartmentalGovernmentMeetings
AninterdepartmentalmeetingwasheldinAugust2014whichbroughttogether17
AustralianGovernmentagenciestodiscussaspectsofthereview.
Separatemeetingswerealsoheldwiththecentralagencies:theDepartmentofPrime
MinisterandCabinet,theTreasuryandtheDepartmentofFinance.
Scientificstakeholders
MeetingswerealsoheldwithscientificstakeholdersfromtheAustralianMaritimeSafety
Authority,CivilAviationSafetyAuthority,DepartmentofInfrastructureandRegional
Development,andGeoscienceAustralia.

MinistersKeynoteAddressattheACMAsRadCommsConference2014
On10September2014,theMinisterprovidedakeynoteaddressattheACMA
RadComms2014conference.
Thisspeechprovidedmorecontextforthereviewandidentifiedthreeareasofpotential
reform:
> aclearerandsimplifiedpolicyframeworktoensuretransparencyandaccountability
indecisionmaking(forexample,bywayofGovernmentpolicystatementsand
specificMinisterialpowersofintervention)
> asimplifiedandmoreflexiblelicensingsystembasedonaparameterbasedsingle
licensingframework(asopposedtothecurrentthreetypesoflicences)
> introducinggreaterflexibilityintothecurrenttelevisionbroadcastingframework
throughavarietyofmeasures.

PotentialReformDirectionsPaper
On11November2014,theMinisterannouncedthereleaseoftheSpectrumReview
PotentialReformDirectionspaper.Thepaperoutlinedfivereformprinciplesand11
potentialreformproposalsandinvitedcommentsfrominterestedparties.
TheDepartmentreceived46submissionstothispaperofwhich38arepublishedonthe
Departmentswebsite.Theremainingeightsubmissionsareconfidential.
Consultationindividualandgroupmeetings
FollowingthereleaseofthePotentialReformDirectionsPaper,theDepartment
undertookadditionalconsultation(includinganinterdepartmentalmeetinginDecember
2014andacentralagenciesmeetinginJanuary2015)toupdatestakeholderson
progressinthereviewprocessandtoprovideanopportunityforstakeholderstoask
questionsandmakefurthercomment.

41

StateandTerritoryGovernments
MeetingswerealsoheldwithrepresentativesfromtheNewSouthWales,Queensland,
Tasmanian,VictorianandWesternAustralianGovernments,includingarepresentative
fromtheNationalCoordinationCommitteeforGovernmentRadiocommunications.

StakeholderWorkshop
OnWednesday28January2015,theDepartmentconductedafulldaystakeholder
workshoponthereview.Theworkshopwasconvenedtoprovidefurtherinformationon
proposalstostakeholdersandgatheradditionalfeedbackbyallowingstakeholdersto
discussproposals,askquestionsandraisenewissuesinanopenforum.
Therewere103attendeesattheworkshop,representing57organisations.
TheworkshopheardpresentationsfromtheParliamentarySecretary,theHonPaul
FletcherMP,and12speakersfromindustry,otherstakeholdersandGovernmentwho
discussedopportunitiesandideaspresentedbythereformprocess.

42

AttachmentB
Currentspectrummanagementframework
Australiasspectrummanagementframeworkisestablishedunderthe
RadiocommunicationsAct,relatedlegislationandsubordinateinstruments.Theobjects
oftheRadiocommunicationsActbroadlyoutlinetheframeworksobjectives,including
maximisingthepublicbenefitthroughspectrumsefficientallocationanduse,making
adequateprovisionforpublicandcommunityservicessuchasdefence,securityand
emergencyservices,andpromotinginternationalharmonisationinAustraliasinterests.

TheroleoftheRadiocommunicationsAct
TheRadiocommunicationsActintroducedmarketbasedarrangementsofspectrum
allocationandpricingtooperatealongsidetheexistingadministrativeframework.These
marketbasedarrangementsweredesignedtopromotemoreefficientallocationanduse
throughtheuseofauctionstoallocatespectrumaccessrights,aswellasallowing
secondarytradingofthoserights.
Thishybridadministrative/marketmodelpreservesthecentralroleofGovernmentin
planningandadministeringspectrumwhileallowingforamarketbasedapproachin
areasofcommerciallydrivendemand.
TheRadiocommunicationsActdefinesthreeseparatelicencecategoriesforspectrum.
> Spectrumlicencesauthoriseexclusiveuseofspecificportionsofspectrumina
particulargeographicarea(includingnationallicences).Spectrumlicencesaffordthe
mostprotectionfrominterference,andbecauseofthisandtheirtechnological
neutrality,theyaregenerallymoresuitabletotrading.Spectrumlicencesareissued
usingapricebasedmethod,throughauction,tenderorpredeterminedorpre
negotiatedprice,foraperiodofupto15years.
> Apparatuslicencesauthoriseapersontooperateaspecifiedtransmitterorreceiver
inadefinedpartofthespectrum,inaccordancewithlicenceconditions.These
licencesaregenerallyissuedforuptofiveyearsandarerenewableuponexpiry,
subjecttotheACMAsconsent.
> Classlicencesauthoriseusersofdesignatedsegmentsofspectrumtooperatealow
powerorlocalisedservice(suchWiFinetworksorcordlesstelephones),provided
thedevicecomplieswiththelicenceconditions.Classlicencesestablishpartsofthe
spectrumascommons,donotinvolvelicencefeesandprovideuserswithno
protectionfrominterference.

43

Spectrummanagement
UndertheRadiocommunicationsAct,theMinisterhascertainpowerstomakespecific
decisionsandinputtoprocesses.Inthiscontext,theDepartmentprovidesadviceto
Governmentonthepolicyaspectsofspectrummanagementandintheexerciseofthese
powers.
TheACMAistheindustryregulatorresponsibleforregulationofradiocommunications
consistentwiththeRadiocommunicationsAct(aswellasspectrumforbroadcasting
purposesconsistentwiththeBroadcastingServicesAct1992).TheACMAsspectrum
managementfunctionsaresetoutintheACMAAct,theyinclude:
>

performingitsfunctionsundertheRadiocommunicationsAct,whichinclude
planning,licensing,allocationandreallocationofspectrum

>

advisingandassistingthespectrumcommunity

>

reportingto,andadvising,theMinisterinrelationtothespectrumcommunity

>

managingAustraliasinputintothesettingofinternationalstandardsfor
radiocommunications

>

givingadviceandmakinginformationavailabletothepublicaboutthespectrum
community,includingconductingpubliceducationalprograms

>

undertakingfunctionsconferredontheACMAthroughthespectrumrelatedtax
Acts.

TheACMAalsopreparesadvicetoGovernmentandthemarketonfuturespectrum
activitiesandissues,includingthrough:
> TheAustralianRadiofrequencySpectrumPlan,whichisastatutoryinstrumentunder
theRadiocommunicationsActthatoutlinesAustraliasinternationalspectrum
harmonisationobligations;identifiesvariationstointernationalallocations;and
informsusersaboutthevarioustypesofservicesthatcanbeoperatedineach
frequencyband,andtheconditionsattachedtotheiroperation.Itisusuallyupdated
aftereachWRCmeeting.
> TheFiveYearSpectrumOutlookwhichprovidesarollingfiveyearsnapshotof
ACMAsspectrumdemandanalysisandindicativeworkprogram.

44

AttachmentC
Currentspectrumreallocationprocess

1. ACMAmustpublishanoticeandconsultondraftrecommendationfortheMinisterto
makeaspectrumreallocationdeclaration(SRD)(s153G).

2. ACMArecommendstotheMinistertomakeaSRD(s153P).
3. TheMinistermakesaSRD(s153B)butonlyiftheACMAmakesrecommendation
withintheprevious180days(s153E).TheActprescribeswhatmustbeincludedin
aSRD(s153B).

4. TheMinistermustgiveacopyoftheSRDtotheACMA(s153C(1)).
5. ACMAmustissueapublicnoticethatSRDhasbeenmade(s153C(2)).

6. ACMAmustprepareamarketingplan(s39A).Thisplanspecifiesthespectrumto
beallocated,howitistobeallocatedandconditionsthatmayapply.

7. ACMAmustdeterminetheprocedurestoapplyforallocatingthespectrum(s60).
Beforedeterminingtheseprocedures,theACMAmustconsultwithACCC(s60(14)).
ACMAmustnotimposecompetitionlimitsunlessdirectedbytheMinister(s60(9)).

8. ACMAmustallocatethespectrumbeforethereallocationdeadlineotherwisethe
SRDistakentoberevoked(s153K).

9. TheMinistermustnotrevokeorvarytheSRDoncetheACMAhasbeguntheallocation
process(s153J).

10. Attheendofthereallocationperiod,anyapparatuslicencesaffectedare
automaticallycancelled(s153H),notingsomeexceptionsforbroadcasting.

11. ACMAmustdeterminespectrumaccesscharges (s294).

12. ACMAmustissuelicencetopersontowhomallocatedonpaymentofcharges
(s62).ACMAmustcomplywithrequirementsofmarketingplaninissuinglicence
(s63).

45

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