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Roberto de Vera, 11 September 2008
Note: This is a word version based on a scanned file of the original pdf file found in http://www.scribd.com/doc/21622530/Demographic-Economic-Historical-Evidence-vs-RH-Bill Please refer to the original file to ensure accuracy of data.
Various groups of Malthusian bent claim that today's high food and fuel prices that are impoverishing more people are caused by overpopulation. So they propose that it would be reasonable to stabilize the population through a reproductive health,responsible parenthood and population development bill that promotes economic growth and lifts people out of their poverty. We reckon that their proposal rests on five assertions: 1) Higher population growthleads to slower economic growth; 2) A larger population means more hungry and malnourished people; 3) Our population growth is out of control; 4) Larger families are poor families; and 5) Instituting a two-child population policy, through the proposed Reproductive Health, Responsible Parenthood and Population Development Bill, will significantly reduce poverty. How does this proposal and its assertions hold in the face of economic, historical and demographic evidence? After examining each assertion, we find that available statistics and scientific studies do not support the claim that "too many people" means "more poor people". Bad governance and bad economic policies, not a large, fast growing population, are the real causes of poverty. Thus, we recommend that more efforts be placed on improving governance and implementing good economic policies. More specifically, we havefound that: 1) Population growth has little or no direct effect on per capita GDP growth. Thus, there is no basis for a policy that aims to reduce population growth to raise per capita GDP growth. 2) Poverty is usually caused by poor governance and inappropriate and badly implemented economic policies—which leads to corruption, poor tax collections, lack of education and roads, lack of irrigation systems —instead of a large and increasing population. Thus, instead of having a bill that promotes reproductive health and population management, we should focus efforts on thegaps in governance and policy implementation that hinder and slow down economic growth. 3) Large families are poor not because they are large but because most ofheads of these the poor families have limited schooling which prevents them from getting good paying jobs. Moreover, a 1994 study shows that parents of poor families want the children they beget. These findings show that there is no basis for having a population management policy that raises economic growth to reduce poverty.
This paper draws heavily from "Too Many People Doesn't Cause Poverty, Bad Governance and Policies Do" by by Emilio T. Antonio, Ronilo Balbieran, Enrico Basilic, Jovi Dacanay, Roberto de Vera, Stephen Huang, Maia Tyche King, Winston Stan Padojinog, Cherrylyn Rodolfo, Kimberiy Agustin, Leandro San Tan, Cid Terosa, Peter Lee U, Bernardo M. Villegas (12 October 2004). The comments and views expressed in this paper are solely the responsibility of the author and do not represent any position held by the University of Asia and the Pacific School of Economics.
4) The population history of developed countries shows that implementing a two-child policy, via the consolidated bill, will place the country in a virtually irreversible course of population decline and ageing that carries with it all kinds problems and thus the of country would be well-advised to avoid it altogether. 5) The country's populationsituation—where the labor force is growing faster than the dependent (youth and elderly) population—gives it a wonderful opportunity to reap a demographic dividend (a period of rapid economic growth) that would reduce poverty significantly for the next 35 years. Thus, instead of implementing a two-child policy, NGOs, firms and governments should focus their efforts on providing these future workers with access to education and training programs which prepare them to take well-paid jobs and on establishing a stable economic and political climate that attracts the needed investments that generates new jobs to match the additional 1.1-1.2 million potential workers each year. The rest of the paper elaborates on these findings. Assertion 1: Higher population growth leads to slower economic growth Economic studies do not support this seemingly logical assertion. Nobel prize winner Simon Kuznets's pioneering study contained in his 1966 book Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread (pp. 67-68) showed that "[n]o clear association appears exist in the to present sample of countries, or is likely to exist in the other developed countries, between rates of growth of population and of product per capita." Other studies have confirmedKuznets's findings, showing no clear link between population growth and economic growth (or poverty). Here are the findings of five studies: (1) the 1992 Ross Levine and David Renelt study of the relationship between growthits and determinants found no significant effect of population growth on economic growth; (2) the 1994 Jeff Kling and Lant Pritchett study arrived at a similar finding where they allowed the effect of population growth on economic growth to vary according to the level of development and resource scarcity; (3) in a 1996 review of the population growth-poverty relationship, Dennis Ahlburg points out that studies have showed population growth has little or no direct effect onpoverty; (4) in a 2004 study examining the determinants of long term growth, Gernot Doppelhofer, Ronald Miller and Xavier Sala-l-Martin, found that average annual population growth from 1960-1990 was not robustly correlated with economic growth; (5) the 2007 Eric Hanushek and Ludger Wommann study found that total fertility rates, which can be seen as an alternative measure of population growth, did not havestatistically a significant association with economic growth.
Similar conclusionshave been arrived at by the US National Research Council in 1986 and in the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) Consultative Meeting of Economists in 1992, Moreover, th ese stud ie s support Kuzn ets's explanation of why no direct relationshipcould be expected between population growth and economic growth. Population growth and economic growth are linked through "a common set of political and social institutions." Thus, any "direct causal relation" between them "may be quite limited." Moreover, any relationship that is measured cannot be used as a basis for managing population to affect economic growth. It important to note that even if there are recent econometric studies that show that population growth is negatively correlated with per capita income growth in the Philippine case (i.e. an increase in the population growth rate leads to a decrease per capita income growth rate), in these studies cannot conclude that higher population growth rates causes Sower per capita income growth rates. It is more probable that there are intervening factors such as those mentioned by Kuznets that may cause economic growth. Thus,these studies cannot serve as bases for a policy that aims to reduce population growth to raise per capita income growth. So if population growth doesn't affect economic growth, what will? Good governance and well-implemented economic policies. These things usually get done in a climate of political and economic freedom. in his book, The Ultimate Resource Julian Simon gives evidence for the crucial role politicalthat economic systems play in economic growth when he compares three pairs of countries that have the same culture and history and practically had the same standard before they split after World War li —East and West Germany, North and South Korea, Taiwan and China. In and 1950, both the communist and non-communist countries had practically the same birthrates and the centrally planned economies had less population pressure thantheir market-directed counterparts as measured by population per square kilometer. Yet the economic growth of West Germany, South Korea, and Taiwan was better than their counterpart centrally planned economies. Due to faster economic growth, personal incomes in Taiwan and South Korea were roughly double China and North Korea, respectively while those in West Germany's was more than 10% larger than East Germany in the early 1980s (see Table 1).
Table 1. Population density, 1950 and real income per capita, 1950, 1980, and 1982 for selected countries* East Germany Germany 171 2,943 9,914 West Germany 201 2,943
Population density, 1950** Real gnp per capita, 1950*** Real gnp per capita, 1982 11,032 Population density, 1950 Real gnp per capita, 1950 Real gnp per capita, 1982
N orth Korea
76 193 817 China
South Korea 212 193 1,611 Taiwan
Population density, 1950 Real gdp per capita, 1950**** Real gdp per capita, 1980
57 300 1,135
212 5 08 2 ,5 22
*The figures for this table are taken from Tables 34-la and 34-lb in Julian Simon. 1996. The Ultimate Resource 2. Revised Edition. Princeton, Jersey: New Princeton University Press, p. 496. **in persons per square kilometer ***Figures for real gross national product (gnp) per capita are based on 1981 constant us dollars. ****Figures for real gross domestic product (gdp) per capita are based 1975 on international prices. Source: Population density: United Nations Educational, Scientific, andCultural Organization, UNESCO Yearbook (1963, pp. 12-21). Real GDP per capita: Summers and Heston Data Set (1984). Real GNP per capita: Internationa! Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), World Tables (1980). GNP deflator: Council of Economic Advisers (1986, Table B-3).
Assertion No. 2: A larger population means more hungry and malnourished people. On the contrary, Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) statistics indicate that the food supply available for consumption has increased and the historical trend shows it can continue to outpace population growth in the future. The FAO statistics for the Philippines from 1961 to 2002 show that the food supply available for consumption increased in three categories: 1) calories per person per day: from 1,745,0 to 2,379.3 2) grams of protein per person per day: from 40,6 to 56.1 3) grams of fat per person per day: from 28.7 to 48.4. These national trends follow world trends. Based on food and nutrition statistics found in FAOSTAT, the online FAO internet database, we find that from 1961 to 2002, available world food supply per person has gone up by 24.4% and enough food is being produced for everyone on earth to enjoy a healthy diet. The FAO reports in The State of Food and Agriculture 20032004: "Over the past two decades, progress has been made in reducing undernourishment in developing countries. The incidence of undernourishment has declined from 28 percent of the population two decades ago to17 percent according to data from 1999-2001." These trends of food supply outpacing population growth clearly prove Ester Boserup's point in her 1965 book The Conditions of Agricultural Growth: that it is population growth that causes increases in food production and not the other way around. Her argument can be paraphrased as follows: Population growth puts pressure on communities who acquire food through hunting and gathering, slash-and-burn farming methods, and other inefficient methods to adopt more efficient ones such asplowing with livestock and multi-cropping. As populations grow, towns develop and people can specialize in other non-farming production activities. This is the result of farmers, being pressured by a growing population, to produce more food with more efficient methods to serve a larger demand.
If the statistics show that food supply is adequate to give every Filipino a healthy diet, are why some families still eating less? For instance, FAO's The State of Food Agriculture 2007 and shows that the incidence of undernourished people in the Philippines be 17% in 2001-2003, to iower than the 26% recorded in 1990-1992. The FAO argues in their report Agriculture: Towards 20 15 /2 03 0 that families that are eating less have heads that are not able to get good paying jobs to pay for foodstuffs. Or that they live in poor, isolated communities dependent on agriculture and are unable to raise localagricultural production to meet their food needs. In some cases, it may, in fact, besparse population that makes it difficult for people to access food supplies. This was the case of the famine in Sahel, West Africa in the 1970s. Because of the region's low population density, not enough roads and transport services were made available in the area. In the case of the Philippines, families need to pay higher prices due to food wastages that can be avoided if there were more food processing and storage facilities. Food prices are also higher due to a fragmented transportation system, which is now being remedied by the roll-on, roll-off (roro) services of the government's Strong Republic-Nautical Highway project. Moreover, in his book The Ultimate Resource Julian Simon has shown that in addition to food supply, the supply of oil, copper, aluminum and other resources have more than kept up with demands of an increasing population. Simon has shown that amid population growth, resources have become less scarce (or are in greater supply relative the technology used to to extract and to employ the resource) by showing that their prices have gone down over time. These trends bolster his argument first pointed out by Simon Kuznets, the 1971 Nobel prize winner: "More people, and increased income, cause problems in the short run. This increased scarcity of resources caus es prices to rise. The higher prices present opportunity, and prompt inventors and entrepreneurs to search for solutions. Many fail at cost to themselves. But in a free society, solutions are eventually found. And in the long run the new developments leave us better off than if the problems had not arisen. That is, prices end up lower than before the increased scarcity occurred." In other words, additionalpersons born in a democratic society mean more minds and hands to feed additional mouths,shelter and clothe additional bodies, and educate additional minds. Each additional person is a net producer of ideas and resources. This is proven by history wherein every larger generation has left the world in a better state next one. One good proof for of this is that the life expectancy of the Filipino has increased from 47.8 years in 1950-1955 to 68.6 years in 1995-2000. Assertion No. 3: Our population growth is out of control. Some persons point out that we need to manage the Philippine population because it is simply growing too fast for its own good (without clearly stating why). For if we don't, they warn that the population will reach 178 million in 2036, double the 89 million in 2007. We shouldn't worry about this at all since this figure is way above the UN high variant projection of 142 million for 2036. Why the wide difference? On one hand, the 'population doubles' projection assumes that the 1995-2000 annual population growth rate of 2.36% will hold steady for thenext 29 years. On the other hand, the UN high variant projection assumes that these growth rates will come down from 2.08% in 2000-2005 to 1.02% in 2045-2050. The latter assumption seems to be a more reasonable one since Philippine annual
population growth rates have been decreasing: from 3.06% in 1948-1960 down to 2. 36% in 1995-2000, Based on the last census, it has gone down even further to 2.04% 2000-2007, in What people don't realize about an increasing population is that it is caused by less babies dying and more people living longer. Peter Bauer has written: "Clearly, the much-deplored population explosion,..should be seen as ablessing rather than a disaster, because it stems from a fall in mortality, a prima facie improvement in people's welfare, not a deterioration." For instance, infant mortality rates in the Philippines (number of deaths per 1,000 births between birth and up to age one year) have gone down from 134.4 in 1950-1955 to 34.4 in 1995-2000 and further down to 25 in 2005, Life expectancies from birth have increased from 47.8 years in 1950-1955to 68.6 years in 1995-2000. Assertion No. 4: Larger families are poor families. This is true. A sample of families that have reached their final family 2 taken from the 2000 size Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES) (published by the National Statistics Office) indicates an increasing proportion of poor families as family size increases: from 4.9% in families with no children to 59.1% in families with seven children (see Table 6). Nonetheless, it would be poor judgment on our part to use this observation as a basis for limiting the family size of poor people for two reasons. First, finding that increasing family size is associated with increasing incidence of poor families does not prove that a larger family size is what makes a family poor. The more likely reason why some families are poor is the limited schooling ofthe household head. In fact, 78% to 90% of the poor households in each family size had heads with no high school diploma (See Table 2). In other words, poor families are poor not because they are large but because most of their heads have limited schooling which prevents them from getting good paying jobs. This finding that poor families have heads that lack schooling confirms the results of the 2002 Balisacan and Pernia study on poverty incidence in Philippine regions: the provision of education, hand in hand with roads, helps reduce poverty. In other words, persons can take full advantage oftheir education only if they have access to jobs that pay good wages and to markets they pay good prices for the goods they produce. The study also showed that agrarian reform and irrigation alleviate poverty. This finding makes sense, especially in regions where agriculture is dominant. In his 2001 paper on Philippine poverty, Balisacan showed that poverty is mainly a rural phenomenon and nearly two- of the thirds rural poor work in the agricultural sector.
Table 2. Proportion of families that are poor and proportion of poor families whose heads had high no school diploma, by number of children, 2000.*
This sample represents 3.3 million families with zero to seven children whose heads are married, aged 40-49 and held a job.. A family is classified as "poor" when its annual income falls below the family poverty threshold income. The latter figure can be calculated by multiplying the number of family members by the per capita poverty threshold income. The latter was estimated to be Pll,605 in 2000 and represented the minimum amount of money needed to enable a person to eat enough food that would give the minimum amount of calories and nutritional requirements and to buy essential non-food items.
0 Proportion of families that are poor (in %) Proportion of poor families Whose Heads had no High School diploma (in %) 4.9 90. 5
1 12.5 84.5
2 15.4 88.9
3 22. 1 84. 6
4 35. 8 78. 2
5 42.3 81.6
6 53.2 83.8
7 59.1 82.1
*This sample consists of families with married household heads, aged 40-49 and held a job the time of the at survey. Poverty incidence was families that earned annual incomes below the family poverty threshold level in 2000 (P11.605 times the number of family members).
Source: 2000 FIES; authors' calculation Second, finding that larger families are usually poor cannot be used as a basis to conclude that poor parents cannot control and do not consider the consequencesof their procreative capacities. For Lant Pritchett, of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, has found that 90% of the variation in actual fertility rates can be accounted by variations in desired fertility rates. In other words, parents who have large families want large families; parents want the children thatthey actually beget. Assertion No. 5: Instituting a two-child population policy, through the proposed Reproductive Health, Responsible Parenthood, and Population Development Bill will significantly reduce poverty. Successfully implementingthis two-child policy will not hasten the economic growth that will reduce poverty because it was shown in the review of the earlier assertions that (1) population growth has no direct effect on economic growth or poverty and (2) larger families are more likely to be poor not because they are large but because their heads have a limited education that limits their access to well-paid jobs. Moreover, implementing this population control policy will put the country on a practically irreversible course of population decline and ageing whose consequences we would want to avoid. For example, slowing down the population growth leads to a situation wherein the share of persons 65 years and older (i.e. retired workers) increases while the sharepersons of between the ages of 15 and 65 years decreases. This results in fewer and workers fewer supporting one retired worker and makes it more difficult to finance pension fund systems in the long run. Moreover, history tells us that government population programs typically drive fertility rates below the replacement level of 2.1 children per family which means that the country's population will be declining in the long run. A shrinking population means fewer minds and hands will be around to find and implement innovative solutions to the challenges it faces. Instead of implementing a two-child policy, we should focus our efforts on reaping a possible demographic dividend—a stage in a population where potential workers support relatively fewer number of child and elderly dependents—by educating ourpeople for well-paid jobs and attracting the investments needed to generate the additional jobs for the 1.1-1.2 million entrants into the workforce each year. What follows is an elaboration of this quick review.
Unplanned births are interpreted as the unmet need of women who would use contraceptives if they had the chance to do so. So, as its proponents argue, by encouraging a two-child policy and contraceptive access, population management is designed to meet this need. Aside from having shown that population growth has no direct causal effect on economic growth and poverty and that population growth will not remain at current rates but will actually decrease, the two-child ideal family size is flawed for three reasons, First, measures of unmet need, which are used to estimate desired fertility and ideal family size, are unreliable. Lant Pritchett, a development economist at the Harvard Kennedy School of government, pointed out in 1994 that the figure for "unmet need" for contraception lumps together all women who might not want a child immediately and are not using contraception. These women, however, would include those who may be infertile, those who may be sexually inactive,and those who may have moral reasons not to use contraceptive drugs or devices even if they were available. Typically, population management proponents bring up the estimated 473,000 induced abortions done each year as evidence of an huge unmet need for contraceptives. A review of the methodology shows that it contains at least three flaws that overestimates the actual number. Using two approaches, we arrived at the much lower estimates of 25,924 and 20,831 induced abortionsdone annually (See Appendix 1). Second, unmet need plays a relatively small role in explaining the actual fertility of women. Pritchett (1994) found that the "desired levels of fertility account for 90% of the differences across countries in total fertility rates." In other words, couples have large families because they want large families. It makes perfect sense, for example,that Filipino farmers may want larger families because they want more hands to help them in the farm, as well as children who can take care of them in their old age. Third, implementing a two-child policy as part of a population management program sets the country on a course of population decline and ageing that it would want to avoid since it would be difficult to reverse. Here's why: Joseph Chamie, director of the UN Population Division, in a paper presented to the Population Association of America in April 2004 says: "Sixty countries—about one-third of the countries in the worldhave period fertility rates below 2.1; and half ofthose countries have levels of 1,5 or less," Fertility rates below the replacement rate of 2.1 means that these countries will eventually experience the decline and ageing of their populations. For example, sixteen countries are projected to lose at least one million people over the 2008-2050 period. Four countries could experience population declines at greater than 10 million:Japan: 33 million; Russia: 32 million; Ukraine, 13 million; and Germany: 11 million. In the same paper, Chamie presents a table that indicates that 28 of the 60 countries withbelow replacement fertility rates are implementing programs to raise fertility rates. Excerpts from newspaper and magazine articles that give a sample what some of these programs are presented in Table 4. It cannot be overemphasized that the countries currently experiencing below replacement rates started on this path with a two-child policy. Acting in his persona! capacity, Chamie concludes in this paper that the efforts of countries to raise fertility rates will not be enough to bring them back to replacement levels. Thus, the
Philippines should learn from the experience of countries who are now trying to raise their
fertility rates, after using a two-child policy to reduce them, by not adopting the policy altogether.
Instead of implementing a two-child population policy, we should focus our efforts on cashing in on a possible "demographic dividend." A chance to reap a demographic dividend exists when a previously fast growing population decreases its growth rate (it was noted earlier that the UN projects that the 2.36% annual growth rate in 1995-2000 will go down to 0.92% in 2045-2050) and thus results in the labor force growing faster than the dependent (thus economically unproductive) population of children and elderly. In other words, the population is in a phase where the potential workforce (population aged 15-64 years) is supporting a relatively smaller number of dependents (population aged 0-14 years (child dependents) and 65 years and over (elderly dependents)). If the proper policies are in place during this demographic stage, then the expected increase in savings and labor supply can be harnessed to sustain rapid economic growth that reduces poverty.
Table 3. Total fertility rates (TFR) and population, 2008, and projected population change,2008-2050 in selected countries TFR 2008 Population (in millions) 127.7 141.9 46.2 82.2 48.6 23.0 21.5 46.5 7.6 9.7 7.4 4.6 11.2 10.6 10.0 10.4 Projected Change 2008-2050 (in millions) -32.5 -31.8 -12.8 -10.8 -6.3 -4.9 -4.4 -2.6 -2.6 -2.0 -1.6 -1.3 -1.3 -1.3 -1.1 -1.0
Japan Russia Ukraine Germany South Korea Taiwan Romania Spain Bulgaria Belarus
1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 Serbia Georgia 1.4 Cuba 1.4 1.3 Portugal Hungary 1.3 Czech Republic 1.4
Source: 2008 World Population Data Sheet Excerpts of news articles on fertility raising programs in selected countries Table 4. A sian economies desperate for Daily Express News, 2 February 2004 '"Our falling birth rate is a cause of great concern,' Singapore a b ie s b Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong said in a recent lunar new year message in which he issued a fresh appeal for his people to produce more babies."
France offers E800 reward for each new baby British Medical Journal, 10 May 2003
"The French Prime Minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, announced last week that a bonus of .800 (£560, $895) will be awarded mothers for each baby born after 1 January 2004. The bonus part of a series of measures to encourage families to have more children," "Women who are fertile will need to have three children each to sustain the current population of Britain at around 59 million, the Office of National Statistics says."
"Have three babies" to sustain the population Daily Telegraph, 12 December
Countries play the dating game "When governments start running dating programmes, you to halt the baby blues know that policymakers are worried about low birth rates. Financial Times, 10 December Since the late 1990s, Japanese prefectures have been 2003 organizing hiking trips and cruises for single people" Italy offers cash to boost its birth rate Reuters, 7 December 2003 "The 2004 budget package includes a one-time 1,000 euros ($1,200) payment to Italians on the birth of their second child, a measure set to from December 1 until the end of 2004. ... Mayor Rocco run Falivena (of Laviano) digging deep town coffers is offering couples into 10,000 euros ($11,900) for every newborn baby."
Have more babies, say the "Women should have more babies to stave off the looming Tories crisis of an ageing population, the Tories will say today. The Daily Mail, 22 September 2003 call to 'go forth and multiply' comes from work and pensions spokesm an David Willetts, who wants couples to send birth rates soaring." Child-friendly policies can't The population of Scotland will fall below five million by defuse a population timebomb 2009, according to a recent article. More worrying than the Scotland on Sunday, fact the population is getting smaller, is that it's also getting 15 February 2004 older as the birth rate falls significantly. All this suggests . that by the year 3573, there'll be two people left in Scotland, probably a married couple in their 90s living in Bearsden." Seoul to use tax breaks to Increase birth rate Korea Herald, 26 August 2003 The government plans to expand tax breaks for families with young children and increase support for daycare centers in order to help working women and boost Korea's falling birth rate, the Ministry of Finance and Economy said yesterday." "Cupid and the stork flew into Parliament for a scolding [yesterday as MPs questioned why Singapore's approach to • get singles to tie the The knot and have babies has failed. They [did not hold back their punches as they called on the Government to relook its policies that have neither stopped [nor reversed the declining marriage and fertility rates. And MPs were not short of policies to pummel, wrestling with issues such as abortion, childcare, infant care and [matchmaking agencies." "Worried about a declining population, Estonia's president has urged the country's 1.4 million residents to make more babies. 'Let us have remember that in just a couple of decades the number of Estonians seeing the New Year will be one-fifth less than today,' President 2 Arnold Ruutel said in a speech broadcast live on national television
Why have cupid and the stork failed? Straits Times, 22 March 2003
In address to Estonians,
President calls on citizens to more babies New York Times, January 2003
Source: Joseph Chamie. 2004. "Low Fertility: Can Governments Make a Difference," A paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, Boston, 1-3 April 2004
We reckon that the Philippines has a 35-year window of opportunity to reap this possible demographic dividend. Based on the UN high variant projection, the total dependency ratio (total number of dependents for every 100 potential workers).isexpected to ease from 65 in 2005 to its lowest level of 53 in 2040. Over the same 5 -year period, the UN projects that the child dependency ratio (number of 3 child dependents for every 100 potential workers) will go down from 59 to 39. The elderly dependency ratio (number of elderly dependents for every 100 potential workers) of in 2005 is expected to six increase to a still manageable ratio of 14 in 2040. These figures clearly show that the Philippines is not suffering from a "demographic onus" as some people are claiming. Rather, we are actually sitting on top of a possible 35-year "demographic bonus." To reap this demographic dividend over the next 35 years, what needs to be done is to educate these potential workers to prepare them to get good jobs and to implement policies that would attract the investments needed to generate good paying jobs that would match the projected annual addition of 1.1-1.2 million to the potential workforce. Appendix 1 A summary of "An Analysis of the Estimated Figure of induced abortions in the Philippines in 2000 as published in a 2006 Cuttrnacher Institute report by sh e e fa Singh et al" Su By Dr. Roberto De Vera In the 2006 Guttmacher Institute report "Unintended Pregnancies and Induced Abortions in the Philippines: Causes and Consequences", Susheela Singh etestimated that there were473,000 al induced abortions completed in the Philippines in 2000 using a method consisting of three steps. First, based on reports gathered from2,039 hospitals which contained the top ten leading causes of admission in the 1999-2001 period, they arrived at an estimate of the number of women in 2000 who were hospitalized due to complications from both induced and spontaneous abortions. Second, they calculated the number of women hospitalized for induced abortions by subtracting the estimated number of women hospitalized for spontaneous abortions (or miscarriages) from the estimated number of women hospitalized for induced and spontaneous abortions. Finally, they arrived at the estimated number of women who had induced abortions by multiplying the estimated number of women hospitalized for complications due to induced abortions by 6 to account for the women who had induced abortions who didn't go to the hospital. We find that their method overestimates the figure of induced abortions in the Philippines in 2000 because of three flaws. These flaws had the effect of 1) overestimating the figure for women hospitalized for spontaneous and induced abortions due to an assumption that is weakly supported by statistical data; 2) underestimating the number of women hospitalized for complications due to spontaneous abortions (or miscarriages) because it mistakenly covers only those
women with spontaneous abortions occurring in 12th to 22nd week of pregnancy who were hospitalized for complications; and 3) using a multiplier which most likely is higher than the ratio of the number of women who have induced abortions to the number of women who are hospitalized for complications due to induced abortions. Using modified version of the Singh et al methodology (corrected to account for the above flaws), we arrived at an alternative estimate of 5 ,9 2 4 induced abortions in thePhilippines in 2000 (1.3 abortions 2 per 1,000 women in the reproductive age). Using a second method, we multiplied 0.0117, the share of induced abortions to live births by the number of live births in 2000, to arrive at second estimate of 20,831 induced abortions in the Philippines in 2000 (1.1 abortions per 1,000 women of reproductive age). We consider these two estimates of induced abortion in the Philippines in 2000 be more to reasonable than the 473,000 estimate (24.5 induced abortions per 1,000 women of reproductive age) published in the 2006 Guttmacher Institute report.
Note: This is a word version based on a scanned file of the original pdf file found in http://www.scribd.com/doc/21622530/Demographic-Economic-Historical-Evidence-vs-RH-Bill Please refer to the original file to ensure accuracy of data.
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