International Development Institute Working Paper 2014-03

What are the Political and Social Implications of the New

Middle Classes in Developing Countries?
Frank-Borge Wietzke
Andy Sumner

King's International Development Institute

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What are the Political and Social Implications of the New Middle
Classes in Developing Countries?
Frank-Borge Wietzke and Andy Sumner

27 November 2014

Abstract: This is a survey paper that considers the emergence of new middle classes in
largely middle-income developing countries and proposes a set of research questions arising
for future exploration. Rapidly falling global poverty rates are leading to changes in the
income distribution of many developing countries. Yet, the political consequences of these
developments have received relatively little attention to date. We review emerging evidence
on the living conditions and attitudes of upwardly mobile lower middle-income groups and
discuss how they compare to theories of middle or working class-led development in the
political regime transition literature. We conclude that middle income groups in emerging
economies still face important economic and organizational challenges that prevent them
from playing the transformative role often attributed to working and middle classes in the
historical development of todays advanced welfare state democracies. Pressures for political
reform are more likely to arise around individual property rights and government corruption,
as formerly poor households aim to protect gains in economic wellbeing. We also identify
important divides in social policy and redistribution preferences between upwardly mobile
lower middle-income groups and more affluent middle classes.

Correspondence to: f.b.wietzke@lse.ac.uk and andrew.sumner@kcl.ac.uk

Many thanks for comments to Nancy Birdsall and Paul Segal.

1. Introduction
There is a long tradition of linking poverty reduction and middle class growth to
political change and democratisation. Modernisation theorists, and more recently analysts of
political transition, often suggest that falling poverty numbers and middle class growth are
conducive to the emergence of stable democracies. This argument is based on historical
observations about the role of bourgeois middle classes in the development process of
advanced European democracies, as well as on observed positive cross-national associations
between the size of middle-income groups and political and social cohesion outcomes (Barro,
1999; Easterly 2001; Easterly et al. 2006; Przeworski, 1985).
By most of these accounts we should expect to see important changes in the political
landscape of many of todays emerging economies. The global population of the developing
world living above the absolute (moderate) global poverty line of PPP$2/day (in 2005
Purchasing Power Parity terms) but below $10/day (which is associated with decreased
vulnerability to poverty) has doubled since the early 1990s. 2 The group on incomes between
PPP$2$10/day now accounts for almost half of the developing worlds population and could
measure 34bn by 2030 (Edward and Sumner, 2014a; 2014b). There is also dramatic growth
of affluent income groups above $10/day whose circumstances resemble more closely those
of conventional middle classes in advanced economies. Even though these groups still
account for relatively small population shares in their countries, their actual numbers are
beginning to exceed those in advanced economies by some estimates (Wilson 2013: 2,
Kharas 2010). 3
The expansion of both these middle classes (the lower insecure middle and the more
prosperous upper middle noted above) is by now a hot topic in the media and among the
major aid organizations and global consultancy agencies. 4 However, political scientists have
only paid limited attention to recent lower middle class growth. Most of the political science
literature on the politics of economic transition from the late 1990s and early 2000s does not
yet take into account more recent estimates of lower income growth. Available literature also
does not provide significant theorising of potential new conflict lines and political coalitions
that might emerge in the process of rapid expansion of the middle-income groups.
2

See Sumner (2012). All dollar values in the remaining parts of the article are reported in 2005 PPP terms.
Projections differ depending on assumptions about growth and inequality trends and use of national accounts
or survey means (see Wilson 2013; Edward and Sumner, 2014a; Goldman Sachs 2008; Kharas and Gertz 2010).
4
See, for example, The Economist, 1 June and 29 June 2013, the New York Times, 2 June 2013, reports by
private sector consultancies (for instance, Goldman Sachs 2008; Wilson 2013), as well as by the growing grey
literature of donor agencies (ADB 2010; AfDB 2011; Chun 2010; Ferreira et al. 2013 for the World Bank and
Kharas 2010 for the OECD).
3

The objective of this paper is to fill this gap by discussing the political and social
consequences of rapid lower middle income growth. Our theoretical starting point is the
standard three-class model that distinguishes between the poor or working classes,
middle classes and elites in the analysis of political regime transitions (Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003; Levantoglu 2013; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). We review
emerging evidence on the economic and social circumstances of the new middle income
groups in emerging economies and discuss how their living conditions compare to attributes
typically associated with middle and working classes in accounts of the historical
development of todays advanced welfare state democracies. We conclude that in particularly
the large population majorities between extreme poverty and affluent middle class incomes
still lack the level of economic security and political (or work-related) organization that
would enable them to play, at least in the near future, the transformative functions attributed
to working and middle classes in the literature. However, we also identify increasing amounts
of disposable income, human capital investments and durable assets among the new middle
income groups. Building on earlier work by Ansell and Samuels (2010) we speculate that this
may create new demands for the protection of individual property rights and government
accountability that may, in themselves, constitute an important impetus for future political
reforms.
Another major influence on our discussion is the literature on social mobility, relative
deprivation, and redistribution preferences. Important theories of political preference
formation suggest that people who believe that they or their children will have strong
prospects for upward mobility in the future are less likely to support redistribution in the
present, because they want to lower the tax burden for themselves and their children in future
time periods (Hirschman 1973; Benabou and Ok 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; see also
Piketty 1995). But observers typically agree that these attitudes weaken as more permanent
inequalities emerge, or as groups begin to face real or perceived threats of falling behind
(Hirschman 1973). We discuss evidence on social and political attitudes in emerging
economies and identify emerging divides between lower and middle income groups. Even at
the comparatively low levels of economic development that still characterise most emerging
nations today, experiences and preferences of affluent groups are often already shaped by
fears of downward mobility and feelings of relative deprivation that resemble those of the
squeezed middle classes in advanced industrialised economies (Frank 2007). This is in
contrast to lower-income and vulnerable groups for whom concerns about absolute economic
deprivation and uncertainty still dominate daily reality. We suggest that these differences in
4

social perceptions may have contributed to recent violent events in countries like Egypt,
Venezuela or Thailand, where social inequalities appear to interact dangerously with preexisting divides along religious, ethnic and regional lines.
The paper proceeds as follows. After an overview of the theoretical literature that
informs our discussion (Section 2) we turn to prevailing definitions of the middle classes.
We focus on relative as well as absolute definitions of middle class status, which we feel are
central to explaining different responses to social mobility between lower and affluent middle
income groups (Section 3). Section 4 discusses lower and middle class divides over
government redistribution and Section 5 reviews emerging evidence on the consequences of
lower middle class growth for actual social policy choices. The last section concludes and
outlines avenues for future research.
Before we enter the discussion it is important to be clear about the strengths and
weaknesses of the evidence reviewed here. We believe that the primary strength of the
studies we discuss comes from the greatly enhanced quality and frequency of micro data on
poverty trends and lower middle-income growth. Most of the economic studies and grey
literature we cite draw on repeated household income and expenditure surveys and databases 5
that are relatively well tested and provide much more detailed information on within-country
income distributions t than simpler indicators of economic and distributional change typically
used in the academic literature on political transitions (such as per capita GDP or the Gini).
By contrast, evidence is much weaker when it comes to establishing causal evidence
on the consequences of poverty change and upward mobility for individual behaviours and
attitudes. In the absence of panel surveys that track values and behaviours over time most
studies of middle class preferences and behaviours reviewed here only provide crosssectional snapshots of the distribution of preferences across relevant income groups. These
studies do not permit claims that personal experiences of upward mobility cause new
political preferences and demands for reforms. For the time being we limit ourselves to
largely descriptive accounts of the distribution of political preferences across relevant income
groups in emerging economies. It will be reserved for future analysis to document how
relevant attitudes and behaviour change over time as formerly poor individuals move along
the income ladder.

2. Theoretical points of departure

See for instance the World Banks PovcalNet: http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/index.htm

A natural starting point for our discussion is the literature on the political economy of
middle class growth. Classical models of middle class development, associated with
modernisation thinkers like Barrington Moore (1966), Seymor Martin Lipset (1959, 1960) or
David Landes (1998) argue that growth in middle-income groups is associated with higher
entrepreneurial activity, investments in human capital and democratic development. This is
because middle classes economic prospects traditionally depend more on professional skills
and income than on inherited capital (Acemoglu and Zilibotti 1997; Doepke and Zilibotti
2007), progressive political and market-friendly value systems of middle class citizens
(Easterly 2001; Lopez-Calva et al. 2011; Lipset 1960; Przeworski (1985), and because of
middle classes ability to mitigate conflicts between elites and extremist movements (Lipset
1959: 58; Easterly 2001; Easterly et al. 2006; Barro, 1999).
Several recent extensions of these theories have linked arguments about middle class
growth to processes of political transition. For instance, drawing on the well-worn median
voter model, Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) respectively argue that falling
or middling inequality levels increase the chances of political reform/democratisation,
because elites are more likely to agree to power sharing when they face fewer threats of
expropriation by the poor masses. In this framework middle classes primarily function as
deal makers or buffers between poor groups and elites, implying again that higher middle
class shares are associated with a greater likelihood of democratic transition (Acemoglu and
Robinson 2006: 253ff).
Other theories have highlighted the role of lower income groups and working classes.
For example Power-Resource Theory and historical accounts of the development of welfare
state institutions in todays advanced economies identify conflicts between urban working
classes and capital holders as the primary drivers of democratisation and social reforms
(Korpi 1983; Therborn 1977; 1979; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Lindert 2004). These theories,
albeit to varying degrees, emphasize rising real wages and advances in the political
organization and unionization of the working classes as the most important historical
developments facilitating political change. By contrast, they are more sceptical about the
transformative role of middle classes. For example Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) suggest that
middle classes first and foremost sought their own inclusion and formed the alliances
necessary to achieve this end (p.168). But middle classes often oppose suffrage extension to
working classes as such a move posed a potential threat to their interests (ibid.: 6). Building
on these ideas Levantoglu (2013) presents a model where middle classes in developing
country autocracies only demand political reforms when they feel insecure about their future
6

status, but these groups will collaborate with elites when they feel secure about their
economic prospects.
Our primary reason for questioning these theories in the context of recent global
lower middle income growth is that there is neither strong evidence for the development of a
broad-based middle class culture in emerging economies, nor that fast growing lower
middle income groups work in conditions that would enable them to organize as effectively
around shared class interest as working classes in the historical development process of
Europes and North Americas advanced welfare states. Our review suggests that political
outcomes in emerging countries are more accurately described by growing divides between
the social protection needs of the new upwardly mobile, but economically vulnerable
population majorities and affluent middle classes that attempt to protect their status
advantages. Low rates of formal sector employment and weaker institutions for work-related
collective action among lower middle income groups also lead us to question whether
political relations in emerging economies will be dominated by the type of organized class
struggle between labor and capital often described in historical accounts of European and
North American welfare state development.
Our own theoretical preference tends to gravitate towards more recent contributions
that emphasise political negotiations over property rights and social protection over
conventional models of working-, middle class, and elite bargaining. The primary change we
observe among populations who have escaped extreme poverty is the increased accumulation
of consumer assets, housing, health and education. This makes it more likely that these
groups will oppose unjustified claims on their property by corrupt or unaccountable
governments and bureaucrats. This trend is consistent with historical scenarios described by
Ansell and Samuels (2010), who argue that the accumulation of assets by upwardly mobile
groups can create strong demands for the extension of economic and political freedoms, as
newly rich households are particularly likely to defend their hard-earned economic gains
against infringement of their property rights by elites. In a different vein, Reenock et al.
(2007) have suggested that radical demands for redistribution and government poverty
alleviation policies are more likely to occur if income growth occurs in the presence of widespread incidences of absolute basic needs deprivation.
Building on the work of these authors we posit that the implication of recent lower
middle income growth is not the linear progression towards more peaceful and democratic
development described by standard political economy models. Most of the evidence reviewed
here suggests that conflicts over political outcomes are likely to increase as growing numbers
7

of people join the lower middle-income ranks. More peaceful outcomes typically associated
with middle income growth will only emerge after more substantive and broad-based
improvements in emerging economies living standards.

3. Who are the new middle classes?

Scholarship on middle class development has traditionally not agreed on a consistent
definition of middle class status. The recent literature on emerging economies middle classes
is no exception. Economists, whose work dominates research on lower middle income
growth, typically rely on statistical definitions of middle class membership. 6 For example, an
early study by Easterly (2001) focuses on the 20th and 80th percentiles on the consumption
distribution to document the existence or absence of a middle class consensus. More
recently Birdsall et al. (2000) use the range from 75% to 125% of national median income,
allowing the population size of the middle class to vary across countries. On the other hand,
sociologists and political scientists working in the Marxist or Weberian tradition define
middle class status by the type of education, skills, or assets individuals bring to the market.
In recent empirical studies this is typically operationalized by peoples position on an asset
index, that summarizes information on household wealth and economic attributes, see for
instance Cramer and Kaufman 2011, Lopez-Calva and Torche, 2011; Lopez-Calva et al.
2011). 7 Finally several studies have used peoples subjective assessment of their class status,
drawing on subjective income and class categories regularly included in international value
and perception surveys (Amoranto et al. 2010; Ferreira et al. 2013). 8
Despite their focus on different aspects of wellbeing, the above approaches all have in
common that they define middle class status in relative terms. Membership in the middle
class is determined in relation to some average measure of material or subjective wellbeing
that is allowed to vary across countries and time. These relative definitions are popular
among analysts because they capture social comparisons and psychological processes that are
at the centre of many theories of middle class behaviour (see below and Birdsall et al. 2000).

The preference for relative measures in earlier studies is likely related to the comparatively better availability
of relative income scales, such as through the UN-WIDER or Deininger/Squire inequality databases.
7
Education is sometimes excluded from these models, because it serves as an independent predictor in the
explanation of political behaviour and mobility experiences (Lopez-Calva and Torche, 2011; Lopez-Calva and
Ortiz-Juarez 2011).
8
These studies typically have to deal with the problem that self-reported middle class shares are typically over
reported, leading to larger middle class shares than would be practically feasible.

However, their primary drawback is a lack of information on peoples objective living

conditions that can be compared across countries. Notwithstanding some recent economic
convergence, differences in average incomes between advanced and emerging economies are
still so large that a person living in the middle of his or her countrys distribution may find
herself in starkly different economic circumstances, depending on whether he or she is was
fortunate enough to be born into a developed nation or not. This makes it harder to compare
changes in actual living standards across countries of the world and it omits important
information about economic risks and deprivations still faced by many people in the middle
income segments of emerging countries. For instance, Ravallion (2010: 4) notes in a telling
example that the Xiaokang in China, an official income category that resembles the idea of
a middle class in local terms, required an income of PPP$2.24 per day in rural areas and
PPP$3.47 a day in urban areas in 1991, 9 far below the official poverty lines of most advanced
economies (for example, US$13/day in the US). Earlier work by Milanovic and Yitzhaki
(2002) finds that only an estimated 11% of the worlds population can be considered as
middle class, using Italys and Brazils mean incomes as the respective upper and lower
cut-offs. 10 In comparison, 78% of the worlds population are still poor by this definition and
only 11% would be counted among the rich. More recent studies that have used absolute
income thresholds that approximate difference between non-poor individuals and middle
classes in advanced economies (typically using a range of PPP$10-100), estimate that only
about a quarter of the worlds population would be categorized as middle class under these
definitions. Of these 60% live in the developed world and only 20% in the fast growing
BRICs economies (Wilson 2013; Kharas and Gertz 2010).
The bottom line that emerges from these studies is that the bulk of recent income
growth in the emerging world is concentrated among populations who are still far from the
incomes associated with middle class status under the relative definitions typically used in
advanced economies. The aforementioned study by Ravallion (2010) shows that income
growth was bundled just above the moderate international poverty line of PPP$2 per day. 11
He consequently proposes a definition of a developing world middle class that explicitly
distinguishes between people who are middle class by emerging country standards and
poor by advanced nations official poverty benchmarks (using the US poverty line of
9

Similar income ranges are often used in the debate about Indian middle classes (Ravallion 2010).
Milanovics and Yitzhak note that at the time of their study Brazils mean income was close to the average
level of Western countries relative poverty lines (PPP$10/day, p.172).
11
Such trends are mostly driven by Asia (with China alone accounting for half of the developing worlds share
in lower middle-incomes) and to a lesser extent by sub-Saharan Africa (AfDB 2011).
10

PPP$13/day as the upper cut-off). Banerjee and Duflo (2008) similarly observe that groups
between the 20th and the 80th percentile of the income distribution, which was used to define
developing countries middle classes under the relative definition of Easterly (2001), live on
precarious incomes between the global PPP$2 poverty line and PPP$4/day (see also Birdsall
et al. 2013). 12 In a slight departure from Ravallion (2010), these authors use the more
conservative upper threshold of PPP$10/day for their definition of the developing worlds
middle class, based on observed differences in economic vulnerability around this income
benchmark (see below). 13

3b. Non-monetary outcomes

The relatively precarious income situation of the fast growing lower-middle income
groups in emerging economies is also reflected in several non-monetary dimensions. On most
of these dimensions lower middle income groups differ quite considerably from the
circumstances typically attributed to working and middle classes in advanced economies.

Occupation
As noted before, work-related behaviours and collective action play an important role
in the literature on working classes and welfare state development. Economic theories of
middle class development similarly highlight occupational attitudes and behaviours, such as
increased entrepreneurial activity, professionalism, and greater human capital investments
among the bourgeoisie (Acemoglu and Zilibotti 1997; Doepke and Zilibotti 2007).
Most of the available evidence suggests that the working conditions of todays lower
middle income groups are still a long away from the scenarios described in these theories.
Birdsall et al. (2013) document that Latin American households on incomes between PPP$4
and PPP$10/day are more likely to be in informal, self-employed relationships in the primary
sector than the more affluent middle classes. This result is supported by Banerjee and Duflo
(2008), who find that work conditions of vulnerable groups resemble those of the poor more
than the affluent middle classes. Households on incomes just above the absolute poverty line
are still often engaged in informal, self-employed activities that do not provide much security
or chances for professional improvement. The only difference relative to poorer groups is that
12

The exceptions are rural India and Pakistan where the majority of the population still live on less than
PPP$2/day and Panama where middle classes are wealthier.
13
Most studies concur that the extreme poverty line of around PPP$ 2 should be used as the lower middle class
threshold. However, a higher poverty cut-off of PPP$ 4 for more advanced emerging regions like Latin America
(Birdsall et al. 2014; Ferreira et al. 2013).).

10

households in the vulnerable income bracket tend to have steadier and better-paid jobs.
Lopez-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2014) similarly document that occupational categories,
especially in interaction with rural-urban differences, are important predictors of movements
into upper middle class status, but with few differences between the poor and lower middle
income groups on incomes below PPP$10. This study is based on panel data and is thus able
to account for initial household attributes. These results are also consistent with other
emerging evidence that in many developing countries self-employment in relatively small
informal non-form enterprises account for a large share of incomes for rural populations close
to extreme poverty (Davis et al. 2010).
The important short-term implication of these results is that reform processes in
todays emerging economies are less likely to be driven by conflicts around organized
occupational interests that were important in the political development of todays advanced
welfare states. The continued high incidence of informality among people just out of poverty
creates obvious barriers for collective action. This is compounded by relative weak
institutions for organized labour in many developing regions, caused by the uneven coverage
and demise of unions during the adjustment period of the 1980s and 1990s in Latin America
and Eastern Europe, and historically more restrictive labour regulations in Asia (McGuire
1994, 1999; Haggard and Kaufmann 2008).
There is similarly little evidence that lower middle class growth will have the positive
macro-economic consequences associated with middle class-centred theories of capitalist
development. Most of the self-employed activities pursued by people close to the poverty line
still tend to represent economic coping strategies, rather than the type of enterprising
behaviours described by these theories. In the words of Banerjee and Duflo (2008:26):

While there are many petty entrepreneurs among the middle class, most of them do not seem
to be capitalists in waiting. They run businesses, but for the most part only because they are
still relatively poor and every little bit helps. If they could only find the right salaried job, they
might be quite content to shut their business down. If the middle class matters for growth, it is
probably not because of its entrepreneurial spirit.

Risk and uncertainty

Another widely accepted attribute of middle class status is economic security.
Sociologists in the Weberian tradition typically consider peoples economic opportunities
(life chances) and the security afforded by ones employment contract as an important
marker of middle class status (Goldthorpe and McKnight 2004; Grusky and Kanbur 2006).

11

This idea has also been taken on board in recent attempts to define middle class status in
developing economies. What emerges from this literature is, again, the large difference in
economic security between lower middle income groups and more affluent middle classes.
Lopez-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2014) and Birdsall et al. (2013) note for Latin America that
households below PPP$10/day have much higher probabilities of sliding back into poverty
(Lopez-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez estimate a probabilities of about 10% at the PPP$10 line, with
much higher values for lower-incomes). They conclude that this justifies distinguishing
explicitly between non-poor vulnerable groups and more affluent middle classes who have
attained a higher degree of economic security. Banerjee and Duflo (2008) and Ravallion
(2010) also acknowledge the high degree of economic insecurity of households in this
income range. All of this suggests that concerns about absolute deprivations (or the risk
thereof) are still a very tangible aspect of the daily realities of the fast growing population
majorities in emerging economies. We argue below that this is likely to lead to very different
reactions to economic growth and mobility experiences than would be predicted by standard
political economy models.

Education
Education is another important marker of middle class. It matters both directly, as a
determinant of individual economic and professional opportunities (Grusky and Kanbur
2006; Ferreira et al. 2013), and indirectly, through its well-documented association with
progressive social and political attitudes (Lopez Calva et al. 2011).
However, there are again few indications that upwardly mobile population majorities
in developing countries resemble affluent middle classes on this dimension. In Lopez-Calvas
and Ortiz-Juarezs (2014) vulnerability-based approach to middle class measurement,
education, especially tertiary, emerges as a strong predictor of differences between lower
income groups between PPP$ 2-10 and more affluent middle classes. Similar evidence is
produced by Castellani and Parent (2011), although the authors do not specify how middle
and affluent classes are defined.. Birdsall et al. (2013) also find that education distinguishes
vulnerable from affluent middle classes. Affluent middle class households are much more
likely to be headed by an individual with completed secondary education than the strugglers
who survive on less than PPP$10 a day.
There are also signs that education still represents a barrier to upward mobility that
affects poor and vulnerable households more than more affluent classes. Ferreira et al. (2013)
and Torche and Lopez-Calva (2011) find for Latin America that upward mobility was less
12

likely for individuals from households with lower educational background. In particular,
movements into the middle class were still much likelier for people who had some tertiary
education (Ferreira et al. 2013: 7).
There are, however, few signs that these educational differences go along with the
cultural changes and progressive values commonly attributed to middle classes. Lopez-Calva
and Ortiz-Juarez (2014), who compare Latin American survey respondents attitudes on
composite indices relating to trust in institutions, perceptions of opportunity, legitimisation of
political violence and left-right partisanship, fail to find strong evidence of a discrete middle
class identity. Typically attitudes change monotonically with income, but affluent middle
classes do not stand out as a group with particularly distinct preference structures (if there are
groups that differ systematically, it is generally the poorest or wealthiest). 14 Moreover,
responses vary little across income classes with generally much larger differences between
countries (see also Cramer and Kaufman 2011). Amoranto et al. (2010: 10f) find on a global
sample from the World Values Survey that people who see themselves as middle class are
more likely to report preferences for liberal economic policies, gender equality, and higher
levels of perceived trust than lower status groups. However, this relationship is again
monotonic with more progressive values and attitudes among respondents who place
themselves in the upper class. 15 All of these results thus undermine the idea that middle
classes would act as socially coherent and politically distinct groups in ways that would
establish them as agents of change within their societies.

Assets and human capital investments

The primary area where circumstances of lower middle classes begin to differ from
those of the extreme poor involves household spending on consumer assets and human
capital. Birdsall et al. (2013: 7f) find that people below PPP$10/day spend just 2436% of
their disposable income on food and other necessities, the rest going to middle class goods
like appliances or vehicles (by comparison poor households spend an estimated 7090% of
expenditure on food). Banerjee and Duflo (2008) also report strong differences between
households below the absolute PPP$2 poverty line and vulnerable groups with respect to
dwelling characteristics. In particular in the upper regions of the PPP$210/day income
14

Lopez-Calva et al. (2011) find that middle classes appear less willing to support individual rights even though
they show higher values of social tolerance.
15
Both studies deal with missing survey information on household income by estimating regression models that
predict permanent household income (Lopez Calva et al. 2011) and subjective class status (Ameranto et al.
2010) on the basis of observed household attributes like assets or educational and occupational outcomes.

13

bracket, households are much more likely to have better access to basic sanitation, electricity
and bigger houses than the extreme poor. 16 Better access to electricity also goes along with a
higher likelihood of television ownership, which could influence behaviours and aspirations
by improving access to news and information.
Households in the vulnerable income bracket further begin to care more about their
physical wellbeing and the health of their household members. Banerjee and Duflo (2008)
show that the vulnerable and middle-income groups spend more in absolute and even in
relative terms on health than the poor. These greater health investments are reflected in
higher life expectancy, 17 and increased insurance coverage (most of which for health). 18
There is also evidence of increased education spending that could eventually offset
school-related differences between vulnerable and affluent middle-income groups. Banerjee
and Duflo (2008) find that the share of household expenditures devoted to education remains
roughly similar with rising incomes. This not only implies a net increase in absolute amounts
spent on schooling. Investments in human capital also tend to be concentrated among fewer
children. The same study finds that the number of children per adult woman in the household
drops by at least 0.5 when households move from extreme poverty to the PPP$24/day
category and again by about the same amount when households move from the $24/day
category to the $610/day category (the number of children actually drops by more than one
in Nicaragua, Pakistan and Peru). At the same time, the share of children aged 1318 in
school and the number of children in higher quality private schools increases dramatically as
income rises. This suggests that income growth, in combination with accompanying
demographic transformations, leads to changes in human capital investments among
vulnerable groups that increasingly resemble the patterns commonly associated with middle
class development. It appears that even households who are still in relatively precarious
circumstances are making very conscious decisions to improve the prospects for upward
mobility for their children.
Taken together all of these trends are consistent with our theory that future political
organization among upwardly mobile lower income groups is likely to revolve more around
the protection of economic and property rights than around conventional (work-related)
class interests. The increased ownership of assets and human capital creates strong incentives
16

This may have to do with the fact that many lower/middle class households live in urban areas, but the trends
broadly hold for rural areas as well.
17
This result also holds in a small number of panel surveys analysed by the authors.
18
However, coverage barely extends to one third in most rural samples and two thirds in urban areas (Banerjee
and Duflo 2008, Table A15).

14

for this group to obtain credible guarantees that their hard-earned gains in private wealth will
be protected in the future (see also Ansell and Samuels 2010). At the same time, the high
level of economic risk and increased investments in insurance suggest that these groups are
averse to the uncertainties associated with rapid economic change. The following sections
will review the consequence of this development for political preference formation and
aggregate political outcomes.

4. Consequences of lower middle class growth for redistribution preferences

Changing living standards of upwardly mobile populations are not only of interest in
their own right. They also have potentially far-reaching implications for political behaviours.
According to most political economy models discussed above changes in incomes
primarily influence political outcomes through their effects on redistribution preferences.
Widely-used theories of political decision-making, like Meltzer and Richards (1981) version
of the median voter model (originally outlined by Hotelling), suggest that people on rising
incomes should gradually lose their taste for radical redistribution. Other models, such as
Benabou and Oks (2001) prospect of upward mobility (POUM) hypothesis, posit that
people who believe they or their children will have strong opportunities for upward mobility
are less likely to support redistribution in the present, because they want to lower the tax
burden for themselves and their children in the future (see also Piketty 1995). According to
the political calculus of the political economy models proposed by Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006), Boix (2003) and Easterly (2001) this should result in more peaceful and democratic
outcomes, by reducing conflict over redistribution and increasing elites willingness to share
power with the less well-off.
Against these predictions stands the possibility of new social divides, related to
uneven experiences of relative inequality and the comparatively precarious living conditions
of the large populations on lower middle incomes. Relative deprivation theories, like
Hirschmans (1973) Tunnel Paradox, suggest that rapid economic transformation and
lower-income growth would lead to heightened concerns about relative downward mobility.
This applies in particular to more affluent middle classes, for whom fears of falling behind
begin to outweigh positive expectations about the future. As a result these groups would be
less able, or willing, to play the mediating function attributed to them in the political
economy literature on middle class.
Drawing on the discussion above there are also reasons to assume that, among lower
income groups, attitudinal effects associated with positive upward mobility prospects will be
15

crowded out by persistent experiences of absolute deprivation. In particular for households

just above the poverty line, who face a realistic risk of sliding back into absolute poverty,
high levels of economic insecurity and limited occupational prospects make it more likely
that these groups will demand more redistribution and/or protection, even if its members
perceive higher prospects for upward mobility. The outcome would be deeper divides
between affluent middle classes and lower-income groups and higher risk of political
conflict.
Extant scholarship has found it notoriously challenging to provide empirical support
for the predictions of standard political economy models like the median voter theorem.
These difficulties generally already start with the explanation of individual redistribution
preferences (Kenworthy and McCall 2007; Lbker 2007). In particular in emerging regions
with traditionally high levels of inequality, like Latin America, people often do not report
strong demands for redistribution (Blofield and Luna 2011; Cramer and Kaufman 2011;
Kaufman 2009, 2009b). Evidence is also weak for more specific predictions about the effect
of individual incomes on redistribution preferences. In most cases relative household income
predicts demand for redistribution less well in countries with lower levels of economic
development and deeper inequalities (Ansell and Samuels 2011; Cramer and Kaufman 2011;
Dion and Birchfield 2010; Haggard et al. 2013). .
There are some indications that social experiences associated with recent lower
middle income growth may have something to with the poor predictive performance of
standard political economic models in emerging economies. The first finding that emerges
from this literature is that, even in countries where vulnerable groups account for the majority
of populations in the middle of the local income distribution, self-assessments are still
influenced by the largely precarious nature of living conditions of populations closer to the
extreme poverty line. For instance Ferreira et al. (2013), who compare economic and
subjective class categories in Latin America, fail to find strong evidence of an emerging
middle class identity among vulnerable lower income groups. In perception surveys from
Colombia, Mexico and Peru there is a remarkable correspondence between the widely used
vulnerability-threshold of PPP$10 and peoples self-placement as belonging to the lowerincome groups or lower middle classes. 19 Other studies also indicate that psychological and
social perceptions in the vulnerable group are strongly influenced by the experience of
19

More specifically the authors find that approximately PPP$10/day emerge as the threshold below which
people consider themselves as belonging to lower or lower middle classes than other (wealthier) income groups.
However, this subjective threshold rises in wealthier countries like Brazil and Chile (the cut-offs are PPP$16
and PPP$20/day respectively), suggesting that relative living standards have some role in these assessments.

16

economic insecurity. Yuan et al. (2010) find for China that, while lower middle class status is
generally associated with small increases in life satisfaction, the group on incomes from
PPP$210/day still reports above average concerns about the stability of life in the future. 20
For wealthier groups subjective status assessments overlap more closely with material
attributes typically associated with middle class status. Amoranto et al. (2010: 8f) find in a
large cross-national sample of responses from the World Value Surveys that higher
educational attainment and more skilled occupations are associated with higher probabilities
of self-reporting a higher class status. This is consistent with the results above, which suggest
that more secure formal types of employment and better schooling are still more common
among affluent middle classes than among lower income groups.
There are also signs that different social experiences contribute to growing divides
between lower and affluent middle income groups. Consistent with the relative deprivation
argument, attitudes of affluent middle classes increasingly appear to shift from a
preoccupation with material outcomes to relative status concerns and other qualitative aspects
of wellbeing. For example, the aforementioned study by Yuan et al. (2010) finds that Chinese
respondents whose incomes approach upper middle class status (PPP$610) also reported
considerably lower values of self-perceived health. While it is not clear if this reflects actual
health problems or changes in sensitivity to physical wellbeing, the results are remarkably
consistent with the well-documented finding for developed economies that money
increasingly loses ground to qualitative aspects in the wellbeing evaluations of individuals on
higher incomes (Easterlin, 1974). In a similar vein Graham and Pettinato (2002) find for
Latin America that, while absolute income levels matter more for the subjective wellbeing of
lower-income groups, relative differences become much more important for those in more
comfortable economic circumstances. They also identify a large group of frustrated
achievers in Peru, who, despite experiencing significant improvements in their incomes,
remain unsatisfied with their relative status in society. They speculate that this has to do with
the fact that these individuals compare themselves to groups higher up on the income ladder.
Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) report for Russia that non-poor households who feared a fall in
their incomes supported stronger redistributive policies. Both of these studies use panel data
and are therefore able to make very precise statements about individual mobility
trajectories. 21

20
21

This holds for the urban sample only.

However, Ravallion and Lokshin cannot account for initial redistribution preferences.

17

By contrast, preferences of poorer and vulnerable households still appear to be

dominated by the largely precarious nature of these groups living conditions. While many
vulnerable households probably experienced periods of upward mobility, and even though
their investment in insurance and human capital of their children reflect positive expectations
about the future, it does not appear that this group is willing to trade off potentially lower
future taxes for its current preferences for redistribution. Cramer and Kaufman (2011) find
that, even though redistribution preferences of poorer and middle-income groups defined by
an asset index- did not respond in the expected way to average inequality, their satisfaction
with distributional outcomes was significantly reduced in times of high growth. 22 Their
findings are also broadly consistent with the work of Reenock et al. (2007), who show that
democratic breakdowns are more likely to occur in rapidly growing societies that still have
large shares of households with unmet basic needs.
Recent work by Wietzke (2014) underlines that these differences between lower and
middle-income groups can contribute to very strong disagreements over social policy
priorities. This study overcomes the problem of lacking income data that has affected the two
aforementioned studies by tracking changes in average support for redistribution along with
transformations in poverty headcounts and growth in various lower/middle-income groups. It
finds that public support for redistribution increased primarily in societies where poverty
reduction was accompanied by growth in the share of economically vulnerable groups up to a
poverty threshold of around PPP$4 a day. By contrast, the estimated association with
distribution preferences gradually disappears in societies that experienced growth among
more affluent middle-income households.
There is also support for our hypothesis that tensions arise increasingly over the
political representation of the growing economic aspirations of upwardly lower middle
income groups. Lopez-Calva et al. (2011) find for Latin America that, while respondents on
incomes of around PPP$ 4-10 report more positive perceptions of economic opportunity than
the poor, lower middle classes generally do not appear to have much trust in the political
institutions of their countries. Of all classes considered only more affluent groups report
significantly weaker feelings of political alienation and higher levels of trust in the political
system. Somewhat worryingly lower middle classes are also more likely than the poor and
the wealthy to express a preference for order and stability at the expense of individual rights.

22

The authors hypothesize that feelings of relative deprivation explain this result, but economic risk and
volatility may also play a role.

18

At the same time there are indications that conflicts along economic class line still
interact quite strongly with other salient social identities in emerging economies. Haggard
et al. (2013) document that unskilled and semi-skilled workers and those residing in large
cities are more inclined to support redistribution. This result is broadly consistent with recent
events in Egypt, Thailand, or Turkey, where protests by urban middle classes seem to be as
much concerned with economic and social policy as with questions of cultural identity and
the growing influence of upwardly mobile but less liberal rural populations (New York
Times, 2 June 2013). Interestingly Haggard et al. also find lower support for redistribution
among unionised workers pointing to possible insider-outsider conflicts between those within
and outside of the formal sector. The literature on ethno-linguistic fractionalization similarly
has documented often considerable differences in political preferences across groups
(Habyarimana et al. 2007; Lieberman and McClendon 2012).

5. Consequences of lower middle class growth for political and social reforms
Turning to aggregate outcomes, the literature has produced similarly little evidence on the
postulated link between distributional change and democratic development. Studies of the
relationship between democracy and inequality generally suggest that large differences in
incomes are more likely to be accompanied by instability and reversions to autocratic rule
(Dutt and Mitra 2008; Houle 2009). However, there is only mixed evidence that falling
inequality leads to democratic transition, with positive results (Boix 2003) outweighed by
contradictory or ambiguous ones (Teorell 2010; Haggard and Kaufman 2012). Ansell, and
Samuels (2010), in the study that resembles our framework more closely, find that land
concentration reduces the probability of democratization, while rising income increases it.
They hypothesize that rising income inequality reflects the emergence of new upwardly
mobile classes that demand stronger protection of their economic property rights from landed
elites, a theory that is broadly consistent both with the three class model of Boix and
Acemoglu and Robinson (Haggard and Kaufman 2012: 500) and the theoretical arguments of
this paper.
In the context of recent lower middle income growth the weakness of empirical
evidence is compounded by a general lack of detailed information on the growth rates of
specific income groups. Beyond income or land inequality, cross-national studies of political
transition and democratisation processes have typically focused on relatively general
measures of economic development, such as per capita GDP, or average indicators of basic
19

needs satisfaction like mean caloric consumption (Reenock et al. 2007) or child mortality
(Gerring et al. 2012; Ross 2006). However, these measures are not sufficiently disaggregated
to test hypotheses about the effects of growth in specific lower or middle income segments
(Wietzke 2014).
In spite of this limitation a small number of studies have tried to link growth of
middle incomes to social and political outcomes. Easterly (2001), in his study on the middle
class consensus, finds that a higher share of income going to groups between the 20th and 80th
percentiles of income distribution is empirically related to better economic policies, greater
political stability, as well as higher income and higher growth. Larger middle class income
shares are also associated with better educational and health outcomes, better infrastructure,
and more democratic governance systems. Based on the historical distribution of incomes in
most low-income countries it is fair to assume that this captures a majority of poor and
vulnerable groups in the developing world (Banerjee and Duflo 2008). However, Easterlys
study generalises across a large group of countries at very different stages of development.
As a consequence it does not provide a direct test of the effect of lower middle-income
growth in emerging economies. 23
Cobham and Sumner (2013a; 2013b), with a slight shift in focus, concentrate on the
ratio of incomes held by elites relative to the poorest groups. They draw on Palmas (2006;
2011) proposition that changes in distribution are determined by the top decile and poorest
four deciles, as the middle of decile 5 to decile 9 capture half of GNI in any given country.
They corroborate Palmas finding on the surprisingly stable capture of decile 5 to decile 9
across countries and note (in Cobham and Sumner, 2013a) that rising relative incomes of the
poorest groups are also associated with improvements in non-monetary outcomes like clean
water supply and lower child mortality, hinting at greater public investments in these areas.
However, this is a statistical correlation rather than a policy explanation.
Probably the most detailed evidence about the consequences of lower and middle
class growth comes from Loayza et al. (2012). They predict changes in government health
and education spending and governance quality over a sample of 670 annual observations
across approximately 130 countries. The analysis distinguishes as main explanatory variables
between the proportion of individuals in extreme poverty (below PPP$2.5 a day), populations
on PPP$ 2.5 to 10 per day, and the proportion of individuals who have reached middle class

23

Easterly also includes ethno-linguistic fractionalisation in his operationalization of the middle class
consensus.

20

status above PPP$10 a day. 24 The results suggest that growth in the vulnerable income
range (PPP$ 2.5-10) does not lead to significantly different results than changes in the share
of poorer households below PPP$2.5. By contrast there are much stronger signs for
improvements when growth occurs at higher income levels. Expansions of incomes above
PPP$10 have a robust positive influence on social policy and governance outcomes that
reduces or entirely crowds out estimated effects of GDP obtained in earlier specifications.
These changes in social policy also do not imply a move towards a more state-driven
economy, as increased upper incomes are associated with reduced tariffs on international
trade and a higher degree of financial liberalisation. It is important to note, however, that it is
not possible to conclude from this study that countries that implemented successful reforms
benefited from a middle class dividend. Because of the difficulty of comparing middle class
incomes across emerging and advanced economies, the authors do not use an upper income
ceiling. This makes it hard to determine if there is a genuine middle class effect or whether
the estimates just pick up positive institutional correlates of growth occurring in higher
incomes.

Evidence from contextualized and case study research

In practice, stronger insights about the link between recent lower middle income
growth and regime change are often obtained from more contextualized analysis. In most
emerging economies economic and political transformations have to be interpreted in the
context of often extreme swings in national political and macro-economic environments. In
particular the third wave of democratisation, which swept over Latin America, Eastern
Europe and parts of Asia and Africa in the 1980s and 1990s often coincided with radical
market reforms and cuts to social expenditures during the period of macro-economic
adjustment and the Asian crisis of the late 1990s (Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Huber et al.
2008; Huber and Stephens 2012). 25 This, on the one hand, increased inequalities and shifted
the burden of social assistance for lower-income households to informal and family networks,
which were ill-equipped for providing protection against systematic macro-economic shocks
(Cook and Kwon 2007; Birdsall et al. 2013).
On the other hand the historical background of economic adjustment probably offset
many of the postulated mechanisms between inequality and political outcomes. Large-N
24

Incomes of PPP$ 2.5-10 are the omitted category. The estimates use the Arellano and Bond estimator for
panel data.
25
The Asian crisis also affected Russia and parts of Latin America.

21

comparative analysis by Haggard and Kaufman (2012) suggests that distributive conflict,
defined broadly as elite responses to the mobilization of redistributive grievances on the part
of economically disadvantaged groups (p. 500) and backed by various measures of income
and asset inequality, was present in just over half of 84 country-events of regime changes
between 1980 and 2000. Contrary to expectations, a substantial number of transitions took
place at high levels of inequality, while reversions to autocracy were often driven by conflicts
that cut across class lines or by intra-elite or military disputes (see also Teorell 2010).
Social policy reforms that were implemented across developing countries after the
adjustment period also only partially coincide with expectations about the politicalinstitutional mediation of distributional conflicts. Quantitative and comparative analysis for
Latin America finds a robust link between democratic reforms and the region-wide shift to a
new post-adjustment consensus (Roberts 2012), including increases in social spending and
the introduction of poverty alleviation programmes like Conditional Cash Transfers (Birdsall
et al. 2011, Daz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2009; Haggard and Kaufman 2008). However, these
reforms were implemented by governments across the left-right spectrum, undermining
popular theories about the link between political partisanship and welfare state generosity
(Huber et al. 2008; Roberts 2012).
In other regions autocratic governments seem to have addressed social grievances of
lower middle income groups without explicit commitment to political power sharing. In
particular examples from fast growing Asian economies suggest that regimes with widely
different sources of political support and legitimacy have begun to pass on benefits of rapid
economic growth to expanding lower and middle income groups without engaging in
accompanying democratic reforms. This is best exemplified by governments in China and
Singapore whose authoritarian regimes engaged in relatively generous expansion to broaden
their political support base (Haggard and Kaufman 2008; see also Cook and Kabeer 2010;
Cook and Kwon 2007).
The only region where social policy outcomes appear to conform more closely to
predictions of institutionalist theories is Eastern Europe. In this region the legacy of
expansive socialist social protection frameworks appears to have created broad-based vested
interest groups that were able to resist excessive cuts to social expenditures during adjustment
and push for an expansion of safety nets during the recent recovery period (Haggard and
Kaufman 2008).
Notwithstanding these reforms it can be questioned whether current social protection
systems do enough to secure lower middle-income groups future commitment to existing
22

political arrangements. A well-known limit on government redistribution is that many

emerging nations collect very low levels of progressive tax (such as income or wealth taxes).
This means that even in countries where social safety nets are put in place, poorer populations
contribute disproportionally to the funding of these programmes (Lindert et al. 2006, Birdsall
et al. 2013). 26 Another problem is the persistent dominance of regressive social spending on
state-subsidized contributory social insurance and pensions in many emerging economies
(Huber 2009: 652; see also de Ferranti et al. 2004, 26872; Lindert et al. 2006; Cook and
Kabeer 2010). In particular vulnerable households in self-employment or informal sector jobs
are less likely to benefit from these programmes that tend to serve formal sector employees
(Cook and Kabeer 2010; Haggard and Kaufman 2008). Moreover, vulnerable populations just
above official poverty lines often fall outside the targeting criteria of new social protection
programmes put in place to address the need of the least well-off. For instance Birdsall et al.
(2013) find that, compared to poor households, vulnerable populations in Latin America on
incomes between PPP$ 4 and 10 benefit relatively little from means-tested conditional cash
transfers (CCTs). 27
Recent events in emerging economies suggest that these imbalances can be a source
of considerable tension along class and social lines. Examples like Venezuela or Thailand
indicate that grievances of vulnerable groups may be exploited by populist leaders, who opt
for unsustainable expansion of social expenditures to strengthen their support base. Violent
clashes between opponents and supporters of these programmes in both countries suggest that
this may exacerbate existing divides between classes, as more affluent groups resist the high
economic costs of these policies.
At the same time there are again indications that political transformations in the
context of rapid lower middle class growth will not be exclusively driven by distributional
conflicts. The growing incidence of public protests against high levels of perceived
corruption in many developing regions suggests that grievances of upwardly mobile groups
are as much about illegitimate demands of governments and bureaucrats on private property

26

Birdsall et al. 2013) find that vulnerable groups in Latin America on incomes from PPP$410/day are net
payers into the fiscal system once indirect taxes are taken into account. The only area where this group benefits
are health and education services, though no more or less than other income groups given its share of the
overall population (p.17). However, the fact that even lower-income vulnerable parents increasingly opt for
private education suggests that the poor quality of many public schools acts as a strong deterrent (Banerjee and
Duflo 2008; Birdsall et al. 2013).
27
The exceptions are Uruguay and Brazil, whose higher living standards mean that vulnerable groups still fall
under local targeting criteria. In these countries, as well as in Guatemala, vulnerable populations also receive
more benefits from new non-contributory pension systems than more affluent middle classes (Birdsall et al.
2013).

23

as they are about social uncertainties caused by rapid growth and economic vulnerability.
This is consistent with our claim above that the growth in discretionary consumer spending
and asset accumulation among lower middle income groups increasingly results in new
demands for the protection economic property rights. However, the long history of autocratic
strong men in emerging economies, and the willingness of some lower middle income
respondents to trade-off political freedoms against greater political stability does not suggest
that these new demands will always result in a systematic shift to more democracy. At least
in the short term many of these demands may be exploited by populist autocratic leaders.

6. Conclusions and research questions arising

This paper has reviewed consequences of recent lower middle class growth for social
and political development in emerging economies. We have illustrated how the objective and
subjective realities of emerging economies middle income groups differ from established
notions of middle and working class status in the welfare regime and political transition
literature. We have also considered recent political transformations that differ from the
predictions of standard political economy models of middle class development.
One of the worrying findings that emerges from our review is the growing divide over
social policies that appears to emerge between rapidly expanding population majorities on
lower middle incomes and more affluent middle classes. Despite recent expansion in
government social spending in many emerging economies, participation of lower middle
income groups in social protection systems is still held back by institutional barriers and the
largely informal nature of employment contracts among these populations. Evidence from
self-reported political preferences reviewed in this paper, and recent public protests over
social inequality, suggest that this is already changing political dynamics in emerging
economies. Political attempts to mitigate these problems will occur in environments where
middle classes become increasingly concerned about maintaining their advantaged status
position, shifting the burden on the ability of governments to respond effectively to shifting
population majorities and social conflict lines. Moreover, because lower middle income
groups are increasing vocal and able to spend higher shares of their income on physical assets
and human capital

we predict more frequent incidences of political conflict around

government accountability and the protection of individual economic property rights.

Other results of our review require more careful investigation. There are some
indications that distributional changes associated with lower middle class growth interact
strongly, and in often unexpected ways, with other salient divides such as urban-rural
24

differences or ethnicity. One fruitful area for future research would be to combine analysis of
the evolution of lower middle class interests with these cultural categories. This work would
be consistent with recent attempts by political scientists and economists to move away from
purely social-identity based measures of political behaviour (e.g. indices of ethnic
polarisation) to more complex models that account for group-level economic inequalities
(Baldwin and Huber 2010, Huber 2013; Haggard et al. 2013; Stewart et al. 2008).
Lastly there is still considerable room for progress in improving the strength of
empirical evidence on the political consequences of recent lower middle income growth. One
striking trend in the political science literature, which we have aimed to redress with this
review, is the almost complete lack of consideration of newly available, detailed information
on the rapid evolution of new income groups in emerging economies We believe that this can
be rectified quite easily by incorporating new evidence from micro-surveys in the way we
have attempted in this article.
Another area for improvement, which cuts across disciplines, is the lack of hard
evidence on how individual mobility experiences influence behaviour of lower-income
groups. As noted before rigorous analysis of the effects of upward (or downward) mobility
experiences on political behaviours is still often constrained by the lack of detailed panel
surveys that permit tracing over time how attitudes of the individuals change with transitions
into new income classes. Again this shortcoming can be addressed through more systematic
collaboration across disciplines. For example indicators on political preferences and
behaviours could be relatively easily introduced into new expenditure panel surveys that are
increasingly used by economists to investigate economic determinants of transitions out of
poverty.

25

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