Lessons from Krechba In Salah Gas Project Algeria

Krechba is the Gas Gathering Centre for the Algeria Phase 1

In Salah Gas Project. The facility comprises of two near
identical gas processing trains that treat gas from the
production centres of REG and TEG. The facility provides
final gas treatment to sales gas spec before the gas is
exported along the new export pipeline line to Hassi R Mel.
Treatment is simple comprising glycol dehydration and CO2
removal. The JGC/ KBR consortia are the EPC contractor,
front end engineering design was undertaken by the KBR
subsidiary Granhearne.
At the time of the incident (May 19), the plant was in the final stages of
commissioning. Train 1 had been flowing gas for a couple of weeks, Train 2 was
brought on stream on May 19. Within a matter of hours of start-up, problems with the
CO2 plant resulted in gas being diverted to flare. During the start-up of Train 1, it had
been note that the flare system seemed excessively noisy and vibration in some of the
pipe work resulted in bolts holding pipe clamps becoming loose. As Train 2 started to
send gas to flare the situation became worse. Within hours the 6 line taking gas off
the top of the glycol contactor to the flare header failed catastrophically at the header.
The plant then went into automatic emergency shutdown resulting in a large
proportion of the gas inventory (calculated circa 80 tonnes) venting through the hole
left by the failed 6 pipe in the flare header. Luckily the wind was blowing away from
the plant and the gas did not ignite.

Fig 1 Showing the 6 Pipe bent back

270 degrees

Fig 2 Hole left in the Train 2 Flare Header

Schematic P&ID
Coming from VB - 0241O2

Undersized
line

VB - 0241O2

Vibrations
10

PIC

T 6x10

T 18
18

6
PV 111

Flare

VB - 0241O1

16

Position of
failure

Initial Investigation Findings

The 6 dia line connecting the glycol contactor to the flare header was grossly
under designed should have been 12 dia. The under-design caused sonic
velocities resulting in excessive vibration and very rapid fatigue failure. This
line has now been replaced.
A complete engineering check of the entire blowdown system including the
systems at REG and TEG revealed numerous instances where gas velocities
exceeded code levels. Over 20 minor modifications to the system involving
the insertion of orifice plates and reinforcing of some tail pipes has been
necessary.
The design case for the flare system at Krechba was assumed to be
simultaneous blowdown of the two trains together. In fact a significantly
worse case is the blowdown of a single train. Single train blowdown should
have been the design case, checks on this case revealed the header to Train 2
to be grossly under sized. This header is being replaced a major modification
to the plant.
Root Cause Findings of the Engineering Authority Investigation
The investigation showed multiple breakdowns of the Project system, including:
Incompetent designer and failure to appreciate the importance of the blow
down system to the safety of operations.
Failure to apply what should have been a good QA/QC system. The original
calculations for the 6 pipeline have not been found. The Contractor QC
system required independent checks of critical safety systems. These checks
were not carried out for this line.

Failure to follow through on PHESR/HAZOP findings. The HAZOP

commented on the unusual configuration of pipe work entering the header.
These comments were not followed upon.
Failure of the commissioning team to adequately respond to excessive noise
and vibration in the blow-down system. Bolts that fell out of pipe clamps were
replaced and re-torqued without reference back to the designer.

Barriers that broke down at Krechba

In competent
designer
failed to
understand
importance
of blowdown
system and
complexity
of design cases

Good
QA/QC
system not
applied

PHESR/HAZOP
queried design
but failed to
follow through

Commissioning
Staff failed to
realise significance
of vibrations

Lack of an
ignition
source
prevented
disaster

Many barriers were broken in this incident. Had there been a source of ignition in the
vicinity of the pipe failure, a major fire could have ensued with some danger to
personnel and the potential loss of a $1bn facility.
Request to Engineering Authorities
Flare systems are one of the primary safety systems that protect staff and plant. They
need to be designed by competent engineers to a basis of design. The design needs to
be thoroughly checked.
The Projects & Engineering Function requests to ensure that:
There is a basis of design for the system that explains the design philosophy.
That piping calculations for the full system exist, show gas velocities within
code limits, and that the calculations have been checked by competent
engineers.
That there has been a Project HAZOP that has included a detailed review of
the blowdown system, and that actions/ recommendations from the HAZOP
have been closed out.