Corey J.

Wilson
17400110
PHIL 451A
Dr. Evan Thompson
University of British Columbia
04/13/2015
On Death: The Necessity of Death for the Value of Life
In his paper, Death, the philosopher Thomas Nagel (TN) considers the question of
whether or not death is a bad thing; and concludes that it is. In contrast to TN, in his work The
Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality the philosopher Bernard Williams
(BW) considers the opposite thesis; and argues that immortality is just as bad as, if not worse
then, death. In this review of both of their works, I intend to show that death is not necessarily
bad, as TN would have us believe, by building upon BWs argument; and then by offering a third
way for understanding the role that death plays in the lives of us mere mortals.
The structure of this analysis will be as follows. First, I will provide a brief exposition of
both TNs and BWs arguments. Second, I will provide my own criticism to both of their
arguments and consider a defence for each of them. Finally, I will build upon each of their
arguments in order to offer a different way of understanding the role mortality plays in our lives.
With that being said, allow us to begin.
In his work, TN explores whether death is a bad thing by dividing the debate into two
positions: death is bad because one suffers the loss of life; and death is not bad because there is
no subject to experience any negative quality that death could have. Per the former, TN states
that death could only be bad because it deprives us of life. By life, TN does not mean mere
survival, but refers to the bare experience of life when stripped of any positive or negative
experiences. As such, when one dies, one is stripped of the ability to live; and the ability to live is

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inherently good because with life, we can experience the things that living has to offer. Looking
at the latter of the two positions, TN asserts that death, or not existing, is not inherently bad in
itself. This is because we neither regard the time before we were born as bad, or the time we may
spend unconscious as being bad. Thus, according to TN, death is bad because it deprives us of
our continued living, which we tend to always desire more of so we can see what we might
become; and not because death is the loss of subjectivity, or nonexistence. 1
Looking at the issue from a different perspective, BW investigates whether death is a bad
thing by looking at immortality, which he defines as an endless temporal existence in a human
body. With a definition of immortality, BW proceeds to define what an immortal human life must
have in order to be desirable. First, the self must continue throughout time, insofar as it is that
person who is continuing to live. Second, the self must be able to achieve the desires which
motivate its continued existence. From here, BW states that their are two kinds of desires. First,
are the categorical desires, or the desires that makes our lives worthwhile, or existentially
meaningful, and essentially define who we are. Second, are the contingent desires, or the fleeting
desires that must be satisfied, but do not constitute meaning in ones life. With the structure of a
desirable immortal human life made clear, BW argues that if one were to live indefinitely, one
would exhaust their categorical desires and only have contingent desires. This would lead to an
apathetic view on life and be undesirable. Thus, according to BW, being immortal is bad
because it would inevitably lead to either a fundamental loss of subjectivity through the

Thomas Nagel, Death, in Mortal Questions, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) 1-10.
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exhaustion of ones' categorical desires, or boredom where we would not desire to continue
living. 2
With a brief exposition of both TNs and BWs positions now available, we can describe
a central tension in the debate about dying: death is bad because it deprives us of our desired
situation, to continue living; but it is also the case that not dying is bad because it deprives us of
the fundament desire to continue living. As I understand it, there are two ways one could proceed
from here.
First, we might assert that TN is correct, and that one will always wish to continue living
in order to experience what life can offer as an immortal. As such, under this view one might
assert that BW is incorrect because human ingenuity will ward off any boredom. While I am
inclined to agree with this optimistic view of human immortality, one might ask just how much
human ingenuity might conquer when faced with the temporal extremes of infinite existence. To
illustrate, consider that there might be two notions of immortality: weak and strong. Under the
weak notion of immortality, a human being might live forever insofar as their body remains
youthful, but it still remains vulnerable to life ending acts. For example, an immortal who
remains youthful enough to climb a mountain untethered, but remains nervous of the possibility
of an accidental fall. On the other hand, under a strong notion of immortality, one not only
remains youthful, but invulnerable to life-ending acts. For example, an immortal human who
remains youthful enough to climb a mountain untether, and jumps off sans parachute after
summiting the peak. When debating whether human ingenuity could resolve the boredom of
immortality, if we are utilizing the weak notion of immortality, we risk changing the discussion
2

Bernard Williams, The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality, in Problems of the Self, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1973) 82-100.
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from desiring to continue living indefinitely, to desiring the ability to choose when one would
die. As such, it appears to be the case that we are discussing the strong notion, as the weak notion
does not address the problem of dying in and of itself. However, if we suppose the strong notion
of immortality (and whatever that might look like), we must fully appreciate how this kind of
immortality would play out. For not only would the human being outlast their family,
friendships, and existential projects; but, it is also reasonable to suppose that they would
additionally outlast humanity, the planet, and quite possibly the cosmos itself. Under these
conditions, it seems to be the case that no amount of human ingenuity could conquer the sheer
lack of material resources one would require to stave off boredom no matter how ingenious one
may be. Thus, even if one has the ability to reinvent themselves over the course of eons, if by
immortality we mean the strong notion, then it appears there may be hard limits to what human
ingenuity can accomplish.
With that said, we might then take the second course and assert that BW is correct, and
that perpetual existence will always result in either boredom, or some kind of existential
shipwreck. Under this view, we might then assert that human mortality is preferential to
immortality even though we are deprived of what life could offer us. However, if we are to
uphold this view, one should ask whether conducting a thought experiment about immortality to
prove its undesirability is a valid method of analyzing the issue. It may be the case that thought
experiments are a useful enterprise in philosophical discussion in order to tease out intuitions
pertaining to some moral dilemma, but only insofar as those thought experiments could actually
obtain themselves in reality. For instance, while it may be perfectly acceptable to conduct a
classic trolley problem grounded in real life situations which could actually present themselves,

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one might ask how acceptable it is to conduct a thought experiment pertaining to immortal
existence when we have never observed this to be the case in nature. As such, we must be
cautious when conducting thought experiments in the realm of fantasy where we can never
discern whether our intuitions are contingent on fantastic circumstances. However, if we already
assume that death is bad because it deprives us possible further living, we additionally must
assume that ones life could possibly be extended. Otherwise, ones death, whether timely or
untimely, is set to necessarily occur, and only deprives us of our erroneous expectation of living a
life longer then what was causally allowed for. Therefor, if we are already going to take an
optimistic view of possibility, immortality as a cautiously carried out thought experiment ought
to be a credible method of calling into question the human desire for continued living.
Now, the question is, where to go from here? We find ourselves at a point where if we
optimistically assert that immortality could be possible, we still could not tolerate it if it was
bestowed upon us due the temporal extremes of immortality. As such, even if we are to accept a
more robust formulation of BWs argument, we are still left wondering what role death plays in
our lives other then the mere prevention of immortality. To answer, we might consider what role
death plays while living, and not just at the point of dying. For instance, one might ask if being
temporally finite is necessary for understanding ourselves as being human. What might living be
without death opposing it? In a sense, one values living because of death, and the undesirability
of death provides the essential motivation for living the life you have, while you have it. Put in
terms of TNs position, the deprivation of further living is necessary for the loss to be considered
a deprivation. Taken from the perspective of BWs position, a limitless life will have no value,
necessarily because it has no limit. Thus, we might consider death to be a necessary bad for the

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constitution of any kind of good.

In conclusion, what I have attempted to achieve with this work is an analysis of TN's and
BW's positions in order to extract a fundamental truth surrounding the nature of death. On one
side, death is bad because it deprives us of something we necessarily desire to extend. On the
other end, if ever given the opportunity to extend it indefinitely, we would eventually lose the
desire to extend it. However, by comparing both of these positions, we can not only assert that
death plays a controversial role; but also, a very fundamental role in conceptualizing our lives. It
provides a background, which gives value to the things we cherish by making our opportunity to
cherish them finite. Perhaps, rather then focusing on the deprivation of death, we should, as the
philosopher Martin Heideggar so tersely stated, simply aim to spend more time in graveyards.
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References
Nagel, Thomas. Death. In Mortal Questions, 1-10. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1979.
Williams, Bernard. The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality. In
Problems of the Self, 82-100. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.

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