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Miranda vs Arizona

The Court further held that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of
persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to
undermine the individuals will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would otherwise do so
freely. Therefore, a defendant must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to
the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him
prior to any questioning if he so desires.
People vs judge ayson
the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to
the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a
subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify
altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He must claim it and could be waived.
Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include:
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a
statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the
trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
People vsordono
whether the accused's confessions should be inadmissible as evidence against them.
YES, insofar as they were not assisted by counsel during custodial investigation. Although the
Parish Priest,Municipal Mayor and Chief of Police were present when the accused made their
admission, this did not cure thedefect in the custodial investigation particularly the deprivation of
their right to competent and independentcounsel. RA 7438, which defines the rights of persons under
custodial investigation, allows certain exceptions tothe right to counsel as long as they meet the
following conditions: (1) counsel of the accused must be absentand (2) a valid waiver must be
executed. In this case, there was no lawyer available but there was no validwaiver executed. Even if
they were brought to a PAO lawyer days later, it still did not remedy this omission.
People vs Molina
Applicable Laws: Article III, Sec. 2Article III, Sec. 3Rationale: The law mandates that searches be carried
out with a search warrant upon the existence of probable cause. Likewise, the law protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures and holds evidence taken from such incidents as inadmissible as
evidence. There are exceptions to this, the first being seizure conducted incidental to a lawful arrest
For this, there should be a lawful arrest first, before a search can be made. It doesn't work the
other way around. Likewise, as a rule, an arrest is legitimate if it's with a valid warrant of arrest.
However, a police officer may conduct warrantless arrests:
People vstulin
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of accusedappellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that
unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates)
and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by
the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was
done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532
requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the
disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the
same need not be committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an
exception to therule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the
instant case, were charged, notwith a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a
special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential

Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force heresince its purpose is precisely to discourage and
prevent piracy in Philippine waters.
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy must be committed
on the high seas byany person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its
amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, thecoverage of the pertinent provision was widened to include
offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand,under Presidential Decree No. 532
(issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embracesany person including "apassenger or
member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of
thecomplement or not, any person is covered by the law.
People vsEndino
Whether the ABS-CBN interview recording Galgarins confession is admissible as evidence.
Held: The interview was recorded on video and it showed Galgarin unburdening his guilt willingly,
openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial
investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy
and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed been forced into confessing, he could have
easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been sympathetic with him.
However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting one's
guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, it is prudent that trial courts are
reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions. For in all
probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to
legitimize coerced extra-judicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an
accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights
of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system. It is not suggested that videotaped
confessions given before media men by an accused with the knowledge of and in the presence of
police officers are impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper and invalid police techniques and
conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is essential to make sharp
judgments in determining whether a confession was given under coercive physical or psychological
atmosphere. A word of counsel then to lower courts: "we should never presume that all media
confessions described as voluntary have been freely given. This type of confession always remains
suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized. Detection of coerced
confessions is admittedly a difficult and arduous task for the courts to make. It requires persistence
and determination in separating polluted confessions from untainted ones.
Luz vs People
There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he
was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in
order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an
actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of
the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or
physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention
on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other
to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. There being no valid arrest,
the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
People vsNicandro
When the Constitution requires a person under investigation to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful information
rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a
rule, therefor, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under
investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to
tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical
terms, e.g., what the person under interrogation may or may not do, and in a language the subject
fairly understands. (See People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312: People VS. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2.) In other
words, the right of a person under interrogation to be informed implies a correlative obligation on the
part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in
understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said
that the person has been informed of his rights. Now, since the right to be informed implies
comprehension, the degree of explanation required will necessary vary, depending upon the

education, intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the person under investigation.
Suffice it to say that a simpler and more lucid explanation is needed where the subject is unlettered.
People vsamestuzo
The guarantees of sec. 12 (1) of the Bill of Rights or the so-called Miranda rights of the accused may
only be invoked while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation begins from the time
when the police no longer ask general questions about the crime, but start focusing on the suspect
and attempt to elicit incriminating questions in the course of the investigation. The object of the
Miranda rights is to ensure that the accused is protected
from possible intimidation or coercion from law enforcement officers who may force him to admit to a
crime that he did not commit. The police line-up is not yet included in the custodial
investigation as it is the witnesses who are asked questions during the line-up.
In this regard, the inquiry has not yet shifted from investigatory to accusatory. Moreover, during the
line-up, there was no evidence that the accused was interrogated by the police, nor were there any
incriminating statements elicited from him.
People vspiedad
The claim by the defense that Piedads pre-trial identification was suggestive due to the absence of a
police lineup is more theoretical than real. It must be pointed out that even before the incident, Luz
Lactawan knew the accused. Fidel, on the other hand, knew Piedad because they played basketball
together. Hence, the witnesses were not identifying persons whom they were unfamiliar with, where
arguably, improper suggestion may set in. On the contrary, when the accused were presented before
the witnesses, they were simply asked to confirm whether they were the ones responsible for the
crime perpetrated. The witnesses did not incriminate the accused simply because they were the only
ones presented by the police, rather, the witnesses were certain they recognized the perpetrators of
the crime. Besides, there is no law which requires a police lineup before a suspect can be identified as
the culprit of a crime. What is important is that the prosecution witnesses positively identify the
persons charged as the malefactors. In this regard, the Court finds no reason to doubt the veracity of
Luzs and Fidels testimony.
People vsbandula
Bandula and Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no counsel present. If
at all, counsel came in only a day after the custodial investigation with respect to Dionanao, and two
weeks later with respect to Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty.
Ruben Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. On top of this, there are telltale signs that violence was
used against Bandua. Certainly, these are blatant violations of the Constitution which mandates in
Section 12, Art. III.
The Constitution also requires that counsel be independent. Obviously, he cannot be a special counsel,
public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly
adverse to the accused. Granting that Atty. Zerna assisted Dionanao and Bandula when they executed
their respective extrajudicial confessions, still their confessions are inadmissible in evidence
considering that Atty. Zerna does not qualify as an independent counsel. As a legal officer of the
municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying
out the delivery of basic services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and order. It is
thus seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the defense of the accused without
running into conflict of interests. He is no better than a fiscal or prosecutor who cannot represent the
accused during custodial investigations.
People vsjanuario
Saunar was not the choice of Januario as his custodial investigation counsel. Arguendo that Saunar's
competence as a lawyer is beyond question, under the circumstances described by the prosecution
however, he could not have been the independent counsel solemnly spoken of by the Constitution. He
was an applicant for a position in the NBI and therefore it can never be said that his loyalty was to the
confessants. In fact, he was actually employed by the NBI a few months after. Further, although Saunar
might have really been around to properly apprise Januario of his constitutional right as reflected in the
written sworn statement itself, the same cannot be said about Canape. Canape was not properly
informed of his constitutional rights. Perfunctorily informing a confessant of his constitutional rights,

asking him if he wants to avail of the services of counsel and telling him that he could ask for counsel if
he so desires or that one could be provided him at his request, are simply not in compliance with the
constitutional mandate.
People vsBarasina
The phrase "competent and independent" and "preferably of his own choice" were explicit details
which were added upon the persistence of human rights lawyers in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission who pointed out cases where, during the martial law period, the lawyers made available
to the detainee would be one appointed by the military and therefore beholden to the military. Yet, the
apprehension of the human rights advocates then along this line hardly inspires belief in the present
inasmuch as there was no indication below that Barasina did in fact choose Atty. Romeo Mendoza to
assist him while in the process of offering the inculpatory statements, to the exclusion of other lawyers
(The hiring of Atty. Romeo Mendoza as counsel by Barasina after the custodial investigation appears to
be an afterthought). Withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12 [1], Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation
is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his
defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation will be solely in the
hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply
selecting lawyer who for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. This absurd
scenario could not have been contemplated by the framers of the charter.
People vsalbofera
Esma testified against the accused during the trial. While in prison, accused Albofera sent a letter to
Esma. Said letter was thereafter introduced as evidence by prosecution. In his letter, accused Albofera
was asking Esma to change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his favor instead.
Later the accused were convicted of murder.
ISSUE: Whether the Alboferas letter to Esma should be excluded as evidence in light of alleged
unwarranted intrusion or invasion of the accuseds privacy?
HELD: No. The production of that letter by the prosecution was not the result of an unlawful search
and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Alboferas privacy. Albofera
admitted having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo Esma himself, who produced and
identified the same in the course of his testimony in Court. Besides, there is nothing really selfincriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his declaration in his Affidavit
and testify in his (Alboferas) favor. Furthermore, nothing Alboferastated in his letter is being taken
against him in arriving at a determination of his culpability.
People vs samolde
Extrajudicial confession of accused is not admissible in evidence. He was not informed of his
constitutional right before his statements were taken. However, his open court testimony is enough to
convict him. His subsequent allegation that he was given money to accept culpability deserves scant
consideration. Judicial confession constitutes evidence of a high order. The presumption is that no
sane person would deliberately confess to the commission of a crime unless prompted to do so by
truth and conscience. Further, accused went into hiding. Flight has been held to be an indication of
guilt.
People vsraus
Whether Laygos and Rous extra-judicial confessions, signed in the presence of the counsel, are
admissible as evidence even if the counsel arrived shortly after the custodial investigation has started
and left before the last 3 questions were asked.
Held: The record shows that the investigating officer fully informed Laygo of his right to counsel and
categorically asked Laygo whether he wanted the assistance of counsel, to which inquiry, Laygo
expressed his desire to be so assisted by counsel. Thereupon, the investigating officer, Sgt. Robert
Gaddi, brought him to the office of Atty. Abraham Datlag. Laygo and Atty. Datlag conferred for a while;
thereafter, Sgt.Gaddi and Laygo returned to the CIS Office of Sgt.Gaddi and Sgt.Gaddi started the
investigation. Atty. Datlag arrived soon after the investigation started and left before the last three
questions were asked, instructing them to follow him to his office. After the extra-judicial statement of
Laygo was finished, Gaddi and Laygo went to the office of Atty. Datlag, after which, Atty. Datlag

conferred with Laygo and then advised Laygo to sign. Laygo did so and Atty. Datlag thereupon likewise
signed. Thus, there was more than substantial compliance with the constitutional requirement that a
person under investigation for the commission of a crime should be provided with counsel, (Section 12
(1), Article III, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines). The very purpose of said
constitutional requirement is to prevent the use of coercion in extracting a confession from a suspect.
Nowhere in the evidence is it shown that coercion was ever employed by the investigating officer in
obtaining the confession of Laygo. The investigation was even witnessed by the relatives of Laygo. The
fact that Atty. Datlag arrived shortly after the investigation of Laygo had begun and left before the
confession was concluded does not negate the validity and admissibility of said confession for the
reason that after the confession was put down in writing, Laygo and the investigating officer proceeded
to the office of Atty. Datlag and the latter then read the confession, conferred with Laygo and then
advised Laygo to sign the confession
People vsmorial
Whether Leonardo Morilas extra-judicial confession was valid, inasmuch as the material points were
tackled when the counsel, Atty. Aguilar Tobias, was present.
Held: Leonardo Morial's extra-judicial confession invalid since he was effectively deprived of his right to
counsel during the custodial investigation. An accused under custodial interrogation must continuously
have a counsel assisting him from the very start thereof. SPO4 Fernandez cannot justify Atty. Aguilar's
leaving by claiming that when the lawyer left, he knew very well that the suspect had already admitted
that Leonardo and his companions committed the crime. Neither can Atty. Aguilar rationalize his
abandoning his client by saying that he left only after the latter had admitted the "material points,"
referring to the three accused's respective participation in the crime. For even as the person under
custodial investigation enjoys the right to counsel from its inception, so does he enjoy such right until
its termination indeed, "in every phase of the investigation." An effective and vigilant counsel
"necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client
from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the
signing of the extrajudicial confession.
People vsmaqueda
It was wrong for the trial court to hold that the the rights to counsel and against self-incriminationare
limited to custodial investigation and do not apply to a person against whom a criminal com-plaint or
information has already been filed.
The trial court made a distinction between an extrajudicial confession --the SinumpaangSalaysay--and
an extrajudicial admision--the verbal admissions to Prosecutor ZarateandRay Dean Salvosa. A perusal
of the SinumpaangSalaysay shows that it is an extrajudicial ladmission.
The distinction is made clear in Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules ofCourt:
Sec. 26:
Admission of a party -The act, declaration or omission of a partyas to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
Sec 33.
Confession -The declaration of an accused acknowledging hisguilty of the offense charged , or of any offense
necessarily included there-in, may be given in evidence against him.
In a confession, there is acknowledgement of guilt. The term admission is usuallyapplied in criminal
cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directlyinvolve an acknowledgement of his
guilty or of the criminal intent to commit the of-fense with which he is charged.
A confession is an acknowledgement in express terms, by a party in a criminalcase, of his guilty of the
crime charged while an admission is a statement by theaccused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to
the issue and tending, in connectionwith proof of other facts, to prove his guilty. An admission is

something less than aconfession, and is but an acknowledgement of some fact or circumstance which,
initself is sufficient to authorize a conviction.
TC: At the time the Sinumpaang Salaysay was made, Maqueda was already facingcharges in court and
no longer had the right to remain silent and to counsel but he had aright to refuse to be a witness. And
still, he confessed. Thus, the admissibility of theSinumpaangSalaysay should be tested not under the
Constitution (Section 12, Article III)but on the voluntariness of its execution. Voluntariness is presumed
so Maqueda has theburden of proving otherwise.
SC: DISAGREE. The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be in-formed are not
confined to that period prior to filing of a criminal complaint or informationbut available at that stage
when a person is under investigation for the commission of anoffense. Thus, procedural safeguards still
need to be used.
The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term custo-dial by inserting it
between the words under and investigation proves that ourConstitution did not adopt in toto the
entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine. The sec-ond paragraph of Section 20 broadened the application
of Miranda by making itapplicable to the investigation for the commission of an offense of a person
and incustody