Professional Documents
Culture Documents
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NAPOLEON N. CAMERO and
RENALD F. VILLANDO, Respondents.
first.
The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a
natural-born citizen because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her
birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio
Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial
defects.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179120
However, in assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding should
be in accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 which
provides that:
Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued. - Upon motion made
in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representative, or
by the proper provincial fiscal, the competent judge may cancel the
naturalization certificate issued and its registration in the Civil Register:
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. Nos. 179132-33
hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. In the election that ensued, she was voted for by the constituents of
Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed
as the winner and has since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member
of the House of Representatives.
Indeed, the citizenship requirement was enshrined in our Constitution in order to
ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens.
3
With this principle in mind, we have said in Aquino v. COMELEC that if one of
the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of
Representatives is lacking, then not even the will of a majority or plurality of the
voters would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law
itself. Hence assuming, time constraints notwithstanding, and after proper
proceedings before the proper tribunal be had, that Limkaichong would prove to
be an alien, the court of justice would tilt against her favor and would not
sanction such an imperfection in her qualification to hold office. But, first things
Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the
Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.
10
In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been
proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of
Representatives (Thirteenth Congress); hence, the COMELEC correctly ruled
that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato's petition. The issues
raised by petitioner Chato essentially relate to the canvassing of returns and
alleged invalidity of respondent Unico's proclamation. These are matters that are
best addressed to the sound judgment and discretion of the HRET. Significantly,
the allegation that respondent Unico's proclamation is null and void does not
divest the HRET of its jurisdiction:
12
jurisdiction. The Court has shed light on this in the case of Vinzons-Chato,
to the effect that:
The 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, provide for the manner of filing either an
election protest or a petition for quo warranto against a Member of the House of
Representatives. In our Decision, we ruled that the ten-day prescriptive period
under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification based on
citizenship, because qualifications for public office are continuing requirements
and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the
13
The Court in Belac v. Commision on Elections, held that a decision must not
only be signed by the Justices who took part in the deliberation, but must also be
promulgated to be considered a Decision, to wit:
[A] true decision of the Court is the decision signed by the Justices and duly
promulgated. Before that decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no
decision of the Court to speak of.The vote cast by a member of the Court after
the deliberation is always understood to be subject to confirmation at the time he
has to sign the decision that is to be promulgated. The vote is of no value if it is
not thus confirmed by the Justice casting it. The purpose of this practice is
apparent. Members of this Court, even after they have cast their votes, wish to
preserve their freedom of action till the last moment when they have to sign the
decision, so that they may take full advantage of what they may believe to be the
best fruit of their most mature reflection and deliberation. In consonance with
this practice, before a decision is signed and promulgated, all opinions and
conclusions stated during and after the deliberation of the Court, remain in
the breasts of the Justices, binding upon no one, not even upon the Justices
themselves. Of course, they may serve for determining what the opinion of the
majority provisionally is and for designating a member to prepare the decision
of the Court, but in no way is that decision binding unless and until signed
and promulgated.
We add that at any time before promulgation, the ponenciamay be changed by
the ponente.Indeed, if any member of the court who may have already signed it
so desires, he may still withdraw his concurrence and register a qualification or
dissent as long as the decision has not yet been promulgated. A promulgation
signifies that on the date it was made the judge or judges who signed the
decision continued to support it.
Thus, an unpromulgated decision is no decision at all. At the very least, they are
part of the confidential internal deliberations of the Court which must not be
released to the public. A decision becomes binding only after it is validly
15
thereto. During the intervening period from the time of signing until the
promulgation of the decision, any one who took part in the deliberation and had
signed the decision may, for a reason, validly withdraw one's vote, thereby
preserving one's freedom of action.
In sum, we hold that Biraogos Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Oral
Argument must be denied. This Court did not err in ruling that the proper
remedy of those who may assail Limkaichong's disqualification based on
citizenship is to file before the HRET the proper petition at any time during her
incumbency.
On May 15, 2007, Paras filed with the COMELEC a Very Urgent
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Suspend the Proclamation of Jocelyn
Sy Limkaichong as Winning Candidate of the First District of Negros
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Oral Argument
filed by petitioner Louis C. Biraogo in G.R. No. 179120 is DENIED with
FINALITY.
FIRST: Limkaichong case
Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the jurisdiction of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal begins over election contests
relating to his election, returns, and qualifications, and mere allegation as to the
invalidity of her proclamation does not divest the Electoral Tribunal of its
jurisdiction.
At the core of these contentious consolidated petitions are: (1) the
Joint Resolution[1] of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second
Division dated May 17, 2007, disqualifying Jocelyn D. Sy Limkaichong
(Limkaichong) from running as a congressional candidate for the First District
of Negros Oriental; (2) the COMELEC En Banc Resolution[2] dated June 29,
2007, affirming her disqualification; and (3) the COMELEC En Banc
Resolution[3] dated August 16, 2007, resolving that all pending incidents
relating to her qualifications should now be determined by the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The facts are uncontroverted.
with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy [4] (COC) for the position of
Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.
In the following weeks, two (2) petitions for her disqualification were
instituted before the COMELEC by concerned citizens coming from her locality.
On April 4, 2007, Napoleon Camero, a registered voter of La Libertad, Negros
Oriental, filed the petition for her disqualification on the ground that she lacked
the citizenship requirement of a Member of the House of Representatives. The
petition, which was docketed as SPA No. (PES) A07-006, [5] alleged that she is
not a natural-born Filipino because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time
of her birth. On April 11, 2007, Renald F. Villando, also a registered voter of
the same locality, filed the second petition on the same ground of citizenship,
docketed as SPA (PES) No. A07-007.[6] He claimed that when Limkaichong
was born, her parents were still Chinese citizens as the proceedings for the
naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to
procedural and substantial defects. Both petitions prayed for the cancellation of
Limkaichong's COC and for the COMELEC to strike out her name from the list
of qualified candidates for the Representative of the First District of Negros
Oriental.
In her separate Answers[7] to the petitions, Limkaichong claimed that
she is a natural-born Filipino since she was born to a naturalized Filipino
father and a natural-born Filipino mother, who had reacquired her status as
such due to her husband's naturalization. Thus, at the time of her birth on
November 9, 1959, nineteen (19) days had already passed after her father took
his Oath of Allegiance on October 21, 1959 and after he was issued a Certificate
of Naturalization on the same day. She contended that the COMELEC should
dismiss the petitions outright for lack of cause of action. Citing Salcedo II v.
Commission on Elections,[8] she averred that a petition filed before an
election, questioning the qualification of a candidate, should be based on Section
78,[9] in relation to Section 74 [10] of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC),
[11] and not under Sections 68[12] and 74 thereof in relation to Section 1,
[13] Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure [14] and Section 5,[15]
paragraph C (3.a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 7800. [16]
She also
contended that the petitions were dismissible on the ground that they were in the
nature of a collateral attack on her and her fathers citizenships, in contravention
of the well-established rule that attack on one's citizenship may only be made
through a direct action for its nullity.
The COMELEC consolidated the two (2) petitions and re-docketed them
as SPA Nos. 07-247[17] and 07-248,[18] entitled IN THE MATTER OF
THE PETITION TO DISQUALIFY JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG FROM HER
CANDIDACY AS FIRST DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVE OF NEGROS
ORIENTAL (herein referred to as the disqualification cases), which remained
pending on May 14, 2007, when the National and Local Elections were
conducted.
After the casting, counting and canvassing of votes in the said elections,
7,746 votes over another congressional candidate, Olivia Paras [20] (Paras),
who obtained 57,962.
Oriental.[21]
In a Joint Resolution[22] dated May 17, 2007, the COMELEC Second
Division granted the petitions in the disqualification cases, disqualified
Limkaichong as a candidate for Representative of the First District of Negros
Oriental, directed the Provincial Supervisor of the COMELEC to strike out her
name from the list of eligible candidates, and for the Provincial Board of
Canvassers (PBOC) to suspend her proclamation. In disposing the cases, the
COMELEC Second Division made the following ratiocination:
On the substantial issue of whether respondent Jocelyn SyLimkaichong is disqualified to run for the congressional seat of the
First District of Negros Oriental on the ground that she is not a
natural-born Filipino, we hold that she is so disqualified.
Petitioners have successfully discharged their burden of proof and
has convincingly shown with pieces of documentary evidence that
Julio Ong Sy, father of herein respondent Jocelyn SyLimkaichong, failed to acquire Filipino citizenship in the
naturalization proceedings which he underwent for the said
purpose.
An examination of the records of Special Case No. 1043 would
reveal that the Office of the Solicitor General was deprived of its
participation in all the stages of the proceedings therein, as
required under Commonwealth Act No. 473 or the Revised
Naturalization Law and Republic Act No. 530, An Act Making
Additional Provisions for Naturalization.
xxx
The documents presented by petitioners showed that the OSG
was not furnished copies of two material orders of the trial court
in the said proceedings. One was the July 9, 1957 Order granting
his petition for naturalization and the other was the September 21,
1959 Order declaring Julio Ong Sy as a Filipino citizen.
Moreover, from a perusal of the same page 171 of the OSG
logbook, we have determined that the OSG did not receive a notice
for the hearing conducted by the trial court on July 9, 1959,
prior to its issuance of the September 12, 1959 Order declaring Julio
Ong Sy as a Filipino citizen.
As correctly pointed out by petitioners, this was fatal to the
naturalization proceedings of Julio Ong Sy, and prevented the
same from gaining finality. The leading case in the matter is
Republic v. Hon. Gabriel V. Valero, 136 SCRA 617 (May 31, 1985),
wherein the Supreme Court declared:
And as though that was not enough, the hearing prior to the
oathtaking of respondent Tan was conducted without the required
notice to the Solicitor General. It is true, as it appeared later, that
Fiscal Veluz, Jr. was authorized by the Solicitor General to represent
the Government in the hearing of the application for naturalization.
That authority, however, does not extend to Fiscal [Veluzs] right to
appear for the State in the hearing preparatory to the oathtaking.
Private respondent Tan was therefore under legal obligation to serve
copy of his motion to be allowed to take his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen upon the Solicitor General which was not done.
Respondent argues that upon his taking of the Oath of Allegiance,
Julio Ong Sy became a Filipino citizen for all intents and purposes,
with all the rights appurtenant thereto.
This argument does not hold water, as was held by the Supreme
Court in the same case of Republic v. Valero, supra:
That private respondent Tan had already taken his oath of allegiance
does not in any way legalize the proceedings relative thereto which
is pregnant with legal infirmities. Compounding these irregularities
is the fact that Tan was allowed to take his oath even before the
expiration of the thirty (30)-day period within which an appeal may
be made thus making the said oath not only highly improper but also
illegal.
In the same case, the Supreme Court added:
To sustain the same would be to sanction a monstrosity
known as citizenship by estoppel. The grant of naturalization under
such circumstances is illegal and cancellation thereof may be had at
any time. Neither estoppel nor res judicata may be set up as a bar
Second Division,
[30]
xxx
The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold
an office is only that the election fails entirely, that the wreath of
victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the
repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a
declaration in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of
votes, and does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest
number of votes to be declared elected. In such case, the electors
have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity. To allow
the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the elective
position despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise
the electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the
importance and meaning of democracy and the peoples right to
elect officials of their choice.
All told, We find no cogent reason to disturb the
findings of this Commission (Second Division) in its
Joint Resolution promulgated on May 17, 2007.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant Motion for Reconsideration of Respondent Jocelyn
Sy-Limkaichong is hereby DENIED.
The Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration with Partial Motion for Reconsideration
filed by Intervenor Olivia P. Paras praying that she be
proclaimed as the winning candidate for the First District
Representative of Negros Oriental is hereby denied for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[34]
On July 3, 2007, Limkaichong filed in the disqualification cases
against her a Manifestation and Motion for Clarification and/or To Declare
the Petitions as Dismissed in Accordance with Section 6, Rule 18 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.[35]
She contended that, with her
proclamation, her having taken her oath of office and her assumption of the
position, the COMELEC was divested of jurisdiction to hear the disqualification
cases. She further contended that, following Section 6, [36] Rule 18 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the disqualification cases would have to be
reheard, and if on rehearing, no decision would be reached, the action or
proceedings should be dismissed, because the COMELEC En Banc was equally
divided in opinion when it resolved her motion for reconsideration.
On an even date, Paras wrote the House of Representatives informing
it of the COMELEC En BancResolution dated June 29, 2007 upholding the Joint
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division dated May 17, 2007, which
2.
3.
4.
5.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.
[53] Article IX-C; Section 6[54] of R.A. 6646; and Sections 241[55] and
243,[56] Article XX of the OEC. As such, it does not have to comply with the
This is to be
SO ORDERED.
3.
4.
5.
III
Whether the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc
correctly disqualified Limkaichong on the ground that she is not a naturalborn Filipino citizen.
In resolving the disqualification cases, the COMELEC Second Division
relied on the entries in the docket book of the OSG, [69] the only remaining
record of the naturalization proceedings, [70] and ruled on the basis thereof
that the naturalization proceedings of Julio Ong Sy, Limkaichongs father, in
Special Case No. 1043, were null and void. The COMELEC Second Division
adopted Villando and Cameros arguments that the OSG was deprived of its
participation in the said case for it was not furnished copies of the following: (a)
the July 9, 1957 Order of the Court of First Instance (CFI) granting the petition
for naturalization; and (b) the September 21, 1959 Order of the CFI declaring
Julio Ong Sy a Filipino citizen.
Thus, when the latter took his oath of
allegiance on October 21, 1959, it was exactly 30 days after his declaration as a
naturalized Filipino, or one day short of the reglementary period required under
Sections 11 and 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473. Such defects were fatal to
the naturalization proceedings of Julio Ong Sy and prevented the same from
gaining finality. The COMELEC Second Division concluded that since Julio
Ong Sy did not acquire Philippine citizenship through the said naturalization
proceedings, it follows that Limkaichong remains a Chinese national and is
disqualified to run as candidate and be elected as a Member of the House of
Representatives.
We cannot resolve the matter of Limkaichongs citizenship as the same
should have been challenged in appropriate proceedings as earlier stated.
IV
Whether the COMELEC's disqualification of Limkaichong
is final and executory.
In resolving this issue, pertinent is the provision of Section 13(b), Rule 18
of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure:
prescribes the power of this Court to review decisions of the COMELEC, [72]
thus:
from this Court while there were several other incidents pending before the
COMELEC, the final resolution in either one of which will amount to res
judicatain the other, clearly showed forum shopping on her part.
In her Reply to the above Comments, Limkaichong countered that she did
not engage in forum shopping, for had she waited for the COMELEC to rule on
her manifestation and other motions, it would have resulted in the expiration of
the reglementary period for filing a petition for certiorari before the Court.
The May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division
disqualifying Limkaichong and suspending her proclamation cannot yet be
implemented considering that she timely filed a motion for reconsideration.
Thus, pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 18 and Section 2 Rule 19 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the Joint Resolution has not yet attained finality
for it to be implemented.
Notably, the seeming impropriety of the Resolution of the COMELEC En
Bancdated June 29, 2007 has since been remedied by the promulgation of its
Resolution dated August 16, 2007, recognizing that it no longer has jurisdiction
over the disqualification cases following the valid proclamation of Limkaichong
and her assumption of office as a Member of the House of Representatives.
V
Whether the Speaker of the House of Representatives may be compelled to
prohibit Limkaichong from assuming her duties as a Member of the House of
Representatives.
Biraogo's contention was that De Venecia[73] should be stopped from
entering Limkaichong's name in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives because he has no power to allow an alien to sit and continue to
sit therein as it would amount to an unlawful exercise of his legal authority.
Moreover, Biraogo opposes Limkaichongs assumption of office in the House of
Representatives since she is not qualified to sit therein, being a Chinese citizen
and, thus, disqualified by virtue of a final and executory judgment of the
COMELEC En Banc. He relied on the COMELEC En BancResolution dated
June 29, 2007, which affirmed the COMELEC Second Division Joint Resolution
dated May 17, 2007 disqualifying Limkaichong from holding public office. He
contended that the said Resolution dated June 29, 2007 is already final and
executory; hence, it should be respected pursuant to the principle of res judicata.
De Venecia, on the other hand, argued that he should not be faulted for
honoring the proclamation of Limkaichong, because it had the hallmarks of
regularity, and he had no power to exclude any Member of the House of
Representatives motu proprio. In their Comment on the petition, respondents
De Venecia, et al., contended that the enrollment of a Member in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives and his/her recognition as such
becomes the ministerial duty of the Secretary General and the House of
Representatives upon presentation by such Member of a valid Certificate of
Proclamation and Oath of Office.
Respondent Nograles, as De Venecia's, substitute, filed a Memorandum
dated July 16, 2008 stating that under the circumstances, the House of
Representatives, and its officials, are without recourse except to honor the
validity of the proclamation of Limkaichong until the same is
canceled, revoked or nullified, and to continue to recognize her as the duly
elected Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental until it is ordered
by this Court, as it was in Codilla, to recognize somebody else. He went on to
state that after assumption by the Member-elect, or having acquired a
presumptively valid title to the office, the House of Representatives cannot,
motu proprio, cancel, revoke, withdraw any recognition given to a sitting
Member or to remove his name from its roll, as such would amount to a
removal of such Member from his office without due process of law. Verily, it
is only after a determination by the appropriate tribunal (as in this case, the
HRET), pursuant to a final and executory order, that the Member does not have
a right to the office (i.e., not being a duly elected Member), that the House of
Representatives is directed to exclude the said Member.
Their contentions are meritorious. The unseating of a Member of the
House of Representatives should be exercised with great caution and after the
proper proceedings for the ouster has been validly completed. For to arbitrarily
unseat someone, who obtained the highest number of votes in the elections, and
during the pendency of the proceedings determining ones qualification or
disqualification, would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom
sovereignty resides.[74]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition in G.R. Nos. 17883132is GRANTED and the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division
dated May 17, 2007 in SPA Nos. 07-247 and 07-248 is REVERSEDand SET
ASIDE. All the other petitions (G.R. Nos. 179120, 179132-33, 179240-41) are
hereby DISMISSED.