1

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
A1: Geographical Distribution of Anti-Semitic Sentiment
A.2: Composite Measure of Anti-Semitism
A.3: Anti-Semitism Questions Correlations in the Cross-Section
A.4: Committed Anti-Semites in the 1920s Birth Cohort
A.5: Anti-Semitic Parties in the Imperial Period
A.6: Persistence Results (Respondents Born After 1945)
A.7: Parental Political Preferences and Indoctrination
A.8: The Effects of Cinema and Radio

A1: Geographical Distribution of Anti-Semitic Sentiment

Fig. A.1: Large Regional Differences in Anti-Semitic Sentiment in Germany, 1996-2006. The map plots
the share of respondents who answer the question Should Jews have equal rights? with a score of 5 or
higher (on a scale from 1-7, with 1 = fully agree and 7 = strongly disagree).

.2

Density

.4

.6

A.2: Composite Measure of Anti-Semitism

6
4
2
Composite Measure of Anti-Semitic Attitudes (1=lowest; 7=highest)

Fig. A.2: The composite measure is the location-specific average of responses to seven individual
questions about anti-Semitism. These are listed in Table 1 of the main text. There are altogether 264
towns and cities in our sample.

A.3: Anti-Semitism Questions Correlations in the Cross-section

3

6
4
3.5

JewNeighbor

3
2.5

JewMarriage

3
4

JewRights

3
2

5
4

JewInfluence

3
2
4
3

JewShame

2
6
5

JewExploit
4
3

JewResponsible

2
2.5

3.5

Fig. A.3: The figure shows scatter plots of responses to different questions in the form of a 7x7 matrix (Data at Regierungsbezirk level). All ALLBUS questions
were recoded so that higher values always indicate more anti-Semitism.

A.4: Committed Anti-Semites in the 1920s Birth Cohort

Figure 1 in the manuscript shows the strongest increase in committed anti-Semitism for
the 1930s cohort, while the effect for the 1920s cohort is much more muted. In the
following, we argue that missing anti-Semites are probably attributable to differential
mortality with the most radical men volunteering for the part of the German armed
forces with the highest mortality rates.
To make this argument, we document a number of historical facts:
1. Broad indoctrination was successful for both the 1920s and 1930s cohorts
overall levels of broad anti-Semitism are higher for these cohorts among both men
and women.
2. Extreme (committed) indoctrination was highly successful for both women and
men born in the 1930s, and for women born in the 1920s. This suggests that only
male extremists from the 1920s cohort are missing in our sample. In the final
step, we show that the share of missing men is strongly correlated with local
anti-Semitic extremism:
3. Towns and cities with rampant anti-Semitism in the 1920s and 1930s have a
lower share of surviving men from the 1920s cohort in our sample. This suggests
that differential mortality due to wartime deaths can help to explain the missing
extremists
We conclude this argument with a detailed historical interpretation of our empirical
findings.
Broad anti-Semitism is high in the 1920s and 1930s. We begin by showing that only
committed anti-Semites are missing from our sample; broad anti-Semitism is higher for
both the 1920s and 1930s cohorts. Recall that broad anti-Semitism reflects the average
across seven questions about attitudes towards Jews, listed in Table 1. Consequently, it
captures attitudes towards Jews more broadly as opposed to the more fervent sentiment
reflected in the committed anti-Semitism dummy. For the broad measure (illustrated in
Figure A.4), men and women show a very similar pattern of significantly higher antiSemitism in both the 1920s and the 1930s birth cohort. 1

It is also interesting that for all other cohorts, men show significantly higher broad anti-Semitism than
women (the difference is 0.2, and it is significant with a t-statistic of 5.17). This suggests that for broad
anti-Semitism in the cohorts most affected by the Nazis, the difference between men and women
disappeared due to heavy indoctrination.

FIG. A.4: Broad anti-Semitism by gender and birth cohort

Gender-specific differences in the share of extremists. Next, we show that only male
extremists are missing. Consider Figure A.5, which uses our measure of committed
(instead of broad) anti-Semitism:
- In the 1920s, there are missing committed anti-Semites among men, but not
among women:
o The share of committed anti-Semites is typically twice as high among men
as compared to women (see the 1930s cohort and all other cohorts).
o The 1920s cohort is an exception: In this cohort, the share of anti-Semites
is only slightly higher among men (6.6% vs 5.2%).
- Among women, there is strong evidence for indoctrination in both cohorts:
o The share of committed anti-Semites amongst women is about twice as
high in both the 1920s (5.2%) and 1930s (7.1%) cohorts as compared to
all other cohorts (2.6%). Thus, for women, there is evidence for
indoctrination also in the 1920s.
- Consequently, it is only for men that the 1920s cohort does not show a large
upward shift in committed anti-Semitism.

FIG. A.5: Committed anti-Semites by gender and birth cohort

Missing men in the 1920s. Finally, we show that in parts of Germany where antiSemitism was particularly virulent, there are fewer surviving males from the 1920s
cohort in our sample. To this end, we use additional data on anti-Semitic violence and
actions in the 1920s and 1930 (originally used in Voigtlnder and Voth, (1)). The
individual (city-level) variables are

Pogroms in the 1920s and in 1933, when the NSDAP had just seized
power

Deportations of Jews after 1933 (relative to Jewish population in 1933)

Attacks on synagogues during the Night of Broken Glass in 1938

Letters to the anti-Semitic newspaper Der Strmer (per capita)

These variables are available for 78 out of the 264 cities in our full ALLBUS dataset. We
use these indicators because they reflect actions requiring a deliberate decision and costly
actions, thus helping us to capture extremist (committed) anti-Semitism, as opposed to
broader anti-Semitic sentiment. 2
We extract the principal component of these action-based variables and show that in
places where Jew-hatred was rampant, fewer men born in the 1920s survived: In Table
A.1, we regress the share of men in the 1920s cohort in each city on our measure of antiSemitic hate. There is a strong negative relationship between local anti-Semitism and the
share of males in the surviving cohort of study respondents born in the 1920s (Panel A).
2

In Voigtlnder and Voth (1), we show that deportations had a strong local element, since they were often
based on the preferences of officials and interacted with denunciations. To show that our results do not
depend on them, we also present regressions without using deportations.

8
A one standard deviation increase in our measure of anti-Semitic hate is associated with
an approximately 10% decline in the share of surviving men (relative to an average male
share of 0.36 in the 1920s cohort in our sample). When we restrict attention to men born
in 1927-29 (Panel B), the effects are even larger, with standardized coefficients of 1619%. We discuss below that men born in these years were particularly likely to be
affected by differential mortality because they were too young for the regular draft by the
end of WWII, but old enough to volunteer.
Table A.1: Local Anti-Semitism and Share of Surviving Men from the 1920s cohort
Dependent variable: Share of men in the 1920s cohort, city level data
(1)

(2)

(3)
excl. deportations

PANEL A: Dep. Var.: Share of men born in 1920-1929

-0.0933***
(0.0307)

-0.0808**
(0.0358)

-0.0869**
(0.0387)

[-0.114]

[-0.099]

[-0.098]

0.0552***
(0.0208)

0.0614
(0.0486)

0.0520
(0.0451)

Controls

no

yes

yes

N (cities)
R2

78
0.077

78
0.129

78
0.133

principal component of 1920s/30s

anti-Semitism
Std coeff #
ln(population 1933)

PANEL B: Dep. Var.: Share of men born in 1927-1929

-0.148***
(0.0524)

-0.138**
(0.0619)

-0.191***
(0.0625)

[-0.19]

[-0.16]

[-0.17]

0.0680
(0.0408)

0.0869
(0.0817)

0.0942
(0.0776)

Controls

no

yes

yes

N (cities)
R2

50
0.100

50
0.157

50
0.205

principal component of 1920s/30s

anti-Semitism
Std coeff #
ln(population 1933)

Notes: The sample includes all cities in the ALLBUS dataset with data on Jewish communities and
persecution in the 1920s and 1930s, as collected by Voigtlnder and Voth (1). All regressions are run by
OLS at the city level. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. The principal component variable is the first
principal component of the four action-based measures of anti-Semitism in the 1920s/30s listed in the text
above. In column 3, the principal component measure excludes deportations. Controls include the shares
of Protestants, Jews, industrial workers, agricultural employees, blue-collar workers, and self-employed, all
measured in 1925.
#
Standardized coefficient: shows the change in the share of men from the 1920s cohort, due to a onestandard deviation increase in Principal Component 1920s/30s. The average sample share of men in the
1920s cohort is 0.358.

9
Historical interpretation. We have documented that more men born in the 1920s are
missing from our data in those towns and cities were Jew-hatred was particularly
strong and that this effect is even stronger for those born in the second half of the
1920s. We argue that this reflects differential mortality male Nazi supporters were more
likely to volunteer for army units with high casualty rates. As a result, heavily
indoctrinated Nazi supporters faced higher death rates. Because volunteers could serve at
a younger age than those drafted, the deaths were heavily concentrated amongst those
born in the second half of the 1920s.
The Waffen-SS was the Nazi Partys armed wing. It was (predominantly) a volunteer
elite army, and recruited heavily amongst the fanaticized youth of the Third Reich (and
from ethnic Germans and Nordic volunteers outside Germany). The Waffen-SS was
tiny in 1939 but became an ever-larger part of the armed forces as World War II wore on,
growing from approx. 28,000 men in 1939 to almost a million men by wars end (2, 3).
The new units were recruited (within Germany) from volunteers. Thus, later cohorts
joined in increasing proportions. Teenagers often volunteered from the age of 15 or 16. In
contrast, the general draft for the armed forces started at age 18.
Waffen-SS casualty rates were higher than in the Wehrmacht (German armed forces) at
large. The overall effect on differential mortality was sizeable. For example, the SSPanzerdivision Hitlerjugend (SS Tank Division Hitler Youth) was mainly recruited from
the Hitler Youth organization. It was formed in 1943, and was almost exclusively
recruited from teenage members of the Nazi youth organization. The unit, 22,000 men
strong, was largely destroyed in Normandy and later battles. This pattern was repeated in
many units and for many cohorts in the final years of the war; other German SS-divisions
(Frundsberg, Hohenstauffen) had an average age (including officers) of 18 (2).
Fanaticism ran so high that, for example, critically wounded POWs from SS units on the
Western front would routinely refuse blood transfusions choosing to die rather than
receive (potentially) Jewish blood (4). 1926 is the last cohort for which the regular callup still affected all males in 1944, recruitment into the regular army still took its regular
form, including the then 18-year olds. However, the cohorts 1927, 1928, and 1929 were
too young for regular recruitment but old enough to volunteer, especially as the age
limit of 17 for volunteers was relaxed towards the end of the war. It is precisely in these
cohorts where we see a particularly strong relationship between missing men and local
anti-Semitism (Panel B of Table A.1).
Overall, for men born before 1920, those serving in the Waffen-SS contributed 3.8% to
the total fatality count; for those born 1920-24, this rose to 9.4%, and for the 1926-30
cohorts, to 19.3% fully five times higher than the pre-1920 average (Figure A.6). In
other words, the nature of recruiting for the most ideologically committed formation of
the German armed forces and its high casualty rate virtually guaranteed that the most
indoctrinated individuals faced an extraordinarily high chance to die on the battlefield. At
the same time, this interpretation can also explain why a) older men were much less
affected by this differential mortality because they were recruited earlier, when the
Waffen-SS was still only a tiny part of the German armed forces, and b) boys born after

10
1930 were mostly unaffected, being too young to fight except in extreme circumstances,
for brief periods, at the very end of the war (Volkssturm).

100%
90%

share of total deaths

80%
70%
60%
50%

81%
95%

96%

97%

98%

95%

91%

40%

rest
Waffen-SS

30%
20%
10%
0%

19%
5%

4%

3%

2%

5%

pre-1900

1901-05

1906-10

1911-15

1916-20

9%

1921-25

1925-

birth cohorts

FIG. A.6: Share of Waffen-SS in all deaths, by birth cohort.

Source: Overmans 2004 (5).
Overall, we conclude that the Nazi regime was successful in instilling anti-Semitic
sentiment in the population, both in terms of broad and more fervent committed
attitudes. However, among the latter, extremists from the late 1920s cohort saw high
attrition during WWII; they are therefore less likely to be represented in modern-day
data.

A.5: Anti-Semitic Parties in the Imperial Period

There were two nuclei of political anti-Semitism in the Imperial period: Adolf Stoecker, a
Protestant chaplain, sought to attract workers to the Christian-Social Workers Party
(Christlich-Soziale Arbeiterpartei, founded 1878) by emphasizing the dangers of Jewish
immigration. Elsewhere, non-religious, anti-Semitic parties sprang up at the same time.
Attempts to unify the anti-Semitic movement came to naught. In 1887, the first antiSemitic candidate obtained a seat in the national diet. From the 1890s onwards, antiSemitic parties agitated nationwide and put forward candidates in a large number of
districts. We use anti-Semitic parties as classified by Schmdeke (6) counting votes for
the Deutschsoziale Partei, the Deutsche Reformpartei, the Christlich-Soziale Partei and

11
the Deutschsoziale Reformpartei. The earliest election for which we use data is the 1890
one. Anti-Semitic candidates were also on the ballot of all subsequent Imperial elections.
The greatest success came in 1893, when a total of 16 MPs were returned to the diet in
Berlin.
As explained in the text, we use three different samples for anti-Semitic vote shares,
addressing the fact that the party did not present candidates in all cities. Figure A.7 shows
the distribution of votes across cities in each of the samples.
Sample a

Sample b

.4

.2
AS vote

.6

Density
6
4
0

.2

.4
AS vote

.6

10

Density

Density
15

10

20

10

25

15

Sample c

.4

.2

.6

AS vote

Fig. A.7: The figure shows histograms of the variable ASVote the average vote for antiSemitic parties in six parliamentary elections between 1890 and 1912. Sample (a)
includes all cities, treating those where the party did not put forward candidates as zero
votes; sample (b) drops these observations and sample (c) only includes cities where antiSemitic parties presented candidates in at least three out of the six elections.

12

A.6: Persistence Results (Respondents Born After 1945)

Table A.2: Persistence of Anti-Semitism at the City Level: Restricting the Sample to
Individuals Born After 1945
Dep var.:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Committed measure of anti-Semitism
(AScomm)

(5)

(6)
(7)
(8)
Broad measure of anti-Semitism
(ASbroad)

ASVote

0.991*
(0.539)

1.350***
(0.434)

1.180*
(0.629)

1.579
(1.016)

0.772*
(0.422)

1.109***
(0.322)

0.713**
(0.336)

1.077**
(0.490)

Std coeff #

[0.5%]

[0.9%]

[0.8%]

[1.3%]

[0.06]

[0.13]

[0.08]

[0.15]

Controls
Sample
N (indiv)
N (cities)
R2

No
(a)

No
(b)

2,897
263

1,820
160

Yes
(b)
1,537
141

Yes
(c)
475
47

No
(a)

No
(b)

2,797
263
0.002

1,760
160
0.013

Yes
(b)
1,488
141
0.127

Yes
(c)
557
47
0.216

Notes: The table repeats the analysis in Table 3 in the main text, focusing on only those individuals born
after 1945. See notes to Table 3 for description of variables and methodology. Standard errors in
parentheses (clustered at the municipality level).
#
Standardized coefficient: shows the change in the dependent variable due to a one-standard deviation
change in ASVote. In cols. 1-4, the effect is expressed in percentage points (of committed anti-Semites,
who account on average for 4.8% of the population); in cols 5-8, it is relative to a mean of 3.12 for broad
anti-Semitism.

Table A.3: Persistence of Nazi Indoctrination after 1945

Dep var.:
Cohorts
post
AS(1930s)
Std coeff #
ASVote

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Committed measure of anti-Semitism
(AScomm)

(5)

(6)
(7)
(8)
Broad measure of anti-Semitism
(ASbroad)

1945

1955

1965

1975

1945

1955

1965

1975

1.003**
(0.470)
[1.2]

0.916**
(0.462)
[1.0%]

1.019
(0.621)
[1.2%]

1.842*
(1.098)
[3.2%]

0.234***
(0.0546)
[0.19]

0.198***
(0.0489)
[0.17]

0.209***
(0.0556)
[0.18]

0.255***
(0.0779)
[0.22]

0.815*
(0.449)
yes
2,535
235

1.370***
(0.505)
yes
1,802
232

0.895
(0.755)
yes
944
224

3.585
(2.196)
yes
233
97

0.349
0.546
0.487
0.166
(0.414)
(0.511)
(0.533)
(1.012)
Controls
yes
yes
yes
yes
N (indiv)
2,404
1,707
895
282
N (cities)
228
226
217
128
R2
0.126
0.128
0.139
0.168
Notes: Regressions in columns 1-4 are run by Probit; those in columns 5-8, by OLS. AS(1930s) is the
city-level average anti-Semitism for the 1930s birth cohort, based on the committed measure in cols 1-4,
and based on the broad measure in cols 5-8. Regressions include only individuals born after 1945 (col 1),
1955 (col 2), etc, as indicated by the Cohorts post entries. Controls are the same as in Table 3 in the main
text. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the municipality level).
#
Standardized coefficient: shows the change in the dependent variable due to a one-standard deviation
change in AS(1930s). In cols. 1-4, the effect is expressed in percentage points (of committed anti-Semites,
who account on average for 4.8% of the population); in cols 5-8, it is relative to a mean of 3.12 for broad
anti-Semitism.

13

A.7: Parental Political Preferences and Indoctrination

Table A.4: Amplifying Pre-Existing Anti-Semitism: Different Samples
Dep. var.
Sample
ASvote
Db
Db ASvote
CONTROLS
N
R2

(1)

(2)
--- AScomm ---

(3)

(4)

(5)
--- ASbroad ---

(6)

(a)

(b)

(c)

(a)

(b)

(c)

0.0438
(0.0622)

**

0.0886
(0.0455)

0.138
(0.0838)

0.604
(0.373)

0.655
(0.318)

1.019*
(0.524)

0.0431***
(0.0127)

0.0417**
(0.0177)

0.0418
(0.0291)

0.285***
(0.0554)

0.228***
(0.0848)

0.144
(0.100)

0.399**
(0.163)
yes

0.210
(0.137)
yes

0.420**
(0.168)
yes

2.028***
(0.611)
yes

1.244**
(0.592)
yes

2.197***
(0.645)
yes

4,150
0.043

2,597
0.041

962
0.097

3,993
0.117

2,507
0.130

921
0.230

Notes: For description of samples (a)-(c), see the note to Table 3 in the main text. Standard errors in
parentheses (clustered at the municipality level). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Dependent variable in
columns 1-3 is AScomm (the proportion of subjects with committed anti-Semitic attitudes) and in columns 46, ASbroad (the average of the seven variables listed in Table 1, reflecting broad anti-Semitism). Db is a
dummy variable for the 1930s birth cohort. CONTROLS are the same as in Table 3 in the main text. All
regressions include only subjects with German nationality and at least two generations of German
ancestors.

A.8: The Role of Cinema, Radio, and Nazi Party Organization

Here, we document that cross-sectional variation in exposure to cinema and radio is not
associated with greater anti-Semitism, especially for the 1930s birth cohort. Similarly, we
find that the strength of the local Nazi party organization is not associated with more
successful indoctrination. This suggests that at least among the young impressionable
cohorts spatial variation in the intensity of propaganda was of minor importance,
relative to the huge universal propaganda in schools and youth organizations.
Cinemas and Radio: Cinema newsreels and the entertainment films produced under the
control of Goebbels were a key channel for indoctrination. So was the radio. In Table
A.5 below, we examine whether indoctrination of the 1930s birth cohort was particularly
effective in cities with more cinema seats per capita in 1934. 3 We find that if anything,
cities with higher cinema density saw somewhat lower indoctrination rates. For the case
of committed anti-Semitism, this can be seen by comparing cols. 1 and 2 (which split the
sample into below- and above-median cinema density), and by looking at the negative
(but insignificant) interaction term in column 3. Of course, a statistically insignificant
coefficient may merely reflect noisy data. We thus use the 95% confidence interval (CI)
3

Data on cinema seats are from Reichs-Kino-Adressbuch 1934, Volumes I and II.

14
of the interaction term in order to narrow down its magnitude. We multiply the upper and
lower bound of the 95% CI with the standard deviation of the interaction term. 4 The
resulting values are reported in square brackets in col. 3. This interval reflects the
confidence band for the change in the dependent variable due to a one-standard deviation
change in the interaction term. Its size of [-0.02, 0.004] is small compared to the dummy
for the 1930s birth cohort (0.0642). This implies that we can reliably (in a statistical
sense) discard an important role of cinemas in Nazi indoctrination among the cohorts that
grew up under the Nazi regime. 5
For broad anti-Semitism, we find the same pattern in cols 4-6 of Table A.5. 6 Again, if
anything towns and cities with higher cinema density saw somewhat less effective
indoctrination. Why may Nazi indoctrination have been lower in cities with more
cinemas? One explanation is that cosmopolitan cities would tend to have more cinemas
per capita in the early 1930s, and at the same time its citizens would find the Nazi
propaganda (on average) less appealing. In fact, we find that votes for the NSDAP
between 1930-33 (i.e., before the partys seizure of power) are significantly negatively
correlated with cinema seats per capita. This supports the interpretation that cinema
density was high in urban centers, where many working-class voters were relatively
averse to the Nazi message and preferred to vote Communist (7). Thus, even if showing
the weekly Nazi newsreel and entertainment films in cinemas may have contributed to
indoctrination in the aggregate, the effect is hard to separate out in our data where we use
regional variation.

This is similar to the methodology of computing standardized beta coefficients, which multiplies the
coefficient estimate (rather than its CI) by a one-standard deviation change in the explanatory variable.
5
The interaction results are very similar when we use a dummy for the 1920s, or for the combined 1920s
and 1930s birth cohorts.
6
Note also that in each of the smaller subsamples, the 1930s cohort shows statistically significantly higher
anti-Semitism, supporting the robustness of our main finding.

15
Table A.5: Cinemas and Nazi Indoctrination
Dep.var.:
Sample
Db (1930s)

(1)
AScomm
Cinemas
low
0.0778***
(0.0184)

(2)
AScomm
Cinemas
high
0.0347**
(0.0166)

(3)
AScomm
all
0.0708***
(0.0163)

(4)
ASbroad
Cinemas
low
0.422***
(0.0785)

(5)
ASbroad
Cinemas
high
0.260***
(0.0681)

(6)
ASbroad
all
0.384***
(0.0678)

Cinema seats
p.c. 1934

0.0316
(0.0801)

0.253
(0.508)

Cinema seats
p.c. 1934 Db

-0.355
(0.257)

-1.034
(0.966)

Std coeff CI #

CONTROLS
N
R2

[-0.02, 0.004]

yes
2,127
0.068

yes
1,907
0.019

yes
4,034
0.041

[-0.071, 0.02]

yes
2,041
0.149

yes
1,842
0.086

yes
3,883
0.112

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the municipality level). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01. Dependent variable in columns 1-3 is AScomm (the proportion of subjects with committed anti-Semitic
attitudes), and in columns 4-6, ASbroad (the average of the seven variables listed in Table 1 in the main text,
reflecting broad anti-Semitism). Db is a dummy variable for the 1930s birth cohort. CONTROLS are the
same as in Table 3 in the main text. Cols. 1 and 4 (2 and 5) include only cities with below- (above-) median
cinema seats per capita in 1934. All regressions include only subjects with German nationality and at least
two generations of German ancestors.
#
The square brackets report the standardized 95% confidence interval computed as the standard
deviation of the interaction term multiplied with the lower and upper bound of the 95% CI of the
interaction coefficient. In words, the interval reflects the confidence band for the change in the dependent
variable due to a one-standard deviation change in the interaction term.

In Table A.6, we repeat the exercise for radio listeners. Germans then as now have to
pay a license fee to tune in, and collection was (and is) rigorously enforced. We use data
on listenership by town from the late 1930s to examine how radio use correlates with
modern-day levels of anti-Semitism among the 1930s cohort 7 About half of the
households in the towns in our sample had radio transmitters in the late 1930s. We find
that the dummy for the 1930s birth cohort is, if anything, smaller in regions with abovemedian transmitters per household (cols 2 and 5, as compared to cols 1 and 4). This is
confirmed by the negative interaction terms in cols 3 and 6. However, the magnitude of
the interaction term is quantitatively small its standardized 95% confidence interval has
a lower bound of -0.07 in col 3, i.e., about one-half (in absolute magnitude) of the 1930
birth cohort dummy (0.141). The (limited) negative effect of radio on indoctrination may
be due to different attributes of radio listeners (similar to the argument above for
cinemas): historical accounts suggest that early radio subscribers were relatively
wealthier and better educated (8) both attributes that tend to be associated with lower
anti-Semitism and lower susceptibility to propaganda. Finally, results for cinema and
7

Radio subscriber data are from Vierteljahreshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, Jahrgang 47 (1938)
Heft IV. We use city-level data for all medium and larger cities. For smaller towns, we use the average
share of subscribing households at the Regierungsbezirk (administrative district) level.

16
radio are very similar when we analyze anti-Semitism among the combined 1920s and
1930s cohorts (these results are not included in the tables but are available upon request).
Table A.6: Radio Subscribers and Nazi Indoctrination
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
comm
comm
comm
Dep.var.:
AS
AS
AS
ASbroad
Low Radio
High Radio
all
Low Radio
Sample
***
**
***
Db (1930s)
0.0691
0.0374
0.141
0.436***
(0.0192)
(0.0150)
(0.0510)
(0.0800)
Radio Subscribers
0.0264
(0.0508)
Radio Subs. Db
-0.167*
(0.0873)
Std coeff CI #

CONTROLS
N
R2

(5)
ASbroad

(6)
ASbroad

High Radio

all

***

0.255
(0.0662)

[-0.070, 0.001]

yes
2,127
0.059

yes
1,978
0.027

yes
4,105
0.040

0.778***
(0.196)
-0.242
(0.375)
-0.824**
(0.348)

[-0.310, -0.028]

yes
2,040
0.129

yes
1,909
0.099

yes
3,949
0.114

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the municipality level). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01. Dependent variable in columns 1-3 is AScomm (the proportion of subjects with committed anti-Semitic
attitudes) and in columns 4-6, ASbroad (the average of the seven variables listed in Table 1, reflecting broad
anti-Semitism). Db is a dummy variable for the 1930s birth cohort. Radio subscribers measures the
proportion of households with a radio subscription in 1938. CONTROLS are the same as in Table 3 in the
main text. All regressions include only subjects with German nationality and at least two generations of
German ancestors.
#
The square brackets report the standardized 95% confidence interval computed as the standard
deviation of the interaction term multiplied with the lower and upper bound of the 95% CI of the
interaction coefficient. In words, the interval reflects the confidence band for the change in the dependent
variable due to a one-standard deviation change in the interaction term.

Finally, we examine whether the strength of the local Nazi party organization played an
important role for indoctrination. We use the total number of NSDAP party members for
each city by late 1932, before the party came to office. 8 NSDAP membership is arguably
a good proxy for the local establishment of the Nazi party, which may have supported
indoctrination by providing organizational support, or by suppressing the opposition.
In Table A.7, we ask whether people in towns and cities where the Nazis were
organizationally strongly before 1933 registered particularly high levels of anti-Semitism,
especially for the cohort born in the 1930s. We find no evidence to support this channel:
the dummy for the 1930s birth cohort is very similar in both the subsample with low
(cols. 1 and 4) and high (cols. 2 and 5) NSDAP members per capita. In addition, the
interaction term between NSDAP members and the 1930s cohort dummy is statistically
insignificant and quantitatively small, as indicated by the standardized confidence

We use the Falter-Hnisch computerized sample of NS members compiled by the universities of Berlin
and Minnesota (9, 10) . The sample contains information on 38,752 membership cards drawn in 1989,
which we match to the 264 towns and cities in our sample.

17
interval in square brackets (cols. 3 and 6). 9 Thus, our results suggest that the strength of
local party organization was not crucial in the indoctrination of people. This makes the
alternative interpretation more likely: where people had historically voted for antiSemitic parties, Nazi propaganda fell on fertile ground among the local population.
Table A.7: NSDAP Members and Nazi Indoctrination
Dep.var.:
Sample
Db (1930s)

(1)
AScomm
members
low
0.0576***
(0.0196)

(2)
AScomm
members
high
0.0538***
(0.0143)

(3)
AScomm
all
0.0524***
(0.0163)

(4)
ASbroad
members
low
0.395***
(0.0818)

(5)
ASbroad
members
high
0.292***
(0.0662)

(6)
ASbroad
all
0.369***
(0.0679)

NSDAP members
p.c. 1933

0.00845
(0.00534)

0.0359
(0.0345)

NSDAP members
p.c. 1933 Db

0.00484
(0.0111)

-0.0288
(0.0506)

Std coeff CI #

CONTROLS
N
R2

[-0.008, 0.012]

yes
2,099
0.044

yes
1,974
0.056

yes
4,073
0.041

[-0.058, 0.032]

yes
2,018
0.131

yes
1,899
0.108

yes
3,917
0.112

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the municipality level). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01. Dependent variable in columns 1-3 is AScomm (the proportion of subjects with committed anti-Semitic
attitudes) and in columns 4-6,ASbroad (the average of the seven variables listed in Table 1 in the main text,
reflecting broad anti-Semitism). Db is a dummy variable for the 1930s birth cohort. CONTROLS are the
same as in Table 3 in the main text. Cols. 1 and 4 (2 and 5) include only cities with below- (above-) median
NSDAP members per capita in 1933. All regressions include only subjects with German nationality and at
least two generations of German ancestors.
#
The square brackets report the standardized 95% confidence interval computed as the standard
deviation of the interaction term multiplied with the lower and upper bound of the 95% CI of the
interaction coefficient. In words, the interval reflects the confidence band for the change in the dependent
variable due to a one-standard deviation change in the interaction term.

Summing up our results, we find that proxies for the local implementation of
indoctrination (such as the strength of local Nazi party organization or media presence)
were not associated with indoctrination of the 1920s and 1930s cohorts. This, in
combination with rich historical evidence, suggests that other channels of indoctrination
most prominently schooling and compulsory Nazi youth organizations were probably
important drivers of the effects that we document.

In col. 3, a one-standard deviation increase in the interaction term is associated with a -0.008 to 0.012
increase in the share of committed anti-Semites. Thus, even the upper bound of the 95% CI yields a
standardized effect that is less than 1/5 of the dummy for the 1930s cohort (0.0525). The interaction effect
in col. 6 (where the dependent variable is broad anti-Semitism) is also quantitatively small. The upper and
lower bound of its 95% confidence interval, multiplied by the standard deviation of the interaction term,
yields the interval of [-0.055, 0.036], relative to a direct effect (dummy for 1930s birth cohort) of 0.37.

18

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