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AMPIL) 6th week

If two things of identical or dissimilar nature are mixed and
the owners of the things are in good faith, OR if the
mixture occurs accidentally and cannot be separated
without injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the
mixture proportionate to the part belonging to him,
according to the value of the things mixed or comingled.
Santos deposited 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay in the
warehouse of Bernabe. At the same time, Tiongson also
deposited 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay. The share of
Tiongson and Santos were mixed together and cannot be
Later on and for some unknown reason, Tiongson files a case
against Bernabe to recover the 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of
palay deposited in Bernabes warehouse. So Tiongson files for
a petition for a writ of attachment and the Court granted it.
Bernabes properties were attached, including only 924
cavans of rice and 31 kilos of palay. These were sold at a
public auction and the proceeds were delivered to Tiongson.
Santos tried to intervene in the attachment of the palay but
then the sheriff had already proceeded with the attachment,
so Santos files a complaint. He says that Tiongson cannot
claim the 924 cavans of palay; he says that by asking for the
attachment of the properties, Tiongson is claiming that the
cavans of rice all belonged to Bernabe and not to him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tiongson can claim the 924 cavans of
rice as his own.
HELD: No, both Tiongson and Santos must divide the cavans
and palay proportionately.
The cavans belonging to Santos, having been mixed with
those belonging to Tiongson, the following rule prescribed is
Article 381 of the Civil Code: If, by will of one of their
owners, two things of identical or dissimilar nature are
mixed, or if the mixture occurs accidentally, if in the latter
case, the things cannot be separated without injury, each
owner shall acquire a right in the mixture proportionate to
the part belonging to him, according to the value of the
things mixed or comingled.
RULING: The number of kilos in a cavan not having been
determined, the Court took the proportion only of the 924
cavans of palay which were attached andsold, therby giving
Santos, who deposited 778 cavans, 398.49 and Tiongson, who
deposited 1,026 cavans, 525.51, or the value thereof at the
rate of 3Php per cavan.
If the commingling of 2 things is made in bad faith, the one
responsible for it will lose his share.

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Siari Valley Inc. brought action to recover 200 heads of cattle
that were driven from its lands to that of Lucasans. Lucasan
however argued that although there was commixtion of
cattle, Siari already retrieved its animals. The CFI of
Zamboanga decided in favor of Siari thus the case at bar.
ISSUE: W/N Lucasan was in bad faith thus should lose his
share in the commixtion
Although there was no actual evidence that all 823 missing
animals were taken by Lucasan or his men, on 2 occasions
however, his men drove away 30 heads of cattle. It is not
erroneous to believe that the others must have also been
driven away applying by analogy the principle that one who
stole a part of the stolen money must have taken also the
larger sum lost by the offended party.
Art. 382 (now Art. 473) of the CC states that if the
commingling of 2 things is made in bad faith, the one
responsible for it will lose his share thus since Lucasan is in
bad faith, he should lose his share in the commixtion.
[this is no longer in Phil Reports provided but in case Sir asks
about the dispositive portion]
The SC ordered Lucasan to deliver the 321 heads that had
been entrusted to his care to Siari; pay damages for the 400
heads he sold since 1946; ordered to allow Siari to round up
all the buffaloes that may be found on its cattle ranch
Spouses Aldaba sold to Jesus Aguirre a circular bolted steel
In specification, if both parties are in good faith, the
principal owner may acquire such property, provided that
he pay reimbursements made by the laborer for his
expenses. Without reimbursements, there is an unjust
enrichment in favor of the petitioner.
tank for Php900, which was not physically possessed by
petitioner due to prevention by the municipality where the
tank was located. The spouses sold again the same tank to
Zosimo Gabriel for the same price, who sold it to Leonora and
Company for Php2,500, who made an improvement
(investment and expenses) thereto worth Php11,299 and sold
it Nassco (National Shipyards and Steel Corporation) for
Php14,500. Aguirre filed a case against the spouses and L&C
where it was held that he is the absolute owner. While the
above case was pending, L&C filed a case against Nassco for
its non-payment, with petitioner as intervenor. It was held
that petitioner must reimburse L&C Php11,299 or upon failure
to deliver, Nassco must pay petitioner Php900 and L&C

(guys its REALLY short so you can read it)



ISSUE: Whether petitioner may acquire such property without
Since there was alteration of such tank, Specification took
place. The court found that L&C was in good faith when it
made the improvements over the property. Since both parties
are in good faith, the principal owner may acquire such
property, provided that pays reimbursements made by the
laborer for his expenses. Without reimbursements, there is an
unjust enrichment in favor of the petitioner.
Actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the
plaintiff are imprescriptible.
The subject property was originally owned by Sapto (this
Sapto was a Moro, so only one name) and located in Alambre,
Toril, Davao City. He died, leaving three sons Samuel,
Constancio, and Ramon. The latter predeceased his brothers,
leaving no heirs. Samuel and Constancio executed a deed of
sale for a portion of said property in favour of Fabiana in
consideration of P240.00. The sale was approved by the
governor of Davao but was never registered. The property
was transferred to Fabiana and from then on he enjoyed
possession from 1931 until the case was filed.
Constancio died with no issue, leaving Samuel as sole
administrator of the property. Upon the latters death, his
widow and two children filed the present action for recovery
of the parcel of land sold by their predecessors to defendant.
The CFI held that although the sale between the Sapto
brothers and Fabiana was never registered, it was binding
valid and binding upon the parties and the vendors heirs.
The CFI also ordered the petitioners to execute the necessary
deed of conveyance in favour of the defendant.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUE W/n the CFIs order of conveyance in favour of Fabiana
was valid.
The SC first affirmed the validity of the sale between the
Sapto brothers and Fabiana, ruling, that even though it was
never registered the sale was valid, binding, and effective
upon the heirs of the vendor. According to the court, actual
notice of the sale served as registration. Futher, that the
transfer and possession of the property was a clear indication
of the validity of the sale.
Regarding the issue on the validity of the order of
conveyance, the SC ruled that it was valid. In assailing the
order, the Sapto heirs claimed that the CFI cannot order the
conveyance because the defendants cause of action had
already prescribed.
The SC ruled however, that the action for conveyance was
actually one to quiet title. In ruling so, the SC cited American
jurisprudence and Art. 480 of the New Civil Code, which

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states, that actions to quiet title to property in the
possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.
The judgement is affirmed, cost against appellants.
For one to file an action to quiet title to a parcel of land,
the requisites in Art 476 of the NCC must be complied with
meaning there should be an instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance setting forth the cloud or doubt over the
title. Otherwise, the action to be filed can either be
ejectment, forcible entry, unlawful detainer, accion
reivindicatoria or accion publiciana.
A 20,592 square meter parcel of land located at Barrio
Titiong, Masbate is the subject property being disputed in this
case. The property is being claimed by 2 contestants,
however legal title over the property can only be given to one
of them.
The case originated from an action for quieting of title filed
by petitioner Mario Titong. The RTC of Masbate decided in
favor of private respondents, Vicente Laurio and Angeles
Laurio as the true and lawful owners of the disputed land.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Titong asserts that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel
of land with an area of 3.2800 hectares and declared for
taxation purposes. He claims that on three separate
occasions, private resps, with their hired laborers, forcibly
entered a portion of the land containing an approximate area
of 2 hectares and began plowing the same under pretext of
ownership. On the other hand, private resps denied the claim
and said that the subject land formed part of the 5.5 hectare
agricultural land which they had purchased from their
predecessor-in-interest, Pablo Espinosa.
Titong identified Espinosa as the his adjoining owner asserting
that no controversy had sprouted between them for 20 years
until the latter sold lot 3749 to V. Laurio. The boundary
between the land sold to Espinosa and what remained of
Titongs property was the old Bugsayon river. When Titong
employed Lerit as his tenant, he instructed the latter to
change the course of the old river and direct the flow of
water to the lowland at the southern portion of Titongs
property, thus converting the old river into a Riceland.
Private resps, on the other hand, denied claim of Titongs,
saying that the area and boundaries of disputed land
remained unaltered during the series of conveyances prior to
its coming into his hands. Accdg to him, Titong first declared
land for taxation purposes which showed that the land had an
area of 5.5 hectares and was bounded on the north by the B.
River; on the east by property under ownership by Zaragoza,
and on the west by property owned by De la Cruz. He also
alleges that Titong sold property to Verano. The latter


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reacquired the property pursuant to mutual agreement to

repurchase the same.

for filing a complaint for quieting title must be instrument,

record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding.

However, the property remained in Titongs hands only for 4

days because he sold it to Espinosa. It then became a part of
the estate of Espinosas wife, late Segundina Espinosa. Later
on, her heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
with Simultaneous Sale whereby the 5.5 hectares was sold to
Laurio for 5,000 pesos. In all these conveyances, the area and
boundaries of the property remained exactly the same as
those appearing in the name of Titongs.

In the case at bar, Titong failed to allege that there was an

instrument, claim etc be clouded over his property. Through
his allegations, what Titong imagined as clouds cast on his
title were Laurios alleged acts of physical intrusion into his
purported property. The grounds mentioned are for action for
forcible entry and not quieting title.

The court found out that 2 surveys were made of the

property. First survey was made by Titong, while the second
was the relocation survey ordered by the lower court.
Because of which, certain discrepancies surfaced. Contrary to
Titongs allegation, he was actually claiming 5.9789 hectares,
the total areas of lot nos 3918, 3918-A and 3606. The lot 3479
pertaining to Espinosas was left with only an area of 4.1841
hectares instead of the 5.5 hectares sold by Titong to him.
Apprised of the discrepancy, private resps filed a protest
before Bureau of Lands against 1st survey, and filing a case
for alteration of boundaries before the MTC, proceedings of
which were suspended because of instant case.
Private resps. Avers that Titong is one of the four heirs of his
mother, Leonida Zaragoza. In the Extrajudicial Settlement
with Sale of Estate of late Zaragoza, the heirs adjudicated
unto themselves the 3.6 hectares property of the deceased.
The property was bounded by the north by Verano, on the
east by Bernardo Titong, on the south by the Bugsayon River
and on the west by Benigno Titong.
Instead of reflecting only .9000 hectares as his rightful share
in the extrajud settlement, Titongs share bloated to 2.4
hectares. It then appeared to Laurio that Titong encroached
upon his property and declared it as part of his inheritance.
The boundaries were likewise altered so that it was bounded
on the north by Verano, on the east by B. Titong, on the
south by Espinosa and on the west by Adolfo Titong. Laurio
also denied that Titong diverted course of the B. river after
he had repurchased the land from Verano because land was
immediately sold to Espinosa thereafter.
ISSUE: W/N Titong is the rightful owner of the subject
The remedy for quieting of title may be availed of under the
circumstances mentioned in Art 476 of the NCC wherein it
says that action to quiet title may be made as a remedial or
preventive measure. Under 476, a claimant must show that
there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding which casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow
upon owners title to or interest in real property. The ground

In addition, the case was considered to be a boundary

dispute. The RTC and CA correctly held that when Titong sold
the 5.5 hectare land to Espinosa, his rights and possession
ceased and were transferred to Laurio upon its sale to the
Thus, it is now a contract of sale wherein it is a contract
transferring dominion and other real rights in the thing sold.
Titong also cannot rely on the claim of prescription as
ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good
faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.
A vendee in an oral contract to convey land who had
made part payment thereof, entered upon the land and had
made valuable improvements thereon is entitled to bring
suit to clear his title against the vendor who had refused to
transfer the title to him. It is not necessary that the
vendee should have an absolute title, an equitable title
being sufficient to clothe him with personality to bring an
action to quiet title.
An action to quiet title of property in ones possession is
In 1969, Pingol, the owner of a lot (Lot No. 3223) in Caloocan
Donasco (private respondent), payable in 6 years.
In 1984, Donasco died and was only able to pay P8,369 plus
P2,000 downpayment, leaving a balance of P10,161. The heirs
of Donasco remained in possession of such lot and offered to
settle the balance with Pingol. However, Pingol refused to
accept the offer and demanded a larger amount. Thus, the
heirs of Donasco filed an action for specific performance
(with Prayer for Writ of Prelim. Injunction, because Pingol
were encroaching upon Donascos lot). Pingol averred that
the sale and transfer of title was conditional upon the full
payment of Donasco (contract to sell, not contract of sale).
With Donascos breach of the contract in 1976 and death in
1984, the sale was deemed cancelled, and the heirs
continuous occupancy was only being tolerated by Pingol.
(1) W/N Pingol can refuse to transfer title to Donasco
(2) W/N Donasco has the right to quiet title


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RULING: (1) No. The contract between Pingol and Donasco is

a contract of sale and not a contract to sell. The acts of the
parties, contemporaneous and subsequent to the contract,
clearly show that the parties intended an absolute deed of
sale; the ownership of the lot was transferred to the Donasco
upon its actual (upon Donascos possession and construction
of the house) and constructive delivery (upon execution of
the contract). The delivery of the lot divested Pingol of his
ownership and he cannot recover the title unless the contract
is resolved or rescinded under Art. 1592 of NCC. It states that
the vendee may pay even after the expiration of the period
stipulated as long as no demand for rescission has been made
upon him either judicially or by notarial act. Pingol neither
did so. Hence, Donasco has equitable title over the property.

ownership over the same. They also claim that the action of
Elias has already PRESCRIBED.

(2) Although the complaint filed by the Donascos was an

action for specific performance, it was actually an action to
quiet title. A cloud has been cast on the title, since despite
the fact that the title had been transferred to them by the
execution of the deed of sale and the delivery of the object
of the contract, Pingol adamantly refused to accept the
payment by Donascos and insisted that they no longer had the
obligation to transfer the title.

2) NO, the action is imprescriptible. This action is not for

specific performance; all it seeks is to quiet title, to remove
the cloud cast on appellee's ownership as a result of
appellant's refusal to recognize the sale made by their
predecessor. And, as plaintiff-appellee is in possession of the
land, the action is imprescriptible. Appellant's argument that
the action has prescribed would be correct if they were in
possession as the action to quiet title would then be an action
for recovery of real property which must be brought within
the statutory period of limitation governing such actions.

Donasco, who had made partial payments and improvements

upon the property, is entitled to bring suit to clear his title
against Pingol who refused to transfer title to him. It is not
necessary that Donasco should have an absolute title, an
equitable title being sufficient to clothe him with personality
to bring an action to quiet title.
Prescription cannot also be invoked against the Donascos
because an action to quiet title to property in ONEs
POSSESSION is imprescriptible.
If the action is brought by the one who is in possession of the
land, the action is imprescriptible; otherwise, it could
Husains in this case are the heirs of Teodoro Husain. Teodoro
Husain sold the land under dispute for 30 pesos to Serapio
Chichirita with the right to repurchase within 6 years.
Teodoro transferred his right to his sister, Graciana Husain.
Graciana paid the redemption price and later sold the land to
Elias Gallar for a cattle. Possession of the land, together with
the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title of Teodoro
Husain, was delivered on the same occasion to Gallar, who
since then has been in possession of the land. A couple of
years after, Gallar filed this suit in the Court of Instance of
Iloilo on October 10, 1960 to compel Hermenegilda and
Bonifacio Husain, as heirs of Teodoro Husain, to execute a
deed of conveyance in his favor so that he could get a
transfer certificate of title. He also asked for damages. The
Husains countered by saying that Graciana already paid the
redemption price thus their father had already reacquired

ISSUE: 1) W/N ownership was transferred to Gallar?

2) W/N the action has already prescribed?
1) YES, ownership has been transferred to Gallar. The right of
repurchase may be exercised only by the vendor in whom the
right is recognized by contract or by any person to whom the
right may have been transferred. Graciana Husain must,
therefore, be deemed to have acquired the land in her own
right, subject only to Teodoro Husain's right of redemption.
As the new owner she had a perfect right to dispose of the
land as she in fact did when she exchanged it for a cattle
with Gallar.

An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be
brought for the purpose of settling a boundary dispute
Eduardo Aviles, the predecessor of the petitioners is the
bother of defendant Camilo. They inherited their lands from
their parents and have agreed to subdivide the same amongst
themselves. The area alloted (sic) to Eduardo Aviles is 16,111
square meters more or less, to Anastacio Aviles is 16,214
square meters more or less, while the area alloted to
defendant Camilo Aviles is 14,470 square meters more or less.
Defendants land composed of the riceland portion of his land
is 13,290 square meters, the fishpond portion is 500 square
meters and the residential portion is 680 square meters, or a
total of 14,470 square meters.
The Petitioners claim that they are the owners of the fish
pond which they claim is within their area. Defendant Camilo
Aviles asserted a color of title over the northern portion of
the property with an area of approximately 1,200 square
meters by constructing a bamboo fence (thereon) and moving
the earthen dikes, thereby molesting and disturbing the
peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over said portion.
Petitioners say that the fences were created to unduly
encroach to their property but the defendant said that he
merely reconstructed the same.


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Petitioners brought an action to quiet title but were denied

thus this case.

stood. As a consequence, on 4 July 1991 Juan Esteban filed an

ejectment suit against petitioner Oblea.

ISSUE: W/N Petitioners filed the right action

MTC decided for Juan Esteban and ordered Oblea to vacate

and pay arrears. On appeal, RTC affirmed MTC.

No, Petitioners filed the wrong action. This is obviously a
boundary dispute and as such the action must fail.
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property
or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid
or effective but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said
title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to
quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being
cast upon a title to real property or any interest therein.
Petitioners fail to point out any any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding that could been a cloud
to their title. In fact, both plaintiffs and defendant admitted
the existence of the agreement of partition dated June 8,
1957 and in accordance therewith, a fixed area was allotted
to them and that the only controversy is whether these lands
were properly measured.
A special civil action for quieting of title is not the proper
remedy for settling a boundary dispute, and that petitioners
should have instituted an ejectment suit instead. An action
for forcible entry, whenever warranted by the period
prescribed in Rule 70, or for recovery of possession de facto,
also within the prescribed period, may be availed of by the
petitioners, in which proceeding the boundary dispute may be
fully threshed out.
The pendency of an action to quiet title in the RTC does
not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction to execute a final
judgment in a prior ejectment case.
The lot in issue was originally registered in the names of
Manuel Melencio, Pura Melencio, Wilfredo Wico and
Mariabelle Wico. But was subsequently re-registered in the
name of Ramon Melencio (son of deceased Manuel Melencio),
Pura Melencio and the Wicos via a deed of sale.
On 6 June 1958 subject lot was bought by private respondent
Juan S. Esteban from Mauricio Ramos who claimed to have
acquired the property from Ursula Melencio, the alleged
administratrix of the estate of Manuel and Pura Melencio.
Meanwhile, petitioner Romeo V. Oblea
located on the subject lot from a certain
alleged son of private respondent Juan
eventually bought from Marius the lot on

leased a building
Marius Esteban, an
S. Esteban. Oblea
which the building

On 3 June 1993, the registered owners (Ramon Melencio, Pura

Melencio and Wilfredo Wico and Mariabelle Wico) sold the
disputed lot to petitioner Oblea. Afterwards, Oblea together
with the registered owners filed before the RTC an action for
quieting of title against Juan Esteban. They contended that
the deeds of sale executed by Mauricio Ramos in favor of
Juan Esteban and by Ursula Melencio in favor of Mauricio
Ramos were a nullity.
Meanwhile, the ejectment case was appealed thrice to the CA
but all were denied.
In the appeal to the SC, Oblea asserts that the subsequent
sale to him by the registered owners is a supervening event
that gave him a better right of possession and ownership.
Hence the judgment of eviction can no longer be enforced.
ISSUE: W/N a subsequent action to quiet title in the RTC
divests the MTC of its jurisdiction over an ejectment case?
No.The sole issue in an action for unlawful detainer is
physical or material possession, i.e., possession de facto and
not possession de jure. The pendency of an action for
quieting of title before the RTC does not divest the MTC of its
jurisdiction to proceed with the ejectment case over the
same property. The subsequent acquisition of ownership by
petitioners is not a supervening event that will bar the
execution of the judgment in said unlawful detainer case, the
fact remaining that when judgment was rendered by the MTC
in the ejectment case, petitioner Oblea was a mere possessor
of the subject lot.
Similarly, the fact that petitioners instituted a separate
action for quieting of title is not a valid reason for defeating
the execution of the summary remedy of ejectment. On the
contrary., it bolsters the conclusion that the eviction case did
not deal with the issue of ownership which was precisely the
subject matter of the action for quieting of title before the
RTC. With the finality of the decision in the ejectment case,
execution in favor of the prevailing party has become a
matter of right; its implementation mandatory. It cannot be
Issues of property rights can be determined in an action
to quiet title.
Paicat Gapacan is the primitive possessor of an unregistered
land in Mt. Province, divided into 3 parcels of riceland and
another planted to camote and declared by him for taxation
purposes. He had two children Maria and Antonio. Antonio
left for a long while to try his luck in the mines Benguet.
Maria remained, took care of their father and eventually took
over the cultivation of the land.


Antonio Gapacan returned to and executed an Affidavit of
Transfer of Real Property showing that the property had been
transferred to him by his sister Maria Gapacan-Omipet
(Omipet) making him in effect the legal owner of the
property in question. Since then, Antonio Gapacans family
(Gapacans) had been occupying and cultivating the property.
Sometime in 1992, Omipet hired laborers to clear and
cultivate portions of the disputed property. Gapacans
prohibited them Gapacans and ordered the defendants to
vacate the land and restore possession to plaintiffs.
Omipet then filed an action to quiet title in RTC and that she
be declared the lawful owner. RTC adjudged that Gapacans
have right of possession over the land. On appeal CA,
declared that the land is common property of both Omipet
and Gapacans and ordered its partition.
Both parties appealed. Gapacans alleged that CA
cannot declare that the land is common property since it
deviates from the cause of action in the trial court. Omipets
appeal is mostly factual.
ISSUE: W/N property rights can be decided in an action to
quiet title?
HELD: Yes.
Art. 476 of the Civil Code provides that an action to quiet
title may be brought when there exists a cloud on the title to
a real property or any interest therein. In the case of Bautista
v. Exconde, we held that the property owner whose property
rights were being disturbed may ask a competent court for a
proper determination of the respective rights of the partyclaimants, not only to place things in their proper place, that
is, to require the one who has no right to refrain from acts
injurious to the peaceful enjoyment of the property not only
of the rightful owner but also for the benefit of both with the
view of dissipating any cloud of doubt over the property. It
goes without saying therefore that the appellate court in
resolving the present controversy is well within its authority
to adjudicate on the respective rights of the parties, that is,
to pass upon the ownership of the property; hence to declare
the same as common property.
As to Omipets appeal, SC merely affirmed the findings of the
trial court that she did not present sufficient evidence to
overcome Gapacans better right to possession. SC ultimately
ruled that CA was correct in its determination that the land
in dispute is common property and should be partitioned.
11. ROBLES v. CA
It is essential to have a legal or equitable title to or
interest in the subject matter of the action for title
quieting; ICERP must be shown to be in fact invalid despite
apparent validity
Petitioners (all surnamed Robles) trace their ownership of a
parcel of land (9,985 sq m.) to Leon and Silvino, their
grandfather and father, respectively. Upon Silvinos death in
1942, said petitioners inherited the property and started
cultivation thereof. Hilario Robles, private respondent and

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half-brother of the petitioners, was entrusted with the
payment of land taxes due on the property. In 1962, Hilario
caused both the cancellation of the tax declaration covering
the property and its transfer to Ballane (his father-in-law).
Ballane mortgaged the property and, for some reason, the tax
declaration thereon was subsequently named to Hilario. The
latter then mortgaged the property to private respondent
Rural Bank of Cardona. The mortgage was foreclosed and said
bank acquired by public bidding the property which was then
sold by it to the spouses Santos. Petitioners learned of the
mortgage only in 1987. Subsequently, the action was filed,
impleading also as parties-defendant the Director of Lands
and the District Land Officer sue to an issuance of a free
patent in favour of spouses Santos. Trial court ruled in favour
of petitioners, declaring null the patent, declaring the heirs
of Silvino absolute owners of the subject land. CA reversed on
the ground that petitioners no longer had title to the
(1) whether petitioners have the appropriate title
essential to an action for quieting of title (relevant
issue) and whether title claimed by respondents is
(2) whether REM between Hilario and RBC is valid
(3) whether issuance of free patent is valid
(1) Petitioners have valid title by virtue of their
continued and open occupation and possession as
owners of the subject property.
In this case, the cloud on petitioners title
emanate from the apparent validity of the free
patent issued and the tax declarations and other
evidence in favour of respondents ultimately leading
to the transfer of the property to spouses Santos.
WRT title of the spouses Santos, such is deemed
invalid/inoperative insofar as it is rooted in the title
and appropriation of Hilario. Hilario could not have
prejudiced the rights of his co-heirs as co-owners of
the real estate. He must have first repudiated the
ownership clearly and evidently. CA failed to
consider the irregularities in the transactions
involving the property. No instrument/deed of
conveyance was presented to show any transaction
between petitioners and Ballane or even Hilario.
(2) Mortgage was only valid insofar as Hilarios
undivided interest is concerned there being coownership between the heirs. Court also delved into
gross negligence which amounted to bad faith on
part of bank by not exercising due diligence in
verifying the ownership of the land considering such
was unregistered.
Free patent was also not valid, the land in question having
been converted ipso jure to private land by virtue of the
adverse possession in the concept of owners since


(3) 1916 by the petitioners. Issuance of patents covering
private lands is out of the jurisdiction of the Director
of Lands or Bureau of Lands.
Hence, the sale of the property in favour of the spouses
Santos WRT the share of Hiario was valid but the patent
issued was null.
A cloud on a title is defined as a semblance of title which
appears in some legal form but which is in fact unfounded.
Where a title was previously held null and void already, an
action to quiet title is not the proper remedy because the
TCT (as basis of the right) is not, on its face or otherwise,
valid in the first place.
Spouses Raul and Cristina Acampado obtained loans from
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company in the amounts of 5k
and 2k. As security for the payment, Spouses Acampados
executed in favor of the bank a Real Estate Mortgage over a
parcel of land registered in their names.
Subsequently a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the
TCT of the spouses was filed by Sy Tan Se in the RTC of

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Petition for relief (what the CA recommended) was not
available to the bank since it was never a party to the civil
An action for quieting of the title was also not available to
the bank. An action for quieting of title is filed only when
there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest
therein. A cloud on a title is defined as a semblance of title
which appears in some legal form but which is in fact
unfounded. The subject judgment cannot be considered as a
cloud on petitioners title or interest over the real property
covered by TCT, which does not even have a semblance of
being a title.
It would not be proper to consider the subject judgment as a
cloud that would warrant the filing of an action to quiet title
because to do so would require the court hearing the action
to modife or interfere with the judgment of another co-equal
court. Well-entrenched in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that
our court has no power to do so, as that action may lead to
confusion and seriously hinder the administration of justice.
Clearly, an action for quieting of title is not an appropriate
remedy in this case.
Bank cant also intervene to a case that he has no knowledge

Despite being the mortgagee of the real property, the bank

was not made a party to the said civil case(complaint for
declaration of nullity of TCT.) They werent notified as well.

2. The judgment of the trial court should also be declared

null and void because the bank, which is an indispensable
party, was not impleaded in the civil case.

The spouses defaulted in the payment of their loan and

extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings were initiated. The
bank submitted the highest and winning bid. A certificate of
sale was issued in their favor.

The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent

actuations of the court null and void, for want of authority to
act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those

When they were about to get their TCT from the Register of
Deeds, petitioner was informed of the existence of the
decision in the aforementioned civil case (complaint for
declaration of nullity of TCT) declaring the Spouses
Acampadoss TCT null and void.


The bank filed with the CA a petition for the annulment of

the RTC Decision
CA dismissed their petition and ruled that the bank should
have filed a petition for relief from judgment or an action for
quieting of title
1. w/n a petition for annulment of judgment is the
proper remedy available to the bank
2. w/n the judgment of the trial court (declaring the
Spouses Acampados TCT null and void) should be declared
null and void
HELD Both Yes
1. Petition for annulment of judgment was the proper remedy
available to the bank. It precisely alleged that Sy Tan Se
purposely concealed the case by excluding petitioner as a
defendant to the civil case even if he was an indispensable
party. This deprived the bank of its duly registered property
right without due process of the law. The allegation of
extrinsic fraud may be the basis for annulling a judgment.

If a person claiming to be the owner of a wrongfully registered

parcel of land is in actual possession, then his right to seek
reconveyance does not prescribea.
Petitioners Horacio and Felisa Benito, originally, bought the
land from Francisco Morales and instituted ejectment
proceedings against all of the other squatters in the land.
Respondent, Agapita Saquitan-Ruiz bought a portion of the
land from petitioner on a promise to contribute Php 6000 for
the ejectment proceedings which will serve as the
consideration for the sale. On 17 April 1979, a Deed of
Absolute Sale was issued in favor of respondent, however, he
failed to pay his obligation of Php 6000. Thus, the petitioner
never caused the issuance of the certificate of title despite
demands of the respondent for such issuance. Instead,
petitioner subdivided the lot where respondents land was
located into five while the latter continued to possess such
land. Petitioners, then borrowed Php75,000 from a certain
Basilia Dela Cruz, who later sued them for collection. For
failure to pay the borrowed money, a writ of execution was
issued by the RTC and the disputed petitioners land was sold
to Dela Cruz at a public auction, in which the latter was the
highest bidder. On 25 March 1996, the assailed Certificate of
Title was issued to Dela Cruz but it was only on 27 May 1999


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that the Certificate of Final Deed of Sale was issued. On 1

April 1999, respondent filed the case for specific performance
with declaration of nullity of titles and damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not an act of God (fortuitous event)

exempts from liability parties who would otherwise be due to

ISSUE/S:Whether or not petitioners action to quiet title had

already prescribed?

Art. 1723 dictates that the engineer/architect and contractor
are liable for damages should the building collapse within 15
years from completion.

The respondent is in possession of the disputed property. If a
person claiming to be the owner of a wrongfully registered
parcel of land is in actual possession, the right to seek
reconveyance does not prescribe. A petition for the quieting
of title, although essentially an action for reconveyance,
should not be dismissed on the ground of prescription, if it is
alleged that the plaintiff is in possession of the property.
Furthermore, the action was seasonably filed since Dela
Cruzs right to its conveyance and possession was subject to
the 12-month redemption perion provided under section 33 of
rule 39 of the Rules of court. In this case, only a month had
To be exempt from liability due to an act of God, the
engineer/architect/contractor must not have been
negligent in the construction of the building.
Private respondents Philippine Bar Association (PBA) a nonprofit organization formed under the corporation law decided
to put up a building in Intramuros, Manila. Hired to plan the
specifications of the building were Juan Nakpil & Sons, while
United Construction was hired to construct it. The proposal
was approved by the Board of Directors and signed by the
President, Ramon Ozaeta. The building was completed in

Art. 1174 of the NCC, however, states that no person shall be

responsible for events, which could not be foreseen. But to
be exempt from liability due to an act of God, the ff must
1) cause of breach must be independent of the will of the
2) event must be unforeseeable or unavoidable
3) event must be such that it would render it impossible
for the debtor to fulfill the obligation
4) debtor must be free from any participation or
aggravation of the industry to the creditor.
In the case at bar, although the damage was ultimately
caused by the earthquake which was an act of God, the
defects in the construction, as well as the deviations in the
specifications and plans aggravated the damage, and lessened
the preventive measures that the building would otherwise
have had.

In 1968, there was an unusually strong earthquake which

caused the building heavy damage, which led the building to
tilt forward, leading the tenants to vacate the premises.
United Construction took remedial measures to sustain the
PBA filed a suit for damages against United Construction, but
United Construction subsequently filed a suit against Nakpil
and Sons, alleging defects in the plans and specifications.
Technical Issues in the case were referred to Mr. Hizon, as a
court appointed Commissioner. PBA moved for the demolition
of the building, but was opposed. PBA eventually paid for the
demolition after the building suffered more damages in 1970
due to previous earthquakes. The Commissioner found that
there were deviations in the specifications and plans, as well
as defects in the construction of the building.