You are on page 1of 19

DAOANG vs.

HONORABLE MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF ILOCOS NORTE
FACTS:
On March 3, 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with
the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the minors
Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. The petition was set for hearing on April 24,
1971 and notices were served upon the Office of the Solicitor General and ordered
published in the Ilocos Times, a weekly newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
On April 22, 1971, the petitioners, minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang
assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, filed an opposition to the petition for
adoption, claiming that the respondents had legitimate daughter named Estrella
Agonoy, the oppositor’s mother and therefore, the respondents were disqualified to
adopt under paragraph (1) Article 335 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Were the respondents spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos Agonoy
disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1) Article 335 of the Civil Code?
DECISION:
The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code in
enumerating the persons who cannot adopt are clear and unambiguous. The
children mentioned therein have clearly defined meaning in law and it does not
include grandchildren. Rule of statutory construction states that a state which is
clear and unambiguous in its face need not be interpreted. Article 174 of the Civil
Code of Spain disqualified persons who have legitimate or legitimated descendants
from adopting. Under this article, the respondent spouses would have been
disqualified to adopt as they have legitimate grandchildren, but when the Civil Code
of the Philippines adopted the word descendants was change to “children” in
paragraph (1) of Article 335. Under the law now in force, having legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, is no longer
a ground for disqualification to adopt.
Wherefore, the petition is denied. The judgment of the Municipal Court of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte in spee. Proclamation No. 37 is affirmed. Without
pronouncement as to costs in this instance.

the child and welfare code provides that a petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. and being dissatisfied with the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals. Luz Salamento of the Department of Social Welfare and Development were taken and admitted in the proceedings. the petitioner seeks for the reversal thereof in the present petition for review on certiorari. The private respondent had the right to file a petition for adoption for her without joining her husband. 603. Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions thereof. subject to the qualification that such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested on acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. The court issued an order dated February 15.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat before the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: On February 2. . the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. 1988 setting the petition for hearing on March 28. ISSUE: Does the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Family Code cannot be applied retroactively to the petition filed by the private respondent? DECISION: Presidential Decree No. 1988. 1988. the testimonies of the private respondent together with that of her husband and one Ma. Upon the compliance of jurisdictional requirements having been proved at the hearing. the trial court rendered judgment granting the petition for adoption. On March 20. 1988. Subsequently.

” The occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. offering their services to the public. “common carriers are persons. its driver. was engaged in buying up used bottles and scrap metal in Pangasinan. corporations. firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both. by land. and are not held liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are investable. his helper and the cargo. 1977 is affirmed. a merchant and authorized dealer of General Milk Company (Philippines) Incorporation in Urdaneta. On January 6. It is necessary to recall that even common carriers are not made absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of transport of goods. Pangasinan.PEDRO DE GUZMAN vs. the petition for review on certiorari is hereby denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 3. 1970. Court of Appeals reached into a decision that private respondent Cendana is not liable for the value of the undelivered merchandise which was lost because of an event entirely beyond private respondent’s control. provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous standard of extraordinary diligence. the 600 boxes carried on the truck were hijacked by armed men who took with them the truck. a junk dealer. 1971. As a result. water. Along the McArthur highway. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO CENDANA FACTS: Respondent Ernesto Cendana. contracted with respondent for the hauling of 750 cartons of milk. On December 1. Accordingly. be properly characterized as a common carrier? DECISION: Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code. or air for compensation. petitioner Pedro de Guzman. the respondent loaded only 150 cartons on to his trucks while 600 cartons were loaded to other truck which was driven by respondent’s driver and employee. . petitioner commenced action against private respondent ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent Ernesto Cendana may under the facts set forth. Sometime in November 1970.

as it apparently so did. about 9 o’clock in the evening. can be a valid and reviewable question of law? (2) Whether or not PKS Shipping has exercised the proper diligence demanded for common carriers? DECISION: . vs. Philamgen interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. in which case the ship owner was not liable or through the negligence of the captain and crew of the vessel and that. On December 22.PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE CO. Philamgen sought reimbursement from PKS Shipping of the sum paid to DUMC but the respondent refused to pay prompting petitioner to file suit with the Makati RTC. 000 bags of cement. the appellate court found that the loss of the goods was sufficiently established as having been due to fortuitous event.00. the vessel with all her equipment and earned freightage. Moreover. PKS SHIPPING COMPANY FACTS: Davao Union Marketing Company (DUMC) contracted the services of respondent PKS Shipping Company for the shipment to Tacloban City of 75. The RTC dismissed the complaint after finding that the total loss of the cargo could have been caused either by a fortuitous event. Limar I sank a couple of miles off the coast of Dumagasa Point in Zambaonga del Sur. negating any liability on the part of PKS Shipping to the shipper. under Article 587 of the Code of Commerce adopting the “Limited Liability Rule. The goods were loaded aboard the dumb barge Limar I belonging to respondent. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not a carrier is a private or common on the basis of the facts found by a trial court or the appellate court.” the ship owner could free itself of liability by abandoning. 1988. 375. 000 bags of cement worth P3. 000. DUMC insured the goods for its full value with petitioner Philippine American General Insurance Company. bringing down with it the entire cargo of 75.

The regularity of its activities in this area indicates more than just a casual activity on its part. or other natural disaster or calamity. (3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods. the person or corporation providing such service could very well be just a private carrier. notwithstanding. and (5) Order or act of competent public authority. whether international or civil. undertaking to carry such goods for a fee. by land. The Appellate Court ruled that there was no way by which the barge or the tugboats crew could have prevented the sinking of Limar I. although involving the carriage of goods for a fee. Neither can the concepts of a common carrier change merely because individual contracts are executed or entered into with patrons of the carrier. storm. defines “common carriers are persons. under Article 1732 of the Civil Code. earthquake. and the carrier does not hold itself out to carry the goods for the general public or to a limited clientele. although for a limited clientele. corporations. PKS Shipping has engaged itself in the business of carrying goods for others. such that if the undertaking is an isolated transaction. common carriers are exempt from liability for loss. (4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers.5 knots resulting in the entry of water into the barge’s hatches. (2) Act of the public enemy in war. it requires common carriers to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods they carry. destruction or deterioration of the goods due to any of the following causes: (1) Flood. The vessel was suddenly tossed by waves of extraordinary height of 6 to 8 feet and buffeted by strong winds of 1.On the first issue. as cited in Article 1733 of the Civil Code. The provisions of Article 1733. offering their services to the public. The official Certificate of Inspection of the barge issued by the Philippine Coastguard and the Coastwise Load Line Certificate would attest to the seaworthiness of Limar I and should strengthen the factual findings of the appellate court. air for compensation. Such restrictive interpretation would make it easy for a common carrier to escape liability by the simple expedient of entering into those distinct agreements with clients. .” Much of the distinction between a “common or public carrier” and a “private or special carrier” lies in the character of the business. On the second issue. water. lightning. firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both. not a part of the business or occupation.

LOPEZ FACTS: On February 11. The Lower Court rendered a decision. any agreement to keep a thing or property undivided should be for a ten-year period only. they contended that the deeds of sale were null and void and hence. declaring valid the deed of absolute sales and ordered the defendants to allow the segregation of the sold portions Lot 465 by a licensed surveyor in order that the plaintiffs could obtain their respective certificates of title over their portions of said lot. Where the parties stipulate a definite period of in division which . The defendants appealed contending the decision of the lower court. Herein. more than twenty-one years later after the death of Lorenzo Lopez his heirs. had prescribed. And. Apparently. 1996. the Oliveras brothers and their wives filed a complaint for partition and damages in the court of First Instance. the counsel of the Oliveras brothers wrote the heirs of Lorenzo demanding to partition the property so that they could acquire their respective titles. unenforceable against them. co-ownership of an estate should not exceed the period of twenty (20) years. ISSUE: Whether or not the intrinsic validity of said deeds in so far as they pertain to sales of designated portions of an undivided. the vendees had been paying the real property taxes and had been in possession of their purchased properties which being planted to palay and peanuts and were segregated from the rest of Lot 4685 by dikes. The defendant’s answered. that the complaint did not state of action and that the cause or causes of action if any. co-owned property? DECISION: Under Article 494 and 1083 of the Civil Code. under the former article.OLIVERAS vs. the Lopezes did not answer since on December 15. Tomasa and Candido Lopez executed two deed of absolute sale in favor of brothers Melecio Oliveras and Pedro Oliveras with their spouses. 1996. On November 21. Since then.

the father of the deceased. although he failed to present the marriage contract due to destruction of the records. when Candido and his mother sold definite portions of lot 4685. TRINIDAD vs. which he left to his three children. Patricio Trinidad. He presented two witnesses who testified that a wedding occurred on May . plaintiff and petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance an action for partition of four parcels of land. 1978. they validly exercised dominion over them because. Prescription might have barred its filing under the general provision of Article 1144 (a) of the Civil Code. how may marriage and filiation be proven? DECISION: Article 267 of the Civil Code provides that. In this case. ISSUE: In the absence of a marriage contract. authentic document. however. considering the validity of the conveyances of portions of Lot 4685 in their favor and as subrogees of Candido Lopez. the Appellate Court reversed the ruling of the lower court on the ground that he was not able to present sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were legally married. In this case. they validly) sold definite portions of Lot 4685. he presented enough evidence to prove marriage and filiation. Hence. the Oliverases' action for partition was timely and properly filed. merely served to put a stamp of formality on Candido's otherwise accomplished act of terminating the co-ownership. are legally considered as subrogated to the rights of Candido over portions of Lot 4685 in their possession. claiming that he was the son of the deceased Inocentes Trinidad.exceeds the maximum allowed by law. said stipulation shall be void only as to the period beyond such maximum. The filing of the complaint for partition by the Oliverases who. Although the complaint was filed thirteen years from the execution of the deeds of sale. owned four parcels of land. The defendants Lourdes and Felix refused to give the demand of Arturio Trinidad which causes him to file a case. by operation of law. Article 494 specifically mandates that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: On August 10. final judgment or possession of status. the co-ownership had ceased. legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. “in the absence of a record of birth. The court rendered judgment in his favor. The action for partition has not prescribed. as vendees. The plaintiff filed a petition for review.

legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and .5. On July 15. private respondents brought an action for partition and accounting against the petitioners. the Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment in favor of private respondents. They had an older brother Gavino who died in 1935 predeceasing their parents. On appeal. authentic document. that the couple deported themselves as husband and wife after the marriage. Petitioners denied knowing the private respondents and alleged that their brother Gavino died single in their parent’s residence. 1973. In 1968. claiming that. Article 267 of the Civil Code provides that. 1942. they were entitled to the two-third share in the estate of their grandparents. that one of the witnesses attended his baptismal party and petitioner presented his baptismal certificate in which Inocentes and Felicidad was named as his father and mother. BALOGBOG vs. “in the absence of a record of birth. ISSUE: Are the respondents the legitimate children of Gavino and Catalina? DECISION: Yes. final judgment or possession of status. The petitioners filed a petition for review. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arzibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961. the Court of Appeals affirmed.

shot at their hogs and chickens and seriously threatened to shoot the said respondents if they did not leave their house and their lands.special laws. harmless and incapable of protecting themselves. COURT OF APPEALS. Province of Negros Oriental. the private respondents ran away and thus the petitioners got into the possession and control of the above-described land and refused to surrender the same despite repeated amicable request made upon them by the private respondents in order to avoid judicial litigation. evidence. 1952. private respondents filed a complaint for Recovery of Property in the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental. And so. through testimonial and they had their children by Gavino public as legitimate BINGCOY vs. That being ignorant. Municipality of Valencia. 1991. on May 31. the private respondents proved. . VICTORIANO AND AGUSTIN FACTS: That on or about the middle of July 1948. In this case. that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929 children. the trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondents because of sufficient evidence on record proving that ownership over the parcels of land was vested to them as prior possessors in good faith. Catalina testified that private respondents are her Balogbog and was recognized by Gavino’s family and by the children. petitioners attacked private respondents at their residence in Barrio Bongbong. On July 25.

Title V thereunder is denominated. adversely. 10 years actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land or interest in land. uninterruptedly continued for 10 years by occupancy. Maria Clemente. by introducing improvements thereon like abaca plants and coconut trees. have they acquired ownership over the parcels of land in question? DECISION: Appellees took possession of the parcels of land left by Juan Cumayao. as petitioners asseverate. 1974. shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and complete title. The petitioner charged Amado with bigamy. . title to land by prescription. descent. ISSUE: If appellees are not entitled to inherit from Juan Cumayao. After serving prison. Tolentino celebrated on July 31. peacefully. Petitioner sought to correct the name of surviving spouse to her name.Unable to agree with the decision of the trial court. 190. “Prescription. successional or inheritance rights. Amado continued to live with private respondent until his death on July 25. petitioners appealed therefrom to the Court of Appeals. Under Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. where the lower court dismissed the petition. Under Book III of the Civil Code of the Philippines. or for a period of 22 years. entitled “Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership” and notably.” Needless to say. His death certificate carried the name of his surviving spouse. declaring the same for taxation purposes and paying the corresponding realty taxes therefor. harvesting fruits thereof. 1943 was still subsisting. openly and in the concept of owners up to 1948. Act No. Maria Clemente at Paombong. Serafia G. in order to ripen into ownership. continuously. PARAS FACTS: On November 1. acquisitive prescription is in itself a mode of acquiring ownership over a parcel of land and does not require. Amado Tolentino contracted a second marriage with the petitioner. TOLENTINO vs. or otherwise. while his marriage to the petitioner. Bulacan. grants. 1948. Amado pleaded guilty and was sentenced to suffer the corresponding penalty. in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued.

the same would be transferred to the BA flight bound for Bombay. The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari. the second marriage that Amado contracted with private respondent was null and void from the beginning and no force and effect. Mr.The petitioner filed a case against the private respondent and the Local Civil Registrar. When Mahtani arrived in Bombay he discovered that his luggage was missing and that upon inquiry from the BA representatives. He asked Mr. he was told that the same might have been diverted to London. Tolentino the rightful surviving spouse of Amado Tolentino? DECISION: Yes. considering the Amado was convicted for bigamy. After waiting for 1 week. India. Mahtani decided to visit his relatives in Bombay. 1976 the court dismissed the case. BRITISH AIRWAYS vs. Before departure. Gumar to prepare his travel plans. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: On April 16. 1989. confident that upon reaching Hongkong. Under Article 35 of the Family Code. and upon arrival in Hongkong he had to take a connecting flight to Bombay on board BA. Gumar purchased a ticket from British Airways (BA). Mahtani checked in at PAL counter his two pieces of luggage containing his clothing and personal effects.Since BA had no direct flights from Manila to Bombay. the sentence furnishes the necessary proof of the marital status of petitioner and Amado. Mahtani had to take a flight to Hongkong via PAL. BA finally advised him to file a claim by accomplishing the "Property . ISSUE: Is Serafia G. On October 21.

BA is ordered to pay Mahtani P7. However. the law governing common carriers imposes an exacting standard. 1990 Mahtani filed his complaint for damages and attorney's fees against BA and Mr. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Article 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention However. . the objection must be made at the earliest opportunity. Gumar before the RTC alleging that the reason for the non-transfer of the luggage was due to the latter's late arrival in Hongkong. . Necessarily. Given the foregoing postulates. thus leaving hardly any time for the proper transfer of Mahtani's luggage to the BA aircraft bound for Bombay.” In the Philippines. Admittedly. without any objection. lest silence when there is opportunity to speak may operate as a waiver of objections. 000 for moral and exemplary damages and 20% for attorney’s fees and cost of the action. the inescapable conclusion is that BA had waived the defense of limited liability when it allowed Mahtani to testify as to the actual damages he incurred due to the misplacement of his luggage. namely: a contract to deliver a cargo or merchandise to its destination and a contract to transport passengers to their destination. in a contract of air carriage a declaration by the passenger of a higher value is needed to recover a greater amount. A business intended to serve the traveling public primarily. the latter has the right to object. The nature of an airline's contract of carriage partakes of two types. hence. Indeed. This decision was affirmed by Court of Appeals. on June 11. ISSUE: Whether or not the award of the damages was without basis since Mahtani failed to declare a higher valuation with respect to his luggage. The RTC rendered its decision in favor of Mahtani. it is a well-settled doctrine that where the proponent offers evidence deemed by counsel of the adverse party to be inadmissible for any reason. we have held that benefits of limited liability are subject to waiver such as when the air carrier failed to raise timely objections during the trial when questions and answers regarding the actual claims and damages sustained by the passenger were asked. such right is a mere privilege which can be waived. Neglect or malfeasance by the carrier's employees could predictably furnish bases for an action for damages. 000 for the value of the 2 suitcases$400 for the value of the contents of the luggageP50. it is imbued with public interest.Irregularity Report.

CENIZA vs. To compound matters for BA. an action in the Court of First Instance of Cebu for recovery of their title to Lots Nos. situated in Casuntingan. . not only to interpose a timely objection. 627-B and 627-C. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: On June 14. Cebu. but even conducted his own crossexamination as well.BA has precisely failed in this regard. the petitioners filed against private respondents. Mandaue. 1967. its counsel failed.

It ruled that the petitioner’s right of action had prescribed after the lapse of 20 years from the date of registration of the land on February 8. The petitioners have appealed to this Court by a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.” TEOTICO vs. the court reversed the decision of the trial court.The respondents answered. constituted a repudiation of the ownership for purposes of acquisitive prescription? DECISION: No. 1970. Article 1452 of the Civil Code states. alleged that the petitioner’s rights of action had already prescribed. The defendants appealed on October 28. their action for reconveyance was imprescriptible. as co-owners. the registration of the Lot No. hence. affixed her signature and acknowledged before . “no prescription sh In this case. 627 in the name of Vicente Dabon created a trust in favor of his co-owners Jose Ceniza and the latter’s heirs.” Paragraph 5 of Article 494 of the Civil Code provides. “if two or more persons agree to purchase property and common consent the legal title is taken in the name of one of them for the benefit of all. ISSUE: Does the registration of the title of the land in the name of one co-owner. On August 31. She executed a will written in Spanish.000. The petitioners replied that Vicente Dabon held the land in trust for them. the trial court rendered judgment for the petitioners. Except when Dabon’s heirs repudiated the co-ownership and made the repudiation known to the co-ownersll run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or coheirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. 1939 in Vicente Dabon’s name. 1976. ordering the private respondents to execute deeds of conveyance of the said lots in favor of the plaintiff. because a trust relation and co-ownership were proven to exist between the predecessors-in-interest of both petitioners and private respondents. a trust is created by force of law in favor of the others in proportion to the interest of each. DEL VAL FACTS: Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600.

Under the terms of the will. ISSUE: Whether or not defendant has right to intervene in this proceeding? HELD: It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding is that he must have an interest in the estate. executor or administrator because it did not appear therein any provision designating her as heir/ legatee in any portion of the estate. will or in the property to be affected by either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and be benefited by such as an heir or one who has a claim against it as creditor. threat. the law does not give her any right to succeed the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose and Francisca because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father and that relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents except only as expressly provided by law. Among the legacies made in the will was the P20. she is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter. Hence. Josefina was likewise instituted. Even if her allegations were true. Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will but was opposed by Ana del Val Chan. She could have acquired such right if she was a legal heir of the deceased but she is not under the CIVIL CODE. AGUILAR vs. the legitimate children of said spouses. claiming that she was an adopted child of Francisca (deceased sister of Maria) and an acknowledged natural child of Jose (deceased brother of Maria). 000 for Rene Teotico who was married to the testatrix’s niece. CA . defendant has no right to intervene because she has no such interest in the estate either as heir. that said will was not executed as required by law and that Maria as physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution and was executed under duress.Notary Public by her and the witnesses. Josefina Mortera. As a consequence. The usufruct of Maria’s interest in the Calvo Building were left to the said spouses and the ownership thereof was left in equal parts to her grandchildren. or influence of fear. as sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed by will. defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in the probate proceeding.

plaintiff and his counsel appealed while the defendant and his counsel did not appear. the proceeds should be divided equally and being a co-owner he was entitled to the use and enjoyment of the property. rendering judgment default by the defendant. the trial court found him and plaintiff to be co-owners of the house and lot in equal shares on the basis of their written agreement. 1979. On January 12. On April 23. . (b) the order of 26 April 1979 declaring him in default and authorizing plaintiff to present his evidence ex-parte. 1979. Defendant sought relief from the Court of Appeals praying that the following orders and decision of the trial court be set aside. The trial court also upheld the right of plaintiff as coowner to demand partition. The trial court likewise ordered defendant to vacate the property and pay plaintiff P1. free of rent. On the pre-trial date. They agreed on a written agreement that their interests in the house and lot should be equal. After the death of their father. the counsel for respondent he filed a motion to cancel pre-trial. On May 7. Upon the issues. the Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court of 26 April 1979 as well as the assailed judgment rendered by default.00 as rentals from January 1975 up to the date of decision plus interest from the time the action was filed. Consequently. the defendant’s counsel file an omnibus motion to reconsider the order of default and the trial court denied the motion and plaintiff presented his evidence. alleging that he had no objection to the sale as long as the best selling price could obtain. they purchased a house and lot in Paranaque and agreed that Virgilio would have 2/3 in the co-ownership while that of Senen was 1/3. It ruled that plaintiff has been deprived of his participation in the property by defendant’s continued enjoyment of the house and lot. (c) the default judgment of 26 July 1979.FACTS: The petitioner and the respondent were brothers. On April 20. petitioner demanded the respondent to vacate the house and the respondent refused to give the petitioner’s demand. 200. 1969. 1979. On July 26. 1979. On 16 October 1986. despite demands of rentals and continued maneuvers of defendants. The trial court held that this property should be sold to third person and the proceeds divided equally between the parties. to delay partition. (a) the order of 23 April 1970 denying defendants motion for postponement of the pre-trial set on 26 April 1979. 1979. the trial court denied the motion and directed that the pre-trial should be continued as scheduled. On October 28. petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the house and the respondent answered with counter claim. on April 26. 1979 the case was set for pre-trial. and (d) the order dated 22 October 1979 denying his omnibus motion for new trial. the trial court declared defendant as in default and ordered reception of plaintiff’s evidence ex parte.

This is resorted to (1) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of the property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of the co-owners. Article 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is essentially. the reason being that until a division is made. this Court upheld the order of the trial court directing the holding of a public sale of the properties owned in common pursuant to Article 498 of the Civil Code. and (b) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners. together with his co-participants joint ownership over the pro indiviso property. and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. In one case. being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without paying any compensation to petitioner. it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. Each co-owner of property held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be. the respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises. Under Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. as he may use the property owned in common long as it is in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in a manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-owners. in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same. However.ISSUE: Does the trial court correctly rendered the default judgment against respondent founding him and plaintiff to be co-owners of the house and lot in equal shares? DECISION: Yes. . allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others. Corollary to this rule.

private respondent went to court asking for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husband’s estate. Antonio. This was challenged by private respondent although the latter admitted during the hearing that all her children were born prior to Sofia’s death in 1967. In this case. the court declared private respondent’s ten children legitimated and thereupon instituted and declared them. Antonio married private respondent. her petition was granted. In a motion. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona. She alleged that the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs. After six years. she argued inter alia that private respondent’s children were illegitimate. the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her half brothers and sisters. in 1951. There being no opposition. petitioner decided to intervene. Antonio and Conchita had eleven children who were all born between the years 1951 and 1967. Antonio then died on March 8. in 1949. On March 30. Conchita Talag in Tokyo. at the time of the conception of the former. However. ANGELES FACTS: On February 7. While separated de facto from Sofia. for the second time. Thereafter. He then married private respondent Dr. Antonio and Sofia subsequently parted ways. namely herself.MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS vs. as the heirs of Antonio de Santos. Japan. Sofia died in Gautemala. Children born outside wedlock of parents who. were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other were natural. 1981 at the Capitol Medical Center. their ten surviving children. and petitioner. Dr. in Tagaytay City. along with petitioner and private respondent. 1941. On May 15. 1991. 1967. 1981. out of this union was born in 1942 petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. contending that since only natural children can be legitimized. USA. ISSUE: Whether or not children of the private respondent can be legitimated? DECISION: Article 269 of the Civil Code states that only natural children can be legitimated. On November 14. She filed the instant petition for certiorari. the marriage under question is considered void . HONORABLE ADORACIO G. secured a divorce decree against her in Nevada.

from the beginning because bigamous. consequently. patterned as it is after Spanish Civil Law. . enjoying the status. the term natural children by legal fiction was invented. Subsequently. Article 269 itself clearly limits the privilege of legitimation to natural children as defined thereunder. and natural children by legal fiction enjoy the rights of acknowledged natural children. clearly not to be confused with natural children as defined under Article 269 but by fiction of law to be equated with acknowledged natural children and. Our archaic law on family relations. frowns upon illegal relations such that the benefits of legitimation under Chapter 3 of Title VII do not extend nor were they intended to extend. thus giving rise to another category of illegitimate children. to natural children by legal fiction. contracted when a prior valid marriage was still subsisting. Natural children by legal fiction cannot be legitimized in this fashion. their parents were disqualified from marrying each other due to the impediment of a prior subsisting marriage. rights and obligations of the latter. It follows that the children begotten of such union cannot be considered natural children proper for at the time of their conception. Another point to be considered is that although natural children can be legitimized. this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that natural children by legal fiction can likewise be legitimized.