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REMEDIAL LAW CASES

CASE #1
G.R. No. 128734 September 14, 1999
ANGEL L. BOLEYLEY, petitioner, vs. HON. CLARENCE J.
VILLANUEVA, Presiding Judge, Branch 7, Regional Trial
Court, Baguio City, and ALBERT S. SURLA, respondents.

PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is a special civil action for
certiorari assailing the orders of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 7, Baguio City 1 that granted private respondent's
motion to dismiss the complaint below on the ground that
petitioner did not refer the action to the barangay lupon for
conciliation or settlement before filing the case in court, as
prescribed in the Revised Katarungan Pambarangay Law.
The facts are as follows:
On August 7, 1996, petitioner Angel L. Boleyley filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Baguio City, a complaint against
private respondent for collection of a sum of money, as
follows:
1.) The sum of P530,000.00 for actual damages;
2.) The sum of P50,000.00 for moral damages;
3.) The sum of P30,000.00 for exemplary damages;

4.) The sum of P30,000.00 as attorney's fees plus P1,000.00
per court hearing;
5.) The costs of suit. 2
On September 13, 1996, private respondent Albert S. Surla
filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that petitioner did not comply with the Revised
Katarungan Pambarangay Law requiring as a condition for
the filing of a complaint in court referral of the matter to the
barangay lupon chairman or the pangkat, for conciliation or
settlement. 3
On September 17, 1997, petitioner filed an opposition to
motion to dismiss on the ground that private respondent was
not a resident of Baguio City so that the dispute involving the
parties was not within the authority of the lupon to bring
together for conciliation or settlement. 4
On November 29, 1996, the trial court issued an order
dismissing the case for being premature, for not having been
referred to the barangay lupon. 5
On December 5, 1996, petitioner filed with the trial court a
motion for reconsideration on the ground that private
respondent could not invoke the Katarungan Pambarangay
Law because he was not a resident of Baguio City. 6
On February 17, 1997, the trial court resolved to deny the
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, notice of which
denial was received by petitioner on March 4, 1997. 7
Hence, this petition. 8
On July 9, 1997, the Court resolved to require the
respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days
from notice. 9

On August 26, 1997, private respondent filed his comment.
10

On November 10, 1997, petitioner filed a reply, 11 in
compliance with the resolution of September 29, 1997. 12
At issue is whether or not petitioner was bound to refer the
dispute to the barangay lupon or pangkat for conciliation or
settlement before he could file an action for collection with
the regional trial court. 13
We give due course to the petition.
It is a basic rule of procedure that "jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter of the action is determined by the
allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein. The jurisdiction of the court can not
be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer
or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the
defendant. 14
In the complaint filed by petitioner with the Regional Trial
Court, Baguio City, he stated that:
COMPLAINT
COMES NOW the plaintiff by his undersigned counsel and to
this Honorable Court respectfully alleges:
1.) That plaintiff is of legal age, married, Filipino and a
resident of No. 100 Imelda Village, Baguio City while
defendant is also of legal age, Filipino and with postal office
address at C-4 Ina Mansion, Kisad Road, Baguio City where
he may be served with summons and other legal processes;
15

From the above allegations, it is obvious that the parties do
not reside in the same city or municipality, and hence, the
dispute is excepted from the requirement of referral to the
barangay lupon or pangkat for conciliation or settlement prior
to filing with the court. 16
It is true that plaintiff's complaint should have alleged
defendant's place of actual residence, not his postal office
address. The allegation of defendant's actual residence
would have been ideal to determine venue, which is
plaintiff's choice of either his place of residence or that of the
defendant or any of the principal defendants. 17 "In
procedural law, however, specifically for purposes of venue it
has been held that the residence of a person is his personal,
actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or place
of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence
or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency, thus:
. . . We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides"
connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished
from "legal residence or domicile". The term "resides", like
the term "residing" or "residence" is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute
or rule in which it is employed. . . . In other words, "resides"
should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. . . . No
particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary
(Emphasis supplied). 18
Nevertheless, the complaint clearly implies that the parties
do not reside in the same city or municipality.

Rollo.. and proceed to the disposition of the case with all deliberate dispatch.nêt No costs.The venue of the action is not affected by the filing of defendant's (respondent's) motion to dismiss stating that he also resided in Baguio City. and April 28. dated November 20.. Villanueva. 1998.1âwphi1. pp. Consequently. Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago. . 1997. WHEREFORE. Baguio City. Davide. JJ. the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for certiorari and ANNULS the orders of the Regional Trial Court. 3483-R. the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. That is not decisive to determine the proper venue. concur. we rule that there is no need of prior referral of the dispute to the barangay lupon or pangkat in the absence of showing in the complaint itself that the parties reside in the same city or municipality. SO ORDERED. 23-28. Puno.. Footnotes 1 Presided over by Judge Clarence J. Jr. 2 Petition. The Court orders the trial court to forthwith deny private respondent's motion to dismiss. Branch 07. entitling petitioner to the relief prayed for. J. C. Annex "C". 19 In thus dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of cause of action or pre-maturity. in Civil Case No.

Inc. 20-21. 49-56. pp. 57. pp. N. Court of Appeals. by registered mail.R. 9 Rollo. 408 [f]. Benolirao.3 Petition. 22. p. pp. Rollo. 255 SCRA 133 [1996]. 5 Petition. Annex "F". Candido vs. 118328. Section 2. No. 6 Petition. Macapagal. San Miguel Corporation vs. Annex "B". 17 Rule 4. G. vs. 18 Bejer vs. No. pp. Rollo. Rollo. Annex "D". pp. 75 SCRA 124 [1977]. October 8. Court of Appeals. NLRC. 1997. Rollo. Rollo. Annex "E". 19 Sec. 7160. Court of Appeals. 11 Rollo.R. Rollo. G. 15 Annex "C". Sarmiento.. 29-32.A. A. pp. Annex "A". 1998. 7 Petition. 33-35. 10 Rollo. pp. supra. 13 Petition. vs. 14 Serdoncillo vs. 10-19 at p. pp. Agbayani vs. November 27. Citibank. 108961. 45. 58-60. R. 23-25. citing Dangwa Transportation Co. 1998. Belen. 13. 12 Rollo. p. . Petition. 8 Filed on April 8. 36-38. 4 Petition. 16 Bejer vs. 169 SCRA 566 [1989]. Rollo. p. 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 145 SCRA 635 [1986]. 221 SCRA 328 [1993].

000.CASE #2 G.00 for actual damages. a complaint against private respondent for collection of a sum of money.) The sum of P50. Presiding Judge. Baguio City 1 that granted private respondent's motion to dismiss the complaint below on the ground that petitioner did not refer the action to the barangay lupon for conciliation or settlement before filing the case in court.00 as attorney's fees plus P1. The facts are as follows: On August 7. Branch 7. 4. vs. and ALBERT S.00 per court hearing. 5.00 for exemplary damages.) The sum of P30.R. Baguio City. No. petitioner Angel L. PARDO. J. Regional Trial Court. CLARENCE J.000. 1999 ANGEL L. Baguio City. 3. SURLA. as prescribed in the Revised Katarungan Pambarangay Law. 1996. BOLEYLEY.000. 128734 September 14.) The costs of suit.000.) The sum of P30. 2.: The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari assailing the orders of the Regional Trial Court. as follows: 1. HON. Branch 7.00 for moral damages. respondents.) The sum of P530. VILLANUEVA.000. petitioner. Boleyley filed with the Regional Trial Court. 2 .

8 On July 9. 11 in compliance with the resolution of September 29. 1997. 1997. 1996. 6 On February 17. 3 On September 17. 4 On November 29.On September 13. 7 Hence. notice of which denial was received by petitioner on March 4. the trial court resolved to deny the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. the trial court issued an order dismissing the case for being premature. 1997. 9 On August 26. this petition. petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration on the ground that private respondent could not invoke the Katarungan Pambarangay Law because he was not a resident of Baguio City. for not having been referred to the barangay lupon. 12 . for conciliation or settlement. 1997. petitioner filed a reply. the Court resolved to require the respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from notice. Surla filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that petitioner did not comply with the Revised Katarungan Pambarangay Law requiring as a condition for the filing of a complaint in court referral of the matter to the barangay lupon chairman or the pangkat. 1996. private respondent filed his comment. private respondent Albert S. 1997. 1997. 5 On December 5. 1997. petitioner filed an opposition to motion to dismiss on the ground that private respondent was not a resident of Baguio City so that the dispute involving the parties was not within the authority of the lupon to bring together for conciliation or settlement. 10 On November 10. 1996.

and hence. 100 Imelda Village. Filipino and with postal office address at C-4 Ina Mansion. 14 In the complaint filed by petitioner with the Regional Trial Court. Baguio City while defendant is also of legal age. irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. 13 We give due course to the petition.) That plaintiff is of legal age. it is obvious that the parties do not reside in the same city or municipality. 16 . Baguio City where he may be served with summons and other legal processes. for otherwise. the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. Baguio City. 15 From the above allegations. It is a basic rule of procedure that "jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint. the dispute is excepted from the requirement of referral to the barangay lupon or pangkat for conciliation or settlement prior to filing with the court. he stated that: COMPLAINT COMES NOW the plaintiff by his undersigned counsel and to this Honorable Court respectfully alleges: 1. Filipino and a resident of No. Kisad Road. married.At issue is whether or not petitioner was bound to refer the dispute to the barangay lupon or pangkat for conciliation or settlement before he could file an action for collection with the regional trial court. The jurisdiction of the court can not be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss.

Consequently. The venue of the action is not affected by the filing of defendant's (respondent's) motion to dismiss stating that he also resided in Baguio City. which is plaintiff's choice of either his place of residence or that of the defendant or any of the principal defendants. .It is true that plaintiff's complaint should have alleged defendant's place of actual residence. 17 "In procedural law. like the term "residing" or "residence" is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. . which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. . . The term "resides". however. meaning. actual residence or place of abode. . . . specifically for purposes of venue it has been held that the residence of a person is his personal. the personal. . The allegation of defendant's actual residence would have been ideal to determine venue. No particular length of time of residence is required though. 18 Nevertheless. we rule that there is no need of prior referral . however. In other words. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode. the complaint clearly implies that the parties do not reside in the same city or municipality. We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile". the residence must be more than temporary (Emphasis supplied). actual or physical habitation of a person. not his postal office address. That is not decisive to determine the proper venue. thus: . "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense.

Rollo. 3 Petition. pp. SO ORDERED. the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for certiorari and ANNULS the orders of the Regional Trial Court. 3483-R. 2 Petition. Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago. and April 28. pp. Annex "D". 22. 4 Petition. Annex "E". in Civil Case No. Branch 07. Footnotes 1 Presided over by Judge Clarence J. Annex "F". No costs. The Court orders the trial court to forthwith deny private respondent's motion to dismiss. dated November 20. the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 6 Petition. Rollo. pp. pp. Annex "C". 20-21. 33-35. entitling petitioner to the relief prayed for. 36-38. 7 Petition. Rollo. 23-28. Rollo. 29-32. Villanueva. and proceed to the disposition of the case with all deliberate dispatch. J. Jr. Rollo. Davide. concur. WHEREFORE. 1998.of the dispute to the barangay lupon or pangkat in the absence of showing in the complaint itself that the parties reside in the same city or municipality. Rollo. 19 In thus dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of cause of action or pre-maturity. p.. C. JJ. pp. 1997.. Annex "A". Annex "B".. 5 Petition. . Puno. Baguio City.

NLRC. 255 SCRA 133 [1996]. No. . Macapagal. 10-19 at p. 45. 7160. Benolirao. 58-60. pp. Rollo. 16 Bejer vs. A. Citibank. 17 Rule 4. San Miguel Corporation vs. Belen. 169 SCRA 566 [1989]. November 27. Candido vs. 49-56. 145 SCRA 635 [1986].8 Filed on April 8. 1998. G. 1998. supra. 1997.R. R. pp. Court of Appeals. 221 SCRA 328 [1993]. N. Court of Appeals. 75 SCRA 124 [1977]. Court of Appeals. 11 Rollo. 12 Rollo. pp. Agbayani vs. 23-25. p. p. by registered mail. Inc. 57. No. Sarmiento. 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petition. 19 Sec. 408 [f]. vs. October 8.A. 18 Bejer vs. Section 2. 15 Annex "C". Rollo. pp. citing Dangwa Transportation Co.. 13 Petition. 14 Serdoncillo vs. vs. 118328. 108961. 10 Rollo.R. 9 Rollo. G. 13.

and GRACE CU. The term of the lease is one year or up to February 1. 1986. 1983. petitioner.CASE # 3 G. Jr. Arthur D. 3 The antecedent facts are set forth in the challenged decision of the public respondent Court of Appeals as follows: It appears from the records that on February 1. Felisa Chan and Grace Cu entered into a contract of lease whereby the latter will occupy for residential purposes Room 401 and the roof top of Room 442 of a building owned by the former located at Elcano corner Urbistondo. HON. 109020 March 3. 1984 at a monthly rental of P2. SP No. 28870 1 which reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case No. it was agreed that the premises shall be used as a learning center. Said contract of lease was renewed every year for two successive years or up to February 1. No.R. 91-55879. 1986. Nicolas V.400. JR. vs. Manila. 2 The RTC had affirmed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila in civil Case No.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. After February 1. COURT OF APPEALS. 1994 FELISA CHAN.00. 131203-CV. DAVIDE. Lim Law Office for petitioner.R. for private respondent.. Benedicto. respondents. In the contracts. J. there .

without justifiable cause. At this juncture. So Grace's lawyer tendered the payment in cash in the same amount of P3. Sometime in November. was merely tolerated. Grace refused to vacate the premises. 1990 to vacate the premises. contending that the lease. Felisa interposed in her answer a counterclaim for ejectment. while Felisa maintained that only Room 401 was leased and that the use of the roof top which. 131203 for consignation with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. 4 . being month to month.310. Thereafter. but Grace has continuously occupied the premises as a learning center. Because of the dispute between the parties. The latter refused to accept the check. Grace filed Civil Case No.484. Felisa did not collect the rental for December. the same will be deposited in court by way of consignation. Felisa allowed Grace to hold classes only up the March. Eventually.was no written contract of lease executed by the parties. In January. Grace insisted that she should be allowed to use the roof top of Room 442. Grace tendered to Felisa a check amounting to P3.56. Whereupon. giving Grace until January 1. it was increased to P3. The monthly rental was raised every year.80. 1990.310. 1989. alleging in her complaint that Felisa refused to accept. had expired but that despite demand. Branch 15. Felisa terminated the lease. the rentals for the premises in question. 1989. 1989.56. 1990. there was an exchange of communications between the parties. On January 15. according to her poses danger to the students. Felisa padlock the way to the roof top. with notice to Felisa that if she will not accept the payment.

Grace Cu maintained that the MTC should have fixed a longer period. Cu then went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for review 6 alleging therein that the RTC erred "in not fixing a longer period of extension of the lease" and "in extending the duration of the lease to 30 June 1992 but subverting its factual findings in justification of the extension as it concluded that the period was intended by the parties for a longer duration. 1992 upon the expiration of which.On 18 December 1990. SO ORDERED. petitioner [Grace Cu] is ordered to vacate the said premises. In its Decision of 27 March 1992. The court declares the consignation of rentals made by the petitioner to be valid and legal and hereby release[s] the petitioner from the obligation of paying the said rentals." In its challenged Decision of 20 January 1993. Manila is included in the lease. the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC. All the respective claims of the parties against each other for damages and attorney's fees are hereby dismissed. 2. 4. the MTC rendered its decision. The court declares that the roof top of the building at 442 Elcano corner Urbistondo Street. The court fixes the term of the lease over the subject premises until June 30. while Felisa Chan contended that the MTC erred in extending the term of the lease and in upholding the validity of the consignation. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the . judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. 5 Both parties appealed to the RTC of Manila. 3.

from respondent landlord's point of view. 1989. for a digression. So. Simply put. The court of Appeals held that Chan's refusal to accept the rental was justified. and that (2) the petitioner is a squatter or trespasser who has occupied the premises not only without any agreement with the respondent but against her will.decisions of the MTC and the RTC and dismissed the complaint for consignation for lack of merit. 8 (1) the petitioner may no longer be considered as lessee or debtor who may relieve herself of liability by tendering payment of the rentals and if refused. 1981. beyond March. respondent's refusal to accept petitioner['s] rental payments was with just cause and that. 9 On the issue of ejectment. the Court of Appeals made the following observations: Now. the Court of Appeals ruled that under Article 1256 of the Civil Code. this consignation may not come under the provisions of Article 1256 of the Civil Code cited above. as far as the respondent is concerned. the respondent [Chan] allowed the petitioner [Cu] to hold classes in the premises only until March. by consigning them in court. We cannot see our way clear why the MTC and the RTC passed upon the issue of ejectment raised in respondent's counterclaim and fixed the term of the . consignation may only be resorted to by a debtor if the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses without just cause to accept it. therefore. In dismissing the complaint for consignation. the respondent may not be compelled to accept such rental payments. It said: Thus. not a counterclaim. It likewise said that the MTC and the RTC erred in passing upon the issue of ejectment raised in Chan's counterclaim since an action for ejectment can only be initiated through a verified complaint. 7 Obviously.

This is basic. In a case of ejectment. etc. 1992. Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court. he may not be ousted therefrom because the owner does not need them for his own use. is not the proper proceedings to determine the relation between landlord and tenant.lease up to June 10. 12 she filed the instant petition wherein she . the landlord claims either that the lease has ended or been terminated or that the lessee has forfeited his right as such because of his failure to pay the rents as agreed upon or because he failed or refused to pay the new rentals fixed and demanded by the lessor. etc. and that the premises are destined solely for dwelling. We repeat that all these questions should be submitted and decided in a case of ejectment and cannot be decided in a case of consignation. or that the period of the lease has not yet expired. the period or life of the lease or tenancy. the said courts should not have fixed the terms of the lease. These questions should be decided in a case of ejectment or detainer like those two cases brought by Gonzales against two of the petitioners under the provisions of Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Gonzales [87 Phil. not counterclaim. in Ching Pue vs. exorbitant and illegal. Under Section 1. the right of the tenant to keep the premises against the will of landlord. 81] held: Consignation in court under article 1176 of the Civil Code. 10 Chan's motion to reconsider the decision 11 having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution of 23 February 1993. an action for ejectment can only be initiated through a verified complaint. or that if the rental law is applicable. The lessee in his turn may put up the defense that according to law. The supreme Court. This issue can only be decided in a case of ejectment filed pursuant to the said rule. the reasonableness of the rental. Thus. the rental demanded of him is unreasonable.

81) AS BASIS FOR NOT ACTING UPON THE COUNTERCLAIM FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER AND IN IMPLIEDLY DISMISSING THE SAME. (B) IN RELYING ON THE CASE OF CHING PUE VS. INSTEAD OF AVOID. IS FORCED TO LITIGATE ANEW AND/OR TO RE-COMMENCE UNLAWFUL DETAINER PROCEEDINGS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE CASE IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT (SECTION 4 (A). 2.alleges that: 1. RULE 45 OF THE RULES OF COURT). (C) IN RENDERING A DECISION WHICH PROMOTES. GONZALES (87 PHIL. (D) IN RENDERING A DECISION WHICH GAVE THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT UNWARRANTED BENEFITS BECAUSE SHE IS PRACTICALLY ALLOWED TO CONTINUE OCCUPYING PETITIONER'S PREMISES WHILE PETITIONER. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. WITH UTMOST RESPECT. COMMITTED AN ERROR: (A) IN HOLDING THAT THE COUNTERCLAIM FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER WAS IMPROPERLY INCLUDED IN THE COMPLAINT FOR CONSIGNATION. Chan contends that the Court of Appeals should have limited itself to the . 13 Chan maintains that the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to Cu's petition for review and in deciding upon issues which Cu never raised in her petition. WHOSE RIGHTS OVER THE PREMISES WERE UPHELD. A MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS.

In the instant case. The summary disposition of the complaint for consignation as determined by the trial court was not affected by the filing of the counterclaim since it is a counterclaim allowed under Section 1 of the Rule on Summary Procedure as it did not involve any question of ownership nor did it allege any claim in excess of P20. Chan also contends that the case of Ching Pue vs. hence. the counterclaim for unlawful detainer should not have been dismissed. which would be laborious and would encourage multiplicity of suits. Gonzales 14 is not applicable because in Ching Pue the consignation cases were filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila which did not have jurisdiction to pass upon the unlawful detainer cases that were properly cognizable by the Municipal Court. the Rules of Court do not prohibit such procedure.000. nor on the propriety of the counterclaim for ejectment. the consignation case was filed with the MTC which also has jurisdiction over the counterclaim for ejectment. The Court of Appeals should have ordered the ejectment of Cu not only because it found that her refusal to accept the payment was with just cause. She then concludes that what the Court of Appeals has impliedly suggested was for her to file a separate complaint for unlawful detainer. Chan submits that while it is true that her cause of action for unlawful detainer was incorporated in her answer to the complaint for consignation.matter of the extension of the lease period and not on the jurisdiction over the action or subject matter of the suit which was never raised. but also because when it promulgated its decision on 20 January 1993. the extended period (until .00. and in her case the MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction on the counterclaim for ejectment. thereby impliedly holding that Cu has no right to stay in the premises in question.

Cu cites Metals Engineering Resources Corp. As to the dismissal of the counterclaim for ejectment. 15 Cu claims that the Court of Appeals decided the case properly and in accord with applicable law and jurisprudence.30 June 1992) fixed by the trial court and the Regional Trial Court had already expired. vs. A new ejectment suit may last for years. . and that a compulsary counterclaim is auxiliary to the proceeding in the original suit and derives its jurisdictional support therefrom inasmuch as it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the complaint. Court of Appeals 16 which holds that where there is no claim against the counterclaimant. In her Reply to the Comment. 17 Chan maintains that the Court of Appeals should not have dismissed the counterclaim because such dismissal would deny her justice and give undue advantage to Cu. for the duration of which Chan would be precluded from increasing the rentals. In her Comment. the counterclaim is improper and should be dismissed. even beyond March 1995 which is the expiration date originally prayed for by Cu. then the compulsory counterclaim. being ancillary to the principal controversy. It follows that if the court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the main action of the case and dismisses the same. must likewise be dismissed since no jurisdiction remained for any grant of relief under the counterclaim. Chan further asserts that the Court of Appeals' decision gives Cu undue and unwarranted benefits since Cu was granted much more than what she prayed for in her complaint for consignation and Chan's counterclaim was dismissed. She set up the counterclaim for ejectment to avoid the effects of Section 4.

issues. (3) that previous notice of the consignation had been given to the person interested in the performance of the obligation (Art. both parties agree that the controlling case is Ponce de Leon vs. 311. The court believes that under the undisputed facts earlier narrated. 18 After deliberating on the allegations. "The debtor must show (1) that there was a debt due. 1177. and arguments raised by the parties in their pleadings." The Metals case is not applicable to this case because the issue therein was lack of jurisdiction by reason of non-payment of docket fees. petitioner has complied with all the requisites laid down in the said case. (4) that the amount due was placed at the disposal of the court and (5) that after the consignation had been made the person interested was notified thereof. or because several persons claimed to be entitled to receive the amount due (Art 1176. Syjuco Inc. both the MTC and the RTC ruled that the consignation was valid. Civil Code). The MTC specifically stated in its decision: On the validity of the consignation. (2) that the consignation of the obligation had been made because the creditor to whom tender of payment was made refused to accept it. As to the first. we find merit in the petition. 90 Phil. It must be stressed that the validity of the consignation and the propriety of the counterclaim for ejectment were not raised before the Court of Appeals. Cu filled a Rejoinder to the Reply.. Civil Code). 19 .Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which bars a counterclaim not set up and Section 2(A) of the Rules of Summary Procedure which states that a compulsory counterclaim "must be asserted in the answer. namely. or because he was absent or incapacitated. or be considered barred.

Cu did not. raise the issue on consignation in her petition for review in CA-G.The RTC explicitly affirmed the MTC on this issue. and no plain errors with respect thereto are discernible from the MTC and RTC decisions. accepted the said ruling. the Court of Appeals seriously erred when it dismissed the complaint for consignation on the ground that it has no merit. Since the validity of the consignation was not raised before it. therefore.R. save as the court. it must be emphasized that the parties have conceded its propriety and accepted the MTC's jurisdiction thereon. thus: 3. therefore. — No error which does not effect the jurisdiction over the subject matter will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors and properly argued in the brief. In her Position . and the length of the extension — all of which were provoked by and linked to the counterclaim for ejectment. Section 7. the same was valid and effective. 7. the consignation was relegated to the background and the parties heatedly tangled on the nagging issues on the duration of the lease after the expiration of the last written contract. With respect to the validity of the consignation. may notice plain errors not specified. and also clerical errors. Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Sec. 20 Chan filed no petition for the review of the RTC decision and had. the Court affirms the finding of the trial court that indeed plaintiff substantially complied with all the requirements of consignation and. at its option. Jurisdiction is not involved in the consignation case. Question that may be decided. SP No. for obvious reasons. As a matter of fact. the power of the court to extend the lease. As to the counterclaim for ejectment. 28870.

. an actor. As counterclaim to the counterclaim. provided all the parties can be brought before the court and the matter decided without prejudicing the rights of any party. It need not diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party. . 21 Cu admitted having filed an answer to the counterclaim and even a counterclaim to the counterclaim: In answer to the counterclaim. . the period of plaintiff's lease should be fixed for at least five years from February 1990 . in respect to the matter stated by him. plaintiff alleged . at one time and in one action. 23 A counterclaim is any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party.Paper for the Plaintiff filed with the MTC. her occupancy of the premises will be abruptly terminated. . the defendant becomes. 25 A counterclaim "is in itself a distinct and independent cause of action. wherein each is at the same time both a plaintiff and . that on the basis of justice and equity. 22 and assigned as one of the errors to be resolved by the court the following: 2. but may claim relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought by the opposing party's claim. She contends that it will be highly iniquitous that after undergoing so much expenses. so that when properly stated as such. . Whether or not the plaintiff may be ejected from the subject premises. 24 Counterclaims are designed to enable the disposition of a whole controversy of interested parties' conflicting claims. . plaintiff [Cu] asserted that the lease is not on a month-to-month basis but for as long as the premises is being used as a learning center. and there are two simultaneous actions pending between the same parties. .

the defendant is a plaintiff with respect to his counterclaim." 26 In short. Rule 6 of the Rules of Court provides that the answer may contain any counterclaim which a party may have against the opposing party provided that the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim and can. a counterclaim not set up shall be barred if it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Consequently. A counterclaim may be compulsary or permissive.a defendant . A counterclaim stands on the same footing and is to be tested by the same rules. We agreed with Chan that Ching Pue vs. . Section 8. the Court of Appeals erred when it held that Chan's cause of action for ejectment should not be set up in a counterclaim.. The ratio decidendi of the said case is that consignation is not proper where the refusal of the creditor to accept tender of payment is with just cause. . if the presence of third parties is essential for its adjudication. the lease contract between them. necessarily. Chan's counterclaim for ejectment is a compulsary counterclaim because it is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of Cu's complaint. as if it were an independent action. no counterclaim for ejectment could have been interposed therein. The former is that covered by Section 4 of Rule 9. Under Section 4 of Rule 9. Gonzales is inapplicable because in Ching Pue the consignation cases were filed with the Court of First Instance which did not have jurisdiction over ejectment cases. acquire jurisdiction of such parties. viz. One will search .

That period had expired six months before the Court of Appeals promulgated its challenged decision. 28870 . the duration of the extended term of the lease fixed in the decision of the MTC and affirmed by the RTC. already lapsed. No written contract was made thereafter.R. Chan informed Cu of the termination of the lease and gave her until 1 January 1990 to vacate the premises. The parties started with a written contract of lease with a term for one year from 1 February 1983 to 1 February 1984. the ejectment was set up as a counterclaim in the MTC which has jurisdiction over it and Cu joined that issue and the incidents thereto by her answer to the counterclaim and the counterclaim to the counterclaim. In November 1989. SP No. as petitioner in CA-G. the parties must be deemed bound by the extended term.. In the instant case. 28870. SP No. but Cu was allowed to occupy the premises at a monthly rental which was increased every year. This was renewed every year for two successive years. viz. Articles 1670 and 1687 of the Civil Code thus came into play: .therein in vain even for an obiter dictum which suggests that an action for ejection cannot be set up in a counterclaim. We hold that the MTC had the authority to extend the period of the lease. the term of the lease was extended to 30 June 1992. deemed to have agreed to the extension. nevertheless. The Court of Appeals therefore should have confined itself to the principal error raised in Cu's petition in CA-G. which has.R. Considering that Chan did not file any petition for the review of the RTC decision and was. or up to 1 February 1986. did not come to us on a petition for review to seek reversal of the decision therein and should thus be considered to have agreed to the dismissal of her consignation case. therefore. As fixed. and considering further that Cu.

If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor and unless a notice to the contrary by either party has previously been given. However. If the period for the lease has not been fixed. the courts may likewise determine a longer period after the lessee has been in possession for over six months. from month to month. it is understood that there is an implied new lease. not for the period of the original contract. even though a monthly rent is paid. SP No. if the rent is weekly. we find the extended term fixed by the MTC to be reasonable. and from day to day. and the Decisions of 27 March 1992 of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 28870 is hereby SET ASIDE. In the light of the special circumstances of this case. In case of daily rent. WHEREFORE. if it is monthly.R. 91-55879. Article 1687 grants the court the authority to fix the term of the lease depending on how the rentals are paid and on the length of the lessee's occupancy of the leased premises. If the rent is weekly.Art. 1687. it is understood to be from year to year. the courts may fix a longer term for the lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. the courts may also fix a longer period after the lessee has stayed in the place for over one month. the instant petition is GRANTED and the challenged Decision of 20 January 1993 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. if the rent is to be paid daily. and of 18 December 1990 of Branch 15 of the Metropolitan . xxx xxx xxx Art. but for the time established in Articles 1682 and 1687. from week to week. The other terms of the original contract shall be revived. if the rent agreed upon is annual. 1670. and no period for the lease has been set.

86-87. Id. 10 Rollo. 6 Annex "I" of Petition. 2 Annex "G" of Petition. JJ.. 131. Id. 118-119 (emphasis supplied).. 5-6. concurred in by Associate Justices Fidel P. Per Associate Justice Angelina S.. 9 Rollo. SO ORDERED. Costs against the private respondent. 11 Annex "K" of Petition. 7 Should be March 1990. Gutierrez. 5 MTC Decision. Bellosillo. .. 131203. 12 Annex "L" of Petition. concur.CV are REINSTATED. 4 Rollo. Cruz.. #Footnotes 1 Rollo.Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 114-120. 118. Quiason and Kapunan. Id. Rollo. 115-116.. 100-112.. 121-129. Id. 88-96. Purisima and Jesus M. Id. Elbinias. 82-87. 3 Annex "F" of Petition. 8 Id.

23 Id. 15 Rollo. 10-11.. 81 [1950]. 133-140. 95. 19 Id. Rollo. 144-148. 18 Rollo. . 86. 22 Rollo. FRANCISCO. 21 Annex "E" of Petition. 17 Rollo. 68-77. Rules of Court. THE REVISED RULES OF COURT IN THE PHILIPPINES 463 (2D ed. 71-72. 26 FRANCISCO. 73..13 Rollo. 14 87 Phil. op.. 24 Section 6. cit. 16 203 SCRA 273 [1991]. 20 Id.. 15-16. at 464. Petition. 151-154. Rule 6. 25 1 VICENTE J. 1973).

1967. 1973. . Consequently.. OFELIA. T19175 in favor of Trinidad Estonina covering all the rights..CASE #4 G.: The instant controversy involves Lot C of the amended plan Psu-22983 Amd.. MARILOU. 111547 January 27. and LOLITA all surnamed GARCIA. Some six years after Santiago Garcia's death. situated in Barrio Santisima Cruz.R. The said parcel of land was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. vs. No. T-19175 issued in the name of Santiago Garcia who died on October 2.. a notice of attachment was inscribed as a memorandum of encumbrance at the back of TCT No. ESTONINA and PAULINO ESTONINA. TRINIDAD S. CELSO ATAYAN and NILDA HICBAN and CONSUELO VDA. JR. or on March 10. J. REMEDIOS. COURT OF APPEALS SPS. 1997 SPS. and HEIRS OF CASTOR GARCIA and of SANTIAGO GARCIA. DE GARCIA. plaintiffs -versus-Consuelo Garcia et al. respondents. 88430 entitled "Trinidad Estonina et al. VIRGILIO. defendants". Sta. petitioners. Laguna with an area of 273 square meters. the then Court of First Instance of Manila issued an order granting Trinidad Estonina's application for a writ of preliminary attachment in Civil Case No. RESOLUTION FRANCISCO. Cruz. ELVIRA.

1 Subsequent to a favorable decision obtained by Trinidad Estonina in Civil Case No. may have in and to the parcel of land covered by the said title. Ofelia Garcia. T-19175 was cancelled and in lieu thereof. rights. transferring and conveying unto the spouses Celso Atayan and Nilda Hicban (hereinafter referred to as the spouses Atayan for brevity) their "title. likewise sold to the spouses Atayan. Remedios. 77215 was in turn cancelled on June 27. T-82229. Virgilio. and TCT No. Garcia. the widow of Santiago Garcia. 88430 against Consuelo Garcia. namely Ofelia. 1977 because of another sale purportedly made during his lifetime by Santiago Garcia to his wife's niece. On August 14. and their children. interest and participation which is four tenths (4/10) pro indiviso share" in the said parcel of land covered by TCT No. 1975 in the name of Santiago Garcia covering the remaining 213 square meters. Adela Isoreta. Santiago Garcia's second wife and widow. No. Elvira and Castor. and participation that Consuelo Garcia. (Santiago Garcia's son from his first marriage). 82229 was issued in the name of the latter. T-82229. executed a deed selling. the children of Santiago Garcia with his first wife. the widow of Santiago Garcia. 1980. Consuelo Garcia and their children. their one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. TCT. followed suit and also sold to the spouses Atayan. Marilou and Lolita. TCT No. all surnamed Garcia. On February 22. their four-tenths (4/10) pro indidviso share in the same parcel of land. . interest. Elizabeth. all surnamed Garcia. TCT No. 1977. Estrella R. 77215 was issued on July 25. As a result of a prior sale made by Santiago Garcia to Anselmo Balasoto of a sixty square meter portion of the said parcel of land. Dorothy and Erlinda.title. About a year after. Roderick. Jr.

T-99961 was issued in favor of "Trinidad Estonina married to Paulino Estonina". the Register of Deeds of Laguna. and the Sheriff's final deed . and the Register of . be declared null and void. . ruled in favor of Trinidad Estonina. T-82229) on July 20. T82229. Nicanor E. Thus. on February 29. . T-82229 a NULLITY and/or CANCELLED". the spouses Atayan filed a complaint for annulment of sheriff's sale and transfer certificate of title with damages before Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz. the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision declaring "owner's copy of Certificate of Title No. that the plaintiffs be declared owners of nine-tenths (9/10) pro indiviso interests. Javier. Silvano. . 88430 before the then Intermediate Appellate Court which. Upon the finality of the said decision. Reynaldo G. T-19175 (now covered by TCT No. T-99961 in the name of Trinidad S. 2 On July 25. 1979. Consuelo Garcia appealed the decision in Civil Case No. The complaint prayed: that the sale at public auction of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. . impleading as defendants therein the spouses Trinidad and Paulino Estonina (hereinafter referred to as the spouses Estonina for brevity). . . Edmund R.execution pending appeal was made on the parcel of land formerly covered by TCT No. . T-82229 was cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Laguna and in lieu thereof. shares and participation in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. . 1984. . TCT No. 1985. . however. Solidum. and the heirs of Santiago Garcia who sold to the spouses Atayan their pro indiviso shares in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. Estonina married to Paulino Estonina . that the Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel TCT No. Laguna. . T-77215. The said parcel of land was sold at a public auction where Trinidad Estonina was the highest bidder. TCT No. 77215 .

T-82229.000 for moral damages and P15.000 for attorney's fees. fictitious and simulated intended to defeat the adverse judgment rendered by the Court against them and the writ of attachment issued pursuant thereto as they were derived from a falsified deed of sale purportedly executed by Santiago Garcia on June 23.Deeds ordered to issue a new certificate of title corresponding thereto. Solidum be ordered to pay. 3 In their amended answer to the plaintiff's complaint. T-19175 and now covered by TCT No.000 for exemplary damages . the spouses Estonina claimed that: the plaintiffs (spouses Atayan) had acted in bad faith in allegedly purchasing the parcel of land. the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. 4 After trial. jointly and severally. and is presumed to be conjugal in nature. among others. 90-99. Upon the death of Santiago Garcia on . that the property covered by TCT No. and that the defendants Nicanor E.). P20. Reynaldo G. . Javier and Edmund R. that there was no valid extrajudicial settlement of agreement executed by the heirs of Santiago Garcia by which their rights could have been adjusted and settled before doing anything with his property. It found. that the property in question is presumed to be conjugal answerable for obligations and liabilities of the conjugal partnership incurred during the existence of the partnership. Silvano. and that the plaintiffs were guilty of laches (pp. was acquired during the marriage of Santiago Garcia and Consuelo Gaza. rec. P15. the plaintiffs spouses and (sic) amount of P30. . they being aware that it was the subject of a lawful and valid attachment.000 for litigation expenses incurred. 1967. that the deeds of sale executed by his heirs were anomalous.

By the law on intestate succession. inherited the same at one-tenth (1/10) each pro indiviso. the RTC ordered the Register of Deeds of the Province of Laguna. his conjugal share of one-half (l/2) of the said parcel of land was transmitted to his heirs by intestate succession. his second wife and widow. but was the former's exclusive property. Thus. 5 Finding as such. T-99961 in the name of TRINIDAD S. inasmuch as Consuelo Garcia inherited one-tenth (1/10) of her husband's conjugal share in the said property and is the owner of one-half (1/2) thereof as her conjugal share. Thus. his nine children. ESTONINA. married to the same person. the Court of Appeals concluded that contrary to the finding of the RTC. the RTC held that what could be attached by the spouses Estonina and later levied on execution and sold at public auction was only Consuelo Garcia's rights and interests which is fifty five per cent (55%) of the property. 1967. 6 Both the spouses Atayan and the heirs of Santiago Garcia appealed to the herein public respondent Court of Appeals. and Consuelo Garcia. married to Paulino Estonina. and issue another one.October 2. After a thorough review of the evidence on record. his nine children and Consuelo Garcia inherited the said property each to the extent of one- . When Santiago Garcia died. and the remaining 45% belongs to the heirs of Santiago Garcia pro indiviso. the parcel of land in question was not the conjugal property of Santiago and Consuelo Garcia. It was therefore the entire property that formed part of Santiago Garcia's estate upon his death. also in her name. The remaining one-half (1/2) pertained to the conjugal share of Consuelo Garcia. stating therein that said person is the owner of the property therein covered to the extent of 55% pro indiviso. she owns a total of 55% (or 1/10 plus 1/2) of the said parcel of land. to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. five by his first wife and four out of the subsequent marriage.

and spouses Celso Atayan and Nilda Hicban. the Court of Appeals rendered a decision. 7 Aggrieved.tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share. . the spouses Estonina filed this petition and raised the following issues: I. Transfer Certificate of Title No. On August 12. Hence. one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share. Accordingly. is hereby ordered cancelled and nullified and the Register of Deeds of Laguna ordered to issue another in lieu thereof covering the same parcel of land in the name of Trinidad S. . II. in issuing the questioned decision. Cruz. widow. married to Paulino Estonina . T-99961. 88430. situated in Sta. DISREGARDED the long established doctrine that the trial court's findings especially as to the credibility of the witnesses should be respected. . Estonina. and conveniently brushed aside the following legal issues raised . The Court of Appeals. solely centered on the nature of the property in question. Laguna issued in the name of Trinidad S. it was only Consuelo Garcia's one-tenth(l/l0) pro indiviso share in the parcel of land in question which could be validly attached. the judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE. The Court of Appeals. 1993. in declaring the property in question as exclusive property of Santiago Garcia. covering Lot 2-C (LRC) Psd 223486. levied and sold in execution to satisfy the judgment against her and in favor of Trinidad Estonina in Civil Case No. Estonina. nine-tenths (9/10) pro indiviso share.

arguendo that they have. the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is generally limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court. by virtue of the foregoing errors. one of which is when there is a conflict between the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial . the same is now barred by laches. the Court of Appeals erred in not granting herein petitioners' prayer that the trial court's findings be modified by upholding Estonina's title to the property under TCT No. and affirming in all other respect the order of the trial court. Atayan and now private respondents) have no cause of action and/or lack cause of action against Estoninas (now petitioners). Assuming. the title of Estonina should have been declared valid. III. Hence. Consequently. As such.on appeal (thereby leading to an erroneous judgment). 10 This is. 8 The settled rule is that the factual findings of the appellate court are deemed conclusive. 88430 where the writ of attachment was issued and which resulted in the execution pending appeal. they cannot attack the validity of the execution in this proceedings especially so when judgment therein had already attained finality. Hence. T-99961. The same is true with the appellants Garcias (now also private respondents). 9 Thus. however. Atayan and now private respondents) are not parties to Civil Case No. this Court is generally not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. to wit: (a) That the plaintiffs-appellant (Sps. subject to several exceptions. (b) That the plaintiffs-appellants (Sps.

Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. It . And as regards the inscription at the back of the TCT No. warranting a review by this Court of such factual findings. 12 the trial court held that "there is no showing at all from said inscription that said property came from the parents of Santiago Garcia. lead us to concur with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the property involved in this dispute is indeed the exclusive property of the deceased Santiago Garcia. thus giving rise to the presumption that the same was indeed conjugal. It found the testimony of Consuelo Garcia that the said property was inherited by Santiago Garcia from his deceased mother to be self-serving and completely disregarded the said testimony. the Court of Appeals in taking the stance that the said land was the exclusive property of Santiago Garcia." 13 On the other hand. the trial court relied solely on the fact that when TCT No. 11 In concluding that the parcel of land in question was the conjugal property of Santiago and Consuelo Garcia. in accordance with the provision of Section 4. 1961.court. as in this case. gave credence to the unrebutted testimony of Consuelo Garcia that the said parcel of land was inherited by Santiago Garcia from his deceased mother Eugenia Clemente and that it used to be part of a big tract of land which was divided among Santiago and his sisters. within two (2) years from January 27. T-19175 covering the said land was issued. T19175 that: [t]he property described in this title is subject to the claims of the heirs of the deceased Eugenia Clemente. The evidence on record as well as established jurisprudence on the matter. Santiago Garcia was already married to Consuelo Garcia.

upon which petitioner rests his claim in insufficient. the certificates of title show. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already erdsting . proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. suffices to establish the conjugal nature of the property. 14 In the case at bench. Santiago was already married to Consuelo as evidenced by the registration in the name of "Santiago Garcia married to Consuelo Gaza". which explains why he was described in the certificates of title as married to the latter. however. This. It may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete. The fact that the properties were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson. . In the case of Jocson v. Otherwise stated. .has been repeatedly held by this Court that the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code that all property of the marriage belong to the conjugal partnership applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Court of Appeals 15 we held that: The certificates of title. the petitioners have been unable to present any proof that the property in question was acquired during the marriage of Santiago and Consuelo. that the properties were exclusively Emilio . The foregoing contention has no merit. according to the spouses Estonina. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture. They anchor their claim solely on the fact that when the title over the land in question was issued. . on their face. Contrary to petitioner's position.

17. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court: Sec. 88430 was only the one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share of Consuelo Garcia in the said parcel of land. . belonging as it does to the other heirs of Santiago Garcia and later to the spouses Atayan. Proceedings where property claimed by third . it was the entire parcel of land in question that formed part of his estate and which passed to his ten heirs by compulsory succession upon his death. 16 Being the exclusive property of Santiago Garcia. 17 For. the same having been registered in his name alone. The levy by the sheriff of a property by virtue of a writ of attachment may be considered as made under the authority of the court only when the property levied upon belongs to the defendant. The sale at public auction of the disputed property in its entirety by the Sheriff in favor of Trinidad Estonina over and above the one-tenth (1/10) share of Consuelo Garcia is null and void. . In other words. 18 The right of a third-party claimant to file an independent action to vindicate his claim of ownership over the properties seized is reserved by Section 17. . and that he is married to Alejandra Poblete. what could therefore be attached and sold at public auction in Civil Case No. the registered owner. This is so because the words "married to" preceding "Alejandra Poblete" are merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson . And as correctly held by the Court of Appeals. one man's goods shall not be sold for another man's debts. the import from the certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties. Worth reiterating is the basic precept that the power of the court in the execution of judgments extends only over properties uncluestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. as the saying goes.Jocson's.

indemnify the officer against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater than the value of the property levied on. and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor. is and should be an entirely separate and distinct action from that in which execution has issued. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied. stating the grounds of his right or title. Discaya. In case of disagreement as to such value. if instituted by a stranger to the . 19 this "proper action" would have for its object the recovery of ownership or possession of the property seized by the sheriff.) As stated in the case of Sy v. the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. for the taking or the keeping of the property. and serve the same upon the officer making the levy. The officer is not liable for damages. — If property levied on be claimed by any other person than the judgment debtor or his agent. the officer shall not be bound to keep the property. as well as damages resulting from the allegedly wrongful seizure and detention thereof despite the third party claim and it may be brought against the sheriff and such other parties as may be alleged to have colluded with him in the supposedly wrongful execution proceedings. But nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property by any other proper action. as above pointed out. such as the judgment creditor himself. on demand of the officer.person. unless such judgment creditor or his agent. and such person make an affidavit of his title thereto or his right to the possession thereof. Such "proper action". to any third-party claimant unless a claim is made by the latter and unless an action for damages is brought by him against the officer within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond.

they cannot be faulted for filing the "proper action" only in 1985 or six (6) years after the levy on execution. suffice it to state that this residual argument deserves scant consideration. 88430. Being strangers to Civil Case No. acting beyond the bounds of his office seizes a stranger's property. 20 In the case at bench. But when the Sheriff. 21 While it is true that property in custody of the law may not be interfered with. this rule is confined to cases where the property belongs to the defendant or one in which the defendant has proprietary interests. Such an independent action cannot be considered as an encroachment upon the jurisdiction of a co-equal and coordinate court. The action filed by the spouses Atayan seeking the annulment of the sheriffs sale and the transfer certificate of title with damages immediately thereafter or on July 25.latter suit. the rule does not apply and interference with his custody is not interference with another court's custody. Anent the contention that the spouses Atayan are guilty of laches. Besides. 22 The foregoing puts to rest any and all questions raised regarding the propriety of the course of action taken by the spouses Atayan in vindication of their claim over the land in question. . without the permission of the proper court. it was only in 1984 that the Court of Appeals rendered a decision finally cancelling the title of their predecessors-in-interest and issuing another one in favor of Trinidad Estonina. the filing by the spouses Atayan of an independent action with the court other than the one which issued the writ of execution is proper as they were strangers to Civil Case No. 88430 where the writ of execution over the land in question was issued. 1985 cannot be considered as undue delay nor does it imply a lack of interest to enforce their claim over the disputed property.

4. 4 Ibid. 2 PETITION in G. 218 SCRA 708 [1993]. p. LPJ Enterprises. Bustamante vs. 1-3. Melo and Panganiban. Guinsatao vs.R. p. p. 28276. the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in toto. 197 SCRA 245 [1991]. p. p. p.J. pp.. concur. JJ. p. Davide. 8 Supra. 111547. Narvasa.R. Rollo.WHEREFORE. 5 Supra. 34. Inc. Rollo. 413 [1993]. Footnotes 1 DECISION in CA-G. CV No. pp.. 24-26. 11.. 220 SCRA 405. 9 Industrial Textile Manufacturing Company of the Philippines vs. Rollo. Rollo. 14-15. p. 3 Supra. Court of Appeals. Rollo. 10 Gaw vs. 11 Ibid. p. 193 SCRA 603 [1991]. 7 Ibid. 6. Intermediate Appellate Court. p. No. 29.. Rollo. 8-9. Rollo. 5. pp. 325 [1993]. 10. pp. . 217 SCRA 322. C. 6 Supra. Radiowealth Finance Company vs. Jr. 15. 28. Court of Appeals. Palileo. SO ORDERED. 38.

Hon. vs. . 16 Ibid. 13 Ibid. p. Court of Appeals. 10. vs. p. CobbPerez vs. 193 SCRA 158 [1991]. Ong vs. 384. ibid. 281. 14 Jocson vs. al. et. Tating. vs. Ong vs. 302 [1989]. 19 181 SCRA 378 [1990]. 20 SCRA 474 [1967]. p. 133 SCRA 141 [1984]. Court of Appeals. 191 SCRA 275. 204 SCRA 297. ibid.. 275.. Court of Appeals. Uy. Court of Appeals. 18 Ong vs. Maramba vs.12 Supra.. Rollo. 22 Uy Jr. Lozano. 23 SCRA 637 [1968]. 15 Ibid. Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. 17 Uy Jr. 170 SCRA 333. 21 Ibid. vs. 33. 345. p. 149 SCRA 265 [1987]. 344 [1989]. supra. 20 Ibid.. Traders Royal Bank vs. IAC. Gregoria Lantin. Tating. 383. Jr.. p. 281 [1990]. p. Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals.

Branch XCVI. Gil S. RTC. The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: Spouses Marciano and Segundina Bandoy herein . Rollo) of the Court of Appeals dated January 13. Hon. and Domingo Empaynado. SP. J.: This is an appeal by certiorari of the decision (pp. 1989 SPOUSES MARCIANO BANDOY and SEGUNDINA BANDOY. petitioners." which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Respondents.R. No. Petitioners.R. 27-31. HON. 77133 July 19. San Diego for petitioners. in his capacity as Presiding Judge. National Capital Region. 09391 entitled "Spouses Marciano and Segundina Bandoy. Quezon City. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DOMINGO P. Galima for private respondent. Benjamin G. vs. MEDIALDEA. 1987 in CA G. dismissing the herein petitioner's complaint for ejectment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction due to the lack of demand to pay rentals and to vacate the premises. Luis L. No.CASE #5 G. Branch XCVI. EMPAYNADO respondents. Victor.

herein private respondent. 1985. Petitioners brought the matter to the office of the barangay captain for settlement. After trial. On August 20. U. Rollo) was issued by the office of the barangay captain. but to no avail. Empaynado still failed and refused to pay. 1986 reads. XXXV48898. The decision. judgment was rendered in favor of the spouses.1985. The case was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila. Sometime in April 1984. petitioners sublet certain spaces of the property to Eduardo Empaynado. were lessees of a residential house and lot owned by the University of the Philippines and located at No. the court is of the view that a demand to vacate . At any rate. for a monthly rental of P550. Pook Amorsolo.petitioners. a certification to file action against Domingo Empaynado for ejectment and non-payment of house rentals including light and water (Annex "A" to the petition. Quezon City.P. In his answer. Empaynado admitted that he did not pay the rentals since July 1985 but denied that there was a demand to vacate and pay made upon him by spouses Marciano and Segundina Bandoy. 88-D. On November 26. Quezon City and docketed as Civil Case No. dated March 6. 1985. Campus. petitioners filed a complaint for ejectment against Empaynado and attached thereto the certification to file action issued by the barangay captain. p. Empaynado failed to pay the rental for the month of July. 1 0. Phase 4. in part: x x x.00. Upon demand by petitioners.

on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. .before the barangay court is a substantial equivalent of the required extrajudicial demand to pay and vacate required by the Rules of Court prior to the filing of an ejectment case in court. Campus and to surrender the same peacefully to the plaintiffs.00 a month from July 1985 up to the time the defendant vacates the premises at bar. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff spouses Marciano and Segundina Bandoy ordering the defendant Domingo Empaynado and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate the residential house or extension thereof at the lot known as No. U. (p. SO ORDERED. ACCORDINGLY. 1986 dismissing the case for ejectment for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. 88-D. in the light of the foregoing disquisition. The defendant is likewise required to pay all unpaid rentals at the rate of P550. and to pay the plaintiff P700. 25.P. without pronouncement as to costs. Rollo) Spouses Marciano and Segundina Bandoy filed a petition for review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals.00 as reasonable attorney's fee and the costs of suit. The decision reads: ACCORDINGLY. SO ORDERED. (pp. the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and this case ordered dismissed. Rollo) Domingo Empaynado appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court which rendered a decision dated June 2. Pook Amorsolo. In a decision promulgated on January 14. 21-22. Phase 4. x x x.

Rollo) Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals. It is the contention of petitioners that no further demand to vacate was made by petitioners after the certification to file was issued by the Barangay captain for the reason that the case was already certified for court action. There is no merit in this contention. any further demand to vacate was merely repetitive and unnecessary. It is not disputed that the complaint contains no allegation that there was a prior demand to vacate made by the petitioners upon private respondent. SO ORDERED. WHEREFORE. the petition for review is hereby DENIED. in part: x x x. the above jurisprudence would hold and all we can do is to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The decision reads. that: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW AND IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE. (pp. petitioners come to Us on a lone assignment of error. And where the Metropolitan Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction.1987. It is a settled rule that . 30-31. Under this situation. there having been no error committed by the Regional Trial Court. the Court of Appeals dismissed the case also for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

it was held that: even supposing without conceding. Tomassi. plaintiffs offered Exhibit "A" as evidence. However. The certification issued by the office of the barangay captain is not conclusive as to the jurisdiction of the court to which the case was subsequently filed. L-7. there was no allegation in the complaint that a notice to quit or vacate was made upon the defendants. 538. In that case. relied upon by petitioners.. This was objected to by the defendants and the objection was sustained by the trial court. 540). By virtue of a writ of mandamus issued by the Court of First Instance. 679. Diaz. (P. it is held that such allegation is insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon a justice of the peace court" (Casilan vs. during the presentation of evidence. that the complaint is deficient (in not alleging the notice to quit) the deficiency was cured by the evidence. which is a notice to quit alleged to have been served upon defendants prior to the filing of the action. it was proven that there was . What was certified by the barangay captain was that no settlement was reached by the parties in the barangay level. Santos vs. the above case of Co Tiamco cannot be applied in this case. Vivas. 96 Phil. the evidence was admitted. The defendants filed with the Court of First Instance a petition for mandamus to compel the municipal court judge to admit Exhibit "A". 10 SCRA 261. et al. supra) But. 672). It did not certify that all the requisites for the filing of an unlawful detainer case had been complied with. In the case of Co Tiamco vs. 264."where the complaint contains no allegation that a demand had been made upon the defendant to vacate the premises but only an allegation that a demand was made for payment of the rentals agreed upon. January 22. In the Co Tiamco case. 1946 (75 Phil.

No costs. does not prove that the spouses demanded that he vacate the premises. . SO ORDERED. JJ. Narvasa. In the case at bar. The affidavit of Empaynado relied upon by the trial judge to the effect that: "na ako ang tinutukoy ni Marciano Tamis Bandoy dahil di umano'y sa di magandang asal namin na gusto niyang paalisin sa kanyang extension". The notice to vacate was offered and admitted in evidence. The defect was not cured because no evidence of a prior demand to vacate was presented in the trial court. It is the latter which confers jurisdiction upon the municipal court. the petition is DENIED. the complaint was defective because of its failure to allege that there was a prior demand to vacate. What Empaynado admitted in the said affidavit was that the spouses intended to expel him out of the premises ("gusto niyang paalisin') but has not actually or definitely demanded that he vacate the premises.. Cruz. ACCORDINGLY. Gancayco and Griño-Aquino. An intention to oust is different from an actually or definitely demanded to vacate. concur.indeed a notice to quit or demand to vacate served upon the defendants. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals is affirmed.