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187167, August 16, 2011
In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the
sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by
R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines
around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of
1984. The requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the
location of some basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;
2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining
our sovereignty and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over
those territories.
Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified
norm that regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to
mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting points to measure. it
merely notices the international community of the scope of our maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation
designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes
passages. but in the absence of such, international law norms operate.
the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not
place them in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a
customary international law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and
in fact, it increased the Phils.’ total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the
Phils.’ continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.

If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:
Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago’.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.
KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll breach the
rules: that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.

Melchora Cabanas vs Francisco Pilapil
Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan that his child will
be his beneficiary. He also indicated that if upon his death the child is still a minor; the
proceeds of his benefits shall be administered by his brother, Francisco Pilapil. The
child was only ten years of age when Florentino died and so Francisco then took charge
of Florentino’s insurance proceeds for the benefit of the child.
On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabanas filed a complaint seeking
the delivery of the insurance proceeds in favor and for her to be declared as the child’s
trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and that as a private
contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended
ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms
of the insurance policy.
HELD: Yes. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic
social unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be
prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed
should resolve that case according to the best interest of that person. The uncle here
should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of
the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shall show more care towards the
child than the uncle will. The application of parens patriae here is in consonance with
this country’s tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of the family hence preference to the
parent (mother) is observed.

the father of Myra entrusted her to the parents of Guillermo. On the same day. Myra Reynaldo. vs. he opened her legs. accused-appellant. He removed her panties. and reported the incident to him. plaintiff-appellee. Guillermo invited Myra to go to the town proper of Alaminos to buy rice and bananas. J. poked a knife at her neck and warned her not to shout. When they reached the poblacion. GUILLERMO CASIPIT y RADAM. they proceeded home. Upon arriving in the poblacion.: FOUND GUILTY OF RAPE and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the offended party P30. . The barangay official then called for Guillermo but he denied having raped Myra. her cousin-in-law. she was observed to be walking abnormally (bull-legged) by Rogelio Casipit. She resisted appellant. after which. After a few minutes. he told her to lie down with him and rest. she called for her and asked her what happened. On 19 September 1986. They were neighbors in Victoria. Nenita Rabadon. He mounted an assault on her chastity until he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. he told her to proceed ahead. Myra sat on the floor while Guillermo laid down. She then narrated everything to her. She agreed. Alaminos. They watched the movie until six o'clock in the evening. 2 After waking up the following morning. Guillermo invited Myra to watch a Movie. she felt pain and could not sleep. but was helpless to subdue him as he tied her hands behind her nape. and the inevitable had to come. BELLOSILLO. went on top of her. kicked him twice. while appellant was 22. Pangasinan. learned about it. before going to Manila for a medical checkup. The victim. Moreover. On their way home it rained hard that they had to take shelter in a hut in the open field of Barangay Talbang. Inside the hut. Bruno Carambas. they took a ride for Alaminos arriving there at eight o'clock. When her aunt.00 for moral damages.000. he told her that they should buy in Dagupan instead because the prices were cheaper.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. 1 the accused GUILLERMO CASIPIT y RADAM appeals to us insisting on his innocence. After the sexual encounter. was then 14 years old and a sixth grader. They took their dinner in Alaminos before proceeding home to Barangay Victoria. Then he went near her. She could not stop him as he was big and strong. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Her aunt took her to the house of their barangay captain. Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant. On their way. When she reached home.

he and Myra were sweethearts. After the love tryst. Myra. On 19 September 1986. thirdly. even as she had testified that she struggled with him and kicked him twice. Metro Manila. Then he lowered her panties and she did not resist. He contended that the victim was probably induced by her aunt Nenita Rabadon to file the case. we affirm his conviction. when they reached Alaminos. Ochave showed no external sign of physical injuries but noted the presence of first degree fresh healing laceration at the perineum and of the hymen at six o'clock position. They went home together the following morning. they went home. the fact that the victim agreed to have a movie date with him shows that she liked him and was attracted to him. While watching the show. Appellant now assails the trial court for giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses while disregarding his and worse. on the other hand. 6 After the trial. Considering the physical condition of the victim and the place where the crime was perpetrated. They removed their wet clothes. They stayed inside the hut the whole night. which is an unnatural behavior of one who had been raped. 4 On 26 September 1986. However. he placed his arm on the shoulder of Myra and she did not object. He kissed her several times. Fideliz Ochave. the victim was examined by her sisterin-law Susan Cabigas and Elsa Carambas. He placed himself on top of her and sexual intercourse followed as a matter of course. hence. accompanied by an uncle. The medical findings of Dr. We cannot sustain the accused. He embraced her and she liked it. Myra gave her statement to the police and later filed a criminal complaint against Guillermo. the victim did not leave the hut but slept with him until morning. We cannot argue against the trial court for giving full faith and credit to the testimony of Myra that appellant poked a knife at her neck and sexually abused her despite her resistance as he was stronger and bigger than she who was only 14 years old. They talked about their love for each other. which . The laboratory result was negative for spermatozoa. 3 The following afternoon. who both found the victim's private part reddish and her panties stained with blood. After the movie.While inside the house of the barangay captain. she kissed him as many times. He was arrested in July 1987. the doctor who examined her found no external physical injuries on her body. for finding him guilty instead. They entered the moviehouse at noon and left at six o'clock in the evening. is that long before the incident. and. the court a quo sustained the prosecution and found appellant guilty of raping Myra by means of force and intimidation. went to the police station of Alaminos to report the rape and then to the Western Pangasinan General Hospital where she was examined by Dr. secondly. He laid her down on the floor and she consented. 5 The version of Guillermo. He maintains that the victim's story contained many flaws: firstly. they agreed to watch the movie "Cabarlo" so they went to Dagupan City. He joined her on the floor. wife of the barangay captain. it rained hard so they sought shelter in a hut. he went to look for a job in San Juan.

or of a flirtatious nature to incite or provoke appellant to have sex with her. and the peculiar manner in which they gave their testimonies and other evidence in court. It is viewed in the light of the victim's perception and not by any hard and fast rule. is under obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who. Records are bereft of evidence that she was a woman of ill-repute. she would not have immediately disclosed to her family and to the authorities the sexual assault done to her. 9 Hence. 8 This does not mean however that no force or intimidation was used on the victim to consummate the act. if that was true. as parens patriae. the answer of the trial court is generally viewed as correct. the appellant used intimidation by threatening the victim with a knife.was in an isolated hut in an open field. an innocent barrio lass. it was not difficult for the accused to subdue the victim and coerce her into submission. hence entitled to the highest respect. The fact that Myra lost no time in immediately reporting the violation of her honor and submitting herself to medical examination bolsters her credibility and reflects the truthfulness and spontaneity of her account of the incident. The force or intimidation required in rape is relative. It should be emphasized that she was then only fourteen years old. Aside from applying force. Her actuation is understandable as she is a close relative of appellant. These factual findings of the trial court appear to be borne by the records. are not yet able to fully protect themselves. The absence of external signs or physical injuries does not negate the commission of rape. and we cannot have any justification to hold otherwise. 11 Worth noting is the marked receptively of our courts to lend credence to the testimonies of victims who are of tender years regarding their versions of what transpired since the State. The fact that Myra went with appellant to a movie is no indication that she already agreed to have sex with him. When the question of credence arises between the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense on the commission of rape. 10 After all. 7 The argument that the absence of external injuries on the body of the victim belies her claim that she struggled with appellant to prevent him from raping her is devoid of merit. according to his grandfather. it is not improbable that the victim placed her trust on appellant by letting him accompany her to the movie. The principal defense of appellant that he and Myra were sweethearts cannot be given weight. For. because of their minority. their deportment. It need not be overpowering or irresistible but necessary only to achieve its purpose. Her unwavering and firm denunciation of appellant negates consent. Proof of injuries is not necessary because this is not an essential element of the crime. nobody else but the two of them knew what happened between them in the loneliness of an isolated hut in an open field. If she had voluntarily consented to the sexual act with appellant. 12 . her most natural reaction would have been to conceal it or keep silent as this would bring disgrace to her honor and reputation as well as to her family. because it is more competent to so conclude having closely observed the witnesses when they testified.

According to the Sandiganbayan. PCGG v SANDIGANBAYAN 1976: General Bank & Trust Company (Genbank) encountered financial difficulties. Sandiganbayan heard the case.00.  1991: PCGG filed a motion to disqualify Mendoza. Central Bank extendedloans to Genbank in the hope of rehabilitating it (P310M). Solicitor General Mendoza. Cory established the PCGG to recover the ill-gotten wealth of Marcos.  1987: PCGG filed a case against Lucio Tan and certain other people (basta marami sila).000. Mendoza did not take an adverseposition to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank. Issue:  W/N Rule 6. PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the respondents bytaking advantage of their close relationship and influence with Marcos. the appealed decision finding accused-appellant GUILLERMO CASIPIT y RADAM guilty of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED. Genbank failed to recover. Nonetheless. PCGG invoked Rule 6. intervened with the liquidation of Genbank.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility apllies to Estelito Mendoza .WHEREFORE. And Mendoza’s appearance as counsel was beyondthe 1 year prohibitory period since he retired in 1986.  1986: after EDSA I. A public bidding of Genbank’s assets was held with the Lucio TanGroup winning the bid. In relation to thiscase. his family andcronies.  1977: Genbank was declared insolvent. Genbank (now Allied Bank) is one of the properties that PCGG is seeking to be sequestered fromthe Lucion Tan group.  Estelito Mendoza (Solicitor General during the time of Marcos) represented the respondents.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. representing the government. because of his participation in the liquidation of Genbank. with the modification that the indemnity in favor of MYRA REYNALDO is increased to P50. Costs against accused-appellant. SO ORDERED.  Sandiganbayan denied PCGG’s motion.

PCGG already lost a lot of cases against Mendoza.  The matter involved in the liquidation of Genbank is entirely different from the matter involved in thePCGG case against the Lucio Tan group. it does not involve conflicts ata l l . they are all questioning the unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive periodand if applied retroactivelyNotes:  Adverse-interest conflicts – where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a clientin private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed with thegovernment and the interests of the current and former are adverse  Congruent-interest conflicts – the use of the word “conflict” is a misnomer.Concurring Opinions:  Panganiban & Carpio: the congruent interest prong of Rule 6. no Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6. Kyle’s interpretation: PCGG getting desperate  Something to think about: SC is somehow of the opinion that Rule 6. a s i t p r o h i b i t s l a w ye r s f r o m r e p r e s e n t i n g a p r i v a t e p e r s o n e v e n i f t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e f o r m e r government client and the new client are entirely parallel  Matter – any discrete.03 yet)  Bottom line. Sandiganbayan decision is affirmed.03 should be substantial and important.  The intervention contemplated in Rule 6.03 should have a prescriptive period  Tinga: Rule 6. it does not apply to Mendoza.  SC is even questioning why PCGG took such a long time to revive the motion to disqualify Mendoza. The role of Mendoza inthe liquidation of Genbank is considered insubstantial.03 will make it harder for thegovernment to get good lawyers in the future to work for them because of the prohibition of acceptingcases in the future that were related to one’s work as a government counsel.Apparently.03 cannot apply retroactively to Mendoza (when he was Solicitor General. isolatable act as well as indentifiable transaction or conduct involving a particularsituation and specific party  Intervention – interference that may affect the interests of others .Held:  No.  The matter (see 3rd note). or the act of Mendoza as Solicitor General is advising the Central Bank on how toproceed with the liquidation of Genbank.

and (3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties. IRRI issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner. Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by the IRRI's Human Resource Development Department Manager. 1620 may not be invoked in the case at bench inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of dismissed employees in relation to P. accordingly." Issue: Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an employer-employee relationship? . petitioner. petitioner figured in an accident. nonetheless. In view of the findings. 1620. 5 and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner." and. 106483 May 22. finding that IRRI did not waive its immunity. However. considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case. The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal and.: Facts: Ernesto Callado. In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of the IRRI as an international organization granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. One day while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the IRRI.ERNESTO CALLADO vs. While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity. petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal. the Labor Arbiter. ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the complaint dismissed. he was charged with: (1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor. Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him. IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No.R.D. cited an Order issued by the Institute to the effect that "in all cases of termination. J. Thereafter. INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (IRRI) G. No. 1995/ ROMERO. was employed as a driver at the IRRI. (2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to supervisors the failure of the vehicle to start because of a problem with the car battery. illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. 1620. not having waived the same. respondent IRRI waives its immunity.

101949 238 SCRA 524 December 1. 1994 Petitioner: The Holy See Respondent: Hon.Held: No. the Institute may waive its immunity. 1620. in his capacity as Presiding Judge of . In cases involving dismissed employees. Holy See vs Rosario G. it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government or other officer acting under his direction. P. The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity. Jr. No. No. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal. civil and administrative proceedings.D. The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies concerned. 3. The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government. Article 3 provides: Art.R. There is in this case "a categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys immunities accorded to international organizations. and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar. signifying that such waiver is discretionary on its part.. which determination has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarass a political department of Government. Elidberto Rosario. except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.

specific performance and damages against Msgr. Inc. Cirilios. the agent. registered under the name Holy See. Rome. Branch 61 and Starbright Sales Enterprises. who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City. Msgr. Cirilios. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also denied hence this special civil action for certiorari was forwarded to the Supreme Court. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution. When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots. Italy. FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land.RTC Makati. The land was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio. insists that Holy See should clear the property while Holy See says that respondent corporation should do it or the earnest money will be returned. PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr.000 earnest money. Inc. Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises. subsequently returned the P100. Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. With this. RTC denied the motion on ground that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign immunity by entering into a business contract. The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). Lot 5-A. Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale. HELD: The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability. ISSUE: Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity. for his residence. which represents the Holy See. a dispute arose between the two parties because both were unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots. Starbright Sales Enterprises. As expressed in Sec. generally accepted .

Furthermore. the petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business. However. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the Philippines and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction and is entitled to the immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court. it shall be understood that in the case at bar. In view of the foregoing. It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that diplomatic envoy shall be granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property. the petition is hereby GRANTED and the complaints were dismissed accordingly. not for a commercial purpose. . the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. The lot was acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. but for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is nonpropriety in nature. The transfer of the property and its subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (non-proprietal) character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather because it merely cannot evict the squatters living in said property.principles of International Law are adopted by our Courts and thus shall form part of the laws of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations. petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. surely.

Such act is only the start of the inquiry. The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with the respondent. HELD: The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis. The agreement shall be effective for 4 years. The new Minister Counsellor allegedly found respondent's work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Agreement. The respondent terminated the agreement with the respondent. water heaters and water motor pumps. ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in sustaining the trial court's decision that petitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the provision in the Maintenance Agreement. The maintenance agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. electrical facilities. June 26. No. 2003] FACTS: Petitioner Vinzon entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent. The state may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises. has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as party-defendant in the Philippines. furnishings and equipment of the embassy. JAMES VINZON [G. It cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit. The latter claim that it was unlawful and arbitrary. There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. . Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the Republic of Indonesia. The maintenance agreement includes the following specific equipments: air conditioning units. as a foreign state.REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA vs. generator sets. 154705.R.

(c) Philippine courts are vested with jurisdiction over the case because Bradford is a civilian employee who had committed the challenged act outside the U. This caused Montoya to feel aggrieved and to file a suit for damages. Contentions: Bradford claimed that she was immune from suit because: 1) (This) action is in effect a suit against the United States of America.D. Military Bases. as amended. and 2) Defendant.) checker at the U. Hon. Montoya argued that: (a) Bradford.S. and (d) Philippine courts can inquire into the factual . unlawful and highly discriminatory act against a Filipino employee and had exceeded the scope of her authority. 1993] Facts: Private respondent [Montoya] is an American citizen was employed as an identification (I. is immune from suit for act(s) done by her in the performance of her official functions under the Philippines-United States Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 and Military Bases Agreement of 1947. in ordering the search upon her person and belongings outside the NEX JUSMAG store in the presence of onlookers. had committed an improper. (b) having exceeded her authority.S. a foreign sovereign immune from suit without its consent for the cause of action pleaded in the complaint. such act is not one of those exempted from the jurisdiction of Philippine courts. Bradford cannot rely on the sovereign immunity of the public petitioner because her liability is personal. as manager of the US Navy Exchange Branch at JUSMAG. Navy Exchange (NEX) at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. Quezon City. Petitioner [Bradford] also worked at NEX JUSMAG as an “activity manager”. March 1. Reyes and Montoya [219 SCRA 192. There was an incident on 22 January 1987 whereby Bradford had Montoya’s person and belongings searched in front of many curious onlookers. Maxine Bradford.USA and Bradford v.

is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same.. et al. Doctrine of State Immunity: The doctrine of state immunity and the exceptions thereto are summarized in Shauf vs. however. vs. The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent. now expressed in Article XVI Section 3. This latter provision merely reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also intended to manifest our resolve to abide by the rules of the international community. unauthorized acts of . As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications. It must be noted. thus: I. it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. etc. of the 1987 Constitution. Section 2.circumstances of the case to determine whether or not Bradford had acted within or outside the scope of her authority. The doctrine of state immunity is at the core of this controversy. "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers. It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. et al. such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them. Aligaen. Court of Appeals. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent. the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. that the rule is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances.

it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that. we held that: . Philippine Veterans Affairs Office. where the suit against such a functionary had to be instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statute . it is equally well-settled that where a litigation may have adverse consequences on the public treasury. and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts. in Animos. Petitioner. as the Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo.. whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property. etc. the public official proceeded against not being liable in his personal capacity. however. etc." The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrinaire of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. In the same tenor. is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent. it was ruled that: There should be no misinterpretation of the scope of the decision reached by this Court. or when the action taken by him cannot be imputed to the government which he represents. et al. he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff. He may therefore be proceeded against in his personal capacity.. Also. then the doctrine of non-suability may appropriately be invoked. In the case of Baer.government officials or officers are not acts of the State.. is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. while claiming to act or the State. under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have. . . et al. Tizon. vs. It has no application. does not possess diplomatic immunity. for the protection of his rights. vs. et al.

She may not even avail of diplomatic immunity because Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations admits of exceptions. The agents and officials of the United States armed forces stationed in Clark Air Base are no exception to this rule. it appears that Bradford was sued for acts done beyond the scope and beyond her place of official functions. . It reads: 1. . [footnotes omitted] In the present case. . The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter.appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff or petitioner. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act donewith malice and in bad faith. . Thus she may not avail of immunity. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. . Disposition: Petition was dismissed. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction except in the case of: (c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions (Emphasis supplied).

Ciper. 1994. Secretary Madamba opined that payment of petitioners' money claims should be based on quantum meruit (what one has earned) and should be forwarded to the Commission on Audit (COA)  In a Letter of the Undersecretary of Budget and Management dated December 20. respondent Secretary Gregorio Vigilar denied the subject money claims . MPWH forged individual contracts with petitioners EPG. Performance Builders.918.Justice and Equity Facts:   In 1983.819. the Ministry of Human Settlement (MHS). intiated a housing project on a government property along the east bank of Manggahan Floodway in Pasig The MHS entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH) where the latter undertook to develop the housing site and construct thereon 145 housing units  By virtue of the MOA. A4-1303-04-41-303  In an indorsement dated December 27.63  Upon a demand letter from the petitioners. on November 14. Plumbing.00 was then released for the payment of the petitioners' money claims under Advise of Allotment No. 1995. vs.Suits not against the State . by the MPWH Undersecretary Aber Canlas that additional funds will be available and forthcoming  Unpaid balance for the additional constructions amounted to P5. Glass World. 2001 Topic: Sovereignty . and not a written contract. Home Construction. and De Leon Araneta Construction for the construction of the housing units  Under the contracts. 1996. Vigilar (Consti1) Second Division Buena. March 16.316. the amount of P5. 1988. Septa.EPG Construction Co. DPWH Asst. World Builders. Phil. the scope of construction and funding covered only around "2/3 of each housing unit"  Petitioners agreed to undertake and perform "additional constructions" for the completion of the housing units despite the fact that there was only a verbal promise.315. through the BLISS Development Corporation. the COA referred anew the money claims to the DPWH  In a letter dated August 26.

considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions.  Lower court denied the petition on February 18. it still finds merit in the instant petition o The illegality of the implied contracts proceeds from an express declaration or prohibition by law. for Legal Affairs recommends their compensation. Whether or not the implied. 2. o The State's immunity cannot serve as an instrument perpetrating injustice Petition granted. Whether or not the State is immune from suit Holding: 1. Ratio: 1." petitioners-contractors' right to be compensated is upheld. The respondent may not conveniently hide under the State's cloak of invincibility against suit. No. . Petitioners filed before the RTC of QC. Yes. RTC decision reversed and set aside. even the DPWH Auditor did not object to the payment of the money claims 2. While the court agrees with the respondent that the implied contracts are void. not from any intrinsic illegality o "in the interest of substantial justice. Sec. Branch 226 a Petition for Mandamus to order the respondent to pay petitioners their money claims plus damages and attorney's fees. auditing rules. in view of violation of applicable laws. and lack of legal requirements. 1997 Issue: 1. applying the principle of quantum meruit o Even the DPWH Asst. verbal contracts between the petitioners and then Undersecretary Canlas should be upheld 2.

DepEd (formerly DECS) now has the rights of possession and property over Lot No. which carries with it the full responsibility of suing or being sued. By giving its consent to the donation. however. apply only to disputed Lot No. of Education. NO. of Education (DepEd) through a Deed of Donation. Culture and Sports (DECS). sometime in 1940. DECS can be sued independently from the State as it gave its authority to continue with the donation. Issue: Is the respondent guilty of laches? Will it be applied to him in this case? Is the State immune from this case? Can DECS be sued independently from the State? Ruling: YES. that he knew only of the school’s occupation on a portion of the land on 1991 and knew of the Deed of Donation on 1992. Elements of laches have set in: 1) disputed land has been used for public education since 1940. The petitioner then claimed that respondent was guilty of laches. mortgage or encumber said Lot while still being . in favor of respondent as his three sisters waived their rights to the property. Onate Facts: Spouses Claro Onate and Gregoria Los Banos owns the disputed lot Lot No. it brings DECS down to level of ordinary citizen. respondent Onate cannot claim Lot No. 6849-A. Albay vs.907 sqm) registered under the Torrens System of land registration with an Original Certificate of Title (OCT). 6849-A anymore. to do that which could or should have been done earlier. the respondent’s grandfather. now Dept. The Municipality of Daraga gave that land to Dept. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect. DECS can be sued as a result of being privy to the Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of Daraga (as its recipient) over disputed property. Onarte cannot sell. confident that the municipality owned the land through buying it from Claro Onate. By virtue of laches. This lot was already settled through a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Cession in 1991. It turns out that the same land was where the Daraga North Central Elementary School was built and had been operating since 1940. Respondent testified that he only knew of the dispute on 1973. to protest the building of the school as early as 1940. and 4) preliminary facts show grave prejudice to the petitioner DECS as they have made major changes in construction and expansion of the school. 3) petitioner DECS did not anticipate that their occupancy of the land would be later questioned. or an unreasonable and unexplained length of time. then named Bagumbayan Elementary School of Daraga. YES. 2) respondent failed to prove that him and his predecessors undertook steps to regain the use of their land. 6849 (27. Therefore. 6849-A. The laches. of Education. from which he took possession of the lot the same year.Dept.

the shares were declared to be delinquent to be put into an auction sale. The lot’s rights will be returned to respondents the moment DECS no longer needs it. owned or registered in the name of private respondent Benedicto. Later on. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) and ROBERTO S. delivered or paid to him as part of the parties’ Compromise Agreement in that case. So petitioner Republic and private respondent Benedicto entered into a Compromise Agreement which contains a general release clause where petitioner agreed and bound itself to lift the sequestration on the 227 NOGCCI shares acknowledging that it was within private respondent’s capacity to acquire the same shares out of his income from business and the exercise of his profession. Among the properties thus sequestered and taken over by PCGG fiscal agents were the 227 shares in NOGCCI owned by and registered under the name of private respondent. or of corporations in which he appeared to have controlling or majority interest due to his involvement in cases of ill-gotten wealth. FACTS: The PCGG issued writs placing under sequestration all business enterprises. BENEDICTO. that his NOGCCI shares of stock be specifically released from sequestration and returned. It was granted but the shares were ordered to be . Implied in this undertaking is the recognition by petitioner that the subject shares of stock could not have been ill-gotten Benedicto filed a Motion for Release from Sequestration and Return of Sequestered Shares/Dividends praying. it was nevertheless dismissed. 2006 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) vs. PCGG did not pay the monthly membership fee. 129406 March 6. entities and other properties. DECS being nonsuable has become moot. G.R.used by DepEd. Despite filing a writ of injunction. As sequester of the 227 shares formerly owned by Benedicto. No. real and personal. inter alia.

Along with this.put under the custody of the Clerk of Court. in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority. When the State enters into contract. breach of which on its part gives the corresponding right to the other party to the agreement. whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom. petitioner Republic. through its officers or agents. . PCGG was ordered to deliver the shares to the Clerk of Court which it failed to comply with without any justifiable grounds. through the PCGG. ISSUE: WON the Republic can invoke state immunity. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract. by entering into a CompromiseAgreement with private respondent Benedicto. petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself in the same level of its adversary. HELD: NO. In fact. In a last-ditch attempt to escape liability. the State may be sued even without its express consent. invokes state immunity from suit. precisely because by entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the level of the citizen.

in effect. i t does not thereby n e c e s s a r i l y c o n s e n t t o a n u n r e s t r a i n e d execution against it. Branch 37 FACTS: Tarcila Laperal Mendoza filed an action for the annulment or declaration of nullity of the title and deed of sale. all it does. The case wasre-raffled to the Manila RTC (Branch 37). Judge Hidalgo declared the R e p u b l i c in default for failure of Solicitor G a b r i e l F r a n c i s c o R a m i r e z . RTJ-05-1959REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. with r e s p o n d e n t V i c e n t e A.A. if it can. as appropriated by law. HELD: It is settled that when the State gives i t s c o n s e n t t o b e s u e d . Tersely put. I t i s a l s o k n o w n a s t h e Arlegui Residence w h i c h h o u s e d t w o P h i l i p p i n e presidents and which now holds the Office of the Press Secretary and the News Information Bureau. In an Order. . I t i s c o n t e n d e d t h a t t h e r e s p o n d e n t J u d g e v i o l a t e d t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d t h e fundamental rule that government funds are exempt from execution or garnishment when he caused the issuance of the writ of execution against the Republic. JUDGE VICENTE A.Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. H i d a l g o a s p r e s i d i n g Judge. reconveyance and/or r e c o v e r y of ownership and possession a p r o p e r t y a g a i n s t t h e R e p u b l i c o f t h e Philippinesin the RTC of Manila. No. i s t o g i v e t h e o t h e r p a r t y a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o prove. The case was initially dismissed by thepresiding Judge of the Manila RTC (Branch 35 )on the ground of state immunity.M. when the State waives its immunity. that the state has a liability. T h e f u n c t i o n s a n d p u b l i c s e r v i c e s r e n d e r e d b y t h e S t a t e c a n n o t b e a l l o w e d t o p a r a l yz e d o r d i s r u p t e d b y t h e d i v e r s i o n o f public funds from their legitimate and specific objects. HIDALGO. ISSUE: WON the Republic can invoke immunityfrom suit. to file the required Answer within the period prayed for in his motion for extension. t h e h a n d l i n g solicitor.

Heirs of Guivelondo Facts:  NHA filed with RTC of Cebu Branch 11 a complaint as amended regarding the eminent domain against Heirs of Guivelondo docketed as civil case. heirs filed a motion for execution since the trial court move for the entry of the partial judgment as modified by the omnibus order.  The petitioner alleged that defendant heirs et.  The Court of Appeals rendered dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the ground of partial judgment and omnibus order became a final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal. per square meter. 13 and 19 as well as the amount of just compensation. The courts of appeals serve on petitioner for a notice of levy pursuant to writ of Execution and a Notice of third garnishment from the Land bank of the Philippines. thereafter trial court declares plaintiff has a right to expropriate the properties of the defendant heirs and appointed 3 commissioners who ascertain the just compensation of the said properties be fixed at 11.  Petitioner NHA filed 2 motion for reconsideration that assails inclusion of lots 12.00 php. but the trial court issued an omnibus order to deny the motion of respondent granting the petitioner’s motion and of just compensation.  Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari.  The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but then it was denied by the court. Thereafter.CASE DIGEST OF NHA VS. however the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial courts partial judgment . al were the rightful private owners of the land which the petitioner intends to develop a socialized housing project. 200. HEIRS OF GUIVELONDO Topic: Execution/Garnishment NHA vs.  The respondent heirs filed a manifestation of waiving their objections to petitioners power to expropriate their properties. .

The temporary Restraining Order was LIFTED. After the rendition of such order the plaintiff shouldn’t be permitted to dismiss or discontinue such proceedings except on such terms of the court be equitable. Its injunctive relief against the levy and garnishment of its funds and personal properties was also DENIED. Whether or not writs of execution and garnishment may be issued against the state in an expropriation where in the exercise of power of eminent domain will not serve public use or purpose Ruling:  The state as represented by the NHA for housing project can continue its inherent power of eminent domain provided that the just compensation for the property sought is taken. Whether or not judgment has become final and executory and if estoppel or laches applies to government. 3. .ISSUE: 1.  Petitioner NHA are not exempt from garnishment or execution.  The order was final after the non-appealing of the petitioner as the lawful right to expropriate the properties of respondent heirs of Guivelondo. Whether or not the state can be compelled and coerced by the courts to continue with its inherent power of eminent domain. 2.  Petition was DENIED and the trial court’s decision denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss expropriation proceeding was AFFIRMED. although it is public in character since it is arbitrary and capricious for a government entity to initiate expropriation proceedings that seize a private owner’s property.