You are on page 1of 351

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 21943

September 15, 1924

ASKAY, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FERNANDO A. COSALAN, defendant-appellee.
A. de Guzman for appellant.
Camus & Delgado and Pio Duran for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The plaintiff in this case is Askay, an illiterate Igorrote between 70 and 80 years of age, residing in
the municipal district of Tublay, Province of Benguet, who at various time has been the owner of
mining property. The defendant is Fernando A. Cosalan, the nephew by marriage of Askay, and
municipal president of Tublay, who likewise has been interested along with his uncle in mining
enterprises.
About 1907, Askay obtained title to the Pet Kel Mineral Claim located in Tublay, Benguet. On
November 23, 1914, if we are to accept defendant's Exhibit 1, Askay sold this claim to Cosalan. Nine
years later, in 1923, Askay instituted action in the Court of First Instance of Benguet to have the sale
of the Pet Kel Mineral Claim adhered null, to secure possession of the mineral claim, and to obtain
damages from the defendant in the amount of P10,500. Following the presentation of various
pleadings including the answer of the defendant, and following trial before Judge of First Instance
Harvey, judgment was rendered dismissing the complaint and absolving the defendant from the
same, with costs against the plaintiff. On being informed of the judgment of the trial court, plaintiff
attacked it on two grounds: The first, jurisdiction, and the second, formal. Both motions were denied
and an appeal was perfected.
Two questions are suggested by the assignments of error. The first is whether Judge George R.
Harvey had jurisdiction to try the case. The second is whether the plaintiff has established his cause
of action by a preponderance of the evidence.
I. On April 16, 1923, as appears from the Official Gazette, the Secretary of Justice authorized and
instructed the Honorable George R. Harvey, Judge of First Instance of the Ninth Judicial District, to
hold a special term of court in the City of Baguio, Mountain Province, beginning May 2, 1923.
(Administrative Order No. 43, 21 Off. Gaz., p. 893.) Acting under the authority granted by the order of
the Secretary of Justice, Judge Harvey proceeded to hear the case of Askay vs. Cosalan, without
protest from anyone until after an adverse decision for the plaintiff and until after Judge Harvey had
left the district.
The point which plaintiff now presses is that Act No. 3107, amendatory of section 155 of the
Administrative Code, which authorizes a Judge of First Instance to be detailed by the Secretary of
Justice to temporary duty, for a period which shall in no case exceed six months, in a district or

province other than his own, for the purpose of trying all kinds of cases, excepting criminal and
election cases, was not in force until fifteen days after the completion of the publication of the statute
in the Official Gazette, or not until August 3, 1923. Plaintiff relies on section 11 of the Administrative
Code, which in part reads: "A statute passed by the Philippine Legislature shall, in the absence of
special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the
publication of the statute in the Official Gazette, the date of issue being excluded."
Now turning to Act No. 3107, its final section provides that "This Act shall take effect on its approval."
The Act was approved on March 17, 1923. Obviously, therefore, there being a special provision in
Act No. 3107, it applies to the exclusion of the general provision contained in the Administrative
Code.
Recalling, therefore, that Act No. 3107 went into effect on March, 17, 1923, and that it was
subsequent thereto, on April 16, 1923, that Judge Harvey was authorized to hold court at Baguio,
beginning with May 2, 1923, appellant's argument along this line is found to be without persuasive
merit. We pass to the material issue which is one of fact.
II. Plaintiff contends that the sale of the Pet Kel Mineral Claim was accomplished through fraud and
deceit on the part of the defendant. Plaintiff may be right but in our judgment he has failed to
established his claim. Fraud must be both alleged and proved.
One facts exists in plaintiff's favor, and this is the age and ignorance of the plaintiff who could be
easily duped by the defendant, a man of greater intelligence. Another fact is the inadequacy of the
consideration for the transfer which, according to the conveyance, consisted of P1 and other
valuable consideration, and which, according to the oral testimony, in reality consisted of P107 in
cash, a bill fold, one sheet, one cow, and two carabaos. Gross inadequacy naturally suggests fraud
and is some evidence thereof, so that it may be sufficient to show it when taken in connection with
other circumstances, such as ignorance or the fact that one of the parties has an advantage over the
other. But the fact that the bargain was a hard one, coupled with mere inadequacy of price when
both parties are in a position to form an independent judgment concerning the transaction, is not a
sufficient ground for the cancellation of a contract.
Against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant, we have the document itself executed in the
presence of witnesses and before a notary public and filed with the mining recorder. The notary
public, Nicanor Sison, and one of the attesting witnesses, Apolonio Ramos, testified to the effect that
in the presence of the plaintiff and the defendant and of the notary public and the subscribing
witnesses, the deed of sale was interpreted to the plaintiff and that thereupon he placed his thumb
mark on the document. Two finger print experts, Dr. Charles S. Banks and A. Simkus, have declared
in depositions that the thumb mark on Exhibit 1 is that of Askay. No less than four other witnesses
testified that at various times Askay had admitted to them that he had sold the Pet Kel Mine to
Fernando A. Cosalan.
Having in mind all of these circumstances, how can the plaintiff expect the courts to nullify the deed
of sale on mere suspicion? Having waited nine years from the date when the deed was executed,
nine years from the time Fernando A. Cosalan started developing the mine, nine years from the time
Askay himself had been deprived of the possession of the mine, and nine years permitting of a third
party to obtain a contract of lease from Cosalan, how can this court overlook plaintiff's silent
acquiescence in the legal rights of the defendant? On the facts of record, the trial judge could have
done nothing less than dismiss the action.

We conclude therefore, that Judge Harvey had jurisdiction to try this case, that his findings of fact
are in accordance with the evidence, that no prejudicial error was committed in the trial, and that the
complaint was properly dismissed. As a result, judgment is affirmed with costs against the appellant.
So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14283

November 29, 1960

GIL BALBUNA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, ET AL., respondents-appellees.
K. V. Faylona and Juan B. Soliven for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Ceferino Padua for appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal by members of the "Jehovah's Witnesses" from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Capiz, dated June 23, 1958, dismissing their petition for prohibition and mandamus against the
Secretary of Education and the other respondents.
The action was brought to enjoin the enforcement of Department Order No. 8, s. 1955, issued by the
Secretary of Education, promulgating rules and regulations for the conduct of the compulsory flag
ceremony in all schools, as provided in Republic Act No. 1265. Petitioners appellants assail the
validity of the above Department Order, for it allegedly denies them freedom of worship and of
speech guaranteed by the Bill of Rights; that it denies them due process of law and the equal
protection of the laws; and that it unduly restricts their rights in the upbringing of their children. Since
the brief for the petitioners-appellants assails Republic Act No. 1265 only as construed and applied,
the issue ultimately boils down the validity of Department Order No. 8, s. 1955, which promulgated
the rules and regulations for the implementation of the law.
This case, therefore, is on all fours with Gerona, et al., vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 106 Phil., 2;
57 Off. Gaz., (5) 820, also involving Jehovah's Witnesses, and assailing, on practically identical
grounds, the validity of the same Department Order above-mentioned. This Court discerns no
reasons for changing its stand therein, where we said:
In conclusion, we find and hold that the Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious
veneration; rather, it is a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an
emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony
but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which
the flag stands for; that by the authority of the Legislature of the Secretary of Education was
duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement
of observance of the flag ceremony, or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8
does not violate the Constitutional provisions about freedom of religion and exercise of

religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations
and school discipline, including observance of the flag ceremony, is a prerequisite to
attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag
ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the public school they
were attending.
However, in their memorandum, petitioners-appellants raise the new issue that that Department
Order No. 8 has no binding force and effect, not having been published in the Official Gazette as
allegedly required by Commonwealth Act 638, Article 2 of the New Civil Code, and Section 11 of the
Revised Administrative Code. We see no merit in this contention. The assailed Department Order,
being addressed only to the Directors of Public and Private Schools, and educational institutions
under their supervision, can not be said to be of general application. Moreover, as observed in
People vs. QuePo Lay, 94 Phil., 640; 50 Off. Gaz., (10) 4850 (affirmed in Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central
Bank, 104 Phil., 573; 55 Off. Gaz., [6] 1006), —
the laws in question (Commonwealth Act 638 and Act 2930) do not require the publication of
the circulars, regulations or notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and
effective. All that said two laws provide is that laws, regulations, decisions of the Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be published shall be
published in the Official Gazette but said two laws do not say that unless so published they
will be of no force and effect. In other words, said two acts merely enumerate and make a list
of what should be published in the Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the
different branches of the government issuing the same, and of the Bureau of Printing.
It is true, as held in the above cases, that pursuant to Article 2 of the New Civil Code and Section 11
of the Revised Administrative Code, statutes or laws shall take effect fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless otherwise provided. It is likewise true
that administrative rules and regulations, issued to implement a law, have the force of law.
Nevertheless, the cases cited above involved circulars of the Central Bank which provided for
penalties for violations thereof and that was the primary factor that influenced the rationale of those
decisions. In the case at bar, Department Order No. 8 does not provide any penalty against those
pupils or students refusing to participate in the flag ceremony or otherwise violating the provisions of
said order. Their expulsion was merely the consequence of their failure to observe school discipline
which the school authorities are bound to maintain. As observed in Gerona vs. Secretary of
Education, supra,
... for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute, they were not
being prosecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal
sanction. If they choose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of
public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more.
Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their
right to attend public schools.
Finally, appellants contend that Republic Act No. 1265 is unconstitutional and void for being an
undue delegations of legislative power, "for its failure to lay down any specific and definite standard
by which the Secretary of Education may be guided in the preparation of those rules and regulations
which he has been authorized to promulgate." With this view we again disagree. Sections 1 and 2 of
the Act read as follows:

Section 1. All educational institutions shall henceforth, observed daily flag ceremony, which
shall be simple and dignified and shall include the playing or singing of the Philippine
National Anthem.
Section 2. The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to issue or cause to
be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony herein provide.
In our opinion, the requirements above-quoted constitute an adequate standard, to wit, simplicity and
dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of the National Anthem — specially when contrasted
with other standards heretofore upheld by the Courts: "public interest"(People vs. Rosenthal, 68 Phil.
328); "public welfare" (Municipality of Cardona vs. Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547); Interest of law and
order"(Rubi vs. Provincial Board, 39 Phil., 669; justice and equity and the substantial merits of the
case" (Int. Hardwood vs. Pañgil Federation of Labor, 70 Phil. 602); or "adequate and efficient
instruction" (P.A.C.U. vs. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil., 806; 51 Off. Gaz., 6230). That the
Legislature did not specify the details of the flag ceremony is no objection to the validity of the
statute, for all that is required of it is the laying down of standards and policy that will limit the
discretion of the regulatory agency. To require the statute to establish in detail the manner of
exercise of the delegated power would be to destroy the administrative flexibility that the delegation
is intended to achieve.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. Costs against petitioner-appellants.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon,
JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6791

March 29, 1954

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant.
Prudencio de Guzman for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lauro G. Marquez for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty
of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, and
sentencing him to suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S.
dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the
Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as
required by Circular No. 20. the appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not
published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that
consequently, said circular had no force and effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638
and Act 2930 both require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or
notice of general applicability. The Solicitor General answering this contention says that
Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said
circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not require the publication of the
circulars, regulations and notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that
said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be of no force and effect. In other words, said
two Acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette,

presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of the Government issuing same, and of the
Bureau of Printing.
However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress
shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the
completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code
(Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that
Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of
the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence.
(See U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil., 119 and authorities cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule,
circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which
prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the
general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and
specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.
Our Old Civil code, ( Spanish Civil Code of 1889) has a similar provision about the effectivity of laws,
(Article 1 thereof), namely, that laws shall be binding twenty days after their promulgation, and that
their promulgation shall be understood as made on the day of the termination of the publication of
the laws in the Gazette. Manresa, commenting on this article is of the opinion that the word "laws"
include regulations and circulars issued in accordance with the same. He says:
El Tribunal Supremo, ha interpretado el articulo 1. del codigo Civil en Sentencia de 22 de
Junio de 1910, en el sentido de que bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se
comprenden tambien los Reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales
ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.
Tambien el poder ejecutivo lo ha venido entendiendo asi, como lo prueba el hecho de que
muchas de sus disposiciones contienen la advertencia de que empiezan a regir el mismo dia
de su publicacion en la Gaceta, advertencia que seria perfectamente inutil si no fuera de
aplicacion al caso el articulo 1.o del Codigo Civil. (Manresa, Codigo Civil Español, Vol. I. p.
52).
In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was
not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its
violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and
bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after November 1951. In other words,
appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to
have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof.
But the Solicitor General also contends that this question of non-publication of the Circular is being
raised for the first time on appeal in this Court, which cannot be done by appellant. Ordinarily, one
may raise on appeal any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is
within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings. (Section 19, Rule 48 of the Rules of Court).
But the question of non-publication is fundamental and decisive. If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20
had not been published as required by law before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was
no such circular to be violated and consequently appellant committed no violation of the circular or
committed any offense, and the trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction. This question may
be raised at any stage of the proceeding whether or not raised in the court below.

concur. 355. proclamations. 1985 LORENZO M. 337. with costs de oficio. C. 171. 718. in his capacity as Director. 64. DE LA CRUZ. Paras. JJ. and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD. 521. 793. 661. 303. 359. 658. L-63915 April 24.J. 324. 286. 573. 923. letter of implementation and administrative orders. 326. 22. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. J. 574. 184. 594.: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern. 429.. a right recognized in Section 6. 491. INC. 644. 38. TUVERA. SARMIENTO. Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution. in his capacity as Director. MELQUIADES P. Concepcion and Diokno. JUAN C. letters of instructions. 836. 733. 566. 200. 447. petitioners. 935. Malacañang Records Office. JOAQUIN VENUS. 406. 179. HON. 415. 298. 599. 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. .In view of the foregoing. executive orders. 528.R. 325. 358. TAÑADA. [MABINI]. respondents. 445. ESCOLIN. and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees. 835. INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM. 504. 265. No. petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish. in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President . 961. Specifically. and FLORENDO S. Bengzon. Reyes. 360. 37. 427.. 473. vs. 404. 103. 59. 731. 368. 234. HON. PABLO. 361. Padilla. Labrador. Bautista Angelo. 197. 551. 802. ABRAHAM F. general orders. we reverse the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant. 312. in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President. the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought: a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 800. 486. Bureau of Printing. 503. 12.

1900. 964. f] Letters of Implementation Nos. 602. 457.: 14. 370.: 10. 76.: 347. to do the act required to be done to . 385. 1270. 429-454. 1810. 438-440. 1868.11491178. 386. 1281. 599. 642. 1538. 1866. 155. 58. 600. 116. 641. 50. 1746-1751. 2030-2044. 405. 1050. 312-315. 1812-1814. 17371742. 251. 1744. 563. 712786. 1968-1984. 202. 1754. 1808.378. c] General Orders Nos. 1060-1061. 8. 524-528. trust. 51. 399. 1829-1840. 726. 293. 1853-1858. 95. board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office. 1952. 263-269. 611. 130. 509-510. 343. 25-27. 531-532. 275-283. 193. 1849. 380-433. 1085. or station. which we quote: SEC. 1825-1826. 1918. b] Letter of Instructions Nos. 1816. 325. 180. 1644. 436-439. 1151. 11-22. 593. 414. 49. 1892. 527.1180-1278. 1550-1558. 241-245. 107. 211-213. 609. 301-303. immediately or at some other specified time. 1694-1695. 473. 494-507. 59. 141. 2147-2161. 1800. 291. 1963. 1697-1701. g] Administrative Orders Nos. 1819-1826. 1835-1836. 62. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding. 123. 1831-1832. 1165.997. 297-299. 1986-2028. 348. 1764-1787. the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant. 367. 498. 1752. 1246. 1870. 360. 64 & 65. would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. 587. 192. 615. 1843-1844. 161. 2046-2145. 1594-1600. 396-397. 665. 1242. 488. 702. 1535. 1762. 107. 1590-1595. 94. 882. 209. 352-354. 285289. 1806-1807. 474-492. 1846-1847. 1196. 1630-1649. 1561-1588. 549. 253-261. 59. 173. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. and there is no other plain. 63. 1166. 594. 122. 357. 486. corporation. 188. or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled. 205. e] Executive Orders Nos. 1532. 358. 150. 1923. 362. 187. 1144. 1147. 1876-1889. 574. 679-703.445. through the Solicitor General. 226-228.—When any tribunal. 39. 1772. 1143. 594. 1705-1723. 1839-1840. 444. 327. 576. 309. 1540-1547. 837-839. 881. 1300. 649-677. 788-852. 18421847. 1933.647. 108. 1797. 712-713. 1965-1966. 1813-1817. 536. 1278. 610.: 1126. 271-273. 1250. 878-879. 939-940. 609. 501. The respondents. 1789-1795. 1319-1526. 120. 199. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 611. 92. 153. 10. 551-553. 1612-1628. 854-857. Petition for Mandamus. 204. 3. 560. 1731-1734. 215-224. 248. 561. 427. 1279. 231-239. 570. 39. 413.1017-1030. d] Proclamation Nos. 9. 60. 382. 1802-1804. 612. 538. 1529.: 7. 598-604. 349. 72. 2163-2244.471. 705-707. 80-81. 543-544. they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3. 346. 567568. 522. 52. 1829.: 411. 16061609. 1860. 136.

the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result.e. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States. the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. or some particular right to be protected.Protect the rights of the petitioner. 3rd ed. Justice Grant T. a private individual. Negros Occidental. because. and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions . Clearly. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding. we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule. 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved. they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course. the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error' No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. 79 M. sec. Trent said: We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay. Upon the other hand. Thus. it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High. considering that the Solicitor General. The issue posed is not one of first impression. Governor General. independent of that which he holds with the public at large. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty." nevertheless. inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be. it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same. Speaking for this Court. Extraordinary Legal Remedies. has entered his appearance for respondents in this case. Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist. as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character." and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty. the government officer generally empowered to represent the people. 431]. The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. If the general rule in America were otherwise. 469]. Mr.. Boardmen. in said case. this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino..

. without publication. Reales decretos. publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code: Art.. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows: Section 1. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of . 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity. Thus.as to the date they are to take effect. unless it is otherwise provided. Without such notice and publication. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the.. much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published. except such as have no general applicability. Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever. Instrucciones. [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law. Congress of the Philippines. which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones. Respondents' argument.. [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations. se comprenden tambien los reglamentos. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes. 5 The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette . or which he may authorize so to be published. In a long line of decisions. even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity... The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. however. and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand. . ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. Thus. there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat. The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette. 2. not even a constructive one.. the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette. is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated. Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.

public concern is to be given substance and reality. Hackett. he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. v. state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.D. the people. private and official. however. and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. presidential decrees that provide for fines. It is quite clear. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct. quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition. to our mind. orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.S. COMELEC 7: In a time of proliferating decrees. Obviously.S. Chicago. 559. that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The answer is all too familiar. having been found to be unconstitutional. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law. Co. such as tax and revenue measures. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. prior to such a determination. Baxter Bank 8 to wit: The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress. 228 U. Ry. Norton v. . The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. & L. 6 It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. 1. the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees. was not a law. The actual existence of a statute. Some members of the Court. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P. 425. which have not been published. The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Shelby County. 442.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. that it was inoperative. leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication. of status. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing. conferring no rights and imposing no duties. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application. 566. shall have no force and effect. of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application. orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land. demand examination. 118 U. of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested. forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. fall within this category.

they shall have no binding force and effect. have not been so published. as a matter of policy.. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration . even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately. and unless so published.. Separate Opinions FERNANDO.." From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court. the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application. this Court in Rutter vs. 1019 to 1030. Angeles. But whatever their subject matter may be. 1278. J. through Justice Ramon Aquino. only Presidential Decrees Nos. Similarly. Aquino... Jr.Consistently with the above principle. inclusive. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law. I am unable. inclusive. In Pesigan vs. albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.J. ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. concurring (with qualification): There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. Concepcion. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government. Relova. took no part. that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified. to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect. SO ORDERED. . 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. and 1937 to 1939.. J. it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette. the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored.. J. WHEREFORE. 11 the Court. however. is on leave. concurs. refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication. C. it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government.

that law as the command of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. It suffices. there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. 6 In traditional terminology. 2. needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. there is an advantage to be gained. That is too be admitted. but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. It does not follow. of course. "if it is unknown and unknowable. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". It conduces to certainty. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. 1. The due process clause is not that precise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette. this clarification is. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. is thus essential. From the pragmatic standpoint. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. raise a constitutional question. Nonetheless. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine. for no person should be bound by a law without notice. The Civil Code . This is elementary fairness. However.I shall explain why. It is of course true that without the requisite publication. That is as far as it goes. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. then serious problems could arise. Moreover. the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. 5 In civil cases though. to my mind. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity. unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute. however. 2 3. To so hold would. 4 Publication. where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power. its ex post facto character becomes evident. 4. For prior thereto. as pointed out by Justice Cardozo. to repeat. I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. as was stated by Judge Learned Hand. then. it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution. for me. retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect.

publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple . It may be fraught. JJ. Justice Herrera. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule. as earlier noted.itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception. "unless it is otherwise provided. regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties. That would be. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement. with undesirable consequences. 386. and Alampay concur in this separate opinion. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. Abad Santos. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication.e. I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason. TEEHANKEE.. Cuevas. Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code. Makasiar. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. Abad Santos.. Cuevas and Alampay. 1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette. the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment. concur. in my opinion. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation. to go too far. " i. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. unless it is otherwise provided. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. 5. a law. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. concurring: I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Republic Act No. especially its penal provisions. J. Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process." Moreover.

Secondly. PLANA. A law." Moreover. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity. it has to be published. cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. 638. determines its frequency. Commonwealth Act No.expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination. which is the Constitution. for no person should be bound by a law without notice. 638. J. especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. among them. but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette.. laws must be published in the Official Gazette. in my opinion. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity." Conformably therewith. for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette. except such as have no general applicability. unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. if said laws already provide for their effectivity date. I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective. and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. MELENCIO-HERRERA. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights. In fine. it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. does not support the proposition that for their effectivity.. This is elementary fairness. can assume that role. provides for its sale and distribution. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature. The due process clause is not that precise. Only a higher law. . * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby. This is as it should be. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette. it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette. concurring: I agree. Thus. J. unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly. "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations. concurring (with qualification): The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity. the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice.

. JJ. Separate Opinions FERNANDO. Jr. concur. until due publication thereof. presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity. however. this clarification is. J. It does not follow. 1. It conduces to certainty. to my mind. GUTIERREZ. to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.J. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette.. To so hold would.However. C. Cuevas and Alampay.. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. concurring: I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the Official Gazette.. I shall explain why. I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. I am unable. that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute. concurring (with qualification): There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. however. From the pragmatic standpoint. raise a constitutional question.. J. a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. Nonetheless. for me. concurring: I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general applicability ineffective. DE LA FUENTE. there is an advantage to be gained. That is too be admitted. . It is of course true that without the requisite publication. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances".

What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. as pointed out by Justice Cardozo. I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity. For prior thereto. Cuevas. 6 In traditional terminology. that law as the command of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby. That would be. to go too far. where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power. The due process clause is not that precise. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. of course. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine. 386. I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. as was stated by Judge Learned Hand." Moreover. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Abad Santos. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette. retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. 4 Publication. 2 3. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement. "unless it is otherwise provided. 5 In civil cases though. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. . with undesirable consequences. for no person should be bound by a law without notice. Republic Act No. That is as far as it goes. I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective. it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. However. as earlier noted. the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. It suffices. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule. Moreover. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. "if it is unknown and unknowable.2. in my opinion. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment. unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. then serious problems could arise. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. and Alampay concur in this separate opinion. to repeat. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. This is elementary fairness. is thus essential. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility. then. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution. 5. 4. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception. its ex post facto character becomes evident. It may be fraught.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice
Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of
equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under
certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play
and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are
commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation, 1 citing the settled principle based on
due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its
penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially
informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the
Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article
3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable
from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which
are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is
manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to
a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process.
The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall
take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading
that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official
Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's
indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple
expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the
completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its
proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it
has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date
of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after
its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to
the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the
retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice
of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due
process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things
may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as
to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a
different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may
prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide
for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it
authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and
distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates
what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is
noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only
"important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the
Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal
and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as
Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has
a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the
Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official
Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or
general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6339

April 20, 1954

MANUEL LARA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
PETRONILO DEL ROSARIO, JR., defendant-appellee.
Manansala and Manansala for appellants.
Ramon L. Resurreccion for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
In 1950 defendant Petronilo del Rosario, Jr., owner of twenty-five taxi cabs or cars, operated a taxi
business under the name of "Waval Taxi." He employed among others three mechanics and 49
chauffeurs or drivers, the latter having worked for periods ranging from 2 to 37 months. On
September 4, 1950, without giving said mechanics and chauffeurs 30 days advance notice, Del
Rosario sold his 25 units or cabs to La Mallorca, a transportation company, as a result of which,
according to the mechanics and chauffeurs above-mentioned they lost their jobs because the La
Mallorca failed to continue them in their employment. They brought this action against Del Rosario to
recover compensation for overtime work rendered beyond eight hours and on Sundays and legal
holidays, and one month salary (mesada) provided for in article 302 of the Code of Commerce
because the failure of their former employer to give them one month notice. Subsequently, the three
mechanics unconditionally withdrew their claims. So only the 49 drivers remained as plaintiffs. The
defendant filed a motion for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it stated no cause of action
and the trial court for the time being denied the motion saying that it will be considered when the
case was heard on the merits. After trial the complaint was dismissed. Plaintiffs appealed from the
order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals which Tribunal after finding only questions of law are
involved, certified the case to us.
The parties are agreed that the plaintiffs as chauffeurs received no fixed compensation based on the
hours or the period of time that they worked. Rather, they were paid on the commission basis, that is
to say, each driver received 20 per cent of the gross returns or earnings from the operation of his taxi
cab. Plaintiffs claim that as a rule, each drive operated a taxi 12 hours a day with gross earnings
ranging from P20 to P25, receiving therefrom the corresponding 20 per cent share ranging from P4
to P5, and that in some cases, especially during Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays when a driver
worked 24 hours a day he grossed from P40 to P50, thereby receiving a share of from P8 to P10 for
the period of twenty-four hours.
The reason given by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is that the defendant being engaged
in the taxi or transportation business which is a public utility, came under the exception provided by
the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Commonwealth Act No. 444); and because plaintiffs did not work on a

salary basis, that is to say, they had no fixed or regular salary or remuneration other than the 20 per
cent of their gross earnings "their situation was therefore practically similar to piece workers and
hence, outside the ambit of article 302 of the Code of Commerce."
For purposes of reference we are reproducing the pertinent provisions of the Eight-Hour Labor Law,
namely, sections 1 to 4.
SECTION 1. The legal working day for any person employed by another shall not be more
than eight hours daily. When the work is not continuous, the time during which the laborer is
not working and can leave his working place and can rest completely shall not be counted.
SEC. 2. This Act shall apply to all persons employed in any industry or occupation, whether
public or private, with the exception of farm laborers, laborers who prefer to be paid on piece
work basis, domestic servants and persons in the personal service of another and members
of the family of the employer working for him.
SEC. 3. Work may be performed beyond eight hours a day in case of actual or impending
emergencies, caused by serious accidents, fire flood, typhoon, earthquakes, epidemic, or
other disaster or calamity in order to prevent loss of life and property or imminent danger to
public safety; or in case of urgent work to be performed on the machines, equipment, or
installations in order to avoid a serious loss which the employer would otherwise suffer, or
some other just cause of a similar nature; but in all cases the laborers and the employees
shall be entitled to receive compensation for the overtime work performed at the same rate
as their regular wages or salary, plus at least twenty-five per centum additional.
In case of national emergency the Government is empowered to establish rules and
regulations for the operation of the plants and factories and to determine the wages to be
paid the laborers.
SEC. 4. No person, firm, or corporation, business establishment or place or center of work
shall compel an employee or laborer to work during Sundays and legal holidays, unless he is
paid an additional sum of at least twenty-five per centum of his regular
remuneration: Provided however, That this prohibition shall not apply to public utilities
performing some public service such as supplying gas, electricity, power, water, or providing
means of transportation or communication.
Under section 4, as a public utility, the defendant could have his chauffeurs work on Sundays and
legal holidays without paying them an additional sum of at least 25 per cent of their regular
remuneration: but that with reference only to work performed on Sundays and holidays. If the work
done on such days exceeds 8 hours a day, then the Eight-Hour Labor Law would operate, provided
of course that plaintiffs came under section 2 of the said law. So that the question to be decided here
is whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to extra compensation for work performed in excess of 8 hours
a day, Sundays and holidays included.
It will be noticed that the last part of section 3 of Commonwealth Act 444 provides for extra
compensation for over-time work "at the same rate as their regular wages or salary, plus at least
twenty-five per centum additional'" and that section 2 of the same act excludes application thereof
laborers who preferred to be on piece work basis.This connotes that a laborer or employee with no
fixed salary, wages or remuneration but receiving as compensation from his employer uncertain and

variable amount depending upon the work done or the result of said work (piece work) irrespective of
the amount of time employed, is not covered by the Eight-Hour Labor Law and is not entitled to extra
compensation should he work in excess of 8 hours a day. And this seems to be the condition of
employment of the plaintiffs. A driver in the taxi business of the defendant, like the plaintiffs, in one
day could operate his taxi cab eight hours, or less than eight hours or in excess of 8 hours, or even
24 hours on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, with no limit or restriction other than his desire,
inclination and state of health and physical endurance. He could drive continuously or intermittently,
systematically or haphazardly, fast or slow, etc. depending upon his exclusive wish or inclination.
One day when he feels strong, active and enthusiastic he works long, continuously, with diligence
and industry and makes considerable gross returns and receives as much as his 20 per cent
commission. Another day when he feels despondent, run down, weak or lazy and wants to rest
between trips and works for less number of hours, his gross returns are less and so is his
commission. In other words, his compensation for the day depends upon the result of his work,
which in turn depends on the amount of industry, intelligence and experience applied to it, rather
than the period of time employed. In short, he has no fixed salary or wages. In this we agree with the
learned trial court presided by Judge Felicisimo Ocampo which makes the following findings and
observations of this point.
. . . As already stated, their earnings were in the form of commission based on the gross
receipts of the day. Their participation in most cases depended upon their own industry. So
much so that the more hours they stayed on the road, the greater the gross returns and the
higher their commissions. They have no fixed hours of labor. They can retire at pleasure,
they not being paid a fixed salary on the hourly, daily, weekly or monthly basis.
It results that the working hours of the plaintiffs as taxi drivers were entirely characterized by
its irregularity, as distinguished from the specific regular remuneration predicated on specific
and regular hours of work of factories and commercial employees.
In the case of the plaintiffs, it is the result of their labor, not the labor itself, which determines
their commissions. They worked under no compulsion of turning a fixed income for each
given day. . . ..
In an opinion dated June 1, 1939 (Opinion No. 115) modified by Opinion No. 22, series 1940, dated
June 11, 1940, the Secretary of Justice held that chauffeurs of the Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. who
"observed in a loose way certain working hours daily," and "the time they report for work as well as
the time they leave work was left to their discretion.," receiving no fixed salary but only 20 per cent of
their gross earnings, may be considered as piece workers and therefore not covered by the
provisions of the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
The Wage Administration Service of the Department of Labor in its Interpretative Bulletin No. 2 dated
May 28, 1953, under "Overtime Compensation," in section 3 thereof entitled Coverage, says:
The provisions of this bulletin on overtime compensation shall apply to all persons employed
in any industry or occupation, whether public or private, with the exception of farm laborers,
non-agricultural laborers or employees who are paid on piece work, contract, pakiao, task
or commission basis, domestic servants and persons in the personal service of another and
members of the family of the employer working for him.

From all this, to us it is clear that the claim of the plaintiffs-appellants for overtime compensation
under the Eight-Hour Labor Law has no valid support.
As to the month pay (mesada) under article 302 of the Code of Commerce, article 2270 of the new
Civil Code (Republic Act 386) appears to have repealed said Article 302 when it repealed the
provisions of the Code of Commerce governing Agency. This repeal took place on August 30, 1950,
when the new Civil Code went into effect, that is, one year after its publication in the Official Gazette.
The alleged termination of services of the plaintiffs by the defendant took place according to the
complaint on September 4, 1950, that is to say, after the repeal of Article 302 which they invoke.
Moreover, said Article 302 of the Code of Commerce, assuming that it were still in force speaks of
"salary corresponding to said month." commonly known as "mesada." If the plaintiffs herein had no
fixed salary either by the day, week or month, then computation of the month's salary payable would
be impossible. Article 302 refers to employees receiving a fixed salary. Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino in his
book entitled "Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Commercial Laws of the Philippines," Vol. 1,
4th edition, p. 160, says that article 302 is not applicable to employees without fixed salary. We
quote —
Employees not entitled to indemnity. — This article refers only to those who are engaged
under salary basis, and not to those who only receive compensation equivalent to whatever
service they may render. (1 Malagarriga 314, citing decision of Argentina Court of Appeals on
Commercial Matters.)
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Diokno,
JJ., concur.
Paras, C.J., concurs in the result.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 18081

March 3, 1922

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CHEONG BOO, deceased.
MORA ADONG, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CHEONG SENG GEE, opponent-appellant.
Kincaid, Perkins & Kincaid and P. J. Moore for petitioner-appellant.
Carlos A. Sobral for opponent-appellant.
MALCOLM, J.:
The two question presented for determination by these appeals may be framed as follows: Is a
marriage contracted in China and proven mainly by an alleged matrimonial letter, valid in the
Philippines? Are the marriage performed in the Philippines according to the rites of the
Mohammedan religion valid? As the decision of the Supreme Court on the last point will affect
marriages consummated by not less than one hundred and fifty thousand Moros who profess the
Mohammedan faith, the transcendental importance of the cause can be realized. We proposed to
give to the subject the serious consideration which it deserves.
Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands, on August 5, 1919.
He left property worth nearly P100,000. The estate of the deceased was claimed, on the one hand,
by Cheong Seng Gee, who alleged that he was a legitimate child by a marriage contracted by
Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in China in 1895. The estate was claimed, on the other hand, by the Mora
Adong who alleged that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine
Islands, and her daughters, Payang, married to Cheng Bian Chay, and Rosalia Cheong Boo,
unmarried.
The conflicting claims to the estate of Cheong Boo were ventilated in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga. The trial judge, the Honorable Quirico Abeto, after hearing the evidence presented by
both sides, reached the conclusion, with reference to the allegations of Cheong Seng Gee, that the
proof did not sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage, but that because Cheong Seng Gee had
been admitted to the Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as

Cheong Boo is said to have remained in China for one year and four months after his marriage during which time there was born to him and his wife a child named Cheong Seng Gee. With reference to the allegations of the Mora Adong and her daughters Payang and Rosalia. to a young lady named Tan Dit. or. Cheong Seng Gee. From the judgment of the Judge of First Instance both parties perfected appeals. 1. and (2) the validity of the Mohammedan marriage. respecfully answers the venerable Chiong Ing. accepting his offer of marriage. As to the legal issues submitted for decision by the numerous assignments of error. Cheong Boo then left China for the Philippine Islands and sometime thereafter took to himself a concubine Mora . on February 16. I consider the marriage of your son Boo with my sister Lit Chia as a mandate of God and I hope that they treat each other with great love and mutual courtesy and that both they and their parents be very happy. There was also introduced in evidence a document in Chinese which in translation reads as follows: One hundred years of life and health for both. during the second moon of the twenty-first year of the Emperor Quang Su. according to the modern count. Validity of the Chinese Marriage The theory advanced on behalf of the claimant Cheong Seng Gee was that Cheong Boo was married in the city of Amoy. Your nephew. father of the bridegroom.a natural child. China. Witnesses were presented who testified to having been present at the marriage ceremony. accordingly. and prolific issue. and let this document serve as proof of the acceptance of said marriage which is to be celebrated during the merry season of the flowers. as noble and great as that which you brought forth. the trial judge reached the conclusion that the marriage between the Mora Adong and the deceased had been adequately proved but that under the laws of the Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage. As to the facts. 1985. and Rosalia. we can say that we agree in substance with the findings of the trial court. these can best be resolved under two heads. Tan Chao. The order of the trial judge. was that there should be a partition of the property of the deceased Cheong Boo between the natural children. Given during the second moon of the twenty-first year of the reign of the Emperor Quang Su. namely: (1) The validity of the Chinese marriage. following these conclusions. I take advantage of this occasion to wish for your and the spouses much happiness. the daughters Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. Payang. a long life.

Cheong Seng Gee. however.. The deceased. In the case at bar there is no competent testimony as to what the laws of China in the Province of Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895. Philippine Islands. which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted. He appears to have first landed on Philippine soil sometime prior to the year 1896. and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of such impediment. We are not disposed to disturb this appreciation of fact by the trial court. 137. as to the conflicting claims to the estate of a Chinese merchant. His Honor noted a strong inclination on the part of the Chinese witnesses. the courts of the Philippines and the Supreme Court of the United States were called upon to decide. was permitted to land in the Philippine Islands as the son of Cheong Boo.. and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage. strong.by whom he had two children. The immigration documents only go to show the relation of parent and child existing between the deceased Cheong Boo and his son Cheong Seng Gee and do not establish the marriage between the deceased and the mother of Cheong Seng Gee. by overstepping the limits of truthfulness. But we are not called upon to make a pronouncement on the question. 216). 16 Phil. never returned to his native hearth and seems never to have corresponded with his Chinese wife or to have had any further relations with her except once when he sent her P10. 22 Phil. the affidavit of Cheong Boo before the American Vice-Consul at Sandakan. we find him in Basilan." Another case in the same category is that of Son Cui vs. There he was married to . 2. Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order No. especially the brother of Cheong Boo. as appears from documents presented in evidence. though an alleged prior Chinese marriage. As in the Encarnacion case. 335). that the proof did not sustain the allegation of the claimant Cheong Seng Gee. Cheong Seng Gee. as we have said. Cheong Boo was followed to the Philippines by Cheong Seng Gee who. in the year las mentioned. to protect the interests of the alleged son. [1913]. it is first necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact. The legal rule was stated by the United States Supreme Court to be this: A Philippine marriage. Substitute twenty-three years for forty years and the two cases are the same. This finding finds some support in Exhibit 3. in the Philippine Islands.S. followed by forty years of uninterrupted marital life. His Honor also noted that reliable witnesses stated that in the year 1895. should not be impugned and discredited. between the descendants of an alleged Chinese marriage and the descendants of an alleged Philippine marriage. As a case directly in point is the leading one of Sy Joc Lieng vs. The Supreme Courts of the Philippine Islands and the United States united in holding that the Chinese marriage was not adequately proved. are valid in these Islands. when Cheong Boo was supposed to have been in China. Here. "save upon proof so clear. strong. there is lacking proof so clear. 228 U. the testamentary rights of an acknowledged natural child." To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision. after the death of the husband and administration of his estate.. The trial judge found. Guepangco ([1912]. British North Borneo. he was in reality in Jolo. The lower court allowed the claimant. At least. 68) provides that "All marriages contracted without these Islands. Encarnacion ([1910]). and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. In 1910. because the oppositor-appellant indicates silent acquiescence by assigning no error. that Cheong Boo had married in China. Validity of the Mohammedan Marriage The biographical data relating to the Philippine odyssey of the Chinaman Cheong Boo is fairly complete.

and pardon." and Mohammedanism is a "denomination. While it is true that . a Buddhist priest." according to the lexicographers. 441. Haggin [1892]. Notwithstanding the insinuation of counsel for the Chinese appellant that the custom is prevalent among the Moros to favor in their testimony.. justice of the peace. 9. Both in his relations with Mora Adong and with third persons during his lifetime. Then the Iman asked the parents if they had any objection to the marriage. From the marriage day until the death of Cheong Boo. sacrifice. the chief of the rancheria. or priest or minister of the Gospel of any denomination . Marahadja Sahibil. Everett [1868]. a relative or friend. failing to take account of the word "priest. In this instance.. twenty-three years later. 35 Neb. deliverance. Payang. etc. now a municipal councilor. means one especially consecrated to the service of a divinity and considered as the medium through whom worship. in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage. He admitted this relationship in several private and public documents." Counsel. The Iman read from the Koran. namely. are living. obtained by the worshipper. "Priest. two of whom. prayer." The law is quite correct in affirming that no precise ceremonial is indispensable requisite for the creation of the marriage contract. Dec. Nor do we think there can exist any doubt as to consent. Are the marriages performed in the Philippines according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion valid? Three sections of the Marriage Law (General Order No. by the Iman who solemnized the marriage. as a priest of Baal or of Jehovah. Payang and Rosalia. In reReinhart. The two essentials of a valid marriage are capacity and consent. H. but the parties must declare. No. when different legal documents were executed. We believe this is a strained interpretation. one of whom was the father of the bride. or other service is to be offered to the being worshipped.) A Mohammedan Iman is a "priest or minister of the Gospel. the Chinaman and the Mora Adong cohabited as husband and wife. blessing. and another. That a marriage ceremony took place is established by one of the parties to the marriage. according to the ceremonies of the Mohammedan religion. Thus. that they take each other as husband and wife. A "denomination" is a religious sect having a particular name. To them were born five children. . The groom complied with Quranic law by giving to the bride a dowry of P250 in money and P250 in goods. Cheong Boo treated Adong as his lawful wife.the Mora Adong according to the ceremonies prescribed by the book on marriage of the Koran. The latter element may be inferred from the ceremony performed. The religious rites began with the bride and groom seating themselves in the house of the father of the bride. "Minister of the Gospel" means all clergymen of every denomination and faith. It is next incumbent upon us to approach the principal question which we announced in the very beginning of this decision. . the acts of the parties. The following section of the Marriage Law." within the meaning of the Marriage Law. and by other eyewitnesses. 68) must be taken into consideration." and only considering the phrase "minister of the Gospel of any denomination" would limit the meaning of this clause to ministers of the Christian religion. Hale vs. VI. it seems to us that proof could not be more convincing of the fact that a marriage was contracted by the Chinaman Cheong Boo and the Mora Adong. and habit or repute. especially when they do not swear on the Koran to tell the truth. 375. including decrees of registration. 53 N. Section V of the Marriage Law provides that "Marriage may be solemnized by either a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court.. (Haggin vs. Cheong Boo stated that he was married to the Mora Adong while as late as 1918. he gave written consent to the marriage of his minor daughter. The marital act was consummated by the groom entering the woman's mosquito net. 9 O. by the Mohammedan Iman (priest) Habubakar. provides that "No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required. there is no question of capacity. the Mora Adong.

and if either of the parties thought that they had been married? Is there any word or hint of any word which would restrict the curative provisions of section IX of the Marriage Law to Christian marriages? By what system of mental gymnastics would it be possible to evolve from such precise language the curious idea that it was restricted to marriages performed under the Spanish law before the revolutionary authorities? In view of the importance of the question. Reinhardt [1907]. and that the separation . (Travers vs. shall forever be allowed . or omission. The particular portion of the law which.. or either of them. That no form of religion and no minister of religion shall be forced upon any community or upon any citizen of the Islands. it is likewise true that the Chinaman and the Mora woman did in fact take each other to be husband and wife and did thereafter live together as husband and wife. if it was not to legalize the marriage. is controlling. What authority there is for this statement. without discrimination or preference. 423. To quote the judge: This provisions relates to marriages contracted by virtue of the provisions of the Spanish law before revolutionary authorized to solemnized marriages. irregularity. Note for a moment the all embracing words found in this section: "No marriage" — Could more inclusive words be found? "Heretofore solemnized" — Could any other construction than that of retrospective force be given to this phrase? "Before any person professing to have authority therefor shall be invalid for want of such authority" — Could stronger language than this be invoked to announce legislative intention? "Or on account of any informality. that he had authority and that they have been lawfully married.. provided that "The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured Instructions to the Philippine Commission imposed on every branch of the Government of the Philippine Islands the inviolable rule "that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Treaty of Paris in its article X. or either of them." The trial judge in construing this provision of law said that he did not believe that the legislative intention in promulgating it was to validate marriages celebrated between Mohammedans.S.during the Mohammedan ceremony. if it was celebrated with the belief of the parties. reading as follows: "No marriage heretofore solemnized before any person professing to have authority therefor shall be invalid for want of such authority or on account of any informality. and it is not to be presumed that the legislator intended by this law to validate void marriages celebrated during the Spanish sovereignty contrary to the laws which then governed. nothing could be clearer than the language used in section IX. To our mind. we do not desire to stop here but would ascertain from other sources the meaning and scope of Section IX of General Order No. no minister of religion shall be interfered with or molested in following his calling. 68. irregularity. is section IX. the remarks of the priest were addressed more to the elders than to the participants. organic law. been announced by treaty. statutory law. that. or omission" — Could the legislative mind frame an idea which would more effectively guard the marriage relation against technicality? "If it was celebrated with the belief of the parties. It would be possible to leave out of view altogether the two sections of the Marriage Law which have just been quoted and discussed. in our opinion.. we cannot conceive. time and again. upon the other hand. if it was celebrated by any person who thought that he had authority to perform the same. 205 U. and that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship. and executive proclamation. that he had authority and that they have been lawfully married" — What was the purpose of the legislator here. The purpose of the government toward the Mohammedan population of the Philippines has.

91 N. 114 of the Legislative Council amended and approved by the Philippine Commission. The rule as to Mormon marriages is that the sealing ceremony entered into before a proper official by members of that Church competent to contract marriage constitutes a valid marriage. The Philippine Bill and the Jones Law reproduced the main constitutional provisions establishing religious toleration and equality.) Section IX of the Marriage Law is in the nature of a curative provision intended to safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages. . with which it will not interfere in the slightest way. as to make quotation of the same superfluous. 101 Ind.between state and church shall be real. an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. were against the law. the Spanish Government guaranteed "with all solemnity to the Sultan and other inhabitants of Sulu the free exercise of their religion. Villafuerte and Rabano [1905]. in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case. Teter [1884]. Consequently. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed. (U. every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. 1283. must be recognized as a valid marriage..) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage. 129. sec. 34 Phil. the Quakers. . but. 633.. . A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 1851. it can render valid. they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. may modify the application of the law of the Philippine Islands." (See further Act No. The retrospective provisions of the Philippine Marriage Law undoubtedly were inspired by the governmental policy in the United States.. when such action is deemed wise. except laws of the United States applicable to the Philippine Islands.) For instance. that a marriage between two Indians entered into according to the customs and laws of the people at a place where such customs and laws are in force. The rule as to Indians marriages is.) Various responsible officials have so oft announced the purpose of the Government not to interfere with the customs of the Moros. entered into by the Captain General of the Philippines and the Sultan of Sulu. supra.. S. provided that "Judges of the Court of First Instance and justices of the peace deciding civil cases in which the parties are Mohammedans or pagans. and it will also respect their customs. Memoracion and Uri [1916]. 2520 of the Philippine Commission. 4 Phil. Act No.. therefore. and the Mormons. 273. peace. to be in fact married. and even their prejudices.Guepangco. The reason is that such is the common order of society. C. No. 1881. The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.Government of the United States [1914]. Executive and legislative policy both under Spain and the United States followed in the same path. entire. that they will be left to their own customs and that their marriages will be recognized although they use no solemnization. Stonington [1822].:" (Sec. "the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs. . Baity vs. their habits. marriages which. 476. . For instance. We can see no substantial reason for denying to the legislative power the right to remove impediments to an effectual marriage. taking into account local laws and customs. . sec. U." The notable state paper of President McKinley also enjoined the Commission. 28. 616. . 13 [ j]. . Cranfill [1884]. vs. when they took place. and absolute. 787. vs. 6 [b]. especially their religious customs. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract. and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands" and that. Act No. If the legislative power can declare what shall be valid marriages. 4 Conn. Public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard acts intended to invalidate marriages. Son Cui vs. section 3. Act No. Teter vs.) . "to bear in mind that the Government which they are establishing is designed . and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being. for the happiness.S. 28 Phil. The rule as to the Society of Quakers is. 209. Cacho vs. 334. it is a new relation. in the Treaty of April 30. with regard to the marriages of the Indians. (Coghsen vs." (See further Decree of the Governor-General of January 14.

In the first place. There are other questions presented in the various assignments of error which it is unnecessary to decide. either to proclaim immorality or to sanction morality. either to make all of the children born of these unions bastards or to make them legitimate. Avanceña. And here the consequences. We then have it within our power either to nullify or to validate all of these marriages. we would unhesitatingly revoke the doctrine announced in the two cases above mentioned.. . was void. We do not. and for further proceedings in accordance with law.. We regard the evidence as producing a moral conviction of the existence of the Mohammedan marriage. and we find the Mohammedan marriage to be proved and to be valid. 434) and United States vs. 29 Phil. 33 Phil. concur. these were criminal actions and two Justice dissented.. in the Tubban case. and the case shall be returned to the lower court for a partition of the property in accordance with this decision. in deciding as to whether or not the accused should be given the benefit of the so-called unwritten law. In neither case. Judgment is reversed in part. 285). Street. Ostrand.. either to block or to advance settled governmental policy. would be far reaching in disastrous result.J. In the second place. if necessary. Johnson. We are free to admit that. we find the Chinese marriage not to be proved and that the Chinaman Cheong Seng Gee has only the rights of a natural child. C. thus giving to the widow and the legitimate children of this union the rights accruing to them under the law. That is the true construction which will best carry legislative intention into effect. JJ. however. Inresume. it is so ordered. entailed in holding that the marriage of the Mora Adong and the deceased Cheong Boo. In moving toward our conclusion. Verzola ([1916. We regard the provisions of section IX of the Marriage law as validating marriages performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion. Tubban ([1915]). in conformity with the Mohammedan religion and Moro customs. we have not lost sight of the decisions of this court in the cases of United Statesvs. 68. The last census shows that there are at least one hundred fifty thousand Moros who have been married according to local custom. Villamor. Without special findings as to costs in this instance. Our duty is a obvious as the law is plain.The courts can properly incline the scales of their decisions in favors of that solution which will mot effectively promote the public policy. while in the Verzola case. Johns and Romualdez.. Araullo. the marriage in question was a tribal marriage of the Kalingas. was any consideration given to the provisions of section IX of General Order No. believe these decisions to be controlling. the marriage had been performed during the Spanish regime by a lieutenant of the Guardia Civil.

the court declared valid the decision rendered by the Board of Special Inquiry No. petitioner-appellee. HON. petitioner filed a motion for new trial requesting an opportunity to clarify certain points taken in the decision. ET AL.R. 3 rendered a decision finding petitioner to be legally married to Perfecto Blas and admitting her into the country as a non-quota immigrant. but the same was denied for lack of merit. VIVO. BAUTISTA ANGELO. This decision was affirmed by the Board of Commissioners on July 12. rendered a new decision reversing that of the Board of Special Inquiry No. Platon A. 3 while it restrained respondents from excluding petitioner from the country. 1961. and. No. L-21076 March 31. petitioner initiated the instant petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Manila which incidentally was considered by it as a petition forcertiorari.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. respondents filed their answer. 1962. In due time. toto the relief prayed for. J. but composed entirely of a new set of members. Thus. the same Board of Commissioners. However. attaching thereto some documentary evidence. . the court a quo rendered a decision granting in. Office of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellants.: On June 28. 1965 WONG WOO YIU alias NG YAO. 1962. 1962. ETC. Whereupon. respondents-appellants. vs. MARTINIANO P. On August 9. on September 14.. 1961 of which petitioner was duly informed in a letter sent on the same date by the Secretary of the Board. Baysa for petitioner-appellee. Respondents interposed the present appeal. 3 and ordering petitioner to be excluded from the country. the Board of Special Inquiry No.. on June 28. after the parties had submitted a written stipulation of facts.

petitioner declared that she came to the Philippines in 1961 for the first time to join her husband Perfecto Blas to whom she was married in Chingkang. therefore. 1929. Thus. and that Perfecto Blas in the same affidavit likewise claimed that he first went to China when he was merely four years old so that computed from his date of birth in 1908 it must have been in 1912. 1961 the Board of Special Inquiry No." the Board of Commissioners motu proprio reviewed the record concerning the admission of petitioner into the country resulting in its finding that she was improperly admitted. then in 1939. or a priest or minister of the gospel of any denomination duly registered in the Philippine Library and Museum (Public Act 3412. a justice of the peace. that on June 28. and lastly in 1941. he could not therefore have been married to herein applicant in 1929. that their marriage was celebrated by one Chua Tio. even though living abroad. 1935 and 1941. that he was married to one Ng Yo in Ki Say. Indeed. although in his re-entry declaration he admitted that he first went to China in 1935. Chingkang. . 1962 the latter found that petitioner's claim that she is the lawful wife of Perfecto Blas was without basis in evidence as it was "bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship". and it is well-known that in 1929 in order that a marriage celebrated in the Philippines may be valid it must be solemnized either by a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court. among others. that petitioner is legally married to Perfecto Blas. that in a motu proprio decision rendered by the Board of Commissioners composed of a new set of members dated June 28. 1äwphï1. that this decision was affirmed by the Board of Commissioners of which petitioner was duly notified by the Secretary of said Board in a letter dated July 12. 1961. 1961. 1947 he declared that he first visited China in 1935 and married petitioner in 1936. not only is there no documentary evidence to support the alleged marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas but the record is punctured with so many inconsistencies which cannot but lead one to doubt their veracity concerning the pretended marriage in China in 1929. it finding support in the record. China on January 15. The above comment cannot be disputed. in the hearing conducted by a Board of special inquiry in connection with his entry on January 23. China in 1936. and admitted her into the country as a non-quota immigrant. 1947. it could not possibly sustain her claim that she married Perfecto Blas in 1929. Thus. Article 15 of our new Civil Code provides that laws relating to family rights or to the status of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines. said Board made the following comment: The only basis in support of the claim that she is the wife of Perfecto Blas is a mass of oral and documentary evidence bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship. that the marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas before a village leader is valid in China. coupled with the fact that the only basis in support of petitioner's claim that she is the lawful wife of Perfecto Blas is "a mass of oral and documentary evidence bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship. the same is not one of those authorized in our country. Section 2). This claim cannot also be entertained under our law on family relations. She relies on the records of Perfecto Blas in connection with his cancellation case and the testimony of the supposed children in the previous admission proceeding. that said Board further held that. a village leader. But this claim is belied by the admission of Perfecto Blas himself.It appears that in the proceedings held before the Board of Special Inquiry sometime in June. 1962 Perfecto Blas claimed that he went to China in 1929. a Filipino Citizen. 3 rendered a decision finding. it appearing that in the entry proceedings of Perfecto Blas had on January 23. his first visit there being in 1935. Even if we assume. that they had several children all of whom are not in the Philippines. then in 1937.ñët In view of the discrepancies found in the statements made by petitioner and her alleged husband Perfecto Blas in the several investigations conducted by the immigration authorities concerning their alleged marriage before a village leader in China in 1929. that in an affidavit dated August 9.

(Miciano v. 68. we should apply the general rule that in the absence of proof of the law of a foreign country it should be presumed that it is the same as our own. 3613. Such being the case.But it may be contended that under Section 4 of General orders No. J. Concepcion. cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. C. concur.. and Zaldivar.B. it is clear that petitioner's marriage.P. J.J. the decision appealed from is reversed. Dizon. . 30 Phil. Makalintal. But no validity can be given to this contention because no proof was presented relative to the law of marriage in China. The statutes of other countries or states must be pleaded and proved the same as any other fact. a marriage contracted outside of the Philippines which is valid under the law of the country in which it was celebrated is also valid in the Philippines. In the absence of evidence to the contrary foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.L. Collector of Customs. JJ. Paredes. as reproduced in Section 19 of Act No. As a corollary. it will be presumed to be the same as the domestic law on the same subject. 867). Reyes. and a village leader is not one of them. 36 Phil. Regala. (Yam Ka Lim v. which is now Article 71 of our new Civil Code. 50 Phil. In the absence of anything to the contrary as to the character of a foreign law. Brimo. No costs. Bengzon.. the petition for mandamus filed before the court a quo is hereby dismissed. even if true. 46). 472). Collector of Customs. Bengzon.. WHEREFORE. Courts cannot take judicial notice of what such laws are. Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the officers mentioned therein. Barrera. In the absence of pleading and proof the laws of a foreign country or state will be presumed to be the same as our own. (Lim and Lim vs..

9262.A.THIRD DIVISION G.2 On January 19.: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM. v. which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. for violation of Republic Act (R. Respondent. 1990. FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM. they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu). December 10. DECISION PERALTA. Petitioner. docketed as Criminal Case No. who at the time of the filing of the .R. CBU-85503. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem. 2014 NORMA A. 1994. respectively. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on September 25. No. 2010. 2010 and September 1. DEL SOCORRO. The following facts are culled from the records: Petitioner Norma A. J. 193707. otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.) No.

respondent was arraigned. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court.9 Respondent and his new wife established a business known as Paree Catering.16 Consequently. respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan.3 Unfortunately.12 Because of the foregoing circumstances. Roderigo. the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein respondent. states that: That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present. refuse and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM. 2010.15 Upon motion and after notice and hearing. Cebu City. Roderigo. through her counsel.500.17 Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his Opposition. and since then.20 On February 19. did then and there wilfully. unlawfully and deliberately deprive.instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age. posted bail. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.5Thereafter. without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection order. petitioner.19 Subsequently. which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof. petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines. in the Municipality of Minglanilla. sent a letter demanding for support from respondent. including their son. of financial support legally due him. 2009. have been residing thereat.11 On August 28. located at Barangay Tajao.A. the above-named accused. subsequently. and (2) prescription of the crime charged. since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines. However. more or less. respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. respondent refused to receive the letter. their marriage bond ended on July 19. paragraph E(2) of R.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto.8 Not long thereafter. resulting in economic abuse to the victim. are presently living in Cebu City. their son was only eighteen (18) months old.00 more or less). respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17.21 dismissing the .18 Pending the resolution thereof. petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5. the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against respondent. Philippines. respondent was arrested and. The information. a fourteen (14) year old minor. all the parties.4 At that time. respondent never gave support to the son.7 However. 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order.14 Thereafter. No. Cebu. to which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit. CONTRARY TO LAW.10 To date. Municipality of Pinamungahan. Province of Cebu.6 According to petitioner.

2010. SO ORDERED. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law.”24 On September 1. 9262 which “equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality. Consequently. let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite the fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court. Thus. failure to do so makes him liable under R. thus. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child. 2010. the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. consistent with the ruling in Republic v. and 2. notwithstanding that he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support. the dispositive part of which states: WHEREFORE. he cannot be charged of violating R. the case should be dismissed. the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released. Cebu City.A. orders this case DISMISSED. 2010. February 19. Cebu City. and accordingly.27 At the outset. hence. it is the considered opinion of the court that no prima facie case exists against the accused herein. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support to his child. No. September 1. the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to give support to his child.28 which lays down the .A.A. No. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues: 1. Philippines. WHEREFORE. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R. SO ORDERED. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation. Thus: x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the memorandum of the prosecution. he being an alien.A.instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien. the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused.26 Hence.22 Thereafter. petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s obligation to support their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code. Philippines. Unless it is conclusively established that R.

to wit: x x x Nevertheless. No. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law. and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. Thus. Now. dismissing the instant petition and remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time. Malabanan..31 respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner. which provides the parent’s obligation to support his child. The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case. the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response thereto concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts. we do not fully agree with petitioner’s contentions. in the present case.” (Emphasis supplied) There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted.e. and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. moreover.29 Indeed. it is imperative that the legal obligation to support exists. 9262. and whether or not he can be held criminally liable under R. Furthermore. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so. the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC. . on the matter of the substantive issues. effort and resources of the courts. in case only questions of law are raised or involved. whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41. Nonetheless. (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42. i. In Republic v. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code. No. or mixed questions of fact and law. specifically in relation to family rights and duties. Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code.A. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. deserves a definitive ruling by this Court. It cannot be negated. of law.A. the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court. whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law. “The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases. To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R. This latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law. We find the petition meritorious. that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable under special criminal laws. therefore. considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

he is not obligated to petitioner for any financial support. for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed by their personal law. as well as her minor son. Article 15). This does not. insofar as Philippine laws are concerned. In other words.36 The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. who is a foreign citizen. It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before. 43 In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor. as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child. specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support. they must be alleged and proved. the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. Court of Appeals.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree. mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether. Civil Code. Like any other fact. our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 34 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent. the laws of the nation to which they belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf.42 has already enunciated that: True. In international law. that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article 195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner that she.40 In the present case. he never proved the same. it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law. i. not to Philippine law. as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.. however. Under this doctrine. because Llorente v.38 the Court held that – Furthermore. foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Cloribel. By analogy.33 On this point. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands.37 In the case of Vivo v. therefore. the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties. we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country. they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. since Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. being still aliens. the same only applies to Filipino citizens. since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case. he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. are entitled to financial support.On the other hand. 39 It cannot be gainsaid. during or after the issuance of a divorce decree). which enforces the obligation of .e. if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son. the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands.44 Thus.

or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the matter of status of persons. Moreover. public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated. San Luis. however. judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum. We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law. a law. she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. hence. the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24. foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. It held: . judgment or order shall not be applied. respondent is no longer liable to support his former wife. even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith. respondent’s obligation to support his child is specifically stated.46 which was not disputed by respondent. in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. prohibitive laws concerning persons. To give justice is the most important function of law. American Realty Corporation.48 Applying the foregoing. said law would still not find applicability. et al. vs. We emphasize.47 to wit: In the instant case. the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is not liable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto. NT and SA v. when the foreign law. in light of the ruling in Bank of America.parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith. the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. and those which have for their object public order. Moreover. while in Pilapil v. Sy-Gonzales. their acts or property. that as to petitioner herself. Thus.49 to wit: As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife. Section 4. Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent — If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action. said foreign law would still not find applicability. Further. or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. the said foreign law. Ibay-Somera'. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee. Additionally. The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant.

observe respect and fidelity. or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support. xxxx (i) Causing mental or emotional anguish. physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm. (Emphasis added)50 Based on the foregoing legal precepts. or intimidation directed against the woman or child. the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an act of violence against women and children. which provides that:“[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory. we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child. that .The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary xxxx (e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in. petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109. but not limited to. including.” On this score..51 Under the aforesaid special law. but not admitting. applies to the instant case. repeated verbal and emotional abuse. in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code. and render support to private respondent. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force. seq. we find strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law. No. under our laws. of the Civil Code cannot be just . we find that respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R. to wit: SECTION 5. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with.A. This shall include. that. as private respondent does. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest. As such. subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations. the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct: xxxx (2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family . et. our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support to petitioner’s son. considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines. anddenial of financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children. In addition. it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. but not limited to.To maintain. Finally.

WHEREFORE. CANDIDA MANALO. of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides that: No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. the criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R. the petition is GRANTED. TEDDY ACTANG.: The second paragraph of Section 39. No. The Orders dated February 19.R. Prescriptive Period.A..petitioner. we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case. 9262 is a continuing offense. that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented.A. JURADO. JJ. .A. LUCENA CRUZ. VICTORIANO DACULLA. The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R. No. and the truth and falsehood of facts being admitted. PALAWAN. SO ORDERED. JR. PASTOR JOSOL. No. BIDIN. 9262 in the instant case. GUTIERREZ. duly represented by MAYOR RICARDO F. the entire original record shall be transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered consecutively. Jr. 1987 THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF CORON. Villarama. ASSOCIATE JUSTICES PORFIRIO V. PEPITO YAMBAO. 2010. Velasco. JOSE CARINO. MARCELINO R. 2010 and September 1. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years. vs. VELOSO and DESIDERIO P. 9262. together with an index of the contents thereof. (Chairperson). Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present.there is a legal basis for charging violation of R. L-65894 September 24. RIC GACUTAN. ANDRES DACULLA. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. The case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case. In lieu thereof.. Given. HILARIA YALON.*and Reyes. Accordingly. however. SISON. which provides that: SECTION 24. the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed. J. No. Jr. LETICIA RAMAL. LIM. Mendoza. concur. ABDULWAHID A.. respectively.. FELICISIMA URSAIS. BEN GUMASING. respondents.

The action sought authority from the court to demolish the structures built by the private respondents alongside the rock causeway of the petitioner's wharf. and also to ease the congested traffic along it (par.Likewise. (Decision CFI. in the broader interest of justice and considering that under the present Interim Rules a record on appeal is no longer necessary for taking an appeal. 6. 7. 15). Palawan and Puerto Princess City. and that for the indigent defendants. the defendants had already been given 3 extensions thereby delaying their ejectment therefrom (par. Ibid). among others: that the defendants' houses were constructed more than 3 years before the filing of instant action (par. 2. the mayor of the plaintiff-municipality is also authorized to remove the defendants' illegal constructions under LOI 19 (par. Sections 18 and 19(b) of the Interim Rules of Court promulgated on January 11. except in the cases referred to in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph (1) hereof. (Rollo. an action was filed by the petitioner before the Court of First Instance of Palawan and Puerto Princess City. 12-13) Following are the pertinent facts of the case as culled from the records. 4. Puerto Princess for further proceedings before this Court. 9. 1983 provide that: Sec.: that on August 19. a surveyed area has already been made ready for their relocation (par. p. notwithstanding the foregoing. Ibid). 5. Marcos had the Mayor of plaintiff-municipality to demolish and remove all constructions along the pier after giving the defendants one month notice (par. No appeal bond shall be required for an appeal. Ibid). 10. Sometime in 1976. 1974 the herein defendants undertook to remove their structures on space where they were then at that time and are presently standing. Reno. Branch IV. Whether or not the above provisions are applicable to the case at bar is the lone issue in this petition which assails the resolution of the respondent appellate court dated July 29. Ibid). Ibid) and aside from this directive of the President. that most of the defendants are affluent squatters (par. Ibid). Branch IV where it was docketed as Civil Case No. pp. Complaint). a record of appeal being required. The dispositive part of the questioned resolution reads: WHEREFORE. that his Excellency. 35. The complaint alleged. Ibid). Ibid). the Court resolved to order the recall of the records of this case from the Regional Trial Court of Palawan Branch I. President Ferdinand E. 18. when it will be needed by the government (par. 12. p. . 19 (b) In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed. The filing of a record on appeal shall be dispensed with. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 3. 1983. the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days. that the space or area is needed by the plaintiff for the docking or berthing of pumpboats (motorized bancas) and fishing boats and for the loading and unloading of cargoes along the pier on both sides thereof (par. that despite said mayor's desire to comply immediately with the said presidential directive. 2.

the private respondents. pp. the dispositive portion of which reads: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING. The lower court issued an order granting the petitioner's motion and considered the case submitted for decision. et al. 1979. (Rollo." On May 15. the private respondents went to the appellate court on certiorari. Benjamin Vega. in their answer. and 22.. the Philippine Coast Guard. pp. SP-09389-R captioned "Jose Carino. the trial court. 1979. Judge CFI. 16. Consequently. authorizing the herein plaintiff represented by its incumbent mayor to demolish the said structures at the expense of the said defendants. among others: that their structures when made were covered by building permits with the approval of the Bureau of Public Highways (par. the private respondents filed a notice to take deposition which the lower court disregarded for being "irrelevant and for other obvious reasons. Answer). 2. March 20. the same having been attended by the local representatives of the Philippine Constabulary. 2. Palawan and against all the herein defendants as follows: 1. that the area where their structures were located is a foreshore area (Par. counter-alleged. Branch IV. 15. 21. the Sangguniang Bayan and the defendants and it was agreed in this meeting that the demolition of the defendants' houses will be suspended pending action of the Office of the President (par. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffmunicipality of Coron. 1979. 28-29) . Confirming the power of plaintiff-municipality and authority of its incumbent mayor to demolish the defendants' structures along the rock causeway or pier of Coron. 4. Ibid). Costs against all the defendants. despite proper notice. (Rollo. 1979 with further warning to the private respondents that no more postponements shall be allowed. that a meeting was convened and presided by Governor Socrates at Coron.On the other hand. on January 16. Mayor Ricardo Lim and Hon. 1979. On March 20. Ordering the said defendants to remove their structures in the area in question within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision and for their failure to do so. 1516) After a series of postponements. the lower court rendered its decision. In view of the above order. and 3. the appellate court dismissed for lack of merit CA G. the Department (now Ministry) of Social Services and Development. and that the Chairman of the National Housing Authority had sent a letter-advice to the mayor of the plaintiff-municipality to suspend the demolition of the houses of the defendants (par. Dismissing the defendants'counterclaim for lack of merit. petitioners v. On June 9. Palawan. the petitioner moved that private respondents' nonappearance be considered as a waiver on their part of their right to cross-examine the petitioner's witnesses and their right to present evidence.R. the private respondents and their counsel failed to appear at the scheduled hearing. 18. reset the hearing of the case for the last time for three consecutive dates. Ibid). after the main case had been submitted for decision as aforestated." On October 10. Ibid). 17. 1980.

In its opposition to the private respondents' motion. printed records on appeal are no longer required. In a resolution dated July 19. 1982 within which the required printed copies of the record on appeal may be submitted. the Acting Clerk of Court of the appellate court. No. 32) Upon motion by the private respondents. a writ of execution was issued to enforce the October 10. 1983. the private respondents. a temporary restraining order dated April 29. their applicability only covers pending actions and does not extend to those which had already become final and executory. their right to be heard on appeal must be upheld instead of the rule on technicalities. the private respondents argued that since under the present law. in an Entry of Judgment. The petitioner maintains that the Interim Rules of Court promulgated on January 11. However. Branch IV. the Petitioner pointed out that although the newly promulgated procedural rules invoked by the private respondents may be given retroactive effect.R. 1982. 1983 to implement the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 29 cannot apply to the case at bar for the simple reason that to revive or recall appealed cases which had been dismissed or which had become final and executory would cause a great injustice to those in whose favor these cases had been decided. despite the extended period given. the private respondents on February 2. Accordingly. the appellate court issued the disputed resolution. 1980 decision. 1982. the appellate court resolved to dismiss the private respondents' appeal docketed as CA G.On appeal. 1982. the appellate court required the private respondents to show cause why their appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the printed copies of the record on appeal. On August 31. 1983. We find merit in the petitioner's contentions. It is further contended that to allow its application would put no end to those appealed cases which are otherwise considered as closed ones. certified that the above resolution dismissing the private respondents' appeal had become final and executory on September 27. As a consequence of the private respondents' motion to recall the records of the case. On July 29. 1983 asked the appellate court that the records of the case be recalled from the court of origin. the appellate court granted an extension of sixty (60) days from April 7. on February 1. p. 1983 was issued by the appellate court directing the Provincial Sheriff of Palawan to desist from executing the October 10. (Rollo. 1980 decision of the Court of First Instance of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City. 69052-R for failure to file the required record on appeal. Before the Provincial Sheriff could proceed with the execution of the judgment. In their supplemental motion. 1982. On December 6. 1982 were required "to submit the forty (40) printed copies of their record on appeal together with the proof of service of fifteen (15) copies thereof upon the appellee" within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice of the appellate court's Acting Clerk of Court regarding their appeal. the private respondents were not able to comply with the appellate court's requirement. The subsequent denial of the petitioner's motion for reconsideration prompted the filing of this petition. in a motion dated April 12. .

(See Siguenza vs. 1982 resolution. they still failed to do so. the private respondents should have complied with Section 5. Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Court of Appeals.We have resolved the issue as to the extent of the retroactive application of section 18 of the Interim Rules of Court in Alday v. The records of the instant case show that despite the 60-day extension period given to the private respondents within which they could file their printed record of appeal as then required. The private respondents even faulted the appellate court as having issued the July 19. Said provision implicitly grants the Court of Appeals the power to do so. Sumilang. as amended by our resolution en banc dated September 17. within fifteen (15) days from the date of the notice referred to in the preceding section. After having failed to submit the required printed copies of their record on appeal. 1983 resolution seeking to revive a case already long final as evidenced by the entry of judgment made by its Acting Clerk of Court on December 6. they cannot now rectify a clear non-compliance with the law by invoking the court's liberality insofar as the application of remedial laws is concerned. 137 SCRA 570). Duty of Appellant upon Receipt of Notice. it was to afford the private respondents a chance to explain why they failed to comply with the applicable rule. When the appellate court issued its July 19. 764 [1946]) Emphasis supplied. (See United CMC Textile Workers Union vs. (See Pfleider vs. The appellate court should have followed this time-honoured rule instead of issuing its July 29. As a general rule. 1982 resolution through oversight. 5. Clave. to pay to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals the fee for the docketing of the appeal. which partly provides that: Sec. it is an equally established doctrine that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. 123 SCRA 782 citing De Las Alas vs. Camilon (120 SCRA 521). (People vs. typewritten or mimeographed copies thereof upon the appellee. 98 SCRA 491). or twelve (12) typewritten or mimeographed (on one side of good quality paper. For a proper exercise of their right to appeal. 1982 requiring them to show cause why their appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the printed record on appeal. This is so because an appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause freed from the constraints of technicalities. eleven inches in length by eight and a half inches in width — commonly known as letter size — written double spaced) copies of said record on appeal together with proof of service of two (2) printed. 1983 that the private respondents responded to the appellate court's resolution dated July 19. 77 Phil. 1974. the Court of Appeals may dismiss his appeal. and within sixty (60) days from such notice to submit to the court twelve (12) printed copies of the record on appeal. 83 SCRA 200). Court of Appeals. It was only after a writ of execution had been issued on February 1. 137 SCRA 346). 1982. However. They claimed that the court's resolution must have been a result of oversight because they actually filed a record on appeal. (Castro vs. Court of Appeals. our policy towards an invocation of the right to appeal has been one of liberality. — It shall be the duty of the appellant. They alleged that they had filed the required . The private respondents in this case did not submit printed copies of their record on appeal. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. upon failure of the appellant to comply with the above rule. We reiterated the rule that: Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Victoriano. Thus.

FERIA. Dayrit. Pangasinan. * J. Gonzales vs. BONIFACIO MACARANAS ET AL. Emiliano C. and executory as an eventual result of the dismissal of the appeal. is entitled as a matter of right to the execution of the judgment in his favor. For the court. The resolution of respondent appellate court dated July 29. vs. 1948 VALENTIN CAMACHO. Gianzon. Barbara. 56614. vs.respondents. the petition is hereby GRANTED. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. petitioners. Court of Appeals.. during the agricultural year of 1946-1947. it becomes its ministerial duty to order the execution of said judgment. the petitioner in the instant case. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Guevarra as amici curiae. Solicitor Guillermo E. 122 SCRA 607). of the palay planted in the haciendas of the now respondents located in the municipality of Sta. 1983 is SET ASIDE. This decision is immediately executory. Inc. G.. 123 SCRA 203.R. L-1505 May 12. Torres and Onofre P. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. after deducting from the gross produce the expenses of harvesting and threshing. the lower court's judgment in favor of the petitioner became final. SO ORDERED. First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. JJ. Abad. Let the records of this case be remanded to the court of origin for enforcement of the writ of execution of the judgment. . Once a judgment becomes final the prevailing party. No. Fernan (Chairman).R. Primicias.record on appeal when in fact what they referred to was the record on appeal from the lower court to the appellate court and not the printed record on appeal. No. 1987 citing Agricultural and Industrial Marketing.. Mencias and Castillo for respondents Canson and Melga de Carretero. Bidin. Tabigne and Arsenio I.. Jr. Since the private respondents failed to submit the required printed record on appeal. concur. Valenzuela. WHEREFORE. Sayo. Paguia and Villanueva for petitioners. et al. (Santos.: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations which reversed that of the Tenancy Law Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice that ordered a 70 per cent and 30 per cent division in favor of the petitioners herein. J. ANGELES CANSON and TERESA MELGAR DE CARRETERO. Martinez for respondents Court of Industrial Relations. Feliciano and Cortes. promulgated July 28. 124 SCRA 331. vs. Court of Appeals. 118 SCRA 49. Balintawak Construction Supply Corporation vs. took no part.

was valid in Santa Barbara. in spite of the provisions of section 4 of Act No. one to be chosen by each party. which amended Act No. 14. (1) The major premise of the first conclusion is not correct. as decided by the said Tenancy Division of the Department of Justice. Commonwealth Act No. and so hold. 34 amendatory of section 8 and other sections of Act No. 1946 the date of the Proclamation . in accordance with section 8 Act No. be construed as to give effect to both. 34." But. therefore. in view of the provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act. 4054 provides that "the contract on share tenancy in order to be valid and binding shall be in writing. when the President issued Proclamation No. 4054 quoted in the preceding paragraph. 53 seems to recognize an oral contract inspite of section 4. Hence. No. 4054. of said Act No. 4054 which according to the lower court's theory recognizes the validity of an oral contract. if in the latter oral contract is not valid and binding. 4054. 4054 had not yet then made effective by proclamation in which oral tenancy contracts were valid. The ground on which the Court of Industrial Relations bases its decision is that." Republic Act 34. 4054 was proclaimed to be effective and. 4054 relating to share basis. and not before. Section 4 of Act No. 14 declaring the provision of Act No. no amount of evidence of whatever kind can be admitted to prove the legal existence and terms thereof. can not be applied to tenancy relation between the parties in this case without impairing the obligations of contract and infringing the Constitution. not by the provisions of section 3 Act No. 1937. It is elementary rule that a subsequent general law should not be construed to repeal or modify a prior special law.The decision appealed from declares that the participations of the parties in this case should be governed. are erroneous because they are based on incorrect premises. Act. to be in full force and effect through-out the Philippines. which amended section 8 of said Act No." and there being an" oral contract embodying the old customs of tenancy sharing observed by the parties prior to 1945-46 agricultural year. but not in those where said Act No. the oral contract embodying the old customs of tenancy sharing observed by the parties in this case prior to 1945-1946 agricultural year. but by an oral contract embodying the old customs of tenancy sharing observed by the parties. Because. 4054 enacted for the . 1946. that the decision of the lower court is contrary to law and. started from November 12. 34 which amended section 8 of Act No. No. and therefore. should be construed to apply to tenancy contracts on all other agricultural products which may be oral. After a mature deliberation. drawn in triplicate in the language known to all the parties there to be signed or thumbmarked both by the landlord or his authorized representative and by the tenant before two witnesses. promulgated on October 17. which prescribes that "where a covenant or contract made between the owner of land and a lessee or tenant on share thereof has not been reduced to writing or has not been forth in a document written in a language known to the lessee or tenant. and that the effectivity in Pangasinan of Republic Act No. Pangasinan. as amended. must be reversed. and therefore the former and subsequent act must if possible. therefore. 4054. to practically repeal section 4 Act No. the testimony of such lessee or tenant shall be accepted as prima facie evidence on the terms of a covenant are recognized by law in spite of the provision of section 4 Act No. 4054 in force in Pangasinan since 1937. we are of the opinion. No. for it would be retrogressive. 4054. and besides it is unconceivable that the Legislature had intended. 1936. although "the records show that Act No. and does not mention or make any reference to Act No. and that repeal by implication is not favored. 53 which refers to "covenant or contract made between the owner of land and a lessee or tenant on share thereof" in general. It is obvious that the conclusion of the lower court that (1) the so called oral contract between the parties in this case was valid and binding upon the parties during the agricultural year 1946-1947. 4054 became effective in Pangasinan on November 12. as well as to tenancy contract on rice in provinces where Act No. 4054. and (2) that Republic Act No. 53. oral contracts were not valid and binding. 4054 had been proclaimed effective in the Province of Pangasinan in January.

and not to provinces. which provides in its section 4 that an oral contract or share tenancy is not valid and binding. Taking into consideration that our Constitution. 14 issued by the President of the Philippines dated November 30. as amended by section 3 of the Republic Act No. that is. and provides that "the promotion of social justice to insure the wellbeing and economic security of all people should be the concern of the State" (section 5. which "establish the fairest possible contractual basis between the tenant and landowner. And it is a well established rule recognized by all authorities without exception. 1946. there could not legally exist an effective oral contract between the parties embodying the old customs of tenancy sharingobserved by the parties prior to 1945-1946 agricultural year. 4054 had already been put in force since January 30. that a retrospective or retroactive law is that which creates a new obligation. 1946. 1947. that it is a well settled rule that the history of a legislation is also important in interpreting the intention of the legislative body. for "agricultural year shall mean the length of time necessary for the preparation of the land sowing.purpose of preventing serious controversies that may arise as a result of the conflicting interpretation of verbal contracts and other agreements affecting rice tenancy between landlords and tenants. but ordains Congress to "regulate the relations between landowner and tenant" (section 6. and the crop in question had been. 1946. (2) The major premises of the other conclusion is also incorrect. 1946 to take effect immediately. sections 5002. it is to be inferred that it was the intention of the Congress to make it applicable to the harvest of rice during the agricultural year 1946-1947. imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already past. 5004. like Pangasinan. No retrospective effect would be given to said provision of section 8 of the Act No. amendatory of said Act No. 4054. 1946. No. according to the conclusion of fact of the lower court. It is therefore clear that Act No. on which. Act No. 34 was passed by Congress and approved by the President on September 30. 34 became effective on September 30. it became effective. 34. 1937. must necessarily become effective therein as a part of the amended law at the time the amendment takes effect. to be in full force and effect throughout the Philippines. 4054). that the President in his message to Congress of the Philippines on August 8. 34. The provisions of Act No. Article II). 34 provides that the Act shall take effect immediately. I earnestly request that this matter receives your early attention and that the proposed amendments be enacted at an early date". and a statute which is to take immediate effect is operative from the exact instance of its becoming law. 481-489). the President said that "In view of the fact that planting season of rice is under way and that the harvest will take place before the next session of the Congress. was obviously intended for territories in the Philippines in which said Act had not yet been declared in force by proclamation prior to said date. became effective ipso facto in Pangasinan since the date of its passage. 4054 and its amendments. where Act No. which declares the provisions of Act. as amended. Proclamation No. according to the express provision of section 4 therefore. Section 4 of Republic Act No. and therefore courts may refer to messages of the executive to the legislature (2 Sutherland's Statutory Construction 3rd ed. and even January. if applied to the rice harvested during agricultural year 1946-1947. planting and harvesting a crop" (section 6. 1946." according to the message. because an amendment of a law being a part of the original which is already in force and effect in a certain territory. but that statute is not made retrospective because . planted during May and harvested during the months from October to December. upon its passage or approval by the President on September 30. 4054. in recommending the earliest approval of the proposed amendments to the tenancy law embodied in Republic Act No. September 30. not only does not take place any limitation on the general legislative power. 4054. and that Act No. which proclamation was never set aside or suspended. Article XIV). having been in the force in the province of Pangasinan since January 20.. and therefore the rice sharing tenancy between the parties must be governed since the year 1937 by the provisions of section 8 of Act No. 1947. 4054. 34 relating to share basis. because said Act No. pp. l937.

. JJ. that he defrayed the cost of plowing and cultivation. is that the rice planting season of 1946-1947 of the lands involved herein commenced in May and ended in July. Share basis.. 4054. and Padilla. and that the costs of harvest and threshing were deducted from the gross produce. be carried out. as narrated on pages 2-3 of the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations. are complied within the present case as found by the lower court in its decision that is. as well as other . applicable to the division of the crop in the absence of a contract in writing between the parties. Moran. Paras. and the decision by the Tenancy Law Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice. those legal provisions. 4054 provides: SEC. to inquire: What was the governing provision of the law at the time as to the respective shares that should pertains to the tenants and to the landlords? For it goes without saying that both landlords and tenants must be taken to have entered into their relation as to such.it drawns on antecedent facts for its operation. between parties prior to the sate Act No. irrigation and fertilizer. and the fact that the conditions set forth in section 8 of Act No. — In the absence of any written agreement to the contrary and when the necessary implements and the work animals are furnished by the tenant. nor a written one for that matter. So ordered. or in other words part of the requirements for its action and application is drawn from a time antedating its passage (See cases cited in 37 Words and Phrases. 34 to the present case. 34. dissenting: I dissent. that is. Separate Opinions HILADO. harvesting. our Constitution does not in terms prohibit the enactment of retrospective laws which do not impair the obligations of contract or deprive a person of property without due process of law. for the agricultural year. 34 to the tenancy share in 1946-1947 rice crop. concur. It is evident that there being no valid or binding oral tenancy contract. It is therefore obvious that the palay crops in question were planted during those months of the year 1946. if any.. which do not divest rights of property and vested rights. pp. the decision appealed from is reversed or set aside. And no vested right having been acquired by the parties over the 1946-1947 rice crop under the provision of section 8 of Act No. C. But even if to apply Republic Act no. 8. no obligations of contract could be impaired by the application of said Republic Act No. that the tenants owns the work animals and the necessary implements. In behooves us. 34 to the tenancy relations in agricultural year 1946-1947 between the parties would be tantamount to giving said Act retroactive or retrospective effect. Pablo. J. no vested right could be affected by the application of said Act No. 4054. In view of all the foregoing. and pursuant to. threshing. consequently. Perfecto. with cost against the respondent. 34 became effective. 34. as amended by section 3 of Republic Act No. Section 8 of Act No.J. before it was amended by Republic Act No. Among the facts stipulated by the parties. Briones. in so far as it applies the provisions of said Act No. in view of. and the expenses for planting. 530-533). 34.

to tell the landlord and the tenant that if they do not stipulate to the contrary in writing their shares in the product shall be equal. as therein defined and specified. The division shall. the said tenants being the owners of their work animals and implements. it might well have been that he would not have agreed to enter into that landlord-tenant relation if the law had been changed before its creation. and after both parties have accordingly acted. whoever comes out prejudiced by the ex post facto change in the law. 34. In my opinion this is a correct solution of the problem. did not intend that said amendatory act or said proclamation should be applicable to crops already planted pursuant to the former legal provisions in force at the time of the planting and before the amendment. No consideration of social justice can possibly justify such an injustice to the landlord or to the tenant. was proclaimed effective in the Province of Pangasinan in January. in the first place would appear rather to tend toward socialism and in the second. That when the landlord furnishes the work animal gratuitously it shall be deemed as a special consideration. harvesting. and when the planted crops are already bearing fruit and nearing harvest. for the law. however. the landlords landlord having supplied only the seeds. which was in force when they entered into their relation. as found by the Court of Industrial Relations in its decision appealed from. might tend to the prejudice of the tenants themselves. when the landlord agreed to let the tenants work their lands and the latter to work them for the planting and raising of palay. any.expenses incident to the proper cultivation of the land. amendatory of Act No. The construction in favor of giving the amendment retroactive effectiveness. I say socialism because it subjects the landlord's property to use and enjoyment by the tenant upon terms not voluntarily accepted by the former but arbitrarily imposed by the government after said landlord had agreed to let his property be worked by the . such tenant might not have entered into it and invested labor or money thereunder. I cannot support such an absurd construction. because they themselves did not in writing fix them. Section 4 of Republic Act. threshing irrigation and fertilizer. the law. their share in the crops under consideration must be determined pursuant to said section 8. or being harvested. And we also suppose that if such change had been adverse to the tenant and had been made before the initiation of the landlord-tenant relation. 4054. I believe that when enacting Republic Act No. No. on the score of social justice. 34 itself clearly evinces the intention to give it only prospective effect. if. 34. the President. as in the case of section 8 of Act No. fixed their shares in the crop upon a 5050 basis when the necessary and the work animals were furnished by the tenants. and the tenant shall be obliged to transport the share of the landlord to his warehouse if it is within the municipality where the land cultivated is situated. 1946. with the sole modification that the tenants should also be required to reimburse the landlords for one-half of the seeds thus supplied or their reasonable value. was against the landlord. The Court of Industrial Relations decided that the crops in question shall be divided pursuant to said section 8. the crop shall be divided equally. as happened through Republic Act No. and neither said act nor said proclamation contain express of retroactivity. are borne equally by both the landlord and tenant. 4054. be made in the same place where the crop has been threshed and each party shall transport his share to his warehouse. Hence. of November 12. to change the sharing basis from 50-50 to 70-30 or the like would be to my mind nothing short of a deception practised by the law upon the prejudiced party. were borne equally by both the landlord and tenants. along with the other sections of said Act No. and the expenses for planting. there being no written contract of tenancy between the instant parties. 14. The above quote provision. the Congress. In effect. with the requirement (in order to adjust matters exactly to the legal mandate) that the landlord shall reimburse the tenants for one-half of the expense of planting and others incidental to the proper cultivation of said lands. as well as other expenses incident to the proper cultivation of the land. Furthermore. 1937. If the change. 4054. unless the contrary is stipulated by the parties: Provided. and in issuing his Proclamation No.

under such a theory the government might have changed the share from 50-50 to 90-10 or any other proportion more onerous to the landlord than 70-30.: Accused-appellants Alex Mijaque and Alfonso Patalin. Philippines. were charged before Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of the 6th Judicial Region stationed in Iloilo City. J. like Mr. J.. Justice Hilado's dissenting opinion. with the result that what was thought to be a measure of social justice for the amelioration of their lot may on the contrary tend to aggravate their situation. JR. plaintiff-appellee. province of Iloilo.R. the above named two (2) . that the law should not apply to contracts a already existing at the time of its approval. because it is not hard to see that under such regime no reasonably prudent landlord would be inclined to allow his property to be worked by a tenant for fear that any time before the actual division of the crop the government may arbitrarily change his share in the crop from that which was required or permitted when he delivered his property to worked by his tenant.: I concur in Mr.* The Amended information dated October 11. No.: I believe. in the municipality of Lambunao. ALFONSO PATALIN. and within the jurisdiction of this Court. AND NESTOR RAS. And I say to the prejudice of the tenant himself. accused-appellants. without such landlord being able to foresee or even guess how great the change might come out to be. MELO.tenant under terms required or permitted by the law in force at the time. ALEX MIJAQUE. Jr. I join this dissent. 1985 charged: That on or about August 11. with the crime of robbery. 125539 July 27. In such state of affairs it is easily comprehensible that tenants would likely be deprived of the very opportunity to work landlord's lands and find it hard to find lands to work. TUASON. vs. 1999 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. BENGZON. Justice Hilado. 1984. J. For instance.

00) Pesos.000. 9293. did then and there wilfully. (pp.00) Pesos in cash. steal and carry away. 1984. and without any justifiable motive. conspiring and working together with their companions who are still at large. Rogelia Carcillar. CONTRARY TO LAW. unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with Perpetua Carcillar. armed with bladed weapons by means of force. unlawfully and feloniously take. against the will and/or consent of the owner. . with intent to gain and with violence against. Philippine Currency. one (1) screw driver. violence and intimidation. Juliana Carcillar. that on the occasion thereof. unlawfully and feloniously take. all armed with firearms and other deadly weapons. II Record. one (1) pair of earrings worth One Thousand (P1. with a total value of Four Hundred (P400.000. 18305.00) pesos. without the consent of the above-mentioned offended parties and to their damage and prejudice in the aforestated amount. as well as inflict physical injuries to the other victims Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belesario causing them to sustain injuries requiring medical attendance for several number of days. and one (1) Seiko wrist watch worth Three Thousand (P3. with intent to gain. confederating and working together with Richard Doe.00) Pesos. taking advantage of the nighttime to better realize their purpose. one (l) vise grip. province of Iloilo. cash amount of Three Hundred (P300. Jr. Philippine Currency. conspiring.00) Pesos. the above-named three (3) accused. Philippines.nêt CONTRARY TO LAW. and Nestor Ras were charged before the same court with the crime of robbery with multiple rape.accused. that by reason or on the occasion of said Robbery. 1âwphi1. ) In a Second Amended Information also dated October 11.500.00) Pesos. confederating and cooperating with three (3) others whose identities are still unknown and who are still at large. and in the dwelling of the offended party. the above named two (2) accused did then and there hack victim Reynaldo Aliman twice hitting him and inflicting wounds which required medical attendance of more than thirty (30) days. Philippine Currency. thereby performing [sic] themselves into a band. and/or intimidation of persons. steal and carry away Five Hundred (P500. did then and there wilfully. and Josephine Belesario. the over all total of cash and personal property being SEVEN HUNDRED (P700. and once inside. 1985 and docketed as Criminal Case No.00) PESOS. one (1) ring worth Two Thousand (P2. thusly: That on or about August 11. making a total of Six Thousand Five Hundred (P6. owned by the victim Corazon Aliman and the following personal property: one (1) adjustable wrench. Alfonso Patalin. did then and there wilfully. accused-appellants Alex Mijaque. one (1) pair of levis pants. Philip Doe and Robert Doe who are still at large. and within the jurisdiction of this Court.000.. with deliberate intent. one (1) travelling bag and one (1) wallet containing ten (P10.00) Pesos. the above-named three (3) accused. entered the dwelling of Jesusa Carcillar. against their will and consent. owned by the victims Reynaldo Aliman and Josephine Belesario. conspiring. in the municipality of Lambunao. by means of force and intimidation.00) Pesos.

00 representing the expenses he incurred for his medication and hospitalization due to the wounds he suffered. and corroborated by her son Reynaldo and the latter's half-sister Josephine Belisario (p. and Alex Mijaque are penalized to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Ten (10) years. based on the positive identification made by complaining witness Corazon Aliman. as minimum. (p. 80. Jr. 9091.(pp.500.000. 77. to indemnify Corazon Aliman the amount of P700. After trial on the merits. accused Alfonso Patalin. 1985.) The trial court arrived at the aforestated conclusion based on the following findings: Criminal Case No. and One (1) day of Prision Mayor. to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months ofReclusion Temporal. Rollo). 18305 Accused-appellants Alfonso Patalin.00 representing the cash and articles taken from them. accused Alfonso Patalin. They were positively identified by the following witnesses. 18305 for Robbery with Multiple Rapes. In both cases the accused are also ordained to pay the costs. as well as by their unidentified companions. disposing: Wherefore. as maximum. II Record).00 representing the value of her property robbed from her and also to indemnify Reynaldo Aliman the amount of P8. b) In Criminal Case No. Jr. as well as an unidentified companion. and Nestor Ras. 18376 for Robbery with Physical Injuries. acted in concert to commit the crime of robbery with multiple rape. Criminal Case No.. Jr. ) Upon arraignment on November 12. a joint judgment was rendered. SO ORDERED. and Alex Mijaque. Roll o. Alex Mijaque and Nestor Ras are sentenced to a death penalty and to indemnify the members of the Carcillar family the amount of P6. 18376 The crime of robbery (with physical injuries) was indeed committed by accused-appellants Alfonso Patalin. accused-appellants entered a plea of "not guilty" to both crimes charged (p. Josephine Belisario who was raped once by Alex Mijaque. Juliana Carcillar who was raped twice by Alex Mijaque. Rogelia Carcillar who was raped by Alex . Jr. II Record. Case No. 103. they are hereby sentenced as follows: a) In Crim. Alex Mijaque. premises considered there being sufficient and satisfactory proof showing that the accused in these two cases are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges filed against them.

Thereupon. Rollo). appellant Alfonso Patalin. July 21. as well as by Corazon Aliman. the trial court in erred in imposing the penalty of death as the same was suspended upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution (pp. his half sister Josephine Belisario. were likewise appreciated against accused-appellant (pp. Leticia Sitchon Santiago. prevail over the latter's defense of denial.). Rogelia Carcillar. because of the moonlight. After Corazon Aliman gave him three hundred pesos (P300. mother of Reynaldo.00) cash. after Alfonso Patalin.00). appellant Alex Mijaque hacked Reynaldo Aliman twice with a bolo hitting the latter at the neck. one (1) screw driver one. Reynaldo Aliman opened the gate and Alfonso Patalin together with his companions. TSN. Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belisario. he ransacked the house and took one (1) wrist watch. 17. 78-79. nocturnity. who was raped by Nestor Ras. Immediately upon entering. Thereafter. Reynaldo Aliman. Jr. who was outside the fenced perimeter of said house. witnessed the hacking incident and the former shouted for help (p. (2) The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant Patalin notwithstanding the fact that the latter was arrested without a warrant. appellant Alex Mijaque dragged Josephine Belisario to the house of the latter's aunt (sister of Corazon Aliman) which is beside their house. Rollo). 6. 1984. one of whom is appellant Alex Mijaque. Juliana Carcillar. asked again Reynaldo Aliman to let them in (pp. The prosecution's version of the August 11. thus allowing their victims to imprint in their memory the countenance or visage of accused-appellants. Dec. who went to the balcony of their house. 1988). 1986).00) cash.Mijaque.00) inclusive of the three hundred pesos (P300. 86. and Perpetua Carcillar. Band.). (1) pair of Levis trousers. ibid. the man . 7-8. based on the testimony of prosecution witnesses Dr. 1984 incident. called out Reynaldo Aliman by his nickname and asked the latter to let him and the other persons with him in (pp. entered the premises (pp. pp. 204.). (3) Assuming without conceding that accused-appellants (Patalin and Ras) committed the crimes charged. one (1) vise grip. TSN. 5-6. saw appellant Alfonso Patalin. Jr.). appellant Alfonso Patalin. one of whom is appellant Alex Mijaque. At this juncture. Dra. and the chest (pp. threatened to kill Corazon Aliman if the latter will not give him money. Later. Reynaldo Aliman opened the window and. 1987. Appellant Alfonso Patalin. Accused-appellant Patalin was likewise identified by Reynaldo Aliman who personally knew him as former barangay-mate for a long time. as follows: At about 7:30 in the evening of August 11. Jr. right arm. Reynaldo Aliman immediately ran away (p. 8. is summarized in the Solicitor General's consolidated Brief. the total value thereof is seven hundred pesos (P700. province of Iloilo. who were not shown to have ill motive to falsify the truth and to implicate accused-appellants. and one (1) wallet containing ten pesos (P10. The identification of accused-appellants was facilitated and aided by a bright full moon and due to the fact that they tarried in the crime scene for a long period of time. failed in his attempt to rape her. The errors assigned by the accused-appellant in their individual briefs are summarized as follows: (1) The trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants are responsible for the crimes charged. and Perpetua Carcillar. and their mother Corazon Aliman were having a conversation inside their house at Barangay Lumanay. 8-9. 14-16. Jr. 146. ibid. with (2) other persons. pointed the beam of his flashlight at Reynaldo Aliman. one (1) travelling bag. 16. Edgardo Carmelo.. June 30. The other man stayed put and while holding a double-bladed knife. covered their mouth and told them not to make any noise. Two of the assailants. pushed Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belisario inside their house. Josephine Belisario. and dwelling. Jr. TSN. ibid. Said positive and clear identification by the complaining witnesses. municipality of Lambunao. while Reynaldo Aliman. ibid. 10-11.

Appellant Alex Mijaque forcibly removed her underwear and placed himself on top of Rogelia. June 29. "It is money we want. Juliana Carcillar was likewise brought outside the house by appellant Alex Mijaque who. ibid. Carcillar (Josephine Belisario's aunt and the mother of her cousins). outside the house of her aunt. p. 1989). TSN. 15.).).). ibid. appellant Alex Mijaque brought her inside the house and ordered her to lie face down on the floor again (pp. one of the companions of appellant Alex Mijaque who was armed with a gun took her outside and brought her to a place not far from where she was raped (p. TSN. February 15.). This man. after delivering fist blows on the body of Juliana Carcillar. 1990. June 30. appellants and their companions seized the following personalities of the Carcillars: (1) one Seiko 5 wristwatch worth three thousand pesos (P3. This man threatened her with the gun and mauled her. February 15. TSN. Thereafter. February 15. Appellant Alex Mijaque.00). who are all surnamed Carcillar. who was dragged by Alex Mijaque to her aunt's house which is just twenty (20) meters away. 15. (3) one (1) pair of earrings. 1998. Feb. Then. TSN. June 30. 15-17. 11-12. 7-8. it was kicked by one of the six (6) persons. 6-8. pp. Appellant Alfonso Patalin got hold of Mrs. TSN. she was raped for the second time by this gun-wielding man (pp. 1987. The other companions of appellant Alfonso Patalin.). 1988.). Josephine Belisario together with her aunt and cousins were all forced to lie face down on the floor of the sala (p. Because of fear.. June 30. Alfonso Patalin immediately went in. 13-14. pp. TSN. TSN. Josephine Belisario. with his knife. kicked and boxed the latter and exclaimed: "Money. p. June 30.000. He inserted his finger on her sex organ and eventually succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her (pp. turned her over to one of his companions who was in the garden outside the house and armed with a gun. 15-16. TSN. ibid. 11-15. This angered appellant Alex Mijaque and he tried to kill Juliana Carcillar by stabbing the latter but was prevailed upon not to do so by one of his companions (pp. 1989). Then. 1990). 14. at the point of a gun. threatened to kill her if she will not obey his orders. Rogelia Carcillar. ibid. 1990). who feared for her life. and Victoriano. July 21.." Appellant Alfonso Patalin forced Mrs. Then. 7. 9. saw six (6) persons. one of whom is appellant. money". TSN.000. . (2) two (2) pairs of lady's rings worth two thousand (P2. appellant Alfonso Patalin was also outside the house standing on guard (p.00). There. tried to rape her but he initially failed because of her resistance. She was overpowered and he undressed her. 11. Roy. Carcillar into a room where the latter gave him money (p. Rogelia Carcillar was brought outside their house by appellant Alex Mijaque who was armed with a butcher's knife and threatened to kill her if she will not lie down. TSN. Jr. June 29. Perpetua. was left with no choice but to obey the man's orders. including appellant Alex Mijaque. namely Rogelio. 16.). boxed the aunt of Josephine Belisario on the body and announced that they are staging a hold-up. and (4) two (2) travelling bags (p. Josephine Belisario was forced to call out her aunt's name and ask that the door be opened for her. 10. She tried to resist but appellant Alex Mijaque pressed the tip of his knife at the former's neck and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her (pp. 12-15. (pp. 18. she did as she was told (pp. Juliana. ibid. 1112. While Rogelia Carcillar was being raped. While the door was being opened.also dragged Corazon Aliman to her sister's house (pp. 1988. who were armed with knive's a bolo and a gun also went in and restrained Josephine Belisario's cousins. Jr. 1990). 1988). 16-17. ibid. Alfonso Patalin.

ordered her to undress and lie down. She resisted when he was forcing her to lie down on the bed but her strength finally gave out . 17-25. left side of neck (pp. The man was also carrying a knife and threatened her with the same. 4. He threatened her with his knife and was able to undress her. TSN. obeyed appellant Alfonso Patalin. Exhibit A). December 16. 1821. Perpetua Carcillar. he found and took a Seiko wristwatch owned by Perpetua Carcillar. he kept on harming her. When she was returned inside the house. Because of fear. taking with them the valuables stated earlier after threatening them not to report the matter to the police or else they will return and kill all of them (p. TSN. Appellant Nestor Ras. She was then brought back inside the house (pp. Appellants left. TSN. and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. After raping her. 1989). the intruders were still demanding for money from her mother and were taking turns in beating the latter (pp. while laying face down on the floor of the sala. 1988). 1986). 15-23. area ulnar side middle third forearm. Her aunt and cousins were also inside the said room (pp. 1986) and was treated by Dr. Reynaldo Aliman sustained the following injuries: (1) hackwound. mid forearm. He likewise succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. While at this position. 5-6. June 29. After raping her. together with the other assailants. armed with a double-bladed knife which he was pointing at Perpetua Carcillar. ibid. He was then brought to West Visayas Medical Center located in Manduriao. TSN. Reynaldo Aliman was brought to Ricardo Ladrido Memorial Hospital where he received first aid.19. he brought her outside the house again where he had a brief conversation with appellants Nestor Ras and Alfonso Patalin. appellant Alfonso Patalin handed her over to appellant Nestor Ras.4. appellant Alex Mijaque approached her and brought her outside the house. July 12. In the course thereof. He fondled her breasts. who was then only thirteen (13) years old. Appellant Alfonso Patalin. One of them saw Josephine Belisario and brought her to another room. and (2) hack wound. He fondled her breasts. armed with a double-bladed knife. Two companions of appellant Alex Mijaque came in bringing with them her cousins Rogelia and Perpetua Carcillar. Then. the man took a piggy bank which was at the foot of the bed and brought her back to the room where she was first raped. 1990). she was pulled by the hair by appellant Alfonso Patalin and ordered to stand up. Then. brought her outside the house. TSN. The man demanded money from her but she was not able to give him money. She was then brought back inside the house and ordered to lie face down on the floor again. kissed her. 18-20. pulled her pubic hair and eventually succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She was then left inside the room. While laying face down on the floor of the living room. appellant Nestor Ras brought her back inside the house. Iloilo (pp. ordered her to lie down. He tried to force his penis into her vagina but did not succeed.this companion of appellant Alex Mijaque brought Juliana Carcillar back inside the house and ordered to look for money. was dragged by appellant Alex Mijaque inside one of the rooms. TSN. 1990). she realized that her sister were no longer there. Her strength gave out and he succeeded in raping her twice. Perpetua Carcillar suffered the same fate. May 14. a member of their group who was only about two (2) arms length away. Edgardo Carmelo (p. When she told him that they have no more money. Josephine Belisario. February 15. When she stood up. Reynaldo Aliman was confined in the hospital for almost three (3) months and he spent more than eight . She refused to obey appellant Alex Mijaque's order to lie down on the ground so he pushed her downwards. June 30.

Dr. 1986). 19. sustained a hematoma in the forehead. ibid).000. November 10. 89. (pp. A fresh laceration at six o'clock position and a hematoma also at six o'clock position were noted on her hymen (Exhibit C. 1986. Her vagina admits two fingers snugly (pp. TSN.00) for medicines. occipital region of the head and left side of the mouth. These are indications that a foreign object. Leticia Santiago but such was conducted three days after the incident (p. Leticia Sitchon Santiago examined and treated Josephine Belisario two days after she was raped. eleven. The denials. Further. 1986). 2-3. are summarized as follows: Alfonso Patalin . 13 years old. 1986). and Cristina Gumban. upper right arm. 1986). TSN. She also sustained the following injuries: (1) 1/2 cm. ibid. eleven and three o'clock positions (p. and three o'clock positions. (2) bite mark with hematoma on the left shoulder. and four o'clock positions (pp. TSN. Juliana Carcillar and Perpetua Carcillar were also examined and treated by Dr. and (5) multiple abrasions at the back including the portion below the waistline. sustained a centimeter lacerated wound on the perineum which was also swollen. TSN. which could be a human penis. Felizardo Lebona. 10-15. Her vagina admits two fingers snugly and the perineum has a lacerated wound which is one centimeter in length (pp. TSN. ibid). September 3. p. 300311. 22 years old. 3. together with other arguments. 15. 17. eleven. September 3.thousand pesos (P8. 18-19. ibid). November 10. Juliana Carcillar. November 10. November 10. about 3x4 inches in diameter. was inserted in the vagina and caused the lacerations of the hymen (pp. p. TSN. Rhodora Losaria. TSN. 1986). uppermost and lower portions of the left thigh. Josephine Belisario "vagina admits two (2) fingers". (3) 1 cm. Alejandro Tabucan. A hematoma was noted in the occipital region of the head of Rogelia Carcillar (p. Perpetua Carcillar. 6-9. Dr. 1âwphi1. Ro llo. lacerated wound on the left side of the lower lip.nêt Rogelia Carcillar. 1986). hematoma was noted in the hymen at nine o'clock and three o'clock positions and fresh lacerations was also noted at nine. left and right side of the face. Record). Fresh lacerations were likewise noted in her hymen at eight. incised wounds on the right index finger and right thumb. her vagina admits two fingers and fresh lacerations in the hymen were noted at eight. A hematoma. 18. (4) 4 inches incised wound on the right forearm. was found on the left shoulder of Josephine Belisario which could have been caused by forcing the latter to lie down on the ground. December 16. food and other expenditures (p. 19. pp. Santiago further testified that a foreign object was inserted in the vagina of Rogelia Carcillar (p. 3.) Denial and alibi were set up by accused-appellants based on their testimony and that of their witnesses.

accusedappellant Patalin also alleges that he was arrested without a warrant. And when Perpetua Carcillar and the other female prosecution witnesses reported the alleged incident to the police authorities. and that Josephine Belisario was merely led by the public prosecutor into mentioning his name. He likewise points out that in the police blotter. Moreover. argues that his name was never mentioned by Dr. whom he described as the land lord of Jesusa Carcillar and the Carcillar sisters. August 13. Further. testified that "Nothing happened to them" (p. 208-210. Meanwhile. August 13. wife." said witness responded that she did not know the person who called her brother. According to this accused-appellant. he declared on the stand that when the victims saw him at the police station. 16-17) at the time of the incident. No rape was reported. all three accused-appellants. the first report mentioned that the alleged offenders were unknown persons. to force him to reveal the names of the persons who staged the robbery and rape. In his brief. the robbery at Lambunao. 1988. The arresting officers of the Manduriao Police Station. he presented Felizardo Lebona. As corroborative witness. 210. pp. in order to save themselves from charges of arbitrary detention. Accused-appellant Patalin testified that he was at home with his parents. Verily. Alex Mijaque Accused-appellant Alex Mijaque argues that in the sworn statement of Reynaldo Aliman (p. Rollo). during the preliminary examination in the lower court. Iloilo. August 11. Lambunao (tsn. accusedappellant Mijaque was also not named as one of the malefactors. id). Edgardo Carmelo. there is no mention of his name nor that of accused-appellant Patalin as the perpetrators of the crimes charged. He also states that the witnesses' declarations as regards his identification are confusing and inconsistent (pp. 1993. also presented their respective alibis. Again. In the second report. so accused-appellant Mijaque contends. Rollo). 10-11. Nestor Pas. it is contended that Rogelio Carcillar himself. immediately referred him for custodial investigation in regard to the Lambunao robbery. the police authorities of Iloilo. Accused-appellant Mijaque was suspected as the thief and was picked up by the agents of the Manduriao Police Station without any warrant of arrest and was thence detained for three days without any complaint (p. when asked by the public prosecutor about what happened to his sister Perpetua Carcillar. pp. Further. Iloilo was being flashed at all police stations in Iloilo. Manduriao (also referred to in the record as "Mandurriao") received a complaint from a resident thereat that his television set was stolen previous to the incidents herein involved. 3. they never mentioned that they were raped.Accused-appellant Alfonso Patalin alleges that his name was only included by Jesus Larang. Consequently. pp. 19-20). II Record). and that she only recognized the caller's voice (tsn. Nestor Pas The third accused-appellant. 1993. three days after his confinement. two of them (Josephine Belisario and Reynaldo Aliman) even smiled at him (tsn. at Pandan. 30-31). it was blottered that the alleged offenders were four unidentified persons. no rape was reported. aside from denying the charges. As mentioned. he argues that he was not positively identified. a criminal complaint for robbery with physical injuries and another for robbery with rape was filed against him by the Chief of Police of Lambunao. and children. rationalizing that when prosecution witness Josephine Belisario was asked on the stand if she recognized "the person who called [her] brother Reynaldo. Accused-appellant Mijaque likewise takes note of the report given by Rogelia Carcillar who merely narrated the robbery but did not report any rape. 93. the person in charge of the plantation where .

Defense witness. 1993. conduct. he will file a case against you. As discussed above in their individual defenses. Although three of the herein complainants were brought in front of his detention cell. who. 327328. Dao. July 29. corroborated the latter's alibi that on August 11.he was working. Herbieto. he presented Cristina Gumban. Lastly. 1984 (tsn. the defense was not able to prove any motive on the part of the private complainants to falsely testify that they were robbed and raped by accused-appellants. to report the hacking and robbery incidents at the Lambunao Police Department. p. pp. and would not ordinarily turn against a relative although this be by mere affinity unless they really suffered the fate they narrated. he testified that he was mauled in jail (tsn. particularly the ravished victims. 4). for approximately two agonizing hours. August 6. Bugarin. 1984. that on August 11. As corroborative witness. "That is Alex Mijaque who raped you. as an appellate court. We generally uphold and respect this appraisal since. Time and again. 1993. a vendor who testified that on August 11. were subjected to a hellish nightmare occurring in the very privacy of their own homes. accused-appellant Nestor Ras declared that he was in the province of Antique (particularly. 4-5. accused-appellant Mijaque insists that he had no opportunity to get out of the farm where he was working which was located in Manduriao. May 6. Iloilo (tsn. Of primordial consideration in appellate matters is the legal principle that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimony is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor. two of the rape victims. 4-5). they had a drinking spree from 6 o'clock in the evening to 12 o'clock midnight. in Igbangkal. 1993. he was arrested for theft of a television set and detained in the Lambunao jail for investigation. 10). he was not identified. Jesus Larang. they emphasize that Reynaldo Aliman failed to mention the names of the perpetrators in his sworn statement. neighbor of accusedappellant Mijaque." Moreover. 1984 (tsn. and that he saw Ras put the purchased items in a sack (tan. Ombrog. pp. Alejandro Tabucan. 268 SCRA 93 [1997]). she bought cassava and sweet potatoes from accused-appellant Ras in Igbangkal. Accused-appellants rely on the delay or vacillation on the part of the complaining witnesses. as well as the robbery committed in the Carcillar household. We are not persuaded by the above posturing and are compelled to affirm. As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its consolidated brief. p. and that the police blotter stated that the alleged offenders were unknown persons but contained no report of any rape. 1993. pp. December 17. 273 SCRA 384 . and attitude under grilling examination (People vs. Rollo). 1984. and that Rogelia Carcillar's report did not mention that she was raped. March 4. October 15. 6). Reynaldo instructed a relative. A close examination of the record convinces us of the prosecution witnesses' credibility. who testified that accused-appellant Patalin did not leave the plantation house from August 9 to 12. were even married to first cousins of accused-appellant Patalin (pp. we have ruled that delay in lodging a criminal accusation does not impair the credibility of a witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained (People vs. If you will not include him. and accused-appellant Mijaque was not able to leave the premises in Manduriao. Instead. 10-13). we do not deal with live witnesses but only with the cold pages of a written record (People vs. In July. p. For his part. 1994. Dao) on August 11. 1993. 1985. the policemen pointed to him and said. In fact. Tabucan also said that he saw Mijaque still asleep the following morning (tsn. 4). Josephine Belisario and Rogelia Carcillar. 1984. 269 SCRA 472 [1997]). Antique from 3 o'clock to 5 o'clock in the afternoon.

People vs. the fact that he mentioned "unknown persons" in his report does not affect Reynaldo's categorical and positive identification of accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque as the perpetrators of the hacking and robbery incidents at his home. 240 SCRA 314 [1995]. are negative and self-serving. 1986. In fact. p. An examination of Reynaldo Aliman's sworn statement (p. People vs. 1988. p. Gayon. 241 SCRA 718 [1995]. 35. People vs. 31). Perpetua Carcillar. as well as the date when Ras was arrested. People vs. it was clearly explained that their assailants told them not to report the matter to the police. Dec. Besides. Anent the rape victims. and do not impair the credibility of such witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the assailant (Sumalpong vs. Jr. 19). which is merely . deserve no weight in law. Feb. The overland travel time from the town of Manduriao to Lambunao is approximately one hour and twenty minutes. 3. People vs. 1990. 38-39). The defense also notes certain inconsistencies in the testimony of the complaining witnesses. Iloilo to identify accusedappellant Nestor Ras. thus placing the house in darkness. 243 SCRA 557 [1995]. 242 SCRA 124 [1995]. 268 SCRA 764 [1997]). Dayson. 16. even if the defense of denial is supported by the testimony of friends of the accused. Gecomo (254 SCRA 82 [1996]) where we held that a delay of 17 or 35 days. he explained on cross-examination that he did not know yet the name of the person who attacked him with the bolo at the time he executed his sworn statement (tsn. People vs. prevails over alibi and denial (People vs. p. does not detract from the veracity of her charge. 243 SCRA 7 [1995]. Dela Iglesia. Verily. these defenses. or even 6 months. 15. otherwise. Positive identification. Gamiao.[1997]). Espinosa. their veracity. a far shorter period than those mentioned in People vs. the delay in reporting the multiple rapes was not procrastination as this was only 3 days from the date of the incident (tsn. It was only later that he found out that the name of his assailant was Alex Mijaque. It will be given weight only if it would preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the time of commission (People vs. especially so when the crime is shocking to the conscience and numbing to the senses (People vs. Parica. yet she could still see because the light of the moon still illuminated their house. and cannot be given evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People vs. or the weight of their testimony. 22). June 30. With respect to the defenses of denial and alibi. Javier. and (2) the prosecution witnesses could not agree concerning the date they went to San Dionisio. Accused-appellant Mijaque testified that on August 11. Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses. De Roxas. by a victim of rape in reporting the attack on her honor. I Record) shows that he clearly identified one of the callers as accused-appellant Alfonso Patalin. pp. As regards Jesus Larang. 241 SCRA 369 [1995]. earlier said that although there was no more light in the house coming from the lamp. honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen rather than destroy the credibility of a witness to a crime. significantly. allegedly through the plastic roofing. when referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration. Escoto. The victims were overcome by fear and shame (ibid. Rivera. Daquipil. the assailants will return and kill them (tsn. where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter. 1984. Agunias.. 242 SCRA 17 [1995]. Court of Appeals. while on the other hand. 242 SCRA 26 [1995]. 240 SCRA 254 [1995]). Anent his failure to mention accused-appellant Mijaque's name. 269 SCRA 587 [1997]). Morin. 244 SCRA 87 [1995]). 269 SCRA 181 [1997]). Accused-appellant Patalin testified that he was in Barangay Pandan. Iloilo. People vs. if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. he was in Manduriao. 241 SCRA 709 [1995]. it deserves the barest consideration (People vs. 279 SCRA 52 [1997]). Umali. as follows: (1) Juliana Carcillar testified earlier that the only light in the house came from a kerosene lamp placed on a small table which was extinguished as a result of it being knocked down. People vs. People vs.

suffice it to say that any objection.. The Revised Penal Code — Criminal Law. 16. a knife. 18376 and 18305. p. 5). hurt him. and Perpetua. including accused-appellant Patalin. In the second case. p. June 30. p. undoubtedly had the common criminal design of robbing the household of Jesusa Carcillar. and hence of naturally doubtful credibility. 10. Dwelling is clear from the abuse of confidence which the victims reposed in the offenders by opening the door to them. and of committing multiple rape on the occasion of the robbery. As correctly pointed out in the People's consolidated brief. they proceeded in ravishing the four young female victims. or do him wrong. and a long gun. which is approximately two hours away therefrom via overland transportation. pp. 68 Phil. or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea (Padilla vs. entered their dwelling that unfortunate night (tsn. The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling in Criminal Case No. 1986). 5th ed. 1988). Said culprits shared the common criminal objective of robbing the victims and inflicting wounds upon Reynaldo Aliman on the occasion of the robbery. who were positively identified by the victims themselves. It is indubitable that there was conspiracy in the commission of the crimes in both Criminal Cases No. as well as the violation of the sanctity of privacy in the victims' homes. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons came to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it (People vs. considering that the places where accused-appellants alleged they were at could be traversed by motorized vehicles. Jr. Vol. With respect to accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque's defense that they were arrested without warrants. I. is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere (Reyes. it was not impossible that accused-appellants could not have been at the crime scene by 7 o'clock or 7:30 o'clock in the evening on August 11. II. It cannot be merely . the evidence clearly shows that accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque. Josephine. 635 [1939] and Viada.10. He who goes to another's house to slander him. Vol. one of whom was accused-appellant Patalin (tsn.. 7. Accused-appellant Mijaque dragged Josephine Belisario to her aunt's house and the other culprits followed suit. committed the crime charged. Queliza (279 SCRA 145 [1997]). 323-324). 269 SCRA 402 [1997]). 242 SCRA 39 [1995]). a province neighboring Iloilo. 24 SCRA 798 [1968]). 18376 considering that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime and the evidence shows that accused-appellants took advantage of the darkness to successfully consummate their plans (People vs. 1984. In the first criminal case. Mutatis mutandi People vs. More importantly and damning yet is the positive identification of their presence thereat by the victims. p. Lastly.adjacent to Lambunao. 1993 ed. one after the other. Rogelia. all three accused-appellants (together with unidentified companions). 324. armed with a bolo. June 29. These same aggravating circumstances likewise attended the commission of the crime of robbery with multiple rape in Criminal Case No. 18305 and this was clearly testified to by the victims thereof who stated that five persons. Abarri. 1990. We further affirm the trial court's finding on the presence of the aggravating circumstance of band considering that Reynaldo Aliman testified that accused-appellants Patalin and two other companions (one of whom was later identified as accused-appellant Mijaque) entered his home (tsn.. After robbing the household. Rollo). The defense tried to corroborate these alibis by presenting witnesses who testified on details which happened ten years prior to the date their testimony was given. together with unidentified companions. Dec. This was corroborated by Josephine Belisario who even saw four (4) persons enter their gate. thus truly exhibiting their concerted acts. the record shows no objection was ever interposed prior to arraignment and trial (p. Ambis. Accused-appellant Patalin boxed Jesusa Carcillar and announced that they were staging a hold-up. February 15. accused-appellant Nestor Ras testified that he was in Antique. 1989. CA. citing the dissenting opinion of Justice Villareal in People vs. defect. Juliana. Apduhan.

( People vs. apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. .. Revised Penal Code).presumed. 76743. 230 SCRA 486). 7659 or the Death Penalty Law which took effect on January 1. Hence. specifically Paragraph (1). degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. 1994 would no longer cover them notwithstanding the fact that the decision was rendered by the trial court on June 14. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. 507-508). each doing a part so that their acts. Section 19 of Article III thereof. . 868. The existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy maybe." Simply stated. pp. were in fact connected and cooperative. being beneficial to the accused. direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. See also People vs. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object. 242 SCRA 620 [1995]). Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself. 1994. said provision left the matter open for Congress to revive capital punishment at its discretion. Carbonel. then a conspiracy maybe inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved (People vs. for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. .R. 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel. Verily. In the case at bar. No. inferred by the court from proof of facts and circumstances which. by virtue of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. This brings us to the crucial issue raised by accused-appellants on the death penalty. when the Death Penalty Law had already taken effect. At the time the crimes charged were committed in 1984. G. People vs. usually must be. the Congress hereafter provides for it. However. 1995. taken together. Balignasay. though apparently independent. . The constitutional abolition of the death penalty immediately took effect upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. 48 Phil. the argument that it could not be imposed upon accused-appellants. the participation of each of the accused-appellants was exhibited by the straightforward testimony of the victims themselves. May 22. People vs. 294. 1996 ed. unless. Viray. the restoration or imposition of the death penalty on January 1. although there was no proof of previous actual agreement among accusedappellants adduced at the trial — . Congress eventually restored the death penalty by virtue of Republic Act No. Said provision reads as follows: Sec. it did not prevent the legislature from reimposing the death penalty at some future time (Bernas. . However. 1992. The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary. robbery with rape was punishable by death (Art. 147 SCRA 146. Miranday. Galit. Neither shall death penalty be imposed. and from the secrecy of the crime. It need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. Accused-appellants are of the position that since the Constitution's abolition of the death penalty had retroactive effect. the death penalty was abolished. indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.

who is not a habitual criminal . robbery with rape. p. It is but human nature to feel some measure of loathing. (b) when sentence has been passed but the service has not begun. 39 Phil. Lukban. the ascendancy of the law is axiomatic in our type of government. is intolerable in any country where freedom prevails (Villavicencio vs. was punishable by reclusion perpetua to death (Article 294[2]. in 1987." it is clear that the framers intended said provision to have a retroactive effect on cases pending without any penalty of death having been imposed yet.. there is no question that the abolition of the death penalty benefits herein accused-appellants. 1996 ed.. 508). or the means of living. 167. 778 [1919]). disgust. did they gain a vested right thereto so that any future act restoring the death penalty would no longer cover them? An affirmative answer would free accused-appellants from the fatal clutches of the death penalty. In the light of the discussion above. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony. 767]). I." A statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense committed against the state (Aquino. p. robbed. Considering that the provision provides that "[a]ny death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Ours is a government of laws and not of men. This penal provision may be given retroactive effect during three possible stages of a criminal prosecution: (a) when the crime has been committed and the prosecution began.. although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. . 5). Perforce. Revised Penal Code [as amended by Presidential Decree No.. The nobility of our intention is insufficient. Before us is a heinous crime indeed where people were harmed.Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code provides that no felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission. 1996 ed. 483 [1932]). and abused in the defaced sanctity of their own homes. Every official act must be based on and must conform to the authority of a valid law. if committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons. ravished. Consequently. and hatred for the offenders considering the inhuman aspect of the crime committed. 51). lacking which the act must be rejected (Cruz. There is no doubt that the abolition of the death penalty in 1987 retroactively affected and benefited accused-appellants. Political Law. . The idea that an individual may be compelled to hold his life (or lose it). 1987 ed. Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review. the Constitution abolished the death penalty subject to Congress' future restoration thereof "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.. upon ratification of the 1987 Constitution. The above-cited provision of the Constitution is penal in character since it deals with the penalty to be imposed for capital crimes. Santos. p. 1996 ed. p. No penalty had as yet then been imposed." At the time of such ratification. . At the time of the commission of the crime in 1984. and (c) when the sentence is being carried out (Gregorio. However. Phil. p. The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary. True. the subsequent reimposition of the death penalty will not affect them. The framers of the Constitution themselves state that the law to be passed by Congress reimposing the death penalty (Republic Act 7659) can only have prospective application (Bernas. at the mere will of another. as held by the trial court. any death penalty already imposed is automatically — without need for any executive action — commuted (Bernas. The Revised Penal Code. Vol. 1988 ed. 56 Phil. The 1987 Constitution the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary. the instant case was still at its trial stage. The instant case poses the following issue: When the death penalty was abolished in 1987 and was retroactively applied to herein accused-appellants. citing Escalante vs.

.00 as indemnification for five counts of rape (considering that Juliana Carcillar was twice raped by accused-appellant Mijaque) in addition to the sum of P6. The Court believes that. the jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should follow the same direction. Burce. correctly awarded P700. 711 [1956]. 748. Pineda.00 to Corazon Aliman representing the total value of the cash and personal property forcibly taken.000. citing I Record. and P8. .000. so that the instant case may serve as an object lesson to the public. accused-appellants should be made to pay P375. p. 1986 ed. July 30. Bernas. No. or a total of P250. 127903.000 per count of rape is further awarded (People vs. nor has he a vested right in the continued existence of a statute which precludes its change or repeal. Clearly. No. 227. Statutory Construction. nor in any omission to legislate on a particular matter. moral damages in the amount of P50.000. the trial court. 205 SCRA 419 [1992]). a subsequent statute cannot be so applied retroactively as to impair a right that accrued under the old law (Agpalo. 747-748). July 9. 269 SCRA 293 [1997]). if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the present amended law. 18305. 1995 ed. in Criminal Case No.00. The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers. As regards accused-appellant's civil liability. 18376. the rule in statutory construction is that all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used (Balatbat vs. Thus.000.R.500. Misa. p. Court of Appeals. accused-appellants' right to be benefited by the abolition of the death penalty accrued or attached by virtue of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. In line with the recent ruling inPeople vs. 264. Hence. 76 Phil. 127569.000. in Criminal Case No.00 is likewise awarded. Victor (G.. 1998) wherein we said: One other point of concern has to be addressed. Courts have thus given statutes strict construction to prevent their retroactive operation in order that the statutes would not impair or interfere with vested or existing rights. we apply the rule in labor law which provides that benefits accruing to workmen under the old law cannot be taken away from them by a succeeding law.00 to Reynaldo Aliman representing expenses incurred for medication and hospitalization. This is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time. 98 Phil. p. there is greater reason to apply this principle since the very taking of life is involved and is at issue. 205 SCRA 515 [1992]). citing Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs.00 for each count of rape.R. This benefit cannot be taken away from them. but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity. However. There is no question that a person has no vested right in any rule of law which entitles him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit. However. Since the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested (Benzonan vs. in line with the pronouncement in People vs. Laurel vs. Lastly. In the case at bar. By analogy. citing I RECORD.508.00 representing the value of the cash and articles that were taken from the victims. 1998). Prades (G. the indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased amount of not less than P75. exemplary damages in the amount of P10. on like considerations. starting with the case at bar. Court of Appeals. 372 [1946]). p. the trial court failed to order indemnification for the multiple rapes. Indictments for rape continue unabated and the legislative response has been in the form of higher penalties.

Because of the findings of conspiracy, accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are jointly and
severally liable for the amounts awarded in Criminal Case No. 18376; whereas all three accusedappellants are solidarily liable for the amounts awarded in Criminal Case No. 18305.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on record, the
Court hereby AFFIRMS said judgment, with the following modifications:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 18376, for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, considering that
the aggravating circumstances of band, nighttime, and dwelling attended the commission of the
crime, accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from six (6) years ofprision correccional, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum;
(b) Accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are jointly and severally held liable for the amounts
awarded by the trial court in said criminal case, particularly, the amount of P700.00 representing the
total value of the cash and articles taken from Corazon Aliman, and P8,000.00 representing the
expenses incurred by Reynaldo Aliman for medication and hospitalization;
(c) In Criminal Case No. 18305, the penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and
(d) Aside from the amount of P6,500.00 already awarded by the trial court to the Carcillar family
representing the value of the cash and articles taken, the victims in Criminal Case No. 18305 are
hereby awarded an additional P75,000 as indemnity for each count of rape, P50,000.00 for each
count of rape as moral damages, and P10,000 for each count of rape as exemplary damages, for
which amounts all the three accused-appellant are jointly and severally liable.
SO ORDERED.

1âwphi1.nêt

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 140500. January 21, 2002]

ERNESTINA BERNABE, petitioner, vs. CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian
ad litem for the minor ADRIAN BERNABE, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate
children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect cannot
be impaired or taken away. The minors have up to four years from attaining
majority age within which to file an action for recognition.
Statement of the Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, praying for (1) the nullification of the July 7, 1999 Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-GR CV No. 51919 and the October 14, 1999
CA Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, as well as (2)
the reinstatement of the two Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasay City (Branch 109) concerning the same case. The dispositive portion
of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court dismissing Civil
Case No. 94-0562 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be
remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits. [5]
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of
twenty-three (23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born
on September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died
on August 13, 1993, while his wife Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year,
leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint praying
that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as
such he (Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal Bernabes estate, which is now being held
by Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that under
the provisions of the Family Code as well as the case of Uyguangco vs. Court of
Appeals, the complaint is now barred x xx.[6]
Orders of the Trial Court
In an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court granted
Ernestina Bernabes Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts Decision
and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for recognition. Citing Article 175
of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the putative father had
barred the action.

In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that since the
putative father had not acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing,
the action for recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the
alleged father to give him the opportunity to either affirm or deny the
childs filiation.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of
justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of
Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born in 1981, his rights are governed by
Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an action for recognition to be filed
within four years after the child has attained the age of majority. The
subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right.
Hence, this appeal.

[7]

Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for our
consideration:
[8]

I

Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner, the
legitimate daughter of the putative father, for recognition and partition with
accounting after the putative fathers death in the absence of any written
acknowledgment of paternity by the latter.
II

Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents had
four years from the attainment of minority to file an action for recognition as provided
in Art. 285 of the Civil Code, in complete disregard of its repeal by the [express]
provisions of the Family Code and the applicable jurisprudence as held by the
Honorable Court of Appeals.
III

Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the petition[er] is fatally defective
for failure to implead the Court of Appeals as one of the respondents. [9]

The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First and Second Issues: Period to File Action for Recognition
Because the first and the second issues are interrelated, we shall discuss
them jointly.
Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an action for
recognition, because Article 285 of the Civil Code has been supplanted by the
provisions of the Family Code. She argues that the latter Code should be
given retroactive effect, since no vested right would be impaired. We do not
agree.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing an action for
recognition as follows:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only
during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case
the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear
of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents
recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the
document.
The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have however
been omitted by Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which we
quote:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or
her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority
or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years
within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of
either or both of the parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child
must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code
makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter
died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance to dispute
the claim, considering that illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised
in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence.
x x x The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or
deny the childs filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already
dead.
[10]

Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have
already vested prior to its enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired as
follows:
ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether Adrians right to an
action for recognition, which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had
already vested prior to the enactment of the Family Code. Our answer is
affirmative.
A vested right is defined as one which is absolute, complete and
unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency x x x.
Respondent however contends that the filing of an action for recognition is
procedural in nature and that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to
[or] arise from procedural laws.
[11]

[12]

Bustos v. Lucero distinguished substantive from procedural law in these
words:
[13]

x x x. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may
be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights
which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations.
Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or
which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of
the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial
law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their
invasion.[14](Citations omitted)
Recently, in Fabian v. Desierto, the Court laid down the test for
determining whether a rule is procedural or substantive:
[15]

[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right,
the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a
vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal,
it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. [16]
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the Civil
Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for
recognition within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family

Code cannot impair or take Adrians right to file an action for recognition,
because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.
Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals is not applicable to the case at bar,
because the plaintiff therein sought recognition as an illegitimate child when
he was no longer a minor. On the other hand, in Aruego Jr. v. Court of
Appeals the Court ruled that an action for recognition filed while the Civil
Code was in effect should not be affected by the subsequent enactment of the
Family Code, because the right had already vested.
[17]

[18]

Not Limited to Natural Children
To be sure, Article 285 of the Civil Code refers to the action for recognition
of natural children. Thus, petitioner contends that the provision cannot be
availed of by respondent, because at the time of his conception, his parents
were impeded from marrying each other. In other words, he is not
a natural child.
A natural child is one whose parents, at the time of conception, were not
disqualified by any legal impediment from marrying each other. Thus, in De
Santos v. Angeles, the Court explained:
[19]

A childs parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of
conception for him to qualify as a natural child. [20]
A strict and literal interpretation of Article 285 has already been frowned
upon by this Court in the aforesaid case of Aruego, which allowed minors to
file a case for recognition even if their parents were disqualified from marrying
each other. There, the Complaint averred that the late Jose Aruego Sr., a
married man, had an extramarital liason with Luz Fabian. Out of this
relationship were born two illegitimate children who in 1983 filed an action for
recognition. The two children were born in 1962 and 1963, while the alleged
putative father died in 1982. In short, at the time of their conception, the two
childrens parents were legally disqualified from marrying each other. The
Court allowed the Complaint to prosper, even though it had been filed almost
a year after the death of the presumed father. At the time of his death, both
children were still minors.
Moreover, in the earlier case Divinagracia v. Rovira, the Court said that
the rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment of natural children, as
[21]

or illegitimate children other than natural children.[22] (Citations omitted.well as the prescriptive period for filing such action. What is simply meant is that the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children. That does not mean that spurious children should be acknowledged. include those adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a married woman cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a married man cohabiting with a woman other than his wife. The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition in the case of natural children. commonly known as bastards. However. Rovira treats them as equals with respect to other rights. The rules on proof of filiation of natural children or the rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to spurious children. may likewise be applied to spurious children. a will. Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. applies to spurious children. [23] . as provided for in article 285 of the Civil Code. natural children have superior successional rights over spurious ones. The implication is that the rules on compulsory recognition of natural children are applicable to spurious children. They are entitled to support and successional rights. a statement before a court of record. then his filiation may be established by means of the circumstances or grounds for compulsory recognition prescribed in the aforementioned articles 283 and 284. including the right to recognition granted by Article 285. Pertinent portions of the case are quoted hereunder: The so-called spurious children. How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the investigation of the paternity or maternity or spurious children under the circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284 of the Civil Code. under the Civil Code. But their filiation must be duly proven. as that term is used with respect to natural children. These are the modes of voluntary recognition of natural children. A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of birth. or in any authentic writing. In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spurious child. italics supplied) Thus.

To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the
Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority
are thus given the right to seek recognition (under Article 285 of the Civil
Code) for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested
right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.
Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of
minors who could not have filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their
putative parents. As respondent aptly points out in his Memorandum, the
State as parens patriae should protect a minors right. Born in
1981, Adrian was only seven years old when the Family Code took effect and
only twelve when his alleged father died in 1993. The minor must be given his
day in court.
[24]

Third Issue: Failure to Implead the CA
Under Section 4(a) of Rule 45 of the current Rules of Court, it is no longer
required to implead the lower courts or judges x x x either as petitioners or
respondents. Under Section 3, however, the lower tribunal should still be
furnished a copy of the petition. Hence, the failure of petitioner to implead the
Court of Appeals as a party is not a reversible error; it is in fact the correct
procedure.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision
and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22228

February 27, 1969

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU) SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-PAFLU, AL FAJARDO AND ALL THE OTHER MEMBERS AND
OFFICERS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY AND EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-PAFLU, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, THE DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS and THE REGISTRAR
OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, respondents.
Cipriano Cid and Associates and Israel Bocobo for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz and Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Petitioners pray for writs of certiorari and prohibition to restrain respondents, the Secretary of Labor,
the Director of Labor Relations and the Registrar of Labor Organizations, from enforcing an order of
cancellation of the registration certificate of the Social Security System Employees Association —
hereinafter referred to as the SSSEA — which is affiliated to the Philippine Association of Free Labor
Unions — hereinafter referred to as PAFLU — as well as to annul all proceedings in connection with
said cancellation and to prohibit respondents from enforcing Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875.
Petitioners, likewise, pray for a writ of preliminary injunction pending the final determination of this
case. In their answer, respondents traversed some allegations of fact and the legal conclusions
made in the petition. No writ of preliminary injunction pendente lite has been issued.
It appears that on September 25, 1963, the Registration of Labor Organizations — hereinafter
referred to as the Registrar — issued a notice of hearing, on October 17, 1963, of the matter of
cancellation of the registration of the SSSEA, because of:
1. Failure to furnish the Bureau of Labor Relations with copies of the reports on the finances
of that union duly verified by affidavits which its treasurer or treasurers rendered to said
union and its members covering the periods from September 24, 1960 to September 23,
1961 and September 24, 1961 to September 23, 1962, inclusive, within sixty days of the 2
respective latter dates, which are the end of its fiscal year; and
2. Failure to submit to this office the names, postal addresses and non-subversive affidavits
of the officers of that union within sixty days of their election in October (1st Sunday), 1961
and 1963, in conformity with Article IV (1) of its constitution and by-laws.
in violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875. Counsel for the SSSEA moved to postpone the
hearing to October 21, 1963, and to submit then a memorandum, as well as the documents specified
in the notice. The motion was granted, but, nobody appeared for the SSSEA on the date last
mentioned. The next day, October 22, 1963, Manuel Villagracia, Assistant Secretary of the SSSEA
filed with the Office of the Registrar, a letter dated October 21, 1963, enclosing the following:
1. Joint non-subversive affidavit of the officers of the SSS Employees' Association-PAFLU;
2. List of newly-elected officers of the Association in its general elections held on April 29,
1963; and
3. Copy of the amended constitution and by-laws of the Association.
Holding

1. That the joint non-subversive affidavit and the list of officers mentioned in the letter of Mr.
Manuel Villagracia were not the documents referred to in the notice of hearing and made the
subject matter of the present proceeding; and
2. That there is no iota of evidence on records to show and/or warrant the dismissal of the
present proceeding.
on October 23, 1963, the Registrar rendered a decision cancelling the SSSEA's Registration
Certificate No. 1-IP169, issued on September 30, 1960. Soon later, or on October 28, 1963, Alfredo
Fajardo, president of the SSSEA moved for a reconsideration of said decision and prayed for time,
up to November 15, within which to submit the requisite papers and data. An opposition thereto
having been filed by one Paulino Escueta, a member of the SSSEA, upon the ground that the latter
had never submitted any financial statement to its members, said motion was heard on November
27, 1963. Subsequently, or on December 4, 1963, the Registrar issued an order declaring that the
SSSEA had "failed to submit the following requirements to wit:
1. Non-subversive affidavits of Messrs. Teodoro Sison, Alfonso Atienza, Rodolfo Zalameda,
Raymundo Sabino and Napoleon Pefianco who were elected along with others on January
30, 1962.
2. Names, postal addresses and non-subversive affidavits of all the officers who were
supposedly elected on October (1st Sunday), of its constitution and by-laws.
and granting the SSSEA 15 days from notice to comply with said requirements, as well as
meanwhile holding in abeyance the resolution of its motion for reconsideration.
Pending such resolution, or on December 16, the PAFLU, the SSSEA, Alfredo Fajardo "and all the
officers and members" of the SSSEA commenced the present action, for the purpose stated at the
beginning of this decision, upon the ground that Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 violates their
freedom of assembly and association, and is inconsistent with the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights; that it unduly delegates judicial power to an administrative agency; that said Section 23
should be deemed repealed by ILO-Convention No. 87; that respondents have acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in promulgating, on November 19, 1963, its
decision dated October 22, 1963, beyond the 30-day period provided in Section 23(c) of Republic
Act No. 875; that "there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law"; that the decision complained of had not been approved by the Secretary of Labor;
and that the cancellation of the SSSEA's certificate of registration would cause irreparable injury.
The theory to the effect that Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 unduly curtails the freedom of
assembly and association guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is devoid of factual basis. The registration
prescribed in paragraph (b) of said section 1 is not a limitation to the right of assembly or association,
which may be exercised with or withoutsaid registration. 2 The latter is merely a condition sine qua
non for the acquisition of legal personality by labor organizations, associations or unions and the
possession of the "rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations". The
Constitution does not guarantee these rights and privileges, much less said personality, which are
mere statutory creations, for the possession and exercise of which registration is required to protect
both labor and the public against abuses, fraud, or impostors who pose as organizers, although not
truly accredited agents of the union they purport to represent. Such requirement is a valid exercise of
the police power, because the activities in which labor organizations, associations and union of
workers are engaged affect public interest, which should be protected. 3 Furthermore, the obligation
to submit financial statements, as a condition for the non-cancellation of a certificate of registration,
is a reasonable regulation for the benefit of the members of the organization, considering that the

same generally solicits funds or membership, as well as oftentimes collects, on behalf of its
members, huge amounts of money due to them or to the organization. 4
For the same reasons, said Section 23 does not impinge upon the right of organization guaranteed
in the Declaration of Human Rights, or run counter to Articles 2, 4, 7 and Section 2 of Article 8 of the
ILO-Convention No. 87, which provide that "workers and employers, ... shall have the right to
establish and ... join organizations of their own choosing, without previous authorization"; that
"workers and employers organizations shall not be liable to be dissolved or suspended by
administrative authority"; that "the acquisition of legal personality by workers' and employers'
organizations, ... shall not be made subject to conditions of such a character as to restrict the
application of the provisions" above mentioned; and that "the guarantees provided for in" said
Convention shall not be impaired by the law of the land.
In B.S.P. v. Araos, 5 we held that there is no incompatibility between Republic Act No. 875 and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Upon the other hand, the cancellation of the SSSEA's
registration certificate would not entail a dissolution of said association or its suspension. The
existence of the SSSEA would not be affected by said cancellation, although its juridical personality
and its statutory rights and privileges — as distinguished from those conferred by the Constitution —
would be suspended thereby.
To be registered, pursuant to Section 23(b) of Republic Act No. 875, a labor organization,
association or union of workers must file with the Department of Labor the following documents:
(1) A copy of the constitution and by-laws of the organization together with a list of all officers
of the association, their addresses and the address of the principal office of the organization;
(2) A sworn statement of all the officers of the said organization, association or union to the
effect that they are not members of the Communist Party and that they are not members of
any organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by any illegal or
unconstitutional method; and
(3) If the applicant organization has been in existence for one or more years, a copy of its
last annual financial report.
Moreover, paragraph (d) of said-Section ordains that:
The registration and permit of a legitimate labor organization shall be cancelled by the
Department of Labor, if the Department has reason to believe that the labor organization no
longer meets one or more of the requirements of paragraph (b) above; or fails to file with the
Department Labor either its financial reportwithin the sixty days of the end of its fiscal year or
the names of its new officers along with their non-subversive affidavits as outlined in
paragraph (b) above within sixty days of their election; however, the Department of Labor
shall not order the cancellation of the registration and permit without due notice and hearing,
as provided under paragraph (c) above and the affected labor organization shall have the
same right of appeal to the courts as previously provided. 6
The determination of the question whether the requirements of paragraph (b) have been met, or
whether or not the requisite financial report or non-subversive affidavits have been filed within the
period above stated, is not judicial power. Indeed, all officers of the government, including those in
the executive department, are supposed, to act on the basis of facts, as they see the same. This is
specially true as regards administrative agencies given by law the power to investigate and render

decisions concerning details related to the execution of laws the enforcement of which is entrusted
thereto. Hence, speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Reyes (J.B.L.) had occassion to say:
The objections of the appellees to the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 2056, not only as
an undue delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works but also for being
unreasonable and arbitrary, are not tenable. It will be noted that the Act (R.A. 2056) merely
empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized obstructions or encroachments upon public
streams, constructions that no private person was anyway entitled to make because the bed
of navigable streams is public property, and ownership thereof is not acquirable by adverse
possession
(Palanca vs. Commonwealth, 69 Phil., 449).
It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act necessarily involves
the determination of some question of fact, such as the existence of the stream and its
previous navigable character; but these functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are
merely incidental to the exercise of the power granted by law to clear navigable streams of
unauthorized obstructions or encroachments, and authorities are clear that they are validly
conferable upon executive officials provided the party affected is given opportunity to be
heard, as is expressly required by Republic Act No. 2056, section 2. 7
It should be noted also, that, admittedly, the SSSEA had not filed the non-subversive affidavits of
some of its officers — "Messrs. Sison, Tolentino, Atienza, Zalameda, Sabino and Pefianca" —
although said organization avers that these persons "were either resigned or out on leave as
directors or officers of the union", without specifying who had resigned and who were on leave. This
averment is, moreover, controverted by respondents herein.
Again, the 30-day period invoked by the petitioners is inapplicable to the decision complained of.
Said period is prescribed in paragraph (c) 8 of Section 23, which refers to the proceedings for the
"registration" of labor organizations, associations or unions not to the "cancellation" of said
registration, which is governed by the abovequoted paragraph (d) of the same section.
Independently of the foregoing, we have repeatedly held that legal provisions prescribing the period
within which a decision should be rendered are directory, not mandatory in nature — in the sense
that, a judgment promulgated after the expiration of said period is not null and void, although the
officer who failed to comply with law may be dealt with administratively, in consequence of his
delay 9 — unless the intention to the contrary is manifest. Such, however, is not the import of said
paragraph (c). In the language of Black:
When a statute specifies the time at or within which an act is to be done by a public officer or
body, it is generally held to be directory only as to the time, and not mandatory, unless time is
of the essence of the thing to be done, or the language of the statute contains negative
words, or shows that the designation of the time was intended as a limitation of power,
authority or right. 10
Then, again, there is no law requiring the approval, by the Secretary of Labor, of the decision of the
Registrar decreeing the cancellation of a registration certificate. In fact, the language of paragraph
(d) of Section 23, suggests that, once the conditions therein specified are present, the office
concerned "shall" have no choice but to issue the order of cancellation. Moreover, in the case at bar,
there is nothing, as yet, for the Secretary of Labor to approve or disapprove, since petitioners,
motion for reconsideration of the Registrar's decision of October 23, 1963, is still pending resolution.
In fact, this circumstance shows, not only that the present action is premature, 11but, also, that
petitioners have failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to them. 12 Indeed, they could

ask the Secretary of Labor to disapprove the Registrar's decision or object to its execution or
enforcement, in the absence of approval of the former, if the same were necessary, on which we
need not and do not express any opinion.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition herein should be, as it is hereby dismissed, and the
writs prayed for denied, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.
lawphi1.nêt

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,. Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and
Barredo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the
mischief at which it is aimed. 1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House
of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election." 2 The mischief which
this provision — reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility of a
"stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified
with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community." 3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995,
providing the following information in item no. 8: 4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years
and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the
Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the
evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 3349772 6and in her Certificate
of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the
certificate of candidacy." 7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the
entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. 8 On the same day,
the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on
the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having
already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy
should have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline. 9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's
Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed
with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word

and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court. in her memorandum. such bill did not pass the Senate. before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa. namely. peaceful. therefore. She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa. . Furthermore. petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot. the Second Division held: Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and. this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. Leyte. However. to which she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned. she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification. the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa. she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood. 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six month actual residence therein. to achieve his purpose. She asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City. by a vote of 2 to 1. to which she could have responded "since childhood. 1995. However. 14 Dealing with two primary issues. orderly. she noted that: When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte."seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She averred that she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District. although she only became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months." In an accompanying affidavit. free and clean elections on May 8. Tolosa. He also filed a bill. 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95009 meritorious. the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy. 1995. Along this point. respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District. a component of the First District. as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest. and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement. petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same objective. seeking the creation of another legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District. along with other Leyte Congressmen. 1995. a component of the First District. Having failed on such moves. his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the congressional election in the First District. an amendment should subsequently be allowed. 12 On April 24.

The dates of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot. Olot. Since on the basis of her Answer. Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan. is devoid of merit.This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake. or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of elections. The case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of the election. The Commission. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). Tolosa. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election. specially those intended to suppress. To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made." The Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only as a matter of form." Besides. From the foregoing. the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an inconsequential deviation. 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive. the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. 1994. 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time. it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate. Leyte. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record accomplished on January 28. Tolosa. Petition). starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8. respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation. she cited the case ofAlialy v. requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. In fact. to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. Tolosa. xxx xxx xxx . Moreover." Thus. But in the instant case. she was quite aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City. dated August 24. The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. xxx xxx xxx Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by this Commission. therefore. The change in the number of years of residence in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her qualification as a candidacy. cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it was an error. Metro Manila. accurate material representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. item no. of the detriment of the integrity of the election. therefore. Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A. Her explanation that she thought what was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. Olot.

it is clear that respondent has not complied with the one year residency requirement of the Constitution. As a matter of fact on August 24. Eliseo Quirino. She could not have served these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Manila where she was again a registered voter. She registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila. In 1965. Tolosa. when she returned to the Philippines in 1991. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality. In this case. when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992. she lived and resided in San Juan. Metro Manila. respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. including Metro Manila. In the case of Romualdez vs. the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place. 96 Phil 294. Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In other words there must basically be animus manendi withanimus non revertendi. the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan. she continuously lived in Manila. respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. she claimed to be a resident of San Juan. Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places. and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila. there must likewise be conduct indicative of such intention. Romualdez vs. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has . one intends to return. Leyte. 226 SCRA 408). or for like reasons. (Perfecto Faypon vs. RTC-Tacloban. as her place of domicile. and based on the foregoing discussion. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa. In election cases. In respondent's case. 1994. In 1959. Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot. where she spent her childhood and school days. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City. This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. In 1978. Metro Manila. Thus. she lived in San Miguel. Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient. Furthermore. her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban. RTC(226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice.Anent the second issue. after her husband was elected Senator. coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place. she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood. (2) intention to remain there. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure. she is considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City.

But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of the district for six months only. the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8. 1995. 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14. she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months.833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. On the same day. 18 On May 11. 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. she had been a resident of Manila. .471 votes compared to the 36. 17 The Resolution tersely stated: After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration." To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of Leyte for more than one year. no new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant reexamination of the resolution granting the petition for disqualification. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications Whether or not petitioner was a resident. Tolosa. without the accompanying conduct to prove that intention. Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct. what was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa. Leyte. the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it. In doing so. the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition. It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte "since childhood. 1995 elections.always intended to return to Tacloban. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70. On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation. petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28. is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Worse. one year prior the election. 1995. of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9. 19 In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995. 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 18-A of Olot. Leyte. the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24. The principal issues may be classified into two general areas: I. however. petitioner comes to this court for relief. 1995 elections. This may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa. for election purposes. 15 In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8.

or the intention of returning there permanently. The Jurisdictional Issue a) Prior to the elections Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code. one has the intention of returning. Residence is not domicile. residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile. but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile. it becomes his domicile. . whether permanent or temporary." In Ong vs. quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. residence is synonymous with domicile. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home". "a place to which. the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence. has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law. whenever absent for business or for pleasure. unless. implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. As it were. 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly: There is a difference between domicile and residence." 21 Based on the foregoing. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. in its ordinary conception. but he may have numerous places of residence. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area. In Uytengsu vs. 22 It is thus. for various reasons. he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. business. one intends to return. Petitioner's qualification A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations. the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence. for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position. when absent. "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which. Republic. I. 1995 elections. Residence. community or country. but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. b) After the Elections Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8. if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. However.II. domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. If a person's intent be to remain. and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent. a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode. or health. a person can only have a single domicile.

Davide: Madame President. The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law. page 2. So. we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical residence. what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile. Negros Oriental. In Nuval vs. I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention. 24 the Court held that "the term residence. "and a resident thereof". but also personal presence in that place. So. is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place. the interpretation given to it was domicile. Mr." 25 Larena vs. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases.For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. that is. 30 In Co vs. . 29 xxx xxx xxx Mrs. coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. De los Reyes: Domicile. . Guray. Ms. among others. As these concepts have evolved in our election law. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7. in the district for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside? Mr. this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile. insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence? Mr. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence. 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. Rosario Braid: Yes. Quirino. 31 this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law. there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. the proposed section merely provides. Faypon vs. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete. it actually means only "domicile" to wit: Mr. 32 . regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile.

Olot. Tolosa. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead. private respondent Montejo opposed the same. it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI. Leyte 8. petitioner. This honest mistake should not. in 1959. be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper. not Tacloban City. Leyte. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Sec. claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa. For instance. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned resolution. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First District. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months. In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte. It stands to reason therefore. Leyte POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile. in its assailed Resolution of April 24. she continuously lived in Manila. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa. according to the Resolution. Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district. a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. when herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District. We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile. resided in . that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. the Second Division of the COMELEC. albeit with a different interpretation." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban. not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. which was "since childhood" in the space provided. or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. however. First. Olot. Leyte. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 — the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile — coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. Tolosa.In the light of the principles just discussed. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. which is Tolosa. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months? It is the fact of residence. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus: 7. misinform.

to improve his lot. practice of his avocation. has his residence in the former municipality. the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence. We have stated. From the foregoing. she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. it bears repeating. It finds justification in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth. in 1965. notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other municipality in question and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial positions. have served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila. Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. and without having lived either alone or with his family in another municipality. the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons. we stressed: [T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning it. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession. Residence. 33 supra. of course includes study in other places. In doing so. and that. This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. many times in the past. Here is where the confusion lies. Quirino.P. not her domicile.San Juan. Teves. In Larena vs. following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency. in Faypon vs. When an election is to be held. or engaging in business. to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Then. 881). 34 We explained that: A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures. Manila where she as a voter. More significantly. she lived in San Miguel. stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality. are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile. or for any other reason. so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in national elections. that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Despite such registration. it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B. however. Thus. he may not absent himself from his professional or business activities. it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. In 1978 and thereafter. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another. which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36 . to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. the animus revertendi to his home. the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes." as the saying goes. 35 What is undeniable." the COMELEC stressed. "She could not.

now Divine Word University in Tacloban. the late speaker Daniel Z. Moreover. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. she established her domicile in Tacloban. contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. [I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu. it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila. Tacloban. still in Tacloban City. once acquired is retained until a new one is gained. Second. Leyte. . always with either her influence or consent. what is inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. Leyte. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959. Even during her husband's presidency. she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. She pursued her college studies in St. Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC. In 1965. when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines. instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown. In 1992. she came home to Manila. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin. one must demonstrate: 37 1. . Paul's College. celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province. To successfully effect a change of domicile. This domicile was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school. she married ex-President Ferdinand E. First. In 1954. and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment. Thereafter. or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban. she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again. petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban. Private respondent in his Comment. She grew up in Tacloban. Metro Manila. while petitioner was born in Manila. where she earned her degree in Education. respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan. at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers. In November 1991. Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. domicile of origin is not easily lost. Manila. . minor follows the domicile of his parents.In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old. Rizal where she registered as a voter." We do not agree. she and her husband lived together in San Juan. she taught in the Leyte Chinese School. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions. As domicile. Leyte (Tacloban City). as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. Hawaii.

To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium). sin embargo. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic. and 3. Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states: La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment. this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which means. Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence. Moreover. Both terms imply relations between a person and a place. . Arturo Tolentino. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. 110. Dr. the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical. 40 Article 110 of the Civil Code provides: Art. the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted. independent of the necessity of physical presence. writing on this specific area explains: In the Civil Code. Acts which correspond with the purpose. "when the husband shall transfer his residence. which means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. Marcos in 1952. it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred.2." referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of actual residence. In this connection. In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria. podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero . This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or residence. A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage. 38 In the case at bench. Los Tribunales. and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed. but in residence.

at other times they are distinguished from one another. Sometimes they are used synonymously." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. . The important thing for domicile is that. observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support. recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). Very significantly. In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial residence. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences. there be an intention to stay there permanently. for obviously practical reasons. The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family. 109. such as a country residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in place. A person can have two or more residences. As Dr. In instances where the wife actually opts. be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence. once residence has been established in one place. we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband. even if residence is also established in some other place. for professional or other reasons. revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). This difference could.fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to another not only once. and the ultimate decision must be made from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is used. Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce. xxx xxx xxx Residence in the civil law is a material fact.under the Civil Code. stays in one of their (various) residences. even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle." Hence. — The husband and wife are obligated to live together. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence. thus: Art." Otherwise. Tolentino further explains: Residence and Domicile — Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty. a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence. it is illogical to conclude that Art. but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family. our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her husband or. Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. to live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or . on the other hand. In De la Vina vs. domicile can exist without actually living in the place. the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together. 41 In fact. for the sake of family unity. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together.

equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England. enforcible (sic) by process of contempt. where a decree of adherence. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded. The decision referred to (Bahn v. formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife. enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience. only one court. we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with. may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. Weldon (9 P. 1909.. and render conjugal rights to. pp. Vasques de Arroyo45 the Court held that: Upon examination of the authorities. that court would make a mandatory decree. and in the alternative. could be obtained by the injured spouse. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order. and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony. Accordingly. as administrator of the ganancial property. the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile. the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment.reverting to her domicile of origin. and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband. and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to the marriage. the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. but could not be enforced by imprisonment. 1. It was decided many years ago. In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States. all income. who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. In Arroyo vs. Sir James Hannen. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders. 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. rents. requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. has ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other. and if the facts were found to warrant it. Ann. so far as we can discover. 36 La. 11) But it does not appear that this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property. Civ. though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured. and he experience of those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. (113 Jur. Darby. In a decision of January 2. expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland. and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc. the other.. Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice. and in Weldon v. to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband. in obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice. 1148). decided in 1883. . At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof. and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. Thus in England.. 52). upon her failure to do so. President in the Probate.D.

Mr. The problem here is that at that time. 48 Moreover. Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences. Moreover. The jurisdictional issue Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24. in 1954. she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home. it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband. the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife — the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses. is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954. petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. She did not lose her domicile of origin. Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died. while living in her brother's house. Rizal and Batac. an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters.Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been incorporated. 1995. petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the . Ilocos Norte. In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point. and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage. But assuming that Mr. as it was in a state of disrepair. what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. . There is no showing which of these places Mr." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore. She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan. . Marcos did fix as his family's residence. On the other hand. fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban. petitioner was obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot. Marcos had several places of residence." not domicile. Leyte. not a domicilium necessarium. 46 Without as much belaboring the point. Leyte." 47 Furthermore. the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. II. among which were San Juan. we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte. having been previously looted by vandals. to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland. into the New Family Code.

and May 25. May 7. in doing so. including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or she justly deserves in law. it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question. the reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law. are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act. 881 even after the elections. In Trapp v.election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. Surely. lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period. As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8. having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives. many established principles of law. In any event.P. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B." Thus. we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the past. This is untenable. The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction.P.A. . in said case. WHEREFORE. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities. this court inMarcelino vs. Moreover. with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity. even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the preEDSA regime. 17 of the Constitution. 1995 elections. It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings. 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Mc Cormick. 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it. 52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B. We renege on these sacred ideals. the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24. it was held that "the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity. returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered without the consent of counsel. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground here. May 11. 881. It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory. the statute under examination was construed merely to be directory. Cruz held that: 51 The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of expediency. suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections.

Feliciano. J. SO ORDERED.Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte. . is on leave..

petitioner. 8: 4 RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.R. the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position. the deadline for the filing of the same having . J. 1995. 1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected. In his petition. 1995 IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS. the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that: [T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time. 119976 September 18. private respondent contended that Mrs.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. respondents. and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election. 1995. changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy." 3 Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8. 8 On the same day. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO." 2 The mischief which this provision — reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter. private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo. providing the following information in item no. On March 23. No. 3349772 6and in her Certificate of Candidacy.: A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. from an elective office to serve that community." 7 On March 29. 1995. vs. filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. 8 of the amended certificate. petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy. KAPUNAN.

Furthermore. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City. as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest. 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31. Leyte. 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95009 meritorious. 14 Dealing with two primary issues. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six month actual residence therein. 1995. 1995. petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros. 1995. free and clean elections on May 8. petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same objective." In an accompanying affidavit. a component of the First District. such bill did not pass the Senate.already lapsed on March 20. 9 Consequently. petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. 1995. before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa. by a vote of 2 to 1. and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy. Having failed on such moves. the Second Division held: Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and. However. in her memorandum. the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the congressional election in the First District. . 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on the same day. she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood. In said Answer. petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot. along with other Leyte Congressmen. a component of the First District. peaceful. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification. she noted that: When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte. to which she could have responded "since childhood. to achieve his purpose. Tolosa. to which she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned. She asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or before the March 20. seeking the creation of another legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District. petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court. an amendment should subsequently be allowed. therefore. and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement. She averred that she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District. 1995. namely. He also filed a bill. Manila on March 31. 1995 deadline. 12 On April 24. although she only became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. orderly.

Tolosa. Petition). item no. 1994. The case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of the election. Leyte. therefore. Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan. The dates of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot. Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time. The change in the number of years of residence in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her qualification as a candidacy. this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District." Thus. From the foregoing. is devoid of merit. she was quite aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City. However. To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate. the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an inconsequential deviation. 1995 will only sum up to 7 months." Besides. The Commission. respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation. She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record accomplished on January 28. specially those intended to suppress.Along this point. accurate material representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. Tolosa. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election. Tolosa. Since on the basis of her Answer. Olot. starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8. therefore. xxx xxx xxx . Olot. to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of elections. the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive. cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it was an error. dated August 24." The Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only as a matter of form. it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake. 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa. the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Moreover. Metro Manila. But in the instant case. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made. Her explanation that she thought what was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A. In fact. of the detriment of the integrity of the election. she cited the case ofAlialy v.

In 1978. Leyte. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City. RTC-Tacloban. 96 Phil 294. 226 SCRA 408). one intends to return. In 1965. coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Furthermore. she lived in San Miguel. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila. Manila where she was again a registered voter. Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot. she lived and resided in San Juan. Eliseo Quirino. Thus. Romualdez vs. she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. These facts manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places. she continuously lived in Manila. the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place. it is clear that respondent has not complied with the one year residency requirement of the Constitution.Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by this Commission. Leyte. In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC(226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. when she returned to the Philippines in 1991. She could not have served these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan. she claimed to be a resident of San Juan. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban. (2) intention to remain there. In 1959. In election cases. the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan. Metro Manila. xxx xxx xxx Anent the second issue. after her husband was elected Senator. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality. when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992. This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. Tolosa. and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. 1994. She registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila. In this case. she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa. Metro Manila. In other words there must basically be animus manendi withanimus non revertendi. In respondent's case. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure. or for like reasons. she is considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. including Metro Manila. coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that . her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban. (Perfecto Faypon vs. and based on the foregoing discussion. As a matter of fact on August 24.

Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient. On the same day. one year prior the election. Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct. Tolosa. showed intention to reside in Tacloban. petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8. there must likewise be conduct indicative of such intention. petitioner comes to this court for relief. what was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa. she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City. 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14. no new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant reexamination of the resolution granting the petition for disqualification. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition. however. 17 The Resolution tersely stated: After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration. the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it. 18 On May 11. without the accompanying conduct to prove that intention. It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte "since childhood. 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70. On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation. Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. is not conclusive of her choice of residence. the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. as her place of domicile. 1995. 15 In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8.833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of the district for six months only. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to Tacloban.471 votes compared to the 36. she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28. Worse. the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24. In doing so. Leyte. 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 1995 elections.place. 1995. Leyte. This may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa. 18-A of Olot. 19 In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995. The principal issues may be classified into two general areas: . where she spent her childhood and school days." To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of Leyte for more than one year. she had been a resident of Manila.

A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Republic. a person can only have a single domicile. it becomes his domicile. he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. Residence. 1995 elections. Residence is . Petitioner's qualification A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. In Uytengsu vs. has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction." In Ong vs. 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly: There is a difference between domicile and residence. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications Whether or not petitioner was a resident. a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position. quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. whether permanent or temporary. "a place to which. Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations. when absent. and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent. If a person's intent be to remain. domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi. or the intention of returning there permanently. As it were. for various reasons. one intends to return. business. "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which. the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence. community or country. 1995 elections. II. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure. one has the intention of returning. whenever absent for business or for pleasure. the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence. 22 It is thus. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area. residence is synonymous with domicile. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home". I. implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. The Jurisdictional Issue a) Prior to the elections Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code. or health. residence. in its ordinary conception. b) After the Elections Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode. However. of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9. for election purposes. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends.I. unless." 21 Based on the foregoing. if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law.

So. Mr. I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention. but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases. there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution. this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile. So. De los Reyes: Domicile. In Nuval vs. 24 the Court held that "the term residence. Ms.not domicile. would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside? Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. in the district for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. among others. but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence? Mr. 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5. . A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time. but he may have numerous places of residence. Davide: Madame President. For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. that is. we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical residence. As these concepts have evolved in our election law. page 2. the interpretation given to it was domicile." 25 Larena vs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7. insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned. . Guray. 30 . Quirino. "and a resident thereof". The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law. the proposed section merely provides. Faypon vs. is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place. Negros Oriental. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete. Rosario Braid: Yes. but also personal presence in that place. 29 xxx xxx xxx Mrs. it actually means only "domicile" to wit: Mr. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile. what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.

that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. Leyte POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. Sec. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First District. It stands to reason therefore. claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa. regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. which was "since childhood" in the space provided. when herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. Olot. This honest mistake should not. Leyte 8. Tolosa. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives. not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus: 7. 32 In the light of the principles just discussed. misinform. Olot. private respondent Montejo opposed the same. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead. albeit with a different interpretation. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned resolution. Leyte. Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 — the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile — coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. For instance. in its assailed Resolution of April 24. the Second Division of the COMELEC. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification. In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months.In Co vs. which is Tolosa. We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa. not Tacloban City. Tolosa. has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI. however. Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile. 31 this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law.1995 maintains . 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months? It is the fact of residence. a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.

P. stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality. it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B. in 1965. When an election is to be held. Residence. In Larena vs. she lived in San Miguel. Leyte. implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. "She could not.that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City." as the saying goes. the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes. Despite such registration. or engaging in business. she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. practice of his avocation. in 1959. not her domicile. petitioner. she continuously lived in Manila. the animus revertendi to his home. First. to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban. he may not absent himself from his professional or business activities. in Faypon vs. More significantly. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another. From the foregoing. Quirino. to improve his lot. to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in national elections. resided in San Juan. notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other municipality in question and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial positions. Here is where the confusion lies. or for any other reason. the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence. Teves. many times in the past. 33 supra. In doing so. of course includes study in other places. This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. and that. Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. It finds justification in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth. 881). The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession. the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons. In 1978 and thereafter. Thus. according to the Resolution. it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. we stressed: [T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning it. 35 . 34 We explained that: A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures. have served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila. and without having lived either alone or with his family in another municipality. Manila where she as a voter. We have stated. it bears repeating. has his residence in the former municipality. Then. following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency." the COMELEC stressed.

Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin. instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown. respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan. She pursued her college studies in St. This domicile was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments." We do not agree. she and her husband lived together in San Juan. Thereafter. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban. Rizal where she registered as a voter. Manila. Leyte (Tacloban City). Leyte. one must demonstrate: 37 . Second. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions. She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school. domicile of origin is not easily lost. what is inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. Moreover. while petitioner was born in Manila. Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. once acquired is retained until a new one is gained. at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers. In 1992. now Divine Word University in Tacloban. as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. she taught in the Leyte Chinese School. which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36 In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old. Private respondent in his Comment. the late speaker Daniel Z. it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila. . . In 1954. Tacloban. contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. In 1965. Paul's College. she established her domicile in Tacloban. Hawaii. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. she married ex-President Ferdinand E. or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban. Metro Manila. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952.What is undeniable. celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province. always with either her influence or consent. In November 1991. Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC. petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban. reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. however. [I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu. (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again. still in Tacloban City. Even during her husband's presidency. As domicile. she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel. First. when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines. are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959. To successfully effect a change of domicile. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. She grew up in Tacloban. and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment. she came home to Manila. minor follows the domicile of his parents. Leyte. where she earned her degree in Education. she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and .

Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article. this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which means. A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage. 110. the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Arturo Tolentino. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or residence. In this connection.1. the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted. Los Tribunales. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one. Marcos in 1952. In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria. Both terms imply relations between a person and a place. there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. 2. writing on this specific area explains: In the Civil Code. 40 Article 110 of the Civil Code provides: Art. it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium). which means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. Acts which correspond with the purpose. Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states: La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. independent of the necessity of physical presence. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic. and 3. "when the husband shall transfer his . An actual removal or an actual change of domicile. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero . Dr. and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. sin embargo. for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment. but in residence. Moreover. 38 In the case at bench.

on the other hand. for professional or other reasons. our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her husband or. recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). thus: Art. domicile can exist without actually living in the place. In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial residence. In instances where the wife ." referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of actual residence. fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to another not only once. it is illogical to conclude that Art. a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence. If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences. This difference could. be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence. for obviously practical reasons. The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. 109. In De la Vina vs. once residence has been established in one place. 41 In fact. the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together. Sometimes they are used synonymously. As Dr. Residence is acquired by living in place. we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce." Hence." Otherwise. revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle. at other times they are distinguished from one another. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed. xxx xxx xxx Residence in the civil law is a material fact. even if residence is also established in some other place. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together. for the sake of family unity. Very significantly. — The husband and wife are obligated to live together. Tolentino further explains: Residence and Domicile — Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty. The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family. The important thing for domicile is that. stays in one of their (various) residences. but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family. observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). and the ultimate decision must be made from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is used. such as a country residence and a city residence. Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence. A person can have two or more residences.residence. there be an intention to stay there permanently.

that court would make a mandatory decree. to live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of origin. formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife. an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband.. only one court. . In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. In a decision of January 2. though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured. enforcible (sic) by process of contempt. It was decided many years ago. and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to the marriage. Accordingly. upon her failure to do so. 52). and render conjugal rights to.under the Civil Code. 11) But it does not appear that this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property. the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile. the other. Sir James Hannen. Darby. as administrator of the ganancial property. requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment. enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience. and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt. 1. (113 Jur. we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with. and he experience of those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Vasques de Arroyo45 the Court held that: Upon examination of the authorities. (21 Cyc. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order.. Thus in England. all income. so far as we can discover. In Arroyo vs. 1148). has ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other. in obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice. 1909. rents. 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code.actually opts. Weldon (9 P. expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland. and in Weldon v. Ann. Civ. 36 La. and in the alternative. President in the Probate. In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States. equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England. but could not be enforced by imprisonment. . the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. The decision referred to (Bahn v. and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded. and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony. and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband. Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice. decided in 1883. pp.. where a decree of adherence. and if the facts were found to warrant it. could be obtained by the injured spouse.D.

the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law." 47 Furthermore. On the other hand. Rizal and Batac. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. Mr. The problem here is that at that time. II. we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte. 1995. it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband. petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban. 46 Without as much belaboring the point. She did not lose her domicile of origin." not domicile. into the New Family Code. not a domicilium necessarium. is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses. Ilocos Norte. . There is no showing which of these places Mr. the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been incorporated. having been previously looted by vandals. . as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence. while living in her brother's house. Marcos had several places of residence. 48 Moreover. In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point. as it was in a state of disrepair. She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan.Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos. But assuming that Mr. The jurisdictional issue Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24. fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Leyte. petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore. the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the . What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife — the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence. to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland. and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage. in 1954. Leyte. she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home. what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. Moreover. Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot. Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters. petitioner was obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. among which were San Juan. an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman.

election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the
Constitution. This is untenable.

It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is
generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the
judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated
it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of
necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this court inMarcelino
vs. Cruz held that: 51
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on
grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public
by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a
limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered without the
consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions which may be thus
departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings,
are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to
effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act."
Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed merely to be
directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a
decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in
the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely
on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P.
881, 52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a
pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the
issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's
jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the
HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to
ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in
a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many established
principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the preEDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA
ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or she
justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the
past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications
to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's
questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.

Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15127

May 30, 1961

EMETERIO CUI, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, defendant-appellee.
G.A.S. Sipin, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.
E. Voltaire Garcia for defendant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by plaintiff Emeterio Cui from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, absolving
defendant Arellano University from plaintiff's complaint, with costs against the plaintiff, and
dismissing defendant's counter claim, for insufficiency of proof thereon.
In the language of the decision appealed from:
The essential facts of this case are short and undisputed. As established by the agreement
of facts Exhibits X and by the respective oral and documentary evidence introduced by the
parties, it appears conclusive that plaintiff, before the school year 1948-1949 took up
preparatory law course in the defendant University. After finishing his preparatory law course
plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law of the defendant from the school year 1948-1949.
Plaintiff finished his law studies in the defendant university up to and including the first
semester of the fourth year. During all the school years in which plaintiff was studying law in
defendant law college, Francisco R. Capistrano, brother of the mother of plaintiff, was the
dean of the College of Law and legal counsel of the defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled for
the last semester of his law studies in the defendant university but failed to pay his tuition
fees because his uncle Dean Francisco R. Capistrano having severed his connection with
defendant and having accepted the deanship and chancellorship of the College of Law of
Abad Santos University, plaintiff left the defendant's law college and enrolled for the last
semester of his fourth year law in the college of law of the Abad Santos University graduating
from the college of law of the latter university. Plaintiff, during all the time he was studying
law in defendant university was awarded scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his
semestral tuition fees were returned to him after the ends of semester and when his
scholarship grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to
defendant and refunded to him by the latter from the first semester up to and including the
first semester of his last year in the college of law or the fourth year, is in total P1,033.87.
After graduating in law from Abad Santos University he applied to take the bar examination.
To secure permission to take the bar he needed the transcripts of his records in defendant
Arellano University. Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue to him the needed transcripts. The
defendant refused until after he had paid back the P1,033 87 which defendant refunded to
him as above stated. As he could not take the bar examination without those transcripts,
plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under protest. This is the sum which plaintiff seeks to
recover from defendant in this case.

Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as above stated, he was made
to sign the following contract covenant and agreement:
"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby waive my right
to transfer to another school without having refunded to the University (defendant) the
equivalent of my scholarship cash.

(Sgd.) Emeterio Cui".

It is admitted that, on August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38,
series of 1949, on the subject of "Scholarship," addressed to "All heads of private schools, colleges
and universities," reading:
1. School catalogs and prospectuses submitted to this, Bureau show that some schools offer
full or partial scholarships to deserving students — for excellence in scholarship or for
leadership in extra-curricular activities. Such inducements to poor but gifted students should
be encouraged. But to stipulate the condition that such scholarships are good only if the
students concerned continue in the same school nullifies the principle of merit in the award
of these scholarships.
2. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is understood that such
scholarships are merited and earned. The amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to
these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they
decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered
merely to attract and keep students in a school.
3. Several complaints have actually been received from students who have enjoyed
scholarships, full or partial, to the effect that they could not transfer to other schools since
their credentials would not be released unless they would pay the fees corresponding to the
period of the scholarships. Where the Bureau believes that the right of the student to transfer
is being denied on this ground, it reserves the right to authorize such transfer.
that defendant herein received a copy of this memorandum; that plaintiff asked the Bureau of Private
Schools to pass upon the issue on his right to secure the transcript of his record in defendant
University, without being required to refund the sum of P1,033.87; that the Bureau of Private Schools
upheld the position taken by the plaintiff and so advised the defendant; and that, this
notwithstanding, the latter refused to issue said transcript of records, unless said refund were made,
and even recommended to said Bureau that it issue a written order directing the defendant to
release said transcript of record, "so that the case may be presented to the court for judicial action."
As above stated, plaintiff was, accordingly, constrained to pay, and did pay under protest, said sum
of P1,033.87, in order that he could take the bar examination in 1953. Subsequently, he brought this
action for the recovery of said amount, aside from P2,000 as moral damages, P500 as exemplary
damages, P2,000 as attorney's fees, and P500 as expenses of litigation.
In its answer, defendant reiterated the stand it took, vis-a-vis the Bureau of Private Schools, namely,
that the provisions of its contract with plaintiff are valid and binding and that the memorandum
above-referred to is null and void. It, likewise, set up a counterclaim for P10,000.00 as damages,
and P3,000 as attorney's fees.

The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision of the contract between plaintiff and the
defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the
latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid or not. The lower court resolved this question
in the affirmative, upon the ground that the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of Private
Schools is not a law; that the provisions thereof are advisory, not mandatory in nature; and that,
although the contractual provision "may be unethical, yet it was more unethical for plaintiff to quit
studying with the defendant without good reasons and simply because he wanted to follow the
example of his uncle." Moreover, defendant maintains in its brief that the aforementioned
memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is null and void because said officer had no
authority to issue it, and because it had been neither approved by the corresponding department
head nor published in the official gazette.
We do not deem it necessary or advisable to consider as the lower court did, the question whether
plaintiff had sufficient reasons or not to transfer from defendant University to the Abad Santos
University. The nature of the issue before us, and its far reaching effects, transcend personal
equations and demand a determination of the case from a high impersonal plane. Neither do we
deem it essential to pass upon the validity of said Memorandum No. 38, for, regardless of the same,
we are of the opinion that the stipulation in question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and
void. The aforesaid memorandum merely incorporates a sound principle of public policy. As the
Director of Private Schools correctly pointed, out in his letter, Exhibit B, to the defendant,
There is one more point that merits refutation and that is whether or not the contract entered
into between Cui and Arellano University on September 10, 1951 was void as against public
policy. In the case of Zeigel vs. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 245 Ill. 180, 19 Ann. Case
127, the court said: 'In determining a public policy of the state, courts are limited to a
consideration of the Constitution, the judicial decisions, the statutes, and the practice of
government officers.' It might take more than a government bureau or office to lay down or
establish a public policy, as alleged in your communication, but courts consider the practices
of government officials as one of the four factors in determining a public policy of the state. It
has been consistently held in America that under the principles relating to the doctrine of
public policy, as applied to the law of contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold
a transaction which its object, operation, or tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to the
public welfare, to sound morality or to civic honesty (Ritter vs. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S.
139; Heding vs. Gallaghere 64 L.R.A. 811; Veazy vs. Allen, 173 N.Y. 359). If Arellano
University understood clearly the real essence of scholarships and the motives which
prompted this office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should have not entered into a
contract of waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a direct violation of our
Memorandum and an open challenge to the authority of the Director of Private Schools
because the contract was repugnant to sound morality and civic honesty. And finally, in
Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, Off. Gazette Supp. Dec. 6, 1941, p. 67 we read: 'In order to
declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find that the contract as to
consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of society, or
is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security
of individual rights. The policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound
policy. Scholarship are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep outstanding students in
school to bolster its prestige. In the understanding of that university scholarships award is a
business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education institution.
Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals. But what is
morals? Manresa has this definition. It is good customs; those generally accepted principles
of morality which have received some kind of social and practical confirmation. The practice
of awarding scholarships to attract students and keep them in school is not good customs
nor has it received some kind of social and practical confirmation except in some private
institutions as in Arellano University. The University of the Philippines which implements

Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution with reference to the giving of free scholarships to
gifted children, does not require scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of the
scholarships if they transfer to other schools. So also with the leading colleges and
universities of the United States after which our educational practices or policies are
patterned. In these institutions scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant
students in school for their propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted students in
whom society has an established interest or a first lien. (Emphasis supplied.)
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered
sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the
legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as well as the costs, and
dismissing defendant's counterclaim. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Parades, Dizon, De Leon and Natividad,
JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., reserves his vote.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-65425 November 5, 1987
IRENEO LEAL, JOSE LEAL, CATALINA LEAL, BERNABELA LEAL, VICENTE LEAL EUIOGIA
LEAL PATERNO RAMOS, MACARIO DEL ROSARIO, MARGARITA ALBERTO, VICTORIA
TORRES, JUSTINA MANUEL, JULIAN MANUEL, MELANIA SANTOS, CLEMENTE SAMARIO,
MARIKINA VALLEY, INC., MIGUELA MENDOZA, and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
RIZAL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (4th Civil Cases Division), and
VICENTE SANTIAGO (Substituted by SALUD M. SANTIAGO), respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:
In its resolution dated September 27, 1983, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court,

1 speaking
through Justice Porfirio V, Sison, ordered, in part, the petitioners to accept the sum of P5,600.00 from the private respondent as repurchase
price of the lots described in the "Compraventa" and, thereafter, to execute a Deed of Repurchase to effect transfer over ownership over the
same properties to the private respondent.

This ruling was a complete reversal of the earlier decision, 2 dated June 28, 1.978, penned by Justice
Paras, of the Court of Appeals, in the same case, affirming the trial court's dismissal of the private
respondent's complaint.
The petitioners, feeling aggrieved and astonished by the complete turnaround of the respondent
court, come to Us with this petition for review by certiorari.
The antecedent facts are undisputed.
This case brings us back almost half a century ago, on March 21, 1941, when a document entitled
"Compraventa," written entirely in the Spanish language, involving three parcels of land, was
executed by the private respondent's predecessors-in-interest, Vicente Santiago and his brother,
Luis Santiago, in favor of Cirilio Leal the deceased father of some of the petitioners, Pursuant to this
"Compraventa," the title over the three parcels of land in the name of the vendors was cancelled and
a new one was issued in the name of Cirilo Leal who immediately took possession and exercised
ownership over the said lands. When Cirilo died on December 10, 1959, the subject lands were
inherited by his six children, who are among the petitioners, and who caused the consolidation and
subdivision of the properties among themselves.
Between the years 1960 and 1965, the properties were either mortgaged or leased by the
petitioners-children of Cirilo Leal — to their co-petitioners.
Sometime before the agricultural year 1966-1967, Vicente Santiago approached the petitioners and
offered re- repurchase the subject properties. Petitioners, however, refused the offer. Consequently,

50 as rental for the year 1967-1968 and the same amount every year thereafter. 42535 in the names of Vicente Santiago and Luis Santiago upon presentation of the deed of sale herein ordered to be executed by the appellees in favor of Salud M. Santiago and to issue thereof another Transfer Certificate of Title in the name alone of Salud M.00 as attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation. the court a quo rendered its decision. in a resolution penned by Justice Sison and promulgated on September 27. Santiago. the private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals and the latter. No costs here and in the courts (sic) below. Santiago) as repurchase price of the lots described in the "Compraventa" of March 21. 3 xxx xxx xxx which is now the subject of varying and conflicting interpretations. 1983.600. filed a-timely motion for reconsideration of the above decision and an opposition to petitioners' motion to amend. Our decision of June 28.600. Not satisfied with this decision. All the trial. .00) siempre y cuando estos ultimos pueden hacer la compra. Resolving the abovestated motion for reconsideration. no podran vender a otros dichos tres lotes de terreno sino al aqui vendedor Vicente Santiago. as yet. 1941. ruled. (3) ordering an the defendants jointly and severally to pay the sum of Pl. the same to be done within five (5) days from payment.00 from plaintiff-appellant (substituted by Salud M. case was reassigned to the Fourth Civil in this cases Division. the respondent court. 1967. The petitioners seasonably filed a motion to amend the dispositive portion of the decision so as to include an order for the cancellation of the annotations at the back of the Transfer certificates of Title issued in their favor. SO ORDERED. The private respondent. the well-spring whence the present controversy arose is the abovementioned "Compraventa. Verily.087. 1978 is hereby reversed and set aside and another one is rendered ordering: (1) defendants-appellees surnamed Leal to accept the sum of P5. to wit: xxx xxx xxx (b) En caso de venta. no sale nor any alienation equivalent to a sale.500. acting through the Fourth Division and with Justice Edgardo Paras as ponente affirmed the decision of the court a quo.-on the other hand. Santiago. These incidents were not resolved until then Court of Appeals was abolished and in lieu of which the Intermideate Appellate Court was established In view of the said reorganization." more particularly paragraph (b) thereof. and (4) ordering defendant Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No.Vicente Santiago instituted a complaint for specific performance before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon City on August 2. and thereafter to execute a deed of repurchase sufficient in law to transfer ownership of the properties to appellant Salud M.-dismissing the complaint on the ground that the same was still premature considering that there was. o los herederos o sucesores de este por el niismo precio de CINCO MIL SEISCIENTOS PESOS (P5. (2) ordering the same defendants Leals and defendant Clemente Samario to indemnify appellant in the sum of P3. as follows: WHEREFORE.

the prohibition to sell the lots to persons other than the vendor (appellant). 1255 of the Civil Code of Spain. we grant the petitioners' prayer for the cancellation of the annotations of this prohibition at the back of their Transfer Certificates 'Title. that the petitioners have never sold. However. Public order signifies the public weal — public policy. V. their assigns and heirs. clauses. morals. indefinite and stated as to time. so much so that it shall continue to be applicable even beyond the lifetime of the original parties to the contract. 5 Essentially. " We now come to what we believe is the very issue in this case which is. and conditions which are contrary to public order are null and void. which is applicable in this instance. or even attempted to sell. Contracts are generally binding between the parties. the properties subject of the "Compraventa. . This. uncertainly. is. in part: xxx xxx xxx Finally. public order and public policy mean one and the same thing. the petitioners. namely. whether or not under the aforequoted paragraph (b) of the "Compraventa" a right of repurchase in favor of the private respondent exist. otherwise there would be subversion of public policy. we hold that any such prohibition. thus. while private respondent naturally lauds the resolution of Justice Sison. which states. public order. there is grave doubt re the validity of the ostensible resolutory condition here. which naturally frowns on unwarranted restrictions on the right of ownership. Sison) interpreted the same provision as granting the right to repurchase subject to a condition precedent. however. a prohibition to alienate should not exceed at most a period of twenty years. the equivalent provision in the Civil Code of the Philippines is that of Art. The ruling of the Fourth Division (Justice Paras) is that the said stipulation does not grant a right to repurchase. the resolution of the Fourth Civil Cases Division (Justice P. specifically the owner's right to freely dispose of his properties. provided they are not contrary to law. on the other hand. 6 One such condition which is contrary to public policy is the present prohibition to self to third parties. 4 xxx xxx xxx We agree with the Paras ponencia. terms and conditions as they may deem convenient. moreover. 1255 of the Civil Code of Spain. therefore. because the same virtually amounts to a perpetual restriction to the right of ownership. under Art. It will be noted. Public policy is simply the English equivalent of "order publico" in Art. a nullity. without doubt. good customs. In the light of this pronouncement. endorse the decision penned by Justice Paras. which states: "That contracting parties may establish such stipulations. Contrarily. Parenthetically. clauses. or public policy. without any binding effect. which sustains the validity of this prohibition. 1306.xxx xxx xxx It is admitted by both parties that the phrase "they shall not sell to others these three lots but only to the seller Vicente Santiago or to his heirs or successors" is an express prohibition against the sale of the lots described in the "Compraventa" to third persons or strangers to the contract. pacts.

nor can we infer." the petitioner correctly asserts that the same has already prescribed. in no uncertain terms. the right to redeem must be expressly stipulated in the contract of sale in order that it may have legal existence. In this case then. 138839. the resale of the lots to their owners. If this were so. 138840. 1978 is hereby REINSTATED.600. reversing the earlier decision of the same respondent court. because the law does not favor suspended ownership." should have been exercise within four years from March 21. of the respondent court is SET ASIDE and the Decision promulgated on June 28. In the case before us. the right to repurchase. 1941 (indubitably the date of execution of the contract). 138838. or 25 years from the date of the contract. the right to repurchase the thing sold. the existence of any such right. or at the latest in 1945. and not "the buyers should sell. shall last four years from the date of the contract. for the same sum of P5. the vendor should reserve. WHEREFORE.. 8 Thus. it is the respondent court's contention that the right may be exercised only when the buyer has money to buy. 1983. and 138842 are hereby ordered CANCELLED. it is further ruled that the right to repurchase was given birth by the condition precedent provided for in the phrase "siempre y cuando estos ultimos pueden hacer la compra" (when the buyer has money to buy). the Resolution dated September 27. hence. including appellants Vicente Santiago including appellants Vicente Santiago and Salud M Santiago. 138837. 7 xxx xxx xxx The law provides that for conventional redemption to take place. 1508 of the Civil Code of Spain (Art. the assailed Resolution. The annotations of the prohibition to sell at the back of TCT Nos. The words envision the situation contemplated by the contracting parties themselves. if it was at four guaranteed under in the "Compraventa. We repeat. the said right has undoubtedly expired. ruled xxx xxx xxx The all-importartant phrase "en caso de venta. The subject phrase is patent and unambiguous. "siempre y cuando estos ultimos pueden hacer la compra" (when the latter shall be able to buy it). xxx xxx xxx . from any word or words in the questioned paragraph. in view of the foregoing." which is clearly a contorted construction of the same phrase. the right should be exercised within ten years. Under Art. the second paragraph of Article 1508 would apply — there is agreement as to the time. In other words. 1606 of the Civil Code of the Philippines). The interpretation in the resolution (Justice Sison) is rather strained. In the respondent court's resolution. and NOT to a sale of the lots to third parties or strangers to the contracts..00. Costs against the private respondent. in the absence of an express agreement as to time. although it is indefinite. 138841. The resort to Article 1373 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is erroneous.Thus. it must not be given another interpretation But even assuming that such a right of repurchase is granted under the "Compraventa... the right to redeem or repurchase. Since the alleged right to repurchase was attempted to be exercised by Vicente Santiago only in 1966.." must of necessity refer to the sale of the properties either by Cirilo or his heirs to the Santiago brothers themselves or to their heirs. . . we cannot and any express or implied grant of a right to repurchase. The phrase "in case case" of should be construed to mean "should the buyers wish to sell which is the plain and simple import of the words. therefore.

as supposed member of said Electoral Tribunal. and one (1) Senator-namely. together with Camilo Osias. 1956. Lorenzo M. and upon his recommendation. and the Senate. . in his capacity as Cashier and Disbursing Officer of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. L-10520 February 28. Teehankee and Macapagal for petitioners. for respondents. Jr. thereafter. J. chose Senators Jose P. and said Alfredo Cruz. Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. petitioners. Francisco Rodrigo. on behalf of the Nacionalista Party. Lorenzo Sumulong. whereas petitioner Diosdado Macapagal. 1957 LORENZO M. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal. CATALINA CAYETANO. vs. the Senate consists of 23 Senators who belong to the Nacionalista Party. ALFREDO CRUZ. respectively to Senator Delgado. as technical assistant and private secretary. Domocao Alonto and Decoroso Rosales.SO ORDERED. and (2) Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. Cuenco and Francisco A. the Chairman of the latter appointed: (1) Alfredo Cruz and Catalina Cayetano. FRANCISCO A. Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada is a member of the Senate of the Philippines. Pio Pedrosa and William Chiongbian-who had. Enrique Magalona. Claro M. CONCEPCION. Recto.: Petitioner Lorenzo M. was one of the official candidates of the Liberal Party for the Senate. Soon.R. Petitioners allege that on February 22. Subsequently. The Senate. a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippines. Quiazon. to Senator Cuenco. No. in nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado. TAÑADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL. on behalf of the Citizens Party. and FERNANDO HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and disbursing officer. as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. in its session of February 22. upon nomination of Senator Cipriano Primicias. 4. petitioner. Upon nomination of petitioner Senator Tañada. the Senate choose respondents Senators Mariano J. Fernando Lopez and Cipriano Primicias. that the Committee on Rules for the Senate. Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Troadio T. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. in which Pacita Madrigal Warns. MARIANO JESUS CUENCO. Pedro Sabido. 1956. Macario Peralta. Laurel. and President of the Citizens Party.respondents. said petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of said Tribunal. Subsequently. MANUEL SERAPIO. Tañada and Congressman Diosdado Macapagal instituted the case at bar against Senators Cuenco and Delgado. . as supposed member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. were proclaimed elected. Then. Tañada-belonging to the Citizens Party. at the General elections held in November. in said election-in Senate Electoral Case No. 1955. Tañada. Catalina Cayetano. respectively. now pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal. also. as technical assistant and private secretary. and over the objections of Senators Tañada and Sumulong. as well as at present. upon his recommendation of said respondent. as well as Fernando Hipolito. PLACIDO REYES. run for the Senate. upon nomination of Senator Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate. DELGADO. Geronima Pecson. the elections of this Senators-elect-who eventually assumed their respective seats in the Senate-was contested by petitioner Macapagal. Quintin Paredes.

intruding into and exercising the powers of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal". instead of by an Electoral Tribunal packed with five members belonging to the Nacionalista Party. Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. Cuenco. pending this action. Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes from the aforementioned public offices in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and that they be altogether excluded therefrom and making the Preliminary injunction permanent. because "petitioner Tañada has exhausted his right to nominate after he nominated himself and refused to nominate two (2) more Senators". Catalina Cayetano. Petitioners pray that:. had "acted absolutely without power or color of authority and in clear violation . because said petitioner is in estoppel. judgment be rendered ousting respondent Mariano J. allege. Catalina Cayetano. both as a Senator belonging to the Citizens Party and as representative of the Citizens Party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Cayetano. the said five (5) Nacionalista Senators having been nominated and chosen in the manner alleged. and that Senators Cuenco and Delgado "are threatening and are about to take cognizance of Electoral Case No. as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. I. to which the Petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants in Electoral Case No. as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.. by way of special and affirmative defenses. Alfredo Cruz. of Article VI. and to respondent Fernando Hipolito restraining him from paying the salaries of respondent Alfredo Cruz. Section 11 of the Constitution". as technical assistants and private secretaries to Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who caused said appointments to be made-as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal. a writ of preliminary injunction be immediately issued directed to respondents Mariano J. Cruz. and in deprivation of the constitutional rights of petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants to have their election protest tried and decided-by an Electoral Tribunal composed of not more than three (3) senators chosen by the Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate and not more than the (3) Senators upon nomination of the Party having the second largest number of votes therein. Serapio and Reyes. consequently. by taking the corresponding oath of office therefor". are unlawful and void. and (b) that the petition states no cause of action. and in violation of the Constitution. together. except insofar as it questions the legality. likewise. 4 belong. with costs against the respondents.". After hearing. intrude into and/ or hold or exercise the said public offices respectively being occupied by them in the Senate Electoral Tribunal. despite the fact that the draft submitted to the constitutional . in nullification of the rights of petitioner Lorenzo M. upon the ground that the power to choose six (6) Senators as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the Senate. and validity of the election of respondents Senators Cuenco and Delgado. that "in assuming membership in the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Francisco A. "1. restraining them from continuing to usurp. Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the petition.". 4 of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. hereinabove.in choosing these respondents. that: (a) this Court is without power. and of the appointment of respondent Alfredo Cruz. Catalina Cayetano. Cuenco Francisco A. Delgado. "2. Upon petitioners' filing of bond in such amount as may be determined by this Honorable Court. three (3) Justice of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice. . as alleged members thereof.. that. Respondents. Delgado. said respondents had "acted absolutely without color of appointment or authority and are unlawfully. which is the rival party of the Liberal Party. Respondents assail our jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. Catalina Cayetano. and because the present action is not the proper remedy. the appointments of respondents. Tañada. Alfredo Cruz. Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes as technical assistants and private secretaries to said respondents Senators. usurping.

and annulled certain acts of the Executive 3 as incompatible with the fundamental law. and on the other hand. This Court exercised its jurisdiction over said case and decided the same on the merits thereof. (Angara vs. not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue. by whom certain powers shall be exercised. this Court declared that a resolution of the defunct National Assembly could not bar the exercise of the powers of the former Electoral Commission under the original Constitution. likewise.. 46 Off. "The courts are called upon to say. Chief Accountant. Gaz. and that the only remedy available to petitioners herein "is not in the judicial forum". the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate. also. whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress or of either House thereof. We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts. In performing the latter function... "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines. since the determination of the validity of an act is not the same. the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised. Chief Accountant (supra) cited by respondent refutes their own pretense. emphasis supplied.. either directly or indirectly. despite the fact that it involved an inquiry into the powers of the Senate and its President over the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the personnel thereof. may not be determined in the proper actions. which cannot be evaded without violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual destruction. it was held that the courts . there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses. but "to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion. 818. pp. 39. 654). Lopez Vito (78 Phil. to determine whether the powers possessed have been validly exercised. supra)." (Judicial Self-Limitation by Finkelstein. Again. invoked by respondents. since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress. The case of Suanes vs. To begin with.. thing as the performance of the act. on the one hand. Francisco (88 Phil. although the Senate has. In the one case we are seeking to ascertain upon whom devolves the duty of the particular service. 192)-relied upon by the respondents this is not an action against the Senate. under the Constitution. like that of any other branch of the Government. Yet. 4. Avelino (77 Phil. Harvard Law Review. 83) and Vera vs. Suanes vs. In fact. 224. Vol. unlike the cases of Alejandrino vs. 139.. the exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.". 81 Phil. Neither are the cases of Mabanag vs. they do not encroach upon the powers of a coordinate branch of the. 462. and approved by the Executive.). in point. the courts have. but. In the Mabanag case. 1) and Cabili vs. Secondly. Electoral Commission. 63 Phil. 2 (Angara vs. .. As the author of a very enlightening study on judicial self-limitation has aptly put it:. In the other case we are merely seeking to determine whether the Constitution has been violated by anything done or attented by either an executive official or the legislative. the duty to do so. to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of said House. and it does not seek to compel the latter. government. Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.convention gave to the respective political parties the right to elect their respective representatives in the Electoral Commission provided for in the original Constitution of the Philippines.). 221. Thus. Quezon (46 Phil. this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress 1 And. under the Constitution. in the exercise of the so-called "judicial supremacy". Electoral Commission. 244.

In this connection. therefore. Tañada's own words." But that learned opinion of Senator Rodriguez. upon nomination by the floor leader of the Nacionalista Party in the Senate. the issue depended mainly on the determination of the political alignment of the members of the Senate at the time of said reorganization and of the necessity or advisability of effecting said reorganization. in favor of a resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution. respondents assert in their answer that "the remedy of petitioners is not in the judicial forum. however. that his only relief against the acts complained of in the petition is to take up the issue before the people. Discussion on the Creation of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Cuenco (83 Phil. Senator Primicias claiming to act on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the Senate. has been weakened. we can appeal to public opinion. The issue in the Cabili case was whether we could review a resolution of the Senate reorganizing its representation in the Commission on Appointments. 1956. This was decided in the negative. xxx xxx xxx The only ground upon which respondents' objection to the jurisdiction of this Court and their theory to the effect that the proper remedy for petitioners herein is. the case at bar does not hinge on the number of votes needed for a particular act of said body. because until now the Supreme Court has always ruled against any action that would constitute interference in the business of anybody pertaining to the Senate. Quezon (supra) and Vera vs. The theory of separation of powers will be upheld by the Supreme Court. therefore. in the course of the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal." one-half (1/2) of the members of which is to be elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein. but clearly. Hence. notwithstanding. The weight of this decision. The issue. could possibly be entertained is. one is the remedy open to all of us that if we feel aggrieved and there is no recourse in the court of justice. "There are two remedies that occur to my mind right now. Senator Tañada was asked what remedies he would suggest if he nominated two (2) Nacionialista Senators and the latter declined the. whether the case at bar raises merely a political question. on February 21. 81. but. I may take the case to the Supreme Court if my right herein is not respected. such question being a political one." This allegation may give the impression that said petitioner had declared. not the present action. you will lose. but an appeal to public opinion. Besides. to which party the Constitution gives the right to nominate three (3) Senators for the Senate electoral Tribunal-could validly choose therefor two (2) Nacionalista Senators. is whether a right vested by the Constitution in the Citizens Party may validly be exercised. impliedly. which is a political question. 1956). to pass upon an identical or similar question. Senator. to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion' (p. has said one day. our President. I may . 17). Of course. on the floor of the Senate. by our resolutions in Avelino vs. either by the Nacionalista Party. Senator Tañada replied:. not one justiciable in nature. as a precedent. The issue before us is whether the Senate-after acknowledging that the Citizens Party is the party. in the case at bar.which is not a fact. in which this Court proceeded to determine the number essential to constitute a quorum in the Senate. that the Citizens Party is the party with the second largest number of votes in the Senate. Mr.could not review the finding of the Senate to the effect that the members thereof who had been suspended by said House should not be considered in determining whether the votes cast therein. Avelino (supra). Another remedy is an action in the Supreme Court. as Senator Rodriguez.. it being conceded. We are not called upon. to use petitioner. or by the Committee on Rules for the Senate. February 21. upon the authority of Alejandrino vs. over the objection of said Citizens Party. nomination. sufficed to satisfy the requirements of the latter. having the second largest number of votes in the Senate. "If you take this matter to the Supreme Court. the main purpose of the petition being "to force upon the Senate the reinstatement of Senator Magalona in the Commission on Appointments. During the discussions in the Senate. our President here.

Thus." (16 C. and the election. "As distinguished from the judicial. 1326. III. Indeed.). together with the consequences that flow therefrom. are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity. Willoughby lucidly states:.S. In this connection. 2d 29. is not a political one and may be settled by the Courts. To the same effect is the language used in Corpus Juris Secundum. Sevilla vs. C. President. 108." (Congressional Record. "It is well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary. 339. 72 App. The Court said:. emphasis supplied." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States. concern themselves only with the question as to the existence and extent of these discretionary powers. the latter announced that he might "take the case to the Supreme Court if my right here is not respected. to recognize that a certain set of facts exists or that a given status exists. therefore. within these limits. the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the political departments of government because in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by considerations of public or political policy. by Senator Primicias.lose. "It is not easy. This statement did not refer to the nomination.W.). that what has been done here is pursuant to the provision of the Constitution. they do permit the departments. by the Senate. but. except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provisions. D.J. 408). Mr. therefore. Where. 182 N. from which we quote:. the nature of political question was considered carefully. emphasis supplied. Elizalde. the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the question whether the issue before us is political or not. Vol. p. p. or the executive to exercise authority not granted him by the Constitution or by. of Senators Cuenco and Delgado as members of said Tribunal. also Geauga Lake Improvement Ass'n.. These considerations of public or political policy of course will not permit the legislature to violate constitutional provisions. may not be traversed in the courts. nor to determine what matters.. The courts. fall within its scope. In the case of In re McConaughy (119 N. said nomination and election took place the day after the aforementioned statement of Senator Tañada was made. 125 Ohio St. 112 F. but who has not lost in the Supreme Court? I may lose because of the theory of the separation of powers. discretionary powers are granted by the Constitution or by statute. however. As already adverted to. It is frequently used to designate all questions that lie outside the scope of the judicial questions. it has been repeatedly held that the question whether certain amendments to the Constitution are invalid for non-compliance with the procedure therein prescribed. 565. to define the phrase `political question'. President. the manner in which those powers are exercised is not subject to judicial review. Lozier. and these determinations. 3. statute. 413. . 491. "Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established principle is considered that it is not within the province of the courts to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action. but that does not mean. or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.".). Vol. E. see. 5 . separately or together. Mr. vs. At any rate. which under the constitution. emphasis supplied.

A. C. 30 L. The courts have no judicial control over such matters. 852. 143. This is not a political question. 561. The recognition of this principle. is that it is a matter which. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith. are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. R. the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such . 16. 683. or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. and not judicial. by the Senate. 497. and hence. In Re Gunn. 32 Pac. namely. 470. Thus the Legislature may in its discretion determine whether it will pass a law or submit a proposed constitutional amendment to the people. contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination . Fletcher vs. 25 L. said that a question is political. " . A. 516. what it means in ordinary parlance. 41. is null and void. or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government. the court has no jurisdiction as the certificate of the state canvassing board would then be final. 42 Am. The Governor may exercise the powers delegated to him. If this is correct. 411. 417. 69 Fed. free from judicial control."At the threshold of the case we are met with the assertion that the questions involved are political. and not judicial.. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. 19 L. the term "political question" connotes. it refers to "those questions which. when it is. 81 Wis. Cunningham. Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. to the end that the government may be one of laws and not men'-words which Webster said were the greatest contained in any written constitutional document. in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra). His discretionary acts cannot be controllable. 519. but because they are matters which the people have by the Constitution delegated to the Legislature. a question of policy. 155. R. See State vs. unknown except in Great Britain and America. What is generally meant. R." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom. upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules. A. is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity. we are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado. Green vs. of a particular measure. ". 90. 37 N. In other words. But every officer under a constitutional government must act according to law and subject him to the restraining and controlling power of the people. in legal parlance. E. is necessary. not primarily because they are of a political nature.. not merely because they involve political question. St. A. regardless of the actual vote upon the amendment. Rep. as well as through the executive or the Legislature. of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate. and the judiciary is the department which is charged with the special duty of determining the limitations which the law places upon all official action. 51 L. under the Constitution.). 948. 220." (pp. but it has been so often decided contrary to the view contended for by the Attorney General that it would seem to be finally settled. 151 Ill. where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation. as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.. One department is just as representative as the other. acting through the courts. so long as he observes the laws and acts within the limits of the power conferred. C. with discretionary power to act. emphasis supplied. In short. R. A. Tuttle. not legality. 50 Kan. Moreover. but because the Constitution and laws have placed the particular matter under his control. xxx xxx x x x. Here. The question thus raised is a fundamental one. Mills.

maintaining that "Senator Tañada should nominate only one" member of the Senate.. a new issue was raised . according to the provision above-quoted.. and (b) that Senator Sabido's motion would compel Senator Tañada to nominate three (3) Senators to said Tribunal. our opinion that we have. 330. the Senate adjourned until the next morning. pp. which." (16 C.." in his discretion. the Nacionalista Party cannot give it to the Citizens Party. three (3) members" of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (Congressional Record for the Senate. 343). Senator Tañada. and. 345.. has such authority. 439. Although the deliberations of the Senate consumed the whole morning and afternoon of February 22. "The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election. although as representative of the minority party in the Senate he has "the right to nominate one. namely. not only seconding the opposition of Senator Tañada. 377). Lim. expressed their views (Do. 358. After some discussion. referring to those who. pp. being devoid of authority to nominate the aforementioned members of said Tribunal. 360-364. and qualifications of their respective Members.). as the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate. do. Senator Tañada further stated that he reserved the right to determine how many he would nominate. 1956 (Do. "the President of the Citizens Party. with Senator Sumulong. be given the privilege to nominate . himself.. February 22. after hearing the reasons of Senator Sabido in support of his motion. When session was resumed at 8:10 p. Sumulong.. 375). Then. 1956. not to the Nacionalista Party of which Senator Sabido and the other Senators are members-but to the Citizens Party.. 338. returns. as well as at present. emphasis supplied. who shall be chosen by each House. the meeting was suspended. do. therefore. pp. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members. and Rodrigo took part. but. on motion of Senator Laurel. should be nominated by "the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate. at 7:40 p. 350. 329. pp. So. as members of the Electoral Tribunal.whether or not one who does not belong to said party may be nominated by its spokesman. three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice.m. to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein.. the duty. Vol. Zulueta. and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives. pursuant to the Constitution. so that. Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution. 349. Rosales and Laurel. 332-333. pp. Senator Sabido moved that Senator Tañada. three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein.. do. in which Senators Primicias.. 1956.m. also. particularly. also. Pelaez.). as well as the other Senators already mentioned.J. do.. already. said issues were debated upon more extensively. 328-329). 336. Cea. Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado. not only jurisdiction." (Emphasis supplied. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. two or three to the Electoral Tribunal. as the case may be. a satisfactory solution of the question before the Senate appeared to be remote. reads:.S.on which Senators Paredes. valid and lawful?. he being the only Senator who belongs to the minority party in said House (Do.statute. 1956. Thus. Senator Tañada . the president of said party. It is. but. In the session of the Senate held on February 21. the Senate of the Philippines consists of twenty three (23) members of the Nacionalista Party and one (1) member of the Citizens Party. Senator Sabido withdrew his motion above referred . with a view to seeking a compromise formula (Do. whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights . III.. who is. 369). also. Senator Tañada objected formally to this motion upon the-ground: (a) that the right to nominate said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal belongs. by the Senate. namely. 354. 339. II. It appears that on February 22. 364.

"SENATOR TAÑADA. (Varios Senadores: Si. no (Silencio. and the election by the Senate. "EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Mr. "Now.) Queda aprobada. III. and the Senate elected. "EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. to the nomination of two additional NP's to the Electoral Tribunal. the other Senators. "SENATOR SUMULONG. for. after the nomination by said party. and such party is. si. The Constitution only permits the Nacionalista Party or the party having the largest number of votes to nominate three. Tañada.). Senators Delgado and Cuenco. as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. I also wish to record my objection to the last nominations. the minority party in this Body. admittedly. Senator Primicias. Senator Tañada stated:. Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who belong to the Nacionalista Party-as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. 377. I would like to record my opposition to the nominations of the last two named gentlemen. nominated. Subsequently.". are null and void and have been made without power or color of authority. I nominate the only Citizens Party member in this Body. Esta dispuesto el Senado a votar? (Varios Senadores: Si. Mr. Then. who shall be members thereof. "SENATOR SUMULONG. this nomination was approved by the House. President. to which Senator Tañada belongs and which he represents. Caballero de Quezon.) Los que no lo esten digan. . and that is Senator Lorenzo M. What took place thereafter appears in the following quotations from the Congressional Record for the Senate. Lopez and Primicias. the Citizens Party. "EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO.) Los que esten conformes con la nominacion hecha por el Presidente del Comite de Reglamentos a favor de los Senadores Delgado y Cuenco para ser miembros del Tribunal Electoral. not because I don't believe that they do not deserve to be appointed to the tribunal but because of my sincere and firm conviction that these additional nominations are not sanctioned by the Constitution.to. President. Without an objection. the Committee on Rules of the Senate-and I am now making this proposal not on behalf of the Nacionalista Party but on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate-I nominate two other members to complete the membership of the Tribunal: Senators Delgado and Cuenco. in order to comply with the provision in the Constitution. Senators Laurel. Vol. President. Thereupon. "On behalf of the Citizens Party." (Congressional Record for the Senate. Lopez and Primicias. Caballero de Rizal. Mr. Senator Primicias stood up and said:. as members of said Tribunal. digan. emphasis supplied. on behalf of the Nacionalista Party. of Senators Laurel.". must necessarily be nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate. For the reasons that I have stated a few moments ago when I took the floor. p. "SENATOR TAÑADA.

. emphasis supplied. that when-after the nomination of three (3) Senators by the majority party. and I maintain that when Senator Tañada as head of the Citizens Party entered into a coalition with the Nacionalista Party. he thereby "waived his right to no two more Senators. At the outset. on behalf of the minority party. however. he should be given this as a matter of right. 360. ". and the appointment of their co-respondents. as Citizens Party Senator. the question is whether we have a party here having the second largest number of votes. We have to bear in mind." six (6) of whom "shall be members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives.). Similarly. not a fusion.Respondents allege. and it is clear in my mind that there is such a party. 32.. id. he belongs to the minority. as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. that he is the head and the representative of the Citizens Party. Then Senator Lim intervened. and that. stating:.. "At present Senator Tañada is considered as forming the only minority or the one that has the second largest number of votes in the existing Senate. Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes is valid and lawful. I don't believe that we should be allowed to grant this authority to Senator Tañada only as a privilege but we must grant it as a matter of right. and from the point of view of the spirit of .. he subsequently parted ways with" said party. accordingly. Senator Primicias inquired why the movant had used the word "privilege". it was by virtue of a coalition or an alliance between the Citizens Party and the Nacionalista Party at that time. when Senator Primicias nominated Senators Cuenco and Delgado. pp. When the Citizens Party entered into a mere coalition. Senator Sabido explained that the present composition of the Senate had created a condition or situation which was not anticipated by the framers of our Constitution. be given the privilege to nominate the three Members" of said Tribunal.. is mandatory. and these respondents were chosen by the Senate. his situation . not as a matter of privilege. has the right and not a mere privilege to nominate. Said Senator Primicias and the Senate merely complied with the aforementioned provision of the fundamental law. therefore. . Catalina Cayetano. Nacionalista Party. Alfredo Cruz. relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. that party did not lose its personality as a party separate and distinct from the. III.. . that the constitutional mandate to the effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall be compose of nine (9) members.. that is the reality of the actual situation-that he is not a Nacionalista now." adding that:.. p. that when Senator Tañada was included in the Nacionalista Party ticket in 1953. and that Senator Tañada "is the distinguished president of the Citizens Party.there is no doubt that he does not belong to the majority in the first place. and that is the Citizens Party to which the gentleman from Quezon belongs. id. and their election by the Senate." (Id. ". .. that although Senator Tañada formed part of the Nacionalista Party before the end of 1955. Senators Cuenco and Delgado are de jure members of said body. emphasis supplied. referring to Senator Tañada:. Senator Sumulong maintained that "Senator Tañada. I think that on equitable ground and from the point of view of public opinion. and. p. that. . approximates or approaches what is within the spirit of that Constitution. the President of the Citizens Party. The debate was closed by Senator Laurel... it will be recalled that the proceedings the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal began with a motion of Senator Sabido to the effect that "the distinguished gentleman from Quezon. And whether we like it or not. as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal-Senator Tañada nominated himself only.. who remarked." that. as the case may be". And we should also remember that the certificate of candidacy filed by Senator Tañada in the 1953 election was one to the effect that he belonged to the Citizens Party . is not that right? And if this is so." which "approximates the situation desired by the framers of the Constitution" (Congressional Record for the Senate Vol. he did not thereby become a Nacionalista because that was a mere coalition.)." (Id. 329-330).

and that. The aforemention opinion of the Secretary of Justice is not backed up by a. while. the minority party in this Body"-not only without any. "if in the judgment of the court. Senator Sabido withdrew his motion to grant Senator Tañada the "privilege" to nominate. 1939. 376. and back up the theory of petitioners herein. as the party having the second largest number of votes in said House. and that both form part of a single sentence and must be considered. it ignores the fact that the same term is used with respect to the method prescribed for their election. weight in the solution of the question before this Court.). there is not the slightest doubt in our mind that the purpose and spirit of said provisions do not warrant said change and that the rejection of the latter is demanded by paramount considerations of public policy.. Referring. as integral portions of one and the same thought. Regardless of the respect due its author. Commenting on the frame of mind of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention. which is clear. What is more. represented by Senator Tañada. is imperative in nature and that this is borne out by an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated February 1. Moreover. it relies upon the compulsory nature of the word "shall". thereafter. it may he rejected. itself to the discretion of some other department.. 6. so essential to give thereto the weight accorded by the rules on contemporaneous constructions. said opinion tends to change the natural meaning of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution. id. as regards the number of members of the Electoral Tribunals. even in a doubtful case. their main argument in support of the mandatory character of the constitutional provision relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is that the word "shall". "except as to matters committed by the Constitution. the history of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution and the records of the Convention. as a distinguished citizen and public official. with the approval of the Senate-leave no room for doubt that the Senate-leave no room for doubt that the Senate has regarded the Citizens Party. The foregoing statements and the fact that.the Constitution it would be a good thing if we grant the opportunity to Senator Tañada to help us in the organization of this Electoral Tribunal (Id. emphasis supplied. for the practical construction of a Constitution is of little." Hence. also. a contemporaneous or practical executive interpretation thereof is entitled to no weight.. therein used. objection whatsoever. The flaw in the position taken in said opinion and by respondent herein is that. J. therefore. when they faced the task of providing for the adjudication of contests relating to the election. emphasis supplied. . if any. As a consequence.) 6b. and should be considered directory as regards the procedure for their selection." (16 C." The reason is that "the application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted as applied to the interpretation of constitutional provisions than when applied to statutory provisions". if any. such construction is erroneous and its further application is not made imperative by any paramount considerations of public policy. p. unless it has been uniform . "where the meaning of a constitutional provision is clear. to the contention of respondents herein. but. said opinion has little. now. S. More important still. contemporary or practical construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts. and will not be allowed to distort or in any way change its natural meaning." 6a Again. refute respondents' pretense. "as a general rule. it is only in cases of substantial doubt and ambiguity that the doctrine of contemporaneous or practical construction has any application". 71-72.. respondents have not even tried to show and we cannot conceive-why "shall" must be deemed mandatory insofar as the number of members of each Electoral Tribunal. "uniform" application of the view therein adopted. and said petitioner actually nominated himself "on behalf of the Citizens Party. pertinent parts of which are quoted at the footnote. returns and . Indeed.

351. President. expressed himself as follows:. who played an important role in the framing of our Constitution. and three from the party having the second largest number votes so that these members may represent the party. The overwhelming majority of election protests decided under the old system was that the majority being then in a position to dictate the. 257-258. there were so main injustices: committed by the majority at the expense and to the prejudice of the minority protestants. for in a great number of cases. p. party interests controlled and dictated the decisions. the irregularities that characterized the proceedings in some of them. decision in the election protest. when he almost became a victim of the majority when he had an election case. "It is true that justice had sometimes prevailed under the old system. For when it comes to a party. Aruego. there ground to believe that decisions will be made along party lines.. emphasis supplied. Vol. 361. This view is shared by distinguished members of the Senate. what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to create a sort of collegiate court composed of nine members: Three of them belonging to the party having the largest number of votes. in its session of February 22. Senator Laurel. a member of said Convention. "The faith of the people in the uprightness of the lawmaking body in the performance of this function assigned to it in the organic laws was by no means great. and the members of said party who will sit before the electoral tribunal as protestees. gradually built up a camp of thought in the Philippines inclined to leave to the courts the determination of election contests. when you leave it to either House to decide election protests involving its own members. Jose M. because each House will be composed of a majority and a minority. p. 1956. The undue delay in the dispatch of election contests for legislative seats. "." (Congressional Record for the Senate. Senator Paredes.. like England and Canada. Vol. emphasis supplied. In fact so blatant was the lack of political justice in the decisions that there was. and it was only through the intervention of President Quezon that he was saved from becoming the victim of majority injustices. you place the majority in a position to dominate and dictate the decision in the case and result was. emphasis supplied. that is virtually placing the majority party in a position to dictate the decision in those election cases." (Congressional Record for the Senate.).qualifications of members of the Legislative Department. said:. There were many complaints against the lack of political justice in this determination. but the record will show that those cases were few and they were the rare exceptions. and when you make each House the judge of every election protest involving any member of that House." (The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Aruego. and qualifications of its members was not altogether satisfactory. a veteran legislator and former Speaker of the House of Representatives. was tempted to commit as it did commit many abuses and injustices. Vol.). Statements have been made here that justice was done even under the old system. . there were so many abuses. says:. "The experience of the Filipino people under the provisions of the organic laws which left to the lawmaking body the determination of the elections. III. ".). Mr. like that case involving Senator Mabanag. following the practice in some countries. Dr. Thus. 1. returns. and the very apparent injection of partisanship in the determination of a great number of the cases were decried by a great number of the people as well as by the organs of public opinion. 111. "Such were the conditions of things at the time of the meeting of the convention. pp. Senator Sumulong declared:.

and there was no reason why that power or that right vested in the legislative body should not be retained. Vol. Aruego states:. I repeat. relating to the election. p. 376. among other things. and that is the intervention of three justices. of this election protest. purely political as has been observed in the past. III. if there would be any fundamental disagreement. there is already a condition. and the greatest argument in favor of the retention of that provision was the fact that was. But it was thought that would make the determination of this contest. with reference to the protests or contests."Now. "The defense of the Electoral Commission was based primarily upon the hope and belief that the abolition of Party line because of the equal representation in this body of the majority and the minority parties of the National Assembly and the intervention of some members of the Supreme Court who.). Referring particularly to the philosophy underlying the constitutional provision quoted above. or if there would be nothing but questions purely of party in which the members of the majority as well as those of the minority should wish to take lightly a protest because the protestant belongs to one of said parties. the best guarantee which . I heard it said here correctly that there was a time when that was given to the corresponding chamber of the legislative department. Hence. returns and qualifications of its members. for the fact that the laws will not be applied rightfully or incorrectly as well as for the fact that the doctrines of the Supreme Court will be applied rightfully. what is really applied in the determination of electoral cases brought before the tribunals of justice or before the House of Representatives or the Senate? Well. If that is the case. From the moment that it is required that not only the majority but also the minority should intervene in these questions. as a check upon the two parties. it is nothing more than the law and the doctrine of the Supreme Court. So that with this intervention of three justices if there would be any question as to the justice applied by the majority or the minority. the system obtaining in the United States under the Federal Constitution of the United States." (Congressional Record for the Senate. `I wish to call the attention of my distinguished colleagues to the fact that in electoral protests it is impossible to set aside party interests. a factor which would make protests decided in a non-partisan manner. Delegate Francisco summarized the arguments for the creation of the Electoral Commission in the following words:. we have already enough guarantee that there would be no tyranny on the part of the majority. We know from experience that many times in the many protests tried in the House or in the Senate. of the Congress or legislative body was entrusted to that body itself as the exclusive body to determine the election. the actuations of the three justices. it was impossible to prevent the factor of party from getting in. there will be greater skill in the application of the laws and in the application of doctrines to electoral matters having as we shall have three justices who will act impartially in these electoral questions. It is interesting to note that not one of the members of the Senate contested the accuracy of the views thus expressed. under the proposed constitutional provision. the returns and the qualifications of the members of the legislative bodies. the best guarantee. `But there is another more detail which is the one which satisfies me most. emphasis supplied. So the election. Dr. returns and qualifications of the members. "I understand that from the time that this question is placed in the hands of members not only of the majority party but also of the minority party. we have in this case. would also be members of the same. for the administration of justice to the parties. In the last analysis. There was some doubt also expressed as to whether that should continue or not. would insure greater political justice in the determination of election contests for seats in the National Assembly than there would be if the power had been lodged in the lawmaking body itself.

dando tres miembrosala mayoria. returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Pp.we shall have. Con mucho gusto. 139). When. they must have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. as the long felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people acting through their delegates to the Convention. "El Sr. I repeat that the best guarantee the fact that these questions will be judged not only by three members of the majority but also by three members of the minority. PRESIDENTE. And I understand. I. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents. Many have criticized. CONEJERO. CONEJERO. with the additional guarantee of the impartial judgment of three justices of the Supreme Court. Tal como esta el draft. during the deliberations of the convention. a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created. the tyranny of the majority in electoral cases . and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court. With this end in view. in Angara vs. "El Sr. is the intervention of the three justices. no cree su Senoria que este equivale pricticamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?. then we shall be placing protests exclusively in the hands of the party in power. And with the formation of the Electoral Commission. many of them were familiar with the history and political development of other countries of the world. as hereinabove stated. I say again. Delegates Conejero and Roxas said:. was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. Antes de votarse la enmienda. to an independent and impartial tribunal.). Electoral Commission (63 Phil. March 4. To be sure.). "El Sr. As a matter of fact. Creemos que si el tribunal a la Comision esta cotistuido en esa forma. tanto los miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Saprema . The foregoing was corroborated by Senator Laurel. he asserted:. the plan.. upon the approval of the Constitution.. "From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members. to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission. ROXAS. that in practice that has not given good results. I repeat. the protestants as well as the protestees could remain tranquil in the certainty that they will receive the justice that they really deserve. Vol. "El Sr. 174-175.. pp. 1861. many have complained against." (The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Aruego. however. emphasis supplied. y otros t?-es a la minyoryia y atros a la Corte Suprerma. quisiera pedir informacion del Subcomite de Siete. "The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority-men mature in years and experience. First Inaugural Address. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation. therefore they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election. (Abraham Lincoln. the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom `ultimate justice of the people'. gentlemen.) 7. All that can be said now is that. 261-263. Speaking for this Court. ROXAS. Que dice el Comite?" El Sr. Si y no. If we eliminate from this precept the intervention of the party of the minority and that of the three justices.

Senator Sabido-who had moved to grant to Senator Tañada the privilege" to make the nominations on behalf of party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate-agrees with it. p. As Senator Sumulong inquired:.. 330. two devices were resorted to. Upon further interpretation.consideration la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos. That is the ideal situation. sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunbo. and the party having the second largest number of votes. supra. the Constitution besides being learned were men of experience.. emphasis supplied. emphasis supplied. ROXAS. But the framers of. podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidisrno?... case that hope that the three from the majority and the three from the minority who will act as Judges should result in disappointment. Senator Sabido replied:." (Congressional Record for the Senate. Vol. They knew that even Senators like us are not angels. Creo que si. Senator Sabido said:. of an Electoral Commission. and (b) the Supreme Court was given in said body the same number of representatives as each one of said political parties. Electoral Commission. was to insure the exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition of election contests affecting members of the lawmaking body.. and thus be induced to act with greater impartiality. This is obvious from the very language of the constitutional provision under consideration. It is clear from the foregoing that the main objective of the framers of our Constitution in providing for the establishment.The intention is that when the three from the majority and the three from the minority become members of the Tribunal it is hoped that they will become aware of their judicial functions. emphasis supplied." (Angara vs. pp. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a balance between the two parties and make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling power so to speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of power. 8 and then 9 of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of Congress. in the National Assembly or in each House of Congress. ". "El Sr. that if we should be chosen to go to the Electoral Tribunal no one can say that we will entirely be free from partisan influence to favor our party. His words were: . 349. "That is so. Senator Sumulong opined along the same line. p. so that the influence of the former may be decisive and endow said Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper. To achieve this purpose.). It is hoped that they will act as judges because to decide election cases is a judicial function. porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo. "El Sr. so that they may realize that partisan considerations could not control the adjudication of said cases. Vol. in case they . not to protect the protestants or the protegees. ". p. . ". III. 330." (Id. In fact.I suppose Your Honor will agree with me that the framers of the Constitution precisely thought of creating this Electoral Tribunal so as to prevent the majority from ever having a preponderant majority in the Tribunal. 168-169. so that in. first.). CONEJERO. III. Cree Su Senoria que en un caso como ese. were given the same number of representatives in the Electoral Commission or Tribunal.). that we are human beings.). namely: (a) the party having the largest number of votes." (Congressional Record for the Senate.

and the determination does not depend on the form of the statute. and "spirit of the Constitution". as of every other question of statutory construction. 364. still there is the guarantee that they will offset each other and the result will be that the deciding vote will reside in the hands of the three Justices who have no partisan motives to favor either the protestees or the protestants. "As a general rule of statutory construction. said feature reflects the "intent" "purpose". while that which is within the letter. 355.). in the determination of this question. and whatever is within the spirit of statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter.do not act as judges but they go there and vote along party liner. but not within the spirit of a statute. Cea and Paredes maintained that the spirit of the Constitution would be violated if the nominees to the Electoral Tribunals did not belong to the parties respectively making the nominations. will have no partisan motives to serve. emphasis supplied. but. the letter of it is not to be disregarded on the pretext of pursuing its spirit. or protestees. pp. that the most vital feature of the Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation of said parties therein. 10. as representative of the Citizens Party-to nominate for the Senate Electoral Tribunal any Senator not belonging to said party. 362-3. the prime object is to ascertain the legislative intent. and secondly by seeing to it that the decisive vote in the Tribunal will be left in the hands of persons who have no partisan interest or motive to favor either protestant or protestee. "There is no universal rule or absolute test by which directory provisions in a statute may in all circumstances be distinguished from those which are mandatory. In other words." (82 C. and the consequences which would result from construing it one . It is patent.. those members of Congress who do not belong to the party nominating them. However. 526) and that. 348-9. it is well settled that "the purpose of all rules or maxims as to the construction or interpretation of statutes is to discover the true intention of the law" (82 C. That is my understanding of the intention of the framers of the Constitution when they decided to create the Electoral Tribunal.). to determine whether the parties having the largest. and the resulting equilibrium to be maintained by the Justices of the Supreme Court as members of said Tribunals. The legislative intent must be obtained front all the surrounding circumstances. 613. Senators Lim. pp. S. however. So important in the "balance of powers" between the two political parties in the Electoral Tribunals. J. the whole idea is to prevent the majority from controlling and dictating the decisions of the Tribunal and to make sure that the decisive vote will be wielded by the Congressmen or Senators who are members the Tribunal but will be wielded by the Justices who. by virtue of their judicial offices. 350. xxx xxx x x x. 351. 376). "My idea is that the intention of the framers of the constitution in creating the Electoral Tribunal is to insure impartially and independence in its decision. for the purpose of this decision. that several members of the Senate questioned the right of the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate and." (Congressional Record for the Senate. pursuant to which the Senate Electoral Tribunal should be organized (Congressional Record for the Senate. In the words of the members of the present Senate. of Senator Tañada.. Now then. and that is sought to be done by never allowing the majority party to control the Tribunal. the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof. hence. 337. its object. either protestants. 330. its nature. Vol. number of votes in each House may nominate. 370. 358. and the second largest. is not within the statute. J. 362-363. to the Electoral Tribunals. III. It is not necessary. where the law is free and clear from ambiguity. Sabido. 365-366. Consideration must be given to the entire statute. S.

because. therein. Hence. pp. and what is a matter of essence can often be determined only by judicial construction. 11. when a particular provision of a statute relates to some immaterial matter. may be deemed directory whenever legislative purpose can best be carried out by such construction. The procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection of members of the Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play. What has been said above. Vol. is mandatory. The same is. or must be performed before certain other powers can be exercise. the . or is a mere matter of form. it constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. the spirit of the law prevails over its letter. holding the resulting balance of power. it is conceded that the present composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the framers of our Constitution (Congressional Record for the Senate.). three (3) members nominated by the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the House concerned. pp. and the purpose of the legislative can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed. 354. members. Words of permissive character may be given a mandatory significance in order to effect the legislative intent. 26. thus. but. and the statute must be construed in connection with other related statutes. Senator Tañada felt he should nominate. in said Tribunal. numerically handicapped. 329. Obviously. that is. emphasis supplied. relative to the conditions antecedent to. otherwise. instead of nine (9). with the Justices of the Supreme Court. or when same antecedent and pre-requisite conditions must exist prior to the exercise of power. and. Words and Phrases. Furthermore. such construction should be given. of the Citizens Party. as to which compliance with the statute is a matter of convenience rather than substance. with substantially the same result. On the other hand. and a statute is regarded as directory were no substantial rights depend on it. Upon the other hand. the language of a statute. a provision relating to the essence of the thing to be done. by the aforementioned nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado. for the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Senator Tañada did not nominate other two Senators. and when a fair interpretation of a statute. it is generally regarded as directory. 359. and concomitant with. 375). 463-467. . . On the other hand.. Accordingly. who are members of said Tribunals. unless followed by words of absolute prohibition.way or the other.. to matters of substance. and the solution herein adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution. 349. what would be the result of respondents' contention if upheld? Owing to the fact that the Citizens Party 12 has only one member in the Upper House. when the terms of a statute are such that they cannot be made effective to the extent of giving each and all of them some reasonable operation. pp. 869-874. which directs acts or proceedings to be done in a certain way shows that the legislature intended a compliance with such provision to be essential to the validity of the act or proceeding. in the case at bar. 342. and acts performed in violation thereof are null and void. It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. and prompt conduct of business. for partisan considerations can not be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court. the statute must be regarded as mandatory. compliance with said procedure is mandatory. and that the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties therein. orderly.. reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals. however mandatory in form. vis-a-vis the majority party. if the same were sanctioned. no injury can result from ignoring it. Indeed. Whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends on whether the thing directed to be done is of the essence of the thing required. Vol. or where the directions of a statute are given merely with a view to the proper. the adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution. to seven (7). (Id. and the legislative intent does not require a mandatory construction. only said member of the Citizens Party. without construing the statute as mandatory.) (See also. he would worsen the already disadvantageous position. but the construction of mandatory words as directory should not be lightly adopted and never where it would in fact make a new law instead of that passed by the legislature. III.

Most respectfully. the Constitution thereby indicates its reliance upon the method of selection thus established. But if electoral protests are filed by candidates of the minority party. In connection.). In connection with the argument of the former Secretary of Justice to the effect that when "there is no minority party represented in the Assembly. as lawyers of great note. we pray this Honorable Court to reject an interpretation that would make of a democratic constitution the very instrument by which a corrupt and ruthless party could entrench itself in power the legislature and thus destroy democracy in the Philippines. In the senatorial elections to fill the remaining 8 seats. 34. the pressure of which is bound to increase in proportion to the degree of predominance of the party from which it comes. the door would be thrown wide open for the predominance of political considerations in the determination of election protests pending before said Tribunal. . supra. as against one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three members of the Supreme Court. What is worst. When the election of members of Congress to the Electoral Tribunal is made dependent upon the nomination of the political parties above referred to. there might be no objection to the statement. for example. he explicitly made of record that his opposition was based. (The ouster of not less than 3 senators-elect in the elections held since liberation attests to the reality of election frauds and terrorism in our country. the very frauds or terrorism committed by a party would establish the legal basis for the final destruction of minority parties in the Congress at least. but upon the principle involved. with the composition of the Electoral Tribunals. ". and contrary to the observation made in the above-quoted opinion. it would be a Senate Electoral Tribunal made up of three Supreme Court Justices and 5 or 6 members of the same party A accused of fraud and terrorism. all the 8 candidates of party A are proclaimed elected through alleged fraud and/or terrorism. " Under the interpretation espoused by the respondents. With the absolute majority thereby attained by the majority party in said Tribunal.) There being no senator or only one senator belonging to the minority. and did not. the decisive moderating role of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be wiped out. and. when Senator Tañada objected to their nomination. for the obvious and simple reason that they could easily be outvoted by the 6 members of the majority party in the Tribunal. the philosophy underlying the same would be entirely upset. this was confirmed by distinguished members of the present Senate. that in the Senate. 25-28. xxx xxx x x x. As a matter of fact. it is at this point that a need for a check on the majority party is greatest. or when the only electoral protests filed are by candidates of the majority against members-elect of the same majority party.. even the most well meaning individuals often find it difficult to shake off the bias and prejudice created by political antagonisms and to resist the demands of political exigencies. in lieu thereof. 13. as veteran politicians and as leaders in other fields of endeavor. As above stated. ignore the fact that the Constitution must limit itself to giving general patterns or norms of action. When there are no electoral protests filed by the Minority party. the following observations of the petitioners herein are worthy of notice:. not upon their character. who would sit in judgment on the election candidates of the minority parties? According to the contention of the respondents. Let us suppose. they could not. (See pp. the 15 or 16 senators with unexpired terms belong to the party A. particularly. 33. they believed that. the necessity for such a check by the minority disappears". This does not imply that the honesty.Nacionalista Party would have five (5) members in the Senate Electoral Tribunal. such a cheek is a function that cannot be successfully exercised by the 3 Justices of the Supreme Court. regardless of the individual qualities of those chosen therefor. The equilibrium between the political parties therein would be destroyed. which is precisely what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to forestall. Considering the wealth of experience of the delegatesto the Convention. integrity or impartiality of Senators Cuenco and Delgado are being questioned.

. are null and void ab initio. and to act upon such belief. As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz. not of law. Although "an individual may waive constitutional provisions intended for his benefit". act or omissions. sec. and it has been held that where a statute is founded on public policy. specifically contested said nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado. the case of Zandueta vs. Rules of Court). that the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal. Lastly. Vol. sometimes. The rule estoppel is that "whenever a party has. said petitioner repeatedly asserted that his was the exclusive right to make the nomination. he cannot. pp. Catalina Cayetano. nor any of them. the election of its personnel is an internal matter falling within . even those tending "to secure his personal liberty". the nomination and election of Senator Tañada as member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal was separate. De la Costa (66 Phil. that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias. those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution. the alleged waiver or exhaustion of his rights does not justify the exercise thereof by a person or party. as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The defenses of waiver and estoppel set up against petitioner Tañada are untenable. as held in Suanes vs. Judge Zandueta assumed office by virtue of an appointment. other than that to which it is vested exclusively by the Constitution. as members of said Tribunal. I Cooley's Constitutional Limitations. Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. there can be no waiver without an intent to such effect. Chief Accountant (supra). In the case at bar. Besides. that the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal. 368-371). 68 [a]. "In the case of the cited opinion of Secretary Abad Santos rendered in 1939. may be nominated by a person or party other than the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative therein. 495). be permitted to falsify it" (Rule 69.xxx xxx x x x. On the contrary. 490. intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true. of the Electoral Tribunals was adopted in response to the demands of the common weal. it. pursuant to the Rules thereof. J. the power to waive does not exist when "public policy or public morals" are involved. we are not prepared to hold. is not in point. likewise. which Senator Tañada did not have. 765. Again. cited by respondents. Such is not the nature of the situation that confronted Senator Tañada and the other members of the Senate. that neither these three (3) Senators. and the election of said respondents by the Senate. In view of the foregoing. S. 615). Although recommended by Senators Cuenco and Delgado. however. The procedure outlined in the Constitution for the organization. presumably.). and. At any rate. In the case at bar. He.. petitioner Senator Tañada did not lead the Senate to believe that Senator Primicias could nominate Senators Cuenco and Delgado. in a litigation arising out of such declaration." (Emphasis supplied. 3. we hold that the Senate may not elect. that their appointments were null and void. the rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact. about the truth of which the other party is ignorant (see Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court. who are not lawful members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. pp. act or omission. particularly those meant for the protection of his property. did not appear that there were minority party candidates who were adversely affected by the ruling of the Secretary of Justice and who could have brought a test case to court. 874). the legality of which he later on assailed. with the consent of the majority of the de jure members of said body 14 or. those to whom it applies should not be permitted to waive its provisions" (82 C. distinct and independent from the nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado. by his declaration. they were appointed by its Chairman. (11 Am. Again. Jur.

and of six members chosen by the National Assembly. and of six members chosen by the National Assembly. three shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes and three by the party having the second largest number of votes. in which you request my opinion as `to the proper interpretation of the following provision of Section (4) of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution':. and that (2) of the six members to be chosen by the National Assembly.J. With the qualification stated above. JJ. A. three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes. In 1939. enjoined from exercising the powers and duties of Members of said Electoral Tribunal and from acting in such capacity in connection with Senate Electoral Case No. J. concur. 1939. thru the office of His Excellency.'. "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of January 24. C. the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was sought on the proper interpretation of the constitutional provision involved. and of six members chosen by the National Assembly. Padilla. 4 thereof. "The main features of the constitutional provision in question are: (1) that there shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice. Wherefore.. Secretary of Justice Jose A. . Paras.. three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes.the jurisdiction and control of said body. the decision in the case at bar. the petition is dismissed. as they are hereby. that they are not entitled to act as such and that they should be. Bengzon. judgment is hereby rendered declaring that. and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein. Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. and there is every reason to believe that it will. dissenting:. and Felix. Santos accordingly rendered the following opinion:. as regards respondents Alfredo Cruz.'. the President. "Sir:." As all the members of the National Assembly then belonged to the Nacionalista Party and a belief arose that it was impossible to comply with the constitutional requirement that three members of the Electoral Commission should be nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes. and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein. It is so ordered. hereafter take appropriate measures. Delgado have not been duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.B. it is impossible to comply with the last part of the provision which requires that three members shall be nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the Assembly. Reyes. Montemayor. Section (4) of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution provided that "There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice. Catalina Cayetano. Reyes. in relation to the four (4) respondents abovementioned. conformably with the spirit of the Constitution and of.. "You state that `as all the members of the present National Assembly belong to the Nacionalista Party. Bautista Angelo. respondents Senators Mariano Jesus Cuenco and Francisco A. Without special pronouncement as to costs. `There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice..L.

"`A cardinal rule in dealing with Constitutions is that they should receive a consistent and uniform interpretation. It was also intended to create a non-partisan body to decide any partisan contest that may be brought before the Commission. We cannot say that the Commission should have nine members during one legislative term and six members during the next... When for lack of a minority representation in the Assembly the power to nominate three minority members cannot be exercised. The membership of the Commission is intended to be fixed and not variable and is not dependent upon the existence or non-existence of one or more parties in the Assembly. with the members of the Supreme Court as the balancing factor. it logically follows that the only party the Assembly may nominate three others.. 659). But as finally adopted by the Convention. especially when the election of any member of the minority party is protested."Examining the history of the constitutional provision. "It is undisputed of course that the primary purpose of the Convention in giving representation to the minority party in the Electoral Commission was to safeguard the rights of the minority party and to protect their interests. Constitutional provisions must always have a consistent application. the Electoral Commission was formally organized. Const. the considerations that must have inspired the Constitutional Convention in adopting it as it is. however. Constitutional amendments were introduced and duly adopted in . Pursuant to the foregoing opinion of February 1. fluctuations in the total membership of the Commission were not and could not have been intended. the changes that it has undergone since it was first introduced until finally adopted by the convertion. pp. The Framing of the Phil. Jur. The primary object was to avoid decision based chiefly if not exclusively on partisan considerations. I find that in the first two drafts it was provided that the Electoral Commission shall be composed of `three members elected by the members of the party having the largest number of vote three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes. "To summarize. even though the circumstances may have so changed as to make a different rule after desirable (11 Am. the Constitution explicitly states that there shall be `six members chosen by the National Assembly. it is evident that the intention of the framers of our Constitution was that there should invariably be six members from the National Assembly. three from the Supreme Court and six chosen by the National Assembly to be nominated by the party in power. "In other words. 1939. as well as. 260-261). an and three by the party having the second largest number of votes' (Aruego. The Framing of the Phil. "The procedure or manner of nomination cannot possibly affect the constitutional mandate that the Assembly is entitled to six members in the Electoral Commission. so they shall not be taken to mean one thing at one time and another thing at another time. there being no other party entitled to such nomination. It is a function that is expected to be exercised by the three Justices of the Supreme Court.(Aruego. The basic philosophy behind the constitutional provision was to enable the minority party to act as a check on the majority in the Electoral Commission. and three justices of the Supreme Court . as there is no minority party represented in the Assembly. with six members of the National Assembly all belonging to the same party and three Justices of the Supreme Court. three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes. 271-272).". Const. "From the foregoing changes in the phraseology of the provision. Inasmuch. pp. the necessity for such a check by the minority party disappears. considering the plain terms of the constitutional provision in question. I have come to the conclusion that the Electoral Commission should be composed of nine members. otherwise the explicit mandate of the Constitution that there shall be six members from the National Assembly would be nullified.

When instead of wording the amendment in such a form as to nullify said opinion. the conclusion is inescapable that party affiliation is neither controlling nor necessary. It is now provided that "Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members. If there was any doubt on the matter. checked or fiscalized only by the votes of the Justices. ." (Article VI. In view of the failure or unwillingness of Senator Lorenzo M. LABRADOR. in obedience to the constitutional mandate. the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate. I vote to dismiss the petition. and the Electoral Commission was replaced by an Electoral Tribunal for each house of Congress. would frustrate the purpose of having an ideal number in the composition of the Electoral Tribunal and guarding against the possibility of deadlocks. otherwise membership in the Tribunal may well be limited to the Justices of the Supreme Court and so others who are not Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives. concurs." the intent has become clear and mandatory that at all times the Electoral Tribunal shall have nine Members regardless of whether or not two parties make up each house of Congress.). as does everybody. as the case may be. and the Chief Justice may similarly designate less than three Justices. to decide jointly with the Justices of the Supreme Court election contests exclusively upon their merits. the latter may nominate less than three or none at all. three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice. three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. Tañada of the Citizens Party. and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives. even if there were sufficient Members belonging to the party having the second largest of votes. Considering further that the six Members are chosen by each house. it is not required that the nominees should belong to the same party. to choose-as it did-said two Members. Endencia. J. who shall be chosen by each house. he framers of the Constitution-not insensitive to some such argument-still had reposed their faith and confidence in the independence. Upon the other hand. It is very significant that while the party having the second largest number of votes is allowed to nominate three Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives. Section 11. the same was removed by the amendment of 1940 the framers of which may be assumed to have been fully aware of the one-party composition of the former National Assembly which gave rise to the abovequoted opinion of the Secretary of Justice. If not absurd. integrity and uprightness of the Members of each House who are to sit in the Electoral Tribunals and thereby expected them. J.1940... to nominate two other Members of the Electoral Tribunal. Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution not only did not substantially depart from the original constitutional provision but also positively and expressly ordains that "Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members. It would not be accurate to argue that the Members of the Electoral Tribunal other than the Justices of the Supreme Court would naturally vote along purely partisan lines. and not by the party or parties. I dissent and herewith proceed to explain my reasons therefor. dissenting:. Under the theory of the petitioners. the Senate was justified. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. of the Constitution.

the process of nomination lodged in the minority party in the Senate.). it would make the supposedly procedural provision. contrary to the constitutional provision. such a construction accords with the generally acknowledged import of constitutional fiat. has refused to exercise the constitutional privilege afforded him to nominate the two other members the Senate may not elect said two other members. In the third place. returns. and qualifications of their respective Members. Indeed. a proviso to the effect that if the minority fails or refuses to exercise its privilege to nominate all the three members. three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. "The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election. in the hands of said member of the minority. Such a holding is in accord with well-settled rules of statutory construction. three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice. i. that of electing the members of the Electoral Tribunal so in effect this right or prerogative is lodged. This arrogation of power by us is not justified by any rule of law or reason. involving as they do concepts of constitutional supremacy. which the Constitutional Convention alone had the power to introduce. 3. In the first Place. that which fixes membership at nine and that which outlines the procedure in which said membership of nine may be elected. 5807. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. And the reason given for this ruling is the presumed intention of the constitutional provision to safeguard the interests of the minority. In the second place.. The above principle (of waiver) furnishes the remedy by which two parts of the constitutional provision. who shall be chosen by each House. I consider the opinion of the Senate that the refusal of Senator Tañada to nominate the two other members must be construed as a waiver of a mere privilege. there is greater likelihood that constitutional provisions will be given mandatory effect than is true of any other class of organic law. as a consequence of the refusal of the minority member to nominate. the only member of the Senate who does not belong to the Nacionalista Party. a procedural provision overrides a substantive one and renders nugatory the other more important mandatory provision that the Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine members. In the fourth place. superior to and paramount over the power of election. more in consonance not only with the constitutional provision as a whole. the majority decision has by interpretation inserted a provision in the Constitution.84.). namely. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members. are such as to form reasonable grounds for a presumption that the framers of a constitution intended that just such efficacy be given to it ." (Sec. but with the dictates of reason. it denies to the Senate the power that the constitutional provision expressly grants it. The majority helds that as Senator Tañada. Well known is the legal principle that provisions which in their application may nullify . which is in the whole Senate itself. This holding is subject to the following fundamental objections. Vol. Article VI of the Constitution. it renders nugatory the provision which fixes the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal at nine. as the case may be. e. I hold that the above provision. can be reconciled. "As a general proposition. Sutherland Statutory Construction. the membership of the Electoral Tribunal shall thereby be correspondingly reduced. p. and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives.The constitutional provision." (Section II. So by the ruling of the majority. is mandatory in character and that this character is true not only of the provision that nine members shall compose the tribunal but also that which defines the manner in which the members shall be chosen.. in pursuance of which Senators Cuenco and Delgado were elected by the Senate members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is as follows:. that its character is such as to require absolute compliance in all cases without exception. just as any other constitutional provision. a provision which is admittedly a mandatory provision. And the very principles of our institutions.

. 1801.. vs.each other should be reconciled to make them both effective. judiciary has once spoken. 333. People vs. 2 Which.. Gaz. El Hogar Filipino. 92 Phil.. S. 49 Off. 11 Phil. Insular Gov't. 429. 8 Phil.. 4411. Ang Tan Ho. Borra. Madison. M. 340. Springer. 348. Romero. they cease to be operative or binding.. 97 Phil. Angara vs. 93 Phil. Shuster. 157 U. and Rodriguez vs. supra. Stanley.. 1778. 51 Off. 136. 49 Off. 440. 50 Phil. Rilloraza. they act under the obligations imposed in the instrument. 87 Phil... S.]. 158 U. Gaz. Vargas vs. David.. Esteban. 65 Phil. Rutter vs. 676. this is not the occasion for it to do so. 3 Pollock vs. 3847. Bautista. S. insofar as pertinent to the issues in the case at bar. Gov't.. vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners. Gaz. Gaz. 85 Phil.. Endencia vs. S... Hepburn vs. Gaz. 84 Phil. Gaz. and Charleston Railroad Co. U. Weigall vs. is substantially identical to each of the Electoral Tribunals under the Constitution as amended. Jover Ledesma vs... vs.. Nacionalista Party vs. 93. 56. Apacible. for to say the least it does not clearly appear that the form and manner in which the Senate exercised its expressly recognized power to elect its members to the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been clearly violative of the constitutional mandate. 5607. 563. 456. People vs. While I agree with the majority that it is the duty of this Court to step in. 25 Phil. 30 Phil. U. 57 Phil. the court are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands. 47 Off. 506. 1 Cranch 137.. Dinglasan. S. Ramos vs. 1. 601.. _Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä_.. 47 Off. 4457. 42 Phil 599. and in the order of time pointed out by it. S. 109 U. Fairbanks vs. Saguitan. Lacson vs. McGirr. 883. Gaz. Paredes. 4 Wall. 43 Phil.. Omo vs. Barredo vs. Ex Parte Garland. 49 Off. Gov't. 259. Manila Electric vs. Moir. McDaniel vs. Hord. Gov't. U.. A822. 50 Phil. 48 Off. 603. S. Compania Gral. All the departments are of the government are unquestionably entitled and compelled to judge of the Constitution for themselves. Gaz.. Nichols. 42 Phil. 844. 286. _Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä_ 4 "From the very nature of the American system of government with Constitutions prescribing the jurisdiction and powers of each of the three branches of government. 3 Araneta vs. 45 Off. Concepcion vs. 368. 48 Phil. if the reconciliation can be effected by the application of other legal principles.. 49 Off. 49 Off. 101. Avelino. Vera. Comm. U.. S. de Tabacos vs. 84 Phil. Electoral Commission. 125. 8 Wall. 399. When the. Agcaoili vs. 12 Wall. Griswold. De los Santos vs. Lacson vs. Commission on Elections. Barrameda vs. 740. Pasay Transp. 289. Mallare. when a constitutional mandate is ignored. 457. Robinson vs. Garcia. 1787. 749. in violation of the Constitution or the vested rights of the citizen. 44. 1 Casanovas vs. 40 Phil. 50 Phil.. U. Gaz. Civil Rights Cases [U.. 181 U. vs. S. investment vs. Agoncillo. S. 46 Phil. vs.. vs. 45 Off. "Since the Constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary as well as the other departments of government and the judges are sworn to support its provisions.. Roque. it has devolved on the judiciary to determine whether the acts of the other two departments are in harmony with the fundamental law. 67. . if the acts of the other two departments are held to be unauthorized or despotic. to enforce said mandate even as against the other coordinate departments.. Ramirez. 2765. xxx xxx x x x. 34 Phil. 600.. S.... Pomar. 2356. Gaz. vs. but. 1807. us. Knox vs. 11 Phil. The reconciliation is brought about in this case by the principle of waiver. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. Gaz. Lee. Teasurer of the Philippines. It is their duty in authorized proceedings to give effect to the existing Constitution and to obey all constitutional provisions irrespective of their opinion as to the wisdom of such provisions. in doing so. Singleton. Marbury vs.. M.. Central Capiz vs. Ryan. Hamilton vs.

Jur. State vs. Timme. Board of Canvassers. 37 Pac. Since the question as to the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter. Swift. McBride. whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law."In accordance with principles which are basic. 183. Tooker. C. constitutional mandate that the Assembly is entitled to six in the Electoral Commission. Kadderly vs. it logically follows that the only party in the Assembly may nominate three others. W. Any other course would lead to the destruction of the Constitution. Rice vs." (11 Am. 76. 700. Jur. the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. State vs. fluctuations in the total membership of the Commission were not and could have been intended. We cannot say that the Commission should have nine members during one legislative term and six members during the next. however.'. Wurtz. The membership of the Commission is intended to be fixed and not variable and is not dependent upon the existence or non-existence of one or more parties in the Assembly. 74 Pac. 713-715. 738. considering the plain terms of the constitutional provision in question. pp. 59 N. State vs. 6 "The procedure or manner of nomination cannot possibly affect the. the courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals. 84 S. Collier vs. W. Inasmuch.W. 785. even though the circumstance may have so changed as to make a different rule seem desirable (11 Am. 5 Rich vs. 840. This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing. and. Prohibition and Amendment Cases. 505. with the members of the Supreme Court as the balancing factor. Frierson. 24 Kan. the necessity for such a check by the minority party disappears. 96 S. State vs. Powell. `A cardinal rule in dealing with Constitutions is that they should receive a consistent and uniform interpretation. Palmer. 11 N. Westinghausen vs. Bott vs. 100. W. 1064. People. When for lack of a minority representation in the Assembly the power to nominate three minority members cannot be exercised. Brockhart. Hill.W. 636. 712-713. 927. "To summarize. 69 Ind. especially when the election of any member of the minority party is protected. 396. 72 N. 43 Atl.. Constitutional provisions must always have a consistent application. 641. as there is no minority party represented in the Assembly. 710. 27 South. 6 N. 29 Am. I have come to the conclusion that the Electoral Commission should be composed of nine members. University vs. as Chief Justice Marshal said. "It is undisputed of course that the primary purpose of the Convention in giving representation to the minority party in the Electoral Commission was to safeguard the rights of the minority party and to protect their interests. the rule is fixed that the duty in a proper case to declare a law unconstitutional cannot be declined and must be performed in accordance with the deliberate judgment of the tribunal before which the validity of the enactment is directly drawn into question. State vs. It is a function that is expected to be exercised by the three Justices of the Supreme Court. Portland. 24 Ala. it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional cause they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. The basic philosophy behind the constitutional provision was to enable the minority party to act as a check on the majority of the Electoral Commission. emphasis supplied). the changes that it has undergone since it was first introduced until finally adopted by the Convention. three . "In other words. When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution. Koehler vs. Melver. 659). W. 14 N. 744. so they shall not be taken to mean one thing at one time and another thing at another time. Dec. otherwise the explicit mandate of the Constitution that there shall be six members from the National Assembly would be nullified. State vs. as well as the considerations that must have inspired the Constitutional Convention in adopting it as it is.

2-3. was that it is likely that the three members representing a party would naturally favor the protestants or protestees. in the House and in the Senate.from the Supreme Court and six chosen by the National Assembly to be nominated by the party in power. Mr. I agree with Your Honor. when said opinion was rendered. in Suanes vs. three to represent. Your Honor can see the point. Chief Accountant (supra)-in which the respondents maintained that the Electoral Commission formed part of the National Assembly. 7 Senator Laurel reiterated this view on the floor of the Senate. But having reached the highest judicial position of the land. could be tempered by a sort of a judicial reflection which could be done by drafting three. meaning the majority party which is the Nacionalista Party now. the question therein raised has not been taken up or discussed. President. Another reason is founded on the theory that the Justices of the Supreme Court are supposed to be beyond influence. consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives. p. until the events leading to the case at bar (in February 1956). 10 Senator Lim said:. meaning the minority party. And that. as to each Electoral Tribunal. I think. Your Honor can see very well that those three should belong to the party having the second largest number of votes. Your Honor can see that the spirit of the provision of the Constitution is clear that the three must come from the party having the highest number of votes and the other three nominated must belong to the party having the second highest number of votes. as Your Honor said. depending on the party of the protestants or the protestees. precisely. III. these persons would likely act impartially. So it would be better that even on that hypothesis or on that supposition it would be better. 9 Upon the substitution of the National Assembly by a bicameral Congress. "And hence this provision that we find in the Constitution. Although grammatically. that the Supreme Court decide the case because then it would be a judicial decision in reality. and three to represent the party receiving the next highest number of votes therein." Annex A to the Answers pp. and so on. the party receiving the next highest number of votes. "But in the spirit.). 6a Since 1939. 1956. citing in support thereof the principle of contemporaneous and practical construction-this Court deemed it unnecessary to refute the same in order to adopt the opposite view. although that may not be true. known as the National Assembly. in case they annul each other because three votes in favor or three votes against. because partisan considerations enter when one is with the majority party. If we allow Your Honor to back up your argument that equilibrium should be maintained. to maintain equilibrium because partisan considerations naturally enter into the mind and heart of a senator belonging to a particular party. the party that received the highest number of votes." (Congressional Record for the Senate Vol. from the Supreme Court. 376. 6b "Thus. there being no other party entitled to such nomination. in the manner prescribed in the Constitution. And one reason that I remember then and I am speaking from memory. was the reason because a great majority of the delegates to the constitutional convention accepted that principle. in the following language:. so far as the legislative department is concerned. Your Honor should also have to consider that the spirit of the Constitution is precisely to obviate that to the extent that the only three can be nominated . That is why we have nine members in each electoral tribunal. and that no party should prevail. But there was a great deal of opinion that it would be better if this political organization. 8 When the legislative power was vested in a unicameral body. on February 22.

). "In the interpretation of Constitutions. Vol. The courts usually hesitate to declare that a constitutional provision is directory merely in view of the tendency of the legislature to disregard provisions which are not said to be mandatory. _Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä_..). 337.). III." (Congressional Record of the Senate. . I said that the ideal composition in the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution is that those participating in the electoral tribunal shall belong to the members of the party who are before the electoral tribunal either as protestants or protestees. Vol.. The analogous rules distinguishing mandatory and directory statutes are of little value in this connection and are rarely applied in passing upon the provisions of a Constitution. and not to leave any direction to the will of a legislature to obey or to disregard them. the party having the second largest number of votes so that these members my represent the party. Ill. ". in order to insure impartiality in the proceeding and justice in the decision that may be finally rendered.from the party having the largest number of votes and three from the party having the second largest number of votes. xxx xxx x x x. 11 The need of adopting this view is demanded. Accordingly. III." (Congressional Record for the Senate. but.. Vol. 352. _Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä_. emphasis supplied. President. 350. are presumed to be mandatory. emphasis supplied. there is ground to believe that decisions will be made along party lines. by the fact that constitutional provisions. III. ". 349. p. Senator Cea declared:." (Congressional Record for the Senate." The pertinent rule of statutory construction is set forth in the American Jurisprudence as follows:. the original purpose of the Constitution is to nominate only members of the two major parties in the Senate in the Electoral Tribunal. This presumption as to mandatory quality is usually followed unless it is unmistakably manifest that the provisions are intended to be merely directory.). "unless the contrary is unmistakably manifest. Mr. p. ". emphasis supplied. Vol. and three from. 351. p. questions frequently arise as to whether particular sections are mandatory or directory. That is the ideal situation. The statement of Senator Sabido was:. emphasis supplied. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a balance between the two parties and make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling power so to speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of power. pp. "." (Congressional Record for the Senate. it is the general rule to regard constitutional provisions as mandatory.".. The words of Senator Paredes were:. also. For when it comes to a party. not only by the factors already adverted to. what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to create a sort of collegiate court composed of nine members three of them belonging to the party having largest number of votes. and the members of said party who will sit before the electoral tribunal as protestees. unlike statutory enactments.

so as to accord more representation to the majority party. or a total of six (6) members of the Tribunal. recalled that:."So strong is the inclination in favor of giving obligatory force to the terms of the organic law that it has even been said that neither by the courts nor by any other department of the government may any provision of the Constitution be regarded as merely directory. then Justice. The Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46). Electoral Commission (supra. emphasis supplied. thus maintaining the non-partisan character of the commission. 14 Namely. Laurel. 13 In Angara vs. without reference to the rules and distinguishing between the directory and the mandatory statutes. Needless to say. 1934.). 1916 ." (II Am."(emphasis supplied. but that each and everyone of its provisions should be treated as imperative and mandatory. 12 Which admittedly. the other two (2) Justices of the Supreme Court and Senators Laurel. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC January 17. "In the same session of December 4. Jur. Lopez and Primicias. a mere creature of said charter. when done by resolution of one House of Congress.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two members each. 169) Senator.). Delegate Cruz (C. 686-687. speaking for this Court. what the Constitutional Convention thus precluded from being done by direct action or grant of authority in the Charter of our Republic should not receive judicial sanction. has the second largest number of votes in the Senate.

the case came to trial. 11002 THE UNITED STATES. Province of Leyte. omit from the tax list certain real properties and improvements belonging to said Francisco Madlonito. and. MATEO P. P. and. 1914. in the municipality of Tacloban. 1915. situated in the barrio of Diit. on or about the 26th day of September. were brought against the defendant. 1914. Evidence was introduced by both the prosecution and the defense.R. to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment and to pay the costs. Mateo P. and finding of the demurrer interposed to the complaint. in violation of law. and criminally upon revising the assessment and in reassessing the property of Francisco Madlonito. The undersigned charges Mateo P. on January 15. Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee. in the following manner. unlawfully.G. vs. to pay a fine of P100. or. Palacio.. ARAULLO. 82. Palacio with having violated section 87 of Act No. to wit: Said accused. 82. Antonio Belmonte for appellant. knowing that the properties omitted were lawfully taxable. said Court of First Instance rendered judgment in which. and finding the defendant guilty of the crime therein charged. did wilfully. J. the same was overruled. he sentenced him to the penalty of forty days' imprisonment in the provincial jail. 82. the Municipal Code. plaintiff-appellee.: These proceedings for violation of section 87 of Act No. in case of insolvency. A demurrer having been filed by defendant's counsel on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint did not constituted the crime provided for and punished by said section 87 of Act No. . in the Court of First Instance of Leyte by the following complaint filed therein by the fiscal on December 18. municipality of Tacloban. charged with the duty of assessing real property. defendant having pleaded not guilty. insisting upon the overruling of the demurrer interposed to the complaint. No. defendant-appellant.I. he being then and there a deputy to the provincial assessor of Leyte. PALACIO.

known as the Municipal Code. by that of Jose Guardino. by that of Nicanor Dolina. and having proceeded under orders of said assessor. by that of Ventura Viñas. it was ascertained that said land was unirrigated hemp or corn land. on the east. 80 clumps of banana trees. 1914. and assessment of the properties of one Francisco Madlonito. proceeded in company with another deputy to remeasure and to make a new valuation and assessment of the same land.Defendant has appealed from this judgment and has assigned thereto various errors which. 82. as a result of this proceeding on the part of said provincial assessor. evaluation. and one coconut tree in bearing. a dwelling house of mixed material. the only improvements consisting of 500 hemp plants. on the east. it measured 3 hectares 51 ares and 23 centiares in area. on the south. by the land of Tomas Tabosa and a wood. given in the month of September. the improvements thereon consisting of a plantation of hemp. municipality of Tacloban of said province. 2. under guidance of and in accordance with date furnished by the same Francisco Madlonito who had previously conducted and furnished information to defendant. as stated by the Attorney-General in his brief. the provincial assessor. in the following month of October. That the facts alleged in the complaint and proven at trial do not constitute the infraction provided for and punished by section 87 of Act No. on the south. to verify the measurement. that it was polygonal in form and was adjoined on the north by the property of Anacleto Condes and Basilio Espejo. may be reduced to the following: 1. having been advised that defendant's report was false. duly appointed and such. situated in the barrio of Di-it. 9 cacao trees. he presented in performance of his duty a report in which he recorded as real property belonging to said Francisco Madlonito a rectangular parcel of unirrigated land which was adjoined on the north by the land of Anacleto Condes. 24 coconut trees 5 years of age. and on the west. and by a wood on the west. It was therefore apparent that in the tax . that several days afterwards. Basilio Espejo and Ventura Viñas. That the lower court erred in holding that the evidence adduced at trial proves defendant's guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. it was found to measure 15 hectares 17 ares and 65 centiares in extent. by woods. The evidence shows beyond all doubt that while defendant was serving as a deputy to the provincial assessor of Leyte.

He himself ought to have verified the correctness of the information and have informed himself of the true area of the land and of all the improvements thereon.list of real property which. Defendant endeavored in a way to explain this omission by attributing it to the fact that in making his report he relied upon the information furnished by Francisco Madlonito himself. was furnished him by the two laborers of whose services he availed himself for the actual performance of that labor. nor can they serve to exonerate him as he claims because. with respect to the house. in order to include them in the report which it was his duty to render to the provincial assessor in fulfillment of the mission confined to him. These explanations of the defendant are not satisfactory. and. deciding to postpone doing so until the 15th of January of the following year. the report presented by him — he had omitted real property belonging to Francisco Madlonito. on that given him at the time by the two laborers who measured the land and who assured him that said measurement was correct. with the exception of the 500 hemp plants specified in this report. in the first place. they being in sight. form which verification and . because it was the same as that which has been pointed out to them by the owner of the land. he should not have relied on what the interest party himself. Francisco Madlonito himself testified at the trial that he had furnished defendant with the same date and information which he subsequently gave to the provincial assessor and to the latter's other deputy when they both went to verify and investigate the defendant's work. Defendant further explained that he also accepted the informations furnished by said laborers with respect to the improvements specified in said report as consisting of a plantation of hemp. Francisco Madlonito told him that it belonged to Emiliano. with respect to the area. that this latter was absent at the time and therefore defendant did not measure the property. when he intended to return. In the second place. Francisco Madlonito. Francisco's brother. as deputy to the provincial assessor. defendant was charged to prepare — that is. nor upon the information which. that these men had told him that there were no other improvements except the hemp plantation and some banana trees of which he did not know how many there were. at the time he inspected and measured the lands. told him. which property consisted of 12 hectares 66 ares and 42 centares of land and all the improvements mentioned.

provides that the real estate of the municipality shall be valued and assessed for taxation by a board. Section 49 of the same Act. constitute proof that defendant (exception made in so far as the house is concerned. 82. as aforesaid. 82. to consist of the president. This. besides the 500 hemp plants mentioned in defendant's report. We therefore fail to understand and it has not been explained how said improvements could have been omitted from the report. in the discretion of the court. and a specially authorized deputy of the provincial treasurer. Defendant's counsel alleges. therefore. however. No. cacao and banana trees. does not constitute an infraction provided for and punished by section 87 of Act No. . consisted of. and having had. sufficient opportunity and time to inform himself of exactly what the latter's property. willfully omitted from his report and extensive portion of Francisco Madlonito's real property that he knew was lawfully taxable and which it was his duty to record in said document. was proven at trial. for it might be true that it did belong to Francisco Madlonito's brother). the municipal treasurer. therefore. shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos.investigation it was disclosed that the land was larger by 12 hectares 66 ares and 42 centiares and that it contained many other improvements such as clumps of coconut. that the act committed by his client and which. The lower court did not." That section provides as follows: Any officer charged with the duty of assessing real property. or both. which board shall be known as the municipal board of assessors. who shall willfully omit from the tax lists real property which he knows to be lawfully taxable. known as the Municipal Code. incur the first error assigned by defendant's counsel in his brief. which was to be measure and recorded in said report. or imprisonment not exceeding two years. nor how defendant could have failed to mentioned therein such a large tract of land as that of the 12 hectares above referred to. together with the circumstances of defendant's having passed the previous night in Francisco Madlonito's own house.

section 1 of which created the position of provincial assessor for each province containing municipalities organized under the provisions of the Municipal Code. those of his deputies. As may be seen. and. Section 2 of this Act provides that provincial assessors shall be allowed such number of deputies and clerks as shall be fixed by the provincial board with the approval of the Executive Secretary. when so directed. 1913. in creating the office of provincial assessor and allowing him such number of deputies and clerks as shall be fixed by the provincial board with the approval of the Executive Secretary. 2238. in amending said section in the manner aforementioned. and. taxable or subject to the land tax. provided that someone representing the provincial board or better said. in reciting the duties of the provincial assessor. Act No. the purpose of Act No. in creating. existing in the municipalities of these Islands. revise and correct. in section 49 thereof. 1930. and . establishes the procedure that must be followed where any municipality or any property owner does not agree with the assessment and valuation so made. a provincial official. Other sections of this Act confer upon the provincial assessor various powers in connection with the preparation of the lists of property subject to assessment. 82. so that the aforementioned municipal board of assessors should consist of the municipal president the municipal treasurer and. of a third member to be appointed by the provincial board. to wit. should be assessed. provides that. make a correct and just assessments and state the true value of the real property. when directed by provincial board.Said section 49 was amended by section 1 of Act No. in the manner set forth in the Act. 2238 by expressly creating the office of provincial assessor for the revision and correction of assessments and valuations of real property declared in the municipalities — and to enable this official to take a direct and active part in . finally. consequently. 1930. on February 11. Subsequently. and Act No. and section 4. was the same as that ofAct No. instead of the deputy to the provincial treasurer. 2238 was passed. and. by providing that all the real property. he shall revise and correct the assessments and valuations of real property for the purpose of taxation. the municipal board of assessors. any and all assessments and valuations for taxation. for this purpose and in order that the provincial board should exercise the necessary and proper supervision over acts of the municipalities relative to said tax. should be a member of the municipal board of assessors — a purpose and object which are more accentuated inAct No.

" A simple perusal of Act No. Nos. Said Act 2238 is therefore intimately related to the two Acts Nos. to proceed to revise and correct the assessments and valuations of real property. is that "when there are two laws on the same subject enacted on different dates. strictly speaking. to render every assistance in their power to the provincial assessor.preparing the lists of property subject to said tax. But that municipalities are not excluded from taking part in the proceedings is shown by the fact that section 9 of this Act No. secretary and treasurer and all municipal employees. as very properly said by defendant's counsel in his brief. one of the rules of interpretation. by means of the intervention which in said procedure is given to the provincial assessors. not only for the reason above stated. Furthermore. It also provides in section 13 that it shall be the duty of the municipal president. in such form and detail as the Executive Secretary may prescribe. shall serve the assessor as basis for the valuation and assessment. and such schedule. nothing which may be said to be in conflict with said Act No. 82 and 1930 aforecited. 82. the latest law should be considered as a legal declaration that all that is comprised therein shall continue in force and that all that is not shall rejected and repealed. a general schedule of the values of the different classes of land for the municipality which shall be forwarded to the provincial board for approval. in so far as relates to the assessment and valuation of taxable real property in municipalities. and is virtually a complement of the same in so far as regards the declaration and assessment of taxable property. 2238 is sufficient to show that it was not the intention of the legislature to cover all . the provincial board shall require each municipal council of the municipalities organized under the provisions of the Municipal Code (Act No. In the two aforementioned Acts. for determining the taxable real property in the municipalities and the value thereof. and that it is a complete and perfect system. when approved by the provincial board. 82 and 1930. 2238 provides in section 18 that all Acts or parts of Acts in conflict therewith are repealed. 82) to prepare. prior to directing the provincial assessor in accordance with the provisions thereof. the Municipal Code. 2238 provides that. there is. and it appears evidently by the form and essence of the later law that it was the intention of the legislator to cover therein the whole of the subject. but also because this Act has done nothing but change the method and procedure provided in Act No. or is in itself a provision. Said Act No. 2238.

but also clear and convincing. the Act in question is closely related to Act No.matters relative to the assessment and valuation of the taxable real property of the municipalities. they can be reconciled. be maintained that section 87 of this latter Act should be considered as repealed. 489. by any reasonable construction. being charged with the duty of assessing real property. Hence. pp. wilfully makes any omission such as that aforestated. wilfully omits form the tax lists any real property which he knows to be lawfully taxable. 2238 provides no penalty for the provincial assessor or his deputy who. Repeals by implications are not favored. is a public official or an official of the class referred to in section 87. (23 Am. and will not be decreed. it being immaterial whether he be a provincial or a municipal official (for it is sufficient that it be the duty of such official to assess real property) it is evident that the said penal provisions in force and is applicable to the provincial assessors and their deputies . therefore.) As said Act No. of Law. every effort must be used to make all acts stand and if. p. and Eng. because. unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable. unless the later act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier. as aforesaid. of which it is virtually a complement in so far as regards the organization of the service of making the lists for the complete and adequate collection to the tax on the real property in municipalities organized under said Act No. in revising the assessment and preparing the tax list of real property. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject. 721. 726]. unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. It cannot. 26. the later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier. or his deputy. and flowing necessarily from the language used. Ency. and subject. 82. in so far as it prescribes the penalty incurred by any official who. 82. and as the provincial assessor. or unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure removed. it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to same matter. and cases there cited [vol.

. C.. . we hereby affirm the same. dissent. Carson and Trent. because what the law punished in said section 87 is the fact of the willful omission. and the judgment appealed from being in accordance with the merits of the case and the law. 2238.J. By reason of the foregoing. concur. with the costs against appellant. of any property which he knows to be lawfully taxable. because it constitutes in itself a false representation in that document and a fraud committed by the public official to prejudice of the Government or with intent to cause such prejudice. Torres and Johnson. JJ. and that such omission might have been repaired by correcting the list or report by means of revision and new assessment made by the provincial assessor himself on his proceeding with the investigation of the misdemeanor committed by defendant. JJ. So ordered. Arellano.. under the provisions of said section 87. and that the lower court did not err in sentencing defendant. by the official charged with the duty of assessing the real property in the tax list.referred to in Act No. The fact that the cadastral survey of the municipality of Tacloban was to terminated at the time of the discovery of the omission made by the defendant in the report presented by him to the provincial assessor. and it is immaterial whether said omission can or cannot subsequently be remedied. to the penalty specified in the judgment appealed from. does not exempt the latter from liability.

on the other hand. in their behalf. STREET. and the cause is now before us for the determination of the questions thus presented. filed in this court by Lichauco & Company against the respondents. requiring the immunization of the cattle before shipment. vs. as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. SILVERIO APOSTOL. it has "an absolute and unrestricted right to import carabao and other draft animals and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum from PnomPehn. The petitioner therefore asks for an order requiring the respondents to admit the contemplated importation of cattle into the Islands and enjoining them from the enforcement of said administrative order in the future. INC. as Director of Agriculture.: This is an original petition for the writs of mandamus and injunction. McDonough and Johnson for petitioner. respondents. 3052 of the Philippine Legislature. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture. a shipment of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum but that the respondent Director of Agriculture refuses to admit said cattle. The respondents. that said cattle shall have been immunized from rinderpest before embarcation at Pnom-Pehn. into the Philippine Islands" and that the respondents have no authority to impose upon the petitioner the restriction referred to above.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. Attorney-General Villa-Real for respondents. No. An order having been issued by this court requiring the respondents to appear and show cause why the relief prayed for should not be granted. as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. and RAFAEL CORPUS. Silverio Apostol. by the . in French Indo-China. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture. rely upon section 1770 of the Administrative Code and upon Administrative Order No. stated in Administrative Order No. as Director of Agriculture. L-19628 December 4.. Indo-China. as amended by Act No. in the nature of a demurrer. Gibbs. 1922 LICHAUCO & COMPANY. promulgated on July 29. J. except upon the condition. The petitioner asserts that under the first proviso to section 1762 of the Administrative Code. It is alleged in the complaint that the petitioner is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands and that it has been engaged for several years in the business of importing carabao and other draft animals into the Philippine Islands and that it is now desirous of importing from Pnom-Pehn. and Rafael Corpus. petitioner. the Attorney-General presented a return.R. 1922.

The Director of Agriculture may. however. shall be submitted to regulations issued by the Director of Agriculture. That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation. 1922. unless the importation thereof shall be authorized under the regulation of the Bureau of Agriculture. 1922. 6. Bringing of diseased animal into Islands forbidden. further. infected with. with the approval of the head of the department first had. } . and such as may be necessary for the improvement of the breed. That all live cattle from foreign countries the importation. with the approval of the head of the department. preceded by section 1762 of the Administrative Code. bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum:Provided. 1922. 4. bringing or introduction of which into the Islands is authorized by this Act. or dead of any dangerous communicable disease. in relation with Department Order No. First paragraph of section 1762 of Administrative Code. — When the Department Head shall by general order declare that a dangerous communicable animal disease prevails in any foreign country. as supplying authority for the action taken. Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. animal effects. as originally enacted. 1770. Department Order No. — It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to import. it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to ship or otherwise bring into the Philippine Islands any animal suffering from. as amended by Act No. Section 1770 of Administrative Code: SEC. 2. bringing or introduction of various classes of thoroughbred cattle from foreign countries for breeding the same to the native cattle of these Islands. 6. or place and that there is danger of spreading such disease by the importation of domestic animals therefrom. 3052 of the Philippine Legislature: SEC. parts. Such portions of the laws above-mentioned as are material to the present controversy will be set out in full. by Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources: DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. 1. promulgated on July 28.Director of Agriculture. prior to authorizing its transfer to other provinces. to which will be appended the pertinent parts of the orders referred to and the communication of the Director of Agriculture of August 31. or any effects pertaining to such animal which are liable to introduce such disease into the Philippine Islands. with the approval of the head of Department first had. } }Series of 1922. promulgated on July 28. 1762. not to exceed five hundred head per annum: Provided. Prohibition against bringing of animals from infected foreign countries. bring or introduce live cattle into the Philippine Islands from any foreign country. — Except upon permission of the Director of Agriculture. First paragraph of section 1762 of Administrative Code in original form: SEC. authorize the importation. it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to ship or bring into the Philippine Islands any such animal. 1762. 6. 3. port. or products from such place.

in accordance with the provisions of section 1770 of Act No. parts. of the Bureau of Agriculture. under the following conditions: 1. for which the importer before placing his order shall have obtained from the Director of Agriculture a written permit to import them from the above named countries. 6. the present regulations of the Bureau of Agriculture governing the importation of livestock from French Indo-China and Hongkong are hereby amended to the effect that the importation of livestock of the species named in the aforementioned Department Order is hereby prohibited from French Indo-China. carabaos. I have the honor to inform you that the permission is hereby granted. animal effects. 5. animals immunized against rinderpest. Hongkong and India. Communication of August 31. unless the importation thereof shall be authorized under the regulations of the Bureau of Agriculture. or products from Hongkong. Pursuant to the provisions of Department Order No. French Indo-China and British India. Administrative Order No. This order shall take effect on and after August 1. who must issue a certificate stating the fact that the animal has been immunized according to the requirements in number 1 and it must not be embarked until ten days after the second injection of virulent blood. carabaos. may be allowed entrance into the Philippine Islands. 1922. The provisions of this order shall take effect on and after August 1. 1922. 2711 (Administrative Code of the Philippine Islands of 1917). However. The immunization must be done by a veterinarian designated by the French Government for the purpose. 21 Re importation of cattle. from the Acting Director of Agriculture to Faustino Lichauco (in part): SIR: In reply to your application for permission to import from 300 to 400 carabaos immunized against rinderpest from Pnom-Pehn. by the Director of Agriculture: ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO.c. } } } .Owing to the fact that a dangerous communicable disease known as rinderpest exist in Hongkong. series of 1922. 1. that rinderpest prevails in said countries. 2. of good virulent blood must be injected at the first injection simultaneously with the serum. Hongkong and India. it is hereby declared. and pigs from French Indo-China. of virulent blood (alone). French Indo-China and British India. of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. 1922. 6. Ten days after the simultaneous inoculation all non-reactors must receive another injection of not less than 10 c. 1922.c. and pigs therefrom. promulgated July 29. At least 10 c. Animals must be immunized by the simultaneous method before shipment. it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to ship or bring into the Philippine Islands any such animal. 21. 2. French Indo-China. and as there is danger of spreading such disease by the importation of cattle.

on the other hand. is readily apparent upon comparing the two provisions. has been impliedly repealed by the amendatory Act No. Section 1770 is the backbone of the power to enforce animal quarantine in these Islands in the special emergency therein contemplated. and the provision is intended to operate only so long as that situation continues. while section 1770 deals with a particular contingency not made the subject of legislation in section 1762. 6) to the importation of cattle and carabao from French Indo-China. is obviously of a general nature. in the sense that if section 1762. It is claimed. namely. supposing of course. as amended. e. Of course the two provisions are different. Acting Director of Agriculture." This then is the first and principal question in the case. we find that while section 1762 relates generally to the subject of the bringing of animals into the Island at any time and from any place. that the disease of rinderpest exists in that country. Upon glancing over the matter above collated. it must be treated as a special qualification of section 1762. which is of later enactment that the Administrative Code. for it will be noted that that Act No. as amended. while if section 1770 is still in force the cattle. can be brought in only upon compliance with the requirements of Administrative Order No. Section 1770 is therefore not to be considered as inconsistent with section 1762. so far as it authorizes restriction upon the importation of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. as everybody knows and as the petitioner does not deny.xxx xxx xxx Very respectfully. That section 1770 is special. in the sense of dealing with a special contingency not dealt with in section 1762. the cattle which the petitioner wishes to bring in can be imported without restriction. for the reason that section 1762. and if that section should be obliterated. as amended. is considered alone. 3052. We are of the opinion that the contention of the petitioner is untenable. i. the administrative authorities here would be powerless to protect the agricultural industry of the Islands from the spread of animal infection originating abroad. and it contains only one section. But this difference between the practical effect of the two provisions does not make then inconsistent in the sense that the earlier provision (sec. that amending section 1762 of the Administrative Code. and in this connection reliance is chiefly placed on the first proviso to section 1762. 3052 has no repealing clause. bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. section 1770 confers on the Department Head a special power to deal with the situation which arises when a dangerous communicable disease prevails in some defined foreign country. however. Thus. 21. it will be seen at once that section 1770 of the Administrative Code on its face authorizes the action taken by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in closing our ports (in the manner and to the extent indicated in Department Order No. 3052. whether section 1770 has been repealed by implication.. under the conditions stated in the petition. which is in these words: "Provided. that section 1762 of the Administrative Code. . however. We say repealed by implication. 1770) should be deemed repealed by the amendatory Act (3052). That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation. in so far as it relates to draft animals and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. SILVERIO APOSTOL. as amended by said Act No.

. A. a general statute without negative words does not repeal a previous statute which is particular. 420. taken in its most comprehensive sense. 281. St. even though the provisions of one be different from the other. 816. the power given in section 1770 is obviously worthless. would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act or provision. 281. and certainly includes the matter in question. In our opinion section 1762.. S.. Ex Parte Crow Dog. leaving section 1770 theoretically in full effect as regards the importation of cattle for other purposes. would overrule the former.. especially when such general and special acts or provisions are contemporaneous. as always. 50 L. The special act and the general law must stand together. 322.) Where there are two acts or provisions.. ed. but the importation of cattle for draft purposes is the principal thing. and should declare that all persons of Chinese nationality shall be at liberty to enter the Philippine Islands without restriction. R.. 1030. Partee vs.) . The judicial precedents are conclusive to the effect that no implied repeal of a special provisions of the character of the one now under consideration will result from the enactment of broader provision of a general nature. and unless that can be regulated under the conditions and to the extent attempted by the respondents in this case.We note that the argument for unrestricted importation extends only to the importation of cattle for draft purposes and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. S.. 928. 970. 109 U. 77 Am. United States.. ed.. 185 U.. Louis & S. as amended. Master of the Rolls. 26 Beav. 226 U. 487. as where they are imported for slaughter. the general must yield to the particular. would anybody suppose that such enactment would have the effect of abolishing the power to maintain quarantine against any Chinese port where cholera or bubonic plaque might hereafter be raging in epidemic form? Yet the question now before us is not fundamentally different from the one thus supposed. and section 1770 must be construed in pari materia as harmonious parts of the law dealing with animal quarantine. 610. Richards. and section 1762. can be given effect only in so far as it is not restricted by section 1770. in Pretty vs. R. 199 U.) The additional words of qualification needed to harmonize a general and a prior special provision in the same statute should be added to the general provision. Reeder and Reeder. 606. ed..) Wherever there is a particular enactment and a general enactment in the same statute. E. 82. one of which is special and particular. 204 Fed. In other words. Luzerne County. (Crane vs. S. Solly. (Ex Parte United States. Petri vs. (Rodgers vs. the special must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general act or provision.. Rep. S. 57 L. and the general enactment must be taken to affect only the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply.. as the Legislature is not to be presumed to have intended a conflict. which. as amended. rather than to the special one. if standing alone.) Specific legislation upon a particular subject is not affected by a general law upon the same subject unless it clearly appears that the provision of the two laws are so repugnant that the legislature must have intended by the later to modify or repeal the earlier legislation. and the other general.. University of Utah vs. (Sir John Romilly. 334. St. and the latter. 22 Mich. F. Creelman Lumber Co. 556. Rep. ed. F. 46 L. Here.. 12 L. If the Congress of the United States should this day repeal the Chinese Exclusion Law so far as it affects these Islands. the one as the law of the particular subject and the other as the general law of the land. 27 L. the particular enactment must be operative. Co. 192. (Rymer vs.

declaring nonmailable 'every obscene . and are not absolutely irreconcilable. epithets. Says the writer: "The various provisions of an act should be read so that all may. and also a general one.. 'This distinctly additional clause. In a prosecution under the act. 164166. Stat. paper..' and the person knowingly or willfully depositing the same in the mails 'shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. the duty of the court — no purpose to repeal being clearly expressed or indicated — is. 46. the later section being the last expression of the legislative mind must. 2d ed. or language may be written or printed . . print. 1074. the rule is that a prior legislative act will not be impliedly repealed by a later act unless there is a plain... have their due and conjoint effect without repugnancy or inconsistency. unavoidable and irreconcilable repugnancy between the two. shall not be conveyed in the mails. terms. 725-726. but some of the observations of the learned author are so appropriate to the case before us that we cannot forego the temptation to include the same in this opinion. ed. or other publication of an indecent character. both will be sustained. Moore and prefixed as a General Introduction to Federal Statutes Annotated. and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment. Stat.' And the Justice proceeded to apply that rule in the construction of a statute upon which there had been much ingenious argument and a decided conflict of authority in the inferior federal courts. C. Justice Lamar pointed out that the statute.1076..) . it must not be supposed that the Legislature intended by a latter statute to repeal a prior one on the same subject. the Circuit Court certified to the Supreme Court the following question: 'Is the knowingly depositing in the mails of an obscene letter. 'specifically designating and describing the particular class of letters which shall be nonmailable. book. & Eng. if possible. in whole or in part. The discussion there given is too lengthy to be here reproduced in full. . The stature was an act of Congress of 1876. (36 Cyc. The sections of a code relative to any subject must be harmonized and to that end the letter of any section may sometimes be disregarded. ." (1 Fed. . But where absolute harmony between parts of a statute is demonstrably non-existent. or lascivious delineations. to give effect to both. also at pp. . Encyc. if possible. 'that where there is in the same statute a particular enactment. ." written by Chas. adds a separate and distinct clause declaring that 'every letter upon the envelope of which .' etc. (Frost vs. obscene. and therefore to displace the prior statute.It is well settled that repeals by implication are not to be favored. Justice Lamar. the court must reject that one which is least in accord with the general plan of the whole.' continued the Justice. In other words. and making it a misdemeanor to deposit any of them for mailing.' and other enumerated articles. the author proceeds: " 'it is an old and familiar rule.) And speaking with reference to the rule by which special provisions are held to dominate over general provisions in the same or later laws. In the course of his argument in support of the view of the court.. 157 U. 2d ed. Wenie. clearly limits the inhibitions of the statute to that class of letters alone whose indecent matter is exposed on the envelope. Law. 614.. lewd. writing. an offense within the act?' On behalf of the government it was contended that the word 'writing' comprehended such a letter. the particular enactment must be operative. unless the last statute is so broad in its terms and so clear and explicit in its words as to show that it was intended to cover the whole subject. 26 Am. vacate the former to the extent of the repugnancy.' said Mr. Ann. S. If both acts can by any reasonable construction stand together. 49-50. in construction. inclosed in an envelope or wrapper upon which there is nothing but the name and address of the person to whom the letter is written. or if there be no such ground for choice between inharmonious section.) As stated in the pages of the two most authoritative legal encyclopedias.' " (1 Fed. which in its most comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former. but the Supreme Court held otherwise. 39 L. 2d ed. And where two statutes cover.) A masterly analysis of the decisions of the United States Courts pertinent to the matter now in hand will be found in the monographic article on "Statutes and Statutory Construction. after enumeration what articles shall be nonmailable. Ann. 619. 50-51. pamphlet. the same matter.. indecent.

as shown by the fact that the latter further require tests to be made upon the arrival of the cattle here. It has been suggested that the regulative power vested in the Director of Agriculture under section 1770 of the Administrative Code with respect to the admission of cattle into the Philippine Islands attaches only when the importation has been effected. reflects a mistaken point of view with reference to the effect of the regulations. however. under the supervision of the Government veterinarians of French Indo-China. Upon the whole we are of the opinion that the petition does not show sufficient ground for granting the writs ofmandamus and injunction. is not unconditionally accepted as efficacious by the Philippine authorities. in our opinion. This contention. but there must always be a sufficient revelation of this intention. and we are not disposed to review the conclusion. the prior immunization of the cattle is made a condition precedent to the right to bring them in. even as regards draft animals alone. The unreasonableness of this interpretation of the amendatory law alone supplies sufficient warrant for rejecting it. as we have already shown. The Legislature could not possibly have intended to destroy the effectiveness of quarantine as regards imported animals. the penalty merely is that the cattle are not admitted. the abrogation of that provision. as much as to say. dated October 7. with reference to which the question arises bear to each other the relation of general to special. The importer is thus left at entire liberty in respect to the taking of the necessary measures to gain admittance for his cattle in our ports. 1922. for if any such intention was entertained. About the principal fact that rinderpest exists in the regions referred to in Department Order No. or provisions. nevertheless. 6. and that the said Director has no authority to dictate the measures to be taken by the importer before the cattle are embarked for transportation to these Islands. It is therefore idle to speculate whether in the case before us the Philippine Legislature may or may not have intended to modify or abrogate section 1770 of the Administrative Code at the time the amendment to section 1762 was enacted. that even supposing section 1770 of the Administrative Code to be in force. it was not revealed in a way that would justify a court in giving this intention effect. the requirement of immunization at the port of embarcation is unreasonable. he was acting upon a matter within his province. is therefore sustained. It is insisted. however. and can be no dispute. and the determination of this question is we think necessarily fatal to the petitioner's case. and the temporary . would leave the animal industry of the Islands exposed to the danger incident to the unrestricted importation of infected animals from districts where rinderpest prevails. there is. this intention must be given effect.The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on the assumption that if the act of latter date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the lawmaking power to abrogate the prior law. and the answer is to be found in the consideration that the regulation in question has prospective reference to the condition of the cattle upon their arrival here. inasmuch as the immunization of the cattle at that port. the Legislature in amending section 1762 could not possibly have entertained a design to modify section 1770. The demurrer interposed thereto by the respondents in their return to the order to show cause. Considerations of this nature are we think more proper to be addressed to the authorities responsible for the regulations than to this court. in the opinion of the majority of the Justices participating in this decision. that only animals conforming to the required type will be admitted. We may add. for. In other words. and it has become an unbending rule of statutory construction that the intention to repeal a former law will not be imputed to the Legislature when it appears that the two statute. and if he fails to do so. consisting of inoculation with virulent blood of animals suffering from rinderpest — which involves additional expenses and exposes the importer to the loss of his entire herd. that. and when the Department Head declared that the disease prevails in those regions and that there is danger of spreading it by the importation of cattle and carabao into this country. Our conclusion then is that section 1770 of the Administrative Code remains in full force.

if any. and Ostrand. a complete substitute for section 1762 of Act No. with the approval of the head of Department first had. cremation. with costs. and is. to enter the Islands under such conditions as to quarantine. as it amends section 1762 of Act No. is dissolved. — It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to import. 1922. or any effects pertaining to such animal which are liable to introduce such disease into the Philippine Islands. As amended by Act No. So ordered. dissenting: The question involved is the meaning and construction of Act No. — Except upon permission of the Director of Agriculture. dismissing the same.. and to what extent. or dead of any dangerous communicable disease. 3052 reads as follows: Section seventeen hundred and sixty-two of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven. Malcolm. Avanceña. authorize the importation. 3052 of the Legislature at its special session approved March 14. with the approval of the head of Department first had. it repeals or modifies section 1770 of Act No. and unless within five days after notification hereof the petitioner shall so amend his petition as to show a sufficient cause of action. 2711. or other disposal as he may direct. 3052 becomes. Bringing of diseased animal into Islands forbidden. 1762. is hereby amended to read as follows: Hence.. 1922. dated September 21. Separate Opinions JOHNS. Any such animal or its effects may be permitted by the Director of Agriculture. with the approval of the head of the department first had. an order absolute will be entered. 2711. it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to ship or otherwise bring into the Philippine Islands any animal suffering from. Villamor. infected with. or which shall be deemed by him sufficient to prevent the spread of any such disease. which reads as follows: SEC. known as the Administrative Code. bring or introduce live cattle into the Philippine Islands from any foreign country. 1762. Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.restraining order heretofore promulgated in this cause. It will be noted that section 1 of Act No. 2711. 3052. bringing or introduction of various classes of thoroughbred cattle from foreign countries for breeding the same to the native cattle of these Islands. concur. JJ. Act No. section 1762 reads as follows: SEC. J. The Director of Agriculture may. and such as may be necessary for the .

" and it must appear that the cattle "are thoroughbred cattle from foreign countries for breeding the same to the native cattle of these Islands. shall be submitted to regulations issued by the Director of Agriculture. suspend this prohibition for a fixed period in case local conditions require it. And that . is not found in the title of the Act as amended. bringing or introduction of various classes of thoroughbred cattle from foreign countries for breeding the same to the native cattle of these Islands. the Governor-General shall issue regulations and others to provide against a raising of the price of both fresh and refrigerated meat. by the express terms of the Act. it is now entitled: Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.improvement of the breed. 1922. It will be noted that the original Act was entitled: Bringing of diseased animal into Islands forbidden. bring or introduce live cattle into the Philippine Islands from any foreign country." as found in the title of the original Act. It will be noted that the word "diseased. with the approval of the head of the department. It was approved March 14. further. The Governor-General also may. together with the approval "of the head of the department. Standing alone that language would be construed as an express prohibition against bringing cattle of any kind into the Philippine Islands "from any foreign country. especially in view of the language used in the amended Act. by executive order. At the time of the approval of this Act. Such provision will not admit of any other construction. That is to say." and that they are of the kind which will improve the breed of the native cattle. and then in a limited quantity. 3052. Of course. thoroughbred cattle cannot be imported without the express consent and approval of the Director of Agriculture and the head of his department. with the approval of the head of the department first had and obtained. not to exceed five hundred head per annum. bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum: Provided. prior to authorizing its transfer to other provinces. bringing or introduction of which into the Islands is authorized by this Act. That all live cattle from foreign countries the importation. the shipper must obtain the consent of the Director of Agriculture. not to exceed five hundred head per annum: Provided. as amended by Act No. That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation. it must follow that any animal imported into the Philippine Islands must be brought here from a foreign country within the meaning of either Act. authorized the importation. Bearing those provisions and such construction in mind. which reads: It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to import. To my mind this is important. with the approval of the head of the department first had. To import such cattle. By those provisions the Director of Agriculture. however. and such as may be necessary for the improvement of the breed." The Act then says: The Director of Agriculture may. and then only for specific purposes. may authorize the importation of thoroughbred cattle for breeding purposes not to exceed five hundred head per annum. and the number must not exceed five hundred head per annum. the Act further says: .

and Act No. Prohibition against bringing of animals from infected foreign countries. That is to say. however. But the majority opinion holds that he is given that power and discretion under section 1770 of Act No. parts. or is a part of. and how and where would it be in force and effect? There would be nothing to which it could apply. or products from such place. But as to draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. and part of one and the same Act. when you amend or repeal section 1762. Section 1770 is absolutely dependent upon section 1762. or place and that there is danger of spreading such disease by the importation of domestic animals therefrom. Under the former provision of the Act thoroughbred cattle cannot be imported without the consent of the Director of Agriculture. and that the two Acts should be construed in pari materia. That is to say. 1922. That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation. 3052. under section 1770. and one is dependent upon the other. and four months after Act No. unless the importation thereof shall be authorized under the regulations of the Bureau of Agriculture. that section 1762 and section 1770 are both sections of a general Act. the Act expressly provides: That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation. bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. as it is. section 1762. which reads as follows: SEC." But as to draft cattle and bovine cattle. 3052. port. there is nothing left upon which section 1770 can operate or to which it would apply. you modify or repeal section 1770. and that when section 1762 is repealed. 3052 was enacted March 14. how then would section 1770 operate. 1922. That is to say. It will also be noted that the rules and regulation here sought to be enforced were promulgated in July. in so far as it applies to draft and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. that here you have rules and regulations of a subordinate department promulgated in July. and to what would it apply. — When the Department Head shall be general order that a dangerous communicable animal disease prevails in any foreign country. it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to ship or bring into the Philippine Islands any such animal.Provided. 3052 became a law. he "shall in all cases permit the importation. 1922. But it is contended that one is a special and the other a general law. Section 1762. in so far as it relates to. and that the Legislature enacted a law expressly repealing the whole section. 2711. 3052. and then only in a limited number. Both of them are sections of the same general law. "without the approval of the head of the department first had. as amended by Act No.net Section 1770 is entitled: Prohibition against bringing of animals from infected foreign countries. The construction overlooks the fact that the force and effect of section 1770 of Act No 2711 is founded upon section 1762. animal effects. and by doing so it repeals section 1770. in so far as it applies to draft and bovine cattle. 1922. and that Act No. without which it cannot be of any force or effect. hence. as to thoroughbred cattle. 1770. is entitled: . five years after section 1770 became a law." As to such cattle it is not a matter of his choice or discretion. For illustration: Suppose that section 1762 had never been amended by Act No. by Act No. he may or may not grant the permit. It will be noted that section 1770 was enacted in 1917. lawphil. that are in dire0ct conflict with an Act of the Legislature approved March. 3052 expressly repeals section 1762. and that both are sections of the same general Act.

volume IV. and must have been used with reference to its legal meaning. page 3438. That is the definition given to the word "importation" by both the Federal and the Supreme Courts of the United State. with an intent to land the goods there.]. ed.) lawphil. within the meaning of the tariff laws..net Applying this definition. Bidwell [U. 104. (United States vs. and the importation is complete before entry at the customhouse. wares. . 1028. Cas. as amended. it does not mean anything. Section 1762. 13 U. Again. harbor. its legal meaning. c.) Act Cong.. ports and harbors of the Philippine Islands. Perots vs. 3052 does not mean what it says.. by which Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. 26 Fed. were not subject to duty. but merely the bringing them into port. 681.S. although they were shipped before April 11th.. 677. 932. 19 Fed. it must be conceded that the Legislature of the Philippine Islands has no authority to make or enforce any law beyond its jurisdiction.S.S. and that it never intended to do so. etc." as used in the Act. and merchandise imported into the United States from and after the passage of the acts. United States. 1899. That is to say. If that part of Act No. July 1. 258. arriving at a port of entry of the United States from Philippine ports after its taking effect.Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.) An article is not imported from a foreign country. (Arnold vs. says: "The literal meaning of "importation" is to bring in with intent to land. Cas. and which took effect by the exchange of ratification and the president's proclamation on April 1. 112. It takes place when the vessel arrives at a port of entry. or haven. Flagler [U.) Importation is not the making entry of goods at the customhouse. recites: That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation. The Mary [U. It means a bringing into some port. which repealed the existing tariff duties on goods brought from those islands. Words and Phrases. 671.]. [9 Cranch]. Giving to the word "importation. Lyman [U. 54 Fed.. etc.S. and the importation is governed by the law in force at the time of such arrival. The word "importation" has a well-defined meaning. providing a double duty on all goods. but also within the limits of some port of entry. it is the express duty of the Director of Agriculture to permit the bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle with the ports and harbors of the Philippine Islands when they are brought here with intent to land. 120.]. intending there to discharge her cargo. the legislative Act says: That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation. (American Sugar Refining Co. 124 Fed.. and hence under the Treaty of Paris. 16 Fed. vs. Cas. 3 L. 369.]. S. means not only that there shall be an arrival within the limits of the United States and of a collection district. the goods. 367. 933. until it actually arrives at a port of entry of the United States. that in all cases it is the express duty of the Director of Agriculture to permit the bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum within the jurisdiction." (Kidd vs. 1812. United States. 1024.

it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to ship or bring into the Philippine Islands any such animal. may be allowed entrance into the Philippine Islands. in accordance with the provisions of section 1770 of Act No. it is hereby declared. 6. 1922. that rinderpest prevails in said countries. This order shall take effect on and after August 1. for which the importer before placing his order shall have obtained from the Director of Agriculture a written permit to import them from the above named countries. of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. and as there is danger of spreading such disease by the importation of cattle. The defendants rely upon Department Order No. You have an Act of the Legislature which says: "That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation. unless the importation thereof shall be authorized under the regulations of the Bureau of Agriculture. Hongkong and India. French Indo-China and British India. and then he may be allowed to import cattle into the Philippine Islands. the present regulations of the Bureau of Agriculture governing the importation of livestock from French Indo-China and Hongkong are hereby amended to the effect that the importation of livestock of the species named in the aforementioned Department Order is hereby prohibited from French Indo-China. 2. and pigs from French Indo-China. } } } . animals immunized against rinderpest. carabaos. or products from Hongkong. Hence. all of the material allegations of the complaint are admitted. 6. "unless the importation thereof shall be authorized under the regulations of the Bureau of Agriculture. series of 1922.As the majority opinion states. } Owing to the fact that a dangerous communicable disease known as rinderpest exist in Hongkong. The provisions of this order shall take effect on and after August 1. before placing his order in a foreign country. you have this situation. the case is submitted to the court on the demurrer of the defendants to the complaint. Hongkong and India." and where the important. Pursuant to the provisions of Department Order No." passed by the Legislature in March." and "that the importation of livestock of the species named in the aforementioned Department Order is hereby prohibited from French Indo-China. Re importation of cattle. 1. and you have rules and regulations of a subordinate department of the Government which absolutely prohibits the importation of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. as follows: ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 6. animal effects. Hence. 21. However. as follows: DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 2711 (Administrative Code of the Philippine Islands of 1917). } }Series of 1922. Hongkong and India. carabaos. 1922. parts. 21. shall obtain a written permit from the Director of Agriculture. 1922. and pigs therefrom. French Indo-China and British India. And Administrative Order No.

the former law is constructively repealed. but . And it can have no effect. Upon the question of where and how a statute is repealed. it includes a negative that it shall not be done otherwise. This is a formal and express grant of limited power to a depository which already had unlimited power. . Nor does it come within the rule that a subsequent affirmative statute does not repeal a previous one. nor be ascribed to any other purpose. In section 247 (vol." it would have said so. If it had been the purpose and intent of the Legislature to place any restrictions or limitations upon "the importation. the last need not be construed as repealing. J. . It is not a case of cumulative or additional power or right or remedy. "Where the later or revising statute clearly covers the whole subject-matter of antecedent acts. nor of a regrant of a pre-existing power to the same or a greater extent. thoroughbred cattle may be brought into the Islands in limited number for certain purposes. 250. the Legislature has said in express terms that the Director of Agriculture shall grant the permit in all cases. or with additional provisions. and displace by repeal whatever in the precedent law is inconsistent with it.The question is thus squarely presented whether the rules and regulations of a subordinate department can overthrow and destroy the express provisions of a legislative Act. Luckett (6 B." An affirmative enactment of a new rule implies a negative of whatever is not included. (Sec. the author says: . 146). But it is contended that. it repeals the prior act from which the larger power had been derived.) In the leading case of Gorham vs. Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction is a recognized as standard authority in all the courts.. notwithstanding Act No. The repugnancy being ascertained. Mon. therefore. An intention will not be ascribed to the law-making power to establish conflict and hostile systems upon the same subject. and subject the law to the reproach of uncertainly and unintelligibility. 249. and if by the language used a thing is limited to be done is a particular form or manner. section 1770 is not repealed and remains in full force and effect. and in terms which interpreted by themselves import a grant of all the power the grantee is intended to exercise. since it cannot be supposed that the law-making power intends to enact or continue in force laws which are contradictions. Such a result would render legislation a useless and idle ceremony. Marshall. the latter is held to be replaced by necessary implication. bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. I). 3052 expressly provides that with certain limitations and reservations. the later act or provision in date or position has full force. not only on the theory of intention. If certain provisions of two statutes are identical.. Subsequent legislation repeals previous inconsistent legislation whether it expressly declares such repeal or not. but because contradictions cannot stand together. but that of limiting the extent of the pre-existing power. or to leave in force provisions of law by which the later will of the legislature may be thwarted and overthrown. and with the consent and approval of the Director of Agriculture and the head of the department. says: This is not a case of the re-enactment of a former law in the same words. There are no such restriction or limitations for the bringing in or introduction of draft and bovine cattle. and it plainly appears to have been the purpose of the legislature to give expression in it to the whole law on the subject. 3052. Under that provision.) Where a later act grants to an officer or tribunal a part of a larger power already possessed. (Sec. It will be noted that Act No. as it did in the previous provision of the Act for the importation of thoroughbred cattle. In the nature of things it would be so. or is different. which can only apply where both statute can have effect.

The difficulty. the former law is constructively repealed. so far as it differs from them in its prescriptions. and a subsequent statute declare that a part of the same remedy or some of the same acts. and the provisions of either may be pursued. 3052 of the Legislature. So. the first and not the last act must yield. or other acts entirely different. there is no conflict between them. . and contains no express words or restriction or change. . . And as both cannot have full operation according to their terms and intent. and Act No.merely as continuing or re-affirming. If there be no such restriction in the first. The two sections are not only inconsistent. especially as to the promulgated rules and regulations. since it cannot be supposed that the law-making power intends to enact or continue in force laws which are contradictions. and the rules and regulations sought to be enforced are founded upon section 1770 and were promulgated about five months after Act No. 3052 in 1922. but granting an express and limited power. if a statute give a remedy. the first. Section 1770 was enacted in 1917. which are impossible of performance. But if a subsequent statute requires the same. . Both may stand together with full effect. here the latter act does not necessarily repeal the former. arises from the fact that a previous law had given to the same grantee unlimited power on the same subject. the necessary consequence is. That being ascertained. for which there might be various reasons. shall suffice for the accomplishment of the same object. and displaces by repeal whatever in the precedent law is inconsistent with it. . and defendants say that we will not grant the permit under any circumstances. The repugnancy being ascertained. As Lewis' Sutherland says: . The great object. it must prevail over any prior inconsistent intention to be deduced from a previous act. to ascertain the true interpretation of the last act. and also more than a former statute had made sufficient. 3052 became a law. or rather the embarrassment in the case. the later act or provision in date or position has full force. unless you comply with the rules and regulations that we have promulgated. or provide that certain acts shall be sufficient for the attainment or security of certain objects. The Legislature says that as to draft and bovine cattle. so far affect the construction of the last. or manifestly intends to regulate the whole subject to which it relates. which is inferior in authority so far as they conflict. But do not these circumstance indicate that it is to be construed as if it were the only act on the subject? Or shall the first act. . and that this twentieth section makes no reference to the previous law. And Subsequent legislation repeals previous inconsistent legislation whether it expressly declares such repeal or not. that the legislative intention thus decided from. the permit shall be granted in all cases. is framed as if it were the first and only act on the subject. except so far as it may be expressed or implied in the former that the end shall be attained by no other mode but that which it prescribes. In the nature of things it would be so. not only on the theory of intention. this is in effect a repeal of so much of the former statute as declares the sufficient of what it prescribes. five years later. therefore. but there is a direct conflict between them as to the importation of draft and bovine cattle. but because contradictions cannot stand together. then is. and are in direct conflict with Act No. as to deprive it of all effect? We say the last act must have effect according to its terms and its obvious intent. it necessary supersedes and repeals all former acts. And if the last act professes.

. bringing and introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. By the majority opinion all that portion of Act No. It is not for this court to legislate or to say whether or not Act No. they should be amended. 3052. and that in the absence of legislative authority. I vigorously dissent. J. the petitioner has brought itself squarely within those provisions and the Director of Agriculture has denied him the permit which the Legislature says he must grant. concur. In so far as there is a conflict. absolutely prohibit the importation of such cattle for any purpose. and the Legislature has the power to absolutely prohibited the importation of cattle into the Islands for any and all purposes. The majority opinion violates every canon of statutory construction.. 3052 should be construed as repealing section 1770. with all due respect to it. If not. J. 3052. you have this situation. Araullo." and the defendants have said that we will not comply with the legislative act. the plaintiff offers to comply with all the port. the defendants have no right or license to promulgate any rules and regulations for any purpose. But it is contended that they are not sufficient to prevent the spread of disease among the cattle. bringing and introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. Hence. That is not good law. 3052 became a law about five years after section 1770. which says "that the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation. In legal effect.It must be conceded that any authority of the defendants to promulgated rules and regulations must be found upon some legislative act. and has imposed upon it the performance of impossible rules and regulations as a condition precedent to the granting of the permit. For such reasons. in legal effect. Act No. and other and more strict quarantine regulations within the Philippine Islands should be adopted. . 3052 is a good law or a bad law. In its petition." Under the facts alleged. which rules and regulations. as to the importation of draft and bovine cattle. etc. which it did in Act No. the provisions of section 1770 must prevail over the provisions of Act No. to say the least. except as to certain limitations and provisions. C. knows as much about the cattle business in the Philippine Islands as do the members of this court. among which are "that in all cases the Director of Agriculture shall permit the importation. for the simple reason that Act No. Suffice it to say that it was enacted by the Legislative. harbor and quarantine rules and regulations of the Philippine Islands. that the Legislature in positive and express language has said that "the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation. we have a government of rules and regulations promulgated by a subordinate of the government which are in direct conflict with the legislative Act. you shall not import cattle until you comply with rules and regulations which we have made and promulgated. which. Under the majority opinion. 3052.. in so far as there is a conflict between them. it holds that. and Romualdez." becomes a nullity and is overruled by a subordinate branch of the Government.

Mapa. Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. At the arraignment on September 11.:p Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital). p. L-30061 February 27. The accused admitted that on September 5. Province of Batangas. 1964. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. without the requisite license or permit. 1 The complaint filed against the accused reads: That on or about 9:00 o'clock. custody and direct control a revolver Cal. Martinez for plaintiffappellee. Makasiar and Solicitor Antonio M. and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question. plaintiff-appellees. . he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint. although he had no license or permit. 1964. 889. 1964. Batangas. He. the above-named accused. unlawfully and feloniously keep in his possession. a person not authorized by law. No. however. the accused entered a plea of not guilty.. . 1974 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. after which trial was accordingly held. which raises in issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v. ANTONIO. vs. RG8 German Made with one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first securing the necessary permit or license to possess the same. he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander. Municipality of Batangas.22. with the accessories provided by law. finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment. did then and there wilfully. in the poblacion. claimed to be entitled to exoneration because.R. defendant-appellant.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G. J. Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant. Philippines. in Criminal Case No.m. JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN. the 5th day of September.

the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as claimed by him. As such Secret Agent. dated December 10.R. illegal cockfighting. 1964. cattle rustling. L-12088 dated December 23. His appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste. you will have the right to bear a firearm. and trusting that you will be an effective agent in the detection of crimes and in the preservation of peace and order in the province of Batangas.Indeed. reads: Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit. for use in connection with the performance of your duties. you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties by taking your oath of office and filing the original thereof with us. especially with respect to the suppression of trafficking in explosives. No. Very truly yours. 1959. In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in G. your duties shall be those generally of a peace officer and particularly to help in the preservation of peace and order in this province and to make reports thereon to me once or twice a month. By virtue hereof. loose firearms. (Sgd. the appointment to take effect immediately. It should be clearly understood that any abuse of authority on your part shall be considered sufficient ground for the automatic cancellation of your appointment and immediate separation from the service.22 On March 15. robbery and the detection of unlicensed firearms.) FELICI ANO LEVIST E Provinci al Govern or FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY: Kind: — ROHM-Revolver Make: — German SN: — 64 Cal:— . subversives and other similar subjects that might affect the peace and order condition in Batangas province. or as soon as you have qualified for the position. particularly described below. you are hereby appointed a SECRET AGENT of the undersigned. jueteng. wanted persons. the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas as Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities. and in connection with these duties he was temporarily authorized to . 1962.

while conceding on the basis of the evidence of record the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas. he had an appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of crimes. or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms. supra. and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964. . supra.) The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers. or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines]. and by implication. supra. and Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and detection of crimes. Macarandang (1959) and People v. nevertheless. "it shall be unlawful for any person to .22 RG-8 SN-64. supra. We therefore held that while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit. 3 The trial court. sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Revised Administrative Code. respectively. Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. 4. soldiers. with authority to hold and carry the said firearm and ammunition. 879.) The law cannot be any clearer. with authority to possess and carry the firearm described in the complaint. . as amended by Republic Act No. In Lucero. detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor. lieutenant governors. and guards of provincial prisoners and jails. guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons. The court considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent. No provision is made for a secret agent.. municipal police. provincial governors." are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties." (Sec. As such he is not exempt. People v. Lucero. the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to the accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the batallion commander to effect the capture of a Huk leader. In Macarandang. and People v. provincial treasurers. We held that under the circumstances of the case. that in Lucero. It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962." (Sec. 878. section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. for his personal protection while in the performance of his duties. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967... Revised Administrative Code. he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs.. Cal. possess any firearm. 1968. municipal mayors. Our decision in People v. nevertheless held the accused in its decision dated December 27. Lucero. We reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction against the accused because it was shown that at the time he was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition without license or permit. In Mapa.possess a ROHM revolver. The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent. The sole question in . parts of firearms. expressly abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang. . Lucero (1958). We sustained the judgment of conviction on the following ground: The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed. the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in People v. or ammunition. Mapa. municipal treasurers. Macarandang. Macarandang 2 and People vs. with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution. Mapa. sailors. the Philippine Constabulary.

. and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.this appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero. where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society. Certainly. or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General is of the first view. . Fernando.. took no part. since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate. JJ. with costs de oficio." The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes. Decisions of this Court. Zaldivar (Chairman). a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed. Fernandez and Aquino. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. It follows. concur. . and he accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed judgment. J. in a way. of the land. the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967. Barredo. although in themselves not laws. The doctrine laid down inLucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence. and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial court.. are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean. therefore. under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws. that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang andLucero. but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted. appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.. the new doctrine should be applied prospectively. hence of the law. WHEREFORE. appellant must be absolved. and appellant is acquitted.

. 1993. Antecedent Facts In a letter-complaint 2 dated November 10. No. By the nature of their functions. 1996. he would have reached the compulsory retirement age of 70 years on August 8. MTJ-95-1070 February 12. J.M. 1997 had death not intervened a few months ago on September 26. Notwithstanding his death. more reverend than plausible. as it may affect his retirement benefits. Above all things. 1 The eminent Francis Bacon wrote the foregoing exhortation some 400 years ago. TERESITA CANTERO SECUROM and GLICERIO CANTERO. and more advised than confident. Today. Judge Esmeraldo G. CANTERO. frailties. with gross misconduct for allegedly having committed bigamy and falsification of public documents. Human as they are. In the case before us.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION A. mistakes and even indiscretions. Cantero charged the respondent. it is still relevant and quotable. integrity is their portion and proper virtue. After an otherwise unblemished record. judges are revered as models of integrity. Cantero Sacurom and son Glicerio A. respondent Judge Esmeraldo G. complainants. respondent. JUDGE ESMERALDO G. competence and propriety. vs. magistrates do have their own weaknesses. 1997 MARIA APIAG. this Court still resolved to rule on this case. Cantero of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pinamungajan-Aloquinsan. Cantero was charged administratively in the twilight of his government service. however. Maria Apiag Cantero with her daughter Teresita A. PANGANIBAN. as a result of a failed love affair that happened some 46 years ago. Cebu. wisdom.: Judges ought to be more learned than witty. decorum.

and your two legitimate children by her.After receipt of the respondent's Comment. 1996. Maria Apiag. and then on October 29. Sacurom) and Glicerio. It appears that sometime in the 1950's for reasons known only to you. . 6 On September 21. Redentor G. . They would wish now that you do them right by living up to your duty as husband and father to them. the Court on February 5. 109 and 195 of the Civil Code) in relation to Art. complainants. they were ignored by defendant. According to the complainants: Sometime in August 11. defendant (should be respondent) and plaintiff (should be complainant) Maria Apiag. defendant left the conjugal home without any apparent cause. without having to resort to judicial recourse. and abandoned without any means of support your said wife and children. Thereafter. Plaintiffs suffered a lot after defendant abandoned them for no reason whatsoever. Southern Leyte. You will please consider this letter as a formal demand for maintenance and support for three of them. Southern Leyte. your wife and children. whom they named: Teresita A. referred this case 3 to Executive Judge Gualberto P. . 1953. the insurance (GSIS) and retirement laws. We hope this matter can be amicably settled among you. 1993. the Court referred this case also to the Office of the Court Administrator 5 for evaluation. Since then and up to now. joined together in holy matrimony in marriage after having lived together as husband and wife wherein they begot a daughter who was born on June 19. Cebu for investigation. Cantero was born. however. 68 and Art. Cantero. whereupon. Cebu Dear Judge Cantero: We are writing in behalf of your legal wife. defendant was never heard of and his whereabout unknown. they have not seen or heard from you. particularly that expressly provided under Art. you left your conjugal home at Hinundayan. 1947. wrote a letter to respondent as follows: Judge Esmeraldo Cantero Pinamungajan. 195 of the Family Code (Art. . 1947. Teresita (Mrs. through Arty. defendant surfaced at Hinundayan. and a request that they be properly instituted and named as your compulsory heirs and legal beneficiaries in all legal documents now on file and to be filed with the Supreme Court and other agencies or offices as may be required under applicable laws. For several years. plaintiffs begged for support. such as. The latter submitted his Report and Recommendation 4 dated July 26. report and recommendation. 203 of the same Code. 1996. Southern Leyte. Guyala. Glicerio A. and leaving the plaintiff Maria Apiag to raise the two children with her meager income as a public school teacher at Hinundayan. Few years ago. Thereafter. report and recommendation. Delgado of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City.

a Public School teacher from Tagao. . . without my consent freely given. Cantero — February 4. and the complainant (to) get married in the (sic) name. with whom he contracted a second marriage. complainants learned that respondent Judge had another family. GUYALA 7 The letter elicited no action or response from the respondent. Judge Cantero related that: . and duly signed by somebody. and then and there gave birth to a child. In their own words. named as follows with their date of births: Noralyn Y. now Mrs. Southern Leyte to attend party celebration of my sister's birthday from Iligan City. The truth of the matter is that defendant is married to plaintiff Maria Apiag with whom they have two legitimate children. Ygay have children of their own. . 001). Maria Apiag were still in their early age and in their second year high school days. 9 Furthermore. It was shocking to the senses that in all of the public documents required of defendant Judge Cantero to be filed with the Supreme Court such as his sworn statement of assets and liabilities. defendant misrepresented himself as being married to Nieves C. Cantero — April 29. and at my second year high school days. (SGD. sometime in the year 1947. but not to live together as husband. for the truth of the matter is that such alleged marriage was only dramatized at the instance of our parents just to shot (sic) their wishes and purposes on the matter. thereby forcing the respondent to appear in a marriage affair where all the pertinent marriage papers were all ready (sic) prepared (sic). . Cantero. the herein defendant and Nieves C. but vehemently deny the validity of its due execution. explained his side as follows: . 1977. . Pinamungajan. that after the said affair both respondent and the complainant immediately separated each other (sic) without living together as . Cantero — December 2. Cantero — May 19. Cantero — June 10. According to some documents obtained by plaintiffs. Teresita Sacurom. I was only called by my parents to go home to our town at Hinundayan. named Teresita Apiag. .Very truly yours. Cantero and Glicerio A. having (been) born out of wedlock on June 19.) That was 46 years ago when I was yet 20 years of age. wife for being close relatives. 1981. 1970. when both respondent and complainant. Erwin Y. Cebu. Ellen Y. 1979. namely: Teresita A. Onofre Y. 1947. As a matter of fact. without patently knowing I was made to appear (in) a certain drama marriage and we were forced to acknowledge our signatures appearing in the duly prepared marriage contract(. Subsequently. I admit the existence and form of Annex "A" of the said complaint. 1968. in his Comment. The plaintiffs later on learned that defendant has another wife by the name of Nieves C. and Desirie Vic Y. 8 The respondent Judge. they were engaged in a lovely affair which resulted to the pregnancy of the said complainant. . income tax returns and his insurance policy with the Government Service Insurance System. parents of both the respondent and the complainant came to an agreement to allow the respondent. Ygay. That in order to save name and shame.) REDENTOR G. one of the complainants. his personal data sheet (SC Form P. Ygay.

except this instant case. on October 3.000. 1947 and no other. From that time respondent and the complainant have never met each other nor having (sic) communicated (with) each other for the last 40 years. having been born on August 8. 10 Relevant portions of said compromise agreement which was executed sometime in March 1994 by Esmeraldo C. and intriguing. province of Cebu. respondent was appointed as CLAO lawyer. that in 1964. that is 35 years after the after the affair of 1947. respondent was appointed to the Judiciary as Municipal Circuit Trial Judge (MCTC) of the Municipalities of Pinamungajan and Aloguinsan. 1947. and that respondent had already given the said allowance for three consecutive months plus the amount of P5. that respondent as member of the Judiciary. that in the year 1982. honestly and judiciously without any complaint whatsoever. that this actuation is very suspicious. and wife even for a day. nor having established a conjugal home. faithfully. xxx xxx xxx That complainant Maria Apiag has been living together with another man during her public service as public school teacher and have begotten a child. complainant proceeded (sic) their complaint after the elapsed (sic) of three (3) years. has live-up (sic) to the standard required by the (sic) member (sic) of the bar and judiciary. and without knowledge of the respondent. having passed the bar examination in the year 1960. 1989.. stating among other things that respondent will give a monthly allowance to Terecita (sic) Sacurom in the (amount) of P4. that is 42 years from August 11. and to do so will be inconsistent with the stand of the respondent.husband. 1997.000. respondent was first connected in the government service as Comelec Registrar of the Commission on Elections. that this instant case (was) simply filed for money consideration as reflected in their letter of demand. that respondent is already 69 years old. of the Department of Justice. (t)hat as a matter of fact. assigned at Pinamungajan. 1927. and retirable by next year if God willing.) that is 16 years after the affair of 1947. that is 14 years after the affair of 1947. an elapsed (sic) of almost 42 years and knowing that respondent (is) retirable by next year. that the complainants are morally dishonest in filing the instant (case) just now.00 for their Attorney to withdraw the case. all the way. and eventually became member of the Philippine Bar. that respondent is (sic) already 32 years in the government service up to the present time with more than 6 years in the Judiciary. respondent and the complainant have already signed a compromised (sic) agreement. Cantero and Teresita C. that respondent continued his studies at Cebu City. and as such nothing is to be voided or nullified. Sacurom and witnessed by Maria Apiag and Leovegardo Sacurom are reproduced thus: . that the said marriage was void from the beginning. copy of which hereto (sic) attached as Annex "1". and finally. that respondent has served in the government service for the last 32 years.00 and the a complainant will withdraw their complaint from the Supreme Court. and that respondent stop (sic) the monthly allowance until such time the complainant will actually withdraw the instant case. name (sic) Manuel Apiag and respondent promised (sic) the Honorable Court to furnish a complete paper regarding this case in order to enlighten the Honorable (Court) that. now PAO. That respondent did not file any annullment (sic) or judicial declaration (of nullity) of the alleged marriage because it is the contention and honest belief. that the charges against the respondent were all based or rooted from the incedent (sic) that happened on August 11. Cebu(. he who seek (sic) justice must seek justice with cleab (sic) hand.

5. (c) That the Second party and his only brother will inherit the properties of the First party inherited from his parents. and TERESITA C.000. and the rest of it will be for the First Party. 1994 addressed to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) designating Teresita Cantero Sacurom and Glicerio Cantero as additional beneficiaries in his life insurance policy. and arrived at compromise agreement based on law of equity. monthly out of the second check salary of the First Party (The second half salary only). 12 . of legal age. That the parties have came (sic) to agreement to have the said case settled amicably in the interest of family unity and reconciliation. shall never be effective and enforceable unless the said case will be withdrawn and dismiss (sic) from the Supreme Court. married. the respondent wrote a letter dated 14 March. Filipino. after having duly swirn (sic) to in accordance with law do hereby depose and say: 1. in case of death. That this agreement is executed voluntarily. That it was also agreed that the above agreement. the Second Party will get ONE FOURTH (1/4) of the retirement that the First will receive from the GSIS. Philippines. That the First Party is presently a Municipal Circuit Trial Judge of PinamungajanAloguinsan. married. Caloocan City. is authorized to receive and collect P4. 2. CANTERO. and the Second Party must desist from further claining (sic) and filing civil abd (sic) criminal liabilities. (b) That the Second Party and his brother will be included as one of the beneficiaries of the First Party. and said dismissal be received by the First Party. Cebu. filipino. Ramos Street. is charged by Second Party for Misconduct before the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court now pending action. otherwise called as the FIRST PARTY. and with residence and postal address at Pinamungajan. as follows: (a) That both parties have agreed voluntarily. in good faith. and in the interest of good will and reconciliation and both parties is (sic) duty bound to follow faithfully and religiously. representing her brother.00. 3. That it was further voluntarily agreed that the Second Party will cause the withdrawal and the outright dismissal of the said pending case filed by her and her mother.That this COMPROMISE AGREEMENT is executed and entered into by ESMERALDO C. 11 In line with the foregoing. (d) That the Second Party. 4. also of legal age. and a residence (sic) of 133-A J. otherwise the above-agreement is void from the beginning. Cebu. representing her mother and her brother. SACUROM.

Delgado recommended in his report that: After a careful perusal of the evidence submitted by the parties. 1947 and have (sic) two (2) children with her. 14 The Office of the Court Administrator also submitted its report dismissal. Maria Apiag on August 11. is unavailing for having studied law and had become a member of the Bar in 1960. Extant from the records of the case and as admitted by respondent. considering his length of service in the government. he knows that the marriage cannot be dissolved without a judicial declaration of death. he was married to complainant Maria Apiag on August 11. 13 Report and Recommendation of Investigating Judge and Court Administrator Investigating Gualberto P. Respondent's second marriage with Nieves Ygay was therefore bigamous for it was contracted during the existence of a previous marriage. Respondent's contention that such marriage was in jest and assuming that it was valid. this Office finds respondent Guilty of the crime of Grave Misconduct (Bigamy and Falsification of Public Documents) however. The charge of Grave Misconduct is not applicable to him because assuming that he committed the offense. that there was no need for any judicial declaration. we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the investigating judge. The infraction he committed continued from the time he became a lawyer in 1960 to the time he was appointed as a judge in October 23. 1989.The Issues The respondent Judge formulated the following "issues": 1. as follows: 15 recommending respondent Judge's After a careful review of all the documents on file in this case. The charges have no basis in fact and in law. he was not yet a member of the judiciary. The crime of Bigamy and Falsification had already prescribed. 2. 3. much more. it has lost its validity on the ground that they never met again nor have communicated with each other for the last 40 years cannot be given a (sic) scant consideration. it is recommended that he be suspended for one (1) year without pay. 4. Respondent's argument that he was not yet a lawyer. We are likewise not persuaded by the assertion of the respondent that he cannot be held liable for misconduct on the ground that he was not yet a lawyer nor a judge when the act(s) complained of were committed. 1947 is void. That the first marriage with the complainant. The absence of his first wife complainant Maria Apiag for more than seven (7) years raise the presumption that she is already dead. 5. a member of the bench when he contracted his first marriage with the complainant. This is a continuing offense (an unlawful act performed .

it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual. it has been said at all times. rollo). instrumentality or agency of the government. "A judge's actuation of cohabiting with another when his marriage was still valid and subsisting — his wife having been allegedly absent for four years only — constitutes gross immoral conduct" (Abadilla vs. must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties . . . 243 SCRA 32-33). as a ground for administrative action. in view of the foregoing recommendation of the OCA which. Sworn Statement of Assets. . and falsification of public documents. Law Dictionary. . it is respectfully recommended that respondent judge be DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch. No position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Atienza vs. Aside from the admission. Income Tax Return (pp. Jr. or malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer. marrying for the second time without having first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." More specifically. Misconduct. ACCORDINGLY. Gross Misconduct Not Applicable The misconduct imputed by the complainants against the judge comprises the following: abandonment of his first wife and children. failing to give support. 249 SCRA 447).. respondent Judge died on September 27. it was shown with clarity in his Personal Data Sheet for Judges.. . this Court decided to resolve this case on the merits.continuously or over and over again. existed prior to his appointment as a . Robert E. "Misconduct in office has definite and well understood legal meaning. Judge. Tabiliran Jr. . 99-102. Liabilities and Networth. must behave with propriety at all times. . He can therefore be held liable for his misdeeds. As earlier indicated. A judge. the untenable line of defense by the respondent presupposes the imposition of an administrative sanction for the charges filed against him. his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with . . that he had committed a misrepresentation by stating therein that his spouse is Nieves Ygay and (had) eight (8) children (with her) which is far from (the) truth that his wife is Maria Apiag with whom he had two (2) children. would mean forfeiture of the death and retirement benefits of the respondent. in the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life. By uniform legal definition. In such cases. . has a specific meaning in law. began and continued when he was already in the judiciary. it is necessary to separate the character of man from the character of an officer. 1996 while this case was still being deliberated upon by this Court. if affirmed by this Court. It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. including government-owned and controlled corporations. These are judicial guidepost to (sic) self-evident to be overlooked. It is settled that misconduct. The Court's Ruling In spite of his death. misfeasance. . Rothenberg). Brilliantes. . While deceit employed by respondent. On the charge of falsification.

Ygay. immorality and falsification of public document. . . In the en banc case of Odayat vs. the act of the judge must have a direct relation to the performance of his official duties. the absence of a finding of criminal liability on his part does not preclude this Court from finding himadministratively liable for his indiscretion. . The complainant Odayat alleged among others ". attesting that . It is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer. . per current jurisprudence. ." In order to rebut the charge of immorality." This Court ruled that "Filomena Abella's marriage with the respondent was void ab initio under Article 80 [4] of the New Civil Code. the charge of falsification will not prosper either because it is based on a finding of guilt in the bigamy charge. . 1948. presented in evidence the certification (of the) . the present Chief justice defines misconduct as referring "to a transgression of some established and definite rule of action. Amante ". . an administrative proceeding against a judge of the court of first instance. Sempio-Diy and before the effectivity of the Family Code. otherwise. . . (t)o warrant disciplinary action. the respondent judge's belief in good faith that his first marriage was void shows his lack of malice in filling up these public documents. the Court emphasizes that "(t)he personal behavior of a judge. with oppression. However. the second marriage will also be void. 23 which must be appreciated in his favor. . Filomena Abella was married to one Eliseo Portales on February 16. with whom he begot many children. . the marriage of Judge Cantero to Nieves Ygay took place and all their children were born before the promulgation of Wiegel vs. even while his spouse Filomena Abella is still alive . "a marriage though void still needs . there must be 'reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules.in Buenaventura vs. because of her previous marriage with said Eliseo Ponales. For any of the aforementioned acts of Judge Cantero " . . 16 The acts imputed against respondent Judge Cantero clearly pertain to his personal life and have no direct relation to his judicial function. Benedicto. Personal Conduct of a Judge However. . more particularly unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. In deciding this case. pursuant to jurisprudence then prevailing. . 18 complainant charged Amante. and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages." 21 This was expressly provided under Article 40 22 of the Family Code. Therefore. Furthermore." That is to abide by the authoritative doctrine as set forth in the leading case of In re Horilleno. Neither do these misdeeds directly relate to the discharge of his official re-sponsibilities. the bigamy charge cannot stand. . Amante applies in favor of respondent. Hence. . He argued however that the first marriage was void and that there was no need to have the same judicially declared void. which would have merited disciplinary action from this Court had death not intervened. not only upon the bench but also in his everyday life." 19 Now. so too must the accusation of falsification fail. the doctrine in Odayat vs. that respondent is cohabiting with one Beatriz Jornada. Since. On the other hand. which requires that in order for serious misconduct to be shown. Respondent's contention is that his marriage with Filomena Abella was void ab initio. . Amante." 17 Nullity of Prior Marriage It is not disputed that respondent did not obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Maria Apiag prior to marrying Nieves C. Local Civil Registrar . a decision penned by Justice Malcolm. a judicial declaration of such fact" 20 before any party thereto "can marry again. should be above . a clerk of court. a valid defense in a charge of falsification of public document. as shown in the preceding discussion. said acts cannot be deemed misconduct much less gross misconduct in office.

This respondent should not be judged solely and finally by what took place some 46 years ago. The record also shows that he did not attend to the needs. should be beyond reproach. this case is hereby DISMISSED. it should not demolish completely what he built in his public life since then. he may commit a mistake. Thus. Narvasa. Other than this case. At one time or another. the Court also scrutinized the whole of respondent's record. Jr.. He may have committed an indiscretion in the past. we also cannot just gloss over the fact that he was remiss in attending to the needs of his children of his first marriage — children whose afiliation he did not deny. The conduct of the respondent judge in his personal life falls short of this standard because the record reveals he had two families. For the judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of restrictions thereon.' and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that '[a] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.'" 25 A Penalty of Suspension is Warranted Finally. we found no trace of wrongdoing in the discharge of his judicial functions from the time of his appointment up to the filing of this administrative case.J. He should maintain high ethical principles and sense of propriety without which he cannot presence the faith of the people in the judiciary. Melo and Francisco. such youthful mistake should not forever haunt him and should not totally destroy his career and render inutile his otherwise unblemished record. dismissal of the case is now in order. support and education of his children of his first marriage. this Court would have imposed a penalty. But having repented for it. and his personal behavior. Davide. However. so indispensable in an orderly society. . But we should not look only at his sin. JJ. premises considered. but also in his everyday life. Such is conduct unbecoming a trial magistrate." 24 It is against this standard that we must gauge the public and private life of Judge Cantero. which he has to observe faithfully as the price he has to pay for accepting and occupying an exalted position in the administration of justice. WHEREFORE. SO ORDERED. Considering his otherwise untarnished 32 years in government service.reproach and free from the appearance of impropriety. Man is not perfect. For these reasons. concur. He neglected them and refused to support them until they came up with this administrative charge. his genuine effort at restitution and his eventual triumph in the reformation of his life. For such conduct.. dismissal from service as recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator would be too harsh. Indeed.. But in view of his death prior to the promulgation of this Decision. and has to all appearances lived up to the stringent standards embodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct. 26 this Court is inclined to treat him with leniency. the late Judge Cantero "violated Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which mandates that '[a] judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety. We should also consider the man's sincerity in his repentance. Much less should it absolutely deprive him and/or his heirs of the rewards and fruits of his long and dedicated service in government. C. not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties.

.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. vs. J. .45. Judge Higinio B. In that case. brought up and presented here. Alejandro for appellant. 590. without special pronouncement as to costs. representing the income tax collected on his salary from January 1. Meer. Chan for appellees. 1950 to December 31. 590 unconstitutional.R. as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.744.1950. Meer. defendant-appellant. Macadaeg presiding.345. plaintiffs-appellees. supra. and to Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2. can justify and legalize the collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers. which are raised. We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and considering the proposition and the arguments pro and cons involved in the case of Perfecto vs. Office of the Solicitor General Juan R.: This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring section 13 of Republic Act No. S. Woodrought 307 U. involving as they do the same question of law. they were jointly submitted for determination in the lower court. 1950. MONTEMAYOR. We shall now confine our-selves to a discussion and determination of the remaining question of whether or not Republic Act No. as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals. and from October 20.1950 to October 19. No. particularly section 13. as Collector of Internal Revenue. 552. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO. 85 Phil. and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M. 1953 PASTOR M. that taxing the salary of a judicial officer in the Philippines is a diminution of such salary and so violates the Constitution. we have held despite the ruling enunciated by the United States Federal Supreme Court in the case of O 'Malley vs. 277. the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines. L-6355-56 August 31. Endencia the sum of P1. and so ordered the refund of said taxes. representing the income tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951. in a rather exhaustive and well considered decision found and held that under the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs..46. Liwag and Solicitor Jose P. Manuel O. Because of the similarity of the two cases. SATURNINO DAVID.

The Executive department is charged with the execution of carrying out of the provisions of said laws. it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law.According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue. We quote section 13 of Republic Act No. Meer. Thereafter. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax. because the collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries. As already stated construing and applying the above constitutional provision. 9. until they reach the age of seventy years. Republic Act No. Congress promulgated Republic Act No. Now comes the Legislature and in section 13. 590. To bring home his point. according to the Solicitor General. Article VIII. particularly section 9. specifically prohibited by the Constitution. we shall have to go back to the fundamental principles regarding separation of powers. has held that judicial officers are exempt from payment of income tax on their salaries. but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two. at least now to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers. was not received favorably by Congress. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not. 590: SEC 13. we are reproducing section 9. supra. So we have this situation. 590. specially a judicial officer. then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional. 1127 which became Republic Act No. because immediately after its promulgation. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise. Under our system of constitutional government. the Solicitor General reproduced what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. fifteen thousand pesos. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. 590. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior. not a decrease of his salary. our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Can the Legislature validly do this? May the Legislature lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official. which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. 590. and each Associate Justice. we held in the Perfecto case that judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries. They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law. if not to counteract the ruling in that decision. or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. says that "no salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic (naturally including a judicial officer) shall be considered as exempt from the income tax. Article VIII of our Constitution:. The Supreme Court in a decision interpreting the Constitution. because Congress did not favorably receive the decision in the Perfecto case. For purposes of reference. Congress enacted Republic Act No. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. payment of which is hereby declared not to be dimunition of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law. because the collection thereof by the Government was a decrease or diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office. the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos. a thing which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution. because if there is. . the Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact laws." and proceeds to declare that payment of said income tax is not a diminution of his compensation. after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise? To determine this question. SEC.

Jur. and.. emphasis supplied) The legislature cannot. the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.. (Bandy vs. as Chief Justice Marshall said. W. or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage. as a closely connected power. Jur. which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. Republic Act NO. otherwise. referring to the salaries of judicial officers. it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office.. Any other course would lead to the destruction of the Constitution. 714-715. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. (11 Am. 919. the Constitution. Considering the practical side thereof. If the Legislature may declare what a law means. Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. (11 Am. 44N. a final court determination of a case based on a judicial interpretation of the law of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative department. validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts. 2nd 341. Mickelson et al. this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a system. Jur. 590. but not to interpret them. (11 Am. 905. Jur. upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision. 914. so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. particularly those governing the separation of powers. By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13. 342.. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law." found in section 9. The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act.Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit or restrict the power granted to the courts by the Constitution. the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. the determination of whether laws and acts of the legislature are or are not contrary to the provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions. or what a specific portion of the Constitution means. besides being clearly violative of the fundamental. we believe that the collection of income tax on a salary is an actual and evident diminution thereof. Under the . Article VIII of the Constitution. emphasis supplied) We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws. That would be neither wise nor desirable. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere. principles of our constitutional system of government. So much for the constitutional aspect of the case.). This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing.) When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution. especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision. (11 Am. Since the question as to the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter. by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition. whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law.. the courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals.) Under the American system of constitutional government.. among the most important functions in trusted to the judiciary are the interpreting of Constitutions and.

was to fulfill his obligation and to exercise his privilege of paying his income tax on his salary. in other words.000 a year. The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial officers. twice a month. as interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court. that of the Supreme Court Justices is relatively insignificant. where the full amount of the income tax corresponding to his salary is computed in advance and divided into equal portions corresponding to the number of pay-days during the year and actually deducted from his salary corresponding to each payday. he should receive P1. All that the official who had previously received his full salary was called upon to do. Gore (253 U. S. 590. Such being its purpose. Let us take the case of Justice Endencia. limitations and pervading principles of the Constitution and to the administration of justice without respect to person and with equal concern for the poor and the rich. not only of this High Tribunal but of the other courts. His salary fixed by law was received by him in the amount of said tax comes from his other sources of income.255.old system where the in-come tax was paid at the end of the year or sometime thereafter. As Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. not restrictively. because the income tax is deducted therefrom every payday. and judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. it is to be construed. So. 245): The primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the judges. it would seem that one of the main reasons behind the enactment of the law was the feeling among certain legislators that members of the Supreme Court should not enjoy any exemption and that as citizens. commissioners of the Public Service Commission.45? Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection with House Bill No. the amount collected by the Collector of Internal Revenue on said salary is P1.685. like the President of the Republic.55. said official actually does not receive his salary in full. . and instead of receiving P12.. out of patriotism and love for their country. to attract good and competent men to the bench and to promote that independence of action and judgment which is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties. that is to say. about 107 Judges of First Instance. And further dividing it by two paydays will bring it down to P72. like the clause in respect of tenure. instead of receiving P500 every payday. In the present case. but.000 a year. he may not fully realize the fact that his salary had been decreased in the amount of said income tax. Is it not therefor clear that every payday. the members of the Commission on Elections.000 a month or P500 every payday. not as a private grant. his salary is fixed at p12. if Justice Endencia's salary as a judicial officer were not exempt from payment of the income tax. but was grounded on public policy. he would be receiving but P10. The exemption also extends to other constitutional officers. the decrease may not be so apparent and clear. that is to say. which became Republic Act No.744. he would be actually receiving P427. whose present membership number more than 990 judicial officials. including 15 Justices of the Court of Appeals. But under the present system of withholding the income tax at the source. 1127.45 for one year. his salary is actually decreased by P72. There are more than 990 other judicial officers enjoying the exemption. and possibly members of the Board of Tax Appeals. but in accord with its spirit and the principle on which it proceeds. but as a limitation imposed in the public interest.744. 38 Municipal Judges and about 830 Justices of the Peace. The reason behind the exemption in the Constitution. It might be stated in this connection that the exemption is not enjoyed by the members of the Supreme Court alone but also by all judicial officers including Justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of inferior courts. is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary.685 and every year is decreased by P1. Divided by twelve (months) we shall have P145. Compares to the number of all these officials. As said by Justice Van Devanter of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Evans vs.37 a month. they should pay income tax on their salaries.31 only. which is the income tax deducted form the collected on his salary each half month. — fifteenth and end of month. the Auditor General.

substantial and onerous. allowances earned by virtue of such services corresponding to the taxable years 1942 to 1945. remark or statement. as long as it is based on public policy or public interest. and being required to retire at seventy. Senators and Congressmen in making such statements during their sessions are extended immunity and exemption. especially when the great bulk thereof are justices of the peace. 35). felony and breach of the peace are exempt from arrest. the amount of national revenue to be derived from income tax on the salaries of judicial officers. While all other citizens are subject to arrest when charged with the commission of a crime. . VI. Persons. They are relatively more numerous. to secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. provided and secured by the fundamental law. Gore. supra. could not be large or substantial. this excemption to them is relatively of short duration. (Republic Act No. oral or written. In the same case of Evans vs. were if not for the constitutional exemption.Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the Philippines enjoying this exemption. the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise and necessary to exempt judicial officers from paying taxes on their salaries so as not to decrease their compensation. (Art. 360). for reasons of public policy and public interest. on the aver-age. and while all other citizens are generally liable for any speech. tending to cause the dishonor.000 for a married person and P600 for each dependent. National Internal Revenue Code as amended by Republic Act No. many of them receiving as low as P200 a month. are exempted from income tax. 22 [3]. around his sixtieth year. Under the same public policy and perhaps for the same it not higher considerations. and considering further the other exemptions allowed by the income tax law. not primarily for his benefit. and due to the high standards of experience. It is rather to the justices of the peace that the exemption can give more benefit. (Republic Act No. 29 (b) [4]. there are not a few citizens who enjoy this exemption. discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. but based on public interest. the Federal Supreme Court declared "that they (fathers of the Constitution) regarded the independence of the judges as far as greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries. When we come to the members of the Supreme Court. (Republic Act No. But even if it were otherwise. and because of the meager salary they receive. inclusive. he does not exactly ask for exemption from payment of income tax on his salary. natural and juridical. Because of the limited membership in this High Tribunal. Considering exemption in the abstract. In other words. members of the Senate and House of Representatives except in cases of treason. thereby insuring the independence of the Judiciary. such as P3. are exempt from taxes on their lands. even if they derive income therefrom. Payments or income received by any person residing in the Philippines under the laws of the United States administered by the United States Veterans Administration are exempt from taxation. When a judicial officer assumed office. And as to tax exemption.) Holders of government bonds are exempted from the payment of taxes on the income or interest they receive therefrom (sec. much less outweigh the purpose and the considerations that prompted the establishment of the constitutional exemption. 210). eleven. assuming that he does not die or become incapacitated earlier. one generally enters its portals and comes to join its membership quite late in life. The payment of wages and allowances of officers and enlisted men of the Army Forces of the Philippines sent to Korea are also exempted from taxation. naturally he is not in a position to receive the benefit of exemption for long. during their attendance in the session of the Legislature. buildings and improvements thereon when used exclusively for educational purposes. they can less afford to pay the income tax on it and its diminution by the amount of the income tax if paid would be real. Sec. Funds received by officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Army who served in the Armed Forces of the United States. as a privilege . practice and training required. it should not affect. 566). there is nothing unusual or abhorrent in it. It is already attached to his office. a citizen may justifiably by constitutional provision or statute be exempted from his ordinary obligation of paying taxes on his income.

J. and Labrador. supra. it being a transgression of the fundamental principle underlying the separation of powers. the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed.. and that in enacting a law. 590. No. PARAS. concurring and dissenting: I dissent for the same reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Pablo. 85 Phil. Reyes. in so far as it provides that taxing of the salary of a judicial officer shall be considered "not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law". Tuason.. the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition.In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. in which I concurred. concur. Meer. In this sense.. I wish however to state that I concur in the opinion of the majority to the effect that section 13. We further hold that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department. C. In the views of the foregoing considerations. Padilla. JJ. Republic Act No. in view of the part I had in that case as former Solicitor General. J. G. I am of the opinion that said section is null and void. Separate Opinions BAUTISTA ANGELO. Justice Ozaeta in Perfecto vs. 552. specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land. thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute. Bengzon. L-2314. But I disagree with the majority in ruling that no legislation may provide that it be held valid although against a provision of the Constitution. to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. . Meer. Meer. constitutes an invasion of the province and jurisdiction of the judiciary. R.. concurring: Without expressing any opinion on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. with no pronouncement as to costs.

Presiding Judge of Branch XIII. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children LINDA. DE VILLAR. FLORESCA and CARMEN S. Court of First Instance of Manila. all surnamed LANUZA. in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE. DE LANUZA. PEDRO S. LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. all surnamed Martinez. CELSO S. all surnamed VILLAR. in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors ROMULO and NESTOR S. RAYMUNDO. MORFE. DE OBRA. No. LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. ESTELA. ROMEO. respondents. in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDNA. FLORESCA. LORENZO. all surnamed OBRA. JR. all surnamed ISLA. in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDITHA. JR. ANTONIO JEAN and ELY. NESTOR and AURELIO. and ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO. Villaluna for respondents. SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. FLORESCA. MELBA S.. DIVINA. JULITA SALUD and DANILO. vs. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. ELIZABETH. and DANIEL MARTINEZ and TOMAS MARTINEZ.. FLORESCA. . DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. GEORGE and LARRY III. VENUS and FELIX. JESUS P. MARIA. Rodolfo C. FLORESCA. JUDITH S. JR.R. 1985 PERFECTO S. FLORESCA. petitioners. DE ISLA. in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE. Tito M. Pacampara for petitioners. EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. L-30642 April 30. FLORESCA.

254. mud and water. represented by the plaintiffs herein. the complaint alleges that Philex. notwithstanding the fact that up to then.00. Annex 'B' hereof.MAKASIAR. and the rest. were left mercilessly to their fate. five (5) were able to escape from the terrifying holocaust. but also failed completely to provide its men working underground the necessary security for the protection of their lives notwithstanding the fact that it had vast financial resources.394. entombed in the tunnels of the mine. Benguet on June 28. the underground workings.: This is a petition to review the order of the former Court of First Instance of Manila.117. Specifically. That for sometime prior and up to June 28. Portion of the complaint reads: xxx xxx xxx 9. 21 in number.220. in a matter of approximately five (5) minutes. while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba. on the said date. with gross and reckless negligence and imprudence and deliberate failure to take the required precautions for the due protection of the lives of its men working underground at the time. approximately 500. a total operating income of P 38.00. including those named in the next preceding paragraph. 22 were rescued within the next 7 days. but were not rescued due to defendant PHILEX's decision to abandon rescue operations. That defendant PHILEX not only violated the law and the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the duly constituted authorities as set out by the Special Committee above referred to. ripped timber supports and carried off materials. in utter disregard of its bounden legal and moral duties in the premises. thereby trapping within its tunnels of all its men above referred to. as per its . during the year 1966 alone. with the result that. Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex). allowed great amount of water and mud to accumulate in an open pit area at the mine above Block 43-S-1 which seeped through and saturated the 600 ft. J. after taxes of P19. or net earnings. it having made. dated December 16. died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon. machines and equipment which blocked all avenues of exit. in their Report of investigation. xxx xxx xxx 13. negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working underground. with the collapse of all underground supports due to such enormous pressure. 1967. 10. the defendant PHILEX. in violation of government rules and regulations. and in utter violation of the laws and the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the Government pursuant thereto. That out of the 48 mine workers who were then working at defendant PHILEX's mine on the said date.1967. 1968 dismissing petitioners' complaint for damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.000 cubic feet of broken ores rocks. including those referred to in paragraph 7 hereinabove. a great many of them were still alive. blasted through the tunnels and flowed out and filled in. thereby exerting tremendous pressure on the working spaces at its 4300 level. who. accompanied by surface boulders. pages 7-13. Branch XIII. column of broken ore and rock below it.

is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.00 as of December 31. .existing contractual relation between the parties. 1968. irrespective of whether or not the employer was negligent. Philex moved to reconsider the aforesaid order which was opposed by petitioners. respondent Judge. 1968 to the said motion to dismiss claiming that the causes of action are not based on the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but on the provisions of the Civil Code allowing the award of actual. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another.103. pay additional compensation equal to 50% of the compensation fixed in the Act. 2178. 1966. Art. moral and exemplary damages. 1968. and with aggregate assets totalling P 45. if there is no pre. on September 23. On petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said order. Art. malice or wanton attitude. x x x x x x x x x In case of fraud. 1968 and allowed Philex to file an answer to the complaint. there being fault or negligence. 1968 dismissing the case on the ground that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. 42-44. (b) Art. the Workmen's Compensation Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over damage or compensation claims for work-connected deaths or injuries of workmen or employees.) A motion to dismiss dated May 14. respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and ruled that in accordance with the established jurisprudence. the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201.llth Annual Report for the year ended December 31. When negligence shows bad faith. paragraph 2 shall apply. Art. as amended by RA 772) and that the former Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the case. pursuant to Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Such fault or negligence. 2231. 2176. particularly: Art. Petitioners filed an opposition dated May 27. reconsidered and set aside his order of June 27. bad faith. is obliged to pay for the damage done. After a reply and a rejoinder thereto were filed. exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. respondent Judge issued an order dated June 27. the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.794. 1173—The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons. the employer shall. rec. 2201. of the time and of the place. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasidelict. xxx xxx xxx (pp. 1968 was filed by Philex alleging that the causes of action of petitioners based on an industrial accident are covered by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428. adding that if the employer's negligence results in work-connected deaths or injuries. On December 16. In quasi-delicts. 1966.

.Petitioners thus filed the present petition.—The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee. 2201 and 2231. Philex asserts that work-connected injuries are compensable exclusively under the provisions of Sections 5 and 46 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. In the second assignment of error.. subject to appeal to the Supreme Court. . Philex cites the case of Manalo vs. II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE AND CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT. SEC. 1173. 2178. Jurisdiction. dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury .. the allegations in their complaint including those contained in the annexes are deemed admitted. They also assert that since Philex opted to file a motion to dismiss in the court a quo. petitioners raised the following assignment of errors: I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFS. petitioners asseverate that respondent Judge failed to see the distinction between the claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the claims for damages based on gross negligence of Philex under the Civil Code. while the claim for damages under the Civil Code which petitioners pursued in the regular court.PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. In their brief. without regard to the fault or negligence of the employer. On the other hand. Exclusive right to compensation. They point out that the complaint alleges gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take the necessary security for the protection of the lives of its employees working underground. disability or death of the working man through industrial accident or disease. refers to the employer's liability for reckless and wanton negligence resulting in the death of the employees and for which the regular court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the same. 46.. which read: SEC. his personal representatives. They point out that workmen's compensation refers to liability for compensation for loss resulting from injury. 855 [1956]) where it was held that "all claims of workmen against their employer for damages due to accident suffered in the course of . particularly Articles 2176. Foster Wheeler (98 Phil. A In the first assignment of error. 5. petitioners argue that the lower court has jurisdiction over the cause of action since the complaint is based on the provisions of the Civil Code on damages.— The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. and not on the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

and vice versa. collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts. it points out that Philex voluntarily paid the compensation due the petitioners and all the payments have been accepted in behalf of the deceased miners. while Atty. In the resolution of September 7. submitted their respective memoranda. WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the case. now President of the University of the Philippines. The issue to be resolved as WE stated in the resolution of November 26. He submits that the remedy of an injured employee for work-connected injury or accident is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. In the hearing of this case. moral and/or exemplary) from the employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of the employer or of his other employees or whether they may avail cumulatively of both actions. He opines that the heirs of the employee in case of his death have a right of choice to avail themselves of the benefits provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or to sue in the regular court under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by virtue of negligence of the latter. Philex maintains that the fact that an employer was negligent. except the heirs of Nazarito Floresca who insisted that they are entitled to a greater amount of damages under the Civil Code. then Undersecretary of Labor Israel Bocobo. as corporate counsel and Assistant General Manager of the GSIS Legal Affairs Department. Bocobo's stand is the same as that of Atty. Edgardo Angara. 1978.employment shall be investigated and adjudicated by the Workmen's Compensation Commission. 1976. There are divergent opinions in this case. they are no longer entitled to avail themselves of the remedy provided for under the Civil Code by filing an action for higher damages in the regular court. it appearing that there are other petitioners in this case. because Section 4-A of the Act provides an additional compensation in case the employer fails to comply with the requirements of safety as imposed by law to prevent accidents. appeared as amici curiae and thereafter. Justice Lazaro is of the opinion that an injured employee or worker. then Atty. 1978. and Commissioner on Elections. i. On August 3. whether his or his heirs' action is exclusively restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or whether they have a right of selection or choice of action between availing of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual. or the heirs in case of his death. Angara believes otherwise. Bacungan's position is that the action is selective. Atty. Atty. is: Whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of his death under the Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive. Bacungan and adds that once the heirs elect the remedy provided for under the Act.e. does not remove the case from the exclusive character of recoveries under the Workmen's Compensation Act. selective or cumulative. may initiate a complaint to recover damages (not compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act) with the regular court on the basis of negligence of an employer pursuant to the Civil Code provisions. Justice Manuel Lazaro. that is to say.. WE dismissed the petition only insofar as the aforesaid petitioners are connected. petitioners-heirs of deceased employee Nazarito Floresca filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that they have amicably settled their claim with respondent Philex." subject to appeal to the Supreme Court. In fact. . formerly UP Law Center Director Froilan Bacungan.

While under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 36). payments under the acts being made as compensation and not as damages (99 C. even if the death or injury is not due to the fault of the employer (Murillo vs. Co. 53). It is the indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained injury either in his person. 689).S. malice or wanton attitude. there exists between Philex and the deceased employees a contractual relationship. The provisions of the Civil Code on cases of breach of contract when there is fraud or bad faith.00) pesos. 100). bad faith.S. through the act or default of another (25 C. In the present case. The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act differs from that in giving damages under the Civil Code. In fact. In cases of fraud. constitute a breach of contract for which it may be held liable for damages. Civil Code. the test is the averments or allegations in the complaint (Belandres vs. there is a presumption in favor of the deceased or injured . sickness or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated. Compensation is given to mitigate the harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the workman and his family. 452). The alleged gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure that amount to bad faith on the part of Philex. In other words. no allegation appeared in the complaint that the employees died from accident arising out of and in the course of their employments. the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is able shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation. Articles 2216 et seq. 2232. Mendoza.. Furthermore. Petitioners did not invoke the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle them to compensation thereunder. property or relative rights.J. Recovery under the Act is not based on any theory of actionable wrong on the part of the employer (99 C. Lopez Sugar Mill. Inc. an employer is liable whether negligence exists or not since liability is created by law. 97 Phil.J. oppressive or malevolent manner.S. On the other hand. allow the payment of all kinds of damages. The compensation acts are based on a theory of compensation distinct from the existing theories of damages.J. as assessed by the court. reckless. damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the wrongful invasion of his rights. 66 Phil. read: Art. as long as the death. 2201. Hence. the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton. The complaint instead alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the part of Philex to protect the lives of its workers as a consequence of which a cave-in occurred resulting in the death of the employees working underground. under the compensation acts.. fraudulent. the employer is liable to pay compensation benefits for loss of income. In contracts and quasi-contracts.. and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. exemplary and moral) in the total amount of eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825. The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden of proving the causal relation between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury as well as the damages suffered. the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation. Art. In contracts and quasi-contracts.It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the Workmen's Compensation Act but a complaint for damages (actual. Settled is the rule that in ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of workmen's compensation claim or a claim for damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code.000.

pointed out that the injured worker has the choice of remedies but cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and thus balanced the relative advantage of recourse under the Workmen's Compensation Act as against an ordinary action. 93 SCRA 551. depends on breach of contract or tort. Workmen's Compensation Act).e. Under the Civil Code. the Workmen's Compensation Act did not contain any provision for an award of actual. and an additional compensation of only 50% if the complaint alleges failure on the part of the employer to "install and maintain safety appliances or to take other precautions for the prevention of accident or occupational disease" (Section 4-A.employee that the death or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated. because he has elected to seek compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law. moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions. now Employees Compensation Commission.00) pesos plus burial expenses of two hundred (P200. Cebu Autobus Company. In disposing of a similar issue. As applied to this case. Ibid. and the employer has the burden to prove otherwise (De los Angeles vs. Mr. is strengthened by the fact that unlike in the Civil Code. and his claim (case No. Carino vs. Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp.L. vs. The Workmen's Compensation Act was specifically enacted to afford protection to the employees or workmen. GSIS. Justice J.000. moral and exemplary damages. 44549 of the Compensation Commission) was being processed at the time he filed this action in the Court of First Instance. 60 SCRA 228). collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.party tortfeasors in the regular courts. 94 SCRA 308. the amount sought to be recovered is over and above that which was provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act and which cannot be granted by the Commission. 32 SCRA 442.B. 12 and 13. under the Workmen's Compensation Act. In the case at bar. Moreover. this Court in Pacana vs. the liability of the employer.00) pesos. again speaking for the Court. 54 SCRA 379). involving the application of Section 6 of the Workmen's Compensation Act on the injured workers' right to sue third. WCC. It is a social legislation designed to give relief to the workman who has been the victim of an accident causing his death or ailment or injury in the pursuit of his employment (Abong vs. The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the Workmen's Compensation Commission then. WCC. petitioner Esguerra cannot maintain his action for damages against the respondents (defendants below). WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual. i. WCC. It is argued for petitioner that as the .).. compensation benefits should be paid to an employee who suffered an accident not due to the facilities or lack of facilities in the industry of his employer but caused by factors outside the industrial plant of his employer. In Pacaña WE said: In the analogous case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma. Reyes. What the Act provided was merely the right of the heirs to claim limited compensation for the death in the amount of six thousand (P6. ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. and medical expenses when incurred (Sections 8.

582). issues that are apt to be troublesome to establish satisfactorily. such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. said rule should likewise apply to the employer-tortfeasor. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. Anyway. that the heirs of the deceased employees.damages recoverable under the Civil Code are much more extensive than the amounts that may be awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 76. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. and of having to establish the extent of the damage suffered. 121-122. Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. namely Emerito Obra. should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court. However. Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss dated May 27.).) in the lower court. by derivative action against the alleged tortfeasors. 1968 (pp.. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full as of August 25. 1967. 1978 in view of the amicable settlement reached by Philex and the said heirs. and of its negligence. petitioner is precluded from pursuing the alternate course. it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14. B . to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages. applies to third-party tortfeasor. at least until the prior claim is rejected by the Compensation Commission. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex. With regard to the other petitioners. Having staked his fortunes on a particular remedy. as already stated. but they set up the defense that the claims were filed under the Workmen's Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of the committee created to investigate the accident which established the criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex. Larry Villar. 1968 before the court a quo. the payments made under the Workmen's Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor. they would not have sought redress under the Workmen's Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. Jr. Insofar as the heirs of Nazarito Floresca are concerned. the petition has been dismissed in the resolution of September 7. rec. rec. they should not be deemed incompatible. a sum greater than the compensation he may have paid the herein petitioner. except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid in installments (pp. the excess accrues to the latter. Aurelio Lanuza. WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act. rec.). if the employer Franklin Baker Company recovers. Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino Martinez submitted notices and claims for compensation to the Regional Office No. under the proviso of Section 6 aforequoted. While perhaps not as profitable. the smaller indemnity obtainable by the first course is balanced by the claimant's being relieved of the burden of proving the causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury. 1967 only (p. and which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to the then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19. 106-107. As already indicated. the injured laborer was initially free to choose either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Compensation Law or else.

and 9 of Article 11 of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of the 1973 Constitution. employment.A.. To emphasize.. just and humane conditions of work"(Sec.. a subsequent law. 2216. and security of all the people ". 6. with characteristic eloquence. Barnette. 1173. ". housing. Justice Robert Jackson in the case of West Virginia State Board of Education vs. and regulate the relations between workers and employers.. 2177. Mr. afford protection to labor. and between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. which took effect on August 30. 1950. 7. race or creed. and now by Sections 6.. and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits "establish.. enunciated: . The guarantees of social justice embodied in Sections 6.Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion. which obey the constitutional mandates of social justice enhancing as they do the rights of the workers as against their employers. maintain and ensure adequate social services in. as amended. security of tenure. the 1935 Constitution declares that: Sec. The Court merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by Section 5 of Article 11 and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution. 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950. 772 on June 20. 1952). the field of education.. 3. Article 173 of the New Labor Code seems to diminish the rights of the workers and therefore collides with the social justice guarantee of the Constitution and the liberal provisions of the New Civil Code. and just and humane conditions of work. and shall regulate the relations between landowner and tenant. ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex. The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the State (Art. the Court does not legislate in the instant case. 2178. health.. 9. Art. The State shall afford protection to labor. II). (emphasis supplied). 7 and 9 of Article II of the 1973 Constitution are statements of legal principles to be applied and enforced by the courts. Declaration of basic policy. Art. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration (Art. and as implemented by Articles 2176. predecessor of Article 173 of the New Labor Code. emphasis supplied). II.. promote full employment. XIV). Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (before it was amended by R. The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the State to "promote social justice to insure the dignity. II. 1973 Constitution. welfare and social security to guarantee the enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living" (Sections 6 and 7. No.. thus: Art. and regulate the relations between workers and employers . Sec. and minors.. has been superseded by the aforestated provisions of the New Civil Code.. 5. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization. 1973 Constitution). The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of labor institutionalized in Section 9 of Article 11 of the 1973 Constitution and re-stated as a declaration of basic policy in Article 3 of the New Labor Code. welfare. especially to working women.. . 2201.—The State shall afford protection to labor. collective bargaining. The aforestated constitutional principles as implemented by the aforementioned articles of the New Civil Code cannot be impliedly repealed by the restrictive provisions of Article 173 of the New Labor Code. regulate the use . and assure the rights of workers to .

Exclusive right to compensation.The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee.. dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws. because of said injury (emphasis supplied). liberty. and all service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section shall be presumed to include such agreement. dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws. a free press. and property. it is presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply .. " More specifically. 625. 1974. Article 4 of the New Labor Code. promulgated on May 1. Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws. One's right to life. Employers contracting laborecsrs in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same may stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment. Only the second paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act No. shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Art. thus: Sec. his personal representatives. Labor Code). including its implementing rules and regulations. "In case of doubt. freedom of worship and assembly.S. because of said injury. both the New Labor Code and the Civil Code direct that the doubts should be resolved in favor of the workers and employees. and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote. as amended. 1952. but which took effect six months thereafter. In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173 of the New Labor Code. 5. to free speech. Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. was amended by Commonwealth Act No. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provided: Sec. 772 on June 20. 2. his personal representatives.The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee. all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer. 1638. to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. provides that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code. 3428. they depend on the outcome of no elections (319 U. 638." Before it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 442. 87 L. emphasis supplied). Thus. 5. Exclusive right to compensation. 1952.The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy. 772 on June 20.ed.

decisions of the Supreme Court form part of the law of the land. Article 173 of the New Labor Code expressly repealed only Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code. R.. R. Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one.to injuries received outside the Island through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment. The application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of . The Court. as amended. which defines the "System" as referring to the Government Service Insurance System or the Social Security System (Art. 4864. Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred eighty. C. although in themselves not laws. No. because said Article 173 provides: Art. 1161. Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not even remotely. through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro. is not barred by Article 173 of the New Labor Code.A. It is patent. repeal the New Civil Code provisions heretofore quoted. his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. therefore. R. As above-quoted. Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred ten. And the damages recoverable under the New Civil Code are not administered by the System provided for by the New Labor Code. The payment of compensation under this Title shall bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code. Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred Sixty-four. in People vs. 186.six.A. and other laws whose benefits are administered by the System during the period of such payment for the same disability or death. should such law be more favorable to them (As amended by section 5 of Republic Act No. No. Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal expressly nor impliedly the applicable provisions of the New Civil Code. No. These decisions. 772). as amended.A. the liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee. much less expressly. that recovery under the New Civil Code for damages arising from negligence. No. 8. Furthermore. Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides: Art. 167 [c]. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. constitute evidence of what the laws mean. as amended. Exclusiveness of liability. 173. [d] and [e] of the New Labor Code). Unlike Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as aforequoted. as amended. under Article 8 of the New Civil Code.A. and conversely (emphasis supplied). Licera ruled: Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. as amended.Unless otherwise provided. Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs. as amended. as amended. 610. as amended. and all other laws whose benefits are administered by the System (referring to the GSIS or SSS).

limited the right of recovery in favor of the deceased. The aforequoted provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect" (65 SCRA 270. Said Pacana case was concurred in by Justices J. Dizon. and does not even refer. but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. Valencia and Esguerra aforementioned as the doctrine in the aforesaid three (3) cases is faithful to and advances the social justice guarantees enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. . applied Article 1711 of the Civil Code as against the Workmen's Compensation Act. is not an exercise of the power of law-making. Fernando and Villamor. as implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code. 763). 7 and 9 of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of Article II of the 1973 Constitution. and now Sections 6. 1952. To relieve the employer from liability for the death of his workers arising from his gross or wanton fault or failure to provide safety devices for the protection of his employees or workers against the dangers which are inherent in underground mining. Cebu Autobus Company (32 SCRA 442) when WE ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amount set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for greater damages. 18 SCRA 247.B.L. Manila Yacht Club (28 SCRA 724. It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution. nor in the various state constitutions of the American Union.B. Even from the moral viewpoint alone. Reyes. is to deprive the deceased worker and his heirs of the right to recover indemnity for the loss of the life of the worker and the consequent loss to his family without due process of law. limb and health of his worker. before and after it was amended by Commonwealth Act No.L. especially Article 1711 of the New Civil Code. Palomer. both penned by Justice J. with greater reason said Article 173 must be subject to the same interpretation adopted in the cases of Pacana. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 272-273 [1975]). It should be stressed likewise that there is no similar provision on social justice in the American Federal Constitution. but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation aforementioned. the restrictive nature of the American decisions on the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot limit the range and compass of OUR interpretation of our own laws. June 30. Reyes. to the Civil Code as Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act did. The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the property rights of the employer. The right to life is guaranteed specifically by the due process clause of the Constitution. such attitude is un-Christian. as amended. Zaldivar.1969) and the 1958 case of Esguerra vs. Said Section 5 was not accorded controlling application by the Supreme Court in the 1970 case of Pacana vs. reiterating the 1969 ruling in the case of Valencia vs. WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself (Caltex vs. Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor Code is merely a re-statement of the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Makalintal. 772 on June 20. in relation to Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution then. Castro. vis-a-vis Article 173 of the New Labor Code. neither expressly nor impliedly. 124 Phil. Consequently. The dissent in effect condones and therefore encourages such gross or wanton neglect on the part of the employer to comply with his legal obligation to provide safety measures for the protection of the life. ailing or injured employee to the compensation provided for therein. 582). Said Pacana case penned by Mr. Justice Teehankee.

Those who profess to be Christians should not adhere to Cain's selfish affirmation that he is not his brother's keeper. obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. which provides that "No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence. which has been discarded soon after the close of the 18th century due to the Industrial Revolution that generated the machines and other mechanical devices (beginning with Eli Whitney's cotton gin of 1793 and Robert Fulton's steamboat of 1807) for production and transportation which are dangerous to life. But about two centuries before Article 9 of the New Civil Code. . "the letter of the law killeth.The Court. even the legislator himself. because the decision derisively refers to the lowly worker as "servant" and utilizes with aristocratic arrogance "master" for "employer. because the mind of the legislator. the founding fathers of the American Constitution foresaw and recognized the eventuality that the courts may have to legislate to supply the omissions or to clarify the ambiguities in the American Constitution and the statutes. in the language of Justice Holmes. Vol. Fowler (3 MN 1. 93. like all human beings. to repeat. its spirit giveth life." This is the very selfish doctrine that provoked the American Civil War which generated so much hatred and drew so much precious blood on American plains and valleys from 1861 to 1864. the court. " Hence. is not legislating in the instant case." It robs man of his inherent dignity and dehumanizes him. 1964). Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and Article 173 of the New Labor Code are retrogressive. through Article 9 of the New Civil Code. To assert otherwise is to be as atavistic and ante-deluvian as the 1837 case of Prisley vs. No man is an island. The Prisley case was decided in 1837 during the era of economic royalists and robber barons of America. each one of us is our brother's keeper. Alexander Hamilton pragmatically admits that judicial legislation may be justified but denies that the power of the Judiciary to nullify statutes may give rise to Judicial tyranny (The Federalist. thus: "The mere relation of the master and the servant never can imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do himself. unfeeling capitalistics and egoistic reactionaries continue to pay obeisance to such un-Christian doctrine. 21. The spirit of the law insures man's survival and ennobles him. 'Thus. Only ruthless. WE only have to restate the quotation from Prisley. "do and must legislate" to fill in the gaps in the law. The old socio-political-economic philosophy of live-and-let-live is now superdesed by the benign Christian shibboleth of live-and-help others to live. "Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. recognizes that in certain instances. The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and of Article 173 of the New Labor Code subvert the rights of the petitioners as surviving heirs of the deceased mining employees. limb and health.150 reprint 1030) invoked by the dissent. In this our civilization. is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply Nor has the human mind the infinite capacity to anticipate all situations. because they are a throwback to the obsolete laissez-faire doctrine of Adam Smith enunciated in 1776 in his treatise Wealth of Nations (Collier's Encyclopedia. To stress this affront to human dignity." C It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that the courts cannot legislate. p. The Prisley rule humiliates man and debases him. It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can override a constitutional provision. That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code. In the words of Shakespeare.

Madison I Cranch 127 1803). and every slip was fatal" (Wood vs. into the inert pages of the Constitution and all statute books. Finally. even if the employer has faithfully and diligently furnished all the safety measures and contrivances decreed by the law to protect the employee. "the courts breathe life. 1937).. 1 Dissenting Opinion. Jensen. 1907. 1937 ed.Modern Library. Common Law and Legislation 21 Harvard Law Review 383.ed. pp. without any fault on the part of the employers. Chief Justice Marshall pronounced: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial department to say what the law is (Marbury vs. 503-511. ailment or injury is work-connected. The written word is no longer the "sovereign talisman. And in the subsequent case of Springer vs. He fills the open spaces in the law. although with a cautionary undertone: "that judges do and must legislate. Justice Holmes delivered the coup de grace when he pragmatically admitted. The Nature of the Judicial Process 100). "The only limit to the judicial legislation is the restraint of the judge" (U. 845." It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act or Article 173 of the New Labor Code is limited to death. Justice Cardozo. Government (277 US 188. which view is also entertained by Justice Frankfurter and Justice Robert Jackson. 1949 335 US 538). Butler 297 U. Justice Holmes pronounced: The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. or Article 173 of the New Labor Code. Cardozo. "the law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman. p. vs. It is correctly termed no fault liability. Many of the great expounders of the American Constitution likewise share the same view." In the epigrammatic language of Mr. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. but they can do so only interstitially they are confined from molar to molecular motions" (Southern Pacific Company vs. This was reiterated by Justice Cardozo who pronounced that "No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. xxx xxx xxx . Under either Section 5 or Article 173. He legislates only between gaps. " (The Nature of the Judicial Process.L. 210-212. . limb and health of the workers.F. feeble or strong. In the rhetoric of Justice Frankfurter. In the language of Chief Justice Harlan F. 72 L. Thomas Jefferson went farther to concede that the court is even independent of the Nation itself (A. Precedents established in those items exert an unhappy influence even now" (citing Pound. x x x. which was re-stated by Chief Justice Hughes when he said that "the Constitution is what the judge says it is (Address on May 3.S.. Duff Gordon 222 NW 88. as amended.). 113). p. Stone. ailment or injury caused by the nature of the work. To make a rule of conduct applicable to an individual who but for such action would be free from it is to legislate yet it is what the judges do whenever they determine which of two competing principles of policy shall prevail. vs. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. the employer remains liable to pay compensation benefits to the employee whose death. American Sash Company.S. Justice Cardozo warned that: "Sometimes the conservatism of judges has threatened for an interval to rob the legislation of its efficacy. 244 US 204 1917). does not cover the tortious liability of the employer occasioned by his fault or culpable negligence in failing to provide the safety devices required by the law for the protection of the life. 387). quoted by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on March 9. When we come to the fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be received with a certain latitude or our government could not go on. 79). 852.853).

the second offense is the same as the first offense if the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or frustration thereof or necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first offense. They include Blackstone. Among other examples. Maryland Board of Education (349 US 294). They criticize the assumption by the courts of such law-making power as dangerous for it may degenerate into Judicial tyranny. These rights are now institutionalized in Section 20. particularly the lowly workers or the underprivileged. but grudgingly concede that in certain cases judges do legislate. Justice Roberts. And these judicial decisions have been re-stated in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Arizona (384 US 436 1964). not by amendment to the Bill of Rights on double jeopardy (see Justice Laurel in People vs. the due process clause was interpreted in the case of People vs. not segregation. The requisites of double jeopardy are not spelled out in the Bill of Rights. Justice David Brewer. . True. which I am far from believing that it is. 851-853). which doctrine was revoked in the case of Brown vs. or decry the exercise of such power. is now the governing principle. These rights are not found in the American Bill of Rights. Pomar (46 Phil. In both provisions. Macklin Fleming and Beryl Harold Levy. there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that judges should not legislate. Illinois (378 US 478). capitalistic court to invalidate a law granting maternity leave to working women-according primacy to property rights over human rights. 73 Phil. Ferguson (163 US 537) as securing to the Negroes equal but separate facilities. Ylagan (58 Phil. On the other hand. Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Again. Ronald Dworkin. Even the definition of Identical offenses for purposes of the double jeopardy provision was developed by American judicial decisions. Tarok. jurists or legal commentators. The case of People vs. the equal protection clause was interpreted in the case of Plessy vs. But said Justices. were it ever so desirable to do so. there are numerous decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights and statutory enactments expanding the scope of such provisions to protect human rights. holding that the equal protection clause means that the Negroes are entitled to attend the same schools attended by the whites-equal facilities in the same school-which was extended to public parks and public buses. Pomar is no longer the rule. Only the peace-and-order adherents were critical of the activism of the American Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Earl Warren. Foremost among them is the doctrine in the cases of Miranda vs. who either deny the power of the courts to legislate in-between gaps of the law. Jeremy Bentham. They were also developed by judicial decisions in the United States and in the Philippines even before people vs. which guaranteed the accused under custodial investigation his rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights as even as it protects him against the use of force or intimidation to extort confession from him. Justice Harlan. Justice Black.It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the branches into waterlight compartments. 260. 261-268). Rolf Sartorious. Gideon vs. as well as in Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. Wainright (372 US 335). or that the Constitution requires. Escubedo vs. have not pointed to examples of the exercise by the courts of such law-making authority in the interpretation and application of the laws in specific cases that gave rise to judicial tyranny or oppression or that such judicial legislation has not protected public interest or individual welfare. De-segregation. 440) by a conservative.

Fernando. C. It is noteworthy that Justice Black. SO ORDERED. 1385.. Teehankee. THE PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED. 937. dissenting: A . Concepcion. 852.J. Plana. supra Coleman vs. Cuevas and Alampay JJ. 76. Escolin. Unlike the American Constitution. is on leave. 703) where the American Supreme Court upheld the rights of workers to social justice in the form of guaranteed minimum wage for women and minors. J. penned a separate concurring opinion in the case of Coleman vs. affirming the doctrine of political question as beyond the ambit of judicial review. Abad Santos and Relova. WHEREFORE. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. Justice Holmes had been railing against the conservatism of Judges perverting the guarantee of due process to protect property rights as against human rights or social justice for the working man. 949). supra. both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitutions expressly vest in the Supreme Court the power to review the validity or constitutionality of any legislative enactment or executive act. The power of judicial review and the principle of separation of powers as well as the rule on political questions have been evolved and grafted into the American Constitution by judicial decisions (Marbury vs.. 83 L. The law fixing maximum hours of labor was invalidated. who seems to be against judicial legislation.As early as 1904. There is nothing in both the American and Philippine Constitutions expressly providing that the power of the courts is limited by the principle of separation of powers and the doctrine on political questions. took no part. 72 L. New York (198 US 45. JJ. Miller.. ed. 49 L.. J. concur. ed. There are numerous cases in Philippine jurisprudence applying the doctrines of separation of powers and political questions and invoking American precedents. working hours not exceeding eight (8) daily. Miller. 277 US 210-212. SHOULD A GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED IN FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONERS. NO COSTS. Government. Jr. 81 L. 853). De la Fuente. in the case of Lochner vs. Justice Holmes was vindicated finally in 1936 in the case of West Coast Hotel vs. and maternity leave for women employees. ed.. Parish (300 US 377-79. Madison. 307 US 433. ed. Springer vs.. Separate Opinions MELENCIO-HERRERA.

In the second place. Justice Gutierrez upholding "the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act.This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of five employees of PHILEX Mining Corporation under the general provisions of the Civil Code. and they have already received compensation payable to them under that Act. 1927 and took effect on June 10. This was not done in the case before the Court. it should be plainly equitable that. the proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act have already become the law in regards to" the "election of remedies". that an employee is entitled to an election of remedies. Act No. The Civil Code itself. provides for its non-applicability to the complaint. 104 Phil. which has to apply to the complaint involved in the instant case. can be no other than the Workmen's Compensation Even assuming. Compensation and damages are synonymous. At the very least. if a person entitled to an "election of remedies" makes a first election and accepts the benefits thereof.. 'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting opinion of Mr.. 1925). found in Title XVIII-Damages that: COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND OTHER EMPLOYEES IN CASE OF DEATH. 586. Stated differently. [Morabe & Inton. That "special law". if he wants to make a second election. Workmen's Compensation Act.L. Reyes had said: Petitioner also avers that compensation is not damages. because those proceedings had become a "finished transaction". in Spanish and some sections of the law were taken from the statutes of Minnesota and Hawaii. INJURY OR ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY SPECIAL LAWS. The term compensation' is used in the law (Act 3812 and Republic Act 772) in the sense of indemnity for damages suffered.B. in disregard of the first election he has made. as the majority rules. etc. Muñoz Palma. By the very provisions of the Civil Code. p. 3428) was approved on December 10. It is specifically provided in Article 2196 of the Code. (Chapter 209 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii. the remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act had already become a "finished transaction". . without conceding. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 582. In the first place. he should no longer be allowed to avail himself of the second option. The petitioners had already exercised their option to come under the Workmen's Compensation Act. There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners should no longer be allowed to exercise the option to sue under the Civil Code." I may further add: 1. et al. 2] . when he makes the second election he should surrender the benefits he had obtained under the first election. 1928. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine legislature.. being awarded for a personal injury caused or aggravated by or in the course of employment. it is a "special law". B. Justice J. In Esguerra vs. This argument is but a play on words. It was patterned from Minnesota and Hawaii statutes. however. and the exercise of one will preclude the exercise of the other. both options cannot be exercised simultaneously. not the Code itself. in reference to the complaint..

. p.) When the act is applicable the remedy thereunder is exclusive (Sec. dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws. commonly-accepted and most obvious significations.-The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee. cannot presume that the lawmaking body does not know the meaning of words and the rules of grammar. (Italics supplied) The use of the word "exclusively is a further confirmation of the exclusory provision of the Act.S. 7482. 267. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided: Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment. his personal representatives. subject only to exceptions which may be provided in the Act itself.) Compensation is not payable when injury is due to employee's willful intention to injure himself or another or to his intoxication. . p. S. S. (Sec. Consequently. (Espino vs. (Sections 7480-7481. according to good and approved usage and without resorting to forced or subtle construction Courts. Vol. 713. 714. pp. 5. 112. p.S. 713. as a rule.S. first of all in the words of the statute itself. Exclusive right to compensation. therefore. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our Workmen's Compensation Act. Sec. S. 7483. the remedy under the Act is exclusive The following is stated in 1 Schneider Workmen's Compensation Text. when the Act is applicable. the Philippine Legislature worded the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as follows: SEC.. 98) [Italics supplied] 3. ordinary. Cleofe 52 SCRA 92.. the grammatical reading of a statute must be presumed to yield its correct sense. read and considered in their natural.Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii. 1. because of said injury (Paragraphing and emphasis supplied) In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing provision: A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning and intention of the law-making body must be sought. 266. The act is compulsory as to employees in 'all industrial employment' and employees of the territory and its political subdivisions. Hawaii Statutory Synopsis.) 2.

. (b) The Workmen's Compensation Act. or under the Civil Code. and the addition of this sentence at the end of the paragraph: Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs. the legislator could very easily have formulated the said first paragraph of Section 5 according to the pattern of Section 6.4.. (Emphasis supplied) If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 5 were to allow the injured employee to sue his employer under the Civil Code. (Emphasis supplied) It will be seen that. formulated in 1927. The compensation is deemed an expense chargeable to the industry (Murillo vs. should the latter be more favorable to him. Mendoza. (a) The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided: Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply (exclusively) to injuries received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment (and all service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section be presumed to include such agreement). under this Act. . there were occasions when the legislator had the opportunity to amend the first paragraph of Section 5 such that the remedies under the Act would not be exclusive. 5. within the Act itself. or his heirs. provided that an injured worker or employee. After 1927. 6. 66 Phil. if he had so desired. provision is made for remedies other than within the Act itself. That shows the legislatives continuing intent to maintain the exclusory provision of the first paragraph of Section 5 unless otherwise provided in the Act itself. Section 6. 1952. should such law be more favorable to them. in part. in accordance with law. yet. it shall be optional with such injured employee either to claim compensation from his employer. There should be no question but that the original first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. grants compensation to an injured employee without regard to the presence or absence of negligence on the part of the employer. Thus. Liability of third parties. provides: SEC. if entitled to compensation under the Act.-In case an employee suffers an injury for which compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his employer. It might be mentioned that. which took effect in 1927. At that time. . the legislator could have amended the first paragraph of Section 5 so that the employee would have the option to sue the employer under the Act. the exclusory character of the Act was amended. through RA 772. On June 20. or sue such other person for damages. the foregoing second paragraph was amended with the elimination of the underlined words in parentheses. cannot have independent recourse neither to the Civil Code nor to any other law relative to the liability of the employer. 689 [1938]). within the Act itself. the legislator refrained from doing so. That that was not done shows the legislative intent not to allow any option to an employee to sue the employer under the Civil Code for injuries compensable under the Act.

receive compensation for work-related injuries. Before workmen's compensation. that his injury was caused by the employer and not a fellow worker.In time. the option to an employee to sue under the Act or under the Civil Code. through RA 772. and that he was not guilty of contributory negligence.. it must have been thought that it was inequitable to have the amount of compensation. The problems associated with the application of the fellow servant rule. It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the trial Court's dismissal of the Complaint. expeditious. Said Section 4-A increased the compensation payable by 50% in case there was negligence on the part of the employer. the principle of contributory negligence. & W. an injured worker seeking damages would have to prove in a tort suit that his employer was either negligent or in bad faith. The legislator was again given the opportunity to provide. When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with the intent of the law-maker. the Court is unjustifiably legislating. At the very least. injured with negligence on the part of the employer. the worker was deemed to accept the risks of employment that he should discover and guard against himself. 150 Reprint 1030) decided in 1837 "the mere relation of the master and the servant never can imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do of himself. Section 4-A 1 was included into the Act. Another objective was to have simplified. and the many other defenses so easily raised in protracted damage suits illustrated the need for a system whereby workers had only to prove the fact of covered employment and the fact of injury arising from employment in order to be compensated. JR. Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils associated with the situation in the early years of the industrial revolution when injured workingmen had to rely on damage suits to get recompense. GUTIERREZ. The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created solely by statute and made compulsory and where the element of fault-either the fault of the employer or the fault of the employee-disregarded became obvious. 1964. On June 20. and non-litigious procedures so that victims of industrial accidents could more readily. Based on that thinking. on June 20. 1952. a provision reiterated in the present Labor Code on employees' compensation. inexpensive. Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially) by RA 4119. As stated in the leading case of Priestley u. J. . but he did not. 1. caused by negligence on the part of the employer." By entering into a contract of employment. to sue the latter under the provisions of the Civil Code. the assumption of risk doctrine. if not automatically. to be the same amount payable when the employer was not negligent. dissenting: To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial accidents to file damages suits based on torts would be a radical innovation not only contrary to the express provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but a departure from the principles evolved in the long history of workmen's compensation. That additional section evidenced the intent of the legislator not to give an option to an employee. The worker was supposed to know what he entered into when he accepted employment. Fowler (3 M. it should be the legislature and not this Court which should remove the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The employer could employ not only his wealth in defeating the claim for damages but a host of common law defenses available to him as well..

the woeful inadequacy of the fault principle was manifest. the actual cost of rehabilitation. who were usually fellow workers of the victim. If the accident was avoidable and could be attributed to the carelessness of the employer. The uncertainty of the outcome of torts litigation in court placed the employee at a substantial disadvantage. employers liability legislation proved inadequate. However. And because the overwhelming mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation system. The employer is required to act swiftly on compensation claims. The employee's judgment was nearly always too little and too late. however. liability not only disregards the element of fault but it is also a pre. The expense and delay of litigation often prompted the injured employee to accept a compromise settlement for a fraction of the full value of his claim.determined amount based on the wages of the injured worker and in certain cases. . it is expected that this cost will eventually pass down the . I cite the above familiar background because workmen's compensation represents a compromise. In most cases both the facts and the law were uncertain. and fear of reprisal by the employer. The worker does not receive the total damages for his pain and suffering which he could otherwise claim in a civil suit. while only a part of this enured to the benefit of the injured employee or his dependents. were torn between friendship or loyalty to their class. xxx xxx xxx Under this approach the element of personal fault either disappears entirely or is subordinated to broader economic considerations. the injured worker gives up the right to subject the employer to a tort suit for huge amounts of damages.Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being recognized. Thus the employer against whom judgment was cast often paid a substantial damage bill. Legislative reform led to the workmen's compensation. The witnesses. individual workers who may want to sue for big amounts of damages must yield to the interests of their entire working class. a large share of the proceeds of the judgment were exacted as contingent fees by counsel. The nature of the compensation principle is explained as follows: An appreciation of the nature of the compensation principle is essential to an understanding of the acts and the cases interpreting them. In return for the near certainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by law. The employer absorbs the cost of accident loss only initially. So long as liability depended on fault there could be no recovery until the finger of blame had been pointed officially at the employer or his agents. Even here. on the one hand. and government was faced with the problem of who was to pay for the human wreckage wrought by the dangers of modern industry. preparation and distribution of the product.whether it be in the form of goods or servicesshould ultimately bear the cost of the injuries or deaths that are incident to the manufacture. xxx xxx xxx Workmen's Compensation rests upon the economic principle that those persons who enjoy the product of a business. Even if suit were successfully prosecuted.. Thus. By the turn of the century it was apparent that the toll of industrial accidents of both the avoidable and unavoidable variety had become enormous. on the other. employers' liability acts were a major step in the desired direction. existing tort principles offered some measure of redress.. An administrative agency supervises the program.

then.. Much of the unevenness and apparent conflict in compensation decisions throughout the various jurisdictions must be attributed to this. So long as each competing unit in a given industry is uniformly affected. All compensation acts alike work these two major changes. Workmen's Compensation American Casebook Series.stream of commerce in the form of increase price until it is spread in dilution among the ultimate consumers. an act that greatly favors the laborer may be so interpreted by the courts that employers can have little reason to complain. The statutes vary a great deal with reference to the proper point of balance. Thus predictability and moderateness of cost are necessary from the broad economic viewpoint. Certainly. The employer gives up the immunity he otherwise would enjoy in cases where he is not at fault. We have a system whose parts must mesh harmonious with one another if it is to succeed. it will be tempted to restore what it regards as a proper balance by adopting an interpretation that favors the worker. differs from the conventional damage suit in two important respects: Fault on the part of either employer or employee is eliminated. Compensation. The amount of weekly compensation payments and the length of the period during which compensation is to be paid are matters concerning which the acts differ considerably. and conversely. and compensation payable according to a definitely limited schedule is substituted for damages. The interpretation of any compensation statute will be influenced greatly by the court's reaction to the basic point of compromise established in the Act. I am personally against stretching the law and allowing payment of compensation for contingencies never envisioned to be compensable when the law was formulated. whom the law allows to receive ." (Malone & Plant. and the employee surrenders his former right to full damages and accepts instead a more modest claim for bare essentials. For instance. the compensable injuries and diseases. If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a spirit of generosity recasts some parts of the system without touching the related others. the entire structure is endangered. the premiums paid by employers to the present system. the actuarial stability of the trust fund and many other interrelated parts have all been carefully studied before the integrated scheme was enacted in to law. pp. Compensation.. represented by compensation. The basic theory has to be followed. If the court feels that the basic compromise unduly favors the employer. the rates of payments. a compensation act drawn in a spirit of extreme conservatism may be transformed by a sympathetic court into a fairly liberal instrument. when regarded from the viewpoint of employer and employee represents a compromise in which each party surrenders certain advantages in order to gain others which are of more importance both to him and to society. The importance of the compromise character of compensation cannot be overemphasized. no producer can gain any substantial competitive advantage or suffer any appreciable loss by reason of the general adoption of the compensation principle. 63-65). In order that the compensation principle may operate properly and with fairness to all parties it is essential that the anticipated accident cost be predictable and that it be fixed at a figure that will not disrupt too violently the traffic in the product of the industry affected. irrespective of how they may differ in other particulars. only harmful results to the principle of workmen's compensation can arise if workmen.. . In this way. The schedule of compensation.

J.B. his personal representatives. being awarded for a personal injury caused or aggravated by or in the course of employment. Separate Opinions MELENCIO-HERRERA. The term compensation' is used in the law (Act 3812 and Republic Act 772) in the sense of indemnity for damages suffered. provides for its non-applicability to the complaint. 586. dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury. Reyes had said: Petitioner also avers that compensation is not damages. INJURY OR ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY SPECIAL LAWS. 104 Phil.. etc. however. dissenting: A This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of five employees of PHILEX Mining Corporation under the general provisions of the Civil Code.-The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee. Exclusivenesss of liability. can still elect to file damage suits for industrial accidents. et al. Exclusive right to compensation.. This argument is but a play on words. Compensation and damages are synonymous. .—Unless otherwise provided. Justice J. 582.L. The Civil Code itself. the liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. found in Title XVIII-Damages that: COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND OTHER EMPLOYEES IN CASE OF DEATH.. . 5. which reads: SEC. a major study will be necessary. If employers already required to contribute to the State Insurance Fund will still have to bear the cost of damage suits or get insurance for that purpose. It was precisely for this reason that Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Article 173 of the labor Code also provides: ART.. . All workers covered by workmen's compensation and all employers who employ covered employees are affected. The issue before us is more far reaching than the interests of the poor victims and their families. In Esguerra vs. Muñoz Palma.. I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a matter calling for actuarial studies and public hearings. Even as I have deepest sympathies for the victims.employment compensation. It is specifically provided in Article 2196 of the Code. 173.. I regret that I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion..

Stated differently. because those proceedings had become a "finished transaction". 1. 1925). in disregard of the first election he has made. This was not done in the case before the Court. when he makes the second election he should surrender the benefits he had obtained under the first election. At the very least. when the Act is applicable. Justice Gutierrez upholding "the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act.) Compensation is not payable when injury is due to employee's willful intention to injure himself or another or to his intoxication. (Sections 7480-7481. (Sec. which has to apply to the complaint involved in the instant case. if he wants to make a second election. both options cannot be exercised simultaneously. in Spanish and some sections of the law were taken from the statutes of Minnesota and Hawaii..S. p. without conceding. it is a "special law". the remedy under the Act is exclusive The following is stated in 1 Schneider Workmen's Compensation Text. p. There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners should no longer be allowed to exercise the option to sue under the Civil Code. and the exercise of one will preclude the exercise of the other. if a person entitled to an "election of remedies" makes a first election and accepts the benefits thereof. The act is compulsory as to employees in 'all industrial employment' and employees of the territory and its political subdivisions.. 713. 1927 and took effect on June 10. The petitioners had already exercised their option to come under the Workmen's Compensation Act.S. Workmen's Compensation Act. pp. Vol.By the very provisions of the Civil Code. B. in reference to the complaint. the remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act had already become a "finished transaction". it should be plainly equitable that. S. Hawaii Statutory Synopsis.) . and they have already received compensation payable to them under that Act.) When the act is applicable the remedy thereunder is exclusive (Sec. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. That "special law". 267. 714. In the second place. 7483. can be no other than the Workmen's Compensation Even assuming. 'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting opinion of Mr. not the Code itself. S. In the first place. 112. that an employee is entitled to an election of remedies. p. (Chapter 209 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii. Act No. p. It was patterned from Minnesota and Hawaii statutes. as the majority rules. 266. 3428) was approved on December 10. S. 1928. 7482. [Morabe & Inton. 2] Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine legislature. Sec. 713. he should no longer be allowed to avail himself of the second option.." I may further add: 1.S. the proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act have already become the law in regards to" the "election of remedies".

in part. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our Workmen's Compensation Act. Consequently. ordinary. Exclusive right to compensation. That that was not done shows the legislative intent not to allow any option to an employee to sue the employer under the Civil Code for injuries compensable under the Act. because of said injury (Paragraphing and emphasis supplied) In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing provision: A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning and intention of the law-making body must be sought. subject only to exceptions which may be provided in the Act itself.2. Section 6. within the Act itself. (Italics supplied) The use of the word "exclusively is a further confirmation of the exclusory provision of the Act. cannot presume that the lawmaking body does not know the meaning of words and the rules of grammar.. Cleofe 52 SCRA 92. under this Act. therefore. provision is made for remedies other than within the Act itself. . 98) [Italics supplied] 3. (Espino vs. according to good and approved usage and without resorting to forced or subtle construction Courts. the grammatical reading of a statute must be presumed to yield its correct sense. his personal representatives. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided: Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment. the legislator could very easily have formulated the said first paragraph of Section 5 according to the pattern of Section 6. 4. . It might be mentioned that. the Philippine Legislature worded the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as follows: SEC.. Liability of third parties. Thus. 5. in accordance with law. dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws. read and considered in their natural. commonly-accepted and most obvious significations. provides: SEC. as a rule.-In case an employee suffers an injury for which compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his employer. it shall be optional with such injured employee either to claim compensation from his employer. 6.-The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee. (Emphasis supplied) If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 5 were to allow the injured employee to sue his employer under the Civil Code. first of all in the words of the statute itself. or sue such other person for damages.

When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with the intent of the law-maker. there were occasions when the legislator had the opportunity to amend the first paragraph of Section 5 such that the remedies under the Act would not be exclusive. The legislator was again given the opportunity to provide. on June 20. It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the trial Court's dismissal of the Complaint. That shows the legislatives continuing intent to maintain the exclusory provision of the first paragraph of Section 5 unless otherwise provided in the Act itself. within the Act itself. 689 [1938]). it must have been thought that it was inequitable to have the amount of compensation. if he had so desired. Based on that thinking. At that time. if entitled to compensation under the Act. In time. . yet. should such law be more favorable to them. Said Section 4-A increased the compensation payable by 50% in case there was negligence on the part of the employer. the legislator refrained from doing so. and the addition of this sentence at the end of the paragraph: Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs. the Court is unjustifiably legislating. should the latter be more favorable to him. or under the Civil Code. grants compensation to an injured employee without regard to the presence or absence of negligence on the part of the employer. cannot have independent recourse neither to the Civil Code nor to any other law relative to the liability of the employer. After 1927. or his heirs. 1952. 1952. the foregoing second paragraph was amended with the elimination of the underlined words in parentheses. injured with negligence on the part of the employer. formulated in 1927. through RA 772.5. Section 4-A 1 was included into the Act. through RA 772. That additional section evidenced the intent of the legislator not to give an option to an employee. Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially) by RA 4119. to sue the latter under the provisions of the Civil Code. The compensation is deemed an expense chargeable to the industry (Murillo vs. 66 Phil. On June 20. (a) The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided: Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply (exclusively) to injuries received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment (and all service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section be presumed to include such agreement). (Emphasis supplied) It will be seen that. to be the same amount payable when the employer was not negligent. but he did not. caused by negligence on the part of the employer. the legislator could have amended the first paragraph of Section 5 so that the employee would have the option to sue the employer under the Act. There should be no question but that the original first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. provided that an injured worker or employee. 1964. Mendoza. On June 20. the exclusory character of the Act was amended. (b) The Workmen's Compensation Act. the option to an employee to sue under the Act or under the Civil Code. which took effect in 1927.

the worker was deemed to accept the risks of employment that he should discover and guard against himself.. I cite the above familiar background because workmen's compensation represents a compromise. J. and non-litigious procedures so that victims of industrial accidents could more readily. and the many other defenses so easily raised in protracted damage suits illustrated the need for a system whereby workers had only to prove the fact of covered employment and the fact of injury arising from employment in order to be compensated. Before workmen's compensation. Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils associated with the situation in the early years of the industrial revolution when injured workingmen had to rely on damage suits to get recompense. the injured worker gives up the right to subject the employer to a tort suit for huge amounts of damages. Thus. that his injury was caused by the employer and not a fellow worker. if not automatically. JR. Another objective was to have simplified. The problems associated with the application of the fellow servant rule. Legislative reform led to the workmen's compensation. inexpensive. it should be the legislature and not this Court which should remove the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act.determined amount based on the wages of the injured worker and in certain cases." By entering into a contract of employment. The nature of the compensation principle is explained as follows: . dissenting: To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial accidents to file damages suits based on torts would be a radical innovation not only contrary to the express provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but a departure from the principles evolved in the long history of workmen's compensation. & W. employers liability legislation proved inadequate. 1. the assumption of risk doctrine. liability not only disregards the element of fault but it is also a pre. 150 Reprint 1030) decided in 1837 "the mere relation of the master and the servant never can imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do of himself. However. An administrative agency supervises the program. and that he was not guilty of contributory negligence. employers' liability acts were a major step in the desired direction. individual workers who may want to sue for big amounts of damages must yield to the interests of their entire working class. a provision reiterated in the present Labor Code on employees' compensation. Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being recognized. In return for the near certainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by law. the actual cost of rehabilitation.. The worker was supposed to know what he entered into when he accepted employment.GUTIERREZ. And because the overwhelming mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation system. The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created solely by statute and made compulsory and where the element of fault-either the fault of the employer or the fault of the employee-disregarded became obvious. The employer could employ not only his wealth in defeating the claim for damages but a host of common law defenses available to him as well. the principle of contributory negligence. The employer is required to act swiftly on compensation claims. receive compensation for work-related injuries. As stated in the leading case of Priestley u. an injured worker seeking damages would have to prove in a tort suit that his employer was either negligent or in bad faith. The worker does not receive the total damages for his pain and suffering which he could otherwise claim in a civil suit. At the very least. expeditious. Fowler (3 M.

whether it be in the form of goods or servicesshould ultimately bear the cost of the injuries or deaths that are incident to the manufacture. The employee's judgment was nearly always too little and too late. Even here. The witnesses. The employer absorbs the cost of accident loss only initially. The uncertainty of the outcome of torts litigation in court placed the employee at a substantial disadvantage. xxx xxx xxx Workmen's Compensation rests upon the economic principle that those persons who enjoy the product of a business. . a large share of the proceeds of the judgment were exacted as contingent fees by counsel. while only a part of this enured to the benefit of the injured employee or his dependents... on the one hand. existing tort principles offered some measure of redress. no producer can gain any substantial competitive advantage or suffer any appreciable loss by reason of the general adoption of the compensation principle. however. The expense and delay of litigation often prompted the injured employee to accept a compromise settlement for a fraction of the full value of his claim. and government was faced with the problem of who was to pay for the human wreckage wrought by the dangers of modern industry. If the accident was avoidable and could be attributed to the carelessness of the employer. By the turn of the century it was apparent that the toll of industrial accidents of both the avoidable and unavoidable variety had become enormous. . and fear of reprisal by the employer. the woeful inadequacy of the fault principle was manifest. xxx xxx xxx Under this approach the element of personal fault either disappears entirely or is subordinated to broader economic considerations. All compensation acts alike work these two major changes. were torn between friendship or loyalty to their class. . it is expected that this cost will eventually pass down the stream of commerce in the form of increase price until it is spread in dilution among the ultimate consumers. Thus predictability and moderateness of cost are necessary from the broad economic viewpoint. and compensation payable according to a definitely limited schedule is substituted for damages.An appreciation of the nature of the compensation principle is essential to an understanding of the acts and the cases interpreting them. In most cases both the facts and the law were uncertain. Thus the employer against whom judgment was cast often paid a substantial damage bill. In order that the compensation principle may operate properly and with fairness to all parties it is essential that the anticipated accident cost be predictable and that it be fixed at a figure that will not disrupt too violently the traffic in the product of the industry affected. Compensation. irrespective of how they may differ in other particulars.. Even if suit were successfully prosecuted. differs from the conventional damage suit in two important respects: Fault on the part of either employer or employee is eliminated. So long as each competing unit in a given industry is uniformly affected. preparation and distribution of the product.. on the other.. then. So long as liability depended on fault there could be no recovery until the finger of blame had been pointed officially at the employer or his agents. who were usually fellow workers of the victim.

63-65). Much of the unevenness and apparent conflict in compensation decisions throughout the various jurisdictions must be attributed to this. the compensable injuries and diseases. whom the law allows to receive employment compensation.. The schedule of compensation. pp. his personal representatives. represented by compensation. Certainly. If the court feels that the basic compromise unduly favors the employer.Compensation.. The statutes vary a great deal with reference to the proper point of balance. Workmen's Compensation American Casebook Series. which reads: SEC. The amount of weekly compensation payments and the length of the period during which compensation is to be paid are matters concerning which the acts differ considerably.-The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee. I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a matter calling for actuarial studies and public hearings. the actuarial stability of the trust fund and many other interrelated parts have all been carefully studied before the integrated scheme was enacted in to law. We have a system whose parts must mesh harmonious with one another if it is to succeed. It was precisely for this reason that Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. . If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a spirit of generosity recasts some parts of the system without touching the related others. the liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. and conversely. The basic theory has to be followed. 173. the rates of payments. The importance of the compromise character of compensation cannot be overemphasized. 5. the premiums paid by employers to the present system. Exclusivenesss of liability. a compensation act drawn in a spirit of extreme conservatism may be transformed by a sympathetic court into a fairly liberal instrument. when regarded from the viewpoint of employer and employee represents a compromise in which each party surrenders certain advantages in order to gain others which are of more importance both to him and to society." (Malone & Plant. If employers already required to contribute to the State Insurance Fund will still have . can still elect to file damage suits for industrial accidents. The interpretation of any compensation statute will be influenced greatly by the court's reaction to the basic point of compromise established in the Act. the entire structure is endangered. Exclusive right to compensation. The employer gives up the immunity he otherwise would enjoy in cases where he is not at fault. dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury. In this way. only harmful results to the principle of workmen's compensation can arise if workmen.—Unless otherwise provided. For instance. an act that greatly favors the laborer may be so interpreted by the courts that employers can have little reason to complain. Article 173 of the labor Code also provides: ART. and the employee surrenders his former right to full damages and accepts instead a more modest claim for bare essentials. I am personally against stretching the law and allowing payment of compensation for contingencies never envisioned to be compensable when the law was formulated. it will be tempted to restore what it regards as a proper balance by adopting an interpretation that favors the worker.

The issue before us is more far reaching than the interests of the poor victims and their families. or with any order. . a major study will be necessary. I regret that I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion. rule or regulation of the Workmen's Compensation Commission or the Bureau of Labor Standards or should the employer violate the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Six hundred seventy-nine and its amendments or fail to install and maintain safety appliances.to bear the cost of damage suits or get insurance for that purpose. All workers covered by workmen's compensation and all employers who employ covered employees are affected. 4-A. Right to additional compensation. he shall be liable to pay an additional compensation equal to fifty per centum of the compensation fixed in this Act. injury or sickness due to the failure of the to comply with any law. or take other precautions for the prevention of accidents or occupational disease.In case of the employee's death. Footnotes 1 SEC. Even as I have deepest sympathies for the victims..

Eufrocino R. Ilocos Sur. In its answer. 42). Tarlac. resident of Cabugao. the Court dismissed the case for non-appearance of plaintiff (59). 41582R * which dismissed petitioner's petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction on the ground that the allegations made therein are insufficient to justify further process. Inc.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the August 5. 1967. are as follows: On August 24. At the scheduled trial of April 29. 215 belonging to the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines.R. vs. Tagayuma for respondent. and the trial was postponed to November 14. and then transferred again upon petition filed by counsel for Philippine Rabbit for January 20. Taurino Singson. On October 6.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G. 1966. 1987 PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES. the same was transferred to February 3 and 4. No. defendant interposed the defense that the collision was due to a fortuitous event (Rec. 1967. Branch I Vigan. The undisputed facts of this case. at 8:40 are only the defendant Philippine Rabbit appeared and upon motion of its counsel. so he brought a complaint for contractual tort (Record 2731). The case was set for trial on December 23. TAURINO SINGSON AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. respondents. petitioner. 1965 (45). PARAS. 1960. but upon motion of both counsels. 1968 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. ARCIAGA. sustained multiple serious physical injuries when the said bus crashed against an acacia tree at La Union. as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur.R. 1966 (57). LUDIVICO D. INC. L-29701 March 16. the Court noted that no pre-trial has ever been conducted in the case and so both parties were ordered to confer with one another for a compromise agreement at the office of the Philippine Rabbit at Tarlac. . as paying passenger on board bus No.. Ilocos Sur. 1967 (58) and then postponed again to April 29. 1966 (55). HON. as found by the Court of Appeals. J. No.

counsel for plaintiff Taurino Singson filed a Petition for Relief accompanied by an affidavit of said plaintiff alleging that on April 29. Constants Pimentel counsel for plaintiff Taurino Singson. On August 16. 1967 (the date of the trial). filed a Petition for certiorari and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction in the Court of Appeals. 1969. the Court of Appeals denied the petition on the ground that the allegations made therein are insufficient to justify its giving it due course.It appears that the order of dismissal of April 29. 56). 1969. 63). boarding a passenger jeepney at Cabugao. on May 6. it had engine trouble. III . the lower court denied the motion for reconsideration of the Philippine Rabbit on the ground that "considering the particular nature and circumstances of the case at bar and also the fact that petition for relief under Rule 38 is premised onequity and is allowed on exceptional circumstances. 1968. but when the vehicle reached Lapog. 1967 and was received by Miss May altuna addressee's agent. 4-20). 41582-R. a case should not be allowed to go off on procedural points to the end that technicalities should not override the merits of the case. 1967 (61 days from receipt of dismissal). On September 14. the Court of Appeals denied the same. and that as far as possible failure of justice should be avoided.R.. at Vigan.. Ilocos Sur. pp. causing him to reach the court 15 minutes late and found thereupon that the court had already dismissed the case (60-62). On January 23. he went to Vigan for the purpose of attending the trial of his case. and on February 19. p. petitioner filed its Reply Brief (Ibid. p. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration. private respondent filed his Brief (Ibid. II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULE OF EQUITY IN THE CASE AT BAR. 38 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS MANDATORY AND NON-EXTENDIBLE. petitioner filed its Brief (Ibid. Inc. p. 67). petitioner raised the following assignment of errors: I THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE 60-DAY PERIOD PROVIDED IN SEC. 1967 alluded to was sent to Atty. Rollo) On July 9. 47). in the absence of a clear lack of intention to delay. In an order dated November 28. Opposition was filed to the Petition for Relief by defendant Philippine Rabbit. In a Resolution dated August 5. P. On March 29. further. herein petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. docketed therein as CA-G. and that. 1967. No. his hometown. this court believes that justice is best served if in this particular case the plaintiff will be given his day in court" (79-72). 1967. (pp. 1967. the instant petition (Record. 1968. the lower court granted plaintiff Taurino Singson's Petition for Relief (66). 22-25. Hence. On July 6. 1967 (70). but in a Resolution dated October 1.. In a Resolution dated November 15. this Court gave due course to the petition. 1969. 1968 (Ibid. In its brief. counsel for Philippine Rabbit filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting the petition for Relief (67-69). 1968. by registered mail on May 3..

The petition is impressed with merit. neither can private respondent invoke equity as a ground for the reopening of the case "there being an express provision of law under which the remedy can be invoked. 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court clearly states that "A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this rule must be verified. never interrupted and cannot be subject to any condition or contingency.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT certiorari DOES NOT LIE IN THE INSTANT CASE. Consequently. otherwise on this ground alone. supra). April 29. Thus." It is undisputed that the Petition for Relief in this case was filed 61 days from receipt of the notice of dismissal or one day late. In fact. it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the said petition was filed within the reglementary period specified in Sec. filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment. The law gives an exception or "last chance" of a timely petition for relief from judgment within the reglementary period (within 60 days from knowledge and 6 months from entry of judgment) under Rule 38 supra. The records further show that counsel for private respondent did not move for reconsideration of the Order of dismissal. but such grace period must be taken as "absolutely fixed. 1967. of the same. Hernando (97 SCRA 488 119801) the Supreme Court in disallowing the reopening of the case which has become final ruled that there is no justification in law and in fact. In expressly reiterating [1985]). the well known maxim that "equity aids the vigilant. Indeed. For the foregoing reasons. Sec. thereby allowing the decision to become final and executory. 7 Phil. the petition should be dismissed. As a last resort. held that the Rule is that. when he arrived late for the hearing so that the Petition for Relief was at least eight (8) days late. nor for new trial Neither did he appeal. the Court held: The Court has said time and again that the doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error the judgments of courts must become final at some definite date fixed by law." (Henson v." (Barrios v. Director of Lands.as it were. accident. not those who slumber on their rights. the equitable remedy is an act of grace. "equity follows the law" and as . he could have availed of the sixty day period provided for by Rule 38 to file a Petition for Relief from judgment but again he allowed this opportunity to lapse. Go Thong & Co. 55 Phil. 3. order or other proceeding to be set aside. for a petition for relief under Rule 38 to be entertained by the court. mistake or excusable neglect). Because the period fixed is itself devised to meet a condition or contingency (fraud." (Turqueza v. and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or order was entered or said proceeding was taken. 542 [1963]). the petitioner must satisfactorily show that he has faithfully and strictly complied with the provisions of said Rule. to him is applicable. The rule is. for respondent judge's void act of ordering the reopening of the case which has become final and executory.. the records show that counsel for private respondent learned of the dismissal on the same day. inextendible. 586). Hernando. In the case of Turqueza v. designed to give the aggrieved party another and last chance'" "and failure to avail of such last chance within the grace period fixed by the statute or Rules of Court is fatal.

Alampay. J. 188-189 (as cited in Appellant's Brief p. Footnotes * Penned by Justice Antonio G. Yatco and Jose M. Fernan (Chairman). Arciaga in Civil Case No. in which a court of equity gives a remedy.discussed in Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence Vol. Jr. 1967 of Judge Ludivico D. indeed. 2 pp. Bidin and Cortes. Lucero concurred in by Justices Nicasio A. the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. but where a particular remedy is given by the law. the meaning of the principle is stated as follows: There are instances.... the issue as to whether or not certiorari is proper in the instant case. 2539 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Hernando. . has been laid to rest in the case of Turqueza vs. SO ORDERED. JJ. In the same manner. Mendoza. and that remedy is bounded and circumscribed by particular rules. (supra) where a petition for certiorari directly filed with the Supreme Court was granted and the Court set aside the questioned order issued by respondent judge to reopen the case below for reception of respondent-defendant's evidence notwithstanding the lapse of the reglementary period within which respondent could file a petition for relief from judgment. concur. and said Civil Case is declared TERMINATED. Padilla. where the law gives none. is on leave. No. PREMISES CONSIDERED. Gutierrez. 20). 41582-R and the questioned Order dated August 16. it would be very improper for the court to take it up where the law leaves it and to extend it further than the law allows.

Camus and Delgado for appellee. The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. provides the following: . (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business. one of the brothers of the deceased. Brimo is in question in this case. for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which. JUAN MICIANO. opponent-appellant. No. 1927 Testate Estate of Joseph G. opposed it. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality. however. and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws. The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. J. petitioner-appellee. The court. (3) the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition. approved it. Andre Brimo. The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are: (1) The approval of said scheme of partition.: The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. vs. administrator.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. Ross. (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance. Lawrence and Selph for appellant. and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause. Brimo. ANDRE BRIMO. L-22595 November 1. ROMUALDEZ. among other things.

must be complied with and executed.. not in accordance with the laws of his nationality. so much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter. himself.) It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. and. any legatee who fails to comply with it. my will. we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular. But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws. taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence. whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated. on the other hand. 472. having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess. otherwise. legal and testamentary successions. (Lim and Lim vs. and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property. lawphil.Nevertheless. Collector of Customs. It is discretionary with the trial court. in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions. acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point. as expressed. be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands. The fact is. as the herein oppositor who. being contrary to law. and in the absence of evidence on such laws. The institution of legatees in this will is conditional. it must be taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will. inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will. therefore. this citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice. I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request. I like desire to state that although by law. however. they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. 36 Phil. inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter. no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. nor by nationality and. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which.net Therefore. If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid. not being contrary to our laws in force. requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish. that the said condition is void. is prevented from receiving his legacy. There is. shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question. by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator. He. which says: Second. The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee. I am a Turkish citizen. it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection with this. but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. for article 792 of the civil Code provides the following: . the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.

concur. JJ. And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when. Avanceña. and to the condition imposed upon the legatees. is considered unwritten. such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions. . Said condition then. Street. and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects. Therefore. and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor. is null and void. Villamor and Ostrand. So ordered. Malcolm. according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted. in the light of the legal provisions above cited. It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it.Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever. All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law. being contrary to law.. even should the testator otherwise provide. the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees. without any pronouncement as to costs.

1920 RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ. 1917. PROVISIONAL RECEIPT Pesos 6.000 Recibi la suma de seis mil pesos de Don Joaquin Herrer de Manila como prima dela Renta Vitalicia solicitada por dicho Don Joaquin Herrer hoy. Cohn. Fisher and DeWitt for appellee. Jose A. defendant-appellee. F. SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA. Two days later he paid the sum of P6. plaintiffappellant. Herrer to recover from the defendant life insurance company the sum of pesos 6.000 paid by the deceased for a life annuity. J.R. vs.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. . Plaintiff appeals. I.000 to the manager of the company's Manila office and was given a receipt reading as follows: MANILA. The undisputed facts are these: On September 24.: This is an action brought by the plaintiff ad administrator of the estate of the late Joaquin Ma. Herrer. Espiritu for appellant. MALCOLM. No. as administrator of the estate of the late Joaquin Ma. L-15895 November 29. 26 de septiembre. 1917.. sujeta al examen medico y aprobacion de la Oficina Central de la Compañia. Joaquin Herrer made application to the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada through its office in Manila for a life annuity. The trial court gave judgment for the defendant.

there was. was never actually mailed and thus was never received by the applicant. on November 26. 1917. testified that he had gone through the effects of the deceased and had found no letter of notification from the insurance company to Mr. This letter was received by Mr. as just noticed. The witness further said that letters. The law of insurance is consequently now found in the Insurance Act and the Civil Code. Our deduction from the evidence on this issue must be that the letter of November 26. in force the Insurance Act. The chief clerk of the Manila office of the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada at the time of the trial testified that he prepared the letter introduced in evidence as Exhibit 3. As above suggested. was prepared and signed in the local office of the insurance company. however. there formerly existed Title VIII of Book III and Section III of Title III of Book III. Not forgetting our conclusion of fact. Torres on the morning of December 21. Mr. On December 18. 1917. E. Herrer that his application had been accepted. after being signed. Herrer died on December 20. in article 1802. The witness admitted on cross-examination that after preparing the letter and giving it to he manager. No. attorney Aurelio A. Mr. In the Civil Code there formerly existed and presumably still exist. In order to reach our legal goal. but as far as we know. not only describes a contact of life annuity markedly similar to the one we are . For the defense. and that he said that the only document relating to the transaction in his possession was the provisional receipt. The following day the local office replied to Mr. (Whether on the same day the cable was received notice was sent by the Manila office of Herrer that the application had been accepted. The local manager. E. the Civil Code. Mr. entitled insurance contracts and life annuities. Herrer. On the other hand. attorney Manuel Torres testified to having prepared the will of Joaquin Ma. Tuason. and handed it to the local manager. Mr. he new nothing of what became of it. In the Code of the Commerce. Chapters II and IV. the issue of fact raised by the evidence is whether Herrer received notice of acceptance of his application. the Insurance Act deals with life insurance. To resolve this question. On November 26. The Act expressly repealed Title VIII of Book II and Section III of Title III of Book III of the code of Commerce. who was the chief clerk. it next becomes necessary to determine the law which should be applied to the facts.The application was immediately forwarded to the head office of the company at Montreal. Chapter IV of this Act concerns life and health insurance. He said that on the same day he signed a letter notifying Mr. While. 1917. which will be discussed later. Canada. Torres wrote to the Manila office of the company stating that Herrer desired to withdraw his application. that on this occasion. On the after July 1. was not called as a witness. the administrator of the estate. is a disputed point. 1917. which dealt with insurance contracts. of date November 26. Herrer. 1917. Until quite recently. it is silent as to the methods to be followed in order that there may be a contract of insurance. was placed in the ordinary channels for transmission. for signature. Rafael Enriquez. 2427. 1917. 1917. the head office gave notice of acceptance by cable to Manila. Mr. 1917. respectively. White.) On December 4. the obvious signposts along the way must be noticed. Herrer of this acceptance. 1917. Herrer mentioned his application for a life annuity. stating that the policy had been issued. of Title XII of Book IV. the policy was issued at Montreal. all of the provisions concerning life insurance in the Philippines were found in the Code of Commerce and the Civil Code. and called attention to the notification of November 26. we propose to go directly to the evidence of record. testified to having received the cablegram accepting the application of Mr. The witness could not tell if the letter had every actually been placed in the mails. notifying Mr. Herrer from the home office on November 26. White. 1915. 1917. Torres. were sent to the chief clerk and placed on the mailing desk for transmission.

that according to the provisional receipt. pp. three things had to be accomplished by the insurance company before there was a contract: (1) There had to be a medical examination of the applicant. it would seem logical to make use of the only pertinent provision of law found in the Civil code. The courts who take this view have expressly held that an acceptance of an offer of insurance not actually or constructively communicated to the proposer does not make a contract. (I Joyce. is presumed to have been entered into at the place where the offer was made.]." This latter article is in opposition to the provisions of article 54 of the Code of Commerce. In the Civil Code is found article 1262 providing that "Consent is shown by the concurrence of offer and acceptance with respect to the thing and the consideration which are to constitute the contract. in such case. it is fatal to the presumption. the subject-matter of the Civil code. but in two other articles. and expressly repealed the provisions in the Code of Commerce on the same subject. The pertinent fact is. any deficiency of the latter shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code. when a letter or other mail matter is addressed and mailed with postage prepaid there is a rebuttable presumption of fact that it was received by the addressee as soon as it could have been transmitted to him in the ordinary course of the mails. as the locus poenitentiae is ended when the acceptance has passed beyond the control of the party. but in order that the principle may not be taken too lightly. namely. the law applicable to the case is found to be the second paragraph of article 1262 of the Civil Code providing that an acceptance made by letter shall not bind the person making the offer except from the time it came to his knowledge. The Civil Code rule. For instance. A. completes the contract of insurance. therefore. An acceptance made by letter shall not bind the person making the offer except from the time it came to his knowledge.J. if there be any. S. did cable the Manila office to that effect. (See 22 C. The legislature in its wisdom having enacted a new law on insurance. therefore. The further admitted facts are that the head office in Montreal did accept the application. through its agent in Manila. The fact as to the letter of notification thus fails to concur with the essential elements of the general rule pertaining to the mailing and delivery of mail matter as announced by the American courts. gives strong clues as to the proper disposition of the case.. But if any one of these elemental facts fails to appear. that an acceptance made by letter shall bind the person making the offer only from the date it came to his knowledge. The Law of Insurance. properly addressed and stamped. and (3) this approval had in some way to be communicated by the company to the applicant. Only the mailing of acceptance. that the special law on the subject of insurance is deficient in enunciating the principles governing acceptance. 235. it has been said. (2) there had to be approval of the application by the head office of the company. which is incontestable.) We hold that the contract for a life annuity in the case at bar was not perfected because it has not been proved satisfactorily that the acceptance of the application ever came to the knowledge of the applicant.. and having thus left a void in the commercial law. 244. For instance. then the only duty remaining is for the court to apply the law as it is found. may not be the best expression of modern commercial usage. pp. let it be noticed that it is identical with the principles announced by a considerable number of respectable courts in the United States." On the supposition. did actually issue the policy and did. R.considering. 96. and 49 L. The contract. [N. a letter will not be presumed to have been received by the addressee unless it is shown that it was deposited in the post-office. would be controlling. et seq. notes. article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "In matters which are governed by special laws. Not only this. 458.net . actually write the letter of notification and place it in the usual channels for transmission to the addressee. lawph!l. closely related to the chapter concerning life annuities.) In resume. If no mistake has been made in announcing the successive steps by which we reach a conclusion. Still it must be admitted that its enforcement avoids uncertainty and tends to security.

under the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. defendant-appellee. Domingo E. Araullo. The cargo subject of the instant case was discharged in Dadiangas unto the custody of the consignee on December 18. dissents. JJ. the relevant portion of which reads: xxx xxx xxx Before the plaintiff started presenting evidence at today's trial at the instance of the Court the lawyers entered into the following stipulation of facts: 1. Avanceña and Villamor. which was certified to the Court by the Court of Appeals as involving only questions of law. No.. J. MARITIME COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES. . appellant Dole Philippines. 1 relates to a claim for loss and/or damage to a shipment of machine parts sought to be enforced by the consignee. until paid. 1918.R. de Lara & Associates for plaintiff-appellant. without special finding as to costs in either instance. and the plaintiff shall have and recover from the defendant the sum of P6. Misa and Lozada Law Office for defendant-appellee.Judgment is reversed.J. Bito. vs. L-61352 February 27. 1971. So ordered. Mapa. concur. C. 1987 DOLE PHILIPPINES. (hereinafter caged Dole) against the carrier. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G. INC. Maritime Company of the Philippines (hereinafter called Maritime).. Inc. 2 The basic facts are succinctly stated in the order of the Trial Court 3 dated March 16. 1977. Johnson.. NARVASA.: This appeal.. J.000 with legal interest from November 20. plaintiff-appellant.

That. suppletory of deficiencies in the Code of Commerce and special laws in matters governed by the latter. 1975. 14 prescription under said Act is subject to the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code on tolling and because Dole's claim for loss or . docketed therein as Civil Case No. 4. 1972. provides that: *** the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered.12 The substance of its argument is that since the provisions of the Civil Code are. The third cause of action which covered the cargo subject of this case now was likewise dismissed but without prejudice as it was not covered by the settlement. 1973 the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila. 91043 dismissing the first two causes of action in the aforesaid case with prejudice and without pronouncement as to costs because the parties had settled or compromised the claims involved therein. that fact shall not affect or prejudice the right of the shipper to bring suit within one year after the delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered. which was denied. 3. Provided. 91043. Maritime filed a formal motion to dismiss invoking once more the ground of prescription. 1977. is not given as provided for in this section. embodying three (3) causes of action involving three (3) separate and different shipments. 1977. The third cause of action therein involved the cargo now subject of this present litigation. scheduling the preliminary hearing on April 27. The corresponding claim for the damages sustained by the cargo was filed by the plaintiff with the defendant vessel on May 4. plaintiff instituted this present complaint on January 6. 5 and following pretrial. moved for a preliminary hearing on said defense. but under date of May 6. On June 11. xxx xxx xxx 4 To the complaint in the subsequent action Maritime filed an answer pleading inter alia the affirmative defense of prescription under the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. 7 The record before the Court does not show whether or not that hearing was held. by express mandate of said Code. The dismissal of that complaint containing the three causes of action was upon a joint motion to dismiss filed by the parties. Because of the dismissal of the (complaint in Civil Case No. either apparent or conceded. 1974. On December 11. in its Section 3. 5. resolved the matter in favor of Maritime and dismissed the complaint 10 Dole sought a reconsideration.2. paragraph 6. 6 The Trial Court granted the motion. xxx xxx xxx Dole concedes that its action is subject to the one-year period of limitation prescribe in the abovecited provision. 8 The motion was opposed by Dole9 and the Trial Court. 13 and there being "*** a patent deficiency *** with respect to the tolling of the prescriptive period ***" provided for in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. 11 and thereafter took the present appeal from the order of dismissal. 91043 with respect to the third cause of action without prejudice. The pivotal issue is whether or not Article 1155 of the Civil Code providing that the prescription of actions is interrupted by the making of an extrajudicial written demand by the creditor is applicable to actions brought under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act which. after due consideration. Judge Serafin Cuevas issued an Order in Civil Case No. if a notice of loss or damage.

Unfortunately. WHEREFORE. It instituted Civil Case No. May 27. 91043 only on June 11. We notice that while plaintiff avoids stating any date when the goods arrived in Manila. more than one month after that period has expired and its right of action had prescribed. it operated to toll prescription also in actions under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. 1953. It is desirable that matters affecting transportation of goods by sea be decided in as short a time as possible. To much the same effect is the further argument based on Article 1176 of the Civil Code which provides that the rights and obligations of common carriers shag be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws in all matters not regulated by the Civil Code. 3(6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. 96353) was filed on January 6. the one-year prescriptive period was interrupted — "tolled" would be the more precise term — and began to run anew from May 4. adverse to the position taken by Dole. contrary to the clear intent and purpose of the law. We have already decided that in a case governed by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. the application of the provisions of Article 1155 of the new Civil Code would unnecessarily extend the period and permit delays in the settlement of questions affecting transportation. 1155) cannot be made to apply. Stated otherwise. vs. 1973. 1972 amounted to a written extrajudicial demand which would toll or interrupt prescription under Article 1155. Inc. this Court rejected the contention that an extrajudicial demand toiled the prescriptive period provided for in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. 1972. the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on prescription should not be made to apply. Everett Steamship Corp. under Dole's theory. Dole let the new period lapse without filing action. with costs against the appellant. 1975 *** well within the one-year prescriptive period in Sec. when its claim was received by Maritime. 1972. we now hold that in such a case the general provisions of the new Civil Code (Art. according to defendant's own motion to dismiss on August 22. viz: In the second assignment of error plaintiff-appellant argues that it was error for the court a quo not to have considered the action of plaintiff-appellant suspended by the extrajudicial demand which took place. in The Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Co. It is clearly fallacious and merits no consideration.. Dole's contention that the prescriptive period "*** remained tolled as of May 4. The demand in this instance would be the claim for damage-filed by Dole with Maritime on May 4. Ltd. the order of dismissal appealed from is affirmed. 1972 *** (and that) in legal contemplation *** (the) case (Civil Case No. 1952.year prescriptive period from the date of its making. G. no different result would obtain even if the Court were to accept the proposition that a written extrajudicial demand does toll prescription under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. in a parallel factual situation. American President Lines.. Dole Philippines. . Inc.damage made on May 4. L-5554. 15 There.) Similarly. * * * Moreover. it relies upon the allegation made in the motion to dismiss that a protest was filed on August 22. These arguments might merit weightier consideration were it not for the fact that the question has already received a definitive answer.R. 1952 — which goes to show that plaintiff-appellant's counsel has not been laying the facts squarely before the court for the consideration of the merits of the case. as such application would have the effect of extending the oneyear period of prescription fixed in the law. SO ORDERED. affording Dole another period of one (1) year counted from that date within which to institute action on its claim for damage." 16 equates tolling with indefinite suspension. No. (Chua Kuy vs. where suit to recover for damage to cargo shipped by vessel from Tokyo to Manila was filed more than two years after the consignee's receipt of the cargo. The effect of that demand would have been to renew the one.

promulgated on May 26. JJ. LEUTERIO. Branch II. Guanlao for respondents. No. Feliciano. F M. vs. Plaintiffs-Appellees. 27 pt. demanded delivery of the lot to it and upon refusal . concur.. and adopted by the Court of Appeals. as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The Calma spouses were the lessees of that lot describe as Lot No.. CALMA. The defendant Albetz Investments. Cruz. for petitioner. Inc. Melencio-Herrera. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.. HON. and wanton demolition of the house of the plaintiffs when the sheriff served the writ of execution issued by the Municipal Court. Calma. Branch II. affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. J. L-32570 February 28. and SPOUSES RICARDO CALMA AND VICENTA D. and Spouses Francisco Umengan and Maria R. 816 Prudencio Street. Gancayco and Sarmiento.: Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. 39253-R. ANTONIO.. R. Manila. Inc. the lessor. respondents. as found by the trial court. R. whereby Albetz Investments. Umengan. No. JOSE N. needing the premises in order to construct a new building. The facts.. and SPOUSES FRANCISCO UMENGAN and MARIA R. Block No. 1970.Yap (Chairman). Jr. was ordered to pay damages and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs.R. petitioner. Sampaloc. 1977 ALBETZ INVESTMENTS. entitled "Spouses Ricardo Calma and Vicenta D. INC. Defendant-Appellant". Inc. COURT OF APPEALS. BP-52 of a subdivision plan and located No. versus Albetz Investments. UMENGAN. are as follows: This is an action for damages caused to the plaintiffs' properties due to the alleged indiscriminate. Quisumbing. negligent.

58246. etc.. Meneses. Vicenta Calma and others filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction on September 7. E): In view of the special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition with preliminary and mandatory injuction filed by defendant in the Court of First Instance of Manila bearing No. 1965. Exh. 58246. Inc. 1964. vs. or four days thereafter the Sheriff. The Sheriff submitted his return of September 12. 17. 0. The petition for certiorari with prohibition was denied by the Court of First Instance. the Municipal Judge entered an order on April 29. Inc. the following order (Exh.. Special Civil Action No. Exh. 1964 in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Exh. Albetz Investments. 15. authorizing and ordering the Sheriff to destroy. Exh. Inc. 1965. C). C). 12. director and lawyer of Albetz Investments. which was duly opposed by defendant Vicenta Calma. civil Case No. Inc. demolished the house of' the spouses Calma without any new writ or order for demolition leaving been issued by the Municipal Court and only on the strength of the order of June 21. Crisanto Aragon. From the order of dismissal. Exh. 1965. thru its lawyer. Exh.. Exh. acting upon the said motion for suspension. 1964. 1965. granting the defendant 30 days from the receipt thereof to vacate and remove her house on the premises. at the instance of defendant Albetz Investments. The judgment having become final. brought an action of unlawful detainer against Vicenta Calma. commanding the Sheriff to remove the defendants in the premises and to collect the damages. Thereafter. Atty. 63549. the spouses Calma filed an action for specific performance with injuction against Albetz Investments. all the proceedings in the above-entitled cases are hereby suspended until after the said special action shall have been finally resolved. praying that all proceedings be suspended until the termination of the petition for certiorari with prohibition. The appeal of the Calmas in the certiorari case was dimissed by the Supreme Court. The Municipal Judge. ordering Vicenta Calma and all persons claiming under her to vacate the premises and to pay the corresponding rentals (Exh. counsel for Vicenta Calma filed a motion on September 8. 7). (Exh. 13. 14. Atty. and on February 19. upon motion of Albetz investments. 58246. causing damage to their . Civil Case No. N. Exh.. The motion was granted and the Municipal Court issued the writ of execution. Vicenta Calma appealed to the Supreme Court on December 19. demolish or remove the house which had been constructed by the defendants. entitled Narciso Nakpil. Inc. 1. Atty. 1965. et al. be ordered to sell the lot in question to the plaintiffs at a reasonable price. Hon. Vicenta Calma having failed to remove the house within the 30 day period. on December 2. 1964. 1966. was dismiss on February 15. and that the manner it was carried out was indiscriminate. informing the Court that or the date of the return the defendant has not yet demolished her house and improvements or vacated the lot. filed a motion for execution (Exh. 1964. Upon the filing of this petition. otherwise a demolition order would issue. Meneses. issued on September 17. 2. Inc. Civil Case No. praying that Albetz Investments. on July 1. D. and Albetz Investments.964. Inc. Macario S. 1964. 119712 (Exh. the Court issued an order on June 21. Judgment by default was rendered by the Municipal Court on March 30. Alleging that the demolition was illegal because it was made eight (8) months after issuance of the demolition order. Meneses then filed a motion for demolition on February 9. in the unlawful detainer case. Exh. 10). This complaint. Acting upon the said motion.of of the Calma Spouses.

1966. that the Calma spouses could not have been unaware of the order of demolition prior to the date when their house was actually demolished. On the principal grounds that the order of demolition was no longer in force. The motion of Albetz Investments. 1965.note that. 1965 was issued only after the certiorari case in the Court of First Instance was dismissed and after the Calma spouses failed to remove their house within the period granted to them by the court. that the Calma spouses were given more than sufficient time to comply with the order of the Municipal Court to remove voluntarily their house from the premises. petitioner has filed the present petition. which judgment had long been final and executory. there was no point in waiting until that order could be served on the adverse party before issuing the corresponding writ of demolition. As stated inAcibo vs. specifically. and the spouses Umengan. 1965 was duly opposed by the Calma spouses. for demolition which was filed on February 9. the Municipal Judge granted the said spouses a period of thirty (30) days within which to vacate the premises and remove their house therefrom. authorizing the Sheriff to demolish and remove the house constructed thereon by the Calma spouses. and the final resolution took place when the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the Calma spouses thereon. 63549. as well as attorney's fees and costs of suit. Macadaeg 1 "Since the order of demolition was not appealable. the Court of First Instance rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant. It is very clear from the records that this case arose out of a judgment in favor of the petitioner in an unlawful detainer case. Inc. It is also important to. the proceedings therein. owners of the house. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals. with about 35 laborers to carry out the demolition of plaintiffs' house"." . From then on. a series of delays in the execution was occasioned by the moves of the Calma spouses to forestall the enforcement of the judgment. which is not implemented within sixty (60) days becomes a nullity. the Latter sought to forestall the implementation of said order by filing another action. 1965. issued under section 13 (now section 14) of Rule 39 of the Rules. and that the said spouses were not notified of the order of demolition. We find. therefore. It must also be noted that even after the Municipal Court issued its order of June 21. 1966. The order of demolition of June 21. Civil Case No. On April 29. 1965. It is not even necessary to await the order of demolition to be served upon the said spouses before carrying out the writ of demolition. by order of the Municipal Court in the unlawful detainer case.personal properties. saying that "it is not disputed that plaintiffs were only notified of the order of demolition on the day the Sheriff appeared at the place of plaintiffs in the morning of February 19. otherwise an order of demolition would issue. the spouses Calma. resulting in their being damaged. having been issued eight (8) months before its enforcement. occupants of its ground floor. were suspended only until after the special civil action for certiorari was finally resolved. Writ of execution was not satisfied because defendants Calma spouses refused to vacate the premises subject matter of the action and to remove their house therefrom. the execution of the judgment. commenced the instant action in the Court of First Instance of Manila. and they demolished the house indiscrimately and the personal properties were carelessly placed. it further appearing that they had not as yet been notified of the dismissal of their complaint for specific performance with injunction. was later action was ultimately dismissed by the Court of First Instance on February 15. on the basis of the records. It is apparent. this time for specific performance on December 2. after 'the dismissal of their certiorari case by this Court. awarding them damages in specified amounts. The Court of Appeals affirmed en toto the decision of the Court of First Instance. Alleging that both the Appellate Court and the trial court erred in declaring that an order of demolition.

after due hearing. 3 . accordingly. specifically provides: SEC. summary character and purposes of an unlawful detainer proceedings. issued upon petition of the judgment creditor after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.. Section 14. . any delay in the implementation of the order of demolition accrues to the benefit of the deforciant. unless expressly authorized by the Court. it should be executed immediately in order to prevent further damages to him caused by the loss of his possession. demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the court. The law does not specify the period within which the order of demolition should be carried out. to direct the defeated party to make such delivery or restitution. The court may authorize the Provincial Sheriff to do so. demolish. This provision has been taken from section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. Therefore.—When the property subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment debtor or his agent. If to accomplish this he has to remove an improvement constructed by the defeated party. Rule 39. shall not destroy. 39. There is no question that the Municipal Court had full authority to order the demolition of the Calma's house by the Sheriff in order to give effect to its judgment in the unlawful detainer case. which states that: "The Provincial Sheriff. "intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession of property. There may be factors and circumstances which would justify deferment of the implementation of the order of demolition. It is for this reason that when judgment is in favor of the plaintiff. in the enforcement of a judgment for delivery or restitution of property. of the Revised Rules of Court. The reason is obvious. technicalities or details of procedure which may cause unnecessary delays should carefully be avoided. The grant of such a reasonable period to remove the improvements is predicated upon reasons of fairness and justice to enable the defeated party to look for another place wherein he can transfer his improvements and personal effects. It is not enough for the Sheriff. Diaz. which order can only be issued upon motion of the prevailing party with notice and after hearing. and upon failure of the defendant to remove the after-mentioned improvements within a reasonable time after being so ordered by the Court.The nature of forcible entry or unlawful detainer proceedings is that they are summary in character. the officer shall not destroy. It is the duty of the Sheriff to oust the defeated party from the property and make the restitution by placing the winning party in possession of said property. and upon the defeated party's failure to remove the improvement within the reasonable time given to him by the court. 5 Thus. 4 The theory of private respondents is inconsistent with the special.." Evident from the foregoing is the statutory purpose which is to grant to the defeated party a reasonable time to remove his improvement from the premises. in executing the decision of a competent court in ejectment cases. upon petition of the plaintiff or his attorney." 2 As aptly explained by Chief Justice Moran in Co Tiamco v. Cases of forcible entry and detainer are summary in nature for they involve perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible and. 14 Removal of improvements on property object of execution. he cannot effect such removal without special order of the court. or remove the improvements constructed or planted by the defendant or his agent or servant on the premises.

however. the personal properties were just carelessly placed between the house and the fence. Certainly. thus: Art. act with justice. nevertheless. the demolition complained of in the case at bar was not carried out in a manner consistent with justice and good faith. The extent of the damage has been determined by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Inc. (Chairman). WHEREFORE. Fernando. concur. indiscriminate. While it is true that Albetz Investments. if their men. AS found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals: In the course of the demolition. Inc.. Every person must. JJ. the Sheriff. took no part. was designated to sit in the Second division. such right should not have been exercised in such a manner as to unduly prejudice its owners. according to the evidence for the the plaintiffs. maliciously and indiscriminately demolished the house. which could only be achieved thru the demolition of the house standing thereon. destroying in the process many of the personal properties therein which belonged to the spouses Calma and Umengan. As here was no one to take care (of them). No damage worth mentioning would have been sustained by petitioner Albetz Investments. had been instructed to allow said occupants to remove their personal properties. specifically Article 19 which provides. led by the Sheriff. Concepcion Jr. At the instance of petitioner. We affirm the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the same was indiscriminate. Muñoz Palma J. it was done in a swift. resulting in their destruction. and Aquino. Urged by the lawyer of petitioner. without pronouncement as to costs. Muñoz Palma. giving the occupants of the house no time at all to remove their belongings therefrom. in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties.Anent the manner in which the demolition was carried out. without due regard to the safety of the personal properties belonging to the Calma and Umengan spouses. many of the properties ere lost. with the foregoing modifications.. J. wantonly. 19. considering that this would not have taken a considerable length of time. give everyone his due. . aided with petitioner's laborers. Barredo. upon a finding that the same was not contested by petitioner. and observe honesty and good faith. the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. had the legal right to the surrender to them of the parcel of land leased by the Calma spouses. unconscionable manner. and the were left in the house and they were damaged by falling debris. We find that the provisions of the Civil Code on Human Relations (Chapter 2) are applicable. which was..

INC. is a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with the Philippines laws. Alfonso Sycip. 4-B and 4-A). Since the start of CALI’s operations. was in charge of the collection thereof. Mr. Fitzgerald. and the management of Defendant probably assumed that the assets of the CALI could very well meet . However. Even before August 6. which will be hereinafter referred to as CALI. Wildred Wooding..58 in its favor for goods it sold and delivered to CALI.. (CALI).000. who represented in this country Defendant’s Board of Directors. intervenors. 1948.R. Ltd. the residence of which is in London. answered that the total outstanding liabilities of his corporation was only P550. in his capacity as Assignee of the insolvent COMMERCIAL AIR LINES.] ALFREDO M. PAUL SYCIP and MABASA & CO. with principal offices at the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank building in the City of Manila. Col. Lambert. As of August.. its fuel needs were all supplied by the Defendant. 1948.. Fitzgerald sometime before August 6. CALI’s Douglas C-54 plane. As a matter of fact. then in California. a corporation organized under the laws of England and duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. Defendant-Appellee. 1948. which offer was. vs. all matters referring to extensions of the term of payment had to be decided first by Mr. L-7817. DECISION FELIX. 1956.162. CALI’s Vice President and General Manager. Inc. I. its Credit Manager who extended credit to CALI. was offered to him by Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald. YEK HUA TRADING CORPORATION. according to Mr. England (Exhs. with offices in the City of Manila and previously engaged in air transportation business. Stephen Crawford and later by Mr. LTD. October 31. J. Plaintif-Appellant. the books of the Defendant showed a balance of P170. declined by Mr.. Crawford. however. is on the other hand. for the purpose of preparing the report for its London office regarding CALI’s indebtedness.: Antecedents — The Commercial Air Lines. which will be designated as the Defendant. Defendant had reasons to believe that the financial condition of the CALI was for from being satisfactory. CALI’s President of the Board of Directors. No. The Shell Company of the P.EN BANC [G. in partial settlement of their accounts. VELAYO. probably because upon inquiries made by Mr. SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

1948.871. of the Phil. In that meeting at noontime of August 6.880.. VV. representing Smith. J. L. The creditors present.127. SS. and HHH). out of the 194 creditors in all (Exh. II-4.68 Smith. representing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 45.04 Manila Int’l Air Terminal (PAL) 36.512. NN). Mr. signed their names and the names of the companies they represented on a memorandum pad of the law firm Quisumbing. representing Gibbs.762. Messrs. and Mr. C. 4. YY. Alfonso Z.280. BBB. T.90 Goodrich Int’l Rubber Co. Chuidian & Quasha 5.72 Alfonso Sycip 575.. Ltd.189. MM. Chuidian & Quasha.50 Mabasa & Co. Mr. representing Goodrich International Rubber Co.000..544. Sycip. Ltd.. 3. Desmond Fitzgerald. 4. JJJ. representing Mabasa & Co. 152. Buenaventura 20.911. Mark Pringle. Fitzgerald.. Yek Hua Trading Corporation and Paul Sycip (Exhs. W. Dominguez and Pacifico Agcaoili. Sycip. CCC. representing himself. Bell & Co. the management of CALI informally convened its principal creditors (excepting only the insignificant small claims) who were invited to a luncheon that was held between 12: 00 and 2: 00 o’clock in the afternoon of that day in the Trade and Commerce Building at 123 Juan Luna St. ZZ. XX.00 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. E.I. J. including Mr.. Vicente Liwag. 1.83 Yek Hua Trading Corp. E.87 . EEE.68 Shell Co. D. A. UU. Mr.142. Gibbs. chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary chanroblesvirt uallawlibrary chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary chan roblesv irtualawlibrary chan roblesv irtualawlibrary chan roblesv irtualawlibrary chan roblesvirt ualawlibrary chan chan roblesvirt ualawlibrary roblesvirt ualawlibrary roblesv irtualawlibrary chan chan chan roblesv irtualawlibrary roblesvirt ualawlibrary The persons present.163.72 Manila Int’l Airport 55. (Lloyds of London). representing Commercial News.. On August 6.33 Mrs. to wit: chanroblesvirt uallawlibrary 13th Air Force P12. QQQ.47 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. AAA.880. Ltd.00 Paul Sycip 8. GGG. Bunnel and Manuel Chan. FFF. Manila.said liabilities and were not included to take charge of the sale of CALI’s said Douglas C-54 plane to collect its credit. TT. and Quisumbing (Exhs. and informed them that CALI was in a state of insolvency and had to stop operation. representing National Airports Corporation.641. P. Messrs.534.00 Civil Aeronautics Administration 98. Mr.20 ————— P1. Mr. G. Valera.867. Adair. representing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. were: Mr. VV and VV-1). Bartolini. 1948. OO) 15 were listed as principal creditors having big balances (Exh.00 Gibbs. DDD. WW. Mr.727. Quintin Yu. NN. Chuidian. Bell & Co. 487. or represented at the meeting. representing Shell Co. Giibs..

5 — P. January 15. He explained the memorandum agreement executed by the CALI with the Philippine Air Lines.n. MM and QQQ. 1948.s. The representatives of the latter Messrs. He was likewise assisted in his explanation by Mr. par. Alexander Sycip was assisted in the explanation by CPA Alfredo Velayo of Washington.). 1952. 247-248 t.. on August 4. par. 1 — memo of meeting. par. Bell vs. Exhs.230 t. Dominguez and Pacifico V. Curtis L. It was agreed that these matters together with the general question of what are preferred claims should be the subject of further discussions. and pp. Vicente H. to the General Manager of the National Airports Corp. of the testimony of Desmond Fitzgerald). 229. MM and QQQ. From the latter exhibit the following is copied: chan chan roblesvirt ualawlibrary roblesv irtualawlibrary chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary “4. Vice President and General Manager of the CALI. (Exhs. 1951. par. par. Inc. Agcaoili’s memorandum dated August 7. NN. Sycip & Company. Fitzgerald shall represent the creditors as a whole in this committee. Auditors of the CALI. the Government and the National Airports Corporation.. MM and QQQ. 1948. 1952. the property now involved in this suit. Liwag. 1948.What occurred in that meeting may be summarized as follows: Mr. informed the creditors present that this corporation was insolvent and had to stop operations. 3 — Memo of meeting). Certain specific matters such as the amount owing to the Philippine Air Lines. MM.n. Agcoaili’s memorandum dated August 7. JJ — P. and pp. C. III and PPP. 3 — 0151 Memo of meeting. of the testimony of D. Agcaoili. III and PPP. III and PPP — P. Secretary of the Board of Directors of the CALI. par. The creditors present agreed to the formation of the working committee to supervise the preservation of the properties of the corporation and agreed further that Mr. and it was further agreed that said working committee would supervise the preservation of the properties of the corporation while the creditors attempted to come to an understanding as to a fair distribution of the assets among them (Exhs. of the testimony of D. The said balance sheet made mention of a C-54 plane in the United States. Co. chanroblesvirt uallawlibrary chan roblesvirt ualawlibrary chan roblesv irtualawlibrary chan roblesvirt ualawlibrary chan roblesv irtualawlibrary Then followed a discussion on the payment of claims of creditors and the preferences claimed for the accounts due to the employees. who discussed the balance sheets and distributed copies thereof to the creditors present (Exhs. Alexander Sycip. and the claims of Smith.. Exh. who described in greater detail the assets of the CALI. Inc. Exhs.. Fitzgerald).. Memo of meeting).n. Fitzgerald). No understanding was reached on this point and it was then generally agreed that the matter of preference be further studied by a working committee to be formed (Exhs. (representing Lloyds of London) that its claim should be offset against the payments which may be due to CALI from insurance claims were not taken up in detail.s. January 10. Mr.. Lambert. but shall not interfere with the consummation of the sale in favor of PAL. It was . to the General Manager of the National Airports Corp.s.. contended that their accounts were preferred. MM and QQQ. Nov. The other creditors disputed such contention of preference (Exhs. Agcaoili’s memorandum dated August 1. The creditors present agreed to the formation of a working committee to continue the discussion of the payment of claims and preferences alleged by certain creditors. 1948. 27. 3 — P. Exhs. regarding the proposed sale to the latter of the aviation equipments of the former (Exhs. 2 — Memo of meeting. to the General Manager of the National Airports Corp. “5. There was a general understanding among all the creditors present on the desirability of consummating the sale in favor of the Philippine Air Lines Inc. Agcaoili’s copy of balance sheet p.. NN-1 to 7. 299-300 t.

however. then all the profits from the sale will be submitted to an insolvency court for proper division among the creditors. I). B. 1948. 1948. O. Agcaoili’s memorandum dated August 7. M. Y.29 (Exhs. to the General Manager of the National Airports (Corp. Defendant effected a telegraphic transfer of its credit against the CALI to the American corporation Shell Oil Company. Credit Manager. N. the credit amounting this time to the sum of $85. although the management of the CALI announced that in case of non-agreement of the creditors on a pro-rata division of the assets. 1948. Atty. U..) were appointed. Mr. X. On September 17.. It was the sense of the persons present that. Sycip made an offer to Mr. 1948. of the Defendant.understood. 70. 1951). DD) and a supplemental attachment for a higher sum was applied for and issued against the C-54 plane. and Z) and a writ of attachment was applied for and issued on the same date against a C-54 plane (Exhs. Inc.081. On August 12.440. K.00. Atty. 1948. FF. R. L. that all questions relating to preference of claims can be decided only by the creditors assembled. EE. “6. 62576 of said Court (Exhs. E.29 (Exh. J. V. which was subsequently followed by a deed of assignment of credit dated August 10. Lambert. which Mr. . Fitzgerald did not decline the nomination to form part of said working committee and on August 9. G. August 9. for the collection of an assigned credit of $79. the American corporation Shell Oil Company. Q. and HH). BB-1 and CC) and on January 5. After the creditors present knew the balance sheet and heard the explanations of the officers of the CALI.A. AA. the 3 members thereof discussed methods of achieving the objectives of the committee as decided at the creditors’ meeting. par.s.081. in and for the County of San Bernardino. Fitzgerald replied that the creditors could rely on Col. the insolvency court be avoided but that should the creditors not meet in agreement. October 22. Pacifico Agcaoili promised to refer the arguments adduced at the second meeting to the General Manager of the National Airports Corporations and to obtain the advice of the Corporate Counsel. and X-1). Inc. Agcaoili of the National Airports Corporation and Atty.00 — Case No. Fitzgerald attended. 1949. T.S. it was their unanimous opinion that it would be advantageous not to present suits against this corporation but to strive for a fair pro-rata division of its assets (Exh.n. H. an amended complaint was filed to recover an assigned credit of $85. assigning its credit. U. Fitzgerald to name a representative to oversee the preservation of the assets of the CALI. if possible. par 6. 1948. Alexander Sycip (Exhs. so the negotiation with respect to the division of assets of the CALI among the creditors was left pending or under advice when on that very day of the meeting of the working committee. S. t. plus miscellaneous personal properties held by Pacific Overseas Air Lines for the CALI (Exhs. Atty. it would file insolvency proceedings (p.” To this working committee. Desmond Fitzgerald. MM. D. C. Memo of meeting). filed a complaint against the CALI in the Superior Court of the State of California. III and PPP. BB. F. a judgment by default was entered by the American court (Exhs. amounting to $79. D. GG. W. Mr. P. which were to preserve the assets of the CALI and to study the way of making a fair division of all the assets among the creditors. 5 — P.440. but Mr.. A. I.

KKK. On November 3.. Inc. stockholders’ meeting). OO — Minutes of August 12. the Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining theDefendant. the clerk of court executed a deed of conveyance in favor of the Assignee (Alfredo M. Ltd. U. 1948. thus compelling the National Airports Corporation to file its claims with the insolvency court (Exh. Velayo instituted this case (No.00 to be approved by the Court conditioned upon the faithful performance of his duties. who was unanimously elected by the creditors as Assignee in the proceedings. 1948. begun by it in the name of the American corporation Shell Oil Company. The CALI. its agent. 6966 of the Court of First Instance of Manila) on December 17. which is the property of the insolvent CALI.. The Case. I. JJ) which necessarily stayed the National Airports Corporation’s action against the CALI and dissolved its attachment (Exh. Velayo) over all the assets of the CALI (Exh.S. On this date. the .. and as an alternative remedy. Inc. be deposited in a local bank (Exh. 1948. with costs. situated in the Ontario International Airport. Velayo.000. an order of insolvency was issued by the court (Exh. and noted “that the Board had been trying to reach an agreement with the creditors of the corporation to prevent insolvency proceedings. against the Shell Company of P. By the first week of September. the stockholders of CALI resolved in a special meeting of August 12. in case the purported assignment of Defendant’s alleged credit to the American corporation Shell Oil Company. and providing further that all funds that the Assignee may collect or receive from the debtors of the corporation. Alfredo M. attorneys and solicitors from prosecuting in and for the County of San Bernardino in the Superior Court of the State of California. The complaint further prays that upon the filing of a bond executed to the Defendant in an amount to be fixed by the Court. servants. Alfredo M.S. KK). SS). a petition for voluntary insolvency. 1948. 62576. also prompted by Defendant’s action in getting the alleged undue preference over the other creditors by attaching the C-54 plane in the United States. LL). 1948.Unaware of Defendant’s assignments of credit and attachment suit. with in the County of San Bernardino. or from any other source or sources. State of California.A.A. the aforementioned Civil Case No. filed on October 7. and ordered him to qualify as such by taking the oath of office within 5 days from notice and filing a bond in the sum of P30.mentioned airplane.. the Court confirmed the appointment of Mr. U.. its agents. Inc. 62576 against the insolvent Commercial Air Lines. but so far no definite agreement had been reached” (Exh. and MMM). 1948. servants. By order of October 28. and the attachment issued against CALI in the said Superior Court of California shall have the effect of defeating the procurement by Plaintif as Assignee in insolvency of the above. NNN). to approve the memorandum agreement of sale to the Philippine Air Lines. the National Airports Corporation learned of Defendant’s action in the United States and hastened to file its own complaint with attachment against the CALI in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Exhs. attorney’s and solicitor. beyond the jurisdiction of the Philippines. Inc. — After properly qualifying as Assignee. that judgment for damages in double the value of the airplane be awarded in favor of Plaintif againstDefendant.. 1948. for the purpose of securing from the Court a writ of injunction restraining Defendant. from prosecuting the aforementioned case No. to the effect that Plaintif will pay to Defendant all damages the latter may sustain by reason of the injunction if the Court should finally decide that the Plaintifwas not entitled thereto. LLL.

1949. among other reasons. was merely invited to a luncheon-meeting at the Trade and Commerce Building in the City of Manila on August 6. and presumably countless American investors inasmuch as its shares of stock are being traded daily in the New York stock market.. with permission of the Court. S. On December 20. and for such other remedy as the Court may deem just and equitable in the premises. which was amended on February 3..e. as well as Mabasa & Co. i. After proper proceedings and hearing. U. that the assignment of its credit in favor of the Shell Oil Company. the Defendant filed an opposition to the Plaintif’s petition for the issuance of a writ of the preliminary injunction. . S.. On December 28. 1954. 62576 instituted in the Superior Court in the State of California by the Shell Oil Company. Fitzgerald could not have officially represented the Defendant at that time because such authority resides on Mr. A. there being no law prohibiting a creditor from assigning his credit to another. the Court rendered decision on February 26. Yek Hua Trading Corporation and Paul Sycip. Plaintif comes to us praying that the judgment of the lower court be reversed and that the Defendant be ordered to pay him damages in the sum of P660. which is outside of the jurisdiction of the Philippines. without knowing the purpose for which it was called. with costs. These complaints in intervention were timely answered by Defendant which prayed that they be dismissed. Inc. State of California. chan roblesv irtualawlibrary chan chan roblesvirt ualawlibrary roblesvirt ualawlibrary Then Alfonso Sycip. in the United States was for a valuable consideration and made in accordance with the established commercial practices.. In view of this outcome. of the United State has its principal stockholders the Shell Union Oil Company of the U. that it had no interest whatsoever in Civil Case No. that Mr. the Philippine court would not be in position to enforce its orders as against the American corporation Shell Oil Company. Fitzgerald. besides denying certain averments of the complaint alleged. 1948. their respective complaints in intervention taking the side of thePlaintif.. and that Mr. filed.000 (being double the value of the airplane as established by evidence. dismissing the complaint as well as the complaints in intervention. Defendant’s Credit Manager. Stephen Crawfurd. he confines his action to the recovery of damages against the Defendant.same writ of preliminary injunction to issue without notice to the Defendantit appearing by verified complaint that the great irreparable injury will result to the Plaintif-Appellant before the matter could be on notice. prays that the complaint be dismissed with costs against thePlaintif. P330.. 1948.S. Defendant. The Plaintif also prays for such other remedies that the Court may deem proper in the premises.. 1948. therefore. A. Defendant. Plaintif having failed to restrain the progress of the attachment suit in the United States by denial of his application for a writ of preliminary injunction and the consequences on execution of the C-54 plane in the County of San Bernardino. the Defendant having as its stockholders the Shell Petroleum Company of London and other persons residing in that City. while the Shell Oil Company Inc. with costs against the Plaintif. 1948. Inc. Inc. and on December 22. In its answer. the Court denied the same because whether the conveyance of Defendant’s credit was fraudulent or not. Defendant filed its answer to the complaint. which is a separate and distinct corporation organized and existing in the State of Virginia and doing business in the State of California.. U.000).

Inc. on the very day its Credit Manager attended the meeting of the Working Committee on August 9. Mr. to the detriment and prejudice of the other CALI’s creditors who were consequently deprived of their share in the distribution of said value. Z). the Government and the National Airports Corporation — who alleged that their claims were preferred). We find that the facts narrated in the preceding statement of the “antecedents” have been sufficiently established.. 1948. or by preponderance of evidence. amounting this time to the sum of $85.The Issues. thus defeating the purpose of the informal meetings of CALI’s principal creditors end depriving the Plaintif. and if so.. at the meeting of August 9. acted in bad faith and betrayed the confidence and trust of the other creditors of CALI present in said meeting by affecting a hasty telegraphic transfer of its credit to the American corporation Shell Oil Company. upon learning the precarious economic situation of CALI and that with all probability. Inc. alleging that Mr. Ltd.. Fitzgerald met the other members of the said Working Committee and heard and discussed the contention of certain creditors of CALI — on the accounts due the employees. or the value thereof. 1948. and the questions at issue submitted to our determination in this instance may be boiled down to the following propositions: chanroblesvirt uallawlibrary (1) Whether or not under the facts of the case. what should be the amount of such damages. taking advantage of its knowledge of the existence of CALI’s airplane C-54 at the Ontario International Airport within the Country of San Bernardino. Desmond Fitzgerald. The mere enunciation of the first proposition can lead to no other conclusion than thatDefendant. and by what is stated in the preceding pages hereof. Defendant may be made under the law to answer for the damages prayed by the Plaintif. S. when said Mr. So. forgot that “Man does not live by bread alone” and entirely disregarded all moral inhibitory tenets. — Either admission of the parties. the Defendant Shell Company of the P. of the means of obtaining said C-54 plane. (Which knowledge it acquired: first at the informal luncheon-meeting of the principal creditors of CALI on August 5. and chanroblesvirt uallawlibrary chan roblesv irtualawlibrary Subsequently. for the sum of $79. as its Assignee. Fitzgerald had no authority from his principal to commit the latter on any agreement. was selected to form part of the Working Committee to supervise the preservation of CALI’s properties and to study the way of making a fair division of all the assets among the creditors and thus avoid the institution of insolvency proceedings in court. U.. and (2) Whether or not by reason of said betrayal of confidence and trust. 1948. I. where its Credit Manager. 1948. We know that were the damaging effects of said assignment upon the right of other creditors of the CALI to participate in the proceeds of said CALI’s plane C-54. it hastily made a telegraphic assignment of its credit against the CALI to its sister American Corporation. A. the Shell Oil Company. it could not get much of its outstanding credit because of the preferred claims of certain other creditors.440 which was subsequently followed by a deed of assignment of credit dated August 10.. Defendants endeavor to extricate itself from any liability caused by such evident misdeed of its part. that the assignment of its credit in favor of chan roblesv irtualawlibrary . State of California. or by sheer weight of the circumstance attending the transactions herein involved. chan roblesvirt ualawlibrary chan roblesvirt ualawlibrary DISCUSSION OF THE CONTROVERSY I.081.28 (Exhs.

The telegraphic transfer made without knowledge and at the back of the other creditors of CALI may be a shrewd and surprise move that enabled Defendant to collect almost all if not the entire amount of its credit. that these intervenors really resorted to such strategem or fraudulent device.its sister corporation. relation or understanding among themselves to come to the aid of each other. the Shell Company of the P. Under the circumstances of the case. Moreover. Shell Oil Company. Defendant’s transfer of its aforementioned credit would have been justified only if Mr. Fitzgerald. said Sections 32 and 70 only contemplate acts and transactions occuring within 30 days prior to the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency and. The assignee shall have the right to recover all the estate. In addition to this. Inc. of the United States is a corporation different and independent from the Defendant. but the Court of Justice cannot countenance such attitude at all. that there is no law prohibiting a creditor from assigning his credit to another. Fitzgerald had declined to take part in the Working Committee and frankly and honestly informed the other creditors present that he had no authority to bind his principal and that the latter was to be left free to collect its credit from CALI by whatever means his principal deemed wise and were available to it.. II. But all these defenses are entirely immaterial and have no bearing on the main question at issue in this appeal. while CALI filed its petition for insolvency on October 7. that the assignment of Defendant’s credit for a valuable consideration is not violative of the provisions of sections 32 and 70 of the Insolvency Law (Public Act No. debt and effects of said insolvent. because the assignment was made since August 9. But section 70 does not constitute the only provisions of the law pertinent to the matter. Defendant may also claim that Mr. If at the time of the commencement of the proceedings in . Ltd. and that the Shell Oil Company Inc.. We may agree with the trial judge. chan chan roblesvirt ualawlibrary roblesvirt ualawlibrary To justify its actions. 1948. We may add that Article 70 of the Insolvency Law refers to acts of the debtor (in this case the insolvent CALI) and not of the creditor. yet Defendant’s act finds not justification for no misdeed on the part of a person is cured by any misdeed of another. the original complaint in the United States was filed on August 12. and that the infiltration of one’s credit is of no sequence if it cannot be proven in the insolvency proceedings to the satisfaction of the court. 1948. I. based on his feeling of distrust and apprehension. and it is to be noted that neither Alfonso Z. and much less from a foreign corporation to the detriment of our Government and local business. we might say that Defendantcould not have accomplished the transfer of its credit to its sister corporation if all the Shell companies throughout the world would not have a sort of union. 1948. all other acts outside of the 30-day period cannot possibly be considered as coming within the orbit of the operation. nor Yek Hua Trading Corporation were the only creditors of CALI. entertained the conviction that intervenors Alfonso Sycip and Yek Hua Trading Corporation tried to take undue advantage by infiltrating their credits. 1956). 33. At his Honor correctly states. But then such information would have immediately dissolved all attempts to come to an amicable conciliation among the creditors and would have precipitated the filing in court of CALI’s voluntary insolvency proceedings and nulified the intended transfer of Defendant’s credit to its above-mentioned sister corporation. Sycip. and the writ of attachment issued on this same date. But even assuming for the sake of argument. consequently. The Insolvency Law also provides the following: chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary “SEC. was for a valuable consideration and in accordance with the established commercial practices. nor even preferred ones.

or having reason to believe that insolvency proceedings are about to be commenced. . vs. de Veloso S. dealing on Human Relations. in like manner and with life effect as if it had been originally commenced by him. 527 — (II Tolentino’s Commercial Laws of the Philippines. If there are any rights of action in favor of the insolvency for damages. 48 Phil. 45 Phil. of the opportunity to recover said plane. C. R. embezzles or disposes of any money. he is chargeable therewith.insolvency. Imperial. 48 Phil. on any account. the assignee represents the insolvent as well as the creditors in voluntary and involuntary proceedings — Intestate of Mariano G. No.” cralaw It must not be forgotten that in accordance with the spirit of the Insolvency Law and with the provisions of Chapter V thereof which deal with the powers and duties of a receiver. and believing it most probable that they would not arrive at such understanding as it was really the case — schemed and effected the transfer of its sister corporation in the United States. vs. for which an action is not pending the assignee shall have the right to prosecute the same with effect as the insolvent might have done himself if no proceedings in insolvency had been instituted . The writer of this decision does not entertain any doubt that the Defendant — taking advantage of his knowledge that insolvency proceedings were to be instituted by CALI if the creditors did not come to an understanding as to the manner of distribution of the insolvent asset among them. before the assignment is made. Any person must. had personality and authority to institute this case for damages. 21. act with justice. Chartered Bank vs. Vda. 633). 931. for the recovery of a debt or other thing might or ought to pass to the assignee by the assignment. Asia Banking Corporation vs. where CALI’s plane C-54 was by that swift and unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed of said insolvent’s property depriving the latter and the Assignee that was latter appointed. the assignee shall be allowed to prosecute the action. an action is pending in the name of the debtor. We see that Plaintif. etc. Veloso. chattels. as Assignee of the Insolvent CALI.From the foregoing. and liable to an action by the assignee for double the value of the property sought to be embezzled or disposed of. 42454. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage”. and the only question that remains determination is whether the payment of damages sought to be recovered from Defendant may be ordered under the Law and the evidence of record. Kerr & Co. — G. to be received for the benefit of the insolvent estate. See also Section 36 of the Insolvency Law. in the exercise of his rights and in the performances of his duties. Hunter. provides the following: chanroblesvirt uallawlibrary “Art 19. In addition to the aforementioned Section 37. or effects of the insolvent. 449. Herridge. Samuel Murray. give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith”. goods. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. chan chan roblesvirt ualawlibrary roblesvirt ualawlibrary chan roblesv irtualawlibrary IF ANY PERSON. having notice of the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency. It maybe said that this article only contains a mere declarations of principles and while such statement may be is essentially correct. yet We find that such declaration is implemented by Article 21 and sequence of the same Chapter which prescribe the following: chanroblesvirt uallawlibrary “Art. Chapter 2 of the PRELIMINARY TITLE of the Civil Code.

1956 edition. the victim loses faith in the ability of the government to afford him protection or relief. thus imparting to every legal system that enduring quality which ought to be one of its superlative attributes.” Now. It is most needful that this ancient principles be clearly and specifically consecrated in the proposed Civil Code to the end that in cases not foreseen by the lawmaker. I.41). one by one. Among these are many business practices that are unfair or oppressive. 51. the legislator. which has been one of the mainstays of every legal system for centuries. “The same observations may be made concerning injurious acts that are contrary to public policy but are not forbidden by statute. This provision embodies the doctrine that no person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another. 812). In this article. good customs or public policy. We also copy the following: chanroblesvirt uallawlibrary “A moral wrong or injury. the liability for damages arises from a willful or negligent act contrary to law. Vol. In Article 20. one cannot but feel that it is safe and salutary to transmute. should be compensated by damages. from those principles which are written with words of fire in the conscience of man. would this proposed article obliterate the boundary line between morality and law? The answer is that. 40. every good law draws its breath of life from morals. “Another rule is expressed in Article 24 which compels the return of a thing acquired ‘without just or legal grounds’. If this premises is admitted. in the last analysis. but have not been foreseen by the lawmakers. There are countless acts of such character. says the following: chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary “Thus at one stroke. moral norms into legal rules. When it is reflected that while codes of law and statutes have changed from age to age. then the proposed rule is a prudent earnest of justice in the face of the impossibility of enumerating. there is no belief of more baneful consequence upon the social order than that a person may with impunity cause damage to his fellow-men so long as he does not break any law of the State. Moral damages (Art. “A provision similar to the one under consideration is embodied in article 826 of the German Civil Code. p. 2217) may be recovered (Art.” (Report of the Code Commission on the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines. the conscience of man has remained fixed to its ancient moorings. would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. 2219). it may be asked. The German Civil Code has a similar provision (art. if Article 23 of the Civil Code goes as far as to provide that: chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary . From the Civil Code Annotated by Ambrosio Padilla. if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved). though he may be defying the most sacred postulates of morality. all wrongs which cause damages. and certain acts of landholders and employers affecting their tenants and employees which contravene the public policy of social justice. as far as may be.The Code Commission commenting on this article. “But. no one may unjustly benefit himself to the prejudice of another. even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law. p. the act is contrary to morals. What is more. “Furthermore.

“no vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the right of others. and that. It may be argued that the aforequoted provisions of the Civil Code only came into effect on August 30. provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right.. [5] 2023). of the same origin. 1950. Moreover. through Mr. Justice Briones. it shall be effective at once. one of the question at issue was whether or not the provisions of the New Civil Code of the Philippines on moral damages should be applied to an act of negligence which occurred before the effectivity of said code.” cralaw and according to Article 2254. Acro Taxicab Company. Article 2253 of the Civil Code further provides: chanroblesvirt uallawlibrary “ But if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code. 38 of the same Act). Gaz. as stated before. Castan. about the revolutionary tendency of Spanish jurisprudence. reaffirming the doctrine laid down in the case of Lilius (59 J. as no such limitation exist in the wording of the section (See also Sec. F. can be given retroactive effect.. specially if We take into consideration that the term “any person” used therein cannot be limited to the officers or employee of the insolvent. But Article 2252 of the Civil Code.“Even if an act or event causing damage to another’s property was not due to the fault or negligence of the Defendant. (82 Phil. and this Court. and that they cannot be applicable to acts that took place in 1948. We effect in this jurisdiction a real symbiosis 1 of the Spanish and American Laws and. the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited. like those on Human Relations. 47 Off.” In case of Juan Castro vs. 1934. and November 14. at the same time. though providing that: chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary “Changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by this Code which may be prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation. even though the act or event which may give rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation. 800) in the sense that indemnity lies for moral and patrimonial damages which include physical and pain sufferings. therefore. sustaining the affirmative proposition and citing decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14. We act in consonance with the spirit and progressive march of time” (translation) The writer of this decision does not see any reason for not applying the provisions of Section 37 of the Insolvency Law to the case at bar. as well as the comment of Mr. said the following: chan roblesv irtualawlibrary chanroblesvirt uallawlibrary “We conclude. With this (doctrine). shall have no retroactive effect . 359. 1941. the Defendant schemed and affected the transfer of its credits (from which it could derive practically nothing) to its sister corporation in the United States where CALI’s . Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Spain.” with mere much more reason the Defendant should be liable for indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith and with betrayal of confidence. prior to its effectivity.” cralaw implies that when the new provisions of the Code does nor prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation — and it cannot be alleged that in the case at barDefendant had any vested or acquired right to betray the confidence of the insolvent CALI or of its creditors — said new provisions.

2234. temperate. as compensatory damages a sum equivalent to the value of the plane at the time aforementioned and another equal sum as exemplary damages. Articles 2229. fraudulent.. oppressive. We hold Defendant liable to pay to the Plaintif.” “Art. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed. liquidated or compensatory damages. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved. temperate. voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another. the decision appealed from is reversed and Defendant-Appellee-. although this was practically the effect and result of the scheme. 2143. the Plaintif must show that he would be entitled to moral.plane C-54 was then situated. Judgment Wherefore. Shell Company of the Philippine Islands. damages in a sum double the amount of the value of the insolvent’s airplane C-54 at the time Defendant’s credit against the CALI was . In case liquidated damages should be upon. as Assignee of the insolvent CALI. or malevolent manner. and 2143 of the Civil Code read as follows: chanroblesvirt uallawlibrary “Art. reckless. 2142. There is no clear proof in the record about the real value of CALI’s plane C-54 at the time whenDefendant’s credit was assigned to its sister corporation in the United States. 2234. or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages. the writer of this decision yields to the objection aforementioned.” In accordance with these quoted provisions of the Civil Code.” “Art. in addition to the moral. succeeding by such swift and unsuspected operation in disposing of said insolvent’s property by removing it from the possession and ownership of the insolvent. 2232.” “Art. nevertheless. by way of example or correction for the public good. before the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages. 2142.” “Art. In contracts quasi-contracts. is hereby sentenced to pay to Plaintif-Appellant. Certain lawful. for the benefit of the insolvent CALI and its creditors. although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages be recovered. the Court may award exemplary damages if theDefendant acted in a wanton. The provisions for quasi-contracts in this Chapter do not exclude other quasi-contracts which may come within the purview of the preceding article. Ltd. Having in mind this objection and that the provisions of Article 37 making the person coming within its purview liable for double the value of the property sought to be disposed of constitute a sort of penal clause which shall be strictly construed. 2229. some members of this Court entertain doubt as to the applicability of said section 37 because in their opinion what Defendant in reality disposed of was its own credit and not the insolvent’s property. and on the strength of the foregoing considerations. by applying only the provisions of the Civil Code. and considering further that the same result may be obtained. the Plaintif must show that he is entitled to moral. However. 2232.

because its claims were fully paid. we are more convinced that the proofs relative to the real value of CALI plane C-54 at the time Defendant’s credit was assigned to its sister corporation in the United States. Reyes. RESOLUTION July 30. Padilla. and then retorted with a manifestation and motion of Defendant-Appellantfollowed by Defendant’s answer to Plaintif’s motion for reconsideration. This motion was opposed byDefendant-Appellee which was replied by Plaintif.Appellant with a supplemental motion for reconsideration. 1957 FELIX. nor caused any loss or injury to other creditors. have filed their respective motions for reconsideration of Our decision rendered in this case. Hence. at the time whenDefendant’s credit was assigned to its sister corporation in the United States. it orders that the value of the C-54 plane — “be determined in the corresponding incident in the lower Court after this decision becomes final. Plaintif-Appellant’s and intervenors’ motion for reconsideration is hereby overruled. under the control of the latter’s President Alfonso Sycip. did not prejudice the Government. as relied upon in its counsel’s memoranda and oral argument. Costs are taxed against Defendant-Appellee. Concepcion.assigned to its sister corporation in the United States. which value shall be determined in the corresponding incident in the lower court after this decision becomes final. B.J. and Endencia. Paras. After considering the evidence pointed out by said parties in support of their respective contentions. may be reduced to the following: chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary (1) That the Defendant Appellee is not guilty of bad faith.: Plaintif-Appellant and intervenors on one hand and Defendant Shell Company of the Philippine Islands. except the entities and groups controlled by Alfonso Z.. the insolvent CALI. J. Labrador.” and. upon such holding. concur. it having done nothing but to protect legitimately its own interest or credit against the bad faith of its debtor. C. The main grounds on which Defendant-Appellee bases its motion for reconsideration. Ltd. J. Bautista Angelo. is not clear. .000 at or about the time Defendant credit was assigned to its sister corporation in the United States and the plane attached.” The movants maintain that there is evidence sufficient to support a finding that CALI’s C-54 plane had a fair market value of $165. Montemayor.. The motion of Plaintif Appellant and the intervenors seeks the reconsideration of said decision in so far as it held that: chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary “There is no clear proof in the record about the real value of CALI’s plane C-54. Sycip. on the other. (2) That Appellee’s transfer of its credit to its sister corporation in the United States. L. It is SO ORDERED..

counsel forPlaintif-Appellant has the following to say: chanroblesvirt uallawlibrary “So far as the claims of the Government are concerned. As pointed out by counsel for Plaintif. But this circumstance cannot erase the fact that the Appellee’s action jeopardised the Government’s claims as well as the other claims. . in addition to the ordinary creditors whose claims are yet unapproved by the insolvency Court. I. (4) That the Plaintif-Appellant has no cause of Appellant and is not the real party in interest. They are not and cannot be denied or contradicted by said Defendant. which counsel for the Shell says to constitute 10/11 of the approved ordinary claims. II. There was doubt as to the preferential character of the Government’s claims.000 against the insolvent CALI as of August 1948.000.000. neither the character of the claim nor the identity of the claimant can possibly affect the application of a principle that no person may profit from his betrayal of a trust. which is assigned to its sister corporation in the United States for P120. Had it been held to be an ordinary claim. that these creditors may recover from the insolvent estate and when they do. the contingency exist. The facts on which this Court based its conclusion that Defendant corporation acted in bad faith are plainly and explicitly narrated in the decision. it is true that they were preferred claims and have all been paid. As long as these claims are pending. amounting to P560. The fact remains thatAppellee’s sister company was enabled to get hold of a C-54 plane worth about P330.32. they will suffer to the diminution of CALI’s asset resulting from the attachment of the plane by Appellee Shell. the Government would have suffered as other creditors. Appellee recovered 70% of its credit and immediately upon making the assignment in 1948.(3) That Appellee is not liable for exemplary damages because the provisions of the new Civil Code on the matter are not applicable to this case. Sycip and Yek Hua Trading Corporation. the preferential character of one of the Government’s claims necessitated a litigation to establish. Indeed. But that is neither here nor there. there is still 1/11 of the other creditors whose claims have been also approved by the insolvency Court. More than this. and action against Defendant- chan roblesv irtualawlibrary (5) That Plaintif’s right of action was based and prosecuted in the lower court under the provisions of the Insolvency Law and consequently that he is stopped from pursuing another theory and is not entitled to damages under the provisions of the New Civil Code. Defendant choses to ignore that besides the claims of intervenors Alfonso Z. Hence. and “no good reason suggests itself why these unapproved but pending claims should be taken into account in considering the prejudice caused all the creditors of the insolvent CALI.” chan roblesvirt ualawlibrary And the Appellant continues thus: chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary “Appellee had a credit of P170.” Answering Defendant’s contention that the transfer of its credit to its sister corporation in the United States did not prejudice the Government or the other creditors of CALI.296. the stated consideration was fixed by and and between two sister companies. On the contrary they are in many respects admitted by theDefendant and no amount of reasoning can make Us change that conclusion.

As to the fifth question raised by counsel for Appellee in the course of his oral argument at the hearing in the City of Baguio of his motion.719.” chan roblesv irtualawlibrary And even if the sale of CALI’s plane would not have obtained the sum of P330. the share of each of the ordinary creditos would certainly amount to approximately 1 1/2 times the dividend each of them has received.000. and Appelleewould recover approximately only 45% and not 70% of its credit.222..59.59 ————— = 30% Total of all ordinary claims approved and unapproved P1. i. 1956. if this amount of P330. Therefore. In that decision We said the following: chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary “Vicente Dimaliwat contends that Esperanza Dimaliwat has no right to claim the ownership of the property in question to the exclusion of the children of the third . That Appellee Shell is not liable for exemplary damages in this case and that Plaintif-Appellant has no cause of action against Defendant-Appellee. each ordinary creditors would received not 30% but approximately 45% of his claim. stopped from pursuing on appeal another theory under which he might be entitled to damages in consonance with the provisions of the new Civil Code”. therefore.e. the calculated dividend of each of the ordinary creditors.33 Had Appellee not assigned its credit in 1948. assignee and attorney’s fees and other reserves P138. no doubt. are matters fully discussed in Our decision and We find no sensible reason for disturbing the conclusions We reached therein. in other words.000 is added to the distributable amount of P529. III and IV. 59 Phil.746.. for he is not the real party in interest. 396. computed as follows: chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary Assets as of October 30.000 representing the fair market value of the plane at the time of the attachment.885. V. We may invoke the decision in the case of Dimaliwat vs. the insolvent CALI would have realized from the sale of the plane (which was attached by Appellee) P330. and the dividend of 70% secured by Defendant Shell in 1948.605. Asuncion. “that Plaintif’s right of action was based and prosecuted in the lower court under the provisions of the Insolvency Law and he is. the proceeds thereof that might be diminished though affecting..885.00.885. 401.“On the other hand. estimated at 45% by reducing it proportionately.15 Less: chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary Preferred claims still uncollected. the ordinary creditors who filed their claims against the insolvent CALI had to wait until November 1956 to get their dividends and only at the rate of 30%.59 Divident: chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary Amount available for distribution P529. such diminution would at the same time increase the difference between the dividend paid CALI’s ordinary creditors in November. 1956 P668.56 ————— Amount available for distribution P529.

are not well taken. goods. However. exemplary or . It will be remembered that this case was looked into from the point of view of the provisions of Section 37 of the Insolvency Law. In this connection it is to be noted that. to be received for the benefit of the insolvent estate. The decision cited are not in point. The writer of the decision was then and still is of the opinion that the provisions of this section were applicable to the case. 2142 and 2143 of the new Civil Code are rules of substantive law. of the opportunity to recover said plane. and accordingly. or effects of the insolvent. In the case at bar.” These acts of Defendant Shell come squarely within the sanction prescribed by Congress by similar acts and no reflection can be reasonably cast on Us if in the measure of the exemplary damages that were to be imposed upon DefendantAppellee. which reads as follows: chanroblesvirt uallawlibrary SEC. for the reasons already stated in the decision. and believing as most probable that they would not arrive at such understanding. they must be made operative and given effect in this litigation. and if they are applicable to the facts of this case they must be given effect. We insist to delve in the question of whether the exemplary damages imposed in this Court upon Defendant Appellee. IF ANY PERSON. Articles 968 and 969 of the Civil Code are rules of substantive law. xxx xxx xxx It maybe seen from the foregoing that the above mentioned grounds on which the motion for reconsideration of the Defendant Shell stand. Articles 19. may be modified.” The same thing can be said in the case at bar. to be received for the benefit of the Insolvent estate. some of the members of this Court. that Defendant Shell was liable in this action instituted by the Assignee for double the value of the property disposed of. and despite this finding. chattels. 21. 2234. However. and liable to an action by the assignee for double the value of the property sought to be embezzled or disposed of. which We hold they do. which the latter’s counsel contends to be inequitable and unfair. and if they are applicable to the facts of this case. because the case was not tried on that theory in the lower court. or having reason to believe that insolvency proceedings are about to be commenced. We find no merit in that contention. We were influenced by the provisions of Section 37 of the Insolvency Law. 2229.marriage. embezzles or disposses of any of the money. inasmuch as the same result could be achieved. 2232. before the assignment is made. 37. entertained some doubt as to the applicability of said Section 37. having notice of the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency. according to the Civil Code. he is chargeable therewith. as it was really the caseschemed and effected the transfer of its credit to its sister corporation in the United States where CALI’s plane C-54 was and by this swift and unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed of said insolvent’s property depriving the latter and the Assignee that was later appointed. under the foregoing provisions of the Civil Code. it cannot be denied that: chanroblesvirt uallawlibrary “Defendant — taking advantage of his knowledge that insolvency proceedings were to be instituted by CALI if the creditors did not come to an understanding as to the manner of distribution of the insolvent assets among them. and yielding to their objections the writer of the decision turned his eyes to the provisions of the new Civil Code.

as Assignee of the insolvent CALI. Bengzon.. Costs are taxed against DefendantAppellee. compensatory damages in a sum equal to the value of the insolvent’s airplane C-54 at the time Defendant’s credit against CALI was assigned to its sister corporation in the United States .000. in addition of the moral. the dispositive part of our decision rendered in this case is hereby amended to read as follows: chanroblesvirt uallawlibrary Wherefore. temperate. 2229. and that the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved (Art.which shall be determined in the corresponding incident in the lower Court after this decision becomes final .and exemplary damages in the sum of P25. is hereby sentenced to pay Plaintif-Appellant. Bautista Angelo and Labrador. JJ. It is SO ORDERED. JJ. for it is left to the sound discretion of the Court. Padilla.. at the time when Defendant’s credit was assigned to its sister corporation in the United States.00. concur.corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. Parás. Separate Opinions MONTEMAYOR. and that exemplary damages should not be left to speculation but properly determined by a certain and fixed amount.. . So they voted for the reconsideration of the decision with regard to the amount of exemplary damages which this Court fixed at P25. and on the strength of the foregoing considerations. concurring: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary We concur.000. Shell Company of the Philippine Islands Ltd. the decision appealed from is reversed and Defendant-Appellee. might result quite high..J. Concepcion and Endencia. a majority of this Court was of the belief that the value of CALI’s plane C-54. Because of this attitude of the Court.000.. Notwithstanding the foregoing. 2234). liquidated or compensatory damages Art. Reyes. concur. C. but we feel that the ends of justice would be sufficiently served if the exemplary damages were reduced to P10. J.

caused to herein private respondents. CHAVES. . wounded feelings and hurt pride.. ISAAC O. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ISAAC CHAVEZ.1967. Sixth Judicial District. CHAVES.00) Pesos as exemplary damages and. and dismissing petitioners' counterclaim. CHAVEZ. 1988 MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY and PEDRO YAMBAO. humiliation. the Court of Appeals and in toto the trial court's decision. Two Thousand (P2. On appeal.: In an action for recovery of damages for embarassment. L-39019 January 22. and JUAN O. No. YAP.00) Pesos as attorney's fees.R.00) Pesos as moral damages. respondents-appellees. ordering herein petitioners jointly and severally to pay private respondents the sum of Ten Thousand (P10.000.000. the then Court of First Instance of Manila. petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari. vs.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G. J. ROSENDO O.. by reason of the disconnection of their electrical service by the petitioners. petitioners-appellants. SR. Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied. JR. One Thousand (P1. rendered a decision dated December 13.000. Branch XXIV.

20 for the bill marked as Exhibit "C-l". and Isaac Jr. Manila. for the amount of P7.m. it must be shown that such a failure was motivated by in or done with . one for January 11 to February 9. "A") with defendant MERALCO on February 12. The failure to give a notice of disconnection to private respondents might have been a breach of duty or breach of contract. of that same day. but paid only the bill marked as Exhibit 'C" leaving the other bill Identified as Exhibit "C-l" unpaid. at about 9:00 a. husband and wife. petitioners. they could not be held liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees..1965. Chaves then sought the help of Atty. informed Yambao that these bills would be paid at the MERALCO main office. Manila. he deposited the sum of P5. April 22. Private respondents Isaac Chaves and Juana O. and the other for February 9 to March 10. and. 1953. plaintiff Rosendo O. 1965.m.00 for the subsequent bill corresponding to the period from March 10 up to April 8. the power line was reconnected and electric service restored to the Chaves residence at about 7:00 p. Past 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon of April 21. do not take issue with such finding. Jr. Isaac.. Chaves. and the sum of P7. The next day. Singalong. one of the defendants' counsel. At or about the end of March. however. Accordingly. 'for the sake of argument and for the purpose of giving focus on the legal issues'. defendant Pedro Yambao went to the residence of plaintiffs and presented two overdue bills.00 (Exh. were practicing lawyers and Rosendo was a Legal Officer at the Agricultural Productivity Commission. 1965 (Exhibit "C-2") after his attention was called to the latter account. The facts as found by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals are as follows: Plaintiff Isaac Chaves became a customer of defendant MERALCO in the year 1953 when he and his family were residing at No. Petitioner Pedro Yambao is a bill collector of MERALCO. 1965. Juana O.1965. 1965. Isaac Sr. for the sum of P7. 2656 Mercedes Street. 211-D Rubi. 1965. However. and Isaac. but by itself does not constitute bad faith or fraud.90 (Exhibit "C"). together with their children. at No. In connection with the contract for electrical service. Chaves. since only questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Chaves was a public school teacher. Sr. and Rosendo O. MERALCO caused the electric service in plaintiff's residence to be discontinued and the power line cut off. Chaves went to the MERALCO main office and paid the amount of P7. Lourdy Torres. Juana O. filed the complaint for damages.Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a public utility corporation providing electric power for the consumption of the general public in Metro Manila. Isaac Chaves went to the defendant's main office at San Marcelino. Manila. Chaves. thereafter. on April 2. Chaves.20 (Exhibit "C"). Rosendo O. This deposit in the name of plaintiff Isaac Chaves was retained by MERALCO and made to apply to subsequent contracts for electrical service entered into after subsequent transfers of the Chaves family to other residences and up to the time this family went to reside at the place aforementioned. 1 Petitioners dispute the finding that there was no notice given to herein respondent. Jr. Petitioners contend that in the absence of bad faith. and Rosendo were members of the Philippine Bar. Isaac O. ..

1964.. Electricity has become a necessity to most people in these areas justifying the exercise by the State of its regulatory power over the business of supplying electrical service to the public.m. 1 of the Public Service Commission which provides as follows: Section 97. petitioner's act in 'disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas service without prior notice constitutes breach of contract amounting to an independent tort. Failure to give such prior notice amounts to a tort. provided that a 48 hours' written notice of such disconnection has been given the customer: Provided.. and executing the disconnection. The prematurity of the action is indicative of an intent to cause additional mental and moral suffering to private respondent. as it has done through Section 97 of the Revised Order No. 4 where we said: . Among others.. otherwise. It. subject only to the requirement that defendant MERALCO should give the customer a written notice of disconnection 48 hours in advance. 1 of the Public Service Commission. the poor consumer can be subjected to the whims and caprices of the defendant. It sets in motion the disconnection of an electrical service of the customer by giving the notice. plays in the life of people living in such areas. No. however. L-9683-R. Calapan Electric Company. there should be sufficient evidence that the requirements for the disconnection had been duly complied with. Said the court: . behooves the defendant MERALCO that before it disconnects a customer's electrical service.Petitioners also maintain that ' private respondents were in arrears in the payment of their electricity bills when their electric service was connected.R. the state may regulate. a prior written notice to the customer is required before disconnection of the service.. of any working day: Provided. by the mere pretension that the written notice had been duly served upon the customer. 2 The respondent court stressed the importance and necessity of the 48-hour advance written notification before a disconnection of service may be effected. May 26. This is a clear violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in . that disconnections of service shall not be made on Sundays and official holidays and never after 2 p. may require that bills for service be paid within a specified time after rendition. determining the expiration date thereof.fraudulent intent. — A public service. further. the respondent Court of Appeals held that MERALCO's right to disconnect the electric service of a delinquent customer "is an absolute one. 3 We find no reversible error in the decision appealed from. as held by us in a similar case. the minimum time allowed will be ten days and upon expiration of the specified time. In its decision. in which petitioner MERALCO is engaged. When the billing period covers a month or more. no moral damages may be recovered by them under the 'clean hands' doctrine enunciated in Mabutas vs. the conditions under which and the manner by which a public utility such as MERALCO may effect a disconnection of service to a delinquent customer. Payment of bills. that if at the moment the disconnection is to be made the customer tenders payment of the unpaid bill to the agent or employee of the operator who is to effect the disconnection. having a monopoly of the supply of electrical power in Metro Manila and some nearby municipalities. service may be discontinued for the non-payment of bills. Thus. the said agent or employee shall be obliged to accept tender of payment and issue a temporary receipt for the amount and shall desist from disconnecting the service. One can not deny the vital role which a public utility such as MERALCO." This requirement is embodied in Section 97 of the Revised Order No. therefore. CA-G.

J. JJ. C. Respondent. Petitioner. doing business G.. is entitled. FIRST DIVISION ALLAN C. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO. this circumstance can be considered as a mitigating factor in ascertaining the amount of damages to which respondent . At most. This is reiterated by paragraph 10 of Article 2219 of the Code. G.a manner that is contrary to morals. the award of moral damages is sanctioned by Article 2220 which provides that wilfull injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that. SO ORDERED. GO. the private respondents are not entitled to moral damages under the doctrine that "he who comes to court in demand of equity.R. . under the circumstances.R. Moreover. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Melencio-Herrera." We rejected this argument in the Manila Gas Corporation case. CORDERO. The petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Paras.. 164703 under the name and style ACG Express Liner. must come with clean hands. concur. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. Petitioner.versus - PUNO. Likewise. . we find no merit in petitioners' contention that being in arrears in the payment of their bills. we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent court in affirming the trial court's decision.. Padilla and Sarmiento.versus MORTIMER F." Accordingly. Chairperson. CARPIO MORALES. such damages are justly due.. No. CORDERO. supra. x-----------------------------------------x MORTIMER F. No. wherein we held that respondents' default in the payment of his bills "cannot be utilized by petitioner to defeat or null the claim for damages. 164747 Present: .

BERSAMIN. The factual antecedents: Sometime in 1996. and ALLAN C. doing business VILLARAMA.[4] After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson.. Cordero. Australia. FELIPE M. Mortimer F. which affirmed with modifications the Decision [3] dated May 31. Branch 85 in Civil Case No. 69113. 9835332.As such exclusive distributor.: For review is the Decision[1] dated March 16.After contacting various overseas fast ferry manufacturers from all over the world.R.. 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. an Australian national based in Brisbane. Go who is the owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City. lawyers of Allan C. CV No. he came to meet Tony Robinson. Robinson signed documents appointing Cordero as the exclusive distributor of AFFA catamaran and other fast ferry vessels in the Philippines. who is the Managing Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA). Between June and August 1997. J. 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION VILLARAMA. TECSON. JR. Cordero offered for sale to prospective buyers the 25-meter Aluminium Passenger catamaran known as the SEACAT 25. underthe name and style ACG Express Liner. JR. 2004 as modified by the Resolution[2] dated July 22. May 4. 2010 Respondents. JJ. Cordero was able to close a deal for the purchase of two (2) SEACAT 25 as evidenced by the Memorandum of Agreement dated August 7. Vice-President of Pamana Marketing Corporation (Pamana). a single proprietorship. Promulgated: LANDICHO and VINCENT D. GO. . ventured into the business of marketing inter-island passenger vessels.

Cordero tried to contact Go and Landicho to confirm the matter but they were nowhere to be found. Tabujara. 7825 for one (1) high-speed catamaran (SEACAT 25) for the price of US$1. to monitor the progress of the building of the vessel. He also spent for long distance telephone calls to communicate regularly with Robinson. In a handwritten letter dated June 24. 1998. Cordero immediately flew to Brisbane to clarify matters with Robinson. Atty.512.[7] Cordero made two (2) trips to the AFFA Shipyard in Brisbane. [8] Corderos lawyer. or 22. Ernesto A. while Robinson refused to answer his calls. Landicho and Tecson who even made Cordero believe there would be no further sale between AFFA and ACG Express Liner. Thyne & Macartney.00.465. [6] Per agreement between Robinson and Cordero. hotel accommodations. the lawyer of AFFA and Robinson. However. Cordero informed Go that such act of dealing directly with Robinson violated his exclusive distributorship and demanded that they respect the same.1997. and on one (1) occasion even accompanied Go and his family and Landicho. Jr. transportation and entertainment during these trips. Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with Robinson when he was informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila Philippines that Go was canvassing for a second catamaran engine from their company which provided the ship engine for the first SEACAT 25.[5] Accordingly.00. only to find out that Go and Landicho were already there in Brisbane negotiating for the sale of the second SEACAT 25. also wrote ACG Express Liner assailing the fraudulent actuations and misrepresentations committed by Go in connivance with his lawyers (Landicho and Tecson) in breach of Corderos exclusive distributorship appointment. the parties executed Shipbuilding Contract No. Padua told Cordero that Go instructed him to fax the requested quotation of the second engine to the Park Royal Hotel in Brisbane where Go was then staying. Tecson and Landicho. from the sale of each vessel.43% of the purchase price. He shouldered all the expenses for airfare. Go. Despite repeated follow-up calls. no explanation was given by Robinson. without prejudice to legal action against him and Robinson should they fail to heed the same.742. Australia. Go. faxed a letter to ACCRA law firm asserting that the . of ACCRA law firm.[9] Having been apprised of Corderos demand letter. the latter shall receive commissions totalling US$328. food.

acting on behalf of Go. set up a meeting with Cordero on June 29. thus depriving him of his due commissions (balance of unpaid commission from the sale of the first vessel in the amount of US$31.m. including P800. The letter further stated that Cordero was offered the exclusive distributorship.01 and unpaid commission for the sale of the second vessel in the amount of US$328.000. On said date.[11] On August 21. on account of AFFAs untimely . and which offer is already being revoked by AFFA.522. Tecson and Landicho proposed that they will convince Go to pay him US$1.00) and causing him actual. talked to him over the telephone and offered to amicably settle their dispute.m. And so it was agreed between him.500.[10] As to the response of Go. In an effort to amicably settle the matter. Landicho and Tecson that the latter would give him a weekly status report and that the matter will be settled in three (3) to four (4) weeks and neither party will file an action against each other until a final report on the proposed settlement.000. an Alert Order was issued by Acting BOC Commissioner Nelson Tan for the vessel which in fact arrived on July 17. 1998 between 9:30 p. the terms of which were contained in a draft agreement which Cordero allegedly failed to return to AFFA within a reasonable time. acting in behalf of Go. it turned out. Cordero instituted Civil Case No. Go. the purchase of a high-speed catamaran vessel by ACG Express Liner in August 1997. No such report was made by either Tecson or Landicho who. Tecson and Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for conniving and conspiring together in violating his exclusive distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights. Tecson and Landicho offered to convince Go to honor his exclusive distributorship with AFFA and to purchase all vessels for ACG Express Liner through him for the next three (3) years.00 on the condition that they will get a cut of 20%. at the Mactan Island Resort Hotel lobby. that is.000. only Landicho and Tecson came and no reason was given for Gos absence. Cordero testified before the trial court that on the same day.742. moral and exemplary damages. had no intention to do so and were just buying time as the catamaran vessel was due to arrive from Australia. 1998. Landicho. Landicho. Consequently. telecommunications bills and entertainment. Landicho and Tecson to his demand letter.00 representing expenses for airplane travel to Australia. to 10:30 p. Cordero claimed that Go and Robinson had conspired to undervalue the vessel by around US$500. however. 98-35332 seeking to hold Robinson.appointment of Cordero as AFFAs distributor was for the purpose of one (1) transaction only. Cordero then filed a complaint with the Bureau of Customs (BOC) to prohibit the entry of SEACAT 25 from Australia based on misdeclaration and undervaluation. 1998.00.

[14] Subsequently.000 as otherwise he will expose in the media the alleged undervaluation of the vessel with the BOC. this was merely requested by Robinson but which Cordero misinterpreted as indication that Go was buying a second vessel. 1999. As to the supposed meeting to settle their dispute. purportedly to go abroad for the holiday season when in truth a Hold-Departure . asserting that there was no act committed in violation of the distributorship agreement.cancellation of the exclusive distributorship agreement. they filed their Answer denying that they have anything to do with the termination by AFFA of Corderos authority as exclusive distributor in thePhilippines. [13] As for Go and Tecson. Said motion was denied by the trial court on December 20. On the contrary. 1999.000. as well as attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Cordero also prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages. such that Go engaged the services of Landicho to fly to Australia and attend to the documents needed for shipment of the vessel to the Philippines. 1998. Landicho and Tecson had no transaction whatsoever with Cordero who had no document to show any such shipbuilding contract. the trial court reconsidered the resetting of the pre-trial to another date for the third time as requested by Go. Cordero no longer had cause of action for his commission for the sale of the second vessel under the memorandum of agreement dated August 7. in view of the latters failure to appear at the pre-trial conference on January 7. The trial court further confirmed that said defendants misled the trial court in moving for continuance during the pre-trial conference held on December 10.[15] Pre-trial was reset twice to afford the parties opportunity to reach a settlement. Tecson and Landicho. Robinson was likewise declared in default for failure to file his answer within the period granted by the trial court. AFFA. their motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action was likewise denied by the trial court on February 26.[12] Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of jurisdiction over his person and failure to state a cause of action. However. 2000 despite due notice. on motion filed by Cordero through counsel. As to the inquiry for the Philippine price for a Wartsila ship engine for AFFAs other ongoing vessel construction. they averred it was Cordero who stopped communicating with Go in connection with the purchase of the first vessel from AFFA and was not doing his part in making progress status reports and airing the clients grievances to his principal. this was due to the malicious demand of Cordero to be given US$3. Moreover. In any case. 1997 considering the termination of his authority by AFFAs lawyers on June 26. 1999.

and 4. the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1. Further. the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1. SO ORDERED. Tecson and Atty.000. the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE. On the Second Cause of Action. the sum total of SIXTEEN MILLION TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY TWO AND FORTY THREE CENTAVOS (P16. 2. the following: 1. On the First Cause of Action. communications. and the latters offer of settlement.000. and (3) AFFA through Robinson paid Cordero his commissions from each scheduled payment made by Go for the first SEACAT 25 purchased from AFFA pursuant to Shipbuilding Contract No.291. Felipe Landicho.[17] On May 31. Tabujara at Shangri-las Mactan Island Resort. documentary evidence including photographs taken of the June 29.00) as exemplary damages.352. and Vincent Tecson. Go with his family. On the Fourth Cause of Action. 1998 meeting with Landicho.43) as actual damages with legal interest from 25 June 1998 until fully paid. was corroborated by his counsel who also took the witness stand. Robinson and Landicho. photographs taken in Brisbane showing Cordero.00) as attorneys fees.000. the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1. Costs against the defendants. and also various documents. 2000. On the Third Cause of Action. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of Plaintiff and against defendants Allan C. plaintiff Cordero was allowed to present his evidence ex parte.00) as moral damages. the trial court rendered its decision. 3. Landicho and Tecson. defendants are hereby ordered to pay Plaintiff jointly and solidarily.Order had been issued against them.000. Go. PREMISES CONSIDERED. Tony Robinson. Corderos testimony regarding his transaction with defendants Go. vouchers and bank transmittals were presented to prove that: (1) Cordero was properly authorized and actually transacted in behalf of AFFA as exclusive distributor in the Philippines.[18] .As prayed for.000. (2) Cordero spent considerable sums of money in pursuance of the contract with Go and ACG Express Liner. 7825.000. [16] Accordingly.

and denied the ex-parte Motion for Break-Open Order and ExParte Motion for Encashment of Check filed by Cordero.[24] Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration and to transmit the case records to the CA. 60354 and setting aside the trial courts orders of execution pending appeal. 2000. as he had assumed that the said ex-parte hearing was being conducted only against Robinson who was earlier declared in default.R.[28] On March 16. Landicho and Tecson filed a motion for new trial. the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration and on August 21. 2000. 2000 denying due course to the notice of appeal and forthwith directed the transmittal of the records to the CA. 2001. CV No. the trial court denied the motion for new trial. they filed a notice of appeal. Corderos motion for execution pending appeal was granted.[27] On January 29. the CA in CA-G. 2000.Go. the trial court reconsidered its Order dated August 21. cancelled the scheduled public auction sale of levied real properties. 2000 did not push through for the reason that Cordero was then allowed to present his evidence ex-parte. Consequently.R. SP No. 2002. Robinson. 69113 affirmed the trial court (1) in allowing Cordero to present his evidence ex-parte after the unjustified failure of appellants (Go. 2000. claiming that they have been unduly prejudiced by the negligence of their counsel who was allegedly unaware that the pre-trial conference on January 28.[22] On August 18. [26] On November 29. [20] In the same order. the trial court recalled and set aside its November 6.[19] In its Order dated July 28.R. 2000 Order granting the ex-parte motion for release of garnished funds. the CA issued a temporary restraining order at the instance of defendants in the certiorari case they filed with said court docketed as CA-G. as requested by the defendants. 2004. the CA rendered judgment granting the petition for certiorari in CA-G. the writ of execution pending appeal was issued. Defendants moved to reconsider the said order insofar as it granted the motion for execution pending appeal. 60354 questioning the execution orders issued by the trial court. 2000.[25] On September 29. SP No. the notice of appeal was denied for failure to pay the appellate court docket fee within the prescribed period.Cordero appealed the said judgment in a petition for review filed with this Court which was eventually denied under our Decision dated September 17. Tecson and Landicho) to appear at the pre-trial . [21] On August 8. [23] Meanwhile. 2000.

as well as attorneys fees. Appellants were held solidarily liable pursuant to the provisions of Article 1207 in relation to Articles 19. (2) in finding that it was Cordero and not Pamana who was appointed by AFFA as the exclusive distributor in the Philippines of its SEACAT 25 and other fast ferry vessels.00 representing expenses incurred by Cordero for transportation.90 (on the basis of US$1. respectively.00=P43.00.000.09 or P1.R.43% of the price of each vessel or US$328.000.R. No. phone bills.522. The CA sustained the trial court in ruling that Cordero is entitled to damages for the breach of his exclusive distributorship agreement with AFFA. No.522.000. 164747) in which petitioners raised the following arguments: .219. The CA further ruled that no error was committed by the trial court in denying their motion for new trial.355.00 andP50. 1997. the CA declared there was no basis for such award. By Resolution dated July 22.000. it held that Cordero is entitled only to commission for the sale of the first catamaran obtained through his efforts with the remaining unpaid sum of US$31. entertainment. 20.91 having been made to Cordero. and the rate of 12% interest per annum shall apply once the decision becomes final and executory until the judgment has been satisfied. As to the P800. and the expenditures having redounded to the benefit of the distributor (Cordero). and affirmed the Decision dated March 16. and with payments of US$297. there remained a balance of US$31. 2004. However. P300.00. 1998 until the finality of the decision.742. 2004 with the sole modification that the legal interest of 6% per annum shall start to run from June 24. the CA denied the motions for reconsideration respectively filed by the appellants and appellee. which said court found to be pro forma and did not raise any substantial matter as to warrant the conduct of another trial.00 rate) with interest at 6% per annum from the time of the filing of the complaint until the same is fully paid.09 still due to him.00. the CA reduced the same to P500. food and lodging. the same being the logical and necessary consequences of the exclusive distributorship agreement which are normal in the field of sales and distribution.449. On the amounts awarded by the trial court as moral and exemplary damages. which is not limited to the sale of one (1) such catamaran to Go on August 7. 164703) and Cordero (G.conference despite due notice. The case before us is a consolidation of the petitions for review under Rule 45 separately filed by Go (G. 21 and 22 of the New Civil Code. and (3) in finding that Cordero is entitled to a commission per vessel sold for AFFA through his efforts in the amount equivalent to 22.

No. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT AWARDING PETITIONER ACTUAL DAMAGES FOR HIS COMMISSION FOR THE SALE OF THE SECOND VESSEL. 164747 (Petitioner Cordero) I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FOUND PETITIONER LIABLE FOR UNPAID COMMISSIONS. SINCE THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHICH PROVES THAT THERE WAS A SECOND SALE OF A VESSEL. and V. THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ACTED CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED HEREIN PETITIONER OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS BY AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURTS DENIAL OF PETITIONERS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 164703 (Petitioner Go) I.R. .G. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING HEREIN PETITIONER RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BREACH IN THE ALLEGED EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTORSHIP AGREEMENT WITH ALUMINIUM FAST FERRIES AUSTRALIA. II. DAMAGES. III. ATTORNEYS FEES. No. AND LITIGATION EXPENSES.R. IV.[29] G. THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT MISAPPLIED THE LAW AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING PETITIONER LIABLE IN SOLIDUMWITH THE CO-DEFENDANTS WITH RESPECT TO THE CLAIMS OF RESPONDENT. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE RULES OF COURT AND PERTINENT JURISPRUDENCE AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT IS NOT THE REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST AND IN NOT DISMISSING THE INSTANT CASE ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION.

ADMITS UNDER OATH THAT HE HAD INDEED PURCHASED A SECOND VESSEL FROM AFFA. II. SINCE IT WAS PETITIONERS EFFORTS WHICH ACTUALLY FACILITATED AND SET-UP THE TRANSACTION FOR RESPONDENTS. B. .A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO HIS COMMISSIONS FOR THE PURCHASE OF A SECOND VESSEL. C. RESPONDENTS ADMITTED IN THEIR PRE-TRIAL BRIEF THAT THEY HAD PURCHASED A SECOND VESSEL. THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT DATED 7 AUGUST 1997 PROVIDES THAT RESPONDENT GO WAS CONTRACTUALLY BOUND TO BUY TWO (2) VESSELS FROM AFFA. RESPONDENT GOS POSITION PAPER AND COUNTERAFFIDAVIT/POSITION PAPER THAT WERE FILED BEFORE THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS. III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT IMPOSING THE PROPER LEGAL INTEREST RATE ON RESPONDENTS UNPAID OBLIGATION WHICH SHOULD BE TWELVE PERCENT (12%) FROM THE TIME OF THE BREACH OF THE OBLIGATION.

Real Party-in-Interest First. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE ORIGINAL AMOUNT OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES AWARDED TO PETITIONER BY THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERING THE BAD FAITH AND FRAUDULENT CONDUCT OF RESPONDENTS IN MISAPPROPRIATING THE MONEY OF PETITIONER. or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.[33] Petitioner Go mentions the following documents also signed by respondent Robinson which state that Pamana Marketing Corporation represented by Mr. For all intents and purposes. hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. and 4) to discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds. I.[32] On this issue.[30] The controversy boils down to two (2) main issues: (1) whether petitioner Cordero has the legal personality to sue the respondents for breach of contract. on the issue of whether the case had been filed by the real party-in-interest as required by Section 2.IV. title or interest in the case. Mortimer F. 2) to require that the actual party entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the action. which defines such party as the one (1) to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. 1997 issued by Tony Robinson. and (3) letter dated 5 August 1997 addressed to petitioner Cordero concerning commissions to be paid to Pamana Marketing Corporation. The purposes of this provision are: 1) to prevent the prosecution of actions by persons without any right. [36] Such apparent inconsistency in naming AFFAs exclusive distributor in the Philippines is of no moment. pursuant to sound public policy. Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. we agree with the CA in ruling that it was Cordero and not Pamana who is the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines as shown by the Certification datedJune 1. Robinson and AFFA dealt only with Cordero who alone made decisions in the performance of the . Cordero was actually the exclusive distributor: (1) letter dated 1 June 1997 [34]. (2) certification dated 5 August 1997[35]. AFFA. and (2) whether the respondents may be held liable for damages to Cordero for his unpaid commissions and termination of his exclusive distributorship appointment by the principal.[31] A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-ininterest. 3) to avoid a multiplicity of suits.

transportation.[38] Moreover. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. while jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them in the manner required by law or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority. Cordero would still give Landicho and Tecson their respective commission. which can be gleaned from their act of immediately furnishing him with copies of bank transmittals everytime Go remits payment to Robinson. food and hotel accommodations for the trip to Australia. it must be noted that he had earlier filed a Motion for Time to file an appropriate . however.[43] In this case. the stipulated commissions from each progress payments made by Go were directly paid by Robinson to Cordero. although the Motion to Dismiss filed by Robinson specifically stated as one (1) of the grounds the lack of personal jurisdiction. against the real party defendant which is AFFA. [41] As already mentioned. [37] Respondents Landicho and Tecson were only too aware of Corderos authority as the person who was appointed and acted as exclusive distributor of AFFA. or cuts from his own commission.[39] and did so only before the CA when they contended that it is Pamana and not Cordero. Respondents Landicho and Tecson failed to refute the evidence submitted by Cordero consisting of receipts signed by them. who in turn transfers a portion of funds received to the bank account of Cordero in the Philippines as his commission. petitioner Go.exclusive distributorship. Moreover. the real party plaintiff appears to be Pamana. the trial court denied the motion to dismiss filed by Robinson. notwithstanding that he raised it in a special appearance specifically raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction over his person.[40] It was Robinson who argued in support of his motion to dismiss that as far as said defendant is concerned. who was appointed and acted as exclusive distributor for AFFA. We find no error committed by the trial court in overruling Robinsons objection over the improper resort to summons by publication upon a foreign national like him and in an action in personam. Said amounts were apart from the earlier expenses shouldered by Cordero for Landichos airline tickets. as with other clients to whom he had similarly offered AFFAs fast ferry vessels. Landicho and Tecson never raised petitioner Corderos lack of personality to sue on behalf of Pamana.[42] A party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of invalid service of summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Out of these partial payments of his commission.

[45] II. and ceased communicating through petitioner Cordero as the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines. he effectively submitted voluntarily to the trial courts jurisdiction. Go simply let his lawyers led by Landicho and Tecson handle the . injunction is the appropriate remedy to prevent a wrongful interference with contracts by strangers to such contracts where the legal remedy is insufficient and the resulting injury is irreparable. He is now estopped from asserting otherwise. Robinson. Breach of Exclusive Distributorship. In that case.[46] this Court ruled that the right to perform an exclusive distributorship agreement and to reap the profits resulting from such performance are proprietary rights which a party may protect.[44] Such motion did not state that it was a conditional appearance entered to question the regularity of the service of summons. the former dealer of the same goods purchased the merchandise from the manufacturer in Englandthrough a trading firm in West Germany and sold these in the Philippines. We held that the rights granted to the petitioner under the exclusive distributorship agreement may not be diminished nor rendered illusory by the expedient act of utilizing or interposing a person or firm to obtain goods for which the exclusive distributorship was conceptualized. Cordero had clearly been cut off from the transaction until the arrival of the first SEACAT 25 which was sold through his efforts. When Cordero complained to Go. it was established that petitioner Cordero was not paid the balance of his commission by respondent Robinson. In other words. From the time petitioner Go and respondent Landicho directly dealt with respondent Robinson in Brisbane. at the expense of the sole authorized distributor. Cordero was no longer informed of payments remitted to AFFA in Brisbane.responsive pleading even beyond the time provided in the summons by publication. Consequently. even before this Court. but an appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging the summons by publication issued by the court and praying for additional time to file a responsive pleading. Landicho and Tecson about their acts prejudicial to his rights and demanded that they respect his exclusive distributorship. Thus. Robinson having acknowledged the summons by publication and also having invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court to secure affirmative relief in his motion for additional time.[47] In the case at bar. Contractual Interference and Respondents Liability for Damages In Yu v. Court of Appeals.

Respondents clearly acted in bad faith in bypassing Cordero as they completed the remaining payments to AFFA without advising him and furnishing him with copies of the bank transmittals as they previously did. relying on Articles 1207. Petitioner Go argues that unlike in Yu v. Court of Appeals[48] there is no conclusive proof adduced by petitioner Cordero that they actually purchased a second SEACAT 25 directly from AFFA and hence there was no violation of the exclusive distributorship agreement. AFFA explicitly committed that it will. he contends that the CA gravely abused its discretion in holding them solidarily liable to Cordero. and directly dealt with AFFA through Robinson regarding arrangements for the arrival of the first SEACAT 25 in Manila and negotiations for the purchase of the second vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement which Cordero signed in behalf of AFFA. It was Robinson on behalf of AFFA who. However. But this circumstance will not absolve respondents from liability for invading Corderos rights under the exclusive distributorship. Cordero was not paid anything and worse.[49] We find that contrary to the claims of petitioner Cordero. upon receipt of progress payments. Petitioner Go contends that the trial and appellate courts erred in holding them solidarily liable for Corderos unpaid commission. As a result of respondents actuations. 19 and 21 of the Civil Code despite absence of evidence. there was indeed no sufficient evidence that respondents actually purchased a second SEACAT 25 directly from AFFA. 1997 addressed to Cordero. undertook to pay commission payments to Pamana on a staggered progress payment plan in the form of percentage of the commission per payment. the purchase of the first SEACAT 25 in August 1997. Further. that is.[50] Petitioner Go further maintains that he had not in any way violated or caused the termination of the exclusive distributorship . pay to Pamana their full commission by telegraphic transfer to an account nominated by Pamana within one to two days of [AFFA] receiving such payments. AFFA through its lawyer in Australia even terminated his exclusive dealership insisting that his services were engaged for only one (1) transaction. which is the sole obligation of the principal AFFA. in the letter dated August 5. Cordero incurred losses as he was not paid the balance of his commission from the sale of the first vessel and his exclusive distributorship revoked by AFFA.matter and tried to settle it by promising to pay a certain amount and to purchase high-speed catamarans through Cordero. showing that they conspired to defeat the very purpose of the exclusive distributorship agreement. documentary or testimonial.

In fact. This may pertain to a situation where a third person induces a party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract. and as a result petitioner deprived respondent corporation of the latters property right. Authorities debate on whether interference may be justified where the defendant acts for the sole purpose of furthering his own financial or economic . and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one person of the enjoyment by the other of his private property. 1314. (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a contract. The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract. he had also paid in full the first and only vessel he purchased from AFFA. to wit: A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others.[51] While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract because only parties can breach contractual provisions. our ruling in the case of So Ping Bun v. In that capacity as exclusive distributor. petitioner Go entered into the Memorandum of Agreement and Shipbuilding Contract No. As to the third element. Clearly.[52] The presence of the first and second elements is not disputed. a contracting party may sue a third person not for breach but for inducing another to commit such breach. Through the letters issued by Robinson attesting that Cordero is the exclusive distributor of AFFA in thePhilippines. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. and as correctly viewed by the appellate court. 7825 with Cordero in behalf of AFFA. In the case before us.agreement between Cordero and AFFA. respondents were clearly aware of the contract between Cordero and AFFA represented by Robinson. and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification. petitioners Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its favor. evidence on record showed that respondents initially dealt with and recognized Cordero as such exclusive dealer of AFFA high-speed catamaran vessels in the Philippines. Court of Appeals[53] is instructive. Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides: Art. the three elements of tort interference above-mentioned are present in the instant case.

Lack of malice. [54] [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED. The respondent appellate court correctly confirmed the permanent injunction and nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing. Where the alleged interferer is financially interested. we find that the conduct herein complained of did not transcend the limits forbidding an obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice. Court of Appeals. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. One view is that. some authorities believe that it is not necessary that the interferers interest outweigh that of the party whose rights are invaded. it is clear that petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of respondent corporation. we held that where there was no malice in the interference of a contract. however. It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives. Malice is bad faith or bad motive. however. As early as Gilchrist vs. and such interest motivates his conduct. The injunction saved the respondents from further damage or injury caused by petitioners interference. In the instant case.interest. without awarding damages. and the impulse behind ones conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives. Added to this. a party cannot be a malicious interferer. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones. it cannot be said that he is an officious or malicious intermeddler. and that an individual acts under an economic interest that is substantial. nothing on record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice in him. for he acts in self-protection.] Malice connotes ill will or spite. Though petitioner took interest in the property of respondent corporation and benefited from it. the defendant must have acted with malice or must . not merely de minimis. xxx While we do not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest to intrude into existing contracts at the expense of others. such that wrongful and malicious motives are negatived. Such justification does not exist where his sole motive is to cause harm to the other. Cuddy. justification for protecting ones financial position should not be made to depend on a comparison of his economic interest in the subject matter with that of others. precludes damages. justification for interfering with the business relations of another exists where the actors motive is to benefit himself.[56] we held that to sustain a case for tortuous interference. Moreover. as a general rule. and speaks not in response to duty.[55] In the case of Lagon v. The business desire is there to make some gain to the detriment of the contracting parties.

such knowledge alone was not sufficient to make him liable for tortuous interference. Go admitted he called the attention of AFFA if it can compete with the prices of other builders. the fact was that he was unable to prove malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner in purchasing the property. in other words. the records do not support the allegation of private respondent that petitioner induced the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him. (3) that to secure compliance of such conditions. adding that the contract was to be effective on August 7. his act of interference cannot be justified. 1997. Go must make an advance payment for the building of the second vessel. we ruled as follows: Assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the contract. and upon mutual agreement. They gave a different version of the events that transpired following the signing of Shipbuilding Contract No. This led to the signing of another contract superseding the first one (1). In short. The word induce refers to situations where a person causes another to choose one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation. x xx Furthermore. We further explained that the word induce refers to situations where a person causes another to choose one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation. Private respondent himself did not proffer any evidence to support his claim. AFFA agreed to give them a discounted price under the following terms and conditions: (1) that the contract price be lowered. still to be dated 07 August 1997. (2) that Go will obtain another vessel. As to the allegation of private respondent in said case that petitioner induced the heirs of the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to petitioner despite an alleged renewal of the original lease contract with the deceased landowner. Attached to the answer were photocopies . the time when their funds was to become available. and (4) that the payment scheme formerly agreed upon as stipulated in the first contract shall still be the basis and used as the guiding factor in remitting money for the building of the first vessel. respondents denied having anything to do with the unpaid balance of the commission due to Cordero and the eventual termination of his exclusive distributorship by AFFA. even assuming that private respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease contract with Bai Tonina Sepi. 7825.have been driven by purely impure reasons to injure the plaintiff. [57] In their Answer. several builder-competitors still entered the picture after the said contract for the purchase of one (1) SEACAT 25 was sent to Brisbane in July 1997 for authentication. According to them. The records show that the decision of the heirs of the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property was completely of their own volition and that petitioner did absolutely nothing to influence their judgment. the claim of tortuous interference was never established. Therefore.

in May 1998 on the scheduled launching of the ship in Australia.00. 7825 and stating a lower price of US$1.[62] .00) was only presented before the BOC to show that the vessel imported into the Philippines was not undervalued by almost US$500. the total remittances made by herein Importer to AFFA does not alone represent the purchase price for Seacat 25. [59] We find these allegations unconvincing and a mere afterthought as these were the very same averments contained in the Position Paper for the Importer dated October 9. Go engaged the services of Landicho who went to Australia to see to it that all documents needed for the shipment of the vessel to the Philippines would be in order. Cordero vehemently denied there was such modification of the contract and accused respondents of resorting to falsified documents.00 (not US$1. Incidentally. etc. 1998. including the facsimile transmission of AFFA supposedly confirming the said sale for only US$1. It was also during this time that Robinsons request for inquiry on the Philippine price of a Wartsila engine for AFFAs then on-going vessel construction.of the second contract stating a lower purchase price (US$1.. after several attempts. that -8.000.465.00) and facsimile transmission of AFFA to Go confirming the transaction.000. which was submitted by Go on behalf of ACG Express Liner in connection with the complaint-affidavit filed by Cordero before the BOC-SGS Appeals Committee relative to the shipment valuation of the first SEACAT 25 purchased from AFFA. It includes advance payment for the acquisition of another vessel as part of the deal due to the discounted price.512. lacking documents for MARINA. were able to locate him only to obtain unsatisfactory reports such that it was Go who would still call up Robinson regarding any progress status report. 1998. Go averred it was Cordero who was nowhere to be contacted at the time the shipbuilding progress did not turn good as promised.00. and it was always Landicho and Tecson who. was misinterpreted by Cordero as indicating that Go was buying a second vessel. [61] states in paragraph 8 under the Antecedent facts thereof.[60] It appears that the purported second contract superseding the original Shipbuilding Contract No.[58] As to the cessation of communication with Cordero. and go to Australia for ocular inspection. Hence.150. As elsewhere stated.000.150.000.150. the Counter-Affidavit/Position Paper for the Importer dated November 16. another document filed in said BOC case.

Tecson and Landicho clearly connived not only in ensuring that Cordero would have no participation in the contract for sale of the second SEACAT 25. . which is not prohibited by the Memorandum of Agreement. but also that Cordero would not be paid the balance of his commission from the sale of the first SEACAT 25. While there was nothing objectionable in negotiating for a lower price in the second purchase of SEACAT 25. Thus. attended to their concerns and spent no measly sum for the trip to Australia with Go. without giving him any explanation. Tecson and Landicho suddenly ceased communicating with him. Tecson and Landicho were without legal justification and intended solely to prejudice Cordero. however.which even gives credence to the claim of Cordero that respondents negotiated for the sale of the second vessel and that the nonpayment of the remaining two (2) instalments of his commission for the sale of the first SEACAT 25 was a result of Go and Landichos directly dealing with Robinson. the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the actuations of Go. Robinson. Cordero was practically excluded from the transaction when Go. Robinson. such act may not be deemed malicious if impelled by a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives. Landicho and Gos family members. Respondents furtively went directly to Robinson after Cordero had worked hard to close the deal for them to purchase from AFFA two (2) SEACAT 25. closely monitored the progress of building the first vessel sold.But what is appalling is the fact that even as Go. demonstrated that respondents transgressed the bounds of permissible financial interest to benefit themselves at the expense of Cordero. The act of Go. Robinson. Landicho and Tecson secretly negotiated with Robinson for the purchase of a second vessel. Go. This. The attendant circumstances. Cuddy (supra). obviously to obtain a lower price for the second vessel at the expense of Cordero. Landicho and Tecson in inducing Robinson and AFFA to enter into another contract directly with ACG Express Liner to obtain a lower price for the second vessel resulted in AFFAs breach of its contractual obligation to pay in full the commission due to Cordero and unceremonious termination of Corderos appointment as exclusive distributor. Landicho and Tecson continued to demand and receive from Cordero their commission or cut from Corderos earned commission from the sale of the first SEACAT 25. despite their knowledge that it was commission already earned by and due to Cordero. Following our pronouncement in Gilchrist v.

Landicho and Tecson cannot be held liable solidarily with Robinson for actual.[64] Petitioner Gos argument that he. as well as . therefore. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty. and observe honesty and good faith. Tecson and Landico to act with fairness. honesty and good faith in securing better terms for the purchase of high-speed catamarans from AFFA. in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties. and (3) it is done with intent to injure. a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. the act complained of must be intentional. 19. is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. act with justice. moral and exemplary damages. is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. on the other hand. give everyone his due. (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. Its antithesis. As a rule. are conclusive on this Court. findings of fact of the trial court. we explained that when a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another. and that is. (2) but which is contrary to morals. (2) which is exercised in bad faith. to the prejudice of Cordero as the duly appointed exclusive distributor. when affirmed by the appellate court. necessarily. an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. or public policy. Go. public order.[63] We see no compelling reason to reverse the findings of the RTC and the CA that respondents acted in bad faith and in utter disregard of the rights of Cordero under the exclusive distributorship agreement. These standards are the following: act with justice. Every person must. The object of this article. As we have expounded in another case: Elsewhere. When Article 19 is violated. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law x x x. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. 21. is further proscribed by Article 19 of the Civil Code: Art.The existence of malice. Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal. states: Art. Article 21. good custom. A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21. The failure of Robinson. ill will or bad faith is a factual matter.

always solidary. by one of the joint tort feasors. to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves. The persons injured may sue all of them or any number less than all. encourage. They are each liable as principals. instigate. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tort feasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates. x xx Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. Each is liable for the whole damages caused by all. or who approve of it after it is done. They are jointly and severally liable for the whole amount. except among themselves.[65] In Lafarge Cement Philippines. the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for the quasi-delict is solidary. The damages can not be apportioned among them. v. in which we held: x x x The difficulty in the contention of the appellants is that they fail to recognize that the basis of the present action is tort. but is also jointly liable with his tort feasors. x x x Of course. aid or abet the commission of a tort. of course satisfies any claim which might exist against the others. The release of one of the joint tort feasors by agreement generally operates to discharge all. Inc. Ocampo. There can be but satisfaction. nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant as compared to that of the others. for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part. that the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants. They cannot insist upon an apportionment. x x x It may be stated as a general rule that joint tort feasors are all the persons who command.[66] we held: [O]bligations arising from tort are. is equally bereft of merit. advise. It is no defense for one sued alone. Continental Cement Corporation. promote. by their nature. if done for their benefit. We have assiduously maintained this legal principle as early as 1912 in Worcester v. the court during trial may find that some of the alleged tort feasors are liable and that others are not liable. x x x A payment in full for the damage done. Conformably with Article 2194 of the Civil Code. cooperate in. countenance.attorneys fees awarded to Cordero since no law or contract provided for solidary obligation in these cases. x x x Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. and all together are jointly liable for the whole damage. The .

[69] On the other hand.000. Trial courts are given discretion in determining the amount. fraudulent. Although incapable of pecuniary estimation. There is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages. since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts.courts may release some for lack of evidence while condemning others of the alleged tort feasors.[71] We believe that the amounts of P300. Respondents having acted in bad faith. the requirements of an award of exemplary damages are: (1) they may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages.000. Moral damages are meant to compensate and alleviate the physical suffering.] The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual relations cannot be held liable for more than the amount for which the party who was inducted to break the contract can be held liable. And this is true even though they are charged jointly and severally. besmirched reputation. in the amount of US$31. and (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton. moral damages may be recovered under Article 2219 of the Civil Code. and only after the claimants right to them has been established. and similar injuries unjustly caused. serious anxiety.00 and P200. However. respectively. we find the sums awarded by the trial court as moral and exemplary damages as reduced by the CA. mental anguish.[70] The award of exemplary damages is thus in order.00 as moral and exemplary damages.522. oppressive or malevolent manner. 1998 until the same is fully paid. would be sufficient and reasonable. wounded feelings. which AFFA/Robinson did not pay in violation of the exclusive distributorship agreement. Moral damages are not punitive in nature and were never intended to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant. Indeed.09 or its peso equivalent. fright. social humiliation. (2) that they cannot be recovered as a matter of right.[68] Respondents Go. Landicho and Tecson were therefore correctly held liable for the balance of petitioner Corderos commission from the sale of the first SEACAT 25. it must be commensurate to the loss or injury suffered. still excessive under the circumstances. Because . the amount must somehow be proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted. moral shock. with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from June 24.[67] [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED. their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant. with the limitation that it should not be palpably and scandalously excessive.

: For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. ALMENDRAS. its Senior Vice President and Operations Manager for the Visayas and Mindanao.R. . respondent. vs. Sometime in 1987. (CCCI). The application was indorsed by CCCI’s two (2) proprietary members. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G. the petitions are DENIED. With costs against the petitioner in G. petitioners. ELIZAGAQUE. respondent filed with CCCI an application for proprietary membership. having its principal place of business in Banilad. RICARDO F. 2008 CEBU COUNTRY CLUB. Misa and Silvano Ludo. a special company proprietary member of CCCI. The Decision dated March 16. LIBI. SALA.00. petitioner. CV No.000.000. 2004 as modified by the Resolution dated July 22. RAMONTITO* E. DAPAT.00 and P200. 69113 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the awards of moral and exemplary damages are hereby reduced to P300.. The facts are: Cebu Country Club. 2003 and Resolution dated October 2. INC. 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. Elizagaque. WHEREFORE. Inc.R. GARCIA and JOSE B.[72] We affirm the appellate courts award of attorneys fees in the amount ofP50. No. LUYM. CV No.R. 164703. Cebu City.00. NERI. San Miguel Corporation. In 1996. assailing the Decision1 dated January 31.000. The designation was thereafter approved by the CCCI’s Board of Directors. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ. CESAR T. 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. Petitioners herein are members of its Board of Directors. RUBEN D. JULIUS Z. respectively. DOUGLAS L. 71506. No. is a domestic corporation operating as a non-profit and non-stock private membership club.exemplary damages are awarded. as a special non-proprietary member. attorneys fees may also be awarded in consonance with Article 2208 (1). 160273 January 18. designated respondent Ricardo F. as amended.R. J. SABINO R. namely: Edmundo T.

Butalid for only P3 million. Consequently. plaintiff the amount of P1. Consequently. jointly and severally. On August 6. 3. affirmed the trial court’s Decision with modification. 1997. 1997. 2003. 67190 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as follows: 1. During the meetings dated April 4. On November 5. jointly and severally. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff: 1. jointly and severally. Pasig City in Civil Case No. Pasig City a complaint for damages against petitioners. plaintiff the amount of P1. In another Board meeting held on July 30.000. . CCCI’s corporate secretary.5 million. SO ORDERED. Costs of suit. on behalf of respondent.000. 2001 in favor of respondent.00 as exemplary damages. respondent again sent CCCI a letter inquiring whether any member of the Board objected to his application. docketed as Civil Case No. Benito Unchuan. respondent received a letter from Julius Z. 1446 to respondent. CCCI did not reply. action on respondent’s application for proprietary membership was deferred. or on August 1. Still. 1997 and May 30. 5. 67190. informing him that the Board disapproved his application for proprietary membership. 1997. Respondent. Ordering defendants to pay. the RTC rendered its Decision dated February 14.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees and P80. 2.000. respondent’s application was voted upon. wrote another letter of reconsideration. 1997 of the CCCI Board of Directors. Ordering defendants to pay. on October 7. 1998. in its Decision dated January 31. Misa. Neri.000. Again. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay. respondent.00 as moral damages.340. on December 23. wrote CCCI a letter of reconsideration. jointly and severally. Ordering defendants to pay. on September 6. Edmundo T.000. Counterclaims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.000. the Court of Appeals. thus: WHEREFORE. plaintiff-appellee the amount ofP2.000. Subsequently. the assailed Decision dated February 14. After trial. however. premises considered.000. then president of CCCI. plaintiff the amount of P5. As CCCI did not answer. 4.000. Ordering defendants to pay. 2001 of the Regional Trial Court. offered to sell respondent a share for only P3. 1997.00 as actual or compensatory damages.000. CCCI kept silent. 1997. 1996.2 On appeal by petitioners.00 as litigation expenses. plaintiff the amount of P2.00 as moral damages. respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Branch 71. Branch 71.As the price of a proprietary share was around the P5 million range. thus: WHEREFORE. CCCI issued Proprietary Ownership Certificate No. jointly and severally. purchased the share of a certain Dr.

respondent maintains that the petition lacks merit.3 On March 3. plaintiff-appellee the mount of P500. SO ORDERED. hence. if no objections have been filed or if there are. Petitioners contend. the present petition.00 as attorney’s fees and P50. (b) Such proposal shall be posted by the Secretary for a period of thirty (30) days on the Club bulletin board during which time any member may interpose objections to the admission of the applicant by communicating the same to the Board of Directors. shall submit to the Secretary a written proposal for the admission of a candidate to the "Eligible-forMembership List". the Board considers the objections unmeritorious. petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and motion for leave to set the motion for oral arguments.00 as litigation expenses. inter alia. . jointly and severally. seconded by another voting proprietary member. The issue for our resolution is whether in disapproving respondent’s application for proprietary membership with CCCI. and if so.2. In its Resolution4 dated October 2. The counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs of the suit. For his part. 2003. Corollary.00 as exemplary damages. should be denied. Section 3. the appellate court denied the motions for lack of merit. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay. and in disregarding their defense of damnum absque injuria.000. (c) After the expiration of the aforesaid thirty (30) days. the candidate shall be qualified for inclusion in the "Eligible-for-Membership List". petitioners are liable to respondent for damages. 3.000.000. that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding exorbitant damages to respondent despite the lack of evidence that they acted in bad faith in disapproving the latter’s application. whether their liability is joint and several. and 4. HOW MEMBERS ARE ELECTED – The procedure for the admission of new members of the Club shall be as follows: (a) Any proprietary member. plaintiff-appellee the amount ofP1. CCCI’s Articles of Incorporation provide in part: SEVENTH: That this is a non-stock corporation and membership therein as well as the right of participation in its assets shall be limited to qualified persons who are duly accredited owners of Proprietary Ownership Certificates issued by the corporation in accordance with its By-Laws. 2003.000. Hence. Article 1 of CCCI’s Amended By-Laws provides: SECTION 3. jointly and severally.

(Emphasis in the original) In rejecting respondent’s application for proprietary membership. As shown by the records. though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such. he shall become a Proprietary Member. Obviously. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. The trial court and the Court of Appeals aptly held that petitioners committed fraud and evident bad faith in disapproving respondent’s . the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. Every person must. A right. a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. 1997. sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties.(d) Once included in the "Eligible-for-Membership List" and after the candidate shall have acquired in his name a valid POC duly recorded in the books of the corporation as his own. known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights. cited above. give everyone his due. In GF Equity. 1978. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order. Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code on the Chapter on Human Relations provide restrictions. Generally. to give everyone his due. act with justice. the Board may. The law.00. provided that admission fees will only be collected once from any person. When respondent’s application for proprietary membership was voted upon during the Board meeting on July 30. But such right should not be exercised arbitrarily. the Board adopted a secret balloting known as the "black ball system" of voting wherein each member will drop a ball in the ballot box. Inc. Article 21. as amended. Pursuant to Section 3(c). recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights. upon a non-refundable admission fee of P1. therefore. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. These standards are the following: to act with justice. the basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of social order.000. his application was disapproved. it does not provide a remedy for its violation. approve the inclusion of the candidate in the "Eligible-for-Membership List". that in their exercise. the ballot box contained one (1) black ball. Section 3(c) was amended to read as follows: (c) After the expiration of the aforesaid thirty (30) days. by unanimous vote of all directors present at a regular or special meeting. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another. for lack of unanimity. thus: This article. and to observe honesty and good faith. thus: Article 19. a unanimous vote of the directors is required. and observe honesty and good faith. v. under its Articles of Incorporation. On March 1. Valenzona. the CCCI Board of Directors. A white ball represents conformity to the admission of an applicant. may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. we find that petitioners violated the rules governing human relations. Thus. has the right to approve or disapprove an application for proprietary membership.5 we expounded Article 19 and correlated it with Article 21. in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties. while a black ball means disapproval.

7 we held that this principle does not apply when there is an abuse of a person’s right. This is contrary to morals.000. suffice it to state that the same is misplaced. he should have been treated by petitioners with courtesy and civility. Under Article 2219 of the New Civil Code. Article 2208 of the same Code provides. At the very least. Petitioners explained that the amendment was not printed on the application form due to economic reasons. 8 Taking into consideration the attending circumstances here. they should have informed him why his application was disapproved. As to the appellate court’s award to respondent of moral damages. Moral damages are not intended to impose a penalty to the wrongdoer. What was printed thereon was the original provision of Section 3(c) which was silent on the required number of votes needed for admission of an applicant as a proprietary member.00 is excessive. we find the same in order. Article 2229 allows it by way of example or correction for the public good. respondent did not deserve this kind of treatment. We cannot fathom why such a prestigious and exclusive golf country club. It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in the dark wondering why his application was disapproved. Certainly. As to petitioners’ reliance on the principle of damnum absque injuria or damage without injury.000.000. petitioners apparently ignored him.000. The exercise of a right. as moral damages is reasonable. among others. whose members are all affluent.000. aside from being extremely significant.000. petitioners are liable for damages pursuant to Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the same Code. Hence. Nonetheless. though legal by itself. When the right is exercised arbitrarily. In Amonoy v. social humiliation and wounded feelings as a result of the arbitrary denial of his application.00. instead of P2. that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation may be recovered in cases when . a legal wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. in acts and actions referred to in Article 21. Having been designated by San Miguel Corporation as a special non-proprietary member of CCCI. We find this excuse flimsy and unconvincing.applications.00 only.000.9 we reduce the amount from P1. Gutierrez. unjustly or excessively and results in damage to another. Anent the award of exemplary damages. 6 It bears reiterating that the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that petitioners’ disapproval of respondent’s application is characterized by bad faith. Such amendment. neither to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant. On the matter of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. the amount of P2. like the CCCI. was introduced way back in 1978 or almost twenty (20) years before respondent filed his application. we hold that an award to respondent of P50.00 to P25. good custom or public policy. did not have enough money to cause the printing of an updated application form. While there is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages. It bears stressing that the amendment to Section 3(c) of CCCI’s Amended By-Laws requiring the unanimous vote of the directors present at a special or regular meeting was not printed on the application form respondent filled and submitted to CCCI. We believe respondent’s testimony that he suffered mental anguish.000. He was not even informed that a unanimous vote of the Board members was required. since exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions. When he sent a letter for reconsideration and an inquiry whether there was an objection to his application.00. moral damages may be recovered. However. the same should not be palpably and scandalously excessive. among others. as in this case. must nonetheless be in accordance with the proper norm.

however. JJ.R. CV No. — Directors or trustees who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faithin directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors.00 to P50. petitioners’ argument that they could not be held jointly and severally liable for damages because only one (1) voted for the disapproval of respondent’s application lacks merit. Chairperson. SO ORDERED.000. or trustees shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation.000.00 and P25.000.00) and litigation expenses (P50. Section 31 of the Corporation Code provides: SEC. (b) the award of exemplary damages is reduced from P1..000. Liability of directors.000. 31. Leonardo-de Castro.exemplary damages are awarded and where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. Azcuna. C.000.00 andP50.00) to P50. trustees or officers.00. respectively. such award must be reasonable.000. 71506 ar