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FERNANDEZ VS. STO.

TOMAS
G.R. No. 116418, MARCH 7, 1995
FACTS:
In this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for
a Temporary Restraining Order, petitioners Salvador C. Fernandez and Anicia
M. de Lima assail the validity of Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Civil Service
Commission ("Commission") and the authority of the Commission to issue
the same.
Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel
Inspection and Audit ("OPIA") while petitioner de Lima was serving as
Director of the Office of the Personnel Relations ("OPR"), both at the Central
Office of the Civil Service Commission in Quezon City, Metropolitan Manila.
While petitioners were so serving, public respondent Sto. Tomas as Chairman
of then Civil Service Commission issued an order to the effect of merging
some departments which has led to the transfer of petitioners to different
region.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to
issue Resolution No. 94-3710 to the extent it merged the OCSS [Office of
Career Systems and Standards], the OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection and
Audit] and the OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to form the RDO
[Research and Development Office]; and
(2) Whether or not Resolution No. 94-3710 violated petitioners'
constitutional right to security of tenure.
HELD:
(1)The Court is unable, in the circumstances of this case, to accept this
argument. The term "public office" is frequently used to refer to the
right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a
given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by that individual
for the benefit of the public. We consider that Resolution No. 94-3710
has not abolished any public office as that term is used in the law of
public officers. It is essential to note that none of the "changes in
organization" introduced by Resolution No. 94-3710 carried with it or
necessarily involved the termination of the relationship of public
employment between the Commission and any of its officers and
employees. We find it very difficult to suppose that the 1987 Revised
Administrative Code having mentioned fourteen (14) different "Offices"
of the Civil Service Commission, meant to freeze those Offices and to
cast in concrete, as it were, the internal organization of the commission
until it might please Congress to change such internal organization

regardless of the ever changing needs of the Civil Service as a whole.
To the contrary, the legislative authority hadexpressly authorized the
Commission to carry out "changes in the organization," as the need
[for such changes] arises." Assuming, for purposes of argument
merely, that legislative authority was necessary to carry out the kinds
off changes contemplated in Resolution No. 94-3710 (and the Court
is not saying that such authority is necessary), such legislative
authority was validly delegated to the Commission by Section 17
earlier quoted. The legislative standards to be observed and respected
in the exercise of such delegated authority are set out not only in
Section 17 itself (i.e., "as the need arises"), but also in the Declaration
of Policies found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 1 of the 1987
Revised Administrative Code which required the Civil Service
Commission
as the central personnel agency of the Government [to] establish
a
career service, adopt measures to promote — efficiency —
[and] responsiveness . . . in the civil service . . . and that
personnel functions shall be decentralized, delegating the
corresponding authority to the departments, offices and
agencies where such functions can be effectively performed.
(Emphasis supplied)
(2)We turn to the second claim of petitioners that their right to security of
tenure was breached by the respondents in promulgating Resolution
No. 94-3710 and ordering petitioners' assignment to the Commission's
Regional Offices in Regions III and V. Section 2(3) of Article IX(B) of the
1987 Constitution declared that "no officer or employee of the Civil
Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by
law." Petitioners in effect contend that they were unlawfully removed
from their positions in the OPIA and OPR by the implementation of
Resolution No. 94-3710 and that they cannot, without their consent, be
moved out to the Regional Offices of the Commission.
We note, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the Commission are
not appointments to a specified public office but rather appointments
to particular positions or ranks. Thus, a person may be appointed to
the position of Director III or Director IV; or to the position of Attorney
IV or Attorney V; or to the position of Records Officer I or Records
Officer II; and so forth. In the instant case, petitioners were each
appointed to the position of Director IV, without specification of any
particular office or station. The same is true with respect to the other
persons holding the same position or rank of Director IV of the
Commission.

MORFE VS. MUTUC
G.R. NO. L-20387, January 31, 1968

ISSUE: Whether or not by virtue of the above requirement for a periodical submission of sworn statement of assets and liabilities. 1986 FACTS: . For it. Is this provision for a periodical submission of sworn statement of assets and liabilities after he had filed one upon assumption of office beyond the power of government to impose? Admittedly without the challenged provision. Nobody can cavil at its objective. HELD: The Anti-Graft Act of 1960 was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. a judge of repute of a court of first instance." The periodical submission "within the month of January of every other year thereafter" of such sworn statement of assets and liabilities after an officer or employee had once bared his financial condition upon assumption of office was challenged for being violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy. LUEGO VS. The lower court in the decision appealed from sustained plaintiff. there is an invasion of liberty protected by the due process clause. The conditions then prevailing called for norms of such character. It is intended to further promote morality in public administration. AUGUST 5. such requirement of periodical submission of such sworn statement of assets and liabilities exceeds the permissible limit of the police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION G.R. his liberty is affected. It cannot be denied however that under the Constitution. the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar: . the goal to be pursued commands the assent of all. as well as upon the termination of his position. including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income. . "a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities. a public officer would be free from such a requirement. 3019 of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 which states that every public officer either within thirty (30) days after its approval or after his assumption of office "and within the month of January of every other year thereafter".FACTS: This petition assailed constitutionality of one of the Section 7. shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs. A public office must indeed be a public trust. implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination. then as well as now. such a restriction is allowable as long as due process is observed. . To the extent then that there is a compulsion to act in a certain way. Republic Act No. L-69137. The times demanded such a remedial device.

the Civil Service Commission found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and. 33. and it was not for the respondent Civil Service Commission to reverse him and call it temporary. dated February 18. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights. accordingly. on the basis of this finding.The petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer 11." On March 22. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer. 1984. 1984. its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. CITY OF MANILA VS. by Mayor Florentino Solon on February 18. If he does. The appointment was described as permanent" but the Civil Service Commission approved it as "temporary. in place of Felimon Luego whose appointment as Administrative Officer II is hereby revoked. Office of the City Mayor. after protracted hearings the legality of which does not have to be decided here. as he had the right to do so. What was temporary was the approval of the appointment. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent. ISSUE: Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and. which was clearly described as "Permanent" in the space provided for in Civil Service Form No. then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. Cebu City. is now before us to question that order and the private respondent's title. Cebu City." The private respondent was so appointed on June 28. The stamping of the words "APPROVED as TEMPORARY" did not change the character of the appointment. the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. order his replacement by the latter? HELD: No. 1983. When the appointee is qualified and authorizing the other legal requirements are satisfied. the appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. Mayor Ronald Duterte. SUBIDO . 1983. by the new mayor. invoking his earlier permanent appointment. The petitioner. directed "that Felicula Tuozo be appointed to the position of Administrative Officer 11 in the Administrative Division. not the appointment it sell and what made the approval temporary was the fact that it was made to depend on the condition specified therein and on the verification of the qualifications of the appointee to the position.

must be affirmed. not an employee. Petitioner Villegas directed Gloria to desist and refrain from exercising the function of Assistant City Treasurer . Secretary of Finance. It was not until the filing of the petition that respondent Jose R. support for the petition is premised on the expansive interpretation that would be accorded the general provisions found in the Decentralization Act of 1967 to the effect that it is a city mayor who has the power to appoint all other employees paid out of city or local funds subject to civil service law. Instead petitioner appointed Manuel D. whether such duties are precisely defined by law or not. Then. may be considered to involve the exercise of discretion in the performance of the function of government. the power to appoint the Assistant City Treasurer. On the other hand. chief of the cash division of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila. It survives in the face of the assertion that the additional power granted local officials to appoint employees paid out of local funds would suffice to transfer such authority to petitioner Mayor. as Assistant City Treasurer. Republic Act No. Commissioner of Civil Service disapproved the appointment of Lapid. not being of a clerical or manual nature. even if far from searching would not justify such an interpretation. Section 4 of the Decentralization Act relied upon by petitioner City Mayor specifically enumerates. considering the fidelity manifested by this Court to the doctrine that looks with less than favor on implied appeals. 1968 to the effect that the appointment of Assistant Provincial Treasurers is still governed by Section 2088 (A) of the Revised Administrative Code. too. Respondent Abelardo Subido. 1968. the Assistant and City Treasurer is an officer. on an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated September 19. The decision now on appeal. A perusal of the words of the statute. Gloria was nominated by the President of the Philippines to the position of Assistant City treasurer of Manila and thereafter duly confirmed. rules and regulations. Gloria of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila to assume the duties of Assistant City Treasurer effective June 1. to repeat. on the ground that respondent Romualdez is not empowered to make such designation." ISSUE: What is the applicable law in issue HELD: Charter of the City of Manila. enacted in 1949. What has been so clearly ordained in the Charter is controlling. with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. in express terms did confer on the President of the Philippines. This is all more evident." 9 Clearly. The Revised Administrative Code distinguishes one in that category from an "officer" to designate those "whose duties.FACTS: This is an appeal by petitioner Antonio Villegas from the decision of the lower court dismissing a special civil action for prohibition. the officials and . 5185. basing his action. and not by Section 4 of the Decentralization Law. The inherent weakness of the contention of petitioner Mayor that would seize upon the vesting of the appointing power of all other "employees" except teachers paid out of local funds to justify his choice of petitioner Manuel D. Lapid as Assistant City Treasurer is readily disclosed. Respondent Eduardo Romualdez. Lapid. authorized respondent Jose R. quo warranto and mandamus.

1992. However. actual expenses for xerox copies. Malaluan filed this petition before us on May 31. the First Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ordered Malaluan to vacate the office. The trial court declared petitioner as the duly elected municipal mayor of Kidapawan. North Cotabato. COMELEC March 6. and exercised the powers and functions of said office. 10 The expansive interpretation contended for is thus unwarranted. 1992. 1994 to April. this petition appears now to be moot and academic because the herein parties are contesting an elective post to which their right to the office no longer exists. The COMELEC found petitioner liable for attorney’s fees. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in awarding the aforecited damages in favor of private respondent. default in payment by petitioner of which shall result in the collection of said amount from the bond posted by petitioner on the occasion of the grant of his motion for execution pending appeal in the trial court. petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court contesting 64 out of the total 181 precincts of the said municipality. 1995. MALALUAN VS. 1996 FACTS: Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private respondent Joseph Evangelista were both mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Kidapawan. COMELEC Rules of Procedure provide that “in all election contests the Court may adjudicate damages and . on May 22. North Cotabato. Private respondent Joseph Evangelista was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor for having garnered. the question as to damages remains ripe for adjudication.their assistants whom he can appoint. specifically excluding therefrom city treasurers. petitioner assumed the office of MunicipaJ Mayor of Kidapawan. Such exercise was not for long. 1995 as a consequence. en mUsse denominated as actual damages. But. and unearned salary and other emoluments from March. Petitioner naturally contests the propriety and legality of this award upon private respondent on the ground that said damages have not been alleged and proved during trial. said division having found and so declared private respondent to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor of said municipality. Indeed. North Cotabato. in the Synchronized National and Local Elections held on May 11. HELD: The Omnibus Election Code provides that “actual or compensatory damages may be granted in all election contests or in quo warranto proceedings in accordance with law.

in order to effectively recover actual or compensatory damages.attorney’s fees as it may deem just and as established by the evidence if the aggrieved party has included such claims in his pleadings. Considering that actual or compensatory damages are appropriate only in breaches of obligations in cases of contracts and quasi-contracts and on the . the petitioner exercised the duties of an elective office under color of election thereto. or tortious act nor crime that may make him liable for actual damages. therefore. The victorious party in an election case cannot be indemnified for expenses which he has incurred in an electoral contest in the absence of a wrongful act or omission or breach of obligation clearly attributable to the losing party. We deem petitioner. if any damage had been suffered by private respondent due to the execution ofjudgment pending appeal. SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRESS VS. is entitled to the compensation. that damage may be said to be equivalent to damnum absque injuria. the claimant may cite any of the following provisions of the Civil Code under the chapter on human relations. crime or negligence. In the absence of any or all of these. or damage or injury inflicted without injustice. emoluments and allowances legally provided for the position. but directly by law. COURT OF APPEALS . have the power to so proclaim winners in electoral contests. damage without injury.occasion of crimes and quasi-delicts where the defendant may be held liable for all damages the proximate cause of which is the act or omission complained of. because both. Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code only provides for the granting in election cases of actual and compensatory damages in accordance with law. At the risk of sounding repetitive. “the claimant must be able to point out a specific provision of law authorizing a money claim for election protest expenses against the losing party. We have painstakingly gone over the records of this case and we can attribute to petitioner no breach of contract or quasi-contract. or loss or damage without violation of a legal right. the monetary claim of a party in an election case must necessarily be hinged on either a contract or a quasi-contract or a tortious act or omission or a crime. if only to emphasize this point. The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction is that notwithstanding his subsequent ouster as a result of an election protest. which is.” For instance. Neither has private respondent been “able to point out to a specific provision of law authorizing a money claim for election protest expenses against the losing party. or a wrong done to a man for which the law provides no remedy. in good faith. To recapitulate. we must reiterate that the decision of a judicial body is no less a basis than the proclamation made by the COMELEC-convened Board of Canvassers for a winning candidate’s right to assume office. at different stages of the electoral process. which provisions create obligations not by contract. Evidently. while a usurper is one who undertakes to act officially without any color of right. for both are undisputedly legally sanctioned. an elective official who has been proclaimed by the COMELEC as winner in an electoral contest and who assumed office and entered into the performance of the duties of that office. to be a “de facto officer who. We hold that petitioner was not a usurper because. has haa possession of the office and had discharged the duties pertaining thereto” and is thus “legally entitled to the emoluments of the office. It matters not that it was the trial court and not the COMELEC that declared petitioner as the winner.

1990 to Mayor Lydia T. On March 31. San Andres Catandaunes in March 1989. Series of 1992. the DILG and the municipal treasurer. renounce. 1990. private respondent wrote to the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres advising them of his re-assumption of his “original position. the DILG secretary designated private respondent as a temporary member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Catanduanes. express or implied. In response thereto. declaring that Antonio had no legal basis to resume office as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. who was also the president of Association of Barangay Councils. Conformably. Santos of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) declared the election for the president of the Federation of the Association of Barangay Councils (FABC) of the same province. Hence. HELD: Resignation as the “act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. and relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority. with copies furnished to the provincial governor. the ruling of DILG Secretary Santos annulling the election of the FABC president was reversed by the Supreme Court. and (c) an . In the same case. private respondent resigned as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. the appointment of Private Respondent Antonio as sectoral representative to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was declared void. Catanduanes. of the intention to surrender. In that capacity and pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1983. there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s resignation as ex-officio member of Petitioner Sangguniang Bayan ng San Andres.” To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office. effective June 15. It is an expression of the incumbent in some form.January 16. 1992. a reorganization of the provincial council became necessary. 1998 FACTS: Private respondent Augusto Antonio was the elected barangay captain of Sapang Palay. he was appointed by the President as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San Andres. (b) an act of relinquishment. the Sanggunian issued Resolution No. He tendered his resignation dated June 14. In view of his designation. then Secretary Luis T. because he did not possess the basic qualification that he should be president of the federation of barangay councils. Meanwhile. Catanduanes is deemed complete so as to terminate his official relation thereto. void for want of a quorum. 6. Romano of San Andres. Subsequently. in which private respondent was a voting member. duties and responsibilities as sectoral representative” therein.

and months after this Court had nullified his “designation” on August 12. Nonuser refers to a neglect to use a privilege or a right. the governing law was B. Sec. while resignation in general is a formal relinquishment. From the time that he was elected as punong barangay up to the time he resigned as a member of Sangguniang Bayan. The last one is required by reason of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code. The position shall be deemed vacated only upon acceptance of the resignation. Neither did he. second. inaction and acquiescence. and a copy of the action taken shall be furnished the official responsible for appointing a replacement and the Ministry of Local Government. to file appropriate legal action or proceeding. 1991. he is deemed to have recognized the validity of Aquino’s appointment and the latter’s discharge of his duties as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. His immediate and natural reaction upon Aquino’s appointment should have been to object or. . abandonment is a voluntary relinquishment through nonuser. express an intention to resume his office as member of the Sangguniang Bayan. While said law was silent as to who specifically should accept the resignation of an appointive member of the Sangguniang Bayan. 337 or the Local Government Code of 1983. In all. it results from a complete abandonment of duties of such a continuance that the law will infer a relinquishment. Clear intention to abandon should be manifested by the officer concerned.acceptance by the proper authority. The records are bereft of any evidence that private respondent’s resignation was accepted by the proper authority. Therefore. His overt acts plainly show that he really meant his resignation and understood its effects. private respondent’s failure to promptly assert his alleged right implies his loss of interest in the position. an intention to abandon and. Private respondent. the failure to perform the duties pertaining to the office must be with the officer’s actual or imputed intention to abandon and relinquish the office. there are two essential elements of abandonment: first. But he did neither. with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. Indeed. Such intention may be express or inferred from his own conduct. It is significant that he expressed his intention to resume office only on March 31. Second ISSUE: Abandonment of office Private Respondent Antonio has effectively relinquished his membership in the Sangguniang Bayan due to his voluntary abandonment of said post. however. 1992. at that time. From his passivity. 6 of Rule XIX of its implementing rules states that the “[r]esignation of sanggunian members shall be acted upon by the sanggunian concerned. after Aquino had been deemed resigned on March 23. failing to do that. show that Antonio had abandoned the contested office. His overt acts. when Aquino succeeded him to his original position. abandonment of office is a species of resignation. Abandonment of an office is not wholly a matter of intention.P. 1992. Abandonment of an office has been defined as the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder. silence. Thus. did not simultaneously discharge the duties and obligations of both positions. an overt or “external” act by which the intention is carried into effect.

GLORIA VS. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period.R. although reprimanded for being absent without leave. Jr. Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. DELA CRUZ VS. Laguio. APRIL 21. The illegality of the strikes was declared in 1991 decision of the Supreme Court in Manila Public School Teachers Association v. and other benefits "beyond the ninety (90) day suspension. the Court of Appeals ordered the DECS to pay private respondents their salaries. no compensation was due for the period of the preventive suspension pending investigation but only for the period of preventive suspension pending appeal in the event the employee is exonerated. he should be reinstated." In other words. 1999 FACTS: This case arose out of the unfortunate strikes and walk-outs staged by public school teachers on different dates in September and October 1990. It is a measure intended to enable to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or any way influencing witnesses against him. HELD: There are thus two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (1) preventive suspension pending investigations and (2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and. but many incidents of those strikes are still to be resolved. after review. the respondent is exonerated. No. At issue in this case is the right to back salaries of teachers who were either dismissed or suspended because they did not report for work but who were eventually ordered reinstated because they had not been shown to have taken part in the strike. 1999 .. If after investigation respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated. the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated. COURT OF APPEALS G. 131012. COURT OF APPEALS March 25. allowances. As already stated. ISSUE: Whether or not those suspended teachers are entitled to back wages.

among other grievances. 1990 issued by this Office. gross neglect of duty. That petitioners be awarded back wages for the period when they were not allowed to work The decisions dismissing petitioners were immediately implemented. As early as 18 December 1990 we have categorically ruled in the consolidated cases of Manila Public School Teachers Association v. conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence without official leave (AWOL). The petitions must be denied in view of previous rulings of this Court already settling all the issues raised by petitioners. and Alliance of Concerned Teachers v. Isidro Cariño that the mass actions of September/October 1990 staged by Metro Manila public school teachers "amounted to a strike in every sense of the term.to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper . Whether or not the petitioners were guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service 2. carried out for essentially economic reasons -.recess. Cariñio of the Department of Education. gross violation of Civil Service Law. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines. HELD: First issue: Yes. Culture and Sports (DECS). 1990. The decisions dismissing petitioners were immediately implemented. which acts constitute grave misconduct. gross insubordination. ISSUES: 1. in violation of Presidential Decree 807. weekends or holidays . Laguio Jr. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. abandoning their classes and refusing to go back even after they had been ordered to do so. it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same. Had the teachers availed of their free time . the strikers perceived to be the unjust or prejudicial implementation of the salary standardization law insofar as they were concerned. and the imposition of additional teaching loads and longer teaching hours. refusal to perform official duty. 19-20. Wherefore. It is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts.FACTS: Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro Manila who were simultaneously charged. this Office finds the respondents guilty as charged." They committed acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service by staging the mass protests on regular school days. That the petitioners participated in the mass action/illegal strike on Sept.to protest and pressure the Government to correct what. the non-payment or delay in payment of various fringe benefits and allowances to which they were entitled. and eventually dismissed in October 1990 by then Secretary Isidro D. after classes. constituting as they did. Rules and Regulations and reasonable office regulations. Hon. and subsequently defied the return-to-work order dated September 17. a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of or absence from work which it was said teachers' sworn duty to perform. after a careful evaluation of the records. preventively suspended.

Considering the foregoing. Court of Appeals[25] we resolved the issue in the negative on the ground that the teachers were neither exonerated nor unjustifiably suspended. the fact that the prompt remedial action taken by Secretary Cariño might have partially deflected the adverse effects of the mass protests did not erase the administrative liability of petitioners for the intended consequences thereof which were the very reason why such prompt remedial action became necessary. in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned. of Executive Order No. immediate implementation even pending appeal was clearly sanctioned by the aforequoted provision of the Administrative Code of 1987. no one .authorities within the bounds of law. We held in Bagana that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the CSC resolutions finding the teachers guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and imposing penalties of six (6) months' suspension without pay. Court of Appeals[24] we added that the persistent refusal of the striking teachers to call the mass actions by the conventional term "strike" did not erase the true nature of the mass actions as unauthorized stoppages of work the purpose of which was to obtain a favorable response to the teachers' economic grievances. the same is authorized by Section 47. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office is appealable to the Commission.e. 292. In Bangalisan v. But herein petitioners contend that classes were not actually disrupted because substitute teachers were immediately appointed by Secretary Cariño. paragraph (2). cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. We again stressed that the teachers were penalized not because they exercised their right to peaceably assemble but because of the manner by which such right was exercised. two (2) circumstances necessary for the grant of back wages in administrative disciplinary cases. being legal. . Their decision shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days' salary. And since it was already the final dismissal orders of Secretary Cariño which were being carried out. going on unauthorized and unilateral absences thus disrupting classes in various schools in Metro Manila which produced adverse effects upon the students for whose education the teachers were responsible.. the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal. the CSC or even the Supreme Court . thus: "The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities. Hence.not the DECS. we find that respondent Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the CSC resolutions finding petitioners guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Second issue: Payment of backwages The issue of whether back wages may be awarded to teachers ordered reinstated to the service after the dismissal orders of Secretary Cariño were commuted by the CSC to six (6) months' suspension is already settled. As to the immediate execution of the decision of the Secretary against petitioners. i.could have held them liable for their participation in the mass actions. Besides being a purely factual assertion which this Court cannot take cognizance of in a petition for review. In Bangalisan v. provinces. the immediate execution of the dismissal orders could not be considered unjustified.

" A few days later.000. ISSUE: HELD: The only authority who. Villegas filed this action for quo warranto in the Court of First Instance of Manila. is competent to classify a position into primary confidential is the President.HERNANDEZ VS. a lawyer and civil service eligible. he was sent to the United States to study enforcement techniques and customs practices under the technical assistance program of the National Economic Council and the International Cooperation Administration. . Villegas returned to the Philippines in June. It appears that Villegas did not know of his appointment and that of Keefe until February 28. that of Director for Security has been classified into category of primarily confidential. James Keefe was designated Acting Director for Security. the appointment of James Keefe to the position of Director for Security was likewise proposed. effective November 1. stating in his letter that "this (the proposed appointment) involves a change of designation and status from Director for Security which is confidential in nature to Arrastre Superintendent. It results that the removal of the plaintiff from the said position without justifiable cause and his transfer to the position of arrastre superintendent are illegal . While he was acting Arrastre Superintendent. n 1956. On this day. by constitutional and. that of arrastre superintendent. on further inquiry. with compensation at P6. . He served notice on Customs Commissioner Eleuterio Capapas that he was resuming the duties and functions of his office as Director for Security. 1957. 1958.. The evidence of the defendants-appellants yield no indication that the position of Director for Security has ever been classified into primarily confidential according to the procedure laid down by the law and the Constitution. 1955. is also illegal. found that he had been appointed Arrastre Superintendent. has been favorably recommended and endorsed by the department heads and the chiefs of offices and approved by the Office of the President does not go to show that an entirely different position. The heads of departments and the Commissioner of Civil Service can only recommend or make comments. VILLEGAS June 30. 1958. he learned that Keefe was being paid the salary for Director for Security and. When all else fails. On January 9. Consequently the appointment of defendant Keefe to the position of Director for Security. the effect of which is to exclude and remove the plaintiff from the said position. Shortly thereafter. The fact that a proposal to appoint to a certain position. in his stead. was appointed Director for Security of the Bureau of Customs. legal provisions. 1965 FACTS: Epifanio Villegas.. Secretary of Finance Jaime Hernandez proposed to the Office of the President the permanent appointment of Villegas as Arrastre Superintendent. This proposal was subsequently approved by the President. he was temporarily detailed to the Arrastre Service vice Eleazar Manikin and. a classified position. Villegas continued receiving his salary as Director for Security. however.

some positions and functions are either abolished.” and of its implementing rules issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. while other offices are also created. found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct in the administrative charge and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of his leave credits and retirement benefits including disqualification for reappointment in the government service. the president. which provides for the creation of “A Committee to Investigate the Administrative Complaint Against Aquilino T. issued by President Ramos on October 26.” Under said order. 4-93. we do not need to consider the position involved in this case is primarily confidential. Inc. petitioner seeks to assail the legality of Executive Order No. We therefore hold that Villegas' removal from the office of Director for Security is without cause and is therefore illegal. 1993. Larin. even assuming the position to be.For our purpose. 1993 which found him guilty of grave misconduct in the administrative charge and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal from office. The Excise Tax Service or the Specific Tax Service. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY October 16. 1993. 164 issued by the Office of the President. he questions Memorandum order no. 101 dated December 2. 1997 FACTS: Challenge in this petition is the validity of petitioner’s removal from service as Assistant Commissioner of the Excise Tax Service of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. 101 dated December 2. which provides for “Redefining the Areas of Jurisdiction and Renumbering of Regional And District Offices. Assistant Commissioner. because. Incidentally. 132. namely: a) Administrative Order No." It is to be understood of course that officials and employees holding primarily confidential positions continue only for so long as confidence in them endures. Likewise. LARIN VS. Consequently. The termination of their official relation can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their cessation from office involves no removal but merely the expiration of the term of office — two different causes for the termination of official relations recognized in the Law of Public Officers. it is nevertheless subject to the Constitutional provision that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause. Petitioner was convicted of the crimes for violation of Section 268 (4) of the Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Bureau of Internal Revenue” as well as the investigation made in pursuance thereto and Administrative Order No. decentralized or transferred to other offices. in the assailed Administrative Order No. which provides for the “Streamlining of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. of which petitioner was the Assistant Commissioner. 5-93. which provides for the “Organizational Structure and Statement of General Functions of Offices in the National Office” and b) Administrative Order No. . as a consequence of his act of favorably recommending the grant of tax credit to Tanduay Distillery. was one of those offices that was abolished by said executive order. renamed..

Aggrieved. as amended. No less than the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of security of tenure of the employees of the civil service. otherwise known as Civil Service Decree of the Philippines. or limited to a period specified by law or to the duration of a particular project for which purpose the employment was made. namely Undersecretary. On the aspect of procedural due process. Concededly. Section 36 of P. Assistant Secretary. because in such a case. Thus. is emphatic that career service officers and employees who enjoy security of tenure may be removed only for any of the causes enumerated in said law. Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board. Corollarily. the circumstantial setting of the instant case sets it miles apart from the foregoing rule and placed it well within the exception. was issued pursuant to the power of removal of the President. Thus.D. We are not unaware of the rule that since administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission.[3] Career Executive Service officers. petitioner was appointed as Assistant Commissioner in January. The rule is well settled that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is that a party . petitioner filed directly with this Court the instant petition on December 13. Article VII of the Constitution. where the very basis of the administrative case against petitioner is his conviction in the criminal action which was later on set aside by this court upon a categorical and clear findings that the acts for which he was administratively held liable are not unlawful and irregular. the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case necessarily entails the dismissal of the administrative action against him.[2] Under the law. It must be pointed out that petitioner is a career service officer. there is no basis nor justifiable reason to maintain the administrative suit. it is worthy to note that the position of the Assistant Commissioner of the BIR is part of the Career Executive Service. Being a presidential appointee. career service is characterized by the existence of security of tenure. petitioner enjoys the right to security of tenure. This power of removal. 164. are all appointed by the President. 807. which created a committee to investigate the administrative charge against petitioner.[6] However. Under the Administrative Code of 1987. petitioner is a presidential appointee who belongs to career service of the Civil Service. This is in line with the well settled principle that the “power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint” conferred to the President by Section 16. the dismissal or acquittal of the criminal charge does not foreclose the institution of administrative action nor carry with it the relief from administrative liability. Bureau director. 1993 to question basically his alleged unlawful removal from office. 1987 by then President Aquino. however. As a career service officer. Assistant Bureau Director. it is ineluctably clear that Memorandum Order No. Specifically. No. Regional Director. as contra-distinguished from non-career service whose tenure is co-terminus with that of the appointing or subject to his pleasure. At the outset. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed from office HELD: Yes. suffice it to say that petitioner was given every chance to present his side. is not an absolute one which accepts no reservation. he comes under the direct diciplining authority of the President. Assistant Regional Director.

the City Mayor wrote separate letters to petitioners notifying them of the abolition of their positions and advising them of the termination of their services "effective at the close of business hours on March 15.be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense. Presidential Decree No. Rosagaran on the other hand. or a total of 32 positions in both offices. in the same capacity as Clerk-Stenographer. and that just a short time before the abolition of their .000 for office supplies and an additional amount of P10. series of 1956 creating 35 positions in the City Mayor’s office. to abolish offices. In 1955. 1958 FACTS: Petitioner Concepcion G. that their efficiency and merit has been attested by repeated and constant promotions and increases in salary. On February 14. which includes the power to group. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government.000 for the City Mayor’s discretionary fund. consolidate bureaus and agencies. she was transferred to the Office of the City Mayor. Briones she was appointed ClerkStenographer in the Office of the City Treasurer of Cebu and on August 5. approved Ordinance No. BRIONES vs OSMEÑA September 24. 192. Among the positions abolished in the Office of the City Mayor were those occupied by petitioners. and promoted to Administrative Officer. abolishing 15 positions in the City Mayor’s office and 17 positions in the Office of the Municipal Board.000 for office equipment. 1416. since Commonwealth days. the Municipal Board in its Resolution No. the amounts of P28. He was employed in the Office of the City Mayor of Cebu since July." ISSUE: Whether or not the abolition of petitioner’s position is void HELD: Yes. that petitioner Rosagaran was even proclaimed "Model Employee" as recently as 1955. in violation of the security of Civil Service tenures as provided by the Constitution. to transfer functions. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. before the war. Respondent city mayor passed Resolution No. 1956. and constitute a mere subterfuge for the removal without cause of the said appellees. The reasons given for the abolition of the positions of the appellees (alleged to be economy and efficiency) are untrue. he was publicly declared and adjudged "Model Employee. 21. 1956. Considering that the appellees have served in the office of the Mayor of Cebu. 192. is a second grade civil service eligible. services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. 1937. to create and classify functions. 187. but with permanent status. series of 1956. and appropriating therefor the necessary amount for salaries for six months. Petitioner Faustino O. 1940. P2. Pursuant to said Ordinance No.

Some of them were dismissed while some were suspended and others were exonerated. 1991 FACTS: Some 800 public school teachers have joined mass action leaving behind their public duty to dramatize and highlight the teachers’ plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again brought to the latter’s attention. A decent respect for the Civil Service provisions of our Constitution dictates that civil service eligibles. the Secretary of Education issued an order commanding the striking teachers to immediately return to their work and threatening them to face dismissal proceedings if they don’t follow the order. Thus the Secretary of Education formed a Committee for purposes of investigating the striking teachers and complaints were filed.100 per annum. Osmeña.. AUGUST 6. we ruled that while abolition of the office does not imply removal of the incumbent. In our recent decision in Gacho. v. the excuse of promoting efficiency and economy is most transparent and unimpressive. Al. his tenure of office is protected by Section 4. for being a member of the Civil Service. the rule is true only where the abolition is made in good faith. It is evident that the mayor could not legally remove the petitioner without cause. 208. 94 Phil. On his part.000 a month.positions.. 95445. Et. etc. like petitioners herein who have rendered long and honorable service. Article XII of the Constitution. petitioners went immediately to the Supreme Court and filed a petition for certiorari to declare their dismissal null and void as they were just exercising their right to redress their grievances as . However. the teachers did not heed to the order and the mass action continued. Instead of appealing the decision of the Secretary to the Civil Service Commission. almost P6. the respondents had created for the same office of the City Mayor no less than 35 new positions calling for an outlay of P68. LAGUIO G.R.’ This Court has always upheld these salutary principles. Al. No. nor should they be left at the mercy of political changes. That ruling is conclusive on the case now before us. Et. should not be sacrificed in favor of non-eligibles given positions of recent creation. The Secretary of Education found them liable for abandonment of work and grave misconduct. MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS VS. that the right to abolish can not be used to discharge employees in violation of the civil service law nor can it be exercised for personal or political reasons. which says:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library ‘No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law.

R. where there would be an opportunity to prove the relevant facts warranting corrective relief. They argued that their right to due process was violated because they were not accorded the opportunity to defend themselves but instead immediately dismissed without giving them notice. in 1968 the Provincial Board issued a resolution abolishing their position and their corresponding items were eliminated from the budget of the Province. to take part. assert and vindicate their rights therein. see those proceedings through to judgment and if adjudged guilty. to apply. The petitioners' obvious remedy was NOT to halt the administrative proceedings but. 1973 FACTS: Petitioners were the Special Counsels in the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Sur since 1964. except only in criminal actions where capital penalties have been imposed. appeal to the Civil Service Commission. Parties-litigant are duty bound to observe the proper order of recourse through the judicial hierarchy. L-30244. but to the Regional Trial Court. No. 23 This Court is a court of last resort. SEPTEMBER 28. on the contrary. ROQUE VS. immediate recourse to judicial authority was believed necessary because the respondent Secretary or those acting under him or on his instructions were acting without or in excess of jurisdiction. ERICTA G. However. and failure to show that the abolishment of their position was done in bad faith. not directly to the Supreme Court. or with grave abuse of discretion. or if. Thus petitioners filed a complaint before the RTC of Zamboanga. the trial court rendered a decision against the petitioners for failure of the latter to p rove that there funds available for their salaries. especially when numerous parties desperately situated as far as the facts are concerned gather under the umbrella of a common plea. ISSUE: Whether or not immediate recourse to the Supreme Court was the proper remedy taken by the dismissed teachers. . Its review jurisdiction is limited to resolving questions of law where there is no dispute of the facts or the facts have already been determined by lower tribunals. they by-pass the rungs of the judicial ladder at the peril of their own causes. and generalization of what should be alleged with particularity becomes unavoidable. pending said proceedings.provided for under the Constitution. HELD: This case illustrates the error of precipitate recourse to the Supreme Court.

The principal reasons advanced by respondent Board for the abolition of the positions of the two special counsels. COURT OF APPEALS G. are: (1) the positions are unnecessary — "as the duties of the Provincial Fiscal as legal officer of the province had been removed from his office and vested upon the Provincial Attorney" and "the prosecution of crimes in a court of justice is purely a state affair (sic) therefore eliminating the necessity for the employment of Special Counsels to act for and in behalf of and to protect the interest of the provincial government .ISSUE: Whether the action of the respondent Board. Thus. and (3) not in violation of the law.." These purported justifications — after a review of the record — appear unimpressive. and in failing to provide appropriations for their salaries in accordance with existing laws. Circumstances there are which indicate them to be but a mere artifice to conceal the unlawful removal of permanent civil service employees. Thus: As well settled as the rule that the abolition of an office dates not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that. for political or personal reasons." and (2) economy — "the province is laboring under heavy stress financial adversities (sic) .. in abolishing the positions of petitioners as special counsels. HELD: We start from the premise that while abolition of an office does not imply removal of the incumbent. Where the abolition is made in bad faith.. FABELLA VS. NOVEMBER 28. then DECS Secretary Cariño issued a returnto-work order to all public school teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various dates during the period September 26. 1990 to . such rule holds true only where the abolition is made (1) in good faith..R. the abolition must be made in good faith. or in order to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees. in order to be valid. 1990. it is null and void.. No. had the effect of unlawfully excluding the petitioners from the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which they are entitled under the law. 1997 FACTS: On September 17. evidence of bad faith is shown when the purpose of the abolition of office is to discharge the incumbent in violation of the civil service law. (2) not for personal or political reasons. 110379. in violation of their security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution.

(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel. Secretary Cariño filed administrative cases against herein petitioner-appellees. (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality. The issue is not whether private respondents may be punished for engaging in a prohibited action but whether. 13 . 1992.October 18. We agree with the Court of Appeals that private respondents were denied due process of law. In short. ISSUE: These issues. The hearing of the case was thereafter conducted ex parte with only the teachers allowed to present their evidence. But the court failed to act on his motion. HELD: The petition is bereft of merit. due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights. At the same time. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month differentials. In the present case. to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor. and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. Secretary Cariño ordered petitioner-appellee to be placed under preventive suspension. however. boil down to a single question: whether private respondents were denied due process of law. their right to due process has been violated. As already observed. not on the right of government workers to strike. On July 3. who are teachers of the Mandaluyong High School. On October 18. clothing allowances and passage of a debt-cap bill in Congress. the Solicitor General informed the trial court that Cariño had ceased to be DECS Secretary and asked for his substitution. In administrative proceedings. all closely related. before they can be investigated and meted out any penalty. 1990. the issue is not whether the private respondents engaged in any prohibited activity which may warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against them as a result of administrative proceedings. among other things. and to defend one's rights. the resolution of this case revolves around the question of due process of law. The charge sheets required petitioner-appellees to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of civil service laws and regulations. due process must first be observed. in the course of the investigation of the alleged proscribed activity. 1990.

the COA disallowed the payment of per diems to the petitioner. petitioner Bitonio. Citing also the Civil Liberties Union case. was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the Department of Labor and Employment. the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof. Jr. The officers concerned sat as alternates of their superiors in an ex officio capacity. or some other such euphemism. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. Brilliantes of the Department of Labor and Employment designated the petitioner to be the DOLE representative to the Board of Directors of PEZA. Commission on Audit. the Court explained thus: "The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office. As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G." . 147392.BITONIO VS. HELD: The petitioner’s case stands on all fours with the case of Dela Cruz v. say. By whatever name it is designated. whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance. which come under the jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance. MARCH 12. the petitioner was receiving a per diem for every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997. No. 2004 FACTS: In 1994. therefore. The Acting Secretary Jose S. it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. he is not entitled to collect any extra compensation. ISSUE: The issue in this case is whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors’ meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor. the Court upheld the COA in disallowing the payment of honoraria and per diems to the officers concerned who sat as members of the Board of Directors of the National Housing Authority. such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution. It should be obvious that if. Here. he is actually and in legal contemplation performing the primary function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary banking matters.R. After a post audit of the PEZA’s disbursement transactions.

Sec. Under the terms of the contract.LEYSON VS. However. (13). Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987. or. Executive Vice President of ITTC. Granexport Manufacturing Corporation (GRANEXPORT) and United Coconut Chemicals. 2. to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock. (UNITED COCONUT). OMBUDSMAN G. where applicable as in the case of stock corporations. entered into a one (1)-year contract with Legaspi Oil Company. Torralba. i. ISSUE: Whether or not these companies fall within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. Torralba.. On 11 March 1997 petitioner Manuel M. The CIIF companies engaged the services of another vessel. 134990.R. for the transport of coconut oil in bulk through MT Transasia. any agency organized as a stock or non-stock . Inc. the CIIF companies with their new President. either party could terminate the agreement provided a three (3)-month advance notice was given to the other party. respondent Oscar A. comprising the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) companies. Inc. in August 1996. operated by Southwest Maritime Corporation. (LEGASPI OIL). any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature. MT Marilag. On 30 January 1998 public respondent dismissed the complaint based on its finding that the case is a simple case of breach of contract with damages which should have been filed in the regular court. APRIL 27. first. The majority shareholdings of these CIIF companies are owned by the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) as administrator of the CIIF. terminated the contract without the requisite advance notice. namely. Leyson Jr. Besides the entities involved are private corporations (over) which this Office has no jurisdiction. and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly.. HELD: But these jurisprudential rules invoked by petitioner in support of his claim that the CIIF companies are government owned and/or controlled corporations are incomplete without resorting to the definition of "government owned or controlled corporation" contained in par. or prior to the expiration of the contract. a domestic corporation engaged in the lighterage or shipping business. The definition mentions three (3) requisites. e. No. 2000 FACTS: The International Towage and Transport Corporation (ITTC). filed with public respondent Office of the Ombudsman a grievance case against respondent Oscar A. This Office has no jurisdiction to determine the legality or validity of the termination of the contract entered into by CIIF and ITTC.

Obviously.corporation. to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock. vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature. all three (3) corporations comprising the CIIF companies were organized as stock corporations. Unfortunately. where applicable as in the case of stock corporations. In the present case. and 92. third. 91. the below 51% shares of stock in LEGASPI OIL removes this firm from the definition of a government owned or controlled corporation. it is in this regard that petitioner failed to substantiate his contentions.1âwphi1 The UCPB-CIIF owns 44. private corporations not within the scope of its jurisdiction. Our concern has thus been limited to GRANEXPORT and UNITED COCONUT as we go back to the second requisite.10% of the shares of LEGASPI OIL. second. and.85% of the shares of UNITED COCONUT. as found by public respondent. . There is no showing that GRANEXPORT and/or UNITED COCONUT was vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature unlike PETROPHIL in Quimpo. or. The Court thus concludes that the CIIF companies are. owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly.24% of the shares of GRANEXPORT.