Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered under

MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro.

THIRD DIVISION

The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private

oppositor are hereby dismissed for want of evidence.

G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by
MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all
surnamed ABISTO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land
registration case mandatory or directory?
Statement of the Case
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure
to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to
grant the application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this
petition to set aside the Decision 1 promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the
subsequent Resolution 2 promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent
Court of Appeals 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the
challenged Decision reads: 4
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal
appealed from is hereby set aside, and a new one entered
confirming the registration and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado,
Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by Margarita, Marissa,
Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented
by their aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion

Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding

taxes due on this land, let an order for the issuance of a decree be
issued.
The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition
for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. 5 The application was docketed as Land
Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional
Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. 6However, during the
pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs Margarita,
Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado
represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their
guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the
petition "for want of jurisdiction." However, it found that the applicants
through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned: 7
. . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with
the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants
to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. "E") in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit "E" was only published
in the Official Gazette (Exhibits "F" and "G"). Consequently, the Court
is of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired
jurisdiction over the instant application for want of compliance with
the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial
hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.

The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982,
which in its pertinent portion provides:8
It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23
[of PD 1529] has a two-fold purpose; the first, which is mentioned in
the provision of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in the
Official Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is
mentioned in the opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to
publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of
general circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is
dispensable. As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is
indispensably necessary because without it, the court would be
powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land registration
case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial hearing also
in a newspaper of general circulation is indispensably necessary as
a requirement of procedural due process; otherwise, any decision
that the court may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm.
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals
which, as earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and
ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.

Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial
hearing shall be "published both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of
general circulation." According to petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette
is "necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and . . . in . . . a
newspaper of general circulation to comply with the notice requirement of
due process." 11
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with
the requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere
"procedural defect." They add that publication in the Official Gazette is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 12
In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals
ruled: 13
. . . although the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation is couched in
mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates
with equal force that publication in the Official Gazette shall be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.

The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA

Resolution dared November 19, 1991.

Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the
opportunity "to explain matters fully and present their side." Thus, it justified
its disposition in this wise: 14

The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this
recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioner's counsel anchored his
petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45
because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence,
we shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not
for certiorari under Rule 65. 9

. . . We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required

procedure prejudiced them in any way. Moreover, the other
requirements of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice
by mailing, and posting at the site and other conspicuous places,
were complied with and these are sufficient to notify any party who is
minded to make any objection of the application for registration.

The Issue

The Court's Ruling

Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed "grave abuse

of discretion" 10 in holding

We find for petitioner.

Newspaper Publication Mandatory

. . . that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case

No. 86 need not be published in a newspaper of general circulation,
and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication.

The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring

publication of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:

Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. The court shall,
within five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting
the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than
forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for
land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3)
posting.
1. By publication.
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial
hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice
of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and
once in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said
notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an
interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as
known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice shall also
require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date
and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not
be granted.
xxx xxx xxx
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that
publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land
registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent any
publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court
can validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the
demands of statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the
publication requirement.
The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the
Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order
setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and
thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. 15 While concededly such

literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import

ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the
present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning.
In Republic vs. Marasigan, 16 the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by
means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be
complied with. "If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would
not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all
persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include
owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land." Indeed, if mailing
of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a
newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since the law included
such requirement in its detailed provision.
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in
rem. 17 Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the
land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or
interests in the property. Anin rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with.
Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be adversely
affected would be barred from contesting an application which they had no
knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription
of realty in the land registration court must prove by satisfactory and
conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the identity of the
same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for
recovery of realty. 18 He must prove his title against the whole world. This
task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved when all persons
concerned nay, "the whole world" who have rights to or interests in the
subject property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and show
cause why the application should not be granted. The elementary norms of
due process require that before the claimed property is taken from concerned
parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must be
given notice and opportunity to oppose.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should
be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in
the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have
already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process
and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as
newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices

published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all.
Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and
may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassingin
rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders
issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice
in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the
requirements for publication, mailing and posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication
requirement of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even
if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no
excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such
mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time
and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or
equivocation; there is room only for application. 19There is no alternative.
Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must
be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal
requisites shall have been duly complied with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private
respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.

WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T.

PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA
PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUALFERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br.
162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set
aside: (a) the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated April 29, 1988 in CAG.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v.
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana
C. Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al."
which dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed the decision of the trial
court and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying petitioners' motion
for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged
natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood
brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue,
legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was
survived by the following:

SECOND DIVISION

(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;

(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full
blood of the deceased, to wit:

G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992

OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners,
vs.
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C.
PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL,

Esperanza C. PascualBautista
Manuel
C.
Pascual
Jose
C.
Pascual
Susana C. Pascual-Bautista

Erlinda
C.
Pascual
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
(c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of
the deceased, to wit:
Avelino
Pascual
Isoceles
Pascual
Loida
Pascual-Martinez
Virginia
Pascual-Ner
Nona
Pascual-Fernando
Octavio
Pascual
Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;
(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother
of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:
Olivia
S.
Pascual
Hermes S. Pascual
(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half
blood of the deceased and represented by the following:

On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental

Petition to the Petition for letters of Administration, where she expressly
stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don
Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an
affidavit, to the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the
younger full blood brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie
the statement made by the oppositors, that they were are not among the
known heirs of the deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein
petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V
of such compromise agreement provides, to wit:
This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to
the continuation of the above-entitled proceedings until the
final determination thereof by the court, or by another
compromise agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia
Pascual and Hermes Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased,
Don Andres Pascual. (Rollo, p. 108)

Dominga
M.
Pascual
Mamerta
P.
Fugoso
Abraham S. Sarmiento, III
Regina
SarmientoMacaibay
Eleuterio
P.
Sarmiento
Domiga P. San Diego
Nelia
P.
Marquez
Silvestre
M.
Pascual
Eleuterio
M.
Pascual
(Rollo, pp. 46-47)

The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the
Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual,
manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres
Pascual, their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).

Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres
Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal,
Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the
intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as

it is hereby resolved to Deny this motion reiterating the
hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual (Rollo, p.
136).

On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary

Rights (Rollo, pp. 113-114) and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to
reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).
On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge
Manuel S. Padolina issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo,
pp. 515-526). and such motion was denied.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:

Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R.

No. 14010 (Rollo, p. 15.).
On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the
decision the dispositive part of which reads:

An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from

the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother;
nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the

petitioners.

The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC,
supra, where this Court ruled that:

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 38)

Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July
14, 1988, the Court of Appeals issued its resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course.
The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized
natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.
Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article
992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude
recognized and of the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA 645
[1987]) because being acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not
due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were under
conception (Rollo, p. 418).

Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain

in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but
this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992.
Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is
presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn
hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which
it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable
evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more
than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.

Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in

Article 992 must be strictly construed to refer only to spurious children (Rollo,
p. 419).

Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in
holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in
the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres
Pascual, full blood brother of their father.

On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are
within the prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid
down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable to them.

In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of

Articles 902 and 989 of the Civil Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to
represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual.

On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court further
elucidated the successional rights of illegitimate children, which squarely
answers the questions raised by the petitioner on this point.
The Court held:
Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional
rights of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to
their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of
these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the
right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In
whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the
persons to be represented are themselvesillegitimate. The
three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The
right of representation is not available to illegitimate
descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a
legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by
petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate
child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of
Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other
descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a
conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession
by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or
mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions
of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant case
because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestatobetween the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be
amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992
the exception.
The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and
other descendants shall inherit by right of representation"
and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . .
are transmitted upon their death to their descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the
limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother.
(Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo

C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182

SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more
humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when
the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their
meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute
must be taken to mean exactly what is says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA
758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of
the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]).
When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied
regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous.
(Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions
may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but
reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly
warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions
rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by
statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication
(Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).
Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are
generally placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as
to whether or not acknowledged natural children should be treated differently,
in the negative.
It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED
LEX).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and
the assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22301

August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.
Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F.
R. Rosete and Solicitor O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower
court is whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a
secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense
to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition. We hold that it does not.

The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information
dated August 14, 1962 reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO
MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section
2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth
Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as
follows: That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have
in his possession and under his custody and control one home-made
revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of
ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or permit
therefor from the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."
When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court
at the outset asked the counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that
the accused was found in possession of the gun involved in this case, that he
has neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we can submit
the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can
hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After
counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would not question the
authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of
law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such question to
be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his
firearm."
Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so
that he could pass on their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following
question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six
rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his
possession on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having
secured the necessary license or permit thereof from the corresponding
authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes,
Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused
admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused
admits."
Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for
decision." Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits
consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste,"
then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962; 1 another document likewise
issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to

proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission; 2the

oath of office of the accused as such secret agent, 3 a certificate dated March
11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov.
Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of
the above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question of
whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the
provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of
firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were given time to file
their respective memoranda.1wph1.t
Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision
convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two
years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from
him are forfeited in favor of the Government."
The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The
decision must be affirmed.
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be
unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of
firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition."5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition
regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the
employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors,
lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal
mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when
such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use
in the performance of their official duties."6
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As
such he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental
duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only
after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate
without them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set
aside.

Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret

agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of
the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the
category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal
police expressly covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not
within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a
statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with
what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 116719

January 18, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PATRICIO AMIGO alias "BEBOT", accused-appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Initially, Patricio Amigo was charged with frustrated murder in an Information
reading as follows:
The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of
FRUSTRATED MURDER, under Art. 248, in relation to Art. 5 of the
Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-mentioned accused, armed with a knife, with treachery and
evident premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attacked, assaulted and stab with said weapon one
Benito Ng Suy, thereby inflicting injuries upon the latter, the following
injuries, to wit:
MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS-LEFT ARM, LEFT CHEST,
ABDOMEN AND LEFT THIGH WITH PENETRATION TO
LEFT PLEURAL CAVITY, DIAPHRAGM STOMACH,
DUODENUM, PANCREAS AND MIDTRANVERSE COLON.
thus performing all the acts of execution which should have
produced the crime of murder as a consequence but nevertheless,
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is,
because of the timely and able medical assistance immediately
rendered to the said Benito Ng Suy.

That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-mentioned accused, armed with a knife, with treachery and
evident premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attacked, assaulted and stabbed with said weapon one
Benito Ng Suy, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple wounds
which caused his death and the consequent loss and damage to the
heirs of the victim.
(p. 3, Rollo.)
After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision, disposing:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Patricio Amigo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER punishable under Art.
248 of the Revised Penal Code, with no modifying circumstance
present, the accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, which is the medium period of the penalty ofreclusion
temporal in its maximum to death and to pay the cost; to indemnify
the offended party the amount of P93,214.70 as actual damages and
P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as moral
damages.
(p. 32, Rollo.)
Reversal thereof is now sought, with accused-appellant arguing that error
was committed by the trial court in imposing or meting out the penalty
of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. 19 (1), Article III
of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when the offense was
committed.
The facts of the case, as briefly summarized in the brief submitted by the
Office of the Solicitor General and as borne out by the evidence, are as
follows:

(p. 1, Rollo.)
to which he pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently, due to the death of the victim, an amended Information was
filed charging now the crime of murder, to wit:

On December 29, 1989, at around 1:00 P.M., after having spent halfday at their store, located at No. 166-A, Ramon Magsaysay Avenue,
Davao City, Benito Ng Suy was driving their gray Ford Fiera back
home, situated at the back of Car Asia, Bajada, Davao City. With him
during that time were his daughters, Jocelyn Ng Suy and a younger

one together with his two year old son, who were all seated at the
front seat beside him while a five year old boy was also seated at the
back of the said vehicle. (TSN, April 29, 1991, pp. 3-5; TSN, March
31, 1992)

Irked by the comment made by Benito, Patricio sarcastically asked;

"You are Chinese, is it you?" With a ready answer Benito said; "Yes, I
am a Chinese and why?" Patricio in turn replied; So, you are a
Chinese, wait for a while," then left. (ibid. pp. 7 and 19)

On their way home and while traversing the National Highway of

Bajada, Davao City, an orange Toyota Tamaraw driven by one Virgilio
Abogada, suddenly made a left turn in front of the Regional Hospital,
Bajada, Davao City, without noticing the Ford Fiera coming from the
opposite direction. This Tamaraw was heading for Sterlyn
Kitchenette, which was situated at the comer of the said hospital.
(TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 4; TSN, March 31, 1992, pp. 3 and 13)

Immediately thereafter, Benito ordered Jocelyn to call a policeman,

but after a lapsed of about one minute, Patricio returned and
arrogantly approached Benito, asking the latter once again, "You are
a Chinese, is it not?" To this Benito calmly responded in the
affirmative. (ibid. pp. 7, 19-20)

With Virgilio was Patricio Amigo alias Bebot, a vulcanizer at

Lingling's vulcanizing shop owned and operated by a certain
Galadua. He was also seated at the right front seat beside Virgilio.
Due to the unexpected veer made by Virgilio, an accidental head on
collision occurred between the Fiera and the Tamaraw, causing a
slight damaged to the right bumper of the latter. (TSN, March 31,
1992, p. 4)
Right after the collision, Benito immediately alighted from the driver's
seat and confronted Virgilio Abogada who also went down from his
vehicle. (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 5)
Benito, who was a big man with a loud voice told Virgilio, "You were
not looking," to which Virgilio retorted, I did not see you". (TSN, April
29, 1991, p. 16)
While the two drivers where having this verbal confrontation, Patricio
who was merely a passenger of Virgilio also alighted from the front
seat of the Tamaraw and instantaneously approached Benito and
advised the latter to leave since it was merely a small and minor
accident. (TSN, April 29, 1991, pp. 16-18)
A bit irritated with the actuation exhibit by Patricio, Benito rebuked
the former and told him not to interfere, since he had nothing to do
with the accident. (ibid. p. 7)

Upon hearing the response, Patricio mumbled "Ah, so you are a

Chinese," and suddenly took a five inch knife from his waist and
simultaneously stabbed Benito hitting him twice on the chest. (Ibid. p.
20)
After being hit, Benito wounded and sensing that his life was in peril,
tried to evade his assailant by pushing Patricio away and run around
the Tamaraw but Patricio wielding the same knife and not content
with the injuries he had already inflicted, still chased Benito and upon
overtaking the latter embraced him and thrusted his knife on the
victim several times, the last of which hit Benito on the left side of his
body. (ibid. pp. 8, 10, 22)
It was at this juncture that Jocelyn who was still inside the Ford
Fiera, pleading for mercy to spare her father tried to get out of the
vehicle but it was very unfortunate that she could not open its door.
(Ibid. p. 10)
Knowing that Patricio was really determined to kill her father by
refusing to heed her pleas, Joselyn shouted for help, since there
were already several people around witnessing that fatal incident,
but to her consternation nobody lifted a single finger to help them.
(ibid. pp. 6, 10, 18, 21-22) Only after her father lay seated on the
floor of their Ford Fiera after being hit on the left side of his body that
she was able to open the door of the said vehicle. (Ibid. p 12)
After this precise moment, her younger sister, upon seeing their
father bathing with his own blood, embraced him, causing Patricio to

cease from his ferocious assault and noticing the presence of

several people, he fled. (Ibid. p. 22)
Thereafter, an enraged Jocelyn chased him, but since the assailant
ran faster than her, she was not able to overtake him, thus, she
instead decided to go back to where her father was and carried him
inside the Tamaraw who bumped them and consequently brought
him to San Pedro Hospital where he was attended to at the
Emergency Room. (ibid. p 13)
While at the Emergency Room, Benito who was on a very critical
condition, due to multiple (13) stabbed wounds, was operated by Dr.
Rolando Chiu. After the operation, he was subsequently brought to
the ICU and stayed there for three (3) weeks. (July 12, 1991, pp. 3
and 4)
In a last ditch effort to save his life, having only 10 to 20 percent
survival, Benito was airlifted to Manila and was directly confined at
the Chinese General Hospital. After three (3) weeks of confinement,
Benito expired. CAUSE OF DEATH SEPSIS (an overwhelming
infection). This means that the infection has already circulated in the
blood all over the body. (ibid. pp. 6-7)
(pp. 59-65, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the
promulgation of Republic Act No. 7659, the death penalty had been
abolished and hence, the penalty that should have been imposed for the
crime of murder committed by accused-appellant without the attendance of
any modifying circumstances, should bereclusion temporal in its medium
period or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day, to 20 years of reclusion temporal.

Decision, ibid.), the correct penalty should be in the medium period

(Art. 64, par. 1, Revised Penal Code) which is 17 years, 4 months
and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal.
(p. 10, Appellant's Brief, ff. p. 50, Rollo.)
The question raised by accused-appellant was settled by this Court
in People vs. Muoz (170 SCRA 107 [1989]) thusly:
In People vs. Gavarra, Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court
that "in view of the abolition of the death penalty under Section 19,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed
for murder isreclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua," thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period.
Later, without categorically saying so, the Court, through Justice
Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera in People vs. Masangkay and
through Justice Andres R. Narvasa in People vs. Atencio, divided the
modified penalty into three new periods, the limits of which were
specified by Justice Edgardo L. Paras inPeople vs. Intino, as follows:
the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the
upper half ofreclusion temporal maximum as the medium;
and reclusion perpetua as the maximum.
The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after extended
discussion, come to the conclusion that the doctrine announced
therein does not reflect the intention of the framers as embodied in
Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution. This conclusion is not
unanimous, to be sure. Indeed, there is much to be said of the
opposite view, which was in fact shared by many of those now voting
for its reversal. The majority of the Court, however, is of the belief
that the original interpretation should be restored as the more
acceptable reading of the constitutional provision in question.

Reasons out accused-appellant:

. . . Since the death penalty (or capital punishment) is not imposable
when the stabbing and killing happened, the computation of the
penalty should be regarded from reclusion perpetua down and not
from death penalty. Indeed, the appropriate penalty is deducible
from reclusion perpetua down to reclusion temporal in its medium
period. Hence, there being no modifying circumstances present (p. 5

The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution

abolished the death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for
murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the
medium. These should now be divided into three new periods in
keeping with the three-grade scheme intended by the legislature.
Those who disagree feel that Article III, Section 19(1) merely
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has not, by reducing

it to reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the remaining

penalties. These should be maintained intact.
A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that here is
really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the
death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall
not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already
imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language,
while rather awkward, is still plain enough. And it is a settled rule of
legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain,
it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like
the records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to

abolish the death penalty or merely to prevent its imposition.
Whatever the intention was, what we should determine is whether or
not they also meant to require a corresponding modification in the
other periods as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty.
It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at
all expressed in Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution or
indicated therein by at least clear and unmistakable implication. It
would have been so easy, assuming such intention, to state it
categorically and plainly, leaving no doubts as to its meaning.
One searches in vain for such a statement, express or even implied.
The writer of this opinion makes the personal observation that this
might be still another instance where the framers meant one thing
and said another or strangely, considering their loquacity
elsewhere did not say enough.
The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra, Masangkay, Atencio
and Intino cases represented the unanimous thinking of the Court as
it was then constituted. All but two members at that time still sit on
the Court today. If we have seen fit to take a second look at the
doctrine on which we were all agreed before, it is not because of a
change in the composition of this body. It is virtually the same Court

that is changing its mind after reflecting on the question again in the
light of new perspectives. And well it might, and can, for the tenets it
lays down are not immutable. The decisions of this Court are not
petrified rules grown rigid once pronounced but vital, growing things
subject to change as all life is. While we are told that the trodden
path is best, this should not prevent us from opening a fresh trial or
exploring the other side or testing a new idea in a spirit of continuing
inquiry.
Accordingly, with the hope that "as judges, (we) will be equal to (our)
tasks," whatever that means, we hereby reverse the current doctrine
providing for three new periods for the penalty for murder as reduced
by the Constitution. Instead, we return to our original interpretation
and hold that Article III, Section 19(1) does not change the periods of
the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty
and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium and
minimum penalties remains unchanged.
The Court realizes that this interpretation may lead to certain
inequities that would not have arisen under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code before its modification. Thus, a person originally
subject to the death penalty and another who committed the murder
without the attendance of any modifying circumstance will now be
both punishable with the same medium period although the former is
concededly more guilty than the latter. True enough. But that is the
will not of this Court but of the Constitution. That is a question of
wisdom, not construction. Of some relevance perhaps is the parable
in the Bible of the workman who was paid the stipulated daily wage
of one penny although he had worked longer than others hired later
in the day also paid the same amount. When he complained
because he felt unjustly treated by the hoe jurisdiction of the court
over the person. An appearance may be madt agree with me for a
penny?
The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the
Congress. Penalties are prescribed by statute and are essentially
and exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only interpret and
apply them and have no authority to modify them or revise their

range as determined exclusively by the legislature. We should not

encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.
Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic
aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the commission of
the offenses, the applicable sentence is the medium period of the
penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which,
conformably to the new doctrine here adopted and announced, is
still reclusion perpetua. This is the penalty we imposed on all the
accused-appellants for each of the three murders they have
committed in conspiracy with the others. The award of civil indemnity
for the heirs of each of the victims is affirmed but the amount thereof
is hereby increased to P30,000.00 in line with the present policy.
(at pp. 120-125.)
The above ruling was reiterated in People vs. Parominog (203 SCRA 673
[1991]) and in People vs. De la Cruz(216 SCRA 476 [1992]).
Finally, accused-appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is too
cruel and harsh a penalty and pleads for sympathy. Courts are not the forum
to plead for sympathy. The duty of courts is to apply the law, disregarding
their feeling of sympathy or pity for an accused. DURA LEX SED LEX. The
remedy is elsewhere clemency from the executive or an amendment of
the law by the legislative, but surely, at this point, this Court can but apply the
law.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S.
GARCIA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent,
Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner
offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy." 1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event
and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation
in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs
awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case
was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner. 2 The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi)
Good Afternoon M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba
ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung
paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na,
magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko
sa 'yo.
CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)

FIRST DIVISION
CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na
nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo,

ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi
hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka
na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa
'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa
review mo, kung kakailanganin ang
certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi
ka sa akin makakahingi.

ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.

CHUCHI Eh, di sana
ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may
utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba
makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako.

CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko

talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.
ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung
paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel.
Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo.
Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka
nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your
own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako.
Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na
kita).

ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papaexplain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka
puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo
kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga
magulang ko.
ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil
nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede
ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka
umalis ka doon.

CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang

duty ko.

CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng

mga taga Union.

ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong

binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.

ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag

mong kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok
kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan
okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.

ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano

ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own
merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka
bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong
hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam noon.

CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na

loob.
ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na
loob, kasi kung baga sa no, nilapastangan
mo ako.

ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan?
CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr.
Tamayo

ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na

ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na.
Magsumbong ka. 3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act
of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a
criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and
other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An
information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6,
1988 is quoted herewith:

CU
N
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court
granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts
charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the
violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by
a personother than a participant to the communication. 4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.

INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D.
Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February,
1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
honorable court, the above-named accused,
Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by
Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's
conversation with said accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with the use of a tape recorder secretly
record the said conversation and thereafter
communicate in writing the contents of the
said recording to other person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16,
1988.
MA
RIA
NO
M.

On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed

Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and
holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable
under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the
information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not
constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in grave
abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. 5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its
Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the
applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a
private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends
that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private
conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication. 8 In
relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the
conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged
would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that
R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private
conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her
conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10

We disagree.

Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".

First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a

statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is
applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted
to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb or
would lead to an injustice. 12

Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded,

the element of secrecy would not appear to be material.
Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made by all
the parties but by some parties and involved not criminal
cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would
cover, for example civil cases or special proceedings
whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the
parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of
the parties because the actuation of the parties prior,
simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act
may be indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a
recording, would you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to
cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other
Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by using a
device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his
private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the
respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers
indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private
conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or
by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx

Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill,

Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the
prosecution of offense but as evidence to be used in Civil
Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on
tape recorded conversations taken without the authorization
of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your
Honor?
Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not
sporting to record the observation of one without his knowing
it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it is not
sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the
intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties should
know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.

Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in

meetings of the board of directors where a tape recording is
taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties know. It is
but fair that the people whose remarks and observations are
being made should know that the observations are being
recorded.

xxx xxx xxx

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with
the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore
plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision
seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the
law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.

Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of
persons, we say: "Please be informed that whatever you say
here may be used against you." That is fairness and that is
what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makes
damaging statements against his own interest, well, he
cannot complain any more. But if you are going to take a
recording of the observations and remarks of a person
without him knowing that it is being taped or recorded,
without him knowing that what is being recorded may be
used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12,
1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under
Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a party secretly
records a public speech, he would be penalized under
Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording
is done secretly.
Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not
contemplated by the bill. It is the communication between
one person and another person not between a speaker
and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12,
1964)

Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the

statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the
information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret
recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would
suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor
General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
"Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a
violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a
third person should be professed."14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the
ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The
word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to
share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the
act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of
sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a
common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These
definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or
expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to
include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between
petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any
doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private
communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms
"conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator
Taada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear
from their conversations being overheard. But this statement

ignores the usual nature of conversations as well the

undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people have
some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose.
Freeconversations are often characterized by exaggerations,
obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of antisocial desires of views not intended to be taken seriously.
The right to the privacy of communication, among others,
has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to
state here, the framers of our Constitution must have
recognized the nature of conversations between individuals
and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings
and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the
pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the
unaudited, and free exchange of communication between
individuals free from every unjustifiable intrusion by
whatever means. 17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the
issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension
for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization
did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither
among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following
the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused." 20 The instant case turns on a different note, because the
applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer
from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized
"recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as
among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and
unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA

SALAZAR, respondents.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.
Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent.

ROMERO, J.:
For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close
association with Delfin Saldivar would mean the loss of her job. In May 1982,
private respondent was employed by Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation (GMCR) as general systems analyst. Also employed by
petitioner as manager for technical operations' support was Delfin Saldivar
with whom private respondent was allegedly very close.
Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company
equipment and spare parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of
Saldivar were missing, caused the investigation of the latter's activities. The
report dated September 25, 1984 prepared by the company's internal auditor,
Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered into a partnership
styled Concave Commercial and Industrial Company with Richard A.
Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a
supplier of petitioner often recommended by Saldivar. The report also
disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing Fedders airconditioning
unit for his own personal use without authorization and also connived with
Yambao to defraud petitioner of its property. The airconditioner was
recovered only after petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin against
Saldivar. 1
It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda
Salazar violated company reglations by involving herself in transactions
conflicting with the company's interests. Evidence showed that she signed as
a witness to the articles of partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. It also
appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the
Fedders airconditioner but failed to inform her employer.

Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed

private respondent Salazar under preventive suspension for one (1) month,
effective October 9, 1984, thus giving her thirty (30) days within which to,
explain her side. But instead of submitting an explanations three (3) days
later or on October 12, 1984 private respondent filed a complaint against
petitioner for illegal suspension, which she subsequently amended to include
illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay and
damages, after petitioner notified her in writing that effective November 8,
1984, she was considered dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute and
disprove these findings. 2
After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985,
ordered petitioner company to reinstate private respondent to her former or
equivalent position and to pay her full backwages and other benefits she
would have received were it not for the illegal dismissal. Petitioner was also
ordered to pay private respondent moral damages of P50,000.00. 3
On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations, Commission in the
questioned resolution dated December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid
decision with respect to the reinstatement of private respondent but limited
the backwages to a period of two (2) years and deleted the award for moral
damages. 4
Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed grave
abuse of discretion in holding that the suspension and subsequent dismissal
of private respondent were illegal and in ordering her reinstatement with two
(2) years' backwages.
On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.
The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar's
acts in conflict with his position as technical operations manager,
necessitated immediate and decisive action on any employee closely,
associated with Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar was further impelled by
th.e discovery of the missing Fedders airconditioning unit inside the
apartment private respondent shared with Saldivar. Under such
circumstances, preventive suspension was the proper remedial recourse
available to the company pending Salazar's investigation. By itself,
preventive suspension does, not signify that the company has adjudged the
employee guilty of the charges she was asked to answer and explain. Such

disciplinary measure is resorted to for the protection of the company's

property pending investigation any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance
committed by the employee. 5
Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated
Salazar's right to due process when she was promptly suspended. If at all,
the fault, lay with private respondent when she ignored petitioner's
memorandum of October 8, 1984 "giving her ample opportunity to present
(her) side to the Management." Instead, she went directly to the Labor
Department and filed her complaint for illegal suspension without giving her
employer a chance to evaluate her side of the controversy.
But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, we
hold that her eventual separation from employment was not for cause.
What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to "make
whole" the victim who has not merely lost her job which, under settled
Jurisprudence, is a property right of which a person is not to be deprived
without due process, but also the compensation that should have accrued to
her during the period when she was unemployed?
Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:
Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee
except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis supplied)
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code:
Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular
employments, the employer shall not terminate the services

of an employee except for a just cause as provided in the

Labor Code or when authorized by existing laws.
Sec. 3. Reinstatement. An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall by entitled to reinstatement
without
loss
of
seniority
rights
and
to
backwages." 7 (Emphasis supplied)
Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be recalled that the present
Constitution has gone further than the 1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital
social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor.
Given the pro-poor orientation of several articulate Commissioners of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986, it was not surprising that a whole new
Article emerged on Social Justice and Human Rights designed, among other
things, to "protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common
good."8 Proof of the priority accorded to labor is that it leads the other areas
of concern in the Article on Social Justice, viz., Labor ranks ahead of such
topics as Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform, Urban Land Roform and
Housing, Health, Women, Role and Rights of Poople's Organizations and
Human Rights. 9
The opening paragraphs on Labor states
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to selforganization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of
tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They
shall also participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits is may be
provided by law. 10 (Emphasis supplied)
Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution under
the Article an Declaration of Principles and State Policies that provides:

Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full

employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate
the relations between workers and employers. The State
shall ensure the rights of workers to self-organization,
collective baegaining, security of tenure, and just and
humane conditions of work. The State may provide for
compulsory arbitration. 11
To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the rights
of labor which the State is mandated to protect. But there is no gainsaying
the fact that the intent of the framers of the present Constitution was to give
primacy to the rights of labor and afford the sector "full protection," at least
greater protection than heretofore accorded them, regardless of the
geographical location of the workers and whether they are organized or not.
It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who
substantially contributed to the present formulation of the protection to labor
provision and proposed that the same be incorporated in the Article on Social
Justice and not just in the Article on Declaration of Principles and State
Policies "in the light of the special importance that we are giving now to social
justice and the necessity of emphasizing the scope and role of social justice
in national development." 12
If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor provisions in
our Constitution and the Labor Code, it is but to stress that the right of an
employee not to be dismissed from his job except for a just or authorized
cause provided by law has assumed greater importance under the 1987
Constitution with the singular prominence labor enjoys under the article on
Social Justice. And this transcendent policy has been translated into law in
the Labor Code. Under its terms, where a case of unlawful or unauthorized
dismissal has been proved by the aggrieved employee, or on the other hand,
the employer whose duty it is to prove the lawfulness or justness of his act of
dismissal has failed to do so, then the remedies provided in Article 279
should find, application. Consonant with this liberalized stance vis-a-vis labor,
the legislature even went further by enacting Republic Act No. 6715 which
took effect on March 2, 1989 that amended said Article to remove any
possible ambiguity that jurisprudence may have generated which watered
down the constitutional intent to grant to labor "full protection." 13

To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an

authorized, much less a legal, cause for the dismissal of private respondent,
she had every right, not only to be entitled to reinstatement, but ay well, to
full backwages." 14
The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement
and payment of backwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed
employee to her status before she lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of
the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state, conditione positions etc. from
which one had been removed" 15 and in the latter, to give her back the income
lost during the period of unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past,
would perforce make her "whole."
Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when
reinstatement has not been forthcoming and the hapless dismissed
employee finds himself on the outside looking in.
Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for
denying reinstatement under the facts of the case and the law applicable
thereto; that reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long
passage of time (22 years of litigation) or because of the realities of the
situation; 16 or that it would be "inimical to the employer's interest; " 17 or that
reinstatement may no longer be feasible; 18 or, that it will not serve the best
interests of the parties involved; 19 or that the company would be prejudiced
by the workers' continued employment; 20 or that it will not serve any prudent
purpose as when supervening facts have transpired which make execution
on that score unjust or inequitable 21 or, to an increasing extent, due to the
resultant atmosphere of "antipathy and antagonism" or "strained relations" or
"irretrievable estrangement" between the employer and the employee. 22
In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of
backwages and separation pay 23 or solely separation pay. 24
In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first
place the wording of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement. . . . and to his full backwages. . . ." 25 Under the principlesof
statutory construction, if a statute is clears plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the

maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the
valid presumption that the words employed by, the legislature in a statute
correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it
differently. 26 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words,
to:have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of
such words as are found in the statute. 27 Verba legis non est recedendum, or
from the words of a statute there should be no departure. Neither does the
provision admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court, there may
be a ground or grounds for non-application of the above-cited provision, this
should be by way of exception, such as when the reinstatement may be
inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between the employer and the
employee.
In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a
position where he enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer; and that it
is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may
be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivity of the
employee concerned.
A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the above
principles: where the employee is a Vice-President for Marketing and as
such, enjoys the full trust and confidence of top management; 28 or is the
Officer-In-Charge of the extension office of the bank where he works; 29 or is
an organizer of a union who was in a position to sabotage the union's efforts
to organize the workers in commercial and industrial establishments; 30 or is
a warehouseman of a non-profit organization whose primary purpose is to
facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts. by foreign individuals and
organizations to the Philippines; 31 or is a manager of its Energy Equipment
Sales. 32
Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied
indiscriminately. Otherwisey reinstatement can never be possible simply
because some hostility is invariably engendered between the parties as a
result of litigation. That is human nature. 33
Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of
asserting one's right; otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could
be easily separated from the service, by merely paying his separation pay on
the pretext that his relationship with his employer had already become
strained. 34

Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as
systems analyst is one that may be characterized as a position of trust and
confidence such that if reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations
between employer and employee. Hence, this does not constitute an
exception to the general rule mandating reinstatement for an employee who
has been unlawfully dismissed.
On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by
engaging in transactions that may have created conflict of interest situations?
Petitioner GMCR points out that as a matter of company policy, it prohibits its
employees from involving themselves with any company that has business
dealings with GMCR. Consequently, when private respondent Salazar signed
as a witness to the partnership papers of Concave (a supplier of Ultra which
in turn is also a supplier of GMCR), she was deemed to have placed. herself
in an untenable position as far as petitioner was concerned.
However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a
circumstance did not create a conflict of interests situation. As a systems
analyst, Salazar was very far removed from operations involving the
procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties revolved around the development
of systems and analysis of designs on a continuing basis. In other words,
Salazar did not occupy a position of trust relative to the approval and
purchase of supplies and company assets.
In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss
of confidence. As we have held countless times, while loss of confidence or
breach of trust is a valid ground for terminations it must rest an some basis
which must be convincingly established. 35 An employee who not be
dismissed on mere presumptions and suppositions. Petitioner's allegation
that since Salazar and Saldivar lived together in the same apartment, it
"presumed reasonably that complainant's sympathy would be with Saldivar"
and its averment that Saldivar's investigation although unverified, was
probably true, do not pass this Court's test. 36 While we should not condone
the acts of disloyalty of an employee, neither should we dismiss him on the
basis of suspicion derived from speculative inferences.
To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be
most inequitous because the bulk of the findings centered principally oh her
friend's alleged thievery and anomalous transactions as technical operations'
support manager. Said report merely insinuated that in view of Salazar's

special relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might have had direct knowledge
of Saldivar's questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private
respondent is wanting from the records.

Amparita S. Sta. Maria for petitioner.

It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar
had already resigned from GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not
have the opportunity to refute management's findings, the report remained
obviously one-sided. Since the main evidence obtained by petitioner dealt
principally on the alleged culpability of Saldivar, without his having had a
chance to voice his side in view of his prior resignation, stringent examination
should have been carried out to ascertain whether or not there existed
independent legal grounds to hold Salatar answerable as well and, thereby,
justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the records, we find her to have
been unlawfully dismissed.

MENDOZA, J.:

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor

Relations Commission dated December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Petitioner GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE private respondent Imelda
Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to her salary for a period of
two (2) years only.
This decision is immediately executory.

This case presents for determination the scope of the State's liability under
Rep. Act No. 7309, which among other things provides compensation for
persons who are unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but on appeal
are acquitted and ordered released.
Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were
convicted of frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated murder for the
killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of the latter's wife Florida and his
son Tirso, at Palo, Calanuga, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, on the night of June 26,
1988. The motive for the killing was apparently a land dispute between the
Boyons and petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to
imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been
cancelled.
Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to
judgment, however, as the appeal of the other accused was dismissed for
failure to file his brief.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994

FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FRANKLIN
DRILON in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, respondent.

On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting

petitioner on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy
between him and his son-in-law. He had been pointed to by a daughter of
Federico Boyon as the companion of Balderrama when the latter barged into
their hut and without warning started shooting, but the appellate court ruled
that because petitioner did nothing more, petitioner's presence at the scene
of the crime was insufficient to show conspiracy.
Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec.
3(a), which provides for the payment of compensation to "any person who
was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by
virtue of a judgment of acquittal." 1 The claim was filed with the Board of
Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim was denied on the ground
that while petitioner's presence at the scene of the killing was not sufficient to
find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad
blood between him and the deceased as a result of a land dispute and the

fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding
that he was "probably guilty."
On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's ruling. Said
the Secretary of Justice in his resolution dated March 11, 1993:
It is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . .
unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned" in Section 3(a)
of R.A. No. 7309 refers to an individual who was wrongly
accused and imprisoned for a crime he did not commit,
thereby making him "a victim of unjust imprisonment." In the
instant case, however, Claimant/Appellant cannot be
deemed such a victim since a reading of the decision of his
acquittal shows that his exculpation is not based on his
innocence, but upon, in effect, a finding of reasonable doubt.
Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. Neither Rule 45 nor
Rep. Act No. 7309, however, provides for review by certiorari of the decisions
of the Secretary of Justice. Nonetheless, in view of the importance of the
question tendered, the Court resolved to treat the petition as a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65.
Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent's ruling that to be able to
recover under sec. 3(a) of the law the claimant must on appeal be found to
be innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted in the trial court.
Through counsel he contends that the language of sec. 3(a) is clear and
does not call for interpretation. The "mere fact that the claimant was
imprisoned for a crime which he was subsequently acquitted of is already
unjust in itself," he contends. To deny his claim because he was not declared
innocent would be to say that his imprisonment for two years while his appeal
was pending was justified. Petitioner argues that there is only one
requirement for conviction in criminal cases and that is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to present such proof, the
presumption that the accused is innocent stands and, therefore, there is no
reason for requiring that he be declared innocent of the crime before he can
recover compensation for his imprisonment.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an
accused is acquitted on appeal he must be given compensation on the
theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by the trial court. Such a reading of

sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner's professed canon of construction that when

the language of the statute is clear it should be given its natural meaning. It
leaves out of the provision in question the qualifying word "unjustly" so that
the provision would simply read: "The following may file claims for
compensation before the Board: (a) any person who was accused, convicted,
imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."
But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and]
imprisoned." The fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is
acquitted is not itself proof that the previous conviction was "unjust." An
accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and his conviction by the
trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set aside. For example, he may
be acquitted not because he is innocent of the crime charged but because of
reasonable doubt, in which case he may be found civilly liable to the
complainant, because while the evidence against him does not satisfy the
quantum of proof required for conviction, it may nonetheless be sufficient to
sustain a civil action for damages. 2 In one case the accused, an alien, was
acquitted of statutory rape with homicide because of doubt as to the ages of
the offended parties who consented to have sex with him. Nonetheless the
accused was ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages and ordered
deported. 3 In such a case to pay the accused compensation for having been
"unjustly convicted" by the trial court would be utterly inconsistent with his
liability to the complainant. Yet to follow petitioner's theory such an accused
would be entitled to compensation under sec. 3(a).
The truth is that the presumption of innocence has never been intended as
evidence of innocence of the accused but only to shift the burden of proof
that he is guilty to the prosecution. If "accusation is not synonymous with
guilt,"4 so is the presumption of innocence not a proof thereof. It is one thing
to say that the accused is presumed to be innocent in order to place on the
prosecution the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
is guilty. It is quite another thing to say that he is innocent and if he is
convicted that he has been "unjustly convicted." As this Court held in a case:
Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape
with homicide, we emphasize that we are not ruling that he is
innocent or blameless. It is only the constitutional
presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution
to build an airtight case for conviction which saved him, not
that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. 5

To say then that an accused has been "unjustly convicted" has to do with
the manner of his conviction rather than with his innocence. An accused may
on appeal be acquitted because he did not commit the crime, but that does
not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the
victim of an "unjust conviction." If his conviction was due to an error in the
appreciation of the evidence the conviction while erroneous is not unjust.
That is why it is not, on the other hand, correct to say as does respondent,
that under the law liability for compensation depends entirely on the
innocence of the accused.
The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning as "knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment" in art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code. What
this Court held in In re Rafael C. Climaco 6 applies:
In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown beyond
doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is
not supported by the evidence, and the same was made with
conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice . . . .
To hold a judge liable for the rendition of manifestly unjust
judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance,
it must be shown, according to Groizard, that although he
has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the
performance of his duty, that diligence, prudence and care
which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of any
public service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if
they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by
a reasonable interpretation. Inexcusable mistake only exists
in the legal concept when it implies a manifest injustice, that
is to say, such injustice which cannot be explained by a
reasonable interpretation, even though there is a
misunderstanding or error of the law applied, yet in the
contrary it results, logically and reasonably, and in a very
clear and indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of
the legal precept.
Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of
which the accused is unjustly imprisoned, but, in addition, to an unjust
accusation. The accused must have been "unjustly accused, in consequence

of which he is unjustly convicted and then imprisoned. It is important to note

this because if from its inception the prosecution of the accused has been
wrongful, his conviction by the court is, in all probability, also wrongful.
Conversely, if the prosecution is not malicious any conviction even though
based on less than the required quantum of proof in criminal cases may be
erroneous but not necessarily unjust.
The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question for the prosecutor in
filing a case in court is not whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt but only whether "there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime
has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof." Hence, an
accusation which is based on "probable guilt" is not an unjust accusation and
a conviction based on such degree of proof is not necessarily an unjust
judgment but only an erroneous one. The remedy for such error is appeal.
In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to show that petitioner's
conviction by the trial court was wrongful or that it was the product of malice
or gross ignorance or gross negligence. To the contrary, the court had reason
to believe that petitioner and his co-accused were in league, because
petitioner is the father-in-law of Wilfredo Balderrama and it was petitioner
who bore the victim a grudge because of a land dispute. Not only that.
Petitioner and his coaccused arrived together in the hut of the victims and
forced their way into it.
The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy only because there was
no proof that he did or say anything on the occasion. Said the appellate
court.
Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant
Felicito Basbacio to have committed any act at all. Both fail
to show Felicito Basbacio as having said anything at all.
Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having committed
anything in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the crimes
charged against the defendants. It seems to be a frail and
flimsy basis on which to conclude that conspiracy existed
between actual killer Wilfredo Balderrama and Felicito
Basbacio to commit murder and two frustrated murders on
that night of June 26, 1988. It may be asked: where was the
coming together of the two defendants to an agreement to
commit the crimes of murder and frustrated murder on two

counts? Where was Basbacio's contribution to the

commission of the said crimes? Basbacio was as the
record shows nothing but part of the dark shadows of that
night. . . .
One may take issue with this ruling because precisely conspiracy may be
shown by concert of action and other circumstances. Why was petitioner with
his son-in-law? Why did they apparently flee together? And what about the
fact that there was bad blood between petitioner and the victim Federico
Boyon? These questions may no longer be passed upon in view of the
acquittal of petitioner but they are relevant in evaluating his claim that he had
been unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned before he was released
because of his acquittal on appeal. We hold that in view of these
circumstances respondent Secretary of Justice and the Board of Claims did
not commit a grave abuse of its discretion in disallowing petitioner's claim for
compensation under Rep. Act No. 7309.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

FIRST DIVISION
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993

JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ULPIANO L. DE LOS
SANTOS, respondent.
Don P. Porciuncula for petitioner.
Eulogio Nones, Jr. for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the order of respondent
National Labor Relations Commission dated October 30, 1992, dismissing
the petitioner's appeal from a decision of the Philippine Overseas

Employment Administration on the ground of failure to post the required

appeal bond. 1
The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code
as amended, providing that:
In the case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment
appealed from.
and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as
amended, reading as follows:
Sec. 6. Bond In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter
involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall
be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond
issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by
the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award.
The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
in applying these rules to decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that the
appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas
employment because they are already required under Section 4, Rule II,
Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also
to post a cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000, thus:
Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall pay a
license fee of P30,000. It shall also post a cash bond of
P100,000 and surety bond of P50,000 from a bonding
company acceptable to the Administration and duly
accredited by the Insurance Commission. The bonds shall
answer for all valid and legal claims arising from violations of
the conditions for the grant and use of the license, and/or
accreditation and contracts of employment. The bonds shall
likewise guarantee compliance with the provisions of the
Code and its implementing rules and regulations relating to

recruitment and placement, the Rules of the Administration

and relevant issuances of the Department and all liabilities
which the Administration may impose. The surety bonds
shall include the condition that the notice to the principal is
notice to the surety and that any judgment against the
principal in connection with matters falling under POEA's
jurisdiction shall be binding and conclusive on the surety.
The surety bonds shall be co-terminus with the validity
period of license. (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000
with the Philippine National Bank in compliance with Section 17, Rule II,
Book II of the same Rule, "to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of
recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims."
Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond
requirement but suggest that the rules cited by the NLRC are applicable only
to decisions of the Labor Arbiters and not of the POEA. Appeals from
decisions of the POEA, he says, are governed by the following provisions of
Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules:
Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal shall
be filed within the reglementary period as provided in
Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of
payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a
cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule;
shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which
shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in
support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the
date when the appellant received the appealed decision
and/or award and proof of service on the other party of such
appeal.
A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other
requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the period
for perfecting an appeal.
Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration
involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall
be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety

bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly

accredited by the Commission in an amount equivalent to
the monetary award. (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the employee to

exceed the amount of P350,000, which is the sum of the bonds and escrow
money required of the recruiter.

The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000 and placed in
escrow the amount of P200,000 as required by the POEA Rules, was the
petitioner still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a
decision of the POEA to the NLRC?

It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed on local employers,
as the petitioner observes, but there is a simple explanation for this
distinction. Overseas recruiters are subject to more stringent requirement
because of the special risks to which our workers abroad are subjected by
their foreign employers, against whom there is usually no direct or effective
recourse. The overseas recruiter is solidarily liable with a foreign employer.
The bonds and the escrow money are intended to insure more care on the
part of the local agent in its choice of the foreign principal to whom our
overseas workers are to be sent.

It was.
The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition to
the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal
from a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the appeal bond is intended to
further insure the payment of the monetary award in favor of the employee if
it is eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are
supposed to guarantee the payment of all valid and legal claims against the
employer, but these claims are not limited to monetary awards to employees
whose contracts of employment have been violated. The POEA can go
against these bonds also for violations by the recruiter of the conditions of its
license, the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules, E.O.
247 (reorganizing POEA) and the POEA Rules, as well as the settlement of
other liabilities the recruiter may incur.
As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended to provide for a
standing fund, as it were, to be used only as a last resort and not to be
reduced with the enforcement against it of every claim of recruited workers
that may be adjudged against the employer. This amount may not even be
enough to cover such claims and, even if it could initially, may eventually be
exhausted after satisfying other subsequent claims.
As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a monetary award
of about P170,000 to the dismissed employee, the herein private respondent.
The standby guarantees required by the POEA Rules would be depleted if
this award were to be enforced not against the appeal bond but against the
bonds and the escrow money, making them inadequate for the satisfaction of
the other obligations the recruiter may incur.

It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of

rules as in this case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given
effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as
a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. 2 Under the petitioner's interpretation, the appeal bond required by
Section 6 of the aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded because
of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would in
effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but we do not see any such
redundancy; on the contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Section 4
and Section 17. The rule is that a construction that would render a provision
inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions
should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and
harmonious whole.
Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the
overseas recruiter prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules
and the escrow agreement under Section 17 of the same Rule, it is
necessary to post the appeal bond required under Section 6, Rule V, Book
VII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an appeal from a
decision of the POEA.
Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the working class,
conformably to the mandate of the Constitution. By sustaining rather than
annulling the appeal bond as a further protection to the claimant employee,
this Court affirms once again its commitment to the interest of labor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner.

It is so ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Gatmaytan, the private respondents herein, the case

docketed as Special Proceeding No. 1548 of the then Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pampanga
and Angeles City.

THIRD DIVISION
On July 9, 1980, the respondent court issued an order taking
cognizance of the said petition and stating inter alia that:
G.R. No. 75222 July 18, 1991
RADIOLA-TOSHIBA PHILIPPINES, INC., through its assignee-ininsolvency VICENTE J. CUNA, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. LEONARDO I. CRUZ, as
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch No. LVI,
EMILIO C. PATINO, as assignee-in-insolvency of CARLOS and
TERESITA GATMAYTAN, SHERIFF OF ANGELES CITY, REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF ANGELES CITY, SANYO MARKETING CORPORATION, S & T
ENTERPRISES INC., REFRIGERATION INDUSTRIES INC., and DELTA
MOTOR CORPORATION, respondents.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.
Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:p
This is a petition for certiorari of the March 31, 1986 Decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court * in A.C-G.R. SP No. 04160 entitled "RadiolaToshiba Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon. Leonardo I. Cruz, et al." denying the
petition for certiorari and mandamus; and its Resolution of July 1, 1986
denying the motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of this case, as found by the then Intermediate
Appellate Court, are as follows:
On July 2, 1980, three creditors filed a petition for the
involuntary insolvency of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita

. . . the Court forbids the payment of any

debts, and the delivery of any property
owing and belonging to said respondentsdebtors from other persons, or, to any other
persons for the use and benefit of the same
respondents-debtors and/or the transfer of
any property by and for the said
respondents-debtors to another, upon
petitioners' putting up a bond by way of
certified and reputable sureties. (Annex 1,
Comment).
Counsel for the petitioners-creditors informed respondent
sheriff Angeles City of the aforesaid order (Annex 2, Ibid)
and on March 26, 1981, also communicated with counsel for
the petitioner herein regarding same order, apprising the
latter that "the personal and real property which have been
levied upon and/or attached should be preserved till the final
determination of the petition aforementioned." (Annex
3, Ibid).
On April 12, 1983, petitioners-creditors filed second urgent
motion for issuance of insolvency order and resolution of the
case, alleging among other things, that in November, 1982,
they filed an urgent motion to issue insolvency order; on
December 2, 1982, they presented a motion to prohibit the
city sheriff of Angeles City from disposing the personal and
real properties of the insolvent debtors, Carlos Gatmaytan
and Teresita Gatmaytan; on January 18, 1983, they (sic)
appealed in the Bulletin Today issue of even date a news
item to the effect that Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc. has already
shut down its factory, sometime in March 1983, through their

representative, they caused to be investigated the real

properties in the names of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita
Gatmaytan and they were surprised to find out that some of
the aforesaid properties were already transferred to RadiolaToshiba Phil. Inc.; and that in view of such development, it is
their submission that without an insolvency order and a
resolution of the case which was ripe for resolution as early
as March 3, 1982, the rights and interest of petitionerscreditors would be injured and jeopardized. (Annex "C").
On April 15, 1983, petitioner filed an opposition to the said
motion vis-a-vis the prayer that the insolvency order (which
has not been rendered yet by the court) be annotated on the
transfer certificates of title already issued in its name (Annex
"D").
On April 22, 1983, judgment was rendered declaring the
insolvency of respondents-debtors Carlos Gatmaytan and
Teresita Gatmaytan.
On April 28, 1983, petitioner filed a supplemental opposition
to the same second urgent motion and motion to direct
respondent sheriff to issue a final certificate of sale for the
properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 in its
favor (Annex "E").
On February 3, 1984, acting upon petitioner's motion
claiming that ownership of certain real properties of the
insolvents had passed to it by virtue of foreclosure
proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. 35946 of the
former Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig,
Metro Manila, which properties were not redeemed within
the period of redemption, respondent court issued an order
disposing, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby, confirms
the election of Mr. Emilio C. Patino, as
assignee of all the registered claimants in
this case, and, in consequence thereof, the
said assignee is hereby directed to post a

bond in the amount of P30,000.00 and to

take his oath thereafter so as to be able to
perform his duties and discharge his
functions, as such.
The Court, likewise, sets the meeting of all
the creditors with the attendance, of course,
of the assignee, on March 9, 1984, at 8:30.,
as by that time the proposals, which the
respective representatives of the partiesclaimants desire to clear with their
principals, shall have already been reported.
The assignee shall see to it that the
properties of the insolvents which are now in
the actual or constructive custody and
management of the receiver previously
appointed by the Court on petitioners' and
claimants' proposals be placed under this
actual or constructive custody and
management, such as he is able to do so,
as the Court hereby dissolves the
receivership previously authorized, it having
become a superfluity. (Annex "F").
On May 18, 1984, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CLII,
Pasig, Metro Manila, in Civil Case No. 35946, issued an
order directing respondent Sheriff of Angeles City, or
whoever is acting in his behalf, to issue within seven (7) days
from notice thereof a final deed of sale over the two (2)
parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos.
18905 and 40430 in favor of petitioner. (Annex "G").
In said Civil Case No. 35946, a case for collection of sum of
money covering the proceeds of television sets and other
appliances, the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
II, Pasig, Metro Manila, issued a writ of preliminary
attachment on February 15, 1980 upon application of the
petitioner, as plaintiff, which put up a bond of P350,000.00.
On March 4, 1980, 3:00 P.M., levy on attachment was done

in favor of petitioner on the real properties registered in the

names of spouses Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita
Gatmaytan under TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 of the
Registry of Deeds of Angeles City, per Entry No. 7216 on
said titles. (Annex "A" and "B").
On December 10, 1980, a decision was rendered in favor of
petitioner, ordering private respondents and their codefendant Peoples Appliance Center, Inc. to pay petitioner,
jointly and severally, the sum of P721,825.91 plus interest
thereon of 14% per annum from October 12, 1979 until fully
paid; P20,000.00, for and attorney's fees; and the costs of
suit (Annex "5", Comment). After the said decision in the
aforementioned Civil Case No. 35946 became final and
executory, a writ of execution for the satisfaction thereof
issued on March 18, 1981; and on May 4, 1981, respondent
sheriff of Angeles City sold at auction sale the attached
properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430, to
petitioner as the highest bidder, and the certificate of sale
was accordingly issued in its favor.
On September 21, 1982, the court ordered the consolidation
of ownership of petitioner over said properties; but
respondent sheriff of Angeles City refused to issue a final
certificate of sale in favor of petitioner.
On May 30, 1984, petitioners-creditors interposed their
opposition, stating among other things, that subject motion is
improper and premature because it treats of matters foreign
to the insolvency proceedings; and premature, for the reason
that the properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430Angeles City were brought to the jurisdiction of the
insolvency court for the determination of the assets of the
insolvents available for distribution to the approved
credits/liabilities of the insolvents. Petitioners-creditors
theorized that the insolvency court is devoid of jurisdiction to
grant the motion referring to matters involved in a case
pending before a coordinate court in another jurisdiction
(Annex "l").

Prior thereto or on July 13, 1984, to be precise, respondent

court came out with its assailed extended order with the
following decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, and also for the reason
stated in the aforequoted order issued in
pursuance of a similar motion of the movant,
the Court denies, as it is hereby denied the
motion of Radiola-Toshiba, dated May 28,
1984 and directs the latter to participate in
the supposed meeting of all the
creditors/claimants presided by the duly
elected assignee. (Annex "J").
On September 8, 1984, herein petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc.
(RTPI, for short) filed a petition forcertiorari and mandamus with respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court, in a Decision promulgated on March
31, 1986, denied petitioner's aforesaid petition. On April 19, 1986, petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in a Resolution
dated July 1, 1986.
Hence, the instant petition. Herein petitioner raised two issues
1. WHETHER OR NOT CERTIORARI IS A REMEDY DESIGNATED FOR
THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF JURISDICTION ONLY; and
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE REFUSAL OF THE COURTS TO ENFORCE
THE LIEN OF PETITIONER ARISING FROM A LEVY OF ATTACHMENT
NOT MADE WITHIN ONE MONTH NEXT PRECEDING THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE INSOLVENCY PROCEEDING IS GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The main issue in this case is whether or not the levy on attachment in favor
of the petitioner is dissolved by the insolvency proceedings against
respondent spouses commenced four months after said attachment.
On this issue, Section 32 of the Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956, as amended),
provides:

Sec. 32 As soon as an assignee is elected or appointed

and qualified, the clerk of the court shall, by an instrument
under his hand and seal of the court, assign and convey to
the assignee all the real and personal property, estate, and
effects of the debtor with all his deeds, books, and papers
relating thereto, and such assignment shall relate back to the
commencement of the proceedings in insolvency, and shall
relate back to the acts upon the adjudication was founded,
and by operation of law shall vest the title to all such
property, estate, and effects in the assignee, although the
same is then attached on mesne process, as the property of
the debtor. Such assignment shall operate to vest in the
assignee all of the estate of the insolvent debtor not exempt
by law from execution. It shall dissolve any attachment
levied within one month next preceding the commencement
of the insolvency proceedings and vacate and set aside any
judgment entered in any action commenced within thirty
days immediately prior to the commencement of insolvency
proceedings and shall set aside any judgment entered by
default or consent of the debtor within thirty days
immediately prior to the commencement of the insolvency
proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
Relative thereto, the findings of the then Intermediate Appellate Court are
undisputed that the levy on attachment against the subject properties of the
Gatmaytans, issued by the then Court of First Instance of Pasig in Civil Case
No. 35946, was on March 4, 1980 while the insolvency proceeding in the
then Court of First Instance of Angeles City, Special Proceeding No. 1548,
was commenced only on July 2, 1980, or more than four (4) months after the
issuance of the said attachment. Under the circumstances, petitioner
contends that its lien on the subject properties overrode the insolvency
proceeding and was not dissolved thereby.
Private respondents, on the other hand, relying on Section 79 of the said law,
which reads:
Sec. 79. When an attachment has been made and is not
dissolved before the commencement of proceedings in
insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given by the
defendant, if the claim upon which the attachment suit was

commenced is proved against the estate of the debtor, the

plaintiff may prove the legal costs and disbursements of the
suit, and of the keeping of the property, and the amount
thereof shall be a preferred debt.
and the fact that petitioner and its counsel have full knowledge of the
proceedings in the insolvent case, argue that the subsequent Certificate of
Sale on August 3, 1981, issued in favor of petitioner over the subject
properties, was issued in bad faith, in violation of the law and is not equitable
for the creditors of the insolvent debtors; and pursuant to the above quoted
Section 79, petitioner should not be entitled to the transfer of the subject
properties in its name.
Petitioner's contention is impressed with merit. The provision of the abovequoted Section 32, of the Insolvency Law is very clear that attachments
dissolved are those levied within one (1) month next preceding the
commencement of the insolvency proceedings and judgments vacated and
set aside are judgments entered in any action, including judgment entered by
default or consent of the debtor, where the action was filed within thirty (30)
days immediately prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings.
In short, there is a cut off period one (1) month in attachment cases and
thirty (30) days in judgments entered in actions commenced prior to the
insolvency proceedings. Section 79, on the other hand, relied upon by private
respondents, provides for the right of the plaintiff if the attachment is not
dissolved before the commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is
dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim upon which
the attachment suit was commenced is proved against the estate of the
debtor. Therefore, there is no conflict between the two provisions.
But even granting that such conflict exists, it may be stated that in construing
a statute, courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part
of a statute, if at all possible. This rule is expressed in the maxim, ut maqis
valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to
the whole of the statute its every word. Hence, where a statute is
susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such
reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof
operative and effective and harmonious with each other (Javellana vs. Tayo,
6 SCRA 1042 [1962]; Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo, p. 182).

Neither can the sheriff's sale in execution of the judgment in favor of the
petitioner be considered as a fraudulent transfer or preference by the
insolvent debtors, which constitute a violation of Sec. 70 of the Insolvency
Law. In the case of Velayo vs. Shell Co. of the Philippines (100 Phil. 187,
[1956]), this Court ruled that Sections 32 and 70 contemplate only acts and
transactions occurring within 30 days prior to the commencement of the
proceedings in insolvency and, consequently, all other acts outside of the 30day period cannot possibly be considered as coming within the orbit of their
operation.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Finally, petitioner correctly argued that the properties in question were never
placed under the jurisdiction of respondent insolvency court so as to be
made available for the payment of claim filed against the Gatmaytans in the
insolvency proceedings.

MANUEL T. DE GUIA, in his capacity as Councilor of the Municipality of

Paraaque, Metro Manila, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Hence, the denial by respondent insolvency court to give due course to the
attachment and execution of Civil Case No. 35946 of the CFI of Rizal
constitutes a freezing of the disposition of subject properties by the former
which were not within its jurisdiction; undeniably, a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to want of jurisdiction, correctable by certiorari.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

WHEREFORE, the March 31, 1986 decision of the then Intermediate

Appellate Court is hereby Reversed and SET ASIDE. The attachment and
execution sale in Civil Case No. 35946 of the former CFI of Rizal are given
due course and petitioner's ownership of subject properties covered by TCT
Nos. 18905 and 40430 is ordered consolidated.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 104712 May 6, 1992

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the validity and the
enforcement by respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) of its
RESOLUTION NO. 2313, adopting rules and guidelines in the
apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1) legislative district
and the Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for
the preparation of the Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial
Election Supervisors and Election Registrars (Annex "A", Petition),
RESOLUTION NO. 2379, approving the Project of District Apportionment
submitted pursuant to Resolution No. 2313 (Annex "B", Petition), and
RESOLUTION UND. 92-010 holding that pars. (a), (b) and (c), and the first
sentence of par. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992
elections (Annex "C", Petition).
Petitioner Manuel T. De Guia is an incumbent Member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, having been elected
in the January 1988 local elections. He prays, more particularly, for reversal
of the position of respondent insofar as it affects the municipality of
Paraaque and all the other municipalities in the Metro Manila Area. He
claims that the second proviso of par. (c), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, which requires
the apportionment into districts of said municipalities does not specify when

the members of their Sangguniang Bayan will be elected by district. He

would consequently lean on par. (d) of Sec. 3, which immediately succeeds
par. (c), to support his view that the elected members of these municipalities
mentioned in par. (c) should continue to be elected at large in the May 11,
1992 elections.
Paragraph (d) states that "[F]or purposes of the regular elections on May 11,
1992, elective members of the Sangguniang Panlunsod and Sangguniang
Bayan shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws. However,
beginning with the regular elections in 1995, they shall be elected by district."
Petitioner therefore insists that the elected members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Paraaque fall under this category so that they should continue to
be elected at large until the 1995 regular elections.
Before addressing the crux of the controversy, the Court observes that
petitioner does not allege that he is running for reelection, much less, that he
is prejudiced by the election, by district, in Paraaque. As such, he does
not appear to have a locus standi, a standing in law, personal or substantial
interest. 1 He does not also allege any legal right that has been violated by
respondent. If for this alone, petitioner does not appear to have any cause of
action.
However, considering the importance of the issue involved, concerning as it
does the political exercise of qualified voters affected by the apportionment,
and petitioner alleging abuse of discretion and violation of the Constitution by
respondent, We resolve to brush aside the question of procedural infirmity,
even as We perceive the petition to be one of declaratory relief. We so held
similarly through Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras in Osmea v. Commission on
Elections. 2
Now on the meat of the dispute.
On November 18, 1991, Congress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the
President on November 26, 1991. It is "An Act Providing for Synchronized
National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing
Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes." At issue in this case is the
proper interpretation of Sec. 3 thereof which provides:
Sec. 3. Elections of Members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang

Bayan. The elective members of the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang
Bayan shall be elected as follows:
(a) For provinces with two (2) or more
legislative districts, the elective members of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall be
elected by legislative districts . . .
(b) For provinces with only one (1)
legislative district, the Commission shall
divide them into two (2) districts for
purposes of electing the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan . . .
(c) The number and election of elective
members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
and Sangguniang Bayan in the Metro Manila
Area, City of Cebu, City of Davao and any
other city with two (2) or more legislative
districts shall continue to be governed by the
provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of Republic
Act No. 6636 . . . Provided, further, That, the
Commission shall divide each of the
municipalities in Metro Manila Area into two
(2) districts by barangay for purposes of
representation in the Sangguniang Bayan
. . . . and,
(d) For purposes of the regular elections on
May 11, 1992, elective members of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang
Bayan shall be elected at large in
accordance with existing laws. However,
beginning with the regular elections in 1995,
they shall be elected by district . . . .
On November 20, 1991, respondent COMELEC, invoking authority of the
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, R.A. 6636, R.A. 6646 and R.A.

7166, 3 issued Resolution No. 2313 and the subsequent resolutions in

question.

apportionment of the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area is applicable to

the May 11, 1992 regular elections.

On February 20, 1992, in view of the perceived ambiguity in the meaning of

par. (d), particularly in relation to par. (c), Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, petitioner filed
with COMELEC a Motion for Clarification of its Resolution No. 2313 inquiring
whether the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Paraaque and the other
municipalities of Metro Manila enumerated therein, which are all singledistrict municipalities, would be elected by district in May 11, 1992 or in the
1995 regular elections.

We have carefully examined pars. (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166,
and its precursor bills on synchronized elections, Senate Bill No. 1861 and
House Bill No. 34811, and We realize the web of confusion generated by the
seeming abstruseness in the language of the law. Some framers of the law
were even fazed at the empirical implications of some of its provisions,
particularly Sec. 3 thereof, and they admitted in fact that said provisions were
susceptible of varied interpretations, as borne by the sponsorship and
explanatory speeches now spread in the Journals of Congress. Hence, We
can understand why petitioner would interpret Sec. 3 as he would. But if we
pursue his course, we may conclude in absurdity because then there would
have been no reason for R.A. 7166 to single out the single-district provinces
referred to in par. (b), and the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area
mentioned in the second proviso of par. (c), to be apportioned at once into
two (2) districts each if the members of their respective sanggunian after all
would still be elected at large as they were in the 1988 elections.

Meanwhile, on March 3, 1992 COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2379

approving the guidelines submitted by the Provincial Election Supervisors
and Municipal Election Registrars concerned pursuant to Resolution No.
2313, and stating therein its purpose in recommending to Congress the
districting/apportionment of Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang
Bayan seats, i.e., to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in the
May 11, 1992 synchronized elections. In this Project of Apportionment,
Paraaque together with the other twelve (12) municipalities in the Metro
Manila Area was divided into two (2) districts with six (6) elective councilors
for each district.
On March 10, 1992, COMELEC resolved petitioner's Motion for Clarification
by interpreting Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, to mean that the election of elective
members of the Sangguniang Bayan, by district, of the thirteen (13)
municipalities in the Metro Manila Area shall apply in the May 11, 1992
elections (Resolution UND. 92-010, prom. March 10, 1992). Petitioner says
that he received copy of Resolution UND. 92-010 on March 13, 1992.
On April 7, 1992, apparently not satisfied with this third Resolution of
COMELEC, petitioner filed the instant petition asserting that under par. (d),
Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166 the elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
and the Sangguniang Bayan, for purposes of the May 11, 1992 regular
elections, shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws. He
would include in this class of sanggunian members to be elected at large
those of the municipality of Paraaque.
Petitioner therefore imputes grave abuse of discretion to COMELEC in
promulgating Resolution No. 2313, Resolution No. 2379 and Resolution
UND. 92-010 which clarifies, contrary to his view, that the district

No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile.

We must therefore, as far as we can, divine its meaning, its significance, its
reason for being. As it has oft been held, the key to open the door to what the
legislature intended which is vaguely expressed in the language of a statute
is its purpose or the reason which induced it to enact the statute. If the
statute needs construction, as it does in the present case, the most dominant
in that process is the purpose of the act. 4 Statutes should be construed in
the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be
suppressed, 5 and they should be given such construction as will advance
the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended. 6 A
construction should be rejected that gives to the language used in a statute a
meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was
enacted, and that tends to defeat the ends which are sought to be attained
by the enactment. 7
The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory
note of Senate Bill No. 1861 which states in part:
This bill proposes to set the national and local elections for
May 11, 1992, and provide for the necessary implementing
details. It also endorses reforms and measures to ensure the

conduct of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible

elections. Specifically, it seeks to: (1) Reduce the number of
positions to be voted for by providing therein that the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan be elected not at large,
but by district . . . .
That respondent COMELEC is cognizant of this legislative intent of R.A.
7166 is reflected in the "WHEREAS" clauses constituting the preamble to
Resolution No. 2379. Thus
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, in order to reduce
the number of candidates to be voted for in the May 11, 1992
synchronized elections recommended, among others, to the
Congress of the Philippines, the districting/apportionment of
sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan seats;
WHEREAS, the Congress of the Philippines passed
Republic Act 7166, and approved by the President of the
Philippines on November 26, 1991, adopting among others,
the recommendation of the Commission on Elections
aforestated;
WHEREAS, pursuant to, and in implementation of Republic
Act 7166, particularly Section 3 thereof, the Commission
promulgated Resolution No. 2313, directing the Provincial
Election Supervisors and Election Registrars concerned to
submit, after consultation, public hearings, and consensustaking with the different sectors in the community, the Project
of District Apportionment of single legislative-district
provinces and municipalities in the Metro Manila area;
WHEREAS, the established criteria/guidelines in the
determination of the district apportionment are as follows: a.
compactness, contiguity and adjacentness of territory; b.
apportionment shall be based on the 1990 census of
population; c. no municipality, in the case of provinces, and
no barangay, in the case of cities and municipalities, shall be
fragmented or apportioned into different districts.

This avowed policy of having sanggunian members elected by district is also

manifest from the four corners of Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166. 8 Thus, a careful
analysis of the provisions of Sec. 3 shows that the purpose of
districting/apportionment of the sanggunian seats is to reduce the number of
positions to be voted for in the May 11, 1992, synchronized elections and
ensure the efficiency of electoral process. Considering that the single-district
provinces and the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area, which are all
single-districts, and under pars. (b) and (c) have already been apportioned
into two (2) districts, they will henceforth be electing the members of their
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Bayan by district in the coming
May 11, 1992, elections, although under par. (d), the single-district cities and
all the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area which are all likewise
single-districts, will have to continue electing at large the members of their
Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan as they have yet to be
apportioned. But beginning the regular elections of 1995, they will all have to
be elected by district. By then, COMELEC would have had enough time to
apportion the single-district cities and the municipalities outside the Metro
Manila Area.
As they now stand in relation to the districting/apportionment of local
government units for purposes of election under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, it is
clear that: (1) for provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts
contemplated in par. (a), they shall continue to be elected by district; (2) for
provinces with single legislative districts, as they have already been
apportioned into two (2) districts each under par. (b), they shall henceforth be
elected likewise by district; (3) for cities with two (2) or more legislative
districts, e.g., the cities of Manila, Cebu and Davao, they shall also continue
to be elected by district under the first part of par. (c); and (4) for the thirteen
(13) municipalities in the Metro Manila Area, which have already been
apportioned into two (2) districts each under the second proviso of par. (c),
they shall likewise be elected by district in the regular elections of May 11,
1992.
Then, that should leave us the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district
cities and the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities outside Metro Manila,
which remain single-districts not having been ordered apportioned under
Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166. They will have to continue to be elected at large in the
May 11, 1992, elections, although starting 1995 they shall all be elected by
district to effect the full implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A. 7166.

That is the true import of par. (d). Consequently, as We view it, where he
stands, petitioner must fall.
WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion, much less grave, on the part
of respondent, and for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.